2024 m. lapkričio 29 d. 13 val. kviečiame į viešą paskaitą „Responsibility practices and the threat of determinism“. Vieša paskaita vyks Filosofijos fakulteto 209 aud.
Paskaitą skaitys Benjamin de Mesel (KU Leuven).
Paskaita vyks anglų kalba be vertimo.
Apie paskaitą:
Is the truth of determinism compatible with the existence of moral responsibility? My aim is to explain how an approach inspired by P.F. Strawson’s paper ‘Freedom and Resentment’ might help to answer that question. Drawing on Strawson, I put forward a new question for the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. The question is: which account of the meaning of responsibility, the compatibilist or incompatibilist one, fits best with a plausible hypothesis about the point of having the concept of responsibility and practices structured by it? I suggest that, according to Strawson, the point of having the concept of responsibility and practices structured by it is that these help us to manifest a basic demand for goodwill or regard. Compatibilist accounts of the meaning of responsibility fit better with this hypothesis about the point of having the concept than incompatibilist ones. I end with a brief overview of possible incompatibilist replies to my argument.