

Viduramžių filosofijos tekstai – šv. Augustinas

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Platoniškosios tradicijos elementai krikščioniškajame mokyme

Confessionum (397-401)

Multa vera Aug. invenit in libris Platoniorum.

9. 13. *Et primo volens ostendere mihi, quam resistas superbis, humilibus autem des gratiam 29 et quanta misericordia tua demonstrata sit hominibus via humilitatis, quod Verbum tuum caro factum est et habitavit inter homines 30, procurasti mihi per quemdam hominem immanissimo typho turgidum quosdam Platoniorum libros ex Graeca lingua in Latinam versos, et ibi legi non quidem his verbis, sed hoc idem omnino multis et multiplicibus suaderi rationibus, quod in principio erat Verbum et Verbum erat apud Deum et Deus erat Verbum: hoc erat in principio apud Deum; omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est, in eo vita est, et vita erat lux hominum; et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt; et quia hominis anima, quamvis testimonium perhibeat de lumine, non est tamen ipsa lumen, sed Verbum, Deus, est lumen verum, quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum; et quia in hoc mundo erat, et mundus per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit. Quia vero in sua propria venit et sui eum non receperunt, quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri credentibus in nomine eius 31, non ibi legi.*

9. 14. *Item legi ibi, quia Verbum, Deus, non ex carne, non ex sanguine non ex voluntate viri neque ex voluntate carnis, sed ex Deo natus est; sed quia Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis 32, non ibi legi. Indagavi quippe in illis litteris varie dictum et multis modis, quod sit Filius in forma Patris non rapinam arbitratus esse aequalis Deo, quia naturaliter id ipsum est, sed quia semetipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens, in similitudine hominum factus et habitu inventus ut homo, humiliavit se factus oboediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis; propter quod Deus eum exaltavit a mortuis et donavit ei nomen, quod est super omne nomen, ut in nomine Iesu omne genuflectatur caelestium, terrestrium et infernorum et omnis lingua confiteatur, quia Dominus Iesus in gloria est Dei Patris 33, non habent illi libri. Quod enim ante omnia tempora et supra omnia tempora incommutabiliter manet unigenitus Filius tuus coaeternus tibi et quia de plenitudine eius 34 accipiunt animae, ut beatae sint, et quia participatione manentis in se 35 sapientiae*

The Confessions

9, 13. You wanted to show me first and foremost how you thwart the proud but give grace to the humble,†37 and with what immense mercy on your part the way of humility was demonstrated to us when your Word was made flesh and dwelt among men and women;†38 and so through a certain man grossly swollen with pride you provided me†39 with some books by the Platonists, translated from the Greek into Latin.†40 In them I read (not that the same words were used, but precisely the same doctrine was taught, buttressed by many and various arguments) that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God; he was God. He was with God in the beginning. Everything was made through him; nothing came to be without him. What was made is alive with his life, and that life was the light of humankind. The Light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has never been able to master it; and that the human soul, even though it bears testimony about the Light, is not itself the Light, but that God, the Word, is the true Light, which illumines every human person who comes into this world; and that he was in this world, a world made by him, but the world did not know him. But that he came to his own home, and his own people did not receive him; but to those who did receive him he gave power to become children of God: to those, that is, who believe in his name†41—none of this did I read there.

14. I also read in them that God, the Word, was born not of blood nor man's desire nor lust of the flesh, but of God;†42 but that the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us,†43 I did not read there. I certainly observed that in these writings it was often stated, in a variety of ways, that the Son, being in the form of God the Father, deemed it no robbery to be equal to God, because he is identical with him in nature. But that he emptied himself and took on the form of a slave, and being made in the likeness of men was found in human form, that he humbled himself and was made obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross, which is why God raised him from the dead, and gave him a name above every other name, so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven, on earth, or in the underworld, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, in the glory of God the Father,†44 of this no mention was made in these books. I did read in them that your only-begotten Son, coeternal with you, abides before all ages and above all ages, and that of his fullness†45 our souls receive, to

renovantur, ut sapientes sint, est ibi; quod autem secundum tempus pro impiis mortuus est 36 et Filio tuo unico non pepercisti, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidisti eum 37, non est ibi. Abscondisti enim haec a sapientibus et revelasti ea parvulis 38, ut venirent ad eum laborantes et onerati et reficeret eos, quoniam mitis est et humilis corde 39, et dirigit mites in iudicio et docet mansuetos vias suas 40 videns humilitatem nostram et laborem nostrum et dimittens omnia peccata nostra 41. Qui autem cothurno tamquam doctrinae sublimioris elati non audiunt dicentem: Discite a me, quoniam mitis sum et humilis corde, et invenietis requiem animabus vestris 42, etsi cognoscunt Deum, non sicut Deum glorificant aut gratias agunt, sed evanescent in cogitationibus suis et obscuratur insipiens cor eorum; dicentes se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt 43.

9. 15. Et ideo legebam ibi etiam immutatam gloriam incorruptionis tuae in idola et varia simulacra, in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium 44, videlicet Aegyptium cibum, quo Esau perdidit primogenita sua 45, quoniam caput quadrupedis pro te honoravit populus primogenitus 46, conversus corde in Aegyptum 47 et curvans imaginem tuam animam suam 48, ante imaginem vituli manducantis faenum 49. Inveni haec ibi et non manducavi. Placuit enim tibi, Domine, auferre opprobrium 50 diminutionis ab Iacob, ut maior serviret minori 51, et vocasti gentes in hereditatem tuam 52. Et ego ad te veneram ex gentibus et intendi in aurum, quod ab Aegypto voluisti ut auferret populus tuus 53, quoniam tuum erat, ubicumque erat. Et dixisti Atheniensibus per Apostolum tuum, quod in te vivimus et movemur et sumus, sicut et quidam secundum eos dixerunt 54, et utique inde erant illi libri. Et non attendi in idola Aegyptiorum, quibus de auro tuo ministrabant, qui transmutaverunt veritatem Dei in mendacium et coluerunt et servierunt creaturae potius quam creatori 55.

become blessed thereby, and that by participation in that Wisdom which abides in itself†46 they are made new in order to become wise;†47 but that at the time of our weakness he died for the wicked,†48 and that you did not spare even your only Son, but delivered him up for us all,†49 these things are not to be found there. For you have hidden these matters from the sagacious and shrewd, and revealed them to little ones,†50 so that those who toil under heavy burdens may come to him and he may give them relief, because he is gentle and humble of heart.†51 He will guide the gentle aright and teach the unassuming his ways,†52 for he sees our lowly estate and our labor, and forgives all our sins.†53 As for those who are raised on the stilts of their loftier doctrine, too high to hear him calling, Learn of me, for I am gentle and humble of heart, and you shall find rest for your souls,†54 even if they know God, they do not honor him as God or give him thanks; their thinking has been frittered away into futility and their foolish hearts are benighted, for in claiming to be wise they have become stupid.†55

15. In consequence what I also read there was the story of their exchanging your glorious, imperishable nature for idols and a variety of man-made things, for the effigy of a perishable human or of birds or animals or crawling creatures;†56 these are the food of the Egyptians, for the sake of which Esau bartered away his dignity as the first-born,†57 just as your first-born people turned back to Egypt in their hearts,†58 worshiping a beast's head instead of you,†59 and abasing their souls, made in your image, before the image of a calf munching hay.†60 These things I found there, but I did not eat that food; for it was pleasing in your sight, Lord, to take away from Jacob the shame of his subordination and cause the elder to serve the younger,†61 so you called the Gentiles into your inheritance. And I had come to you from the Gentiles. I set my heart upon the gold which at your bidding your people had brought out of Egypt, because wherever it was, it belonged to you.†62 So you told the Athenians through your apostle that in you we live and move and have our being, and that indeed some of their own authorities had said this,†63 and unquestionably those books I read came from there.†64 I disregarded the idols of the Egyptians, to which they paid homage with gold that belonged to you, for they perverted the truth of God into a lie, worshiping a creature and serving it rather than the creator.†65

De Civitate Dei contra Paganos (413-427)

Cum platonice conferenda Christi religio.

VIII.1. Nunc intentiore nobis opus est animo multo quam erat in superiorum solutione quaestionum et

The City of God

VIII.1 I must now turn to a matter which calls for much deeper thought than was needed to resolve the issues raised

explicatione librorum. De theologia quippe, quam naturalem vocant, non cum quibuslibet hominibus (non enim fabulosa est vel civilis, hoc est vel theatrica vel urbana; quarum altera iactitat deorum crimina, altera indicat deorum desideria criminiosiora ac per hoc malignorum potius daemonum quam deorum), sed cum philosophis est habenda collatio; quorum ipsum nomen si latine interpretemur, amorem sapientiae profitetur. Porro si sapientia Deus est, per quem facta sunt omnia, sicut divina auctoritas veritasque monstravit, verus philosophus est amator Dei. Sed quia res ipsa, cuius hoc nomen est, non est in omnibus, qui hoc nomine gloriantur (neque enim continuo verae sapientiae sunt amatores, quicumque appellantur philosophi): profecto ex omnibus, quorum sententias litteris nosse potuimus, eligendi sunt cum quibus non indigne quaestio ista tractetur. Neque enim hoc opere omnes omnium philosophorum vanas opiniones refutare suscepi, sed eas tantum, quae ad theologian pertinent, quo verbo Graeco significari intellegimus de divinitate rationem sive sermonem; nec eas omnium, sed eorum tantum, qui cum et esse divinitatem et humana curare consentiant, non tamen sufficere unius incommutabilis Dei cultum ad vitam adipiscendam etiam post mortem beatam, sed multos ab illo sane uno conditos atque institutos ob eam causam colendos putant. Hi iam etiam Varronis opinionem veritatis propinquitate transcendunt; si quidem ille totam theologian naturalem usque ad mundum istum vel animam eius extendere potuit, isti vero supra omnem animae naturam confitentur Deum, qui non solum mundum istum visibilem, qui saepe caeli et terrae nomine nuncupatur, sed etiam omnem omnino animam fecerit, et qui rationalem et intellectualem, cuius generis anima humana est, participatione sui luminis incommutabilis et incorporei beatam facit. Hos philosophos Platonicos appellatos a Platone doctore vocabulo derivato nullus, qui haec vel tenuiter audivit, ignorat. De hoc igitur Platone, quae necessaria praesenti quaestioni existimo, breviter attingam, prius illis commemorans, qui eum in eodem genere litterarum tempore praecesserunt.

Duplex philosophorum genus fuit: italicum et ionicum.

2. Quantum enim attinet ad litteras Graecas, quae lingua inter ceteras gentium clarior habetur, duo philosophorum genera traduntur: unum Italicum ex ea parte Italiae, quae quondam magna Graecia nuncupata est; alterum Ionicum in eis terris, ubi et nunc Graecia nominatur. Italicum genus auctorem habuit Pythagoram Samium, a quo etiam ferunt ipsum philosophiae nomen exortum. Nam cum antea Sapientes appellarentur, qui modo quodam laudabilis vitae alii

in the previous Books. I mean natural theology. Unlike the poetical theology of the stage which flaunts the crimes of the gods and the political theology of the city which publicizes their evil desires, and both of which reveal them as dangerous demons rather than deities, natural theology cannot be discussed with men in the street but only with philosophers, that is, as the name implies, with lovers of wisdom. I may add that, since divine truth and scripture dearly teach us that God, the Creator of all things, is Wisdom, a true philosopher will be a lover of God. That does not mean that all who answer to the name are really in love with genuine wisdom, for it is one thing to be and another to be called a philosopher. And, therefore, from all the philosophers whose teachings I have learned from books I shall select only those with whom it would not be improper to discuss this subject. I shall not bother in this work to refute all the errors of all the philosophers, but only such as pertain to theology-which term from its Greek derivation I take to mean a study of the divine nature. My only purpose is to challenge the opinions of those philosophers who, while admitting that there is a God who concerns himself with human affairs, claim that, since the worship of this one unchangeable God is not sufficient to attain happiness even after death, lesser gods, admittedly created and directed by this supreme God, should also be revered. I must say that such philosophers were nearer to the truth than Varro was. His idea of natural theology embraced at most the universe and the world-soul. They, on the contrary, acknowledged a God who transcends the nature of every kind of soul, a God who created the visible cosmos of heaven and earth, and the spirit of every living creature, and who, by the communication of His own immutable and immaterial light, makes blessed the kind of rational and intellectual soul which man possesses. Even the most superficial student will recognize in these men the Platonic philosophers, so named after their master, Plato. I shall speak briefly about Plato's ideas, in so far as they are relevant to the matter in hand, but first I must review the opinions of his predecessors in the field of philosophy.

2. The legacy of literature written in the universally admired Greek language records two schools of philosophy. They are, first, the Italian, established in that part of Italy formerly known as Magna Graecia; and second, the Ionian, in that country which is now called Greece. Pythagoras of Samos is said to be the founder of the Italian school and also the originator of the word philosophy. Before his time, any person of outstanding achievement was called a sage. But when Pythagoras, who considered it arrogance to call one's

praestare videbantur, iste interrogatus, quid profiteretur, philosophum se esse respondit, id est studiosum vel amatorem sapientiae; quoniam sapientem profiteri arrogantissimum videbatur. Ionici vero generis princeps fuit Thales, Milesius, unus illorum septem, qui sunt appellati Sapientes. Sed illi sex vitae genere distinguebantur et quibusdam praeceptis ad bene vivendum accommodatis; iste autem Thales, ut successores etiam propagaret, rerum naturam scrutatus suasque disputationes litteris mandans eminuit maximeque admirabilis existit, quod astrologiae numeris comprehensis defectus solis et lunae etiam praedicere potuit. Aquam tamen putavit rerum esse principium et hinc omnia elementa mundi ipsumque mundum et quae in eo gignuntur existere. Nihil autem huic operi, quod mundo considerato tam mirabile aspicimus, ex divina mente praecepit. Huic successit Anaximander, eius auditor, mutavitque de rerum natura opinionem. Non enim ex una re, sicut Thales ex umore, sed ex suis propriis principiis quasque res nasci putavit. Quae rerum principia singularum esse credidit infinita, et innumerabiles mundos gignere et quaecumque in eis oriuntur; eosque mundos modo dissolvi, modo iterum gigni existimavit, quanta quisque aetate sua manere potuerit; nec ipse aliquid divinae menti in his rerum operibus tribuens. Iste Anaximenes discipulum et successorem reliquit, qui omnes rerum causas aeri infinito dedit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit; non tamen ab ipsis aerem factum, sed ipsos ex aere ortos credidit. Anaxagoras vero eius auditor harum rerum omnium, quas videmus, effectorem divinum animum sensit et dixit ex infinita materia, quae constaret similibus inter se particulis rerum omnium; quibus suis et propriis singula fieri, sed animo faciente divino. Diogenes quoque Anaximenes alter auditor, aerem quidem dixit rerum esse materiam, de qua omnia fierent; sed eum esse compotem divinae rationis, sine qua nihil ex eo fieri posset. Anaxagorae successit auditor eius Archelaus. Etiam ipse de particulis inter se similibus, quibus singula quaeque fierent, ita putavit constare omnia, ut inesse etiam mentem diceret, quae corpora aeterna, id est illas particulas, coniungendo et dissipando ageret omnia. Socrates huius discipulus fuisse perhibetur, magister Platonis, propter quem breviter cuncta ista recolui.

Socrates de bonis moribus disseruit.

3. Socrates ergo, primus universam philosophiam ad corrigendos componendosque mores flexisse memoratur, cum ante illum omnes magis physicis, id est naturalibus, rebus perscrutandis operam maximam impenderent. Non mihi autem videtur posse ad liquidum

self wise, was asked his profession, he replied that he was a philosopher, that is to say, a man in pursuit of, or in love with, wisdom. Thales of Miletus, who initiated the Ionian School, was one of the celebrated Seven Wise Men. While the remaining six were distinguished by balanced lives and moral teachings, Thales took up the study of nature and committed the results of his researches to writing. He won particular applause by his mastery of astronomical calculations and by his predictions of solar and lunar eclipses. His deliberate purpose in this was to found a school that would survive him. His main theory was that the primary stuff of all things is water, and that from this principle originated the elements, the cosmos and everything which the world produced. As far as he was concerned, nothing of all this universe, so marvelous to gaze upon, was directed by divine intelligence. His disciple and successor, Anaximander, proposed a new cosmological theory. For him, there could be no one ultimate element of all things such as water; rather, each thing is derived from principles of its own. Hence, he held, the number of principles is infinite, and from these arise uncounted worlds and all that they produce. And, in an endless succession of dissolution and becoming, no one world endures longer than its period permits. Like Thales, he found no place for any divine direction in the processes of nature. Anaximander's disciple, Anaximenes, believed that all cosmic 'energy is derived from air, which he considered infinite. He neither denied nor ignored the gods; nevertheless, he taught that they were creatures of the air and not its creators. His pupil, Anaxagoras,⁶ realizing that divine spirit was the cause of all visible things, held that the divine mind, using infinite matter, consisting of unlike particles, made each particular thing out of its own kind of like particles. Diogenes, another follower of Anaximenes, held that air was the ultimate element of all things, but that nothing could be produced from it without the agency of the divine reason, which permeated it. Anaxagoras was followed by his pupil Archelaus. He, too, asserted that everything in the universe was composed of like particles, which, however, were informed by intelligence. This mind, by causing the conjunction and dissolution of the eternal bodies or particles, was the source of all movements. Archelaus is said to have taught Socrates, the master of Plato. This brief review has been but a preparation for the discussion of Plato's philosophy.

3. To Socrates goes the credit of being the first one to channel the whole of philosophy into an ethical system for the reformation and regulation of morals. His predecessors without exception had applied themselves particularly to physics or natural science. I do not think that it can be definitely decided just why Socrates chose to follow this course. It has been suggested that he did so because he had

colligi, utrum Socrates, ut hoc faceret, taedio rerum obscurarum et incertarum ad aliquid apertum et certum reperiendum animum intenderit, quod esset beatae vitae necessarium, propter quam unam omnium philosophorum invigilasse ac laborasse videtur industria; an vero, sicut de illo quidam benevolentius suspicantur, nolebat immundos terrenis cupiditatibus animos se extendere in divina conari. Quando quidem ab eis causas rerum videbat inquiri, quas primas atque summas non nisi in unius ac summi Dei voluntate esse credebat; unde non eas putabat nisi mundata mente posse comprehendere; et ideo purgandae bonis moribus vitae censebat instandum, ut deprimentibus libidinibus exoneratus animus naturali vigore in aeterna se attolleret naturamque incorporei et incommutabilis luminis, ubi causae omnium factarum naturarum stabiliter vivunt, intellegentiae puritate conspiceret. Constat eum tamen imperitorum stultitiam scire se aliquid opinantium etiam in ipsis moralibus quaestionibus, quo totum animum intendisse videbatur, vel confessa ignorantia sua vel dissimulata scientia lepore mirabili disserendi et acutissima urbanitate agitare atque versasse. Unde et concitatis inimicitiis calumniosa criminatione damnatus morte multatus est. Sed eum postea illa ipsa, quae publice damnaverat, Atheniensium civitas publice luxit, in duos accusatores eius usque adeo populi indignatione conversa, ut unus eorum oppressus vi multitudinis interiret, exilio autem voluntario atque perpetuo poenam similem alter evaderet. Tam praeclara igitur vitae mortisque fama Socrates reliquit plurimos suae philosophiae sectatores, quorum certatim studium fuit in quaestionum moralium disceptatione versari, ubi agitur de summo bono, quo fieri homo beatus potest. Quod in Socratis disputationibus, dum omnia, movet asserit, destruit, quoniam non evidentem apparuit: quod cuique placuit inde sumpserunt et ubi cuique visum est constituerunt finem boni. Finis autem boni appellatur, quo quisque cum pervenerit beatus est. Sic autem diversas inter se Socratici de isto fine sententias habuerunt, ut (quod vix credibile est unius magistri potuisse facere sectatores) quidam summum bonum esse dicerent voluptatem, sicut Aristippus; quidam virtutem, sicut Antisthenes. Sic alii atque alii aliud atque aliud opinati sunt, quos commemorare longum est.

Quae Plato intellexerit et praeceperit.

4. Sed inter discipulos Socratis, non quidem immerito, excellentissima gloria claruit, qua omnino ceteros obscuraret, Plato. Qui cum esset Atheniensis honesto apud suos loco natus et ingenio mirabili longe suos condiscipulos anteiret, parum tamen putans

become wearied of obscure and uncertain investigations, and preferred to turn his mind to a clean-cut objective, to that secret of human happiness which seems to have been the sole purpose of all philosophical research. Others have claimed, more kindly, that he did not think it right for minds darkened with earthly desires to reach out beyond their limits to the realm of the divine. Socrates realized that his predecessors had been seeking the origin of all things, but he believed that these first and highest causes could be found only in the will of the single and supreme Divinity and, therefore, could be comprehended only by a mind purified from passion. Hence his conclusion, that he must apply himself to the acquisition of virtue, so that his mind, freed from the weight of earthly desires, might, by its own natural vigor, lift itself up to eternal realities and, with purified intelligence, contemplate the very nature of that immaterial and immutable light in which the causes of all created natures abidingly dwell. Nevertheless, with his marvelous combination of wit and words, pungency and politeness, and with his trick of confessing ignorance and concealing knowledge he used to tease and poke fun at the folly of ignoramuses who talked as though they knew the answers to those moral problems in which he seemed wholly absorbed. The result was that he incurred their enmity. He was falsely accused and condemned to death. However, the very city of Athens that had publicly condemned him began publicly to mourn his loss, and the wrath of the people was so turned against his two accusers that one of them was killed by an angry mob and the other escaped a similar death only by voluntary and perpetual exile. Socrates was thus so highly distinguished both in life and in death that he left behind him numerous disciples. They rivaled one another in zealous discussions of those ethical problems where there is question of the supreme good and, hence, of human happiness. In his discussions, Socrates had a way of proposing and defending his theories and then demolishing them. No one could make out exactly what he believed. Consequently, each of his followers picked what he preferred and sought the supreme good in his heart's desire. Now the truth is that the supreme good is that which, when attained, makes all men happy. Yet, so varied in regard to this good were the views of the Socratic that it seems hardly credible that all of them were followers of one and the same master. Some, like Aristippus, claimed that pleasure was the highest good; others, like Antisthenes, virtue. The men and their views are so numerous and varied that it would be irksome to mention them all.

4. Of the pupils of Socrates, Plato was so remarkable for his brilliance that he has deservedly outshone all the rest. He was born in Athens of a good family and by his marvelous ability easily surpassed all his fellow disciples. Realizing, however, that neither his own genius nor Socratic training

perficiendae philosophiae sufficere se ipsum ac Socraticam disciplinam, quam longe ac late potuit peregrinatus est, quaquaversum eum alicuius nobilitatae scientiae percipiendae fama rapiebat. Itaque et in Aegypto didicit quaecumque magna illic habebantur atque docebantur, et inde in eas Italiae partes veniens, ubi Pythagoreorum fama celebrabatur, quidquid Italicae philosophiae tunc florebat, auditis eminentioribus in ea doctoribus facillime comprehendit. Et quia magistrum Socratem singulariter diligebat, eum loquentem faciens fere in omnibus sermonibus suis etiam illa, quae vel ab aliis didicerat, vel ipse quanta potuerat intellegentia viderat, cum illius lepore et moralibus disputationibus temperavit. Itaque cum studium sapientiae in actione et contemplatione versetur, unde una pars eius activa, altera contemplativa dici potest (quarum activa ad agendam vitam, id est ad mores instituendos pertinet, contemplativa autem ad conspiciendas naturae causas et sincerissimam veritatem): Socrates in activa excelluisse memoratur; Pythagoras vero magis contemplativae, quibus potuit intellegentiae viribus, instituisse. Proinde Plato utrumque iungendo philosophiam perfecisse laudatur, quam in tres partes distribuit: unam moralem, quae maxime in actione versatur; alteram naturalem, quae contemplationi deputata est; tertiam rationalem, qua verum disternitur a falso. Quae licet utrique, id est actioni et contemplationi, sit necessaria, maxime tamen contemplatio perspectionem sibi vindicat veritatis. Ideo haec tripartitio non est contraria illi distinctioni, qua intellegitur omne studium sapientiae in actione et contemplatione consistere. Quid autem in his vel de his singulis partibus Plato senserit, id est, ubi finem omnium actionum, ubi causam omnium naturarum, ubi lumen omnium rationum esse cognoverit vel crediderit, disserendo explicare et longum esse arbitror et temere affirmandum esse non arbitror. Cum enim magistri sui Socratis, quem facit in suis voluminibus disputantem, notissimum morem dissimulandae scientiae vel opinionis suae servare affectat, quia et illi ipse mos placuit, factum est ut etiam ipsius Platonis de rebus magnis sententiae non facile perspici possint. Ex his tamen, quae apud eum leguntur, sive quae dixit, sive quae ab aliis dicta esse narravit atque conscripsit, quae sibi placita viderentur, quaedam commemorari et operi huic inseri oportet a nobis, vel ubi suffragatur religioni verae, quam fides nostra suscepit ac defendit, vel ubi ei videtur esse contrarius, quantum ad istam de uno Deo et pluribus pertinet quaestionem, propter vitam, quae post mortem futura est, veraciter beatam. Fortassis enim qui Platonem ceteris philosophis gentium longe recteque praelatum acutius atque veracius intellexisse

was adequate to evolve a perfect system of philosophy, he traveled far and wide to wherever there was any hope of gaining some valuable addition to knowledge. Thus, in Egypt he mastered the lore which was there esteemed. From there he went to lower Italy, famous for the Pythagorean School, and there successfully imbibed from eminent teachers all that was then in vogue in Italian philosophy. However, Plato's special affection was for his old masters so much so that in practically all the Dialogues he makes Socrates, with all his charm, the mouthpiece not only of his own moral arguments but of all that Plato learned from others or managed to discover himself. Now, the pursuit of wisdom follows two avenues-action and contemplation. Thus, one division of philosophy may be called active; the other part, contemplative. The former deals with the conduct of life; that is to say, with the cultivation of morals. Contemplative philosophy considers natural causality and truth as such. Socrates excelled in practical wisdom; Pythagoras favored contemplation, and to this he applied his whole intelligence. It is to Plato's praise that he combined both in a more perfect philosophy, and then divided the whole into three parts: first, moral philosophy which pertains to action; second, natural philosophy whose purpose is contemplation; third, rational philosophy which discriminates between truth and error. Although this last is necessary for both action and contemplation, it is contemplation especially which claims to reach a vision of the truth. Hence, this threefold division in no way invalidates the distinction whereby action and contemplation are considered the constituent elements of the whole of philosophy. Just what Plato's position was in each of these three divisions-that is to say, just what he knew or believed to be the end of all action, the cause of all nature, the light of all reason-I think it would be rash to affirm and would take too long to discuss at length. Plato was so fond of following the well-known habit of his master of dissimulating his knowledge or opinions that in Plato's own works (where Socrates appears as a speaker) it is difficult to determine just what views he held even on important questions. However, of the views which are set forth in his writings, whether his own or those of others which seemed to have pleased him, a few must be recalled and included here. In some places, Plato is on the side of the true religion which our faith accepts and defends. At other times he seems opposed; for example, on the respective merits of monotheism and polytheism in relation to genuine beatitude after death. Perhaps this may be said of the best disciples of Plato-of those who followed most closely and understood most clearly the teachings of a master rightly esteemed above all other pagan philosophers-that they have perceived, at least, these truths about God: that in Him is to be found the cause of all being, the reason of all thinking, the rule of all living. The first of these truths belongs to

ac secuti esse fama celebriore laudantur, aliquid tale de Deo sentiunt, ut in illo inveniatur et causa subsistendi et ratio intellegendi et ordo vivendi; quorum trium unum ad naturalem, alterum ad rationalem, tertium ad moralem partem intellegitur pertinere. Si enim homo ita creatus est, ut per id, quod in eo praecellit, attingat illud, quod cuncta praecellit, id est unum verum optimum Deum, sine quo nulla natura subsistit, nulla doctrina instruit, nullus usus expedit: ipse quaeratur, ubi nobis sarta sunt omnia; ipse cernatur, ubi nobis certa sunt omnia; ipse diligatur, ubi nobis recta sunt omnia.

Convenienter Christi religio cum platonis confertur.

5. Si ergo Plato Dei huius imitorem cognitorem amatorem dixit esse sapientem, cuius participatione sit beatus, quid opus est excutere ceteros? Nulli nobis quam isti propius accesserunt. Cedat eis igitur non solum theologia illa fabulosa deorum criminibus oblectans animos impiorum, nec solum etiam illa civilis, ubi impuri daemones terrestribus gaudiis deditos populos deorum nomine seducentes humanos errores tamquam suos divinos honores habere voluerunt, ad spectandos suorum criminum ludos cultores suos tamquam ad suum cultum studiis immundissimis excitantes et sibi delectabiliores ludos de ipsis spectatoribus exhibentes (ubi si qua velut honesta geruntur in templis, coniuncta sibi theatrorum obscenitate turpantur, et quaecumque turpia geruntur in theatris, comparata sibi templorum foeditate laudantur), et ea, quae Varro ex his sacris quasi ad caelum et terram rerumque mortalium semina et actus interpretatus est (quia nec ipsa illis ritibus significantur, quae ipse insinuare conatur, et ideo veritas conantem non sequitur; et si ipsa essent, tamen animae rationali ea, quae infra illam naturae ordine constituta sunt, pro Deo suo colenda non essent, nec sibi debuit praeferre tamquam deos eas res, quibus ipsam praetulit verus Deus), et ea, quae Numa Pompilius vera ad sacra eius modi pertinentia se cum sepeliendo curavit abscondi et aratro eruta senatus iussit incendi. (In eo genere sunt etiam illa, ut aliquid de Numa mitius suspicemur, quae Alexander Macedo scribit ad matrem sibi a magno antistite sacrorum Aegyptiorum quodam Leone patefacta, ubi non Picus et Faunus et Aeneas et Romulus vel etiam Hercules et Aesculapius et Liber Semela natus et Tyndaridae fratres et si quos alios ex mortalibus pro diis habent, sed ipsi etiam maiorum gentium dii, quos Cicero in Tusculanis tacitis nominibus videtur attingere, Iuppiter, Iuno, Saturnus, Vulcanus, Vesta et alii plurimi, quos Varro conatur ad mundi partes sive elementa transferre, homines fuisse

natural, the second to rational, the third to moral philosophy. Now, if man was created so that by his highest faculty he might attain to the highest of all realities, that is, to the one, true and supreme God, apart from whom no nature exists, no teaching is true, no conduct is good, then let us seek Him in whom all we find is real, know Him in whom all we contemplate is true, love Him in whom all things for us are good.

5. If, then, Plato defined a philosopher as one who knows, loves and imitates the God in whom he finds his happiness, there is little need to examine further. For, none of the other philosophers has come so close to us as the Platonists have, and, therefore, we may neglect the others. Take for example, the theology of the stage. It beguiles the minds of the pagans with the crimes of the gods. Or, take political theology, according to which impure demons under the name of gods seduce the populace who are slaves of earthly pleasures, and demand human errors as divine honors for themselves. They excite in their worshipers an impure passion to watch the demons sinning on the stage as though this were an act of worship, and they are even more satisfied than the spectators with the plays that exhibit their human passions. Proper as such rites may seem in places of worship, they are debased by connection with the obscenity of the theatres; while the filth of the stage loses its foulness by comparison with the rites that take place in the temples. Nor is the theology of Varro any better in its interpretation of these rites as symbolic of heaven and earth and the origins and movements of mortal affairs. The fact is, they do not denote what he tries to insinuate. His fancy gets the better of the truth. And, even were he right, it would still be wrong for a rational soul to worship as a god something which, in the order of nature, is in a lower category or to submit as to gods to those very things over which the true God has put men in charge. Finally, the Platonic theology is superior to those revealing writings about the sacred rites which Numa Pompilius had buried with himself in order to hide them and which, when turned up by a plough, the Senate ordered to be burned. And to do justice to Numa, we should include in this class the letter that Alexander of Macedon³ wrote to his mother, telling her what had been revealed to him by Leo, an Egyptian high priest, to the effect that all the gods, major as well as minor, were nothing more than mortal men—not only Picus and Faunus, Aeneas, and Romulus, Hercules and Aesculapius, Bacchus, son of Semele, the twin sons of Tyndareus, and such like mortals who are reckoned as gods, but even the greater gods whom Cicero in his Tusculan Disputations' alludes to without mentioning their names; that is, Jupiter, Juno, Saturn, Vulcan, Vesta, and many others whom Varro attempts to identify with the parts or elements of the world. Fearful that he had revealed a great mystery, Leo begged Alexander to

produntur. Timens enim et ille quasi revelata mysteria petens admonet Alexandrum, ut, cum ea matri conscripta insinuaverit, flammis iubeat concremari. Non solum ergo ista, quae duae theologiae, fabulosa continet et civilis, Platonicis philosophis cedant, qui verum Deum et rerum auctorem et veritatis illustratorem et beatitudinis largitorem esse dixerunt; sed alii quoque philosophi, qui corporalia naturae principia corpori deditis mentibus opinati sunt, cedant his tantis et tanti Dei cognitoribus viris, ut Thales in umore, Anaximenes in aere, Stoici in igne, Epicurus in atomis, hoc est minutissimis corpusculis, quae nec dividi nec sentiri queunt, et quicumque alii, quorum enumeratione immorari non est necesse, sive simplicia sive coniuncta corpora, sive vita carentia sive viventia, sed tamen corpora, causam principiumque rerum esse dixerunt. Nam quidam eorum a rebus non vivis res vivas fieri posse crediderunt, sicut Epicurei; quidam vero a vivente quidem et viventia et non viventia, sed tamen a corpore corpora. Nam Stoici ignem, id est corpus unum ex his quattuor elementis, quibus visibilis mundus hic constat, et viventem et sapientem et ipsius mundi fabricatorem atque omnium, quae in eo sunt, eumque omnino ignem deum esse putaverunt. Hi et ceteri similes eorum id solum cogitare potuerunt, quod cum eis corda eorum obstricta carnis sensibus fabulata sunt. In se quippe habebant quod non videbant, et apud se imaginabantur quod foris viderant, etiam quando non videbant, sed tantummodo cogitabant. Hoc autem in conspectu talis cogitationis iam non est corpus, sed similitudo corporis; illud autem, unde videtur in animo haec similitudo corporis, nec corpus est nec similitudo corporis; et unde videtur atque utrum pulchra an deformis sit iudicatur, profecto est melius quam ipsa quae iudicatur. Haec mens hominis et rationalis animae natura est, quae utique corpus non est, si iam illa corporis similitudo, cum in animo cogitantis aspicitur atque iudicatur, nec ipsa corpus est. Non est ergo nec terra nec aqua, nec aer nec ignis, quibus quattuor corporibus, quae dicuntur quattuor elementa, mundum corporeum videmus esse compactum. Porro si noster animus corpus non est, quo modo Deus creator animi corpus est? Cedant ergo et isti, ut dictum est, Platonicis; cedant et illi, quos quidem puduit dicere Deum corpus esse, verum tamen eiusdem naturae, cuius ille est, animos nostros esse putaverunt; ita non eos movit tanta mutabilitas animae, quam Dei naturae tribuere nefas est. Sed dicunt: corpore mutatur animae natura, nam per se ipsa incommutabilis est. Poterant isti dicere: corpore aliquo vulneratur caro, nam per se ipsa invulnerabilis est. Prorsus quod mutari non potest, nulla re potest, ac per hoc quod corpore mutari potest,

have his mother bum the message conveyed to her. Certainly, all such fancies of both the mythical and civil theologies should yield to the Platonists who acknowledged the true God as the author of being, the light of truth and the giver of blessedness. So, too, those philosophers, the materialists who believe that the ultimate principles of nature are corporeal, should yield to those great men who had knowledge of so great a God. Such were Thales, who found the cause and principle of things in water, Anaximenes in air, the Stoics in fire, Epicurus in atoms, that is, minute indivisible and imperceptible corpuscles. And so of the rest, whose names it is needless to mention, who maintained that bodies, simple or compound, animate or inanimate, but nevertheless material, were the root of all reality. The Epicureans, for example, believed that life could be produced from lifeless matter. Others taught that both animate and inanimate things derive from a living principle but that this principle must be as material as the things themselves. The Stoics claimed that fire, one of the four material elements of this visible world, had life and intelligence, that it was the creator of the universe and all within it; in fact, that it was God. Now, philosophers of this type could think only about such matters as their sense-bound minds suggested to them. Yet they have within themselves something they have never seen and they can see in their imagination, without looking at it, an external object which they have previously seen. Now, whatever can be so imagined in the mind's eye is certainly not a body but only the likeness of a body, and that power of the mind which can perceive this likeness is itself neither a body nor an image of a body. Moreover, that faculty which perceives and judges whether this likeness is beautiful or ugly is certainly superior to the object judged. Now, this faculty is a man's reason, the essence of his rational soul, which is certainly not material, since the likeness of a body which is seen and judged in the mind of a thinking person is not material. The soul, then, cannot be one of the four elements out of which the visible, material cosmos is composed--earth, water, air, and fire. And if our mind is not material, how can God the Creator of the soul be material? As I said before, let all such philosophers give place to the Platonists. That goes for those, too, who were ashamed to acknowledge a material god, yet thought that men's souls were of the same nature as His--so little were they moved by the fact of a mutability in the soul that it would be unthinkable to attribute to the nature of God. Their answer to this difficulty was that the soul is unalterable in itself but is affected by the body. They might as well have said that the flesh is wounded because of the body, but in itself is invulnerable. The fact is that what is immutable can be changed by nothing. But, if a thing can be changed by a body, it can be changed by something and, therefore, cannot rightly be called immutable.

aliqua re potest et ideo incommutabile recte dici non potest.

Philosophia naturali platonici Deum quaerunt...

6. *Viderunt ergo isti philosophi, quos ceteris non immerito fama atque gloria praelatos videmus, nullum corpus esse Deum, et ideo cuncta corpora transcenderunt quaerentes Deum. Viderunt, quidquid mutabile est, non esse summum Deum, et ideo animam omnem mutabilesque omnes spiritus transcenderunt quaerentes summum Deum. Deinde viderunt omnem speciem in re quacumque mutabili, qua est, quidquid illud est, quoquo modo et qualiscumque natura est, non esse posse nisi ab illo, qui vere est, quia incommutabiliter est. Ac per hoc sive universi mundi corpus figuras, qualitates ordinatumque motum et elementa disposita a caelo usque ad terram et quaecumque corpora in eis sunt, sive omnem vitam, vel quae nutrit et continet, qualis est in arboribus, vel quae et hoc habet et sentit, qualis est in pecoribus, vel quae et haec habet et intellegit, qualis est in hominibus, vel quae nutritorio subsidio non indiget, sed tantum continet sentit intellegit, qualis est in angelis, nisi ab illo esse non posse, qui simpliciter est; quia non aliud illi est esse, aliud vivere, quasi possit esse non vivens; nec aliud illi est vivere, aliud intellegere, quasi possit vivere non intellegens; nec aliud illi est intellegere, aliud beatum esse, quasi possit intellegere non beatum; sed quod est illi vivere, intellegere, beatum esse, hoc est illi esse. Propter hanc incommutabilitatem et simplicitatem intellexerunt eum et omnia ista fecisse, et ipsum a nullo fieri potuisse. Consideraverunt enim, quidquid est, vel corpus esse vel vitam, meliusque aliquid vitam esse quam corpus, speciemque corporis esse sensibilem, intellegibilem vitae. Proinde intellegibilem speciem sensibili praetulerunt. Sensibilia dicimus, quae visu tactuque corporis sentiri queunt; intellegibilia, quae conspectu mentis intellegi. Nulla est enim pulchritudo corporalis sive in statu corporis, sicut est figura, sive in motu, sicut est cantilena, de qua non animus iudicet. Quod profecto non posset, nisi melior in illo esset haec species, sine tumore molis, sine strepitu vocis, sine spatio vel loci vel temporis. Sed ibi quoque nisi mutabilis esset, non alius alio melius de specie sensibili iudicaret; melius ingeniosior quam tardior, melius peritior quam imperitior, melius exercitator quam minus exercitatus, et idem ipse unus, cum proficit, melius utique postea quam prius. Quod autem recipit magis et minus, sine dubitatione mutabile est. Unde ingeniosi et docti et in his exercitati homines facile collegerunt non esse in eis rebus primam speciem, ubi mutabilis esse convincitur. Cum igitur in eorum*

6. The Platonic philosophers, then, so deservedly considered superior to all the others in reputation and achievement, well understood that no body could be God and, therefore, in order to find Him, they rose beyond all material things. Convinced that no mutable reality could be the Most High, they transcended every soul and spirit subject to change in their search for God. They perceived that no determining form by which any mutable being is what it is--whatever be the reality, mode or nature of that form--could have any existence apart from Him who truly exists because His existence is immutable. From this it follows that neither the whole universe, with its frame, figures, qualities and ordered movement, all the elements and bodies arranged in the heavens and on earth, nor any life--whether merely nourishing and preserving as in trees, or both vegetative and sensitive as in animals, or which is also intellectual as in man, or which needs no nourishment but merely preserves, feels and knows as in angels--can have existence apart from Him whose existence is simple and indivisible. For, in God, being is not one thing and living another though He could be and not be living. Nor in God is it one thing to live and another to understand--as though He could live without understanding. Nor in Him is it one thing to know and another to be blessed--as though He could know and not be blessed. For, in God, to live, to know, to be blessed is one and the same as to be. The Platonists have understood that God, by reason of His immutability and simplicity, could not have been produced from any existing thing, but that He Himself made all those things that are. They argued that whatever exists is either matter or life; that life is superior to matter; that the appearance of a body is sensible, whereas the form of life is intelligible. Hence, they preferred intelligible form to sensible appearance. We call things sensible which can be perceived by sight and bodily touch. If there is any loveliness discerned in the lineaments of the body, or beauty in the movement of music and song, it is the mind that makes this judgment. This means that there must be within the mind a superior form, one that is immaterial and independent of sound and space and time. However, the mind itself is not immutable, for, if it were, all minds would judge alike concerning sensible forms. Actually, a clever mind judges more aptly than the stupid one; a skilled one better than one unskilled; an experienced one better than one inexperienced. Even the same mind, once it improves, judges better than it did before. Undoubtedly, anything susceptible of degrees is mutable, and for this reason, the most able, learned and experienced philosophers readily concluded that the first form of all could not be in any of these things in which the form was clearly mutable. Once they perceived various degrees of beauty in both body and mind, they realized that, if all form were lacking, their very

conspectu et corpus et animus magis minusque speciosa essent, si autem omni specie carere possent, omnino nulla essent: viderunt esse aliquid ubi prima esset incommutabilis et ideo nec comparabilis; atque ibi esse rerum principium rectissime crediderunt, quod factum non esset et ex quo facta cuncta essent. Ita quod notum est Dei, manifestavit eis ipse, cum ab eis invisibilia eius per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspecta sunt; sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas; a quo etiam visibilia et temporalia cuncta creata sunt. Haec de illa parte, quam physicam, id est naturalem, nuncupant, dicta sint.

...rationali conspiciunt lumen veritatis...

7. *Quod autem attinet ad doctrinam, ubi versatur pars altera, quae ab eis logica, id est rationalis, vocatur: absit ut his comparandi videantur, qui posuerunt iudicium veritatis in sensibus corporis eorumque infidis et fallacibus regulis omnia, quae discutuntur, metienda esse censuerunt, ut Epicurei et quicumque alii tales, ut etiam ipsi Stoici, qui cum vehementer amaverint sollertiam disputandi, quam dialecticam nominant, a corporis sensibus eam ducendam putarunt, hinc asseverantes animum concipere notiones, quas appellant ἔννοιαι, earum rerum scilicet quas definiendo explicant; hinc propagari atque coneciti totam discendi docendique rationem. Ubi ego multum mirari soleo, cum pulchros dicant non esse nisi sapientes, quibus sensibus corporis istam pulchritudinem viderint, qualibus oculis carnis formam sapientiae decusque conspexerint. Hi vero, quos merito ceteris anteposui, discreverunt ea, quae mente conspiciuntur, ab his, quae sensibus attinguntur, nec sensibus adimentes quod possunt, nec eis dantes ultra quam possunt. Lumen autem mentium esse dixerunt ad discenda omnia eundem ipsum Deum, a quo facta sunt omnia.*

...morali finem boni Deum esse praecipunt.

8. *Reliqua est pars moralis, quam Graeco vocabulo dicunt ubi quaeritur de summo bono, quo referentes omnia quae agimus, et quod non propter aliud, sed propter se ipsum appetentes idque adipiscentes nihil, quo beati simus, ulterius requiramus. Ideo quippe et finis est dictus, quia propter hunc cetera volumus, ipsum autem non nisi propter ipsum. Hoc ergo beatificum bonum alii a corpore, alii ab animo, alii ab utroque homini esse dixerunt. Videbant quippe ipsum hominem constare ex animo et corpore et ideo ab alterutro istorum duorum aut ab utroque bene sibi esse posse credebant, finali quodam bono, quo beati essent, quo*

existence would end. Thus, they argued that there must be some reality in which the form was ultimate, immutable and, therefore, not susceptible of degrees. They rightly concluded that only a reality unmade from which all other realities originate could be the ultimate principle of things. So that what is known about God, God Himself manifested to them, since 'his invisible attributes are clearly seen by them-his everlasting power also and divinity-being understood through the things that are made.' By Him, also all visible and temporal things were created. Enough has been said, I think, concerning what the Platonists call physical or natural philosophy.

7. As for the second part of philosophy, logic or rational philosophy, the Platonists are beyond all comparison with those who taught that the criterion of truth is in the bodily senses, and who would have us believe that all knowledge is to be measured and ruled by such doubtful and deceitful testimony. I mean the Epicureans and even the Stoics. For all their passion for adroitness in disputation or, as they would say, dialectics, even this was reckoned a matter of sense perception. They maintained that it was by sensation that the mind conceived those notions (or ennoiai as they would say) which are needed for clear definitions and, hence, for the unification and communication of the whole system of learning and teaching. When these philosophers quote their famous dictum that only the wise are beautiful, I often wonder by just what bodily senses they have perceived that beauty, by what kind of fleshy eyes they could have possibly beheld the form and fairness of wisdom. Certainly, the Platonists, whom we rightly prefer to all others, were able to distinguish what is apprehended by the mind from what is experienced by the senses, without either denying or exaggerating the faculties of sense. As for that light of our minds by which all can be learned, that, they declared, was the very God by whom all things were made.

8. The final division is moral philosophy or, to use the Greek name, ethics. It deals with the supreme good, by reference to which all our actions are directed. It is the good we seek for itself and not because of something else and, once it is attained, we seek nothing further to make us happy. This, in fact, is why we call it our end, because other things are desired on account of this summum bonum, while it is desired purely for itself. Now, some philosophers maintained that this happinessgiving good for man arises from the body; others claimed that it has its source in the soul; while a third group held that it derives from both. All philosophers have realized that man is made up of body and soul and, therefore, that the possibility of his well-being must proceed either from one of these constituents or from both together, the final good, whereby man would be happy, being the one to which all human actions would be referred

cuncta quae agebant referrent atque id quo referendum esset non ultra quaerent. Unde illi, qui dicuntur addidisse tertium genus bonorum, quod appellatur extrinsecus, sicuti est honor, gloria, pecunia et si quid huius modi, non sic addiderunt, ut finale esset, id est propter se ipsum appetendum, sed propter aliud; bonumque esse hoc genus bonis, malum autem malis. Ita bonum hominis qui vel ab animo vel a corpore vel ab utroque expetiverunt, nihil aliud quam ab homine expetendum esse putaverunt; sed qui id appetiverunt a corpore, a parte hominis deteriore; qui vero ab animo, a parte meliore; qui autem ab utroque, a toto homine. Sive ergo a parte qualibet sive a toto, non nisi ab homine. Nec istae differentiae, quoniam tres sunt, ideo tres, sed multas dissensiones philosophorum sectasque fecerunt, quia et de bono corporis et de bono animi et de bono utriusque diversi diversa opinati sunt. Cedant igitur omnes illis philosophis, qui non dixerunt beatum esse hominem fruentem corpore vel fruentem animo, sed fruentem Deo; non sicut corpore vel se ipso animus aut sicut amico amicus, sed sicut luce oculus, si aliquid ab his ad illa similitudinis afferendum est, quod quale sit, si Deus ipse adiuerit, alio loco, quantum per nos fieri poterit, apparebit. Nunc satis sit commemorare Platonem determinasse finem boni esse secundum virtutem vivere et ei soli evenire posse, qui notitiam Dei habeat et imitationem nec esse aliam ob causam beatum; ideoque non dubitat hoc esse philosophari, amare Deum, cuius natura sit incorporalis. Unde utique colligitur tunc fore beatum studiosum sapientiae (id enim est philosophus), cum frui Deo coeperit. Quamvis enim non continuo beatus sit, qui eo fruatur quod amat (multi enim amando ea, quae amanda non sunt, miseri sunt et miseriores cum fruuntur): nemo tamen beatus est, qui eo quod amat non fruatur. Nam et ipsi, qui res non amandas amant, non se beatos putant amando, sed fruendo. Quisquis ergo fruatur eo, quod amat, verumque et summum bonum amat, quis eum beatum nisi miserimus negat? Ipsum autem verum ac summum bonum Plato dicit Deum, unde vult esse philosophum amatorem Dei, ut, quoniam philosophia ad beatam vitam tendit, fruens Deo sit beatus qui Deum amaverit.

Quaedam sapientiae rationes omnium sunt gentium.

9. Quicumque igitur philosophi de Deo summo et vero ista senserunt, quod et rerum creaturarum sit effector et lumen cognoscendarum et bonum agendarum, quod ab illo nobis sit et principium naturae et veritas doctrinae et felicitas vitae, sive Platonici accommodatius nuncupentur, sive quodlibet aliud sectae suae nomen imponant; sive tantummodo ionici generis, qui in eis praecipui fuerunt, ista senserint, sicut idem Plato et qui

and beyond which they would seek nothing to which it might be referred. Hence, those who are said to have added to the list of goods the 'extrinsic' good--such as honor, glory, wealth and so on--did not mean this as though it were a supreme good to be sought for its own sake, but merely as a relative good and one that was good for good men but bad for the wicked. Thus, those who sought for human good either in man's body or in his mind or in both did not think they had to search outside of man himself to find it. Only those who looked to the body sought it in man's lower nature; those who looked to the soul, in man's higher nature; and the others, in man as a whole; but in every case they sought it only in man himself. This threefold division of opinion concerning the summum bonum resulted, not in three, but in a multitude of philosophical sects and dissensions because of the varying views as to what constituted the good of the body, the good of the soul and the good of the whole man. The definers of all these defective conclusions should yield to those philosophers who taught that man is never fully blessed, in the enjoyment of either corporal or spiritual good, but only by a fruition in God. This joy in God is not like any pleasure found in physical or intellectual satisfaction. Nor is it such as a friend experiences in the presence of a friend. But, if we are to use any such analogy, it is more like the eye rejoicing in light. Elsewhere, with God's help I shall try to explain the nature of this analogy. For the moment, let it suffice to recall the doctrine of Plato that a virtuous life is the ultimate end of man and that only those attain to it who know and imitate God and find their blessedness wholly in this. Consequently, Plato did not hesitate to say that to philosophize is to love that God whose nature is incorporeal. From this we infer that the pursuer of wisdom, that is, the philosopher, will only be truly happy when he begins to rejoice in God. Certainly, not everyone who delights in what he loves is always blessed, for many are unhappy in loving things they should not love and still more wretched once they begin to enjoy them. On the other hand, no one is really happy until his love ends in fruition. For, even those who love what they should not love do not consider loving but only fruition as the source of their satisfaction. Who, then, but the very sorriest of persons would deny that a man is really happy who finds fruition in what he loves when what he loves is his true and highest good? Now, for Plato, this true and highest good was God, and, therefore, he calls a philosopher a lover of God, implying that philosophy is a hunt for happiness which ends only when a lover of God reaches fruition in God.

9. Philosophers, therefore, of whatever sort who have believed that the true and supreme God is the cause of created things, and the light by which they are known and the good toward which our actions are directed, and that He

eum bene intellexerunt; sive etiam Italici, propter Pythagoram et Pythagoreos et si qui forte alii eiusdem sententiae indidem fuerunt; sive aliarum quoque gentium qui sapientes vel philosophi habiti sunt, Atlantici Libyes, Aegyptii, Indi, Persae, Chaldaei, Scythae, Galli, Hispani, aliqui reperiuntur, qui hoc viderint ac docuerint: eos omnes ceteris anteponimus eosque nobis propinquiores fatemur.

Quid censeat Paulus de humana sapientia.

10. 1. Quamvis enim homo Christianus litteris tantum ecclesiasticis eruditus Platonorum forte nomen ignoret, nec utrum duo genera philosophorum exstiterint in Graeca lingua, Ionicorum et Italicorum, sciat: non tamen ita surdus est in rebus humanis, ut nesciat philosophos vel studium sapientiae vel ipsam sapientiam profiteri. Cavet eos tamen, qui secundum elementa huius mundi philosophantur, non secundum Deum, a quo ipse factus est mundus. Admonetur enim praecepto apostolico fideliterque audit quod dictum est: Cavete ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem seductionem secundum elementa mundi. Deinde ne omnes tales esse arbitretur, audit ab eodem Apostolo dici de quibusdam: Quia quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis; Deus enim illis manifestavit. Invisibilia enim eius a constitutione mundi per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas; et ubi Atheniensibus loquens, cum rem magnam de Deo dixisset et quae a paucis possit intellegi, quod in illo vivimus et movemur et sumus, adiecit et ait: Sicut et vestri quidam dixerunt. Novit sane etiam ipsos, in quibus errant, cavere; ubi enim dictum est, quod per ea, quae facta sunt, Deus illis manifestavit intellectu conspicienda invisibilia sua: ibi etiam dictum est non illos ipsum Deum recte coluisse, quia et aliis rebus, quibus non oportebat, divinos honores illi uni tantum debitos detulerunt: Quoniam cognoscentes Deum non sicut Deum glorificaverunt, aut gratias egerunt, sed evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum. Dicentes enim se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt et immutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium; ubi et Romanos et Graecos et Aegyptios, qui de sapientiae nomine gloriati sunt, fecit intellegi. Sed de hoc cum istis post modum disputabimus. In quo autem nobis consentiunt de uno Deo huius universitatis auctore, qui non solum super omnia corpora est incorporeus, verum etiam super omnes animas incorruptibilis, principium nostrum, lumen nostrum, bonum nostrum, in hoc eos ceteris anteponimus.

is the source from which our nature has its origin, our learning truth, our life its happiness—all these we prefer to others and recognize them as our neighbors. It does not matter whether they call themselves---as, perhaps, they should-Platonists, or whether they give their school some other name. Nor need we enquire whether it was only the leaders of the Ionian School-like Plato and his best disciples—who were teachers of these truths, or whether we should include the Italians on account of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans and, perhaps, others of similar views. For all I know, there may have been men reckoned as wise men or philosophers in other parts of the world who shared these views and doctrines-Atlantic Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls, and Spaniards.

10. Doubtless, it could happen that a Christian, well versed in ecclesiastical literature, might not be familiar with the name of Platonists nor even know that among Greek-speaking people two distinct schools of philosophy have flourished: the Ionian and the Italian. Nevertheless, he is not so naive as not to know that philosophers look upon themselves as the lovers, if not the possessors, of wisdom; and he is on his guard against materialistic philosophers, who give no thought to the Creator of the world. The Christian heeds carefully the apostolic admonition which says: 'See to it that no one deceives you by philosophy and vain deceit ... according to the elements of the world.' But the same Apostle tells him not to decry all as materialistic philosophers, for of some he says: 'What may be known about God is manifest to them. For God has manifested it to them. For since the creation of the world his invisible attributes are dearly seen-his everlasting power also and divinity-being understood through the things that are made.' And again, speaking to the Athenians, after the magnificent remark about God which so few can appreciate, namely, that 'in Him we live and move and have our being,' he went on to add: 'as indeed some of your own [poets] have said.' The Christian knows, of course, how to distrust the doctrines of even these latter where they are wrong. Thus, the very Scripture which says that God manifested His invisible attributes to be seen and understood also says that they failed to worship the true God rightly because they rendered to creatures divine honors that were due to Him alone. 'Although they knew God, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks, but became vain in their reasonings, and their senseless minds have been darkened. For while professing to be wise, they have become fools, and they have changed the glory of the incorruptible God for an image made like to corruptible man and to birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things.' Here the Apostle has in mind the Romans, Greeks and Egyptians, all boastful of their renown for wisdom. This is a matter that I intend to debate with these philosophers later on. Yet we prefer them

Platonici nobiscum sentiunt.

10. 2. Nec, si litteras eorum Christianus ignorans verbis, quae non didicit, in disputatione non utitur, ut vel naturalem Latine vel physicam Graece appellet eam partem, in qua de naturae inquisitione tractatur, et rationalem sive logicam, in qua quaeritur quonam modo veritas percipi possit, et moralem vel ethicam, in qua de moribus agitur bonorumque finibus appetendis malorumque vitandis, ideo nescit ab uno vero Deo atque optimo et naturam nobis esse, qua facti ad eius imaginem sumus, et doctrinam, qua eum nosque noverimus, et gratiam, qua illi cohaerendo beati simus. Haec itaque causa est cur istos ceteris praeferamus, quia, cum alii philosophi ingenia sua studiaque contriverint in requirendis rerum causis, et quinam esset modus discendi atque vivendi, isti Deo cognito reppererunt ubi esset et causa constitutae universitatis et lux percipiendae veritatis et fons bibendae felicitatis. Sive ergo isti Platonici sive quicumque alii quarumlibet gentium philosophi de Deo ista sentiunt, nobiscum sentiunt. Sed ideo cum Platonibus magis agere placuit hanc causam, quia eorum sunt litterae notiores. Nam et Graeci, quorum lingua in gentibus praeminet, eas magna praedicatione celebrarunt, et Latini permoti earum vel excellentia vel gloria, ipsas libentius didicerunt atque in nostrum eloquium transferendo nobiliores clarioresque fecerunt.

An Plato prophetarum scripta legerit?

11. Mirantur autem quidam nobis in Christi gratia sociati, cum audiunt vel legunt Platonem de Deo ista sensisse, quae multum congruere veritati nostrae religionis agnoscunt. Unde nonnulli putaverunt eum, quando perrexit in Aegyptum, Hieremiam audisse prophetam vel Scripturas propheticas in eadem peregrinatione legisse; quorum quidem opinionem in quibusdam libris meis posui. Sed diligenter supputata temporum ratio, quae chronica historia continetur, Platonem indicat a tempore, quo prophetavit Hieremias, centum ferme annos postea natum fuisse; qui cum octoginta et unum vixisset, ab anno mortis eius usque ad id tempus, quo Ptolomaeus rex Aegypti Scripturas propheticas gentis Hebraeorum de Iudaea poposcit et per septuaginta viros Hebraeos, qui etiam Graecam linguam noverant, interpretandas habendasque curavit, anni reperiuntur ferme sexaginta. Quapropter in illa peregrinatione sua Plato nec Hieremiam videre potuit tanto ante defunctum, nec easdem Scripturas legere, quae nondum fuerant in Graecam linguam translatae, qua ille pollebat; nisi forte, quia fuit acerrimi studii, sicut Aegyptias, ita et

to all others inasmuch as they agree with us concerning one God, the Creator of the universe, who is not only incorporeal, transcending all corporeal beings, but also incorruptible, surpassing every kind of soul--our source, our light, our goal. Now, it may happen that the Christian has not studied the works of these philosophers, nor learned to use their terms in disputation. He may not designate that part of philosophy which treats of the investigation of nature as natural (if he speaks Latin) or as physical (if Greek); nor that part which seeks the ways by which truth may be perceived as rational or logical; nor that part which treats of conduct, with the highest good which is to be sought and the supreme evil to be avoided, as moral or ethics. Nevertheless, he knows that from the one, true and infinitely good God we have a nature by which we were made in His image, faith by which we know God and ourselves, and grace whereby we reach beatitude in union with God. This, then, is the reason for preferring the Platonists to all other philosophers. While the others consumed time and talent in seeking the causes of things, and the right ways of learning and living, the Platonists, once they knew God, discovered where to find the cause by which the universe was made, the light by which all truth is seen, the fountain from which true happiness flows. If philosophers, then, whether Platonists or wise men of any nation whatsoever, hold these truths concerning God, they agree with us. However, I have preferred to plead this cause with the Platonists because I know their writings better. The Greeks, whose language is universally esteemed, have eloquently eulogized these writings. The Latins, captivated either by their fascination or their fame, have gladly studied them, and, by translating them into our own language, have added to them new light and luster.

11. Some of our fellow Christians are astonished to learn that Plato had such ideas about God and to realize how close they are to the truths of our faith. Some even have been led to suppose that he was influenced by the Prophet Jeremiah during his travels in Egypt or, at least, that he had access to the scriptural prophecies; and this opinion I followed in some of my writings. However, a careful calculation of dates according to historical chronology shows that Plato was born almost one hundred years after Jeremiah prophesied, and that nearly sixty years intervened between Plato's death at the age of eighty-one and the time when the Septuagint translation was begun. Ptolemy, King of Egypt, it will be remembered, asked that the Hebraic prophecies be sent to him from Judea and he arranged to have them translated and safeguarded by seventy Hebrew scholars who were also experts in Greek. Therefore, it follows that, while journeying in Egypt, Plato could not have seen Jeremiah who was long since dead, nor could he have read the Scriptures which had not yet been rendered into Greek, his

istas per interpretem didicit, non ut scribendo transferret (quod Ptolomaeus pro ingenti beneficio, qui regia potestate etiam timeri poterat, meruisse perhibetur), sed ut colloquendo quid continerent, quantum capere posset, addisceret. Hoc ut existimetur, illa suadere videntur indicia, quod liber geneleos sic incipit: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Terra autem erat invisibilis et incomposita, et tenebrae <erant> super abyssum, et Spiritus Dei superferebatur super aquam; in Timaeo autem Plato, quem librum de mundi constitutione conscripsit, Deum dicit in illo opere terram primo ignemque iunxisse. Manifestum est autem, quod igni tribuat caeli locum: habet ergo haec sententia quandam illius similitudinem, qua dictum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Deinde ille duo media, quibus interpositis sibimet haec extrema copularentur, aquam dicit et aerem; unde putatur sic intellexisse quod scriptum est: Spiritus Dei superferebatur super aquam. Parum quippe attendens quo more soleat illa Scriptura appellare Spiritum Dei, quoniam et aer spiritus dicitur, quattuor opinatus elementa loco illo commemorata videri potest. Deinde quod Plato dicit amatorem Dei esse philosophum, nihil sic illis sacris Litteris flagrat; et maxime illud (quod et me plurimum adducit, ut paene assentiar Platonem illorum librorum expertem non fuisse), quod, cum ad sanctum Moysen ita verba Dei per angelum perferantur, ut quaerenti quod sit nomen eius, qui eum pergere praecipiebat ad populum Hebraeum ex Aegypto liberandum, respondeatur: Ego sum qui sum, et dices filiis Israel: qui est, misit me ad vos, tamquam in eius comparatione, qui vere est quia incommutabilis est, ea quae mutabilia facta sunt non sint, vehementer hoc Plato tenuit et diligentissime commendavit. Et nescio utrum hoc uspiam reperiatur in libris eorum, qui ante Platonem fuerunt, nisi ubi dictum est: Ego sum qui sum, et dices eis: qui est, misit me ad vos.

Qui Platonem secuti fuerint.

12. Sed undecumque ille ista didicerit, sive praecedentibus eum veterum libris sive potius, quo modo dicit Apostolus, quia quod notum est Dei manifestum est in illis; Deus enim illis manifestavit; invisibilia enim eius a constitutione mundi per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas: nunc non immerito me Platonicos philosophos elegisse cum quibus agam, quod in ista quaestione, quam modo suscepimus, agitur de naturali theologia, utrum propter felicitatem, quae post mortem futura est, uni Deo an pluribus sacra facere oporteat, satis, ut existimo, exposui. Ideo quippe hos potissimum elegi, quoniam de uno Deo qui fecit

native tongue. Of course, it is just possible that Plato, who was an indefatigable student and who used an interpreter to delve into Egyptian literature, may have done the same with the Scriptures. I do not mean to suggest that he undertook a translation of them. That was a feat which Ptolemy alone could accomplish by virtue of his liberality and of others' respect for his kingly power. But Plato could have learned from conversation the content of the Scriptures, without fully understanding their meaning. Certain evidence favors this belief. For example, the first book of Genesis begins: 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth; the earth was waste and void; darkness covered the abyss, and the spirit of God was stirring above the waters.' Plato in the Timaeus, which deals with the origin of the world, says that in this work God first united earth and fire. Now it is clear that Plato locates fire in the heavens. His statement, therefore, bears a certain resemblance to the words: 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.' Plato also mentions two intermediary elements, water and air, by means of which the extremes, earth and fire, were united. This idea, perhaps, originated from his interpretation of the verse: 'the spirit of God was stirring above the waters.' Paying little attention to the meaning which Scripture habitually ascribes to spirit and remembering that air is often called breath or spirit, Plato could easily have assumed that all four elements were mentioned in this text. Then, too, Plato's definition of a philosopher--one who loves God--contains an idea which shines forth everywhere in Scripture. But the most palpable proof to my mind that he was conversant with the sacred books is this, that when Moses, informed by an angel that God wished him to deliver the Hebrews from Egypt, questioned the angel concerning the name of the one who had sent him, the answer received was this: 'I AM WHO AM. Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is, hath sent me to you,' as though, in comparison with Him who, being immutable, truly is, all mutable things are as if they were not. Now, Plato had a passionate perception of this truth and was never tired of teaching it. Yet, I doubt whether this idea can be found in any of the works of Plato's predecessors except in the text: 'I AM WHO AM, and you shall say to them: He who is hath sent me to you.'

12. Whether, then, Plato got his ideas from the works of earlier writers or, as seems more likely, in the way described in the words of the Apostle: 'Because that which is known of God is manifest in them. For God hath manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: His eternal power also and divinity,' it seems to me that I have sufficiently justified my choice of the Platonic philosophers for the purpose of discussing this present problem in natural theology. The question is this: In

caelum et terram, quanto melius senserunt, tanto ceteris gloriosiores et illustriores habentur, in tantum aliis praelati iudicio posterorum, ut, cum Aristoteles Platonis discipulus, vir excellentis ingenii et eloquio Platoni quidem impar, sed multos facile superans, cum sectam Peripateticam condidisset, quod deambulans disputare consueverat, plurimosque discipulos praeclara fama excellens vivo adhuc praeceptore in suam haeresim congregasset, post mortem vero Platonis Speusippus, sororis eius filius, et Xenocrates, dilectus eius discipulus, in scholam eius, quae Academia vocabatur, eidem successissent atque ob hoc et ipsi et eorum successores Academici appellarentur, recentiores tamen philosophi nobilissimi, quibus Plato sectandus placuit, noluerint se dici Peripateticos aut Academicos, sed Platonicos. Ex quibus sunt valde nobilitati Graeci Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyrius; in utraque autem lingua, id est et Graeca et Latina, Apuleius Afer exstitit Platonicus nobilis. Sed hi omnes et ceteri eius modi et ipse Plato diis plurimis esse sacra facienda putaverunt.

order to secure happiness after death, should man worship a single God or many? The main reason for selecting the Platonists is the superiority of their conceptions concerning one God, Creator of heaven and earth, and, hence, their greater reputation in the judgment of posterity. It is true that Aristotle, a disciple of Plato, was a man of extraordinary genius and wide reputation (though in literary style inferior to Plato) who easily surpassed many others, and no less true that the Peripatetic school (so called from Aristotle's custom of teaching while walking) attracted many disciples even while his teacher, Plato, was alive. So, too, after the death of Plato, a son of his sister, Speusippus, and Xenocrates, Plato's favorite pupil, succeeded him in his Academy and, for this reason, they and their successors are called Academics. Nevertheless, the very best of the Platonists are those relatively recent philosophers who, refusing to be styled either Peripatetics or Academics, have called themselves Platonists. Among these last are those highly distinguished Greek scholars, Plotinus, Iamblichus and Porphyry. A hardly less notable Platonist was the African Apuleius, who was a master of both Greek and Latin. All of these and many others of the same school, not to mention Plato himself, believed in polytheistic worship.

De Civitate Dei contra Paganos (413-427)

X. Angelis placet ut uni Deo sacrificemus.

1. 1. Omnium certa sententia est, qui ratione quoquo modo uti possunt, beatos esse omnes homines velle 1. Qui autem sint vel unde fiant dum mortalium quaerit infirmitas, multae magnaeque controversiae concitatae sunt, in quibus philosophi sua studia et otia contriverunt, quas in medium adducere atque discutere et longum est et non necessarium. Si enim recolit qui haec legit, quid in libro egerimus octavo in eligendis philosophis, cum quibus haec de beata vita, quae post mortem futura est, quaestio tractaretur, utrum ad eam uni Deo vero, qui etiam effector est deorum, an plurimis diis religione sacrisque serviendo pervenire possimus: non etiam hic eadem repeti exspectat, praesertim cum possit relegendo, si forte oblitus est, adminiculare memoriam 2. Elegimus enim Platonicos omnium philosophorum merito nobilissimos, propterea quia sapere potuerunt licet immortalem ac rationalem vel intellectualem hominis animam nisi participato lumine illius Dei, a quo et ipsa et mundus factus est, beatam esse non posse; ita illud, quod omnes homines appetunt, id est vitam beatam, quemquam isti assecuturum negant, qui non illi uni optimo, quod est incommutabilis Deus, puritate casti amoris adhaeserit 3. Sed quia ipsi quoque sive cedentes vanitati errorique populorum sive, ut ait Apostolus, Evanescentes in cogitationibus suis 4

The City of God

X.1 That all men wish to be happy is a certitude for anyone who can think. But, so long as human intelligence remains incapable of deciding which men are happy and how they become so, endless controversies arise in which philosophers waste their time and toil. But it would be tedious and futile to recall and examine these battles here. The reader will remember what I said in Book VIII, 1 when making a choice of philosophers with whom to discuss the question of beatitude after death and whether it is to be attained by serving the one true God and Creator of gods, or by worshiping many gods. He will not expect to find the same things repeated here. If the reader has forgotten, he can easily refresh his memory by a second reading. It will be recalled that I selected the Platonists, who are deservedly considered the outstanding philosophers, first, because they could see that not even the soul of man, immortal and rational (or intellectual) as it is, can attain happiness apart from the Light of that God by whom both itself and the world were made, and, second, because they hold that the blessed life which all men seek can be found only by him who, in the purity of a chaste love, embraces that one Supreme Good which is the unchangeable God. However, even these philosophers, whether through yielding to popular superstition or, as the Apostle says, through 'growing vain in their reasonings,'² also believed--or

multos deos colendos ita putaverunt vel putari voluerunt, ut quidam eorum etiam daemonibus divinos honores sacrorum et sacrificiorum deferendos esse censerent, quibus iam non parva ex parte respondimus: nunc videndum ac disserendum est, quantum Deus donat, immortales ac beati in caelestibus sedibus dominationibus, principatibus potestatibus constituti 5, quos isti deos et ex quibus quosdam vel bonos daemones vel nobiscum Angelos nominant 6, quo modo credendi sint velle a nobis religionem pietatemque servari; hoc est, ut apertius dicam, utrum etiam sibi an tantum Deo suo, qui etiam noster est, placeat eis ut sacra faciamus et sacrificemus, vel aliqua nostra seu nos ipsos religionis ritibus consecremus.

Dei cultus servitus appellatur.

1. 2. Hic est enim divinitati vel, si expressius dicendum est, deitati debitus cultus, propter quem uno verbo significandum, quoniam mihi satis idoneum non occurrit latinum, graeco ubi necesse est insinuo quid velim dicere. λατρεία quippe nostri, ubicumque sanctarum Scripturarum positum est, interpretati sunt "servitum" 7. Sed ea servitus, quae debetur hominibus, secundum quam praecipit Apostolus servos dominis suis subditos esse debere 8, alio nomine Graece nuncupari solet 9; λατρεία vero secundum consuetudinem, qua locuti sunt qui nobis divina eloquia condiderunt, aut semper aut tam frequenter ut paene semper ea dicitur servitus, quae pertinet ad colendum Deum 10. Proinde si tantummodo cultus ipse dicatur, non soli Deo deberi videtur. Dicimur enim colere etiam homines, quos honorifica vel recordatione vel praesentia frequentamus. Nec solum ea, quibus nos religiosa humilitate subicimus, sed quaedam etiam, quae subiecta sunt nobis, perhibentur coli. Nam ex hoc verbo et agricolae et coloni et incolae vocantur, et ipsos deos non ob aliud appellant caelicolas, nisi quod caelum colant, non utique venerando, sed inhabitando, tamquam caeli quosdam colonos 11; non sicut appellantur coloni, qui condicionem debent genitili solo, propter agriculturam sub dominio possessorum, sed, sicut ait quidam latini eloquii magnus auctor:

Urbs antiqua fuit, Tyrii tenuere coloni 12.

Ab incolendo enim colonos vocavit, non ab agricultura. Hinc et civitates a maioribus civitatibus velut populorum examinibus conditae coloniae nuncupantur. Ac per hoc cultum quidem non deberi nisi Deo propria quadam notione verbi huius omnino verissimum est; sed quia et aliarum rerum dicitur cultus, ideo latine uno verbo significari cultus Deo debitus non potest.

An pietas sit tantum religionis officium.

wanted others to believe-in polytheism. At any rate, some of them went so far as to think that the divine honors of rites and sacrifices should be offered to demons-an opinion which I have already refuted at some length. It is time, therefore, to take a look, as far as with God's help we may, at those immortal and blessed spirits established in Heaven as Thrones, Dominations, Principalities, and Powers. The Platonists call them gods or, at least, good demons or even, like us, angels. We must ask in what sense it is credible that they should desire from us any kind of religious devotion. The precise point at issue is whether they wish for themselves or only for their God, who is also ours, the homage of our ceremonies and sacrifices and the consecration by religious rites of some of our goods or even of ourselves.

But this is the worship which we owe to the divinity, or, if I must speak more exactly, to the deity. However, since I do not find a sufficiently suitable Latin expression, I must use a Greek term to suggest in one word what I wish to say. Wherever the term *latreia* has been found in Sacred Scripture, our interpreters, I know, have translated it as service. But the service which is due to men and of which the Apostle speaks when he admonishes slaves to obey their master³ is commonly called by another name in Greek,⁴ whereas the term *latreia*, according to the usage of those who put divine revelation into human language, refers always or almost always to that service which pertains to the worship of God. Consequently, if the service in question is called simply a cult [*cultus*], it seems that it is not reserved for God alone. For we employ a similar word [*colere*] in reference to distinguished men whose memory or whose company we 'cultivate.' The word 'cult' refers to things to which we subject ourselves in a spirit of piety and religion, but we also 'cultivate' certain things which are subject to us. From the Latin word, *colere*, are derived such words as agriculturists, colonists, and *incolae*, that is, inhabitants. The pagan gods are spoken of as *caelicolae* not in the sense of venerating heaven by a cult but of inhabiting heaven like colonists. However, they are not called *coloni*, in the technical sense of those whose condition in their native land demands that they cultivate the soil under the authority of the owner, but in the sense in which it is used in a line of a great master of the Latin language: 'There was an ancient city, inhabited by Tyrian colonists,& where 'colonists' means inhabitants, not tillers of the soil. So, too, colonies mean cities founded, like new hives of bees, by larger cities. Thus, although it is certainly true that 'cult,' in its special sense of 'worship,' is due to God alone, yet, because the Latin *cultus* is used in many other ways, it cannot, when taken by itself, designate the worship due to God

1. 3. Nam et ipsa religio quamvis distinctius non quemlibet, sed Dei cultum significare videatur (unde isto nomine interpretati sunt nostri eam, quae Graece **θησκειά** dicitur 13): tamen quia latina loquendi consuetudine, non imperitorum, verum etiam doctissimorum, et cognationibus humanis atque affinitatibus et quibusque necessitudinibus dicitur exhibenda religio 14, non eo vocabulo vitatur ambiguum, cum de cultu deitatis vertitur quaestio, ut fidenter dicere valeamus religionem non esse nisi cultum Dei, quoniam videtur hoc verbum a significanda observantia propinquitatis humanae insolenter auferri 15. Pietas quoque proprie Dei cultus 16 intellegi solet, quam graeci **εὐσεβείαν** vocant. Haec tamen et erga parentes officiose haberi dicitur. More autem vulgi hoc nomen etiam in operibus misericordiae frequentatur 17; quod ideo arbitror evenisse, quia haec fieri praecipue mandat Deus eaque sibi vel pro sacrificiis vel prae sacrificiis placere testatur. Ex qua loquendi consuetudine factum est, ut et Deus ipse dicatur pius 18; quem sane Graeci nullo suo sermonis usu **εὐσεβῆν** vocant, quamvis **εὐσεβείαν** pro misericordia illorum etiam vulgus usurpet 19. Unde in quibusdam Scripturarum locis 20, ut distinctio certior appareret, non **εὐσεβείαν**, quod ex bono cultu, sed **θεοσεβείαν**, quod ex Dei cultu compositum resonat, dicere maluerunt. Utrumlibet autem horum nos uno verbo enuntiare non possumus. Quae itaque **λατρεία** graece nuncupatur et latine interpretatur "servitus", sed ea qua colimus Deum 21; vel quae **θησκειά** graece, latine autem "religio" dicitur, sed ea quae nobis est erga Deum; vel quam illi **θεοσεβείαν**, nos vero non uno verbo exprimere, sed Dei cultum possumus appellare 22: hanc ei tantum Deo deberi dicimus, qui verus est Deus facitque suos cultores deos 23. Quicumque igitur sunt in caelestibus habitationibus immortales et beati, si nos non amant nec beatos esse nos volunt, colendi utique non sunt. Si autem amant et beatos volunt, profecto inde volunt, unde et ipsi sunt; an aliunde ipsi beati, aliunde nos?

Participes nos esse Dei Plotinus et Ioannes docent.

2. Sed non est nobis ullus cum his excellentioribus philosophis in hac quaestione conflictus. Viderunt enim suisque litteris multis modis copiosissime mandaverunt hinc illos, unde et nos, fieri beatos, obiecto quodam lumine intellegibili, quod Deus est illis et aliud est quam illi, a quo illustrantur, ut clareant atque eius participatione perfecti beatique subsistant 24. Saepe multumque Plotinus asserit sensum Platonis explanans,

As for the word 'religion,' is usually means the cult which is rendered to God; hence, Latin translators render the Greek word, *theskeia*, by *religio*. Nevertheless, at least in Latin, not only the ignorant but the most educated persons use *religio* to express the binding force of blood relationships and affinities and other social ties. Hence, when there is a question of the cult of the deity, the word *religio* is ambiguous. If we make bold to say that *religio* means nothing else but the worship of God, then we seem to be rudely contradicting those who use the word to signify the binding force of human relationships.

So, too, the word 'piety' (in Greek, *eusebeia*). In its strict sense, it ordinarily means the worship of God. However, it is also used to express a dutiful respect for parents. Moreover, in everyday speech, the word *pietas* means pity or mercy. This has come about, I think, because God commands us especially to practice mercy, declaring that it pleases Him as much as or even more than sacrifices. Hence, God himself is spoken of as *pious*, in the sense of merciful. However, the Greeks never call Him *eusebes*, although ordinary people employ the word *eusebeia* in the sense of mercy. In certain passages of the Greek text of Scripture, to mark the distinction, *eusebeia* (reverence in general) is replaced by *theosebeia* (reverence to God). In Latin, there is no single word which expresses either one or the other of these ideas. My point is that what in Greek is called *latreia* and in Latin *servitus* in the sense of the service of worshiping God; or what in Greek is called *theskeia* and in Latin *religio*, in the sense of religion binding us to God; or what the Greeks call *theosebeia*, meaning 'piety toward God' and for which there is no Latin equivalent-this is due exclusively to God who is the true God and who makes those who worship Him sharers in His divinity. Therefore, whoever they are, these immortal and blessed beings who dwell in heaven, if they do not love us and desire us to be happy, then, undoubtedly, we owe them no service; but, if they love us and desire our happiness, then, indeed, they will wish our happiness to flow from the same source as theirs. For, how could our happiness have any other source than theirs?

2. But, on this point, we have no dispute with these excellent philosophers. For they have borne manifold and abundant witness in their writings to their belief that these beings receive their happiness from the same source as we do-from the ray of a certain Intelligible Light which is the God of angels and is distinct from them, for only by this Light are they resplendent and only by participation in God are they established in perfection and beatitude. Often, and with much insistence, Plotinus, developing the thought of Plato, asserts that even that being which they believe to be the soul of the universe receives its happiness from the same source

ne illam quidem, quam credunt esse universitatis animam, aliunde beatam esse quam nostram, idque esse lumen quod ipsa non est, sed a quo creata est et quo intellegibiliter illuminante intellegibiliter lucet 25. Dat etiam similitudinem ad illa incorporea de his caelestibus conspicuis amplisque corporibus, tamquam ille sit sol et ipsa sit luna 26. Lunam quippe solis obiectu illuminari putant 27. Dicit ergo ille magnus Platonicus animam rationalem, sive potius intellectualis dicenda sit, ex quo genere etiam immortalium beatorumque animas esse intellegit, quos in caelestibus sedibus habitare non dubitat, non habere supra se naturam nisi Dei, qui fabricatus est mundum, a quo et ipsa facta est; nec aliunde illis supernis praeberi vitam beatam et lumen intellegentiae veritatis 28, quam unde praebetur et nobis, consonans Evangelio, ubi legitur: Fuit homo missus a Deo, cui nomen erat Ioannes; hic venit in testimonium, ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine, ut omnes crederent per eum. Non erat ille lumen, sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. Erat lumen verum, quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum 29. In qua differentia satis ostenditur animam rationalem vel intellectualem, qualis erat in Ioanne, sibi lumen esse non posse, sed alterius veri luminis participatione lucere. Hoc et ipse Ioannes fatetur, ubi ei perhibens testimonium dicit: Nos omnes de plenitudine eius accepimus 30.

Quid platonici de Deo et diis senserint.

3. 1. Quae cum ita sint, si Platonici vel quicumque alii ista senserunt cognoscentes Deum sicut Deum glorificarent et gratias agerent nec evanescerent in cogitationibus suis 31 nec populorum erroribus partim auctores fierent, partim resistere non auderent: profecto confiterentur et illis immortalibus ac beatis et nobis mortalibus ac miseris, ut immortales ac beati esse possimus, unum Deum deorum colendum, qui et noster est et illorum.

Vera est religio Deum cognoscere ipsumque et alios amare.

3. 2. Huic nos servitatem, quae *λατρεία* graecae dicitur, sive in quibusque sacramentis sive in nobis ipsis debemus. Huius enim templum simul omnes et singuli templa sumus 32, quia et omnium concordiam et singulos inhabitare dignatur; non in omnibus quam in singulis maior, quoniam nec mole distenditur nec partitione minuitur. Cum ad illum sursum est, eius est altare cor nostrum; eius Unigenito eum sacerdote placamus; ei cruentas victimas caedimus, quando usque ad sanguinem pro eius veritate certamus; eum

as we do, namely, the Light which created the universal soul and is distinct from it and by reason of whose 'intelligible' illumination this soul is alight with intelligence. And to help us rise from the vast and visible bodies in the sky to the celestial 'intelligences,' he notices the analogy of the moon made luminous-in Platonic theory-by rays from the sun, as the spheres are alight with intelligence. This great Platonist, therefore, says that the rational (or, perhaps, better, the intellectual) soul-in which genus he includes the souls of those immortal and blessed spirits who are believed to inhabit the celestial dwellings-has no nature above it except that of God who fashioned the universe and created the soul itself, and that these heavenly beings receive their beatitude and their light for the understanding of truth from the same source as we do. In this belief, he is in agreement with the Gospel: 'There was a man, one sent from God, whose name was John. This man came as a witness, to bear witness concerning the Light, that all might believe through him. He was not himself the Light, but was to bear witness to the Light. It was the true Light that enlightens every man who comes into the world.' The distinction here made sufficiently shows that a rational or intellectual soul such as John's cannot be a light to itself but needs to be illumined by participation in the true Light. This is what John himself confesses in his witness to the Word: 'And of his fullness we have all received, grace for grace.'

3. Since this is the case, if the Platonists and others like them who have a knowledge of God would only glorify Him as such and render Him thanks and not become vain in their thoughts, whether by starting errors among the people or by failing to correct them, surely they would acknowledge that, in order to be immortal and blessed, both immortal and blessed spirits and we miserable mortals must worship the one God of gods who is our God as well as theirs. Both in outward signs and inner devtion, we owe to Him that service which the Greeks call *latreia*. Indeed, all of us together, and each one in particular, constitute His temple because He deigns to take for a dwelling both the community of all and the person of each individual. Nor is He greater in all than in each, since He cannot be extended by numbers nor diminished by being shared. When raised to Him, our heart becomes His altar; His only Son is the priest who wins for us His favor. It is only by the shedding of our blood in fighting for His truth that we offer Him bloody victims. We burn the sweetest incense in His sight when we are aflame with holy piety and love. As the best gifts we consecrate and surrender to Him our very selves which He has given us. We dedicate and consecrate to Him the memory of His bounties by establishing appointed days as solemn feasts, lest, by the lapse of time, ingratitude and forgetfulness should steal upon us. On the altar of our heart, we offer to Him a sacrifice of humility and praise, aglow with the fire

suavissimo adolemus incenso 33, cum in eius conspectu pio sanctoque amore flagramus; ei dona eius in nobis nosque ipsos vovemus et reddimus; ei beneficiorum eius sollemnitatibus festis et diebus statutis dicamus sacramusque memoriam, ne volumine temporum ingrata subrepat oblivio; ei sacrificamus hostiam humilitatis et laudis in ara cordis igne fervidam caritatis 34. Ad hunc videndum, sicut videri poterit, eique cohaerendum ab omni peccatorum et cupiditatum malarum labe mundamur et eius nomine consecramur. Ipse enim fons nostrae beatitudinis, ipse omnis appetitionis est finis. Hunc eligentes vel potius religentes (amiseramus enim neglegentes) hunc ergo religentes, unde et religio dicta perhibetur 35, ad eum dilectione tendimus, ut perveniendo quiescamus, ideo beati, quia illo fine perfecti. Bonum enim nostrum, de cuius fine inter philosophos magna contentio est, nullum est aliud quam illi cohaerere, cuius unius anima intellectualis incorporeo, si dici potest, amplexu veris impletur fecundaturque virtutibus. Hoc bonum diligere in toto corde, in tota anima et in tota virtute praecipimur; ad hoc bonum debemus et a quibus diligimur duci, et quos diligimus ducere. Sic complentur duo illa praecepta in quibus tota Lex pendet et Prophetarum: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum in toto corde tuo et in tota anima tua et in tota mente tua, et: Diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum 36. Ut enim homo se diligere nosset, constitutus est ei finis, quo referret omnia quae ageret, ut beatus esset; non enim qui se diligit aliud vult esse quam beatus. Hic autem finis est adhaerere Deo 37. Iam igitur scienti diligere se ipsum, cum mandatur de proximo diligendo sicut se ipsum, quid aliud mandatur, nisi ut ei, quantum potest, commendat diligendum Deum? Hic est Dei cultus, haec vera religio, haec recta pietas, haec tantum Deo debita servitus. Quaecumque igitur immortalis potestas quantalibet virtute praedita si nos diligit sicut se ipsam, ei vult esse subditos, ut beati simus, cui et ipsa subdita beata est. Si ergo non colit Deum, misera est, quia privatur Deo; si autem colit Deum, non vult se coli pro Deo. Illi enim potius divinae sententiae suffragatur et dilectionis viribus favet, qua scriptum est: Sacrificans diis eradicabitur, nisi Domino soli 38.

of charity. In order to see Him as, one day, it will be possible to see and to cling to Him, we cleanse ourselves from every stain of sin and evil desire, sanctifying ourselves by His name. For He is the source of our happiness and the very end of all our aspirations. We elect Him, whom, by neglect, we lost. We offer Him our allegiance-for 'allegiance' and 'religion' are at root, the same. We pursue Him with our love so that when we reach Him we may rest in perfect happiness in Him who is our goal. For our goal (or, as the philosophers in their endless disputes have termed it, our end or good) is nothing else than union with Him whose spiritual embrace, if I may so speak, can alone fecundate the intellectual soul and fill it with true virtue. It is this Good which we are commanded to love with our whole heart, with our whole mind, and with all our strength. It is toward this Good that we should be led by those who love us, and toward this Good we should lead those whom we love. In this way, we fulfill the commandments on which depend the whole Law and the Prophets: 'Thou shalt love the Lord Thy God with thy whole heart, and thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind'; and 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.'² For, in order that a man might learn how to love himself, a standard was set to regulate all his actions on which his happiness depends. For, to love one's own self is nothing but to wish to be happy, and the standard is union with God. When, therefore, a person who knows how to love himself is bidden to love his neighbor as himself, is he not, in effect, commanded to persuade others, as far as he can, to love God? This, then, is the worship of God; this is true religion and the right kind of piety; this is the service that is due only to God. It follows, therefore, that if any immortal power, however highly endowed with virtue, loves us as itself, it must wish us to be subject, for our own happiness, to Him in submission to whom it finds its happiness. If, then, this spirit does not worship God, it is unhappy because deprived of God, and if it worships God, it cannot wish to be worshiped in place of Him. Rather will such a spirit acknowledge, in loving allegiance, that divine decision which runs: 'He that sacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save only to the Lord.'³

De diversis Quaestionibus octoginta tribus (388-396)

46. Ideas Plato primus appellasse perhibetur. Non tamen si hoc nomen antequam ipse institueret non erat, ideo vel res ipsae non erant, quas ideas vocavit, vel a nullo erant intellectae; sed alio fortassis atque alio nomine ab aliis atque aliis nuncupatae sunt; licet enim

On Eighty-Three Varied Questions

On ideas

46. Plato is said to be the first to have used the term "ideas." On the other hand, if this word did not exist before he introduced it, it is either because the things themselves, which he called ideas, did not exist, or because no one understood them. But perhaps they were called by other

cuique rei cognitae, quae nullum habeat usitatum nomen, quodlibet nomen imponere. Nam non est verisimile sapientes aut nullos fuisse ante Platonem aut istas quas Plato, ut dictum est, ideas vocat, quaecumque res sint, non intellexisse, siquidem tanta in eis vis constituitur ut nisi his intellectis sapiens esse nemo possit. Credibile est etiam praeter Graeciam fuisse in aliis Gentibus sapientes, quod etiam Plato ipse non solum peregrinando sapientiae perficiendae causa satis testatur, sed etiam in libris suis commemorat. Hos ergo, si qui fuerunt, non existimandum est ideas ignorasse, quamvis eas alio fortasse nomine vocitaverint. Sed de nomine hactenus dictum sit. Rem videamus, quae maxime consideranda atque noscenda est, in potestate constitutis vocabulis, ut quod volet quisque appellet rem quam cognoverit. Ideas igitur latine possumus vel formas vel species dicere, ut verbum e verbo transferre videamur. Si autem rationes eas vocemus, ab interpretandi quidem proprietate discedimus; rationes enim Graece λόγοι appellantur non ideae: sed tamen quisquis hoc vocabulo uti voluerit, a re ipsa non abhorrebit. Sunt namque ideae principales quaedam formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae divina intellegentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriuntur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest et omne quod oritur et interit. Anima vero negatur eas intueri posse nisi rationalis, ea sui parte qua excellit, id est, ipsa mente atque ratione, quasi quadam facie vel oculo suo interiore atque intellegibili. Et ea quidem ipsa rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, sed quae sancta et pura fuerit, haec asseritur illi visioni esse idonea, id est, quae illum ipsum oculum, quo videntur ista, sanum et sincerum et serenum et similem his rebus, quas videre intendit, habuerit. Quis autem religiosus et vera religione imbutus, quamvis nondum haec possit intueri, negare tamen audeat, immo non etiam profiteatur, omnia quae sunt, id est, quaecumque in suo genere propria quadam natura continentur ut sint, auctore Deo esse procreata, eoque auctore omnia quae vivunt vivere, atque universalem rerum incolumitatem ordinemque ipsum, quo ea quae mutantur suos temporales cursus certo moderamine celebrant, summi Dei legibus contineri et gubernari? Quo constituto atque concesso, quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse? Quod si recte dici vel credi non potest, restat ut omnia ratione sint condita, nec eadem ratione homo qua equus; hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus. Has autem rationes ubi esse arbitrandum est nisi in ipsa mente Creatoris? Non enim extra se

names by other persons, for it is legitimate to give a name to something that is known which has no common name. For it is unlikely either that there were no wise men before Plato or that they did not understand what Plato, as has been said, calls ideas, whatever the things may be, since there is such meaning in them that no one could be wise without having understood them. It is believable that even outside Greece there were wise men in other races, since even Plato himself not only bears witness to this by his travels abroad for the sake of making progress in wisdom but even mentions it in his writings. It should not be thought, therefore, that these persons, if they existed, were ignorant of ideas, although they may have called them by another name. Let this be sufficient as far as the name is concerned. Let us look at the thing, which should very much be reflected upon and known, now that the terms have been established, so that whoever wishes may refer to the thing that he knows. In Latin, then, we can call ideas either forms or species, so that we seem to use the terms loosely. But if we call them reasons we are in fact departing from the proper interpretation (for reasons are referred to as λόγοι in Greek and not as ideas), yet whoever wishes to use this term will not be far from the thing itself. For ideas are the principal forms or the fixed and unchangeable reasons of things that have themselves not been formed and consequently are eternal, always constituted in the same way and contained in the divine intelligence. And although these neither come into existence nor perish, none the less everything that can come into existence and perish and everything that does come into existence and perish is said to be formed in accordance with them. But no soul except a rational one is given the possibility of seeing them in that part of itself by which it excels—that is, in the mind itself and the reason—which is, so to speak, its visage (facie) or its interior and intelligible eye. And indeed it is not just any rational soul, but one that is holy and pure, which is said to be suited to that vision – that is, which possesses that eye by which those things are seen and is whole and sound and peaceful and similar to those things that it is intent upon seeing. But what religious person imbued with true religion, although not yet able to see these things, would none the less dare to deny – indeed, would not acknowledge – that everything that exists – that is, whatever is contained just as it is in its own genus by its own nature – was produced by God as its maker; and that, with him as their maker, all living things are alive; and that the universal soundness of things and the very order by which those things that undergo change proclaim that their trajectories through time are subject to a firm control are contained within and governed by the laws of the most high God? Once this has been established and conceded, who would dare to say that God created all things without good reason? If this cannot be rightly said and believed, it remains that all things were

quidquam positum intuebatur, ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat; nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est. Quod si hae rerum omnium creandarum creatarumve rationes divina mente continentur, neque in divina mente quidquam nisi aeternum atque incommutabile potest esse, atque has rationes rerum principales appellat ideas Plato, non solum sunt ideae, sed ipsae verae sunt, quia aeternae sunt et eiusdem modi atque incommutabiles manent. Quarum participatione fit ut sit quidquid est, quoquo modo est. Sed anima rationalis inter eas res, quae sunt a Deo conditae, omnia superat et Deo proxima est, quando pura est; eique in quantum caritate cohaeserit, in tantum ab eo lumine illo intellegibili perfusa quodammodo et illustrata cernit non per corporeos oculos, sed per ipsius sui principale quo excellit, id est, per intellegentiam suam, istas rationes, quarum visione fit beatissima. Quas rationes, ut dictum est, sive ideas sive formas sive species sive rationes licet vocare, et multis conceditur appellare quod libet, sed paucissimis videre quod verum est.

created in accordance with reason, but human kind in accordance with a different reason than the horse, for it is absurd to think this [i.e., that they were created in accordance with the same reason]. Individual things, then, have been created in accordance with their own reasons. But where should these reasons be thought to exist if not in the very mind of the creator? For it is sacrilegious to imagine that there was something located outside of himself that he looked at, so that in accordance with it he could create what he created. If the reasons for all the things that will be created and that have been created are contained in the divine mind, and if there can be nothing in the divine mind that is not eternal and unchangeable, and if Plato refers to these principal reasons of things as ideas, then ideas not only exist but are themselves true because they are eternal and remain the same and unchangeable. It is by participation in them that a thing exists, in whatever way it exists. But the rational soul stands out among all those things that have been created by God and, when it is pure, is very near to God. To the extent that it clings to him in charity it is to a certain degree filled and lit by him with intelligible light and discerns, not with the eyes of the body but by that principle of its very self by which it excels (that is, by its intelligence), those reasons whose vision produces supreme blessedness. As has been said, it is legitimate to refer to these reasons as ideas or forms or species or reasons, and it is granted to the many to call them whatever they please but to the very few to see what is true.

Racionalaus svarstymo ir tikėjimo, proto ir autoriteto santykis. *Crede ut intellegas*

Sermo 43 (400)

*DE EO QUOD SCRIPTUM EST IN ISAIA:
"NISI CREDIDERITIS, NON INTELLEGETIS"*

Initium bonae vitae recta fides est.

1. Initium bonae vitae, cui vita etiam aeterna debetur, recta fides est. Est autem fides credere quod nondum vides, cuius fidei merces est videre quod credis. Tempore igitur fidei tamquam tempore sementis non deficiamus, et usque in finem non deficiamus, sed perseveremus, donec quod seminavimus metamus 1. Cum enim aversum esset genus humanum a Deo et iaceret in delictis suis, sicut Creatore opus habebamus ut essemus, sic Salvatore ut revivisceremus. Iustus Deus damnavit hominem, misericors Deus liberat hominem. Deus Israel ipse dabit virtutem et fortitudinem plebi suae. Benedictus Deus 2. Sed accipiunt credentes, non accipiunt contemnentes.

2. Nec de ipsa fide tamen ita gloriandum est, quasi aliquid nos possimus. Non enim fides nihil est, sed magnum aliquid; quam si habes, profecto accepisti. Quid enim habes, quod non accepisti? 3 Videte, carissimi, unde Domino Deo gratias agatis, ne in aliquo dono eius ingrati remaneatis, et propter hoc quod ingrati estis, quod accepistis perdatis. Laus fidei explicari a me nullo modo potest, sed a fidelibus cogitari potest. Porro si ex aliqua parte ut dignum est cogitetur, quis digne cogitet quam multis donis Dei ipsius praeferatur? Et si minora dona Dei in nobis debemus agnoscere, quanto magis illud quod ea superat debemus agnoscere?

Homo ad Dei imaginem creatus est.

3. A Deo debemus esse quod sumus. Quia non nihil sumus, a quo nisi a Deo habemus? Sed sunt et ligna, sunt et lapides, a quo nisi a Deo? Nos ergo quid plus? Non vivunt ligna et lapides; nos autem vivimus. Sed adhuc nobis id ipsum vivere cum arboribus fructibusque commune est. Dicuntur enim et vites vivere. Nam si non viverent, non scriptum esset: Occidit in grandine vineas eorum 4. Vivit, cum viret; arescit, cum moritur. Sed vita ista non habet sensum. Quid nos amplius? Sentimus. Quinquepertitus corporis notus est sensus. Videmus,

Sermon 43

ON WHAT IS WRITTEN IN ISAIAH: UNLESS YOU BELIEVE, YOU SHALL NOT UNDERSTAND

The starting point of a good life, right faith

1. The starting point of a good life, whose due what's more is eternal life, is right faith. Now faith means believing what you don't yet see, and the reward of this faith is to see what you believe. So in the season of faith, which is like the season for sowing, let us not falter, and right to the end let us not falter but persevere instead, until we reap what we have sown.†2 When the human race, you see, had turned away from God and was lying weltering in its transgressions, we needed a savior in order to come to life again, just as we needed a creator in order to exist. God in his justice condemned humanity; God in his mercy sets humanity free. The God of Israel will himself give strength and courage to his people. Blessed be God (Ps 68:35). But it's those who believe that receive this gift; those who disdain him don't.

2. Even about faith itself, however, we mustn't boast as though we could manage it on our own. Faith isn't a mere nothing, you know, it's something serious and important. If you possess it, then of course you have received it. For what do you possess that you did not receive? (1 Cor 4:7). Take note, dearly beloved, of what it is you give thanks for to the Lord God, in order not to be continuously ungrateful for any gift of his, and because you are ungrateful to lose what you have received. I cannot in any way at all unfold before you the priceless value of faith, but any believer can reflect upon it. On the other hand, if in some respect you can reflect upon it as it deserves, is there anyone who can adequately reflect on how many gifts of God himself faith is to be preferred to? And if we are in duty bound to acknowledge God's lesser gifts to us, how much more should we acknowledge the one that so surpasses them?

Made to the image of God

3. We owe it to God that we are what we are. From whom, if not from God, do we get it that we are not nothing? But sticks and stones also are, and from whom do they get it but God? Aren't we anything more, then? Sticks and stones aren't alive, but we are alive. Still, though, being alive is something we have in common with trees and shrubs. Vines too, after all, are said to be alive. If they weren't alive, it wouldn't have been written, He slew their vines with hail (Ps 78:47). It's alive when it's green; when it dies it withers. But this kind of life is

audimus, olfacimus, gustamus, tactu etiam per totum corpus nostrum mollia diiudicamus et dura, aspera et lenia, calida et frigida. Est ergo in nobis sensus quinquepertitus. Sed hunc habent et bestiae. Habemus ergo aliquid amplius nos. Et ista tamen quae enumeravimus, Fratres mei, si consideremus in nobis, quantam de his gratiarum actionem, quantam Creatori laudem debemus? Sed tamen amplius quid habemus? Mentem, rationem, consilium, quod non habent bestiae, non habent volucres, non habent pisces. In eo facti sumus ad imaginem Dei 5. Denique ubi Scriptura narrat quod facti sumus, ibi subiungit ut nos pecoribus non solum anteponat, sed et praeponat, id est, ut ea nobis subiecta sint: Faciamus, inquit, hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram et habeat potestatem piscium maris et volatilium caeli et omnium pecorum et serpentium quae repunt super terram 6. Unde habeat potestatem? Propter imaginem Dei. Unde quibusdam dicitur increpando: Nolite esse sicut equus et mulus, quibus non est intellectus 7. Sed aliud est intellectus, aliud ratio. Nam rationem habemus et antequam intellegamus, sed intellegere non valemus, nisi rationem habeamus. Est ergo animal rationalis capax, verum ut melius et citius dicam animal rationale, cui natura inest ratio, et antequam intellegat iam rationem habet. Nam ideo vult intellegere, quia ratione praecedit.

Fides quaerens intellectum.

4. Hoc ergo unde bestias anteceditur maxime in nobis excolere debemus et resculpere quodam modo et reformare. Sed quis poterit, nisi sit artifex qui formavit? Imaginem in nobis Dei deformare potuimus, reformare non possumus. Habemus ergo, ut cuncta breviter retextamus, ipsum esse cum lignis et lapidibus, vivere cum arboribus, sentire cum bestiis, intellegere cum angelis. Diiudicamus ergo oculis colores, auribus sonores, naribus odores, gustatu saporos, tactu calores, intellectu mores. Intellegi omnis homo vult; intellegere nemo est qui nolit; credere non omnes volunt. Dicit mihi homo: "Intellegam ut credam". Respondeo: "Credere ut intellegas". Cum ergo nata inter nos sit controversia talis quodam modo, ut ille mihi dicat: "Intellegam ut credam", ego ei respondeam: Immo crede ut intellegas, cum hac controversia veniamus ad iudicem, neuter nostrum praesumat pro sua parte sententiam. Quem iudicem inventuri sumus? Discussis omnibus hominibus, nescio utrum meliorem iudicem invenire possimus, quam hominem per quem loquitur Deus. Non eamus ergo

without sensation. What more do we have? Senses. We all know the five senses of the body. We see, we hear, we smell, we taste, and by touch all over the body we distinguish soft from hard, rough from smooth, hot from cold. So we have a fivefold sensitivity. But so too do the animals. So we must have something more yet. Even so, my brothers, if we consider just these things we have listed, how many thanks, how much praise do we not owe for them to our creator? However, what more have we got? Mind, reason, judgment, which animals haven't got, nor have birds, nor have fishes. It is in this respect that we were made to the image of God. What's more, when scripture relates that we were made, it adds that he not only puts us ahead of the beasts, but also puts us over them, that is to say that they have been subjected to us. Let us make man, he says, to our own image and likeness, and let him have authority over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the sky and all cattle and creeping things that creep upon the earth (Gn 1:26). What gives him this authority? The image of God. Which is why he says to some people by way of rebuke, Do not be like horse and mule, which have no understanding (Ps 32:9). Understanding, though, is one thing, reason another. We've got reason even before we understand, but we wouldn't be able to understand unless we had got reason. So he's an animal capable of reason,†3 or to put it better and more neatly, a rational animal, imbued with reason by nature, and he has already got reason before he understands. After all, that's why he wants to understand, because he surpasses other animals in reason.

Believe in order to understand

4. So we ought above all else to cultivate in ourselves this quality in which we excel the beasts, and somehow or other refashion it and chisel it afresh. But who ever will be able to do that, except the craftsman who fashioned it in the first place? We were able to distort God's image in us, we are not able to restore it. So then, to run over it all again quickly, we have existence in common with sticks and stones, life in common with trees, sense in common with beasts, understanding in common with angels. So we distinguish colors with the eyes, sounds with the ears, smells with the nostrils, flavors with the sense of taste, temperatures with touch, conduct with the understanding. Everybody wants to be understood; there isn't anybody who doesn't want to understand; not everybody wants to believe. Someone says to me, "Let me understand, in order to believe." I answer, "Believe in order to understand." So when an argument of this sort somehow starts between us, so that he says to me, "Let me understand in order to believe," and I answer him, "On the contrary, believe in order to understand," let us go with this argument to a judge, don't let either of us presume to give judgment for his own side. What judge are we going to find? After considering all sorts of men, I don't know

in hac re et in hac controversia ad litteras saeculares, non inter nos iudicet poeta, sed Propheta.

Habemus certiozem propheticum sermonem.

5. Beatus apostolus Petrus cum duobus aliis Christi Domini discipulis Iacobo et Ioanne in monte cum ipso Domino constitutus 8 audivit vocem delatam de caelo: Hic est Filius meus dilectus, in quo bene complacui. Ipsum audite 9. Quod commendans memoratus Apostolus in epistola sua dixit: Hanc vocem nos audivimus de caelo delatam cum essemus cum illo in sancto monte 10. Et cum dixisset: Hanc vocem nos audivimus de caelo delatam subiunxit atque ait: Et habemus certiozem propheticum sermonem 11. Sonuit vox illa de caelo, et certior est propheticus sermo. Attendite, carissimi, adiuvet Dominus et voluntatem meam et expectationem vestram ut dicam quod volo, quomodo volo. Quis enim nostrum non miretur delata voce de caelo certiozem propheticum sermonem ab Apostolo dictum esse? Certiozem sane dixit, certiozem, non meliorem, non veriozem. Tam enim verus ille sermo de caelo, quam sermo propheticus, tam bonus, tam utilis. Quid est ergo, certiozem, nisi in quo magis confirmetur auditor? Quare hoc? Quoniam sunt homines infideles, qui sic detrahunt Christo, ut dicant cum magicis artibus fecisse quae fecit. Possent ergo infideles etiam illam vocem delatam de caelo, per coniecturas humanas et illicitas curiositates ad magicas artes referre. Sed Prophetae antea fuerunt, non dico ante istam vocem, sed ante Christi carnem. Nondum erat homo Christus, quando misit Prophetas. Quisquis eum dicit magnum fuisse, si ergo magicis artibus fecit ut coleretur et mortuus, numquid magus erat antequam natus? Ecce quare ait apostolus Petrus: Habemus certiozem propheticum sermonem 12. Vox de caelo, qua fideles admoneantur; propheticus sermo, quo infideles convincantur. Intelleximus, quantum mihi videtur, carissimi, quare dixerit apostolus Petrus: Habemus certiozem propheticum sermonem, post vocem de caelo delatam.

Prius veniat piscator quam imperator.

6. Et ipsa quanta Christi dignatio? Petrus iste qui sic loquitur piscator fuit, et modo magnam laudem habet orator, si potuerit ab illo intellegi piscator. Propterea primis christianis loquens apostolus Paulus ait: Videte vocationem vestram fratres, quia non multi sapientes secundum carnem, non multi

whether we can find a better judge than a man through whom God speaks. So in this matter, over this argument, don't let's go to secular literature, don't let us have a poet judge between us, but a prophet.

The prophetic word

5. The blessed apostle Peter, with two other disciples of Christ the Lord, James and John, was up the mountain with the Lord himself, and heard a voice coming down from heaven, This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased. Listen to him (Mt 17:5). To remind us of this and draw it to our attention the same apostle said in his letter, We heard this voice carried down from heaven when we were with him on the holy mountain. And after saying We heard this voice carried down from heaven, he went on to add, And we have more certain the prophetic word (2 Pt 1:18-19). That voice echoes from heaven, and the prophetic word is more certain.

Pay close attention, dearly beloved, may the Lord assist both my will and your expectation, so that I may say what I wish to and as I wish to. After all, can any of us fail to be astonished that the prophetic word was said by the apostle to be more certain than the voice carried down from heaven? Well sure, he said more certain, more certain, not better, not truer. That word from heaven was as true as the prophetic word, as good, as useful. So what can he mean by more certain, but what is more convincing to the hearer? And why should it be this? Because there are unbelieving people who disparage Christ by saying that he used the arts of magic to do what he did. So unbelievers, indulging in human guesswork and misplaced ingenuity, may also refer that voice carried down from heaven to magic arts. But the prophets lived before, I don't just say this voice, but before the incarnation of Christ. Christ was not yet man when he sent the prophets. So, anyone who says he was a wizard, if he employed magic arts to get himself worshiped even when he was dead, was he a wizard before he was even born? So there you have why the apostle Peter said We have more certain the prophetic word. The voice from heaven, to admonish believers; the prophetic word, to convince unbelievers. As far as I can see, beloved, we have achieved an understanding of why the apostle Peter said We have more certain the prophetic word, after mentioning the voice carried down from heaven.

The fisherman

6. And what extraordinary consideration on Christ's part! This Peter who speaks in this way was a fisherman, and nowadays a professional orator†4 wins great acclaim if he is able to understand the fisherman. That's why the apostle Paul said, when speaking to the first Christians, Consider your calling, brothers, that not many of you are wise according to the flesh, not many powerful, not many noble. But the weak things of

potentes, non multi nobiles. Sed infirma mundi elegit Deus ut confundat fortia, et stulta mundi elegit Deus ut confundat sapientes, et ignobilia mundi et contemptibilia elegit Deus et ea quae non sunt tamquam sint ut ea quae sunt evacuarentur 13. Si enim eligeret Christus primitus oratorem, diceret orator: "Eloquentiae meae merito electus sum". Si eligeret senatorem, diceret senator: "Dignitatis meae merito electus sum". Postremo, si prius eligeret imperatorem, diceret imperator: "Potestatis meae merito electus sum". Quiescant et differantur isti paululum, quiescant, non omittantur, non contemnantur, sed aliquantulum differantur, quo possunt gloriari de semetipsis in semetipsis. "Da mihi inquit, illum piscatorem, da mihi idiotam da mihi imperitum, mihi cum, cum quo non dignatur loqui senator, nec quando emit piscem. Ipsum, inquit, da. Hunc si implevero, manifestum erit quod ego facio. Quamquam et senatorem et oratorem et imperatorem ego sum facturus: quandocumque facturus ego et senatorem, sed certius ego piscatorem. Potest senator gloriari de semetipso, potest orator, potest, imperator. Non potest nisi de Christo piscator. Veniat propter docendam salubrem humilitatem. Prius veniat piscator. Per ipsum melius adducitur imperator".

Nisi credideritis non intellegitis.

7. Mementote ergo piscatorem sanctum, iustum, bonum, Christo plenum, ad cuius missa per mundum retia capiendus cum ceteris etiam populus iste pertinuit. Ergo mementote eum dixisse: Habemus certiore propheticum sermonem 14. Da mihi ergo ad illam controversiam iudicem Prophetam. Quid inter nos agebatur? Tu dicebas: "Intellegam ut credam". Ego dicebam: "Ut intellegas crede". Nata est controversia, veniamus ad iudicem, iudicet Propheta, immo vero Deus iudicet per Prophetam. Ambo taceamus. Quid ambo dixerimus, auditum est. "Intellegam inquis, ut credam". "Crede, inquam ut intellegas". Respondeat Propheta: Nisi credideritis, non intellegitis 15.

8. Putatis autem, carissimi, nihil dicere etiam illum qui dicit: "Intellegam ut credam"? Quid enim nunc agimus, nisi ut credant, non qui non credunt, sed qui adhuc parum credunt? Nam si nullo modo credidissent, hic non essent. Fides eos adduxit, ut audiant. Fides eos fecit praesentes verbo Dei, sed ipsa fides quae germinavit irriganda est, nutrienda est, roboranda est. Hoc est quod agimus. Ego, inquit, plantavi, Apollo rigavit, sed Deus incrementum

the world God chose, to confound the strong; and the foolish things of the world God chose, to confound the wise; and the ignoble things of the world and the contemptible ones God chose, and things that are not, as though they were, that the things that are might be made void (1 Cor 1:26-28). You see, if Christ had begun by choosing an orator, the orator would say, "I was chosen for the sake of my eloquence." If he had chosen a senator, the senator would say, "I was chosen because of my rank." Finally, if he had first chosen the emperor, the emperor would have said, "I was chosen because of my authority." All these types have to keep quiet for a little while and be put on one side; let them keep quiet—they are not being left out, they are not being ignored, they are just being put on one side for a time, in that they are likely to boast about themselves in themselves.†5 "Give me," he says, "that fisherman, give me a common man, give me an uneducated man, give me one whom the senator doesn't deign to talk to, not even when he's buying fish. That's the one to give me," he says. "If I fill that one, it will be obvious that it's I who am doing it. Though I am also going to do it with the senator and the orator and the emperor; some time or other I am going to do it with the senator, though it's more certainly me with the fisherman. The senator is in a position to boast about himself, so is the orator, so is the emperor. The fisherman isn't in a position to boast about anything except Christ. Let him come first, to give a salutary lesson in humility. Let the fisherman come first; the emperor is best brought along through him."

Unless you believe, you shall not understand

7. So remember this fisherman, this holy, just and good man, filled with Christ, in whose nets cast throughout the world this people too, along with all the rest, was destined to be caught.†6 So remember that he said, We have more certain the prophetic word. So therefore, give me a prophet to act as judge in that argument. What were we arguing about? You were saying "Let me understand in order to believe"; I was saying "In order to understand, believe." An argument has arisen, let us put it before a judge, let a prophet judge, or rather let God judge through a prophet. Let's both of us keep silent. What we have each said has been heard: "Let me understand," you say, "in order to believe." "Believe," say I, "in order to understand." Let the prophet make his reply: "Unless you believe, you shall not understand" (Is 7:9).

8. Do you imagine, beloved, that the one who says "Let me understand, in order to believe" is really saying nothing very much? After all, what are we on about now, but getting people to believe—not those who don't believe at all, but those who do, though still not enough. If they didn't believe at all, they wouldn't be here. It's faith that brought them here, to listen. Faith brought them into the presence of the word of God, but this faith which has sprouted needs to be watered, nourished,

dedit. Itaque neque qui plantat est aliquid, neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat Deus 16. Loquendo, hortando, docendo, suadendo plantare possumus et rigare, non autem incrementum dare. Noverat autem ille cum quo loquebatur, qui fidei suae germinanti et adhuc tenerae et adhuc infirmae et ex magna parte titubanti, non tamen nullae fidei, sed alicui fidei adiutorem orabat, cui dicebat: Credo Domine 17.

Credo, Domine; adiuva incredulitatem meam.

9. Modo cum Evangelium legeretur, audistis: Si potes credere, ait Dominus Iesus patri pueri, si potes credere, omniaabilia sunt credenti 18. Et ille intuens semetipsum, et positus ante semetipsum, non habens temerariam confidentiam sed prius discutiens conscientiam vidit in se esse aliquam fidem, vidit et titubationem. Utrumque vidit. Unum se habere confessus est, et altero adiutorium postulavit. Credo, inquit, Domine. Quid sequebatur, nisi: "Adiuva fidem meam"? Non hoc dixit: Credo Domine 19. Video hic aliquid unde non mentior. Credo, verum dico. Sed video hic etiam nescio quid, quod mihi displiceat. Stare volo, sed adhuc nuto. Stans loquor, non eccidi, quia credo. Sed tamen adhuc nuto: Adiuva incredulitatem meam 20. Ergo, carissimi, et ille quem contra me constitui, et propter cuius controversiam inter nos natam Prophetam iudicem postulavi, non nihil dicit etiam ipse, cum dicit: "Intellegam ut credam". Nam utique modo quod loquor, ad hoc loquor ut credant qui nondum credunt. Et tamen nisi quod loquor intellegant, credere non possunt, Ergo ex aliqua parte verum est quod ille dicit: "Intellegam ut credam", et ego qui dico, Sicut dicit Propheta: "Immo crede ut intellegas", verum dicimus, concordemus. Ergo intellege ut credas, crede ut intellegas. Breviter dico quomodo utrumque sine controversia accipiamus. Intellege, ut credas, verbum meum; crede, ut intellegas, verbum Dei.

strengthened. That's what we are concerned with right now. I, he said, planted, Apollo watered, but it is God who gave the increase. So neither the one who plants is anything, nor the one who waters, but God who gives the increase (1 Cor 3:6-7). By speaking, exhorting, teaching, persuading I can plant and water, but I cannot give the increase. That man he was talking to, who asked him to help his faith, which was budding and still tender and still weak and really very hesitant, but some sort of faith for all that and not no faith at all—he knew who it was to whom he said, I believe, Lord (Mk 9:23).

Help my unbelief

9. Just now when the gospel was being read, you heard If you can believe—the Lord Jesus said to the boy's father, If you can believe, all things are possible to one who believes (Mk 9:23).†7 And the man took a look at himself, and standing in front of himself, not in a spirit of brash self-satisfaction but first examining his conscience, he saw that he did have some faith in him, and he also saw that it was tottering. He saw both things. He confessed he had one, and he begged for help for the other. I believe, Lord, he says. What was to follow, if not “Help my faith”? That's not what he said. “I believe, Lord. I can see this something in me, which I'm not lying about. I believe; I'm telling the truth. But I also see this other heaven knows what, and I don't like it. I want to stand, I'm still staggering. I'm standing and speaking, I haven't fallen, because I believe. But yet I'm still staggering: Help my unbelief” (Mk 9:24). And so, beloved, that other man too whom I set up against myself, calling in the prophet as referee because of the argument that arose between us, he too isn't saying just nothing when he says “Let me understand, in order to believe.” Of course, what I am now saying, I am saying to help those people believe who do not yet believe. And yet, unless they understand what I am saying, they cannot believe.†8 So what this person says is partly true—“Let me understand, in order to believe”; and I on my side, when I say, just as the prophet says, “On the contrary, believe, in order to understand,” am speaking the truth. Let's come to an agreement, then. So: understand, in order to believe; believe, in order to understand. I'll put it in a nutshell, how we can accept both without argument: Understand, in order to believe, my word; believe, in order to understand, the word of God.

Epistola 120 (410)

Loca difficilia A. explananda suscipit.

1. 1. Ego propterea ut ad nos venires rogavi, quoniam in libris tuis valde sum tuo delectatus ingenio. Proinde volui ut quaedam nostra opuscula, quae arbitratus sum tibi esse necessaria, non procul a nobis positus, sed potius apud nos legeres, ut ea

Letter 120

Augustine to Consentius

1, 1. I asked you to come to visit us precisely because I was greatly pleased with your talent revealed in your books. Hence I wanted you to read certain small works of ours, which I thought to be very useful for you, not while you were situated far from us, but rather in our presence. In that way you could,

quae forte minus intellexisses, non difficulter praesens interrogares, atque ex nostra sermocinatione mutuoque colloquio, quantum Dominus et nobis promere, et tibi capere tribuisset, quid in libris tuis emendandum esset, ipse cognosceres, ipse emendares. Eius quippe es facultatis, ut possis ea quae senseris explicare; eius porro probitatis et humilitatis, ut merearis vera sentire. Et nunc in eadem sum, quae nec tibi debet displicere, sententia; unde te nuper admonui ut in his quae a nobis elaborata apud te legis, signa facias ad ea loca quae te movent, et cum his ad me venias, et de singulis quaeras. Nondum quae fecisti exhortor ut facias. Recte quippe verecundareris, ac te pigeret id agere, si vel semel voluisses, et me difficilem repperisses. Illud quoque dixeram, cum a te audissem quod mendosissimis fatigareris codicibus, ut in nostris legeres, quos emendatiores posses caeteris invenire.

Nec fides nec ratio respuenda.

1. 2. Quod autem petis, ut quaestionem Trinitatis, hoc est de unitate divinitatis et discrezione personarum, caute prudenterque discutiam, ut doctrinae meae, sicut dicis, ingeniique serenitas, ita nebulam vestrae mentis abstergat, ut quod nunc cogitare non potestis, intellegentiae a me lumine declaratum oculis quodammodo videre possitis: vide prius utrum ista petitio cum tua superiori definitione concordet. Superius quippe in eadem ipsa epistola, in qua hoc petis, apud te ipsum definisse te dicis, ex fide veritatem magis quam ex ratione percipi oportere. "Si enim fides, inquis, sanctae Ecclesiae ex disputationis ratione, et non ex credulitatis pietate apprehenderetur, nemo praeter philosophos atque oratores beatitudinem possideret. Sed quia placuit, inquis: Deo, qui infirma huius mundi elegit ut confunderet fortia, per stultitiam praedicationi salvos facere credentes 1, non tam ratio requirenda, quam auctoritas est sequenda sanctorum". Vide ergo secundum haec verba tua, ne potius debeas, maxime de hac re, in qua praecipue fides nostra consistit, solam sanctorum auctoritatem sequi, nec eius intellegentiae a me quaerere rationem. Neque enim cum coepero te in tanti huius secreti intellegentiam utcumque introducere (quod nisi Deus intus adiuverit, omnino non potero), aliud disserendo facturus sum, quam rationem ut potero redditurus: quam si a me, vel a quolibet doctore non irrationabiliter flagitas, ut quod credis intellegas, corrige definitionem tuam, non ut fidem respuas, sed

while present, ask without any difficulty about those ideas that you might perhaps understand less well, and from our discussion and conversation with each other you yourself would recognize and you yourself would correct, to the extent that the Lord granted me to explain and you to grasp, what needed correction in your books. You certainly have the ability to explain what you held; you also have the goodness and humility to merit to hold the truth. And I am now of the same opinion, which ought not to displease you either. For this reason I recently advised you that in these works of ours, which you are reading at home, you should make marks at those passages that trouble you and that you should come to me with them and ask about each of them. I urge you to do what you have not yet done. You would be right, of course, to be shy and to hesitate to do this if you had chosen to do so even once and had found me difficult. I had also said, when I heard from you that you were tired of very defective manuscripts, that you should read ours, which you would discover have fewer errors than the others.

2. But you ask that I carefully and prudently discuss the question of the Trinity, that is, of the unity of the divinity and the distinction of the persons, in order that the clarity of my teaching and mind may, as you put it, wipe away the fog of your mind so that you may be able to see somehow with your eyes what you cannot now imagine, after I have clarified it by the light of intelligence. See first whether this request is in harmony with your earlier conviction. Earlier in the same letter in which you make this request, you say that you had determined for yourself that "the truth about things divine must be attained more by faith than by reason. For," you say, "if the faith of the holy Church were grasped by reasoned argumentation and not by pious belief, no one except philosophers and professors would possess happiness. But because it pleased God, who chose the weak things of this world in order to confound the strong,†1 to save through the foolishness of preaching those who believe,†2 we should not so much require reasoning concerning God as we should follow the authority of the saints."†3 See, then, whether in accord with your words you ought not rather, especially on this topic in which above all our faith consists, to follow only the authority of the saints and not ask of me a rational account in order to understand it. For, when I begin to introduce you to some extent to an understanding of this mystery--and if God does not help interiorly, I shall be utterly unable to do so--I shall do nothing else in my explanation than give a rational account to the extent I am able. And if you not unreasonably demand of me or of any teacher that you may understand what you believe, correct your conviction, not so that you reject faith, but so that what you already hold with the firmness of faith you may also see with the light of reason.

ut ea quae fidei firmitate iam tenes, etiam rationis luce conspicias.

Fides rationem praecedat oportet.

1. 3. Absit namque ut hoc in nobis Deus oderit, in quo nos reliquis animantibus excellentiores creavit. Absit, inquam, ut ideo credamus, ne rationem accipiamus sive quaeramus; cum etiam credere non possemus, nisi rationales animas haberemus. Ut ergo in quibusdam rebus ad doctrinam salutarem pertinentibus, quas ratione nondum percipere valemus, sed aliquando valebimus, fides praecedat rationem, qua cor mundetur, ut magnae rationis capiat et perferat lucem, hoc utique rationis est. Et ideo rationabiliter dictum est per prophetam: Nisi credideritis, non intellegitis 2. Ubi procul dubio discrevit haec duo, deditque consilium quo prius credamus, ut id quod credimus intellegere valeamus. Proinde ut fides praecedat rationem, rationabiliter iussum est. Nam si hoc praeceptum rationabile non est, ergo irrationabile est: absit. Si igitur rationabile est ut ad magna quaedam, quae capi nondum possunt, fides praecedat rationem, procul dubio quantulacumque ratio quae hoc persuadet, etiam ipsa antecedit fidem.

Quomodo ratio de fide danda sit.

1. 4. Propterea monet apostolus Petrus, paratos nos esse debere ad responsionem omni poscenti nos rationem de fide et spe nostra 3: quoniam si a me infidelis rationem poscit fidei et spei meae, et video quod antequam credat capere non potest, hanc ipsam ei reddo rationem in qua, si fieri potest, videat quam praepostere ante fidem poscat rationem earum rerum quas capere non potest. Si autem iam fidelis rationem poscat, ut quod credit intellegat, capacitas eius intuenda est, ut secundum eam ratione reddita, sumat fidei suae quantam potest intellegentiam; maiorem, si plus capit; minorem, si minus: dum tamen quousque ad plenitudinem cognitionis perfectionemque perveniat, ab itinere fidei non recedat. Hinc est quod dicit Apostolus: Et tamen si quid aliter sapitis, id quoque vobis Deus revelabit; verumtamen in quod pervenimus, in eo ambulemus 4. Iam ergo si fideles sumus, ad fidei viam pervenimus, quam si non dimiserimus, non solum ad tantam intellegentiam rerum incorporearum et incommutabilium, quanta in hac vita capi non ab omnibus potest, verum etiam ad summitatem contemplationis, quam dicit Apostolus, facie ad faciem 5, sine dubitatione perveniemus. Nam quidam

3. Heaven forbid, after all, that God should hate in us that by which he made us more excellent than the other animals. Heaven forbid, I say, that we should believe in such a way that we do not accept or seek a rational account, since we could not even believe if we did not have rational souls. In certain matters, therefore, pertaining to the teaching of salvation, which we cannot yet grasp by reason, but which we will be able to at some point, faith precedes reason so that the heart may be purified in order that it may receive and sustain the light of the great reason, which is, of course, a demand of reason! And so, the prophet stated quite reasonably, Unless you believe, you will not understand (Is 7:9 LXX). There he undoubtedly distinguished these two and gave the counsel that we should believe first in order that we may be able to understand what we believe. Hence it was reasonably commanded that faith should precede reason. For, if this command is not reasonable it is, therefore, unreasonable. Heaven forbid! If, then, it is reasonable that faith precede reason with respect to certain great truths that cannot yet be grasped, however slight the reason is that persuades us to this, it undoubtedly also comes before faith.

4. Hence the apostle Peter warns that we should be ready to respond to everyone who asks us for an account of our faith and hope†4 because, if an unbeliever asks me for an account of my faith and hope and I see that, before he believes, he cannot grasp it, I give him this very argument by which he may, if possible, see how preposterous it is to demand before faith an account of those things that he cannot grasp. But if a believer asks for an account in order that he may understand what he believes, we must look at his ability in order that, when an account has been given in accord with it, he may derive as great an understanding of his faith as is possible: a greater understanding if he grasps more, a smaller understanding if he grasps less. Yet until he comes to the fullness and perfection of knowledge, let him not depart from the journey of faith. This is the reason why the apostle says, And even if you have some other ideas, God will also reveal it to you; let us, nonetheless, continue to walk in the path to which we have come (Phil 3:15-16). If, then, we are already believers, we have come to the way of faith, and, if we do not give it up, we shall undoubtedly come not only to as great an understanding of incorporeal and immutable things as can be grasped in this life, though not by all, but also to the peak of contemplation, which the apostle calls face to face (1 Cor 13:12). For certain people, even the simplest who, nonetheless, walk with great perseverance in the path of faith, come to that most blessed contemplation. But there are those who somehow already know what the invisible, immutable, incorporeal nature is and refuse to hold onto the way that leads to so great an abode of happiness, because it seems foolish to them. That

etiam minimi, et tamen in via fidei perseverantissime gradientes, ad illam beatissimam contemplationem perveniunt: quidam vero quid sit natura invisibilis, incommutabilis, incorporea, utcumque iam scientes, et viam quae ducit ad tantae beatitudinis mansionem, quoniam stulta illis videtur, quod est Christus crucifixus, tenere recusantes, ad quietis ipsius penetrabile, cuius iam luce mens eorum velut in longinqua radiante perstringitur, pervenire non possunt.

Quorundam mysteriorum ratio cur nequeat reddi.

1. 5. Sunt autem quaedam, quae cum audierimus, non eis accommodamus fidem, et ratione nobis reddita vera esse cognoscimus, quae credere non valemus. Et universa Dei miracula ideo ab infidelibus non creduntur, quia eorum ratio non videtur. Et revera sunt de quibus ratio reddi non potest, non tamen non est: quid enim est in rerum natura, quod irrationabiliter fecerit Deus? Sed quorundam mirabilium operum eius, etiam expedit tantisper occultam esse rationem, ne apud animos fastidio languidos, eiusdem rationis cognitione vilescant. Sunt enim, et multi sunt qui plus tenentur admiratione rerum quam cognitione causarum, ubi miracula mira esse desistunt, et opus est eos ad invisibilium fidem visibilibus mirabilibus excitari, ut caritate purgati, eo perveniant ubi familiaritate veritatis mirari desistant. Nam et in theatris homines funambulium mirantur, musicis delectantur: in illo stupet difficultas; in his retinet pascitque iucunditas.

Integra ratio ad fidem perducit.

1. 6. Haec dixerim, ut fidem tuam ad amorem intelligentiae cohorter, ad quam ratio vera perducit, et cui fides animum praeparat. Nam illa quae persuasit, in ea Trinitate quae est Deus, Filium Patri non esse coaeternum, vel alterius esse substantiae, atque aliqua parte dissimilem, et eo modo inferiorem Spiritum sanctum; itemque illa quae persuasit, Patrem et Filium unius eiusdemque, Spiritum vero sanctum alterius esse substantiae, non ideo quia ratio est, sed quia falsa ratio est, cavenda et detestanda dicenda est. Nam si ratio vera esset, non utique errasset. Quapropter sicut non ideo debes omnem vitare sermonem, quia est et sermo falsus; ita non debes omnem vitare rationem, quia est et falsa ratio. Hoc et de sapientia dixerim. Neque enim propterea sapientia vitanda est, quia est et falsa sapientia, cui stultitia est Christus crucifixus, qui est Dei Virtus, et Dei Sapientia 6: et ideo per hanc

way is Christ crucified. And hence they cannot arrive at the temple of that rest by the light of which their mind is now touched as it sheds its ray from afar.

5. There are, however, certain things to which, when we hear them, we do not give credence, and after a rational account has been given, we know that those things that we cannot believe are true. None of God's miracles are believed by those without faith precisely because they do not see their rational explanation. And there really are some for which a rational explanation cannot be given, though there is one. After all, what is there in the world that God has created without a reason? But it is even beneficial that the reason for some of his marvelous works is to some extent hidden so that the knowledge of that same reason does not make them seem worthless in the minds of the bored and jaded. For there are not only a few, but many, who are drawn more by a wonder over things than by a knowledge of their causes, which makes miracles cease to be sources of amazement. And it is necessary to arouse them to a faith in invisible things by visible miracles in order that, having been purified by love, they may come to where they cease to be filled with wonder because of familiarity with the truth. For human beings are filled with wonder at the tightrope walker in a theater, and they are delighted by musicians. In the first case they are awed by the difficulty; in the latter the sweetness of the sounds holds and nourishes them.

6. I wanted to say these things in order to encourage your faith toward a love for the understanding to which true reasoning leads and for which faith prepares the minds. For there is a reasoning that leads to the belief that, in that Trinity which is God, the Son is not coeternal with the Father or is of another substance and the Holy Spirit is unlike in some respect and in that way inferior. So, too, there is a reasoning that leads to the belief that the Father and the Son are of the same substance but the Holy Spirit is of another substance. Such reasoning, it must be said, is to be shunned and detested not because it is reasoning but because it is false reasoning. For, if the reasoning were true, it would not, of course, have fallen into error. Hence, just as you ought not to avoid all speech because there is also speech that is false, so you ought not to avoid all reasoning because there is also reasoning that is false. I would say this of wisdom as well. After all, wisdom is not to be avoided because there is also wisdom that is false, a wisdom for which Christ crucified is foolishness,†5 though he is the power of God and the wisdom of God.†6 And so through this foolishness of preaching it pleased God to save those who believe, because the foolishness of God is wiser than human beings.†7 Certain philosophers and professors who were following not the true way but one like the truth, and who were

stultitiam praedicationis placuit Deo salvos facere credentes, quoniam quod stultum est Dei, sapientius est hominibus 7. Hoc quibusdam philosophorum et oratorum, non veram viam, sed veri similem sectantibus, et in ea seipsos aliosque fallentibus, persuaderi non potuit; quibusdam vero eorum potuit. Et quibus potuit, neque scandalum est Christus crucifixus, neque stultitia; in iis enim sunt, quibus vocatis Iudaeis et Graecis, Dei Virtus est et Dei Sapientia 8. In qua via, id est in cuius Christi crucifixi fide, qui eius rectitudinem per Dei gratiam comprehendere potuerunt, etsi philosophi appellati sunt, sive oratores, profecto humili pietate confessi sunt, sibi longe excellentius in ea fuisse praevios piscatores, non solum credendi firmissimo robore, verum etiam intellegendi certissima veritate. Cum enim didicissent, ad hoc electa stulta esse mundi et infirma, ut fortia et sapientia confunderentur 9, seque cognovissent fallaciter sapere, et imbecilliter praevalere; confusi salubriter, facti sunt stulti et infirmi, ut per stultum et infirmum Dei, quod sapientius et fortius est hominibus, inter electa stulta et infirma fierent veraciter sapientes et efficaciter fortes.

Dei Trinitas minime fingi aut cogitari potest.

2. 7. Cui autem nisi verissimae rationi fidelis pietas erubescit, ut quamdam idololatricam, quam in corde nostro ex consuetudine visibilium constituere conatur humanae cogitationis infirmitas, non dubitemus evertere; nec audeamus credere ita esse Trinitatem, quam invisibilem et incorpoream atque incommutabilem colimus, quasi tres quasdam viventes moles, licet maximas et pulcherrimas, suorum tamen locorum spatii propriis terminatas, et sibimet in suis locis contigua propinquitate cohaerentes, sive una earum sic in medio constituta, ut duas dirimat sibi ex lateribus singulis iunctas, sive in modum trigoni duas caeteras unaquaeque contingat, ut nulla ab aliqua separetur; earumque trium tantarum ac talium personarum, licet in grandi valde, molibus tamen a summo et imo et circumquaque terminatarum, unam esse divinitatem aliquam quartam, nec talem qualis est aliqua ex illis, sed communem omnibus tamquam numen omnium, et in omnibus et in singulis totum, per quam unam divinitatem dicatur eadem Trinitas unus Deus; eiusque tres personas nusquam esse nisi in coelis, illam vero divinitatem nusquam non esse, sed ubique praesentem: ac per hoc recte quidem dici, Deum et in coelo esse et in terra, propter illam divinitatem quae ubique sit tribusque communis; non autem

misleading themselves and others by it, could not be convinced of this, but some of them could be. And, for those who could be, Christ crucified is neither a scandal nor foolishness; they are, after all, among the Jews and Greeks who have been called and for whom he is the power of God and the wisdom of God.†8 On that way, that is, in the faith of Christ crucified, those who were able to grasp its correctness by the grace of God, even if they were called philosophers or professors, certainly confessed with humble piety that fishermen had preceded them, who were more excellent than they were not only by the most firm strength of believing but also by the most certain truth of understanding. For when they learned that the foolish and weak of the world were chosen in order to confound the strong and the wise,†9 and when they realized that they were wise with false wisdom and strong with a feeble strength, they were confounded with a saving confusion, and they became foolish and weak in order that through the foolishness and weakness of God, which is wiser and stronger than human beings, they might become truly wise and really strong among the foolish and weak whom God has chosen.

2, 7. Faithful piety, however, respects only the truest reason so that we do not hesitate to overthrow a certain idolatry that the weakness of human thought tries to build up in our heart because of our familiarity with visible things and so that we do not dare to believe that the invisible, incorporeal, immutable Trinity, which we worship, is like three living masses, though very large and beautiful, each bounded by the limits of its own space and clinging to one another by close proximity in their places. It makes no difference whether one of them is located in the middle so that it separates the two joined to it on each side or whether, arranged like a triangle, each touches the others so that none is separated from another. We do not dare to believe that those three great and good persons, though in very great masses, still bounded on top, on the bottom, and on every side, have the one divinity as a fourth something, not like one of them, but common to all of them as the deity of all, whole in all and in each one, and that because of this one divinity the same Trinity is said to be one God. We do not dare to believe that its three persons are nowhere but in the heavens, while that divinity is absent nowhere but is present everywhere. We do not dare to believe that for this reason it is correct to say that God is both in heaven and on earth on account of that divinity that is everywhere and common to the three, but that it is not correct to say that the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit is on earth, since this Trinity has its abode only in heaven. When true reason begins to undermine this construction and vain figment of carnal thinking, let us immediately hasten, with the interior help and enlightenment of him who does not want to dwell in our hearts along with such idols, to smash them and to shake them from our faith so

recte dici, Patrem esse in terra vel Filium vel Spiritum sanctum, cum huic Trinitati sedes non nisi in coelo sit. Istam cogitationis carnalis compositionem vanumque figmentum ubi vera ratio labefactare incipit, continuo illo intus adiuvante atque illuminante, qui cum talibus idolis in corde nostro habitare non vult, ita ista confingere atque a fide nostra quodammodo excutere festinamus, ut ne pulverem quidem ullum talium phantasmatum illic remanere patiamur.

Quomodo fides se habeat: a) ad rationem;

2. 8. Quamobrem nisi rationem disputationis, qua forinsecus admoniti, ipsa intrinsecus veritate lucente, haec falsa esse perspicimus, fides in corde nostro antecessisset, quae nos indueret pietate, nonne incassum quae vera sunt audiremus? Ac per hoc quoniam id quod ad eam pertinebat fides egit, ideo subsequens ratio aliquid eorum quae inquirebat invenit. Falsae itaque rationi, non solum ratio vera, qua id quod credimus intellegimus, verum etiam fides ipsa rerum nondum intellectarum sine dubio praeferenda est. Melius est enim quamvis nondum visum, credere quod verum est, quam putare te verum videre quod falsum est. Habet namque fides oculos suos, quibus quodammodo videt verum esse quod nondum videt, et quibus certissime videt, nondum se videre quod credit. Porro autem qui vera ratione iam quod tantummodo credebat intellegit, profecto praeponendus est ei qui cupit adhuc intellegere quod credit; si autem nec cupit, et ea quae intellegenda sunt, credenda tantummodo existimat, cui rei fides prosit ignorat: nam pia fides sine spe et sine caritate esse non vult. Sic igitur homo fidelis debet credere quod nondum videt, ut visionem et speret et amet.

b) ad visibilia atque invisibilia;

2. 9. Et visibilium quidem rerum praeteritarum, quae temporaliter transierunt, sola fides est, quoniam non adhuc videnda sperantur, sed facta et transacta creduntur; sicut est illud, quod Christus semel pro peccatis nostris mortuus est et resurrexit, nec iam moritur, et mors ei ultra non dominabitur 10. Ea vero quae nondum sunt, sed futura sunt, sicut nostrorum spiritalium corporum resurrectio, ita creduntur ut etiam videnda sperentur; sed ostendi modo nullo possunt modo. Quae vero ita sunt ut neque praetereant, neque futura sint, sed aeterna permaneant, partim sunt invisibilia, sicut iustitia, sicut sapientia; partim visibilia, sicut Christi

that we allow not even any dust of such phantasms to remain there.

8. Hence, in order to clothe us with piety, faith had to precede in our heart the reasoned argumentation by which, once we have been admonished externally, we see that these ideas are false because the truth shines interiorly. If faith had not come first, would we not have heard the truth to no purpose? And for this reason, because faith did what pertained to it, reason followed along and found some of those things that it was seeking. We ought undoubtedly, therefore, to prefer to false reasoning not only the reasoning by which we understand what we believe but also the very faith in those things we have not yet understood. For it is better to believe what is true, though it is not yet seen, than to think you see something true, which is in fact false. For faith has eyes of its own by which it somehow sees that what it does not yet see is true and by which it most certainly sees that it does not yet see what it believes. But one who now understands by true reason what he before only believed should certainly be preferred to one who still desires to understand what he believes. But if he does not even desire to understand and thinks that those things which should be understood ought only to be believed, he does not know the benefit faith brings. For pious faith does not want to be without hope and love. A believer, therefore, ought to believe what he does not yet see in such a way that he both hopes for and loves that vision.

9. And for past visible events, which have passed away in time, there is only faith, because we no longer hope to see them but believe that they happened and passed away. Such is the fact that Christ once died for our sins and rose, that he now no longer dies, and that death will no longer have dominion over him.†10 But we believe in those events that are not yet, but are future, such as the resurrection of our spiritual bodies, in such a way that we also hope that we will see them. Yet we can now in no way point to them. Those things that exist so that they neither pass away nor are in the future, but last eternally, however, are in part invisible, like justice and like wisdom, and they are in part visible, like the body of Christ, which is now immortal. But invisible things are perceived when they are understood, and for this reason they are seen in a manner appropriate to them. And when they are seen, they are much more certain than those things that the senses of the body attain, but they are called “invisible” because they cannot be seen at all by these mortal eyes. But those lasting things that are visible can, if they are shown to us, be perceived even by these mortal eyes. In that way the Lord showed himself to the disciples after the resurrection,†11 and in that way he showed himself to the apostle Paul†12 and the deacon Stephen after the ascension.†13

immortale iam corpus: sed invisibilia intellecta conspiciuntur, ac per hoc et ipsa modo quodam sibi congruo videntur; et cum videntur, multo certiora sunt quam ea quae corporis sensus attingit, sed ideo dicuntur invisibilia, quia oculis istis mortalibus videri omnino non possunt. At illa quae visibilia sunt permanentia, possunt, si ostendantur, etiam his mortalibus oculis conspici; sicut se Discipulis post resurrectionem Dominus ostendit 11, sicut etiam post ascensionem apostolo Paulo 12, et Stephano diacono 13.

c) ad aeterna atque invisibilia.

2. 10. Proinde ista visibilia permanentia ita credimus, ut etiamsi non demonstrantur, speremus ea nos quandoque visuros; nec ea conemur ratione vel intellectu comprehendere, nisi ut ea, quia visibilia sunt, ab invisibilibus distinctius cogitemus: et cum cogitatione qualia sint imaginamur, satis utique novimus ea nobis nota non esse. Nam et Antiochiam cogito incognitam, sed non sicut Carthaginem cognitam. Illam quippe visionem cogitatio mea fingit, hanc recolit; nequaquam tamen dubito, sive quod de illa testibus multis, sive quod de ista meis aspectibus credidi. Iustitiam vero et sapientiam et quidquid eiusmodi est, non aliter imaginamur, aliter contuemur; sed haec invisibilia simplici mentis atque rationis intentione intellecta conspiciamus, sine ullis formis et molibus corporalibus, sine ullis lineamentis figurisque membrorum, sine ullis localibus sive finitis sive spatiis infinitis. Ipsumque lumen, quo cuncta ista discernimus, in quo nobis satis apparet quid credamus incognitum, quid cognitum teneamus, quam formam corporis recordemur, quam cogitatione fingamus, quid corporis sensus attingat, quid imaginetur animus simile corpori, quid certum et omnium corporum dissimillimum intellegentia contempletur: hoc ergo lumen ubi haec cuncta diiudicantur, non utique, sicut huius solis et cuiusque corporei luminis fulgor, per localia spatia circumquaque diffunditur, mentemque nostram quasi visibili candore illustrat, sed invisibiliter et ineffabiliter, et tamen intellegibiliter lucet, tamque nobis certum est, quam nobis efficit certa quae secundum ipsum cuncta conspiciamus.

10. Hence we believe in these lasting visible things so that, even if they are not shown to us, we hope that we will at some time see them, and we do not try to grasp them by reason or intellect except in order that we might think of them as more distinct from invisible things, since they are visible. And when in thought we imagine what they are, we know quite well that we do not know them. For I think of Antioch, which I do not know, but not in the way in which I think of Carthage, which I do know. For my thinking fashions for itself that former vision, but recalls the latter; I in no way, nonetheless, doubt what I have believed about the former on the basis of many witnesses or what I have believed about the latter on the basis of my own eyes. But we do not imagine justice and wisdom and other things of that sort in one way and gaze upon them in another, but we perceive these invisible things, which are understood by the simple attention of the mind and reason, without any bodily forms or masses, without any lines or shapes of members, without an spatial areas, whether finite or infinite. The very light by which we distinguish all these, in which it is quite clear to us what we believe though it is unknown, what we hold as known, what form of a body we recall and what we make up in thought, what the sense of the body attains and what the mind imagines like a body, what the intelligence contemplates as certain and utterly unlike all bodies--this light, then, in which all these things are distinguished is not, of course, poured out like the brightness of this sun or of any bodily light through stretches of space and in every direction. And it does not illumine our mind as if by a visible splendor but invisibly and ineffably, and it shines, nonetheless, in an intelligible manner. It is as certain for us as it makes certain for us what we see in accord with it.

In Evangelium Ioannis tractatus (406-421)

Intellegere vis? Crede.

Tractates on the Gospel of John

29.6. *Si intelleximus, Deo gratias: si quis autem parum intellexit, fecit homo quo usque potuit, caetera videat unde speret. Forinsecus ut operarii possumus plantare et rigare, sed Dei est incrementum dare* 6. *Mea, inquit, doctrina non est mea, sed eius qui misit me. Audiat consilium, qui dicit: Nondum intellexi. Magna quippe res et profunda cum fuisset dicta, vidit utique ipse Dominus Christus hoc tam profundum non omnes intellecturos, et in consequenti dedit consilium. Intellegere vis? crede. Deus enim per prophetam dixit: Nisi credideritis, non intellegetis* 7. *Ad hoc pertinet quod etiam hic Dominus secutus adiunxit: Si quis voluerit voluntatem eius facere, cognoscat de doctrina, utrum ex Deo sit, an ego a meipso loquar* 8. *Quid est hoc: Si quis voluerit voluntatem eius facere? Sed ego dixeram: Si quis crediderit; et hoc consilium dederam. Si non intellexisti, inquam, crede. Intellectus enim merces est fidei. Ergo noli quaerere intellegere ut credas, sed crede ut intellegas; quoniam nisi credideritis, non intellegetis. Cum ergo ad possibilitatem intellegendi consilium dederim obedientiam credendi, et dixerim Dominum Iesum Christum hoc ipsum adiunxisse in consequenti sententia, invenimus eum dixisse: Si quis voluerit voluntatem eius facere, cognoscat de doctrina. Quid est, cognoscat? Hoc est intellegere. Quod est autem: Si quis voluerit voluntatem eius facere, hoc est credere. Sed quia cognoscat, hoc est intellegere, omnes intellegunt: quia vero quod ait: Si quis voluerit voluntatem eius facere, hoc pertinet ad credere, ut diligentius intellegatur, opus est nobis ipso Domino nostro expositore, ut indicet nobis utrum revera ad credere pertineat facere voluntatem Patris eius. Quis nesciat hoc esse facere voluntatem Dei, operari opus eius, id est, quod illi placet? Ipse autem Dominus aperte alio loco dicit: Hoc est opus Dei, ut credatis in eum quem ille misit* 9. *Ut credatis in eum; non, ut credatis ei. Sed si creditis in eum, creditis ei: non autem continuo qui credit ei, credit in eum. Nam et daemones credebant ei, et non credebant in eum. Rursus etiam de Apostolis ipsius possumus dicere: Credimus Paulo; sed non: Credimus in Paulum: Credimus Petro; sed non: Credimus in Petrum. Credenti enim in eum qui iustificat impium, deputatur fides eius ad iustitiam* 10. *Quid est ergo credere in eum? Credendo amare, credendo diligere, credendo in eum ire, et eius membris incorporari. Ipsa est ergo fides quam de nobis exigit Deus: et non invenit quod exigit, nisi donaverit quod inveniat. Quae fides, nisi quam definivit alio loco Apostolus plenissime dicens: Neque circumcisio aliquid valet, neque praeputium,*

29.6. If we have understood this, thanks be to God; but if any has not sufficiently understood, man has done as far as he could: as for the rest, let him see whence he may hope to understand. As laborers outside, we can plant and water; but it is of God to give the increase. "My doctrine," says He, "is not mine, but His that sent me." Let him who says he has not yet understood hear counsel. For since it was a great and profound matter that had been spoken, the Lord Christ Himself did certainly see that all would not understand this so profound a matter, and He gave counsel in the sequel. Do you wish to understand? Believe. For God has said by the prophet: "Unless you believe, you shall not understand." Isaiah 7:9 To the same purpose what the Lord here also added as He went on — "If any man is willing to do His will, he shall know concerning the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from myself." What is the meaning of this, "If any man be willing to do His will"? But I had said, if any man believe; and I gave this counsel: If you have not understood, said I, believe. For understanding is the reward of faith. Therefore do not seek to understand in order to believe, but believe that you may understand; since, "except ye believe, you shall not understand." Therefore when I would counsel the obedience of believing toward the possibility of understanding, and say that our Lord Jesus Christ has added this very thing in the following sentence, we find Him to have said, "If any man be willing to do His will, he shall know of the doctrine." What is "he shall know"? It is the same thing as "he shall understand." But what is "If any man be willing to do His will"? It is the same thing as to believe. All men indeed perceive that "shall know" is the same thing as "shall understand." but that the saying, "If any man be willing to do His will," refers to believing, all do not perceive; to perceive this more accurately, we need the Lord Himself for expounder, to show us whether the doing of the Father's will does in reality refer to believing. But who does not know that this is to do the will of God, to work the work of God; that is, to work that work which is pleasing to Him? But the Lord Himself says openly in another place: "This is the work of God, that you believe in Him whom He has sent." John 6:29 "That ye believe in Him," not, that you believe Him. But if you believe on Him, you believe Him; yet he that believes Him does not necessarily believe on Him. For even the devils believed Him, but they did not believe in Him. Again, moreover, of His apostles we can say, we believe Paul; but not, we believe in Paul: we believe Peter; but not, we believe in Peter. For, "to him that believes in Him that justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted unto him for righteousness." Romans 4:5 What then is "to believe in Him"? By believing to love Him, by believing to esteem highly, by believing to go into Him and to be incorporated in His members. It is faith itself then that God exacts from us: and He finds not that which He exacts, unless He has bestowed what He may find. What faith, but that which the apostle has most amply defined in another place, saying, "Neither circumcision avails anything,

sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur 11? Non qualiscumque fides, sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur: haec in te sit, et intelleges de doctrina. Quid enim intelleges? Quia doctrina ista non est mea, sed eius qui misit me 12: id est, intelleges quia Christus Filius Dei, qui est doctrina Patris, non est ex seipso, sed Filius est Patris.

Enchiridion ad Laurentium de Fide, Spe et Caritate (421-422)

Quod etiam fidem a quo bona opera incipiunt gratia tribuit.

9.31. Et ne ipsam sibi saltem fidem sic arrogarent ut non intellexerent divinitus esse donatam, sicut idem Apostolus alio loco dicit se ut fidelis esset misericordiam consecutum 51, hic quoque adiunxit atque ait: Et hoc non ex vobis sed Dei donum est non ex operibus ne forte quis extollatur 52. Et ne putarentur fidelibus bona opera defutura, rursus adiecit: Ipsius enim sumus figmentum creati in Christo Iesu in operibus bonis quae praeparavit Deus ut in illis ambulemus 53. Tunc ergo efficimur vere liberi cum Deus nos fingit, id est format et creat, non ut homines, quod iam fecit, sed ut boni homines simus: quod nunc gratia sua facit, ut simus in Christo Iesu nova creatura 54, secundum quod dictum est: Cor mundum crea in me Deus 55. Neque enim cor eius, quantum pertinet ad naturam cordis humani, non iam creaverat Deus.

9. 32. Item ne quisquam, etsi non de operibus, de ipso gloriatur libero arbitrio voluntatis, tamquam ab ipso incipiat meritum cui tamquam debitum reddatur praemium bene operandi ipsa libertas, audiat eundem gratiae praeconem dicentem: Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate 56, et alio loco: Igitur non volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei 57. Cum procul dubio, si homo eius aetatis est ut ratione iam utatur, non possit credere sperare diligere nisi velit, nec pervenire ad palmam supernae vocationis Dei nisi voluntate cucurrerit 58, quomodo ergo non volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei nisi quia et ipsa voluntas, sicut scriptum est, a Domino praeparatur 59? Alioquin si propterea dictum est: Non volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei, quia ex utroque fit, id est et voluntate hominis et misericordia Dei, ut sic dictum accipiamus: Non volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei, tamquam diceretur: Non sufficit sola voluntas

nor uncircumcision, but faith that works by love?" Galatians 5:6 Not any faith of whatever kind, but "faith that works by love:" let this faith be in you, and you shall understand concerning the doctrine. What indeed shall you understand? That "this doctrine is not mine, but His that sent me;" that is, you shall understand that Christ the Son of God, who is the doctrine of the Father, is not from Himself, but is the Son of the Father.

The Handbook on Faith, Hope and Love

31. Faith Itself is the Gift of God

And lest men should arrogate to themselves the merit of their own faith at least, not understanding that this too is the gift of God, this same apostle, who says in another place that he had "obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful," here also adds: "and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God: not of works, lest any man should boast." And lest it should be thought that good works will be wanting in those who believe, he adds further: "For we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God has before ordained that we should walk in them." We shall be made truly free, then, when God fashions us, that is, forms and creates us anew, not as men — for He has done that already — but as good men, which His grace is now doing, that we may be a new creation in Christ Jesus, according as it is said: "Create in me a clean heart, O God." For God had already created his heart, so far as the physical structure of the human heart is concerned; but the psalmist prays for the renewal of the life which was still lingering in his heart.

32. The Freedom of the Will is Also the Gift of God, for God Works in Us Both to Will and to Do.

And further, should any one be inclined to boast, not indeed of his works, but of the freedom of his will, as if the first merit belonged to him, this very liberty of good action being given to him as a reward he had earned, let him listen to this same preacher of grace, when he says: "For it is God which works in you, both to will and to do of His own good pleasure;" and in another place: "So, then, it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy." Now as, undoubtedly, if a man is of the age to use his reason, he cannot believe, hope, love, unless he will to do so, nor obtain the prize of the high calling of God unless he voluntarily run for it; in what sense is it "not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy," except that, as it is written, "the preparation of the heart is from the Lord?" Otherwise, if it is said, "It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy," because it is of both, that is, both of the will of man and of the mercy of God, so that we are to

hominis si non sit etiam misericordia Dei, non ergo sufficit et sola misericordia Dei si non sit etiam voluntas hominis; ac per hoc, si recte dictum est: Non volentis est hominis sed miserentis est Dei, quia id voluntas hominis sola non implet, cur non et e contrario recte dicitur: Non miserentis est Dei sed volentis hominis, quia id misericordia Dei sola non implet? Porro si nullus dicere christianus audebit: Non miserentis Dei sed volentis est hominis, ne Apostolo apertissime contradicat, restat ut propterea recte dictum intellegatur: Non volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei, ut totum detur Deo, qui hominis voluntatem bonam et praeparat adiuvandam et adiuvat praeparatam. Praecedat enim bona voluntas hominis multa Dei dona sed non omnia; quae autem non praecedat ipsa, in eis est et ipsa. Nam utrumque legitur in sanctis eloquiis, et: Misericordia eius praeveniet me 60, et: Misericordia eius subsequetur me 61: nolentem praevenit, ut velit, volentem subsequitur, ne frustra velit. Cur enim admonemur orare pro inimicis nostris 62 utique nolentibus pie vivere, nisi ut Deus in eis operetur et velle? Itemque cur admonemur petere ut accipiamus 63, nisi ut ab illo fiat quod volumus a quo factum est ut velimus? Oramus ergo pro inimicis nostris ut misericordia Dei praeveniat eos sicut praevenit et nos: oramus autem pro nobis ut misericordia eius subsequatur nos.

understand the saying, "It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy," as if it meant the will of man alone is not sufficient, if the mercy of God go not with it — then it will follow that the mercy of God alone is not sufficient, if the will of man go not with it; and therefore, if we may rightly say, "it is not of man that wills, but of God that shows mercy," because the will of man by itself is not enough, why may we not also rightly put it in the converse way: "It is not of God that shows mercy, but of man that wills," because the mercy of God by itself does not suffice? Surely, if no Christian will dare to say this, "It is not of God that shows mercy, but of man that wills," lest he should openly contradict the apostle, it follows that the true interpretation of the saying, "It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy," is that the whole work belongs to God, who both makes the will of man righteous, and thus prepares it for assistance, and assists it when it is prepared. For the man's righteousness of will precedes many of God's gifts, but not all; and it must itself be included among those which it does not precede. We read in Holy Scripture, both that God's mercy "shall meet me," and that His mercy "shall follow me." It goes before the unwilling to make him willing; it follows the willing to make his will effectual. Why are we taught to pray for our enemies, who are plainly unwilling to lead a holy life, unless that God may work willingness in them? And why are we ourselves taught to ask that we may receive, unless that He who has created in us the wish, may Himself satisfy the wish? We pray, then, for our enemies, that the mercy of God may prevent them, as it has prevented us: we pray for ourselves that His mercy may follow us.

Contra Academicos (386-387)

III.19.42. Itaque nunc philosophos non fere videmus, nisi aut Cynicos aut Peripateticos aut Platonicos: et Cynicos quidem, quia eos vitae quaedam delectat libertas atque licentia. Quod autem ad eruditionem doctrinamque attinet, et mores quibus consulitur animae, quia non defuerunt acutissimi et solertissimi viri, qui docerent disputationibus suis Aristotelem ac Platonem ita sibi concinere, ut imperitis minusque attentis dissentire videantur; multis quidem saeculis multisque contentionibus, sed tamen eliquata est, ut opinor, una verissimae philosophiae disciplina. Non enim est ista huius mundi philosophia, quam sacra nostra meritissime detestantur, sed alterius intellegibilis; cui animas multiformibus erroris tenebris caecatas, et altissimis a corpore sordibus oblitas, nunquam ista ratio subtilissima revocaret, nisi summus Deus populari quadam clementia divini intellectus auctoritatem usque ad ipsum corpus humanum declinaret, atque submitteret; cuius non

Answer to Sceptics

III.19.42. Thus it is that today we see scarcely any philosophers except Cynics or Peripatetics or Platonists. We have the Cynics, just because a certain libertine and licentious kind of life delights them. But, as regards erudition and doctrine and morality by which the interests of the soul are consulted, a system of philosophy – the truest philosophy, in my opinion – has been crystallized through multifarious disputes throughout many centuries, because the times did not lack men of the utmost discernment and industry who, in their disputations, continued to teach that Aristotle and Plato blend and chord in such a manner that to the inattentive and unskilled they seem to be out of harmony. For, it is not the philosophy of this world – the philosophy which our sacred mysteries rightly detest. It is of the other world, the intelligible world – a world to which even the most acute reasoning would never lead souls blinded by the multiform darkness of error and smeared with so much grime from the bodies. Human reason would never lead such souls to that intelligible world if the most high God had not vouchsafed – through clemency toward the whole human race

solum praeceptis, sed etiam factis excitatae animae redire in semetipsas, et resipiscere patriam, etiam sine disputationum concertatione potuissent.

Quid Augustinus expertus sentiat de sapientum et Christi auctoritate.

20. 43. *Hoc mihi de Academicis interim probabiliter, ut potui, persuasi. Quod si falsum est, nihil ad me, cui satis est iam non arbitrari, non posse ab homine inveniri veritatem. Quisquis autem putat hoc sensisse Academicos, ipsum Ciceronem audiat. Ait enim illis morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam, nec eam cuiquam nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixisset, aperire consuesse (Cicerone, Varro, fr. 35 t. A). Quae sit autem ista, Deus viderit; eam tamen arbitror Platonis fuisse. Sed ut breviter accipiatis omne propositum meum; quoquo modo se habeat humana sapientia, eam me video nondum percepisse. Sed cum trigesimum et tertium aetatis annum agam, non me arbitror desperare debere eam me quandoque adepturum. Contemptis tamen caeteris omnibus quae bona mortales putant, huic investigandae inservire proposui. A quo me negotio quoniam rationes Academicorum non leviter deterrebant, satis, ut arbitror, contra eas ista disputatione munitus sum. Nulli autem dubium est gemino pondere nos impelli ad descendum, auctoritatis atque rationis. Mihi ergo certum est nusquam prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere: non enim reperio valentiorum. Quod autem subtilissima ratione persequendum est; ita enim iam sum affectus, ut quid sit verum, non credendo solum, sed etiam intellegendo apprehendere impatienter desiderem; apud Platonicos me interim quod sacris nostris non repugnet reperturum esse confido.*

– to send the authority of the divine intellect down even to a human body, and caused it to dwell therein, so that souls would be aroused not only by divine precepts but also by divine acts, and would be thus enabled to reflect on themselves and to gaze upon their fatherland, without any disputatious wranglings.

20.43. At one time or another, I have become convinced – insofar as I was able – that this is probably true with regard to the Academics. And, even if it is false, I need not care, for I am satisfied so long as I do not believe that the discovery of the truth is beyond the reach of man. But, whoever thinks that the Academics were of this opinion, let him hear Cicero himself. For he says that it was their practice to conceal their theory, and that they usually did not disclose it to anybody unless he had continued with them up to his old age. Of course, I do not know exactly what their theory was, but I think it was Plato’s theory. And now – that you may grasp my whole meaning in a few words – whatever may be the nature of human wisdom, I see that I have not yet understood it. Nevertheless, although I am now in the thirty-third year of my life, I do not think that I ought to despair of understanding it some day, for I have resolved to disregard all the other things which mortals consider good, and to devote myself to an investigation of it. And, whereas the reasonings of the Academics used to deter me greatly from such an undertaking, I believe that through this disputation I am now sufficiently protected against those reasonings. Certainly, no one doubts that we are impelled toward knowledge by a twofold force: the force of authority and the force of reason. And I am resolved never to deviate in the least from the authority of Christ, for I find none more powerful. But, as to what is attainable by acute and accurate reasoning, such is my state of mind that I am impatient to grasp what truth is – to grasp it not only by belief, but also by comprehension. Meanwhile, I am confident that I shall find among the Platonists what is not in opposition to our Sacred Scriptures.

De Ordine (386-387)

II.5.16. *Duplex enim est via quam sequimur, cum rerum nos obscuritas movet, aut rationem, aut certe auctoritatem. Philosophia rationem promittit et vix paucissimos liberat, quos tamen non modo non contemnere illa mysteria, sed sola intellegere, ut intellegenda sunt, cogit. Nullumque aliud habet negotium, quae vera, et, ut ita dicam, germana philosophia est, quam ut doceat quod sit omnium rerum principium sine principio quantusque in eo maneat intellectus quidve inde in nostram salutem sine ulla degeneratione manaverit, quem unum Deum omnipotentem cum quo tripotentem, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, veneranda mysteria, quae fide sincera et inconcussa populos liberant, nec*

Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil

II.5.16. When the obscurity of things perplexes us, we follow a twofold path: reason, or at least, authority. Philosophy sends forth reason, and it frees scarcely a few. By itself it compels these not only not to spurn those mysteries, but to understand them insofar as they can be understood. The philosophy that is true – the genuine philosophy, so to speak – has no other function than to teach what is the First Principle of all things – Itself without beginning, - and how great an Intellect dwells therein, and what has proceeded therefrom for our welfare, but without deterioration of any kind. Now, the venerated mysteries, which liberate persons of sincere and firm faith – not indiscriminately, as some say; and not harmfully, as many assert – these mysteries teach that this First Principle is one God omnipotent, and that He is tripotent, Father and Son and

confuse, ut quidam, nec contumeliose, ut multi praedicant. Quantum autem illud sit, quod hoc etiam nostri generis corpus tantus propter nos Deus assumere atque agere dignatus est, quanto videtur vilius tanto est clementia plenius et a quadam ingeniosorum superbia longe alteque remotius.

...

Quae sint auctoritas et ratio.

II.9.26. Sequitur ut dicam quomodo studiosi erudiri debeant, qui sicut dictum est vivere instituerunt. Ad discendum item necessario dupliciter ducimur, auctoritate atque ratione. Tempore auctoritas, re autem ratio prior est. Aliud est enim quod in agendo antepositur, aliud quod pluris in appetendo aestimatur. Itaque, quamquam bonorum auctoritas imperitae multitudini videatur esse salubrior, ratio vero aptior eruditis, tamen quia nullus hominum nisi ex imperito peritus fit, nullus autem imperitus novit qualem se debeat praebere docentibus et quali vita esse docilis possit, evenit ut omnibus bona magna et occulta discere cupientibus non aperiatur nisi auctoritas ianuam. Quam quisque ingressus sine ulla dubitatione vitae optima praecipua sectatur, per quae cum docilis factus fuerit, tum demum discet et quanta ratione praedita sint ea ipsa quae secutus est ante rationem, et quid sit ipsa ratio quam post auctoritatis cunabula firmus et idoneus iam sequitur atque comprehendit et quid intellectus, in quo universa sunt, vel ipse potius universa, et quid praeter universa universorum principium. Ad quam cognitionem in hac vita pervenire pauci, ultra quam vero etiam post hanc vitam nemo progredi potest. Qui autem sola auctoritate contenti bonis tantum moribus rectisque votis constanter operam dederint, aut contemnerent, aut non valentes disciplinis liberalibus atque optimis erudiri, beatos eos quidem, cum inter homines vivant, nescio quomodo appellem, tamen inconcusse credo mox ut hoc corpus reliquerint, eos quo bene magis minusve vixerunt, eo facilius aut difficilius liberari.

Quae sit Dei et hominis auctoritas.

9. 27. Auctoritas autem partim divina est, partim humana: sed vera, firma, summa ea est quae divina nominatur. In qua metuenda est aeriorum animalium mira fallacia, quae per rerum ad istos sensus corporis pertinentium quasdam divinationes nonnullasque sententias decipere animas facillime consuerunt, aut periturarum fortunarum curiosas,

Holy Spirit. Great, indeed, though it be that so great a God has for our sake deigned to take up and dwell in this body of our own kind, yet, the more lowly it appears, so much the more is it replete with clemency and the father and wider remote from a certain characteristic pride of ingenious men.

...

We learn by authority and reason

II.9.26. It remains for me to declare how instruction is to be imparted to the studious youths who have resolved to live after the manner described above. Likewise, with regard to the acquiring of knowledge, we are of necessity led in a twofold manner: by authority and by reason. In point of time, authority is first; in the order of reality, reason is prior. What takes precedence in operation is one thing; what is more highly prized as an object of desire is something else. Consequently, although the authority of upright men seems to be the safer guide for the uninstructed multitude, reason is better adapted for the educated. Furthermore, since no one becomes learned except by ceasing to be unlearned, and since no unlearned person knows in what quality he ought to present himself to instructors or by what manner of life he may become docile, it happens that for those who seek to learn great and hidden truths authority alone opens the door. But, after one has entered, then without any hesitation he begins to follow the precepts of the perfect life. When he has become docile through these precepts, then at length he will come to know: (a) how much wisdom is embodied in those very precepts that he has been observing before understanding; (b) what reason itself is, which he – now strong and capable after the cradle of authority – follows and comprehends; (c) what intellect is, in which all things are, or rather, which is itself the sum total of all things; (d) and what, beyond all things, is the source of all things. To this knowledge, few are able to arrive in this life; even after this life, no one can exceed it. As to those who are content to follow authority alone and who apply themselves constantly to right living and holy desires, while they make no account of the liberal and fine arts, or are incapable of being instructed in them – I know not how I could call them happy as long as they live among men. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that, upon leaving the body, they will be liberated with greater facility or difficulty according as they have lived the more virtuously or otherwise.

9.27. Authority is, indeed, partly divine and partly human, but the true, solid and sovereign authority is that which is called divine. In this matter there is to be feared the wonderful deception of invisible beings that, by certain divinations and numerous powers of things pertaining to the senses, are accustomed to deceive with the utmost ease those souls that are engrossed with perishable possessions, or eagerly desirous of

aut fragilium cupidas potestatum, aut inanium formidolosas miraculorum. Illa ergo auctoritas divina dicenda est, quae non solum in sensibilibus signis transcendit omnem humanam facultatem, sed et ipsum hominem agens ostendit ei quousque se propter ipsum depresserit et non teneri sensibus, quibus videntur illa miranda, sed ad intellectum iubet evolare, simul demonstrans et quanta hic possit et cur haec faciat et quam parvi pendat. Doceat enim oportet et factis potestatem suam et humilitate clementia et praeceptione naturam, quae omnia sacris quibus initiamur, secretius firmitusque traduntur, in quibus bonorum vita facillime, non disputationum ambagibus sed mysteriorum auctoritate purgatur. Humana vero auctoritas plerumque fallit: in eis tamen iure videtur excellere, qui quantum imperitorum sensus capit, multa dant indicia doctrinarum suarum et non vivunt aliter quam vivendum esse praecipiant. Quibus si aliqua etiam fortunae munera accesserint, quorum appareant usu magni contemptuque maiores, difficillimum omnino est ut eis quisque vivendi praecepta dantibus credens recte vituperetur.

transitory power, or overawed by meaningless prodigies. We must, therefore, accept as divine that Authority which not only exceeds human power in its outward manifestations, but also, in the very act of leading a man onward, shows him to what extent It has debased Itself for his sake, and bids him not to be confined to the senses, to which indeed those things seem wondrous, but to soar upward to the intellect. At the same time It shows him what great things It is able to do, and why It does them, and how little importance It attaches to them. For, it is fitting that by deeds It show Its power; by humility, Its clemency; by commandment, Its nature. And all this is being delivered to us so distinctly and steadily by the sacred rites into which we are now being initiated: therein the life of good men is most easily purified, not indeed by the circumlocution of disputation, but by the authority of the mysteries. But human authority is very often deceiving. Yet it rightly seems to show itself at its best in those men who propose various proofs for their teachings, insofar as the mind of the unlearned can grasp them, and who do not live otherwise than how they prescribe that one ought to live. If certain goods of fortune accrue to these men, they reveal themselves great men in the use of those things, but still greater in their contempt of them; and then it is most difficult to lay blame on anyone who puts trust in those men when they enunciate principles of right living.

De Utilitate Credendi (391/392)

Nihil vitii esse in fide, atque inter credentem et credulum (quod nomen culpae datur) plurimum interesse.

9. 22. *Sed quaeris fortasse vel de hoc ipso aliquam accipere rationem, qua tibi persuadeatur, non prius ratione quam fide te esse docendum. Quod facile potest, si modo aequum te praebeas. Sed ut commode fiat, volo quasi respondeas interroganti: et primo dicas mihi, quare tibi videatur non esse credendum. Quod ipsa, inquis, credulitas, a qua creduli nominantur, vitium quoddam mihi videtur esse: alioquin hoc nomen non pro convicio obiectare soleremus. Nam si suspiciosus in vitio est, eo quod non comperta suspicatur; quanto magis credulus, qui hoc a suspicioso differt, quod ille incognitis aliquam, iste nullam tribuit dubitationem. Interim accipio hanc opinionem ac distinctionem. Sed scis etiam curiosum non nos solere appellare sine convicio; studiosum vero etiam cum laude. Quamobrem attende, si placet, etiam inter haec duo quid tibi distare videatur. Id certe respondes, quod quamvis uterque agatur magna cupiditate noscendi, curiosus tamen ea requirit quae nihil ad se attinent; studiosus autem contra, quae ad sese attinent requirit. Sed quia non negamus ad hominem*

On the Profit of Believing

22. But perhaps you seek to have some reason given you on this very point, such as may persuade you, that you ought not to be taught by reason before faith. Which may easily be done, if only you make yourself a fair hearer. But, in order that it may be done suitably, I wish you as it were to answer my questions; and, first, to tell me, why you, think that one ought not to believe. Because, you say, credulity, from which men are called credulous, in itself, seems to me to be a certain fault: otherwise we should not use to cast this as a term of reproach. For if a suspicious man is in fault, in that he suspects things not ascertained; how much more a credulous man, who herein differs from a suspicious man, that the one allows some doubt, the other none, in matters which he knows not. In the mean while I accept this opinion and distinction. But you know that we are not wont to call a person even curious without some reproach; but we call him studiosus even with praise. Wherefore observe, if you please, what seems to you to be the difference between these two. This surely, you answer, that, although both be led by great desire to know, yet the curious man seeks after things that no way pertain to him, but the studiosus man, on the contrary, seeks after what pertain to him. But, because we deny not that a man's wife and children, and their health, pertain unto him; if any one, being settled abroad, were to be careful to ask all comers, how his wife and children are and fare, he is surely led by great desire to know, and yet we call not this man studiosus, who both exceedingly wishes to know, and that (in)

pertinere coniugem ac liberos et eorum salutem; si quispiam peregre positus, quemadmodum valeant ac sese agant sua coniux ac liberi, omnes advenientes sedulo percontetur, magna utique ducitur cupiditate noscendi: et tamen hunc studiosum non vocamus, qui et magnopere scire vult, et ea quae ad se maxime pertinent. Quare iam intellegis eo vacillare istam definitionem studiosi, quod omnis quidem studiosus ea nosse vult quae ad se pertinent, non tamen omnis qui id agit studiosus vocandus est; sed is qui ea quae ad animum nutriendum liberaliter atque ornandum pertinent, impensissime requirit: tamen studentem recte appellamus, praesertim addentes quid studeat audire. Nam etiam suorum studiosum possumus appellare, si suos tantum diligit: non tamen adiunctione nulla, communi nomine studiosorum dignum putamus. Audiendi autem cupidum quemadmodum se sui haberent, non appellarem studiosum audiendi, nisi gaudens fama bona id ipsum saepe vellet audire: studentem vero, etiamsi semel. Refer nunc animum ad curiosum, et dic mihi, utrum si quis fabellam libenter audiret, nihil sibi omnino profuturam, id est, rerum ad se non pertinentium; neque id odiose atque crebro, sed rarissime ac modestissime, vel in convivio, vel in aliquo circulo, ullove consessu; videretur tibi curiosus? Non opinor: sed certe habens illius rei curam, quam libenter audiret, profecto videretur. Quapropter etiam curiosi definitio ea regula, qua studiosi, emendanda est. Vide igitur utrum et illa superiora emendanda sint. Cur enim non et suspiciosi nomine indignus sit, qui aliquando aliquid suspicatur; et creduli, qui aliquando aliquid credit? Itaque ut inter studentem alicuius rei et omnino studiosum, rursumque inter curam habentem atque curiosum: ita inter credentem et credulum plurimum interest. Turpe non esse credere in religione.

10. 23. *Sed nunc vide, inquires, utrum in religione credere debeamus. Neque enim si concedimus aliud esse credere, aliud credulum esse, sequitur ut nulla culpa sit in religionibus credere. Quid enim, si et credere et credulum esse vitiosum est, quemadmodum et ebrium et ebriosum esse? quod qui certum existimat, nullum mihi habere posse amicum videtur. Si enim turpe est aliquid credere, aut turpiter facit qui amico credit, aut nihil amico credens quomodo amicum vel ipsum vel se appellet non video. Hic fortasse dicas: Concedo aliquid aliquando esse credendum; nunc expedi quomodo in religione turpe non sit credere, antequam scire. Faciam, si potero. Quocirca ex te quaero quid existimes in graviore culpa esse, religionem tradere*

matters which very greatly pertain unto him. Wherefore you now understand that the definition of a studious person falters in this point, that every studious person wishes to know what pertain to himself, and yet not every one, who makes this his business, is to be called studious; but he who with all earnestness seeks those things which pertain unto the liberal culture and adornment of the mind. Yet we rightly call him one who studies, especially if we add what he studies to hear. For we may call him even studious of his own (family) if he love only his own (family), we do not however, without some addition, think him worthy of the common name of the studious. But one who was desirous to hear how his family were I should not call studious of hearing, unless taking pleasure in the good report, he should wish to hear it again and again: but one who studied, even if only once. Now return to the curious person, and tell me, if any one should be willing to listen to some tale, such as would no way profit him, that is, of matters that pertain not to him: and that not in an offensive way and frequently, but very seldom and with great moderation, either at a feast, or in some company, or meeting of any kind; would he seem to you curious? I think not: but at any rate he would certainly seem to have a care for that matter, to which he was willing to listen. Wherefore the definition of a curious person also must be corrected by the same rule as that of a studious person: Consider therefore whether the former statements also do not need to be corrected. For why should not both he, who at some time suspects something, be unworthy the name of a suspicious person; and he who at some time believes something, of a credulous person? Thus as there is very great difference between one who studies any matter, and the absolutely studious; and again between him who has a care and the curious; so is there between him who believes and the credulous.

23. But you will say, consider now whether we ought to believe in religion. For, although we grant that it is one thing to believe, another to be credulous, it does not follow that it is no fault to believe in matters of religion. For what if it be a fault both to believe and to be credulous, as (it is) both to be drunk and to be a drunkard? Now he who thinks this certain, it seems to me can have no friend; for, if it is base to believe any thing, either he acts basely who believes a friend, or in nothing believing a friend I see not how he can call either him or himself a friend. Here perhaps you may say, I grant that we must believe something at some time; now make plain, how in the case of religion it be not base to believe before one knows. I will do so, if I can. Wherefore I ask of you, which you esteem the graver fault, to deliver religion to one unworthy, or to believe what is said by them who deliver it. If you understand not whom I call unworthy, I call him, who approaches with feigned breast. You grant, as I suppose, that it is more blameable to unfold unto such an one whatever holy secrets there are, than to believe religious men affirming any thing on the matter of

indigno, an id quod ab eis qui illam tradunt dicitur, credere. Si quem dicam indignum, non intellegis; eum dico, qui ficto pectore accedit. Concedis, ut arbitror, magis culpandum esse, tali homini pandere si qua sunt sancta secreta, quam religiosus viris de ipsa religione aliquid affirmantibus credere. Neque enim te aliud respondere decuerit. Quare nunc fac putes eum adesse, qui tibi religionem sit traditurus: quonam modo illi fidem facturus es, vero animo te accedere, neque quidquam in te, quod ad hanc rem attinet, doli atque simulationis esse? Dices, bona tua conscientia nihil te fingere, quantis poteris idipsum asserens verbis, sed tamen verbis. Non enim animi tui latebras, ita ut intime sciaris, homo homini aperire possis. At ille si dixerit: Ecce credo tibi; sed nonne est aequius ut etiam tu credas mihi, cum tu beneficium, si aliquid veri teneo, sis accepturus, daturus ergo? quid respondebis nisi esse credendum?

Rationi percipiendae idonei perpauci; via ad religionem tutior et tenenda ab omnibus fides.

10. 24. Sed, inquis, nonne erat melius, rationem mihi redderes, ut ea quocumque me duceret, sine ulla sequerer temeritate? Erat fortasse: sed cum res tanta sit, ut Deus tibi ratione cognoscendus sit, omnesne putas idoneos esse percipiendis rationibus, quibus ad divinam intellegentiam mens ducitur humana, an plures, an paucos? Paucos, ais, existimo. Horumne in numero esse te credis? Non est meum, inquis, hoc respondere. Illius ergo putas, etiam hoc tibi credere: quod quidem facit. Tu tantum memento, iam eum his credidisse tibi incerta dicenti; te illi religiose admonenti ne semel quidem velle credere. Verum fac ita esse et vero animo te ad accipiendam religionem accedere, et ita paucorum te esse hominum, ut rationes quibus ad certam cognitionem vis divina perducitur, capere possis: quid, ceteris hominibus, qui tam sereno ingenio praediti non sunt, negandam religionem putas? An eos pedetentim quibusdam gradibus ad illa summa penetralia esse ducendos? Vides plane quid sit religiosius. Neque enim tibi quivis homo in rei tantae cupiditate ullo modo deserendus aut respuendus videri potest. Sed nonne censes, nisi primo credat se ad id quod instituit perventurum, mentemque supplicem praebeat, et quibusdam magnis necessariisque praeceptis obtemperans quadam vitae actione perpurget, non eum esse aliter illa quae pure vera sunt adepturum? Censes profecto. Quid ergo istis, quorum de genere te esse iam credo, qui facillime divina secreta ratione certa capere possunt, si hac via veniant, qua illi qui primitus credunt, numquid tandem oberit?

religion itself. For it would be unbecoming you to make any other answer. Wherefore now suppose him present, who is about to deliver to you a religion, in what way shall you assure him, that you approach with a true mind, and that, so far as this matter is concerned, there is in you no fraud or feigning? You will say, your own good conscience that you are no way feigning, asserting this with words as strong as you can, but yet with words. For you cannot lay open man to man the hiding places of your soul, so that you may be thoroughly known. But if he shall say, Lo, I believe you, but is it not more fair that you also believe me, when, if I hold any truth, you are about to receive, I about to give, a benefit? What will you answer, save that you must believe.

24. But you say, Were it not better that you should give me a reason, that, wherever, that shall lead me, I may follow without any rashness? Perhaps it were: but, it being so great a matter, that you are by reason to come to the knowledge of God, do you think that all are qualified to understand the reasons, by which the human soul is led to know God, or many, or few? Few I think, you say. Do you believe that you are in the number of these? It is not for me, you say, to answer this. Therefore you think it is for him to believe you in this also: and this indeed he does: only do you remember, that he has already twice believed you saying things uncertain; that you are unwilling to believe him even once admonishing you in a religious spirit. But suppose that it is so, and that you approach with a true mind to receive religion, and that you are one of few men in such sense as to be able to take in the reasons by which the Divine Power is brought into certain knowledge; what? Do you think that other men, who are not endued with so serene a disposition, are to be denied religion? Or do you think that they are to be led gradually by certain steps unto those highest inner recesses? You see clearly which is the more religious. For you cannot think that any one whatever in a case where he desires so great a thing, ought by any means to be abandoned or rejected. But do you not think, that, unless he do first believe that he shall attain unto that which he purposes; and do yield his mind as a suppliant; and, submitting to certain great and necessary precepts, do by a certain course of life thoroughly cleanse it, that he will not otherwise attain the things that are purely true? Certainly you think so. What, then, is the case of those, (of whom I already believe you to be one,) who are able most easily to receive divine secrets by sure reason, will it, I ask, be to them any hindrance at all, if they so come as they who at the first believe? I think not. But yet, you say, what need to delay them? Because although they will in no way harm themselves by what is done, yet they will harm the rest by the precedent. For there is hardly one who has a just notion of his own power: but he who has a less notion must be roused; he who has a greater notion must be checked: that neither the one be broken by despair, nor the other carried headlong by rashness. And this is easily done, if even they, who are able to

Non arbitror. Sed tamen, ais, quid eos morari opus est? Quia etsi facto sibi nihil nocebunt, nocebunt tamen exemplo ceteris. Vix enim est qui de se tantum sentiat, quantum potest: sed qui minus, excitandus est; qui amplius, reprimendus; ut neque ille desperatione frangatur, neque iste praecipitetur audacia. Quod facile fit, si etiam ii qui valent volare, ne cui sint periculoso invitamento, paulisper cogantur incedere qua etiam ceteris tutum est. Haec est providentia verae religionis; hoc iussum divinitus, hoc a beatis maioribus traditum, hoc ad nos usque servatum; hoc perturbare velle atque pervertere, nihil est aliud quam ad veram religionem sacrilegam viam quaerere. Quod qui faciunt, nec si eis concedatur quod volunt, possunt quo intendunt pervenire. Cuiusmodi enim libet excellant ingenio, nisi Deus adsit, humo repunt. Tunc autem adest, si societas humana in Deum tendentibus curae sit. Quo gradu nihil firmitus in caelum reperiri potest. Ego quidem huic rationi non possum resistere; nam nihil sine cognitione esse credendum, qui possum dicere? cum et amicitia, nisi aliquid credatur quod certa ratione demonstrari non potest, omnino nulla sit, et saepe dispensatoribus servis sine ulla culpa dominorum credatur. In religione vero quid iniquius fieri potest, quam ut Dei antistites nobis non fictum animum pollicentibus credant, nos eis praecipientibus nolimus credere? Postremo quae potest esse via salubrior, quam idoneum primo fieri percipiendae veritatis, adhibendo iis fidem, quae ad praecolendum et ad praecurandum animum sunt divinitus constituta? aut si iam prorsus idoneus sis, circumire potius aliquantum qua tutissimum est ingredi, quam et tibi esse auctorem periculi, et ceteris temeritatis exemplum?

Credentes ab opinantium temeritate quomodo alieni. Intellegere, credere, opinari.

11. 25. *Quare iam superest ut consideremus, quo pacto hi sequendi non sint qui se pollicentur ratione ducturos. Nam quomodo sine culpa possumus sequi eos qui credere iubent, iam dictum est: ad hos autem sponsors rationis, non modo sine vituperatione, sed etiam cum aliqua laude se venire nonnulli putant: sed non ita est. Duae enim personae in religione sunt laudabiles: una eorum qui iam invenerunt, quos etiam beatissimos iudicare necesse est; alia eorum qui studiosissime et rectissime inquirunt. Primi ergo sunt iam in ipsa possessione, alteri in via, qua tamen certissime pervenitur. Tria sunt alia hominum genera, profecto improbanda ac detestanda. Unum est opinantium, id est, eorum qui se arbitrantur scire quod nesciunt. Alterum eorum qui sentiunt quidem*

fly, (that they be not alluring the occasion of any into danger,) are forced for a short time to walk where the rest also may walk with safety. This is the forethought of true religion: this the command of God: this what has been handed down from our blessed forefathers, this what has been preserved even unto us: to wish to distrust and overthrow this, is nothing else than to seek a sacrilegious way unto true religion. And whoever do this, not even if what they wish be granted to them are they able to arrive at the point at which they aim. For whatever kind of excellent genius they have, unless God be present, they creep on the ground. But He is then present, if they, who are aiming at God, have a regard for their fellow men. Than which step there can be found nothing more sure Heavenward. I for my part cannot resist this reasoning, for how can I say that we are to believe nothing without certain knowledge? Whereas both there can be no friendship at all, unless there be believed something which cannot be proved by some reason, and often stewards, who are slaves, are trusted by their masters without any fault on their part. But in religion what can there be more unfair than that the ministers of God believe us when we promise an unfeigned mind, and we are unwilling to believe them when they enjoin us any thing. Lastly, what way can there be more healthful, than for a man to become fitted to receive the truth by believing those things, which have been appointed by God to serve for the previous culture and treatment of the mind? Or, if you be already altogether fitted, rather to make some little circuit where it is safest to tread, than both to cause yourself danger, and to be a precedent for rashness to other men?

25. Wherefore it now remains to consider, in what manner we ought not to follow these, who profess that they will lead by reason. For how we may without fault follow those who bid us to believe, has been already said: but unto these who make promises of reason certain think that they come, not only without blame, but also with some praise: but it is not so. For there are two (classes of) persons, praiseworthy in religion; one of those who have already found, whom also we must needs judge most blessed; another of those who are seeking with all earnestness and in the right way. The first, therefore, are already in very possession, the other on the way, yet on that way whereby they are most sure to arrive. There are three other kinds of men altogether to be disapproved of and detested. One is of those who hold an opinion, that is, of those who think that they know what they know not. Another is of those who are indeed aware that they know not, but do not so seek as to be able to find. A third is of those who neither think that they know, nor wish to seek. There are also three things, as it were bordering upon one another, in the minds of men well worth distinguishing; understanding, belief, opinion. And, if these be considered by themselves, the first is always without fault, the second sometimes with fault, the third never without fault. For the understanding of matters great, and honorable, and even

se nescire, sed non ita quaerunt, ut invenire possint. Tertium eorum qui neque se scire existimant, nec quaerere volunt. Tria sunt item vel finitima sibi in animis hominum distinctione dignissima: intellegere, credere, opinari. Quae si per se ipsa considerentur, primum semper sine vitio est; secundum, aliquando cum vitio; tertium, numquam sine vitio. Nam intellegere magna et honesta vel etiam divina, beatissimum est. Intellegere autem superflua, nihil nocet; sed fortasse discere nocuit, cum tempus necessariorum occuparent. Ipsa etiam noxia, non intellegere, sed facere aut pati, miserum est. Non enim si quis intellegat quomodo possit inimicus sine suo periculo occidi, intellegentia ipsa, ac non cupiditate reus est: quae si absit, quid innocentius dici potest? Credere autem tunc est culpandum, cum vel de Deo indignum aliquid creditur, vel de homine facile creditur. In ceteris vero rebus si quis quid credit, si se id nescire intellegat, nulla culpa est. Credo enim sceleratissimos coniuratos virtute Ciceronis quondam interfectos: atque id non solum nescio, sed etiam nullo pacto me scire posse, certo scio. Opinari autem, duas ob res turpissimum est: quod et discere non potest, qui sibi iam se scire persuasit, si modo illud disci potest; et per se ipsa temeritas non bene affecti animi signum est. Nam etiamsi hoc ipsum quod de Cicerone dixi, scire se quisquam arbitratur, quamquam nihil eum impediatur a discendo, quia res ipsa nulla scientia teneri potest: tamen quod non intellegit multum interesse, utrum aliquid mentis certa ratione videatur, quod intellegere dicimus, an famae vel litteris credendum posteris utiliter commendetur; profecto errat, neque quisquam error turpitudine caret. Quod intellegimus igitur, debemus rationi: quod credimus, auctoritati: quod opinamur, errori. Sed intellegens omnis etiam credit, credit omnis et qui opinatur: non omnis qui credit intellegit; nullus qui opinatur intellegit. Haec ergo tria si ad illa quinque hominum genera, quae paulo ante commemoravimus, referantur; id est, duo probanda quae priora posuimus, et tria reliqua vitiosa: invenimus primum beatorum genus ipsi veritati credere; secundum autem studiosorum amatorumque veritatis, auctoritati. In quibus duobus generibus laudabiliter creditur. In primo autem vitiosorum, id est, eorum qui opinantur se scire quod nesciant, est profecto vitiosa credulitas. Cetera duo improbanda genera nihil credunt, et illi qui verum quaerunt cum desperatione inveniendi, et illi qui omnino non quaerunt. Et hoc dumtaxat in rebus ad aliquam pertinentibus disciplinam. Nam in alio vitae actu, prorsus nescio quo pacto possit homo nihil

divine, is most blessed. But the understanding of things unnecessary is no injury; but perhaps the learning was an injury, in that it took up the time of necessary matters. But on the matters themselves that are injurious, it is not the understanding, but the doing or suffering them, that is wretched. For not, in case any understand how an enemy may be slain without danger to himself, is he guilty from the mere understanding, not the wish; and, if the wish be absent, what can be called more innocent? But belief is then worthy of blame, when either any thing is believed of God which is unworthy of Him, or any thing is over easily believed of man. But in all other matters if any believe anything, provided he understand that he knows it not, there is no fault. For I believe that very wicked conspirators were formerly put to death by the virtue of Cicero; but this I not only know not, but also I know for certain that I can by no means know. But opinion is on two accounts very base; in that both he who has persuaded himself that he already knows, cannot learn; provided only it may be learned; and in itself rashness is a sign of a mind not well disposed. For even if any suppose that he know what I said of Cicero, (although it be no hindrance to him from learning, in that the matter itself is incapable of being grasped by any knowledge;) yet, (in that he understands not that there is a great difference, whether any thing be grasped by sure reason of mind, which we call understanding, or whether for practical purposes it be entrusted to common fame or writing, for posterity to believe it,) he assuredly errs, and no error is without what is base. What then we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority; what we have an opinion on, to error. But every one who understands also believes, and also every one who has an opinion believes; not every one who believes understands, no one who has an opinion understands. Therefore if these three things be referred unto the five kinds of men, which we mentioned a little above; that is, two kinds to be approved, which we set first, and three that remain faulty; we find that the first kind, that of the blessed, believe the truth itself; but the second kind, that of such as are earnest after, and lovers of, the truth, believe authority. In which kinds, of the two, the act of belief is praiseworthy. But in the first of the faulty kinds, that is, of those who have an opinion that they know what they know not, there is an altogether faulty credulity. The other two kinds that are to be disapproved believe nothing, both they who seek the truth despairing of finding it, and they who seek it not at all. And this only in matters which pertain unto any system of teaching. For in the other business of life, I am utterly ignorant by what means a man can believe nothing. Although in the case of those also they who say that in practical matters they follow probabilities, would seem rather to be unable to know than unable to believe. For who believes not what he approves? or how is what they follow probable, if it be not approved? Wherefore there may be two kinds of such as oppose the truth: one of those who assail knowledge alone, not faith; the other of those who condemn

credere. Quamquam in illis etiam qui se in agendo probabilia sequi dicunt, scire potius nihil posse, quam nihil credere, volunt videri. Quis enim quod probat non credit? aut quomodo est illud quod sequuntur, si non probatur, probabile? Quare duo genera possunt esse adversantium veritati: unum eorum qui scientiam tantum oppugnant, non fidem; alterum eorum qui utrumque condemnant; qui tamen utrum in rebus humanis inveniri possint, rursus ignoro. Haec dicta sunt, ut intellegeremus nos retenta fide, illarum etiam rerum quas nondum comprehendimus, a temeritate opinantium vindicari. Nam qui dicunt nihil esse credendum nisi quod scimus, hi unum cavent nomen opinionationis, quod fatendum est turpe ac miserrimum: sed si diligenter considerent plurimum interesse, utrum se scire quis putet, an quod nescire se intellegit, credat aliqua auctoritate commotus; profecto errores et inhumanitatis atque superbiae crimen evitabunt. Credere in multis quam necessarium ad humanam societatem.

12. 26. *Quaero enim, si quod nescitur, credendum non est, quomodo serviant parentibus liberi, eosque mutua pietate diligant, quos parentes suos esse non credant. Non enim ratione ullo pacto sciri potest: sed interposita matris auctoritate de patre creditur; de ipsa vero matre plerumque nec matri, sed obstetricibus, nutricibus, famulis. Nam cui furari filius potest, aliusque supponi, nonne potest decepta decipere? Credimus tamen, et sine ulla dubitatione credimus, quod scire non posse confitemur. Quis enim non videat pietatem, nisi ita sit, sanctissimum generis humani vinculum, superbissimo scelere violari? Nam quis vel insanus eum culpandum putet, qui eis officia debita impenderit quos parentes esse crediderit, etiamsi non essent? Quis contra non exterminandum iudicaverit, qui veros fortasse parentes minime dilexerit, dum ne falsos diligat metuit? Multa possunt afferri, quibus ostendatur nihil omnino humanae societatis incolume remanere, si nihil credere statuerimus, quod non possumus tenere perceptum.*

both: and yet again, I am ignorant whether these can be found in matters of human life. These things have been said, in order that we might understand, that, in retaining faith, even of those things which as yet we comprehend not, we are set free from the rashness of such as have an opinion. For they, who say that we are to believe nothing but what we know, are on their guard against that one name "opining," which must be confessed to be base and very wretched, but, if they consider carefully that there is a very great difference, whether one think that he knows, or moved by some authority believe that which he understands that he knows not, surely he will escape the charge of error, and inhumanity, and pride.

26. For I ask, if what is not known must not be believed, in what way may children do service to their parents, and love with mutual affection those whom they believe not to be their parents? For it cannot, by any means, be known by reason. But the authority of the mother comes in, that it be believed of the father; but of the mother it is usually not the mother that is believed, but midwives, nurses, servants. For she, from whom a son may be stolen and another put in his place, may she not being deceived deceive? Yet we believe, and believe without any doubt, what we confess we cannot know. For who but must see, that unless it be so, filial affection, the most sacred bond of the human race, is violated by extreme pride of wickedness? For what madman even would think him to be blamed who discharged the duties that were due to those whom he believed to be his parents, although they were not so? Who, on the other hand, would not judge him to deserve banishment, who failed to love those who were perhaps his true parents, through fear lest he should love pretended. Many things may be alleged, whereby to show that nothing at all of human society remains safe, if we shall determine to believe nothing, which we cannot grasp by full apprehension.

Pažinimo sąlygų klausimas: introspekcija, vidinis žmogus (*interior homo*), atmintis

De Vera Religione (390/391)

Ex ipsis vitiis suis animam admoneri ut primam pulchritudinem requirat: quod primo de vitio voluptatis ostenditur usque ad caput 43.

39. 72. *Quid igitur restat, unde non possit anima recordari primam pulchritudinem quam reliquit, quando de ipsis suis vitiis potest? Ita enim Sapientia Dei pertendit usque in finem fortiter 89. Ita per hanc summus ille artifex opera sua in unum finem decoris ordinata contexit. Ita illa bonitas a summo ad extremum nulli pulchritudini, quae ab ipso solo esse posset, invidit; ut nemo ab ipsa veritate deiciatur, qui non excipitur ab aliqua effigie veritatis. Quaere in corporis voluptate quid teneat, nihil aliud invenies quam convenientiam: nam si resistentia pariunt dolorem, convenientia pariunt voluptatem. Recognosce igitur quae sit summa convenientia. Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas; et si tuam naturam mutabilem inveneris, transcede et teipsum. Sed memento cum te transcendis, ratiocinantem animam te transcendere. Illuc ergo tende, unde ipsum lumen rationis accenditur. Quo enim pervenit omnis bonus ratiocinator, nisi ad veritatem? cum ad seipsam veritas non utique ratiocinando perveniat, sed quod ratiocinantes appetunt, ipsa sit. Vide ibi convenientiam qua superior esse non possit, et ipse conveni cum ea. Confitere te non esse quod ipsa est: siquidem se ipsa non quaerit; tu autem ad eam quaerendo venisti, non locorum spatio, sed mentis affectu, ut ipse interior homo cum suo inhabitatore, non infima et carnali, sed summa et spiritali voluptate conveniat.*

39. 73. *Aut si non cernis quae dico, et an vera sint dubitas, cerne saltem utrum te de iis dubitare non dubites; et si certum est te esse dubitantem, quaere unde sit certum: non illic tibi, non omnino solis huius lumen occurret, sed lumen verum quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum 90. Quod his oculis videri non potest; nec illis quibus phantasmata cogitantur, per eosdem oculos animae impacta; sed illis quibus ipsis phantasmatis dicitur: Non estis vos quod ego quaero, neque illud estis unde ego vos ordino; et quod mihi inter vos foedum occurrerit, improbo; quod pulchrum,*

On Christian Belief

Even Things of the Lowest Order Reflect the Supreme Concord and Harmony of the Truth

39. 72. Is there anything therefore left by which the soul cannot be reminded of its original beauty, seeing that it can be so by its very vices? This is why, after all, the Wisdom of God stretches out mightily to the end;¹³⁸ this is why the supreme craftsman has woven his works together through her into one final gracefulness and glory; this is why his goodness, reaching from the highest to the least of things, has been envious of no beauty (which could issue from him alone)—all this to ensure that nobody who was not excepted from being in some way a portrait of Truth¹³⁹ would be cast off from Truth herself. Ask bodily pleasure what there is to it; you will find it is nothing else but concord. I mean, if things that resist you cause pain, then things that accord with you cause pleasure. Recognize therefore what the last word in concord might be. Do not go outside, come back into yourself. It is in the inner self that Truth dwells. And if you find your own nature to be subject to change, transcend even yourself.¹⁴⁰ But remember, when you are transcending yourself, that it is your reasoning soul transcending yourself. So then, direct your course to what the light of reason itself gets its light from. Where, after all, does every good reasoner arrive but at the truth? Since Truth herself, of course, does not reach herself by a process of reasoning but is herself what reasoners are aiming at, see there the concord which cannot be surpassed, and put yourself in accord with her. Confess that you are not what she is—if in fact she does not seek herself, while you have sought her, and come to her, not by walking from one place to another but by the desire of your mind, so that the inner self might find in accord with its lodger not a carnal pleasure of the lowest sort but a spiritual pleasure of the highest.

73. Or, if you are not sure what I am saying and have doubts about whether it is true, at least be sure that you have no doubt about your having doubts about this; and, if it is certain that you do have doubts, ask where this certainty comes from. What will not occur to you then, what will not occur to you in the slightest, is that it is from the light of this sun up there but that it is from the true light, which enlightens every person coming into this world (Jn 1:9), which cannot be seen by these eyes nor by those which think up the fancies that have been stamped on the soul through those outer ones. No, what it is seen by is the eyes which tell the fancies themselves: "You are not what I am looking for, nor are you that by which I juggle you around and

approbo; cum pulchrius sit illud unde improbo et approbo: quare hoc ipsum magis approbo, et non solum vobis, sed illis omnibus corporibus unde vos hausit, antepono. Deinde regulam ipsam quam vides, concipe hoc modo: Omnis qui se dubitantem intellegit, verum intellegit, et de hac re quam intellegit certus est: de vero igitur certus est. Omnis ergo qui utrum sit veritas dubitat, in seipso habet verum unde non dubitet; nec ullum verum nisi veritate verum est. Non itaque oportet eum de veritate dubitare, qui potuit undecumque dubitare. Ubi videntur haec, ibi est lumen sine spatio locorum et temporum, et sine ullo spatiorum talium phantasmate. Numquid ista ex aliqua parte corrumpi possunt, etiamsi omnis ratiocinator intereat, aut apud carnales inferos veterascant? Non enim ratiocinatio talia facit, sed invenit. Ergo antequam inveniantur, in se manent, et cum inveniuntur, nos innovant.

disapprove of anything foul and ugly among you that occurs to me or approve of what is beautiful, since that in virtue of which I give both my approval and disapproval is more beautiful still. Accordingly, this is what I give my approval to most of all, and what I place not only before you but before all those bodies from which I have drunk you in." Next, now that you see this rule, think of it in this way: Everyone who understands that he has doubts is understanding something true, and he is certain about this thing that he understands. He is certain therefore about something true. So then, everyone who has doubts whether there is such a thing as truth has something true in himself about which he cannot have any doubts, and there cannot be anything true except with truth. And so, one who has been able to have doubts about anything has no business to have doubts about truth. Where these things are seen is where the light is that is independent of space and time and of any fancies or imaginings of such places and space. Can these things¹⁴¹ in any degree perish, even though every reasoner should vanish or grow old among the carnal ones below?¹⁴² Reasoning, after all, does not make such things but finds them. So then, before they are found they abide in themselves, and when they are found they make us new again.

Confessionum (397-401)

Spes eius Deus.

X.1.1. Cognoscam te, cognitor meus, cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum 1. Virtus animae meae, intra in eam et coapta tibi, ut habeas et possideas sine macula et ruga 2. Haec est mea spes, ideo loquor et in ea spe gaudeo 3, quando sanum gaudeo. Cetera vero vitae huius tanto minus flenda, quanto magis fletur, et tanto magis flenda, quanto minus fletur in eis. Ecce enim veritatem dilexisti 4, quoniam qui facit eam, venit ad lucem 5. Volo eam facere in corde meo coram te in confessione, in stilo autem meo coram multis testibus.

Domino iam manifestus est.

2. 2. Et tibi quidem, Domine, cuius oculis nuda 6 est abyssus humanae conscientiae, quid occultum esset in me, etiamsi nollem confiteri tibi 7? Te enim mihi absconderem, non me tibi. Nunc autem quod gemitus meus testis est displicere me mihi, tu refulges et places et amaris et desideraris, ut erubescam de me et abiciam me atque eligam te et nec tibi nec mihi placeam nisi de te. Tibi ergo, Domine, manifestus sum, quicumque sim. Et quo fructu tibi confitear, dixi 8. Neque id ago verbis carnis et vocibus, sed verbis animae et clamore cogitationis, quem novit auris tua. Cum enim malus sum, nihil est aliud confiteri

The Confessions

X.1.1. Let me know you, O you who know me; then shall I know even as I am known.†1 You are the strength of my soul; make your way in and shape it to yourself, that it may be yours to have and to hold, free from stain or wrinkle.†2 I speak because this is my hope,†3 and whenever my joy springs from that hope it is joy well founded. As for the rest of this life's experiences, the more tears are shed over them the less are they worth weeping over, and the more truly worth lamenting the less do we bewail them while mired in them. You love the truth†4 because anyone who "does truth" comes to the light. Truth it is that I want to do, in my heart by confession in your presence, and with my pen before many witnesses.†5

Motives for confession

2, 2. But the abyss of the human conscience lies naked to your eyes, O Lord,†6 so would anything in me be secret even if I were unwilling to confess to you? I would be hiding you from myself, but not myself from you. But now that my groans bear witness that I find no pleasure in myself, you shed light upon me and give me joy, you offer yourself, lovable and longed for, that I may thrust myself away in disgust and choose you, and be pleasing no more either to you or to myself except in what I have from you. To you, then, Lord, I lie exposed, exactly as I am. I have spoken of what I hope to gain by confessing to you. My confession to you is made not with words of tongue and voice, but with the words of my soul and the clamor of my thought, to which your ear is attuned; for when I am bad,

tibi quam displicere mihi; cum vero pius, nihil est aliud confiteri tibi quam hoc non tribuere mihi quoniam tu, Domine, benedicis iustum 9, sed prius eum iustificas impium 10. Confessio itaque mea, Deus meus, in conspectu tuo 11 tibi tacite fit et non tacite. Tacet enim strepitu, clamat affectu. Neque enim dico recti aliquid hominibus, quod non a me tu prius audieris, aut etiam tu aliquid tale audis a me, quod non mihi tu prius dixeris.

Domino confitetur, ut homines audiant.

3. 3. Quid mihi ergo est cum hominibus, ut audiant confessiones meas, quasi ipsi sanaturi sint omnes languores 12 meos? Curiosum genus ad cognoscendam vitam alienam, desidiosum ad corrigendam suam. Quid a me quaerunt audire qui sim, qui nolunt a te audire qui sint? Et unde sciunt, cum a me ipso de me ipso audiunt, an verum dicam, quandoquidem nemo scit hominum, quid agatur in homine, nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est 13? Si autem a te audiant de se ipsis, non poterunt dicere: "Mentitur Dominus". Quid est enim a te audire de se nisi cognoscere se? Quis porro cognoscit et dicit: "Falsum est", nisi ipse mentiatur? Sed quia caritas omnia credit 14, inter eos utique, quos connexos sibimet unum facit, ego quoque, Domine, etiam sic tibi confiteor, ut audiant homines, quibus demonstrare non possum, an vera confitear; sed credunt mihi, quorum mihi aures caritas aperit.

Qualis ipse fuerit confessus est, nunc autem qualis sit.

3. 4. Verumtamen tu, medice meus intime, quo fructu ista faciam, eliqua mihi. Nam confessiones praeteritorum malorum meorum, quae remisisti et texisti 15, ut beares me in te, mutans animam meam fide et sacramento tuo, cum leguntur et audiuntur, excitant cor, ne dormiat in desperatione et dicat: "Non possum", sed evigilet in amore misericordiae tuae 16 et dulcedine gratiae tuae, qua potens est omnis infirmus 17, qui sibi per ipsam fit conscius infirmitatis suae. Et delectat bonos audire praeterita mala eorum, qui iam carent eis, nec ideo delectat, quia mala sunt, sed quia fuerunt et non sunt. Quo itaque fructu, Domine meus, cui quotidie confitetur conscientia mea spe misericordiae tuae securior quam innocentia sua, quo fructu, quaeso, etiam hominibus coram te confiteor per has litteras adhuc, quis ego sim, non quis fuerim? Nam illum fructum vidi et commemoravi. Sed quis adhuc sim ecce in ipso tempore confessionum mearum, et multi hoc

confession to you is simply disgust with myself, but when I am good, confession to you consists in not attributing my goodness to myself, because though you, Lord, bless the person who is just, it is only because you have first made him just when he was sinful.†7 This is why, O my God, my confession in your presence is silent, yet not altogether silent: there is no noise to it, but it shouts by love. I can say nothing right to other people unless you have heard it from me first, nor can you even hear anything of the kind from me which you have not first told me.†8

3, 3. What point is there for me in other people hearing my confessions? Are they likely to heal my infirmities?†9 A curious lot they are, eager to pry into the lives of others, but tardy when it comes to correcting their own. Why should they seek to hear from me what I am, when they are reluctant to hear from you what they are? And when they hear from me about myself, how do they know that I am speaking the truth, since no one knows what goes on inside a person except the spirit of that person within him?†10 If, on the contrary, they hear from you about themselves, they will be in no position to say, "The Lord is lying." Is hearing the truth about oneself from you anything different from knowing oneself? And can anyone have this self-knowledge and still protest, "It is not true," unless he himself is lying? Yet charity believes without stint,†11 at least among those who are bonded together by charity,†12 and so I also confess to you, Lord, in such a way that people to whom I can offer no proof may discern whether I confess truthfully. I cannot prove it, but all whose ears are open to me by love will believe me.

4. All the same, my inward healer, make clear to me what advantage there is in doing this. When the confession of my past evil deeds is read and listened to—those evil deeds which you have forgiven and covered over†13 to make me glad in yourself, transforming my soul by faith and your sacrament—that recital arouses the hearer's heart, forbidding it to slump into despair and say, "I can't." Let it rather keep watch†14 for your loving mercy and your gentle grace, through which every weak soul that knows its own weakness grows strong.†15 It is cheering to good people to hear about the past evil deeds of those who are now freed from them: cheering not because the deeds were evil but because they existed once but exist no more. But then what profit is there, O my Lord, to whom my conscience confesses every day, more secure in the hope of your mercy than in its own innocence—what profit is there, I ask, if through these writings I also confess to other people in your presence not what I have been, but what I still am? The desirability of confessing the past I have recognized and stated; but there are many people who desire to know what I still am at this time of writing my confessions, people who know me without really knowing me, people who have read my works or know me only by hearsay. None of these have laid their ears to

nosse cupiunt, qui me noverunt, et non me noverunt, qui ex me vel de me aliquid audierunt, sed auris eorum non est ad cor meum, ubi ego sum quicumque sum. Volunt ergo audire confitente me, quid ipse intus sim, quo nec oculum nec aurem nec mentem possunt intendere; credituri tamen volunt, numquid cognituri? Dicit enim eis caritas, qua boni sunt, non mentiri me de me confitentem, et ipsa in eis credit mihi.

Legentes respirent in bonis, suspirent in malis eius.

4. 5. Sed quo fructu id volunt? An congratulari mihi cupiunt, cum audierint, quantum ad te accedam munere tuo, et orare pro me, cum audierint, quantum retarder pondere meo? Indicabo me talibus. Non enim parvus est fructus, Domine Deus meus, ut a multis tibi gratiae agantur de nobis 18, et a multis rogeris pro nobis. Amet in me fraternus animus quod amandum doces, et doleat in me quod dolendum doces. Animus ille hoc faciat fraternus, non extraneus, non filiorum alienorum, quorum os locutum est vanitatem, et dextera eorum dextera iniquitatis 19, sed fraternus ille, qui cum approbat me, gaudet de me, cum autem improbat me, contristatur pro me, quia sive approbet sive improbet me, diligit me. Indicabo me talibus: respirent in bonis meis, suspirent in malis meis. Bona mea instituta tua sunt et dona tua, mala mea delicta mea sunt et iudicia tua. Respirent in illis et suspirent in his, et hymnus et fletus ascendant in conspectum tuum de fraternis cordibus, turibulis tuis 20. Tu autem, Domine, delectatus odore sancti templi tui, miserere mei secundum magnam misericordiam tuam 21 propter nomen tuum 22 et nequaquam deserens coepta tua consumma imperfecta mea 23.

4. 6. Hic est fructus confessionum mearum, non qualis fuerim, sed qualis sim, ut hoc confitear non tantum coram te secreta exultatione cum tremore 24, et secreto maerore cum spe, sed etiam in auribus credentium filiorum hominum 25, sociorum gaudii mei et consortium mortalitatis meae, civium meorum et mecum peregrinorum, praecedentium et consequentium et comitum viae meae. Hi sunt servi tui, fratres mei, quos filios tuos esse voluisti dominos meos, quibus iussisti ut serviam, si volo tecum de te vivere. Et hoc mihi verbum tuum parum erat si loquendo praeciperet, nisi et faciendo praeiret 26. Et ego id ago factis et dictis, id ago sub alis tuis 27 nimis cum ingenti periculo, nisi quia sub alis tuis tibi subdita est anima mea 28 et infirmitas mea tibi nota

my heart, though it is only there that I am whoever I am. They therefore want to hear from my own confession what I am within, where they can venture neither eye nor ear nor mind. They want to hear and are ready to believe me: will they really recognize me? Yes, because the charity that makes them good assures them that I am not lying when I confess about myself; that very charity in them believes me.

4, 5. But what do they hope to gain, those who want this? Do they wish to congratulate me when they hear how much progress I am making toward you by your gift, and to pray for me when they hear how badly I am dragged back by my own weight? To people like that I will disclose myself, for it is no small gain, O Lord my God, if thanks are offered to you by many people on our account†16 and many pray to you for us. Yes, let a fraternal mind love in me what you teach us to be worthy of love, and deplore in me what you teach us to be deplorable. But let it be a brotherly mind that does this, not the mind of a stranger, not the minds of alien foes who mouth falsehood and whose power wreaks wickedness;†17 let it be a brotherly mind which when it approves of me will rejoice over me, and when it disapproves will be saddened on my account, because whether it approves or disapproves it still loves me. To such people I will disclose myself: let them sigh with relief over my good actions, but with grief over my evil deeds. The good derive from you and are your gift; the evil are my sins and your punishments. Let them sigh with relief over the one and with grief over the other, and let both hymns and laments ascend into your presence from the hearts of my brethren, which are your censurers.†18 And then do you, Lord, in your delight at the fragrance which pervades your holy temple, have mercy on me according to your great mercy†19 for the sake of your name.†20 Do not, I entreat you, do not abandon your unfinished work, but bring to perfection all that is wanting in me.†21

6. So then, when I confess not what I have been but what I am now, this is the fruit to be reaped from my confessions: I confess not only before you in secret exultation tinged with fear†22 and secret sorrow infused with hope, but also in the ears of believing men and women, the companions of my joy and sharers in my mortality, my fellow citizens still on pilgrimage with me, those who have gone before and those who will follow, and all who bear me company in my life. They are your servants and my brethren, but you have willed them to be your children and my masters, and you have ordered me to serve them if I wish to live with you and share your life. This command of yours would mean little to me if it were only spoken, and not first carried out in deed as well.†23 So I do likewise, and I do it in deeds and in words; I do it under your outstretched wings†24 and would do it in grave peril, were it not that under those wings my soul is surrendered to you†25 and to you my weakness known. I am a little child, but my

est. Parvulus sum, sed vivit semper Pater meus et idoneus est mihi tutor meus; idem ipse est 29 enim, qui genuit me 30 et tuetur me, et tu ipse es omnia bona mea, tu Omnipotens, qui mecum es et priusquam tecum sim. Indicabo ergo talibus, qualibus iubes ut serviam, non quis fuerim, sed quis iam sim et quis adhuc sim; sed neque me ipsum diiudico 31. Sic itaque audiar.

Dominus solus scit omnia de homine.

5. 7. Tu enim, Domine, diiudicas me, quia etsi nemo scit hominum, quae sunt hominis nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est 32, tamen est aliquid hominis, quod nec ipse scit spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est, tu autem, Domine, scis 33 eius omnia, qui fecisti eum. Ego vero quamvis prae tuo conspectu me despiciam et aestimem me terram et cinerem 34, tamen aliquid de te scio, quod de me nescio. Et certe videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, nondum facie ad faciem 35; et ideo, quandiu peregrinor abs te 36, mihi sum praesentior quam tibi et tamen te novi nullo modo posse violari; ego vero quibus temptationibus resistere valeam quibusve non valeam nescio. Et spes est, quia fidelis es, qui nos non sinis temptari supra quam possumus ferre, sed facis cum temptatione etiam exitum, ut possimus sustinere 37. Confitear ergo quid de me sciam, confitear et quid de me nesciam, quoniam et quod de me scio, te mihi lucente scio, et quod de me nescio, tamdiu nescio, donec fiant tenebrae meae sicut meridies 38 in vultu tuo 39.

Deus quaeritur

Quid amatur, cum Deus amatur?

6. 8. Non dubia, sed certa conscientia, Domine, amo te. Percussisti cor meum verbo tuo, et amavi te. Sed et caelum et terra et omnia, quae in eis sunt, ecce undique mihi dicunt, ut te amem, nec cessant dicere omnibus, ut sint inexcusabiles 40. Altius autem tu misereberis, cui misertus eris, et misericordiam praestabis, cui misericors fueris 41; alioquin caelum et terra surdis loquuntur laudes tuas 42. Quid autem amo, cum te amo? Non speciem corporis nec decus temporis, non candorem lucis ecce istis amicis oculis, non dulces melodias cantilenarum omninodarum, non florum et unguentorum et aromatum suaveolentiam, non manna et mella, non membra acceptabilia carnis amplexibus; non haec amo, cum amo Deum meum. Et tamen amo quamdam lucem et quamdam vocem et quemdam odorem et quemdam cibum et quemdam amplexum, cum amo

Father lives for ever and in him I have a guardian suited to me. He who begot me is also he who keeps me safe; you yourself are all the good I have, you are almighty and you are with me before ever I am with you. To such people, then, the people you command me to serve, I will disclose myself not as I have been but as I am now, as I am still, though I do not judge myself.†26 In this way, then, let me be heard.

5, 7. For it is you, Lord, who judge me. No one knows what he himself is made of, except his own spirit within him,†27 yet there is still some part of him which remains hidden even from his own spirit; but you, Lord, know everything about a human being because you have made him. And though in your sight I may despise myself and reckon myself dust and ashes†28 I know something about you which I do not know about myself. It is true that we now see only a tantalizing reflection in a mirror,†29 and so it is that while I am on pilgrimage far from you†30 I am more present to myself than to you; yet I do know that you cannot be defiled in any way whatever, whereas I do not know which temptations I may have the strength to resist, and to which ones I shall succumb. Our hope is that, because you are trustworthy, you do not allow us to be tempted more fiercely than we can bear, but along with the temptation you ordain the outcome of it, so that we can endure.†31 Let me, then, confess what I know about myself, and confess too what I do not know, because what I know of myself I know only because you shed light on me, and what I do not know I shall remain ignorant about until my darkness becomes like bright noon before your face.†32

Looking for God in creatures

6, 8. I love you, Lord, with no doubtful mind but with absolute certainty. You pierced my heart with your word, and I fell in love with you. But the sky and the earth too, and everything in them—all these things around me are telling me that I should love you; and since they never cease to proclaim this to everyone, those who do not hear are left without excuse.†33 But you, far above, will show mercy to anyone with whom you have already determined to deal mercifully, and will grant pity to whomsoever you choose.†34 Were this not so, the sky and the earth would be proclaiming your praises to the deaf. But what am I loving when I love you? Not beauty of body nor transient grace, not this fair light which is now so friendly to my eyes, not melodious song in all its lovely harmonies, not the sweet fragrance of flowers or ointments or spices, not manna or honey, not limbs that draw me to carnal embrace: none of these do I love when I love my God. And yet I do love a kind of light, a kind of voice, a certain fragrance, a food and an embrace, when I love my God: a light, voice, fragrance, food and embrace for my inmost self, where something limited to no place shines into my mind, where something not snatched away by passing time sings for me, where something no breath blows

Deum meum, lucem, vocem, odorem, cibum, amplexum interioris hominis mei, ubi fulget animae meae, quod non capit locus, et ubi sonat, quod non rapit tempus, et ubi olet, quod non spargit flatus, et ubi sapit, quod non minuit edacitas, et ubi haeret, quod non divellit satietas. Hoc est quod amo, cum Deum meum amo.

Supra omnia corpora Deus est quaerendus.

6. 9. *Et quid est hoc? 43 Interrogavi terram, et dixit: "Non sum"; et quaecumque in eadem sunt, idem confessa sunt. Interrogavi mare et abyssos 44 et reptilia animarum vivarum 45, et responderunt: "Non sumus Deus tuus; quaere super nos". Interrogavi auras flabiles, et inquit universus aer cum incolis suis: "Fallitur Anaximenes; non sum Deus". Interrogavi caelum, solem, lunam, stellas: "Neque nos sumus Deus, quem quaeris", inquit. Et dixi omnibus his, quae circumstant fores carnis meae: "Dicite mihi de Deo meo, quod vos non estis, dicite mihi de illo aliquid". Et exclamaverunt voce magna: Ipse fecit nos 46. Interrogatio mea, intentio mea; et responsio eorum, species eorum. Et direxi me ad me et dixi mihi: "Tu quis es?". Et respondi: "Homo". Et ecce corpus et anima in me mihi praesto sunt, unum exterius et alterum interius. Quid horum est, unde quaerere debui Deum meum, quem iam quaesiveram per corpus a terra usque ad caelum, quousque potui mittere nuntios radios oculorum meorum? Sed melius quod interius. Ei quippe renuntiabant omnes nuntii corporales praesidenti et iudicanti de responsionibus caeli et terrae et omnium, quae in eis sunt, dicentium: "Non sumus Deus", et: "Ipse fecit nos". Homo interior 47 cognovit haec per exterioris ministerium; ego interior cognovi haec, ego, ego animus per sensum corporis mei. Interrogavi mundi molem de Deo meo, et respondit mihi: "Non ego sum, sed ipse me fecit".*

6. 10. *Nonne omnibus, quibus integer sensus est, apparet haec species? Cur non omnibus eadem loquitur? Animalia pusilla et magna vident eam, sed interrogare nequeunt. Non enim praeposita est in eis nuntiantibus sensibus iudex ratio. Homines autem possunt interrogare, ut invisibilia Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta 48 conspiciant, sed amore subduntur eis et subditi iudicare non possunt. Nec respondent ista interrogantibus nisi iudicantibus nec vocem suam mutant, id est speciem suam, si alius tantum videat, alius autem videns interroget, ut aliter illi appareat, aliter huic, sed eodem modo utrique apparens illi muta est, huic loquitur; immo vero*

away yields to me its scent, where there is savor undiminished by famished eating, and where I am clasped in a union from which no satiety can tear me away.

This is what I love, when I love my God.

9. And what is this? I put my question to the earth, and it replied, "I am not he"; I questioned everything it held, and they confessed the same. I questioned the sea and the great deep,†35 and the teeming live creatures that crawl,†36

and they replied, "We are not God; seek higher." I questioned the gusty winds, and every breeze with all its flying creatures told me, "Anaximenes was wrong: I am not God."†37

To the sky I put my question, to sun, moon, stars, but they denied me: "We are not the God you seek."

And to all things which stood around the portals of my flesh I said, "Tell me of my God. You are not he, but tell me something of him." Then they lifted up their mighty voices and cried,

"He made us."†38 My questioning was my attentive spirit, and their reply, their beauty. Then toward myself I turned, and asked myself, "Who are you?" And I answered my own question: "A man." See, here are the body and soul that make up myself, the one outward and the other within. Through which of these should I seek my God? With my body's senses I had already sought him from earth to heaven, to the farthest place whither I could send the darting rays of my eyes;†39 but what lay within me was better, and to this all those bodily messengers reported back, for it controlled and judged the replies of sky and earth, and of all the creatures dwelling in them, all those who had proclaimed, "We are not God," and "He made us." My inner self†40 recognized them all through the service of the outer. I, who was that inmost self, I, who was mind, knew them through the senses of my body; and so I questioned the vast frame of the world concerning my God, and it answered, "I am not he, but he made me."†41

10. Surely this beauty is apparent to all whose faculties are sound? Why, then, does it not speak the same message to all? Animals, both small and large, see the beauty, but they are not able to question it, for in them reason does not hold sway as judge over the reports of the senses. Human beings have the power to question, so that by understanding the things he has made they may glimpse the unseen things of God;†42 but by base love they subject themselves to these creatures, and once subject can no longer judge.†43 Creatures do not respond to those who question unless the questioners are also judges: not that they change their voice—that is, their beauty—if one person merely sees it, while another sees and inquires, as though they would appear in one guise to the former, and differently to the latter; no, the beauty appears in the same way to both beholders, but to one it is dumb, and to the other it speaks. Or rather, it speaks to all, but only they understand who

omnibus loquitur, sed illi intellegunt, qui eius vocem acceptam foris intus cum veritate conferunt. Veritas enim dicit mihi: "Non est Deus tuus terra et caelum neque omne corpus". Hoc dicit eorum natura. Vident: moles est, minor in parte quam in toto. Iam tu melior es, tibi dico, anima, quoniam tu vegetas molem corporis tui praebens ei vitam, quod nullum corpus praestat corpori. Deus autem tuus etiam tibi vitae vita est.

Supra animam et sensus Deus est quaerendus.

7. 11. Quid ergo amo, cum Deum meum amo? Quis est ille super caput animae meae? Per ipsam animam meam ascendam at illum. Transibo vim meam, qua haereo corpori et vitaliter compagem eius repleo. Non ea vi reperio Deum meum: nam reperiret et equus et mulus, quibus non est intellectus 49, et est eadem vis, qua vivunt etiam eorum corpora. Est alia vis, non solum qua vivifico sed etiam qua sensifico carnem meam, quam mihi fabricavit Dominus, iubens oculo, ut non audiat, et auri, ut non videat 50, sed illi, per quem videam, huic, per quam audiam, et propria singillatim ceteris sensibus sedibus suis et officiis suis: quae diversa per eos ago unus ego animus. Transibo et istam vim meam; nam et hanc habet equus et mulus; sentiunt enim etiam ipsi per corpus.

*Memoriae campi
Memoriae thesauri:*

8. 12. Transibo ergo et istam naturae meae, gradibus ascendens ad eum, qui fecit me, et venio in campos et lata praetoria memoriae, ubi sunt thesauri innumerabilium imaginum de cuiusmodi rebus sensis invectarum. Ibi reconditum est, quidquid etiam cogitamus, vel augendo vel minuendo vel utcumque variando ea quae sensus attigerit, et si quid aliud commendatum et repositum est, quod nondum absorbit et sepelivit oblivio. Ibi quando sum, posco, ut proferatur quidquid volo, et quaedam statim prodeunt, quaedam requiruntur diutius et tamquam de abstrusioribus quibusdam receptaculis eruuntur, quaedam catervatim se prouunt et, dum aliud petitur et quaeritur, prosiliunt in medium quasi dicentia: "Ne forte nos sumus?". Et abigo ea manu cordis a facie recordationis meae, donec enubiletur quod volo atque in conspectum prodeat ex abditis. Alia faciliter atque imperturbata serie sicut poscuntur suggeruntur et cedunt praecedentia consequentibus et cedendo conduntur, iterum cum

test the voice heard outwardly against the truth within.†44 Truth tells me, "Neither earth nor sky nor any bodily thing is your God." Their own nature avers it. Do you not see, my soul? Nature is an extended mass, smaller in any one part than in the whole. Even you, my soul, are better than that, for you impart energy to the mass of your body and endow it with life, and no corporeal thing can do that for any other corporeal thing. But your God is to you the life of your life itself.†45

7, 11. What is it, then, that I love when I love my God? Who is he who towers above my soul? By this same soul I will mount to him. I will leave behind that faculty whereby I am united to a body and animate its frame. Not by that faculty do I find my God, for horse and mule would find him equally, since the same faculty gives life to their bodies too, yet they are beasts who lack intelligence.†46 There is another power by which I do more than give life to my flesh: with this I endow with senses the flesh that God has fashioned for me, commanding the eye not to hear and the ear not to see, giving to my organ of seeing and my organ of hearing and to all my other senses what is proper to them in their respective places and for their particular work. Their functions are diverse, but I, the one mind, act through them all. This power too I will leave behind, for horse and mule have it too, since they also have sensory organs throughout their bodies.

Looking for God in himself: the fields of memory

8, 12. So then, I will leave behind that faculty of my nature, and mount by stages toward him who made me. Now I arrive in the fields and vast mansions of memory, where are treasured innumerable images brought in there from objects of every conceivable kind perceived by the senses.†47 There too are hidden away the modified images we produce when by our thinking we magnify or diminish or in any way alter the information our senses have reported. There too is everything else that has been consigned and stowed away, and not yet engulfed and buried in oblivion. Sojourning there I command something I want to present itself, and immediately certain things emerge, while others have to be pursued for some time and dug out from remote crannies. Others again come tumbling out in disorderly profusion, and leap into prominence as though asking, "Are we what you want?" when it is something different that I am asking for and trying to recall. With my mental hand I push them out of the way of my effort to remember, until what I want becomes clear and breaks from cover. Then there are remembered items that come to hand easily and in orderly sequence as soon as they are summoned, the earlier members giving way to those that follow and returning to their storage-places, ready to be retrieved next time I need them. All of which happens when I recite anything from memory.

voluero processura. Quod totum fit, cum aliquid narro memoriter.

a) rerum sensarum imagines;

8. 13. *Ibi sunt omnia distincte generatimque servata, quae suo quaeque aditu ingesta sunt, sicut lux atque omnes colores formaeque corporum per oculos, per aures autem omnia genera sonorum omnesque odores per aditum narium, omnes saporis per oris aditum, a sensu autem totius corporis, quid durum, quid molle, quid calidum frigidumve, lene aut asperum, grave seu leve sive extrinsecus sive intrinsecus corpori. Haec omnia recipit recolenda, cum opus est, et retractanda grandis memoriae recessus et nescio qui secreti atque ineffabiles sinus eius; quae omnia suis quaeque foribus intrant ad eam et reponuntur in ea. Nec ipsa tamen intrant, sed rerum sensarum imagines illic praesto sunt cogitationi reminiscenti eas. Quae quomodo fabricatae sint, quis dicit, cum appareat, quibus sensibus raptae sint interiusque reconditae? Nam et in tenebris atque in silentio dum habito, in memoria mea profero, si volo, colores, et discerno inter album et nigrum et inter quos alios volo, nec incurrunt soni atque perturbant quod per oculos haustum considero, cum et ipsi ibi sint et quasi seorsum repositi lateant. Nam et ipsos posco, si placet, atque adsunt illico, et quiescente lingua ac silente gutture canto quantum volo, imaginesque illae colorum, quae nihilo minus ibi sunt, non se interponunt neque interrumpunt, cum thesaurus alius retractatur, qui influxit ab auribus. Ita cetera, quae per sensus ceteros ingesta atque congesta sunt, recordor prout libet et auram liliorum discerno a violis nihil olfaciens et mel defruto, lene aspero, nihil tum gustando neque contrectando, sed reminiscendo antepono.*

b) omnia sive experta a se sive credita.

8. 14. *Intus haec ago, in aula ingenti memoriae meae. Ibi enim mihi caelum et terra et mare praesto sunt cum omnibus, quae in eis sentire potui, praeter illa, quae oblitus sum. Ibi mihi et ipse occurro meque recolo, quid, quando et ubi egerim quoque modo, cum agerem, affectus fuerim. Ibi sunt omnia, quae sive experta a me sive credita memini. Ex eadem copia etiam similitudines rerum vel expertarum vel ex eis, quas expertus sum, creditarum alias atque alias et ipse contexo praeteritis atque ex his etiam futuras actiones et eventa et spes, et haec omnia rursus quasi praesentia meditor. "Faciam hoc et*

13. Preserved there, classified and distinct, are all those impressions which have been admitted through the entrances proper to each: light, colors and bodily shapes through the eye; all kinds of sound through the ears; various odors through the gateways of the nostrils; flavors through the entrance of the mouth; and through the pervasive sense of touch whatever is felt as hard or soft, hot or cold, smooth or rough, heavy or light, external to the body or inside it. The huge repository of the memory, with its secret and unimaginable caverns, welcomes and keeps all these things, to be recalled and brought out for use when needed; and as all of them have their particular ways into it, so all are put back again in their proper places. The sense-impressions themselves do not find their way in, however; it is the images of things perceived by the senses that are available there to the person who recalls them. Who can tell how these images are fashioned, obvious though it may be through which senses they were captured and stowed away within? For when I am sitting quietly in the dark I can bring up colors in my memory if I wish, and distinguish white from black and any others I select. No sounds burst in to intrude on these images acquired through my eyes, which I am considering, though sounds too are present there, lying hidden and stored in a place by themselves. I can summon them equally well, if I wish, and find them present at once, and though my tongue and throat are silent I sing as much as I like. Images of color, which are just as truly present, do not thrust themselves in on my song or interrupt it while I am enjoying this other treasure, which has flowed into me through my ears. Similarly I can recall at will anything drawn in and hoarded by way of my other senses. I can distinguish the scent of lilies from violets even though I am not actually smelling anything, and honey from grape-juice, smooth from rough, without tasting or feeling anything: I am simply passing them in review before my mind by remembering them.

14. This I do within myself in the immense court of my memory; for there sky and earth and sea are readily available to me, together with everything that I have ever been able to perceive in them, apart from what I have forgotten. And there I come to meet myself.†48 I recall myself, what I did, when and where I acted in a certain way, and how I felt about so acting. Everything is there which I remember having experienced for myself or believed on the assertion of others. Moreover, I can draw on this abundant store to form imaginary pictures which resemble the things I have myself experienced, or believed because my own experience confirmed them, and weave these together with images from the past, and so evoke future actions, occurrences or hopes; and on all these as well I can meditate as though they were present to me. In that same enormous recess of my mind, thronging with so many great images, I say to myself, "That's what I will do!" And the action I have envisaged follows. "Oh, if only this or that could be! Pray God this or that may not happen!" I say to myself, and

illud" dico apud me in ipso ingenti sinu animi mei pleno tot et tantarum rerum imaginibus, et hoc aut illud sequitur. "O si esset hoc aut illud!". "Avertat Deus hoc aut illud!"; dico apud me ista et, cum dico, praesto sunt imagines omnium quae dico ex eodem thesauro memoriae, nec omnino aliquid eorum dicerem, si defuissent.

Magna vis memoriae.

8. 15. *Magna ista vis est memoriae, magna nimis, Deus meus, penetrabile amplum et infinitum. Quis ad fundum eius pervenit? Et vis est haec animi mei atque ad meam naturam pertinet, nec ego ipse capio totum, quod sum. Ergo animus ad habendum se ipsum angustus est, ut ubi sit quod sui non capit? Numquid extra ipsum ac non in ipso? Quomodo ergo non capit? Multa mihi super hoc oboritur admiratio, stupor apprehendit me. Et eunt homines mirari alta montium et ingentes fluctus maris et latissimos lapsus fluminum et Oceani ambitum et gyros siderum et relinquunt se ipsos nec mirantur, quod haec omnia cum dicerem, non ea videbam oculis, nec tamen dicerem, nisi montes et fluctus et flumina et sidera, quae vidi, et Oceanum, quem credidi, intus in memoria mea viderem spatiis tam ingentibus, quasi foris viderem. Nec ea tamen videndo absorbiui, quando vidi oculis, nec ipsa sunt apud me, sed imagines eorum, et novi, quid ex quo sensu corporis impressum sit mihi.*

c) omnia de doctrinis liberalibus percepta.

9. 16. *Sed non ea sola gestat immensa ista capacitas memoriae meae. Hic sunt et illa omnia, quae de doctrinis liberalibus percepta nondum exciderunt, quasi remota interiore loco, non loco; nec eorum imagines, sed res ipsas gero. Nam quid sit litteratura, quid peritia disputandi, quot genera quaestionum, quidquid horum scio, sic est in memoria mea, ut non retenta imagine rem foris reliquerim aut sonuerit et praeterierit, sicut vox impressa per aures vestigio, quo recoleretur, quasi sonaret, cum iam non sonaret, aut sicut odor dum transit et vanescit in ventos, olfactum afficit, unde traicit in memoriam imaginem sui, quam reminiscendo repetamus, aut sicut cibus, qui certe in ventre iam non sapit et tamen in memoria quasi sapit, aut sicut aliquid, quod corpore tangendo sentitur quod etiam separatum a nobis imaginatur memoria. Istae quippe res non intromittuntur ad eam, sed earum solae imagines mira celeritate*

even as I say it the images of all these things of which I speak pass before me, coming from the same treasure-house of memory. If they were not there, I would be quite unable to conjure up such possibilities.†49

15. This faculty of memory is a great one, O my God, exceedingly great, a vast, infinite recess. Who can plumb its depth? This is a faculty of my mind, belonging to my nature, yet I cannot myself comprehend all that I am. Is the mind, then, too narrow to grasp itself, forcing us to ask where that part of it is which it is incapable of grasping? Is it outside the mind, not inside? How can the mind not compass it? Enormous wonder wells up within me when I think of this, and I am dumbfounded. People go to admire lofty mountains, and huge breakers at sea, and crashing waterfalls, and vast stretches of ocean, and the dance of the stars, but they leave themselves behind out of sight. It does not strike them as wonderful that I could enumerate those things without seeing them with my eyes, and that I could not even have spoken of them unless I could within my mind contemplate mountains and waves and rivers and stars (which I have seen), and the ocean (which I only take on trust), and contemplate them there in spaces just as vast as though I were seeing them outside myself. But I did not suck them into myself when I looked at them with my eyes, for it was not these things themselves that entered me, but only the images of them; and I know which impressions were made on me through which of my bodily senses.

9, 16. The immense spaces of my memory harbor even more than these, however. Here too are all those things which I received through a liberal education and have not yet forgotten; they are stored away in some remote inner place, which yet is not really a place at all. However, in this case it is not images of the realities that I harbor, but the realities themselves; for everything I know about literature, or skill in debate, or how many kinds of questions can logically be formulated, lodges indeed in my memory, but not like an image which remains after I have turned away from some object perceived externally, nor like the trace of a sound that has faded, by means of which a voice that has penetrated my ears can still be recalled as though audible when it is audible no longer, nor like a fleeting scent that is blown away by the wind after affecting our nostrils, but leaves an image of itself in the memory which we can savor again later by remembering it, nor like food, which is certainly no longer present as a flavor in the stomach but can still be tasted in the memory, nor like anything which is felt by bodily touch and can still be touched by our memory when the object is no longer in contact with our bodies. None of these objects is admitted into the memory in its own right; only the images of them are captured with astonishing speed, put away in wonderful compartments, and brought out again in a wonderful way when we recall them.

capiuntur et miris tamquam cellis reponuntur et mirabiliter recordando proferuntur.

Unde et qua intrant in memoriam doctrinae ac scientiae?

10. 17. *At vero, cum audio tria genera esse quaestionum: an sit, quid sit, quale sit, sonorum quidem, quibus haec verba confecta sunt, imagines teneo et eos per auras cum strepitu transisse ac iam non esse scio. Res vero ipsas, quae illis significantur sonis, neque ullo sensu corporis attingi neque usquam vidi praeter animum meum et in memoria recondidi non imagines earum, sed ipsas; quae unde ad me intraverint dicant, si possunt. Nam percurro ianuas omnes carnis meae nec invenio, qua earum ingressae sint. Quippe oculi dicunt: "Si coloratae sunt, nos eas nuntiavimus"; aures dicunt: "Si sonuerunt, a nobis indicatae sunt"; nares dicunt: "Si oluerunt, per nos transierunt", dicit etiam sensus gustandi: "Si sapor non est, nihil me interroges"; tactus dicit: "Si corpulentum non est, non contrectavi; si non contrectavi, non indicavi". Unde et qua haec intraverunt in memoriam meam? Nescio quomodo; nam cum ea didici, non credidi alieno cordi, sed in meo recognovi et vera esse approbavi et commendavi ei tamquam reponens, unde proferrem, cum vellem. Ibi ergo erant et antequam ea didicissem, sed in memoria non erant. Ubi ergo aut quare, cum dicerentur, agnovi et dixi: "Ita est, verum est", nisi quia iam erant in memoria, sed tam remota et retrusa quasi in cavis abditioribus, ut, nisi admonente aliquo eruerentur, ea fortasse cogitare non possem?*

Cur cogitatio a cogendo sit dicta.

11. 18. *Quocirca invenimus nihil esse aliud discere ista, quorum non per sensus haurimus imagines, sed sine imaginibus, sicuti sunt, per se ipsa intus cernimus, nisi ea, quae passim atque indisposite memoria continebat, cogitando quasi colligere atque animadvertendo curare, ut tamquam ad manum posita in ipsa memoria, ubi sparsa prius et neglecta latitabant, iam familiari intentioni facile occurrant. Et quam multa huius modi gestat memoria mea quae iam inventa sunt et, sicut dixi, quasi ad manum posita, quae didicisse et nosse dicimur. Quae si modestis temporum intervallis recolere desivero, ita rursus demerguntur et quasi in remotiora penetralia dilabuntur, ut denuo velut nova excogitanda sint indidem iterum (neque enim est alia regio eorum) et cogenda rursus, ut sciri possint, id est velut ex*

10, 17. When I hear that there are three classes of questions—namely, whether something exists, what it is, and what qualities belong to it—I do, to be sure, retain images of the sounds by which these words are composed; and I know that those sounds were borne upon the breeze with some noise, but have now fallen silent. But through no bodily sense whatever have I made contact with the realities themselves, for I have never seen these realities anywhere except in my own mind. What I have stowed away in my memory is not the images of these things but the things themselves. Let them say how they found their way into me if they can, for when I check every physical gateway in myself I find none by which they can have entered. My eyes tell me, "If those things were colored, it was we who reported them"; my ears declare, "If they made some sound, we gave you the information"; my nostrils say, "If there was a smell to them, we let them through"; my sense of taste replies, "If they had no flavor, don't ask me"; touch says, "If they had no bodily substance, I did not handle them, and if I did not handle them, I told you nothing." From what source and by what route did they enter my memory? I do not know, for when I learned them I did not take them on trust from some stranger's intelligence but recognized them as present in my own, and affirmed them as true, and entrusted them to my memory for safekeeping so that I could bring them out again when I wished. This means that they were there even before I learned them, but not remembered. Where and why did I recognize them and say, "Yes, that's how it is; that is true," when these things were stated? Surely because they were already in my memory, but so remote, so hidden from sight in concealed hollows, that unless they had been dug out by someone who reminded me, I would perhaps never have been able to think about them.†50

11, 18. We are therefore led to conclude that when we learn things which are not imbibed through the senses as images, but are known directly in their own reality inside the mind, as they are in themselves, and without the intervention of images, we are collecting by means of our thought those things which the memory already held, but in a scattered and disorderly way. By applying our minds to them we ensure that they are stacked ready-to-hand in the memory, where they may be easily available for habitual use, instead of lying hidden, dispersed and neglected, as hitherto. How many things of this kind are carried in my memory! Such things have been found and placed ready-to-hand in the way I have described, and so it is said that we have learned them and now we know them. If I have ceased to recall them for a fair stretch of time they sink back again and slip away into distant caverns, and then they need to be pulled from the same places (for there is no other home for them) as though newly thought out, and herded together†51 to become knowable once more: that is to say they need to be collected again,†52 which is why we call this activity cogitating,†53 or collecting one's thoughts. Cogo is

quadam dispersione colligenda, unde dictum est cogitare. Nam cogo et cogito sic est, ut ago et agito, facio et factito. Verumtamen sibi animus hoc verbum proprie vindicavit, ut non quod alibi, sed quod in animo colligitur, id est cogitur, cogitari proprie iam dicatur.

d) numerorum dimensionumque rationes et leges;

12. 19. Item continet memoria numerorum dimensionumque rationes et leges innumerabiles, quarum nullam corporis sensus impressit, quia nec ipsae coloratae sunt aut sonant aut olent aut gustatae aut contrectatae sunt. Audivi sonos verborum, quibus significantur, cum de his disseritur, sed illi alii, istae autem aliae sunt. Nam illi aliter Graece, aliter Latine sonant, istae vero nec Graecae nec Latinae sunt nec aliud eloquiorum genus. Vidi lineas fabrorum vel etiam tenuissimas, sicut filum araneae; sed illae aliae sunt, non sunt imagines earum, quas mihi nuntiavit carnis oculus: novit eas quisquis sine ulla cogitatione qualiscumque corporis intus agnovit eas. Sensi etiam numeros omnibus corporis sensibus, quos numeramus; sed illi alii sunt, quibus numeramus, nec imagines istorum sunt et ideo valde sunt. Rideat me ista dicentem, qui non eos videt, et ego doleam ridentem me.

e) quomodo haec omnia cognita sint;

13. 20. Haec omnia memoria teneo et quomodo ea didicerim memoria teneo. Multa etiam, quae adversus haec falsissime disputantur, audivi et memoria teneo; quae tametsi falsa sunt tamen ea meminisse me non est falsum; et discrevisse me inter illa vera et haec falsa, quae contra dicuntur, et hoc memini aliterque nunc video discernere me ista, aliter autem memini saepe me discrevisse, cum ea saepe cogitarem. Ergo et intellexisse me saepius ista memini, et quod nunc discerno et intellego, recondo in memoria, ut postea me nunc intellexisse meminero. Ergo et meminisse me memini, sicut postea, quod haec reminisci nunc potui, si recordabor, utique per vim memoriae recordabor.

f) animi affectiones.

14. 21. Affectiones quoque animi mei eadem memoria continet non illo modo, quo eas habet ipse animus, cum patitur eas, sed alio multum diverso, sicut sese habet vis memoriae. Nam et laetatum me fuisse reminiscor non laetus et tristitiam meam

related to cogito as ago is to agito and facio to factito.†54 The mind, however, has claimed this verb as properly applicable to itself, so that only what is “collected,” within the mind, what is “herded together” there, and there only, is properly said to be “thought.”

12, 19. The memory also stores countless truths and laws of mathematics and mensuration, no single one of which was impressed upon it by bodily sense, for they have no color, sound or smell, nor have they been tasted or handled. I heard the sound of the words that indicated these truths when they were under discussion, but the sounds are one thing and the truths themselves something else. The words sound one way in Greek and differently in Latin, but the truths are neither Greek nor Latin, nor spoken entities of any kind. I have seen a draughtsman's geometric lines, and even though they are infinitely fine, like a spider's thread, the mathematical lines they represent are something quite different, not the images of those lines which my fleshly eye has observed. Everyone knows these truths, without a physical representation of any kind being involved. One recognizes them within oneself. With all my bodily senses I have apprehended the numbers of things as we count them; but the principle of number is something entirely different, and without it we could not think mathematically at all. This principle is not an image of the things counted, and therefore has a much more real existence.†55 Let anyone who cannot see it laugh at me, but allow me to pity him for laughing.

13, 20. Not only do I retain all these things in my memory: I can also keep in my memory the way in which I learned them. I have heard many completely erroneous arguments urged against them, and these too I retain in my memory. Erroneous they were, yet my memory is not in error as I recall them. Further, I can remember discriminating between the truth and those erroneous arguments against it, and I see that my discrimination between them today is distinct from the discrimination I often practiced at various times in the past when I thought about them. So I remember that I have often understood these matters, and I also store in my memory what I discern and understand now, so that later on I may remember that I understood it today. It follows that I have the power to remember that I remembered, just as later, if I recall that I have been able to remember these things now, I shall undoubtedly be recalling it through the faculty of memory.

14, 21. The same memory also records emotions previously experienced in the mind, not in the same way as the mind experienced them at the time, but in the mode proper to the power of memory. I remember having been happy, without feeling happy now; I recall my past sadness but feel no sadness in so doing; I remember having been afraid once, but am not frightened as I remember; I summon the memory of how I once

praeteritam recordor non tristis et me aliquando timuisse recolo sine timore et pristinae cupiditatis sine cupiditate sum memor. Aliquando et e contrario tristitiam meam transactam laetus reminiscor et tristis laetitiam. Quod mirandum non est de corpore: aliud enim animus, aliud corpus. Itaque si praeteritum dolorem corporis gaudens memini, non ita mirum est. Hic vero, cum animus sit etiam ipsa memoria (nam et cum mandamus aliquid, ut memoriter habeatur, dicimus: "Vide, ut illud in animo habeas", et cum obliviscimur, dicimus: "Non fuit in animo" et "Elapsum est animo", ipsam memoriam vocantes animum) cum ergo ita sit, quid est hoc 51, quod cum tristitiam meam praeteritam laetus memini, animus habet laetitiam et memoria tristitiam laetusque est animus ex eo, quod inest ei laetitia, memoria vero ex eo, quod inest ei tristitia, tristis non est? Num forte non pertinet ad animum? Quis hoc dixerit? Nimirum ergo memoria quasi venter est animi, laetitia vero atque tristitia quasi cibus dulcis et amarus; cum memoriae commendantur, quasi traiecta in ventrem recondi illic possunt, sapere non possunt. Ridiculum est haec illis similia putare, nec tamen sunt omni modo dissimilia.

14. 22. *Sed ecce de memoria profero, cum dico quattuor esse perturbationes animi: cupiditatem, laetitiam, metum, tristitiam 52, et quidquid de his disputare potuero, dividendo singula per species sui cuiusque generis et definiendo, ibi invenio quid dicam atque inde profero, nec tamen ulla earum perturbatione perturbor, cum eas reminiscendo commemoro; et antequam recolerentur a me et retractarentur, ibi erant; propterea inde per recordationem potuere depromi. Forte ergo sicut de ventre cibus ruminando, sic ista de memoria recordando proferuntur. Cur igitur in ore cogitationis non sentitur a disputante, hoc est a reminiscente, laetitiae dulcedo vel amaritudo maestitiae? An in hoc dissimile est, quod non undique simile est? Quis enim talia volens loqueretur, si quotiens tristitiam metumve nominamus, totiens maerere vel timere cogeremur? Et tamen non ea loqueremur, nisi in memoria nostra non tantum sonos nominum secundum imagines impressas a sensibus corporis sed etiam rerum ipsarum notiones inveniremus, quas nulla ianua carnis accepimus, sed eas ipse animus per experientiam passionum suarum sentiens memoriae commendavit, aut ipsa sibi haec etiam non commendata retinuit.*

wanted something, but without wanting it today. Sometimes the opposite emotion is present: I can happily remember some sadness I suffered which is now over and done with, or sadly recall lost happiness. There is nothing strange about this where the previous experience was one that simply involved the body, for the mind is one thing and the body another; it is therefore unremarkable if in my mind I joyfully recall some former bodily pain. Mind and memory, however, are one and the same. This is why when we instruct someone to remember a point we say, "Be sure to bear that in mind"; and when we forget we say, "I didn't have my mind on it" or "It slipped my mind." So we call memory itself "mind." This being the case, how does it happen that when I happily recall my past sadness, my mind is experiencing joy while my memory is of sorrow, and yet while the mind is happy in the joy it contains, the memory is not saddened by the sadness in it? Does the memory not belong to the mind? Who would maintain that? It is truer to say that the memory is like the mind's stomach, while joy and sorrow are like delicious or bitter food. When they are committed to memory they are transferred to the stomach, as it were, and can be kept there, but cannot be tasted. It is absurd to think the operations of memory and stomach are really alike, yet they are not in all respects dissimilar. †56

22. But now suppose I produce something else from my memory: I state that there are four passions that disturb the soul—desire, joy, fear and sadness; for purposes of disputation I state whatever analysis of them I have formulated by dividing each according to species and genus; I find in my memory what I am to say and it is from there that I produce my statement; yet when I run through these passions from memory I suffer no emotional disturbance from any of them. Before they were recalled and brought out for inspection they were there: that is why they could be fetched by the act of remembrance. Perhaps, then, these things are produced from the memory in the same way that cattle can bring food back from the stomach for chewing the cud. But in that case why does the disputant (that is, the person who remembers) not taste the sweetness of joy or the bitterness of grief in the mouth of his thought? Or is this precisely the point of difference between two activities, the point where the analogy breaks down? Who indeed would discuss these passions if every time we mentioned sadness or fear we were forced to mourn or feel frightened? And yet we would be in no position to discuss them unless we found in our memory not just the sound of their names, as images derived from sense-impressions, but the very notions of the things themselves. These we have received through no gateway of the flesh; the mind itself has become aware of them by undergoing its emotions and has committed them to memory, or else the memory has retained them of its own accord, though they were not expressly entrusted to it.

Difficile est dictu num per imagines omnia recordemur.

15. 23. Sed utrum per imagines an non, quis facile dixerit? Nomino quippe lapidem, nomino solem, cum res ipsae non adsunt sensibus meis; in memoria sane mea praesto sunt imagines earum. Nomino dolorem corporis, nec mihi adest, dum nihil dolet, nisi tamen adesset imago eius in memoria mea, nescirem, quid dicerem, nec eum in disputando a voluptate discernerem. Nomino salutem corporis, cum salvus sum corpore; adest mihi quidem res ipsa; verumtamen nisi et imago eius inesset in memoria mea, nullo modo recordarer, quid huius nominis significaret sonus, nec aegrotantes agnoscerent salute nominata, quid esset dictum, nisi eadem imago vi memoriae teneretur, quamvis ipsa res abesset a corpore. Nomino numeros, quibus numeramus; et adsunt in memoria mea non imagines eorum, sed ipsi. Nomino imaginem solis, et haec adest in memoria mea; neque enim imaginem imaginis eius, sed ipsam recolo: ipsa mihi reminiscenti praesto est. Nomino memoriam et agnosco quod nomino. Et ubi agnosco nisi in ipsa memoria? Num et ipsa per imaginem suam sibi adest ac non per se ipsam?

g) oblivio ipsa.

16. 24. Quid, cum oblivionem nomino atque itidem agnosco quod nomino, unde agnoscerem, nisi meminissem? Non eundem sonum nominis dico, sed rem, quam significat; quam si oblitus essem, quid ille valeret sonus, agnoscere utique non valerem. Ergo cum memoriam memini, per se ipsam sibi praesto est ipsa memoria; cum vero memini oblivionem, et memoria praesto est et oblivio, memoria, qua meminierim, oblivio, quam meminierim. Sed quid est oblivio nisi privatio memoriae? Quomodo ergo adest, ut eam meminierim, quando cum adest meminisse non possum? At si quod meminimus memoria retinemus, oblivionem autem nisi meminissemus, nequaquam possemus audito isto nomine rem quae illo significatur, agnoscere, memoria retinetur oblivio. Adest ergo, ne obliviscamur, quae cum adest, obliviscimur. An ex hoc intellegitur non per se ipsam inesse memoriae, cum eam meminimus, sed per imaginem suam, quia, si per se ipsam praesto esset oblivio, non ut meminissemus, sed ut oblivisceremur, efficeret? Et hoc quis tandem indagabit? Quis comprehendet, quomodo sit?

15, 23. It is not easy to say whether this process occurs with the help of images or not. I speak of a stone, or the sun, when these objects are not present to my senses, and unquestionably the images of them are available in my memory. I name a bodily pain: it is not present to me, because nothing is hurting; but unless the image of it resided in my memory I would not know how to speak of it, nor would I be able in an argument to distinguish it from pleasure. I name bodily health when I am myself in a healthy condition; in this case the object itself is present to me, yet if its image were not also retained in my memory I would be quite unable to recall what the sound of its name signified; and similarly sick people would not know the meaning of any statement about health if the same image were not retained by the power of memory, even though the thing itself is lacking in their bodies.†57 When I speak of “numbers”—ideal numbers in the light of which we count—it is not the images of them that are present in my memory but the numbers themselves. I speak of “the image of the sun,” and this is precisely what is in my memory, for what I recall is not an image of that image, but the primary image itself: it is this which springs to mind immediately in my act of remembering. I name “memory,” and recognize what I am naming; but where can this act of recognition take place, except in the memory? Does this mean that memory is present to itself through its image, and not in itself?

16, 24. Now when I name “forgetfulness” and similarly recognize the thing I am naming, whence comes my recognition, if not from an act of remembering? I do not mean recognition of the sound of its name, but of the thing signified, for if I forgot that, I would be unable to recognize the meaning of the word. So when I remember “memory,” memory itself immediately makes itself available; but when I remember “forgetfulness,” both memory and forgetfulness are promptly present: memory since by means of it I remember, and forgetfulness since that is what I am remembering. But what else is forgetfulness but loss of memory? How then can it be present so that I can remember it, when its very presence deprives me of the power to remember? What we remember, we retain in our memory. If we did not remember forgetfulness, we would never recognize the reality which is being referred to when we hear its name; hence forgetfulness is retained by the memory. It must be present, otherwise we would forget it, yet when it is present we forget! Are we to understand, then, that forgetfulness is not in itself present in the memory when we remember it, but present only through its image, since if it were immediately present in its reality it would make us forget, not remember?†58 In the end, who can fathom this matter, who understand how the mind works?

25. This much is certain, Lord, that I am laboring over it, laboring over myself, and I have become for myself a land hard to till and of heavy sweat.†59 We are not in this instance gazing

16. 25. *Ego certe, Domine, laboro hic et laboro in me ipso: factus sum mihi terra difficultatis et sudoris nimii* 53. *Neque enim nunc scrutamur plagas caeli* 54 *aut siderum intervalla dimetimur vel terrae libramenta quaerimus; ego sum, qui memini, ego animus. Non ita mirum, si a me longe est quidquid ego non sum; quid autem propinquius me ipso mihi? Et ecce memoriae meae vis non comprehenditur a me, cum ipsum me non dicam praeter illam. Quid enim dicturus sum, quando mihi certum est meminisse me oblivionem? An dicturus sum non esse in memoria mea quod memini? An dicturus sum ad hoc inesse oblivionem in memoria mea, ut non obliviscar? Utrumque absurdissimum est. Quid illud tertium? Quo pacto dicam imaginem oblivionis teneri memoria mea, non ipsam oblivionem, cum eam memini? Quo pacto et hoc dicam, quandoquidem cum imprimitur rei cuiusque imago in memoria, prius necesse est, ut adsit res ipsa, unde illa imago possit imprimi? Sic enim Carthaginis memini, sic omnium locorum, quibus interfui, sic facies hominum, quas vidi, et ceterorum sensuum nuntiata, sic ipsius corporis salutem sive dolorem; cum praesto essent ista, cepit ab eis imagines memoria, quas intuerer praesentes et retractarem animo, cum illa et absentia reminiscerer. Si ergo per imaginem suam, non per se ipsam in memoria tenetur oblivio, ipsa utique aderat, ut eius imago caperetur. Cum autem adesset, quomodo imaginem suam in memoria conscriberet, quando id etiam, quod iam notatum invenit, praesentia sua delet oblivio? Et tamen quocumque modo, licet sit modus iste incomprehensibilis et inexplicabilis, etiam ipsam oblivionem meminisse me certus sum, qua id quod meminimus obruitur.*

Supra memoriam Deus est quaerendus.

17. 26. *Magna vis est memoriae, nescio quid horrendum, Deus meus, profunda et infinita multiplicitas; et hoc animus est et hoc ego ipse sum. Quid ergo sum, Deus meus? Quae natura sum? Varia, multimoda vita et immensa vehementer. Ecce in memoriae meae campis et antris et cavernis innumerabilibus atque innumerabiliter plenis innumerabilium rerum generibus sive per imagines, sicut omnium corporum, sive per praesentiam, sicut artium, sive per nescio quas notiones vel notationes, sicut affectionum animi (quas et cum animus non patitur, memoria tenet, cum in animo sit quidquid est in memoria) per haec omnia discuro et volito hac illac, penetro etiam, quantum possum, et finis nusquam; tanta vis est memoriae, tanta vitae vis est*

at the expanses of the sky†60 or calculating the distances between stars or the weight of the earth:†61 the person who remembers is myself; I am my mind.†62 It is not surprising that whatever is not myself should be remote, but what can be nearer to me than I am to myself? Yet here I am, unable to comprehend the nature of my memory, when I cannot even speak of myself without it. How am I to explain it, when I am quite certain that I remember forgetting? Am I to say that something I remember is not in my memory? Or am I to say that forgetfulness is in my memory for the very purpose of preventing me from forgetting? Either alternative is completely absurd. Is there a third possibility? I might say that when I remember “forgetfulness” it is only the image of forgetfulness that is held in my memory, not forgetfulness itself. But what right have I to make that assertion, in view of the fact that when an image of something is imprinted upon the memory, the thing itself must have been present first, so that the image can be derived from it and imprinted? That is how I remember Carthage; that is how I remember all the places where I have been and the faces of people I have met, and that is how I remember all the information reported by my other senses, and the health or pain of my own body: when these objects were to hand my memory abstracted from them images which I would be able to contemplate as truly present and review in my mind, when later I remembered those objects in their absence. It would follow, then, that if “forgetfulness” is kept in the memory not in its own reality but by means of its image, it would need to have been present so that its image could be abstracted. But when it was present, how did it inscribe its image in my memory, when its very presence blotted out even what it found already registered there? Nonetheless in some way, some way which is incomprehensible and defies explanation, I am certain that I do remember forgetfulness—that very forgetfulness beneath which what we remember is submerged.

17, 26. O my God, profound, infinite complexity, what a great faculty memory is, how awesome a mystery! It is the mind, and this is nothing other than my very self. What am I, then, O my God? What is my nature? It is teeming life of every conceivable kind, and exceedingly vast. See, in the measureless plains and vaults and caves of my memory, immeasurably full of countless kinds of things which are there either through their images (as with material things), or by being themselves present (as is the knowledge acquired through a liberal education), or by registering themselves and making their mark in some indefinable way (as with emotional states which the memory retains even when the mind is not actually experiencing them, although whatever is in the memory must be in the mind too)—in this wide land I am made free of all of them, free to run and fly to and fro, to penetrate as deeply as I can, to collide with no boundary anywhere. So great is the

in homine vivente mortaliter! Quid igitur agam, tu vera mea vita, Deus meus? Transibo et hanc vim meam, quae memoria vocatur, transibo eam, ut pertendam ad te, dulce lumen 55. Quid dicis mihi? Ecce ego ascendens per animum meum ad te, qui desuper mihi manes, transibo et istam vim meam, quae memoria vocatur, volens te attingere, unde attingi potes, et inhaerere tibi, unde inhaereri tibi potest. Habent enim memoriam et pecora et aves, alioquin non cubilia nidove repeterent, non alia multa, quibus assuescunt; neque enim et assuescere valerent ullis rebus nisi per memoriam. Transibo ergo et memoriam, ut attingam eum, qui separavit me a quadrupedibus et a volatilibus caeli sapientiore me fecit. Transibo et memoriam, ut ubi te inveniam, vere bone, segura suavitas, ut ubi te inveniam? Si praeter memoriam meam te invenio, immemor tui sum. Et quomodo iam inveniam te, si memor non sum tui?

Memoria et oblivio.

18. 27. Perdiderat enim mulier drachmam et quaesivit eam cum lucerna et, nisi memor eius esset, non inveniret eam 56. Cum enim esset inventa, unde sciret, utrum ipsa esset, si memor eius non esset? Multa memini me perdita quaesisse atque invenisse. Inde istuc scio, quia, cum quaererem aliquid eorum et diceretur mihi: "Num forte hoc est?", "Num forte illud?", tamdiu dicebam: "Non est", donec id offerretur quod quaerebam. Cuius nisi memor essem, quidquid illud esset, etiamsi mihi offerretur, non invenirem, quia non agnoscerem. Et semper ita fit, cum aliquid perditum quaerimus et invenimus. Verumtamen si forte aliquid ab oculis perit, non a memoria, veluti corpus quodlibet visibile, tenetur intus imago eius et quaeritur, donec reddatur aspectui. Quod cum inventum fuerit, ex imagine, quae intus est, recognoscitur. Nec invenisse nos dicimus quod perierat 57, si non agnoscimus, nec agnoscere possumus, si non meminimus; sed hoc perierat quidem oculis, memoria tenebatur.

De iis, quae memoria perdit.

19. 28. Quid? Cum ipsa memoria perdit aliquid, sicut fit, cum obliviscimur et quaerimus, ut recordemur, ubi tandem quaerimus nisi in ipsa memoria? Et ibi si aliud pro alio forte offeratur, respuimus, donec illud occurrat quod quaerimus. Et cum occurrit, dicimus: "Hoc est"; quod non diceremus, nisi agnosceremus, nec agnosceremus, nisi meminissemus. Certe ergo obliti fueramus. An

faculty of memory, so great the power of life in a person whose life is tending toward death!

What shall I do, then, O my God, my true life? I will pass beyond this faculty of mine called memory, I will pass beyond it and continue resolutely toward you, O lovely Light.†63 What are you saying to me? See, I am climbing through my mind to you who abide high above me; I will pass beyond even this faculty of mine which is called memory in my longing to touch you from that side whence you can be touched, and cleave to you in the way in which holding fast to you is possible. For animals and birds also have memories; they would not otherwise return to their accustomed lairs and nests, rather than randomly to others, and indeed they would never be able to grow accustomed to anything without memory. I will therefore pass beyond memory and try to touch him who marked me out from the four-footed beasts and made me wiser than the birds in the sky;†64 yes, I will pass beyond even my memory that I may find you... where? O my true good, O sweetness that will never fail me, that I may find you... where? If I find you somewhere beyond my memory, that means that I shall be forgetful of you. And how shall I find you, once I am no longer mindful of you?

18, 27. A woman had lost a coin; she searched for it with a lamp,†65 and unless she had had some memory of it she would not have found it, for when it was found, how could she have known that this was it, if she did not remember it? I remember losing many things myself, and looking for them and finding them, and this is how I know, because when I was searching for one or another of them, and someone said to me, "Perhaps this is it?" or "Is that it?" I went on saying, "No, that's not it," until what I was looking for was offered to me. Unless I had remembered that thing, whatever it was, I would not have found it even when it was handed to me, because I would not have recognized it. This is what always happens when we look for something we have lost and then find it. If some article chances to drop out of view, but not out of memory, such as any kind of visible object, the image of it persists within us and the thing is sought until it comes to light again; and when it has been found it is recognized by comparison with this inward image. We do not say that we have found the lost object unless we recognize it, and we cannot recognize it if we do not remember it. The thing had disappeared from our sight, but was held in our memory.

19, 28. What follows? When the memory itself loses some item, as for instance when we forget something and try to remember, where are we to search in the end but in the memory itself? And if some other thing is offered us there, we brush it aside, until the thing we are looking for turns up. When it does, we say, "That's it!" which we would not be in a position to say if we did not recognize the object, and we could not recognize it if we did not remember it. Yet we had undoubtedly forgotten.

non totum exciderat, sed ex parte, quae tenebatur, pars alia quaerebatur, quia sentiebat se memoria non simulolvere, quod simul solebat, et quasi detruncata consuetudine claudicans reddi quod deerat flagitabat? Tamquam si homo notus sive conspiciatur oculis sive cogitetur et nomen eius obliti requiramus, quidquid aliud occurrerit non connectitur, quia non cum illo cogitari consuevit ideoque respuitur, donec illud adsit, ubi simul assuefacta notitia non inaequaliter adquiescat. Et unde adest nisi ex ipsa memoria? Nam et cum ab alio commoniti recognoscimus, inde adest. Non enim quasi novum credimus, sed recordantes approbamus hoc esse, quod dictum est. Si autem penitus aboleatur ex animo, nec admoniti reminiscimur. Neque enim omni modo adhuc obliti sumus, quod vel oblitos nos esse meminimus. Hoc ergo nec amissum quaerere poterimus, quod omnino obliti fuerimus.

Cum Deum quaerimus, vitam beatam quaerimus.

20. 29. Quomodo ergo te quaero, Domine? Cum enim te, Deum meum, quaero, vitam beatam quaero. Quaeram te, ut vivat anima mea. Vivit enim corpus meum de anima mea et vivit anima mea de te. Quomodo ergo quaero vitam beatam? Quia non est mihi, donec dicam: "Sat, est illic". Ubi oportet ut dicam, quomodo eam quaero, utrum per recordationem, tamquam eam oblitus sim oblitumque me esse adhuc teneam, an per appetitum discendi incognitam, sive quam numquam scierim sive quam sic oblitus fuerim, ut me nec oblitum esse meminerm. Nonne ipsa est beata vita, quam omnes volunt et omnino qui nolit nemo est? Ubi noverunt eam, quod sic volunt eam? Ubi viderunt, ut amarent eam? Nimirum habemus eam nescio quomodo. Et est alius quidam modus, quo quisque cum habet eam, tunc beatus est, et sunt, qui spe beati sunt. Inferiore modo isti habent eam quam illi, qui iam re ipsa beati sunt, sed tamen meliores quam illi, qui nec re nec spe beati sunt. Qui tamen etiam ipsi nisi aliquo modo haberent eam, non ita vellent beati esse: quod eos velle certissimum est. Nescio quomodo noverunt eam ideoque habent eam in nescio qua notitia, de qua satago, utrum in memoria sit, quia, si ibi est, iam beati fuimus aliquando, utrum singillatim omnes, an in illo homine, qui primus peccavit, in quo et omnes mortui sumus et de quo omnes cum miseria nati sumus 58, non quaero nunc, sed quaero, utrum in memoria sit beata vita. Neque enim amaremus eam, nisi nossemus. Audimus nomen hoc et omnes rem ipsam nos appetere fatemur; non enim sono delectamur. Nam hoc cum Latine audit Graecus, non

Is this the explanation: that the thing had not fallen out of the memory entirely? Can it be that the part which was retained gave a clue to the part which had vanished,†66 because the memory was aware that some item was absent from the full complement it was used to turning over and, feeling itself to be lame and lacking something that normally belonged to it, demanded that the missing element be restored? Suppose we see with our eyes or consider in our mind a certain person known to us, but cannot remember his name, and try to recall it. Any other name that presents itself will seem quite irrelevant to him, because we are not used to associating him with that, and so we reject it. Then at last the right one comes up, and this fits satisfactorily with our habitual knowledge of the person. From where does it emerge, if not from the memory itself? This must be the case, because even if someone else reminds us, we recognize it again only because it springs from our memory: we do not believe what we are told as though this were a piece of fresh information, but remember and agree that what we have just been told is correct. If it has been entirely blotted out from the mind, we do not remember even when reminded. If we remember that we have forgotten something, we have not forgotten it entirely. But if we have forgotten altogether, we shall not be in a position to search for it.

Universal desire for happiness

20, 29. How then am I to seek you, Lord? When I seek you, my God, what I am seeking is a life of happiness.†67 Let me seek you that my soul may live,†68 for as my body draws its life from my soul, so does my soul draw its life from you. How, then, am I to seek a life of happiness? It is not mine until I can say, "This is all I want; here is happiness." I must know how to seek it. Should it be by way of remembering, as though it were something I have forgotten but am still aware of having forgotten? Or by thirsting for a life still strange to me, either because I have never known it or because I have so completely forgotten that I do not even remember that I have forgotten? What is a life of happiness? Surely what everyone wants, absolutely everyone without exception?†69 But if they all want it so badly, where did they come to know it? Where have they seen it, that they are so enamored of it? Evidently we possess it in some fashion. A person who possesses it is happy in one way, actually happy; in a different manner others are made happy by hoping for happiness. These latter possess happiness in a less perfect way than the former, who are happy in the reality itself, but they are better off than people who are happy neither in possessing the reality nor in hoping for it. Yet even these would not so strongly desire happiness†70 unless they possessed it in some degree, and there can be no doubt that they do desire it. In some mysterious way they must know it, therefore, and hence truly possess it through some kind of cognizance. What I am attempting to find out is whether this resides in the memory, because if it does, that must mean that

delectatur, quia ignorat, quid dictum sit; nos autem delectamur, sicut etiam ille, si Graece hoc audierit, quoniam res ipsa nec Graeca nec Latina est, cui adipiscendae Graeci Latinique inhiant ceterarumque linguarum homines. Nota est igitur omnibus, qui una voce, si interrogari possent, utrum beati esse vellent, sine ulla dubitatione velle responderent. Quod non fieret, nisi res ipsa, cuius hoc nomen est, eorum memoria teneretur.

Vitae beatae recordatio.

21. 30. Numquid ita, ut meminit Carthaginem qui vidit? Non, vita enim beata non videtur oculis, quia non est corpus. Numquid sicut meminimus numeros? Non; hos enim qui habet in notitia, non adhuc quaerit adipisci, vitam vero beatam habemus in notitia ideoque amamus et tamen adhuc adipisci eam volumus, ut beati simus. Numquid sicut meminimus eloquentiam? Non; quamvis enim et hoc nomine audito recordentur ipsam rem, qui etiam nondum sunt eloquentes multique esse cupiant (unde apparet eam esse in eorum notitia) tamen per corporis sensus alios eloquentes animadverterunt et delectati sunt et hoc esse desiderant (quamquam nisi ex interiore notitia non delectarentur neque hoc esse vellent, nisi delectarentur) beatam vero vitam nullo sensu corporis in aliis experimur. Numquid sicut meminimus gaudium? Fortasse ita. Nam gaudium meum etiam tristis memini sicut vitam beatam miser, neque umquam corporis sensu gaudium meum vel vidi vel audivi vel odoratus sum vel gustavi vel tetigi, sed expertus sum in animo meo, quando laetatus sum, et adhaesit eius notitia memoriae meae, ut id reminisci valeam aliquando cum aspersione, aliquando cum desiderio pro earum rerum diversitate, de quibus me gavisum esse memini. Nam et de turpibus gaudio quodam perfusus sum, quod nunc recordans detestor atque execror, aliquando de bonis et honestis, quod desiderans recolo, tametsi forte non adsunt, et ideo tristis gaudium pristinum recolo.

Beati omnes esse volumus.

21. 31. Ubi ergo et quando expertus sum vitam meam beatam, ut recorder eam et amem et desiderem? Nec ego tantum aut cum paucis, sed beati prorsus omnes esse volumus 59. Quod nisi certa notitia nossemus, non tam certa voluntate vellemus. Sed quid est hoc? 60 Quod si quaeratur a duobus, utrum militare velint, fieri possit, ut alter eorum velle se, alter nolle respondeat; si autem ab eis quaeratur, utrum esse

we were happy once upon a time—though whether each of us was happy individually, or we were all happy in the man who committed the first sin, in whom we all died and from whom we are all born to misery,†71 I am not now inquiring. I am simply posing the question: Does the life of happiness exist in the memory? We should not love it if we had no acquaintance with it. When we hear the word we all acknowledge that what we want is the reality behind the name, for the sound in itself holds no attraction for us. If a Greek hears it mentioned in Latin he does not find it delightful, because he does not understand what has been said; we, on the contrary, are delighted, just as he would be if he heard it in Greek, because the reality itself is neither Greek nor Latin. Greek-speakers, Latin-speakers and peoples of every other tongue are all athirst with longing to gain it. This proves that it is known to everyone, and if they could all be asked in some common tongue whether they wish to be happy, they would undoubtedly all reply that they do. This affirmation would not be possible if the reality spoken of were not held in their memories.

21, 30. Do they retain it in their memories in the same way as someone remembers Carthage after visiting it? No: the happy life is not seen with the eye, since it is not a corporeal object. Perhaps in the way we remember numbers, then? No, for a person who has knowledge of these does not still seek to gain it; but while we have knowledge of the happy life and therefore love for it, we still long to obtain it in order to be happy. Then in the way we remember eloquence, perhaps? No again. It is true that on hearing the word “eloquence” even people who are not yet eloquent remember the reality, and many of them desire to make it their own; this proves that some knowledge of eloquence is in them, but that is only because they have been exposed through the medium of their bodily senses to eloquence in others, and have appreciated it and desire to be similarly eloquent (though to be sure they would not appreciate it unless some knowledge of it were in them already, and they would not want it for themselves if they had no appreciation of it). But we do not experience the happy life in other people through any kind of bodily sense. Are we aware of it, then, in the way that we remember enjoyment? This may be the case, for even when sad I remember my earlier enjoyment, as I can remember leading a happy life even when I am miserable, yet I have never made contact with my enjoyment through any bodily sense: I have never seen, heard, smelled, tasted or touched it; in my mind alone I experienced being happy, and the knowledge of it stuck fast in my memory, so that I am able to remember it, sometimes with contempt and at other times with longing for the various things which I recall having enjoyed. I was formerly flooded with a kind of joy in depraved actions which I now recollect with loathing and disgust. Sometimes, though, it was good and honorable things that I enjoyed, and when I recall these I am stirred by desire for them,

beati velint, uterque se statim sine ulla dubitatione dicat optare, nec ob aliud velit ille militare, nec ob aliud iste nolit, nisi ut beati sint. Num forte quoniam alius hinc, alius inde gaudet? Ita se omnes beatos esse velle consonant, quemadmodum consonarent, si hoc interrogarentur, se velle gaudere atque ipsum gaudium vitam beatam vocant. Quod etsi alius hinc, alius illinc assequitur, unum est tamen, quo pervenire omnes nituntur, ut gaudeant. Quae quoniam res est, quam se expertum non esse nemo potest dicere, propterea reperta in memoria recognoscitur, quando beatae vitae nomen auditur.

Deus ipse est gaudium eorum, qui eum colunt.

22. 32. *Absit, Domine, absit a corde servi tui, qui confitetur tibi, absit, ut, quocumque gaudio gaudeam, beatum me putem. Est enim gaudium, quod non datur impiis, sed eis, qui te gratis colunt, quorum gaudium tu ipse es. Et ipsa est beata vita, gaudere ad te, de te, propter te; ipsa est et non est altera. Qui autem aliam putant esse, aliud sectantur gaudium neque ipsum verum. Ab aliqua tamen imagine gaudii voluntas eorum non avertitur.*

Gaudium de veritate omnes volunt.

23. 33. *Non ergo certum est, quod omnes esse beati volunt, quoniam qui non de te gaudere volunt, quae sola vita beata est, non utique beatam vitam volunt. An omnes hoc volunt, sed quoniam caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem, ut non faciant quod volunt 61, cadunt in id quod valent eoque contenti sunt, quia illud, quod non valent, non tantum volunt, quantum sat est, ut valeant? Nam quaero ab omnibus, utrum malint de veritate quam de falsitate gaudere; tam non dubitant dicere de veritate se malle, quam non dubitant dicere beatos esse se velle. Beata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate. Hoc est enim gaudium de te, qui Veritas es 62, Deus, illuminatio mea 63, salus faciei meae, Deus meus 64. Hanc vitam beatam omnes volunt, hanc vitam, quae sola beata est, omnes volunt, gaudium de veritate omnes volunt. Multos expertus sum, qui vellent fallere, qui autem falli, neminem. Ubi ergo noverunt hanc vitam beatam, nisi ubi noverunt etiam veritatem? Amant enim et ipsam, quia falli nolunt, et cum amant beatam vitam, quod non est aliud quam de veritate gaudium, utique amant etiam veritatem nec amarent, nisi esset aliqua notitia eius in memoria eorum. Cur ergo non de illa gaudent? Cur non beati sunt? Quia fortius occupantur in aliis, quae potius eos faciunt miseros*

even if perhaps they are no longer present, and then it is in sadness that I recollect my earlier joy.

31. So where and when did I experience my life of happiness, so as to remember, love and desire it? This desire is not confined to me alone, nor to me and a few others; absolutely all of us want to be happy. Unless we had some sure knowledge of it, our wills would not be so firmly set on gaining it. But how can this be? If two men are asked whether they wish to undertake military service, it may happen that one of them will reply that he does, and the other that he does not, whereas if they are asked whether they wish to be happy, each of them will immediately say without hesitation that this is what he longs for; and in fact the choice of military service by the one and the refusal of it by the other are directed to no other end than happiness. Is this, perhaps, because one person finds enjoyment in one way and another differently? Thus all agree that they want to be happy, just as they would, if questioned, all agree that they want to enjoy life, and they think that a life of happiness consists of this enjoyment. One person pursues it in this way, another in that, but all are striving for the same goal, enjoyment. And since no one can claim never to have enjoyed anything, enjoyment is discovered in the memory and recognized there when the life of happiness is mentioned.

22, 32. Far be it, Lord, far be it from the heart of your servant who confesses to you, far be it from me to think that enjoyment of any and every kind could make me happy. A joy there is that is not granted to the godless,†72 but to those only who worship you without looking for reward, because you yourself are their joy. This is the happy life, and this alone: to rejoice in you, about you and because of you. This is the life of happiness, and it is not to be found anywhere else. Whoever thinks there can be some other is chasing a joy that is not the true one; yet such a person's will has not turned away from all notion of joy.

23, 33. We cannot therefore assert without qualification that everyone wants to be happy, because people who are unwilling to find joy in you, in which alone the happy life consists, obviously do not want the happy life. Perhaps, though, all men and women do want it, but by reason of the struggle of flesh against spirit and spirit against flesh, which hinders them from doing what they want to do,†73 they fall back on what their strength permits, and make do with that? But is this because they do not want that other thing, for which strength is lacking, ardently enough to find the necessary strength? I think so, because when I ask everybody which they prefer: joy over the truth or joy over what is false,†74 they are as unhesitating in their reply that they prefer to rejoice over the truth as in their declaration that they want to be happy. Now the happy life is joy in the truth; and that means joy in you, who are the Truth,†75 O God who shed the light of salvation on my face,†76 my God. Everyone wants this happy life, this life

quam illud beatos, quod tenuiter meminerunt. Adhuc enim modicum lumen est in hominibus; ambulent, ambulent, ne tenebrae comprehendant 65.

23. 34. Cur autem veritas parit odium 66, et inimicus eis factus est homo tuus verum praedicans 67, cum ametur beata vita, quae non est nisi gaudium de veritate, nisi quia sic amatur veritas, ut, quicumque aliud amant, hoc quod amant velint esse veritatem, et quia falli nollent, nolunt convinci, quod falsi sint? Itaque propter eam rem oderunt veritatem, quam pro veritate amant. Amant eam lucentem, oderunt eam redargentem 68. Quia enim falli nolunt et fallere volunt, amant eam, cum se ipsa indicat, et oderunt eam, cum eos ipsos indicat. Inde retribuet eis, ut, qui se ab ea manifestari nolunt, et eos nolentes manifestet et eis ipsa non sit manifesta. Sic, sic, etiam sic animus humanus, etiam sic caecus et languidus, turpis atque indecens latere vult, se autem ut lateat aliquid non vult. Contra illi redditur, ut ipse non lateat veritatem, ipsum autem veritas lateat. Tamen etiam sic, dum miser est, veris mavult gaudere quam falsis. Beatus ergo erit, si nulla interpellante molestia de ipsa, per quam vera sunt omnia, sola veritate gaudebit.

Deus in memoria invenitur.

24. 35. Ecce quantum spatiatus sum in memoria mea quaerens te, Domine, et non te inveni extra eam. Neque enim aliquid de te inveni, quod non meminissem, ex quo didici te. Nam ex quo didici te, non sum oblitus tui. Ubi enim inveni veritatem, ibi inveni Deum meum, ipsam Veritatem 69. Quam ex quo didici, non sum oblitus. Itaque ex quo te didici, manes in memoria mea, et illic te invenio, cum reminiscor tui et delector in te. Hae sunt sanctae deliciae meae, quas donasti mihi misericordia tua respiciens paupertatem meam 70.

Quo memoriae loco habitat Deus?

25. 36. Sed ubi manes in memoria mea, Domine, ubi illic manes? Quale cubile fabricasti tibi? Quale sanctuarium aedificasti tibi? Tu dedisti hanc dignationem memoriae meae, ut maneas in ea, sed in qua eius parte maneas, hoc considero. Transcendi enim partes eius, quas habent et bestiae, cum te recordarer, quia non ibi te inveniebam inter imagines rerum corporalium, et veni ad partes eius, ubi commendavi affectiones animi mei, nec illic inveni te. Et intravi ad ipsius animi mei sedem, quae illi est in memoria mea, quoniam sui quoque meminit

which alone deserves to be called happy; all want it, all want joy in the truth. I have met plenty of people who would gladly deceive others, but no one who wants to be deceived. Where else, then, did they come to know this happy life, except where they also came to know about truth? Since they do not wish to be deceived, they must love truth; and when they love the happy life, which is nothing else but joy in the truth, they are unquestionably loving truth also; but they could not be loving the truth unless there was some knowledge of it in their memories. Why, in that case, do they not rejoice over it? Why are they not happy? Because they are more immediately engrossed in other things which more surely make them miserable than that other reality, so faintly remembered, can make them happy. For a little while yet there is light for human beings; let them walk in it, yes, let them walk, lest the darkness close over them. †77

34. Why, though, does “truth engender hatred,” †78 why does a servant of yours who preaches the truth make himself an enemy to his hearers, †79 if the life of happiness, which consists in rejoicing over the truth, is what they love? It must be because people love truth in such a way that those who love something else wish to regard what they love as truth and, since they would not want to be deceived, are unwilling to be convinced that they are wrong. They are thus led into hatred of truth for the sake of that very thing which they love under the guise of truth. They love truth when it enlightens them, but hate it when it accuses them. †80 In this attitude of reluctance to be deceived and intent to deceive others they love truth when it reveals itself but hate it when it reveals them. Truth will therefore take its revenge: when people refuse to be shown up by it, truth will show them up willy-nilly and yet elude them. Yes, this is our condition, this is the lot of the human soul, this is its case, as blind and feeble, disreputable and shabby, it attempts to hide, while at the same time not wishing anything to be hidden from it. It is paid back in a coin which is the opposite to what it desires, for while the soul cannot hide from truth, truth hides from the soul. Nonetheless, even while in this miserable state it would rather rejoice in truth than in a sham; and so it will be happy when it comes to rejoice without interruption or hindrance in the very truth, upon which depends whatever else is true.

In memory he knows God

24, 35. How widely I have ranged through my memory seeking you, Lord, and I have not found you outside it; for I have discovered nothing about you that I did not remember from the time I learned to know you. From that time when I learned about you I have never forgotten you, because wherever I have found truth I have found my God who is absolute Truth, and once I had learned that I did not forget it. That is why you have dwelt in my memory ever since I learned to know you, and it

animus, nec ibi tu eras, quia sicut non es imago corporalis nec affectio viventis, qualis est, cum laetamur, contristamur, cupimus, metuimus, meminimus, obliviscimur et quidquid huius modi est, ita nec ipse animus es, quia Dominus Deus animi tu es, et commutantur haec omnia, tu autem incommutabilis manes super omnia et dignatus es habitare in memoria mea, ex quo te didici. Et quid quaero, quo loco eius habitet, quasi vero loca ibi sint? Habitas certe in ea, quoniam tui meministi, ex quo te didici, et in ea te invenio, cum recordor te.

Ubi Deus invenitur, cum cognoscitur?

26. 37. Ubi ergo te inveni, ut discerem te? Neque enim iam eras in memoria mea, priusquam te discerem. Ubi ergo te inveni, ut discerem te, nisi in te supra me? Et nusquam locus, et recedimus et accedimus, et nusquam locus. Veritas, ubique praesides omnibus consulentibus te simulque respondes omnibus etiam diversa consulentibus. Liquide tu respondes, sed non liquide omnes audiunt. Omnes unde volunt consulunt, sed non semper quod volunt audiunt. Optimus minister tuus est, qui non magis intuetur hoc a te audire quod ipse voluerit, sed potius hoc velle quod a te audierit.

Sero Aug. amavit Deum.

27. 38. Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova, sero te amavi! Et ecce intus eras et ego foris et ibi te quaerebam et in ista formosa, quae fecisti, deformis irruebam. Mecum eras, et tecum non eram. Ea me tenebant longe a te, quae si in te non essent, non essent. Vocasti et clamasti et rupisti surditatem meam, coruscasti, splenduisti et fugasti caecitatem meam; fragrasti, et duxi spiritum et anhele tibi, gustavi 71, et esurio et sitio 72, tetigisti me, et exarsi in pacem tuam.

...

Conclusio

Quae auctor lustraverit quaerens Deum.

40. 65. Ubi non mecum ambulasti, Veritas, docens, quid caveam et quid appetam, cum ad te referrem inferiora visa mea, quae potui, teque consulerem? Lustravi mundum foris sensu, quo potui, et attendi vitam corporis mei de me sensusque ipsos meos. Inde ingressus sum in recessus memoriae meae, multiplices amplitudines plenas miris modis copiarum innumerabilium, et consideravi et expavi

is there that I find you when I remember and delight in you. These are my holy delights, and they are your gift to me, for in your mercy you look graciously upon my poverty.

25, 36. But whereabouts in my memory do you dwell, Lord, in which part of it do you abide? What kind of couch have you fashioned for your repose, what manner of temple have you built yourself there? You have honored my memory by making it your dwelling-place, but I am wondering in what region of it you dwell. As I remembered you I left behind those parts of it which animals also possess, because I did not find you there amid the images of material things. I came to those regions of memory to which I had committed my emotional states, but I did not find you there either. Then I arrived at that place in my memory where my mind itself is enthroned, for indeed the mind must reside there, since it can remember itself; yet not even there were you to be found. Just as you are not any corporeal image, nor any of the emotions that belong to a living person, such as we experience when we are joyful or sad, when we desire or fear something, when we remember or forget or anything similar, so too you are not the mind itself: you are the Lord and God of the mind, and though all these things are subject to change you abide unchangeably^{†82} above them all. And yet you have deigned to dwell in my memory from the first day that I learned to know you. What am I doing, inquiring which place in it is your place, as though there were really places there? Most certain it is that you do dwell in it, because I have been remembering you since I first learned to know you, and there I find you when I remember you.

26, 37. If that is so, where did I find you in order to make acquaintance with you at the outset? You could not have been in my memory before I learned to know you. Where then could I have found you in order to learn of you, if not in yourself, far above me? "Place" has here no meaning: further away from you or toward you we may travel, but place there is none. O Truth, you hold sovereign sway over all who turn to you for counsel, and to all of them you respond at the same time, however diverse their pleas. Clear is your response, but not all hear it clearly. They all appeal to you about what they want, but do not always hear what they want to hear. Your best servant is the one who is less intent on hearing from you what accords with his own will, and more on embracing with his will what he has heard from you.

27, 38. Late have I loved you, Beauty so ancient and so new, late have I loved you!
Lo, you were within,
but I outside, seeking there for you,
and upon the shapely things you have made I rushed headlong,
I, misshapen.
You were with me, but I was not with you.
They held me back far from you,

167 et nihil eorum discernere potui sine te et nihil eorum esse te inveni. Nec ego ipse inventor, qui peragravi omnia et distinguere et pro suis quaeque dignitatibus aestimare conatus sum, excipiens alia nuntiantibus sensibus et interrogans, alia mecum commixta sentiens ipsosque nuntios dignoscens atque dinumerans iamque in memoriae latis opibus alia pertractans, alia recondens, alia eruens; nec ego ipse, cum haec agerem, id est vis mea, qua id agebam, nec ipsa eras tu, quia lux es tu permanens 168, quam de omnibus consulebam, an essent, quid essent, quanti pendenda essent: et audiebam docentem ac iubentem. Et saepe istuc facio; hoc me delectat, et ab actionibus necessitatis, quantum relaxari possum, ad istam voluptatem refugio. Neque in his omnibus, quae percurro consulens te, invenio tutum locum animae meae nisi in te, quo colligantur sparsa mea nec a te quidquam recedat ex me. Et aliquando intromittis me in affectum multum inusitatum introrsus ad nescio quam dulcedinem, quae si perficiatur in me, nescio quid erit, quod vita ista non erit. Sed recido in haec aerumnosis ponderibus et resorbeor solitis et teneor et multum fleo, sed multum teneor. Tantum consuetudinis sarcina digna est! Hic esse valeo nec volo, illic volo nec valeo, miser utrobique.

Veritas et mendacium.

41. 66. Ideoque consideravi languores peccatorum meorum in cupiditate triplici et dexteram tuam invocavi ad salutem meam 169. Vidi enim splendorem tuum corde saucio et percussus dixi: Quis illuc potest? Proiectus sum a facie oculorum tuorum 170. Tu es Veritas 171 super omnia praesidens. At ego per avaritiam meam non amittere te volui, sed volui tecum possidere mendacium, sicut nemo vult ita falsum dicere, ut nesciat ipse, quid verum sit. Itaque amisi te, quia non dignaris cum mendacio possideri.

Fallaces mediatores inter Deum et homines a quibusdam laudati.

42. 67. Quem invenirem, qui me reconciliaret tibi? Ambendum mihi fuit ad angelos? Qua prece? Quibus sacramentis? Multi conantes ad te redire neque per se ipsos valentes, sicut audio, temptaverunt haec et inciderunt in desiderium curiosarum visionum et digni habitus sunt illusionibus. Elati enim te quaerebant doctrinae fastu exserentes potius quam tundentes pectora et adduxerunt sibi per similitudinem cordis sui

those things which would have no being were they not in you.

You called, shouted, broke through my deafness; you flared, blazed, banished my blindness; you lavished your fragrance, I gasped, and now I pant for you; I tasted you, and I hunger and thirst; you touched me, and I burned for your peace.†83

...

Summary of all his discoveries

40, 65. O Truth,†176 is there any road where you have not walked with me, teaching me what to avoid and what to aim at, whenever I referred to you the paltry insights I had managed to attain, and sought your guidance? I surveyed the external world as best I could with the aid of my senses,†177 and studied the life my body derives from my spirit, and my senses themselves. Then I moved inward to the storehouse of my memory, to those vast, complex places amazingly filled with riches beyond counting; I contemplated them and was adread.†178 No single one of them could I have perceived without you, but I found that no single one of them was you. But what of myself, the discoverer, I who scanned them all and tried to distinguish them and evaluate each in accordance with its proper dignity? Some things I questioned as my senses reported them, others I felt to be inextricably part of myself; I classified and counted the very messengers, and in the ample stores of memory I scrutinized some items, pushed some into the background and dragged others into the light: what, then of me? No, I was not you, either, not even I as I did all this: the faculty, that is, by which I achieved it, not even that faculty in me was you; for you are that abiding Light†179 whom I consulted throughout my search. I questioned you about each thing, asking whether it existed, what it was, how highly it should be regarded; and all the while I listened to you teaching me and laying your commands upon me. It is still my constant delight to reflect like this; in such meditation I take refuge from the demands of necessary business, insofar as I can free myself. Nowhere amid all these things which I survey under your guidance do I find a safe haven for my soul except in you; only there are the scattered elements of my being collected, so that no part of me may escape from you. From time to time you lead me into an inward experience quite unlike any other, a sweetness beyond understanding. If ever it is brought to fullness in me my life will not be what it is now, though what it will be I cannot tell. But I am dragged down again by my weight of woe, sucked back into everyday things and held fast in them;†180 grievously I lament, but just as grievously am I held. How high a price we pay for the burden of habit! I am fitted for life here where I do not want to be, I want to live there but am unfit for it, and on both counts I am miserable.

conspirantes et socias superbiae suae potestates aeris huius 172, a quibus per potentias magicas deciperentur, quaerentes mediatorem, per quem purgarentur, et non erat. Diabolus enim erat transfigurans se in angelum lucis 173. Et multum illexit superbam carnem, quod carneo corpore ipse non esset. Erant enim illi mortales et peccatores, tu autem, Domine, cui reconciliari superbe quaerebant, immortalis et sine peccato. Mediator autem inter Deum et homines 174 oportebat ut haberet aliquid simile Deo, aliquid simile hominibus, ne in utroque hominibus similis longe esset a Deo aut in utroque Deo similis longe esset ab hominibus atque ita mediator non esset. Fallax itaque ille mediator, quo per secreta iudicia tua superbia meretur illudi, unum cum hominibus habet, id est peccatum, aliud videri vult habere cum Deo, ut, quia carnis mortalitate non tegitur, pro immortalis se ostendet. Sed quia stipendium peccati mors est 175, hoc habet commune cum hominibus, unde simul damnetur in mortem.

Verax Mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus.

43. 68. Verax autem mediator, quem secreta tua misericordia demonstrasti humilibus et misisti, ut eius exemplo etiam ipsam discerent humilitatem, mediator ille Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus 176, inter mortales peccatores et immortalem iustum apparuit, mortalis cum hominibus, iustus cum Deo, ut, quoniam stipendium iustitiae vita et pax est, per iustitiam coniunctam Deo evacuet mortem iustificatorum impiorum 177, quam cum illis voluit habere communem. Hic demonstratus est antiquis sanctis, ut ita ipsi per fidem futurae passionis eius, sicut nos per fidem praeteritae, salvi fierent 178. In quantum enim homo, in tantum mediator, in quantum autem Verbum, non medius, quia aequalis Deo 179 et Deus apud Deum 180 et simul unus Deus.

43. 69. Quomodo nos amasti, Pater bone, qui Filio tuo unico non pepercisti, sed pro nobis impiis tradidisti eum 181! Quomodo nos amasti, pro quibus ille non rapinam arbitratus esse aequalis tibi factus est subditus usque ad mortem crucis 182, unus ille in mortuis liber 183, potestatem habens ponendi animam suam et potestatem habens iterum sumendi eam 184, pro nobis tibi victor et victima, et ideo victor, quia victima, pro nobis tibi sacerdos et sacrificium, et ideo sacerdos, quia sacrificium, faciens tibi nos de servis filios de te nascendo, nobis serviendo! Merito mihi spes valida in illo est, quod

41, 66. So now under the three headings of temptation I have taken stock of the sickly state to which my sins have reduced me, and I have called upon your right hand for saving help.†181 I have seen your blazing splendor, but with a wounded heart; I was beaten back, and I asked, “Can anyone reach that?” I was flung far out of your sight.†182 You are the Truth,†183 sovereign over all. I did not want to lose you, but in my greed I thought to possess falsehood along with you, just as no one wants to tell lies in such a way that he loses his own sense of what is true. That was why I lost you, for you did not consent to be possessed in consort with a lie.

The Mediator, priest and victim

42, 67. Whom could I find to reconcile me to you? Should I go courting the angels? With what prayer or by what rites could I win them to my cause? Many have there been who tried to make their way back to you and, finding themselves insufficient by their own powers, had recourse to such means as these, only to lapse into a fancy for visions that tickled their curiosity.†184 They were deservedly deluded for they sought you in arrogance, thrusting out their chests in their haughty knowledge instead of beating them in penitence; and so they attracted to themselves the spiritual powers of the air†185 as their true kin, fit accomplices and allies of their pride. These spirits used magical powers to beguile their clients, who were seeking a mediator to purge them of their impurities, but found none; for there was no one there but the devil, disguised as an angel of light.†186 Being without a fleshly body himself, he strongly appealed to the pride of fleshly humans. They were mortal and sinful, whereas you, Lord, to whom they sought, though proudly, to be reconciled, are immortal and without sin. What we needed was a mediator to stand between God and men†187 who should be in one respect like God, in another kin to human beings, for if he were manlike in both regards he would be far from God, but if Godlike in both, far from us; and then he would be no mediator. By the same token that spurious mediator, by whose means pride was deservedly duped in keeping with your secret decree, does have one thing in common with human beings, namely sin; and he appears to have something else in common with God because, not being clad in mortal flesh, he is able to flaunt himself as immortal. But in fact since death is the wage sin earns†188 he has this in common with humans, that he lies under sentence of death as surely as they do.

43, 68. In your unfathomable mercy you first gave the humble certain pointers to the true Mediator, and then sent him, that by his example they might learn even a humility like his.†189 This Mediator between God and humankind, the man Christ Jesus,†190 appeared to stand between mortal sinners and the God who is immortal and just: like us he was mortal, but like God he was just. Now the wage due to justice is life and peace;

sanabis omnes languores 185 meos per eum, qui sedet ad dexteram tuam et te interpellat pro nobis 186; alioquin desperarem. Multi enim et magni sunt idem languores, multi sunt et magni; sed amplior est medicina tua. Potuimus putare Verbum tuum remotum esse a coniunctione hominis et desperare de nobis, nisi caro fieret et habitaret in nobis 187.

43. 70. Conterritus peccatis meis et mole miseriae meae agitaveram corde meditatusque fueram fugam in solitudinem, sed prohibuisti me et confirmasti me dicens: Ideo Christus pro omnibus mortuus est, ut qui vivunt iam non sibi vivant, sed ei qui pro ipsis mortuus est 188. Ecce, Domine, iacto in te curam meam 189, ut vivam, et considerabo mirabilia de lege tua 190. Tu scis 191 imperitiam meam et infirmitatem meam 192; doce me 193 et sana me 194. Ille tuus Unicus, in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi 195, redemit me sanguine suo 196. Non calumnientur mihi superbi 197, quoniam cogito pretium meum 198 et manduco et bibo 199 et erogo et pauper cupio saturari 200 ex eo inter illos, qui edunt et saturantur: et laudabunt Dominum qui requirunt eum 201.

and so through the justice whereby he was one with God he broke the power of death†191 on behalf of malefactors rendered just,†192 using that very death to which he willed to be liable along with them. He was pointed out to holy people under the old dispensation that they might be saved through faith in his future passion,†193 as we are through faith in that passion now accomplished. Only in virtue of his humanity is he the Mediator; in his nature as the Word he does not stand between us and God, for he is God's equal,†194 God with God,†195 and with him one only God.

69. How you loved us, O good Father, who spared not even your only Son, but gave him up for us evildoers!†196 How you loved us, for whose sake he who deemed it no robbery to be your equal was made subservient, even to the point of dying on the cross!†197 Alone of all he was free among the dead,†198 for he had power to lay down his life and power to retrieve it.†199 For our sake he stood to you as both victor and victim, and victor because victim;†200 for us he stood to you as priest and sacrifice, and priest because sacrifice,†201 making us sons and daughters to you instead of servants†202 by being born of you to serve us. With good reason is there solid hope for me in him, because you will heal all my infirmities†203 through him who sits at your right hand and intercedes for us.†204 Were it not so, I would despair. Many and grave are those infirmities, many and grave; but wider-reaching is your healing power. We might have despaired, thinking your Word remote from any conjunction with humankind, had he not become flesh and made his dwelling among us.†205

70. Filled with terror by my sins and my load of misery I had been turning over in my mind a plan to flee into solitude, but you forbade me, and strengthened me by your words. To this end Christ died for all, you reminded me, that they who are alive may live not for themselves, but for him who died for them.†206 See, then, Lord: I cast my care upon you†207 that I may live, and I will contemplate the wonders you have revealed.†208 You know how stupid and weak I am:†209 teach me and heal me.†210 Your only Son, in whom are hidden all treasures of wisdom and knowledge,†211 has redeemed me with his blood. Let not the proud disparage me,†212 for I am mindful of my ransom. I eat it, I drink it,†213 I dispense it to others, and as a poor man I long to be filled†214 with it among those who are fed and feasted. And then do those who seek him praise the Lord.†215

Kalbos problema: sąryšiai tarp daikto, ženklo ir jo prasmės. Iliuminacijos teorijos postulatų paieška*De Dialectica (387)*

1. *Dialectica est bene disputandi scientia. Disputamus autem utique verbis. Verba igitur aut simplicia sunt aut coniuncta. Simplicia sunt quae unum quiddam significant ut cum dicimus " homo, equus, disputat, currit ". Nec mireris, quod " disputat " quamvis ex duobus compositum sit tamen inter simplicia numeratum est. Nam res definitione illustratur. Dictum est enim id esse simplex quod unum quiddam significet. Itaque hoc includitur hac definitione qua non includitur cum dicimus " loquor ". Quamvis enim unum verbum sit, non habet tamen simplicem significationem, siquidem significat etiam personam quae loquitur. Ideo iam obnoxium est veritati aut falsitati, nam et negari et affirmari potest. Omnis itaque prima et secunda persona verbi quamvis singillatim enuntietur tamen inter coniuncta verba numerabitur, quia simplicem non habet significationem. Siquidem quisquis dicit " ambulo " et ambulationem facit intellegi et se ipsum qui ambulat, et quisquis dicit " ambulas " similiter et rem quae fit et eum qui facit significat. At vero qui dicit " ambulat " nihil aliud quam ipsam significat ambulationem. Quamobrem tertia persona verbi semper inter simplicia numeratur et nondum aut affirmari aut negari potest, nisi cum talia verba sunt, quibus necessario cohaeret personae significatio consuetudine loquendi, ut cum dicimus " pluit " vel " ninguit ", etiamsi non addatur quis pluat aut ninguat, tamen quia intellegitur non potest inter simplicia numerari.*

2. *Coniuncta verba sunt quae sibi conexas res plures significant, ut cum dicimus " homo ambulat " aut " homo festinans in montem ambulat " et siquid tale. Sed coniunctorum verborum alia sunt quae sententiam comprehendunt, ut ea quae dicta sunt: < alia quae > expectant aliquid < ad completionem sententiae > ut eadem ipsa quae nunc diximus, si subtrahas verbum quod positum est " ambulat ". Quamvis enim verba coniuncta sint " homo festinans in montem ", tamen adhuc pendet oratio. Separatis igitur his coniunctis verbis quae non implent sententiam restant ea verba coniuncta quae sententiam comprehendunt. Horum item duae species sunt. Aut enim sic sententia*

On Dialectic

Chapter I. SIMPLE WORDS

Dialectic is the science of disputing well. 2 We always dispute with words. Now words are simple or combined.³ Words which signify some one thing are simple, as when we say 'homo,' 'equus,' 'disputat,' 'currit' (man, horse, disputes, runs). Do not be surprised that 'disputat' is classified as simple although it is composed of two elements.⁴ This is made clear by our definition; for that is said to be simple which signifies some one thing. And so 'disputat' is included in this definition. On the other hand, the words 'loquor' (I speak) is not included. For even though the latter is one word, it does not have a simple signification, since it also signifies the person who speaks. Now for this reason it is subject to truth or falsity, for it can be denied and affirmed. So every first and second person verb, although it is expressed singly, nevertheless is classified as a combined word, because it does not have a simple signification. For whoever says 'ambulo' (I am walking) causes both the walking and he himself, who is walking, to be understood. And whoever says 'ambulas' (you are walking) in a similar manner signifies both the thing which is done and the person who does it. On the other hand, whoever says 'ambulat' (walks) signifies only walking. For this reason a third person verb is always classified as simple and it cannot be affirmed or denied except in the case of verbs which have the signification of the person necessarily attached to them in ordinary usage. For example, the verbs 'pluit' (it is raining) or 'ninguit' (it is snowing) cannot be classified as simple words because, even though it is not added "who" rains or snows, it is understood. ⁶

Chapter II. COMBINED WORDS

Combined words are those which, when connected to one another, signify many things, for example, when we say 'the man is walking' or 'the man is walking quickly toward the mountain' and others of this kind. But among combined words there are some which make a statement, for example, those just cited, and there are others which require something further to complete the statement, as in the case of the second example if we omit 'is walking.' For even though the words 'the man quickly toward the mountain' are combined, still the utterance is left hanging. If we leave aside these combined words which do not make a statement, there remain those combined words which do make a statement. But again there are two species of these. For either a statement is made in such a way that it is held to be subject to truth or falsity, such as 'every man is walking' or 'every man is

comprehenditur, ut vero aut falso teneatur obnoxia, ut est "omnis homo ambulat" aut "omnis homo non ambulat" et si quid huiusmodi est. Aut ita impletur sententia, ut licet perficiat propositum animi, affirmari tamen negative non possit, ut cum imperamus, cum optamus, cum execramur et similia. Nam quisquis dicit "perge ad villam" vel "utinam pergat ad villam" vel "dii illum perduint", non potest argui quod mentiatur aut credi quod verum dicat. Nihil enim affirmavit aut negavit. Ergo nec tales sententiae in quaestionem veniunt, ut disputatorem requirant.

3. Sed illae quae requirunt aut simplices sunt aut coniunctae. Simples sunt, quae sine ulla copulatione sententiae alterius enuntiantur, ut est illud quod dicimus "omnis homo ambulat". Coniunctae sunt, de quarum copulatione iudicatur, ut est "si ambulat, movetur". Sed cum de coniunctione sententiarum iudicium fit, tamdiu est, donec perveniatur ad summam. Summa est autem quae conficitur ex concessis. Quod dico tale est. Qui dicit "si ambulat, movetur", probare vult aliquid, ut cum hoc concessero verum esse, restet illi docere quod ambulet et summa consequatur, quae iam negari non potest, id est quod moveatur - aut restet illi docere quod non moveatur ut consequatur summa, quae item non potest non concedi, id est quod non ambulet. Rursus si hoc modo velit dicere "homo iste ambulat", simplex sententia est: quam si concessero et adiunxerit aliam "quisquis autem ambulat movetur" et hanc etiam concessero ex hac coniunctione sententiarum quamvis singillatim enuntiatarum et concessarum illa summa sequitur, quae iam necessario concedatur, id est "homo iste igitur movetur".

4. His breviter constitutis singulas partes consideremus. Nam sunt primae duae: una de his quae simpliciter dicuntur, ubi est quasi materia dialecticae, altera de his quae coniuncta dicuntur, ubi iam quasi opus apparet. Quae de simplicibus est vocatur de loquendo. Illa vero quae deconiunctis est in tres partes dividitur. Separata enim coniunctione verborum quae non implet sententiam, illa, quae sic implet sententiam, ut nondum faciat quaestionem vel disputatorem requirat, vocatur de eloquendo; illa, quae sic implet sententiam, ut de sentiis simplicibus iudicetur, vocatur de proloquendo; illa, quae sic comprehendit sententiam, ut de ipsa etiam copulatione iudicetur donec perveniatur ad sum

not walking' and others of this kind. Or a statement is made in such a way that, although it fully expresses what one has in mind, it cannot be affirmed or denied, as when we command, wish, curse, and the like.² For whoever says 'go into the house' or 'oh that he would go into the house' or 'may the gods destroy that man' cannot be thought to lie or to tell the truth, since he did not affirm or deny anything. Such statements do not, therefore, come into question so as to require anyone to dispute them.

Chapter III. SIMPLE AND COMBINED STATEMENTS

But those statements which require disputation are either simple or combined. Those are simple which are spoken without any connection with another statement, for example, 'every man is walking.' Those are combined in which a judgment is made in respect of their connection, for example, 'if he is walking, he is moving.' Now when a judgment is made in respect of the connection of statements, a conclusion can be reached.² The conclusion is what is established on the basis of what is conceded. Here is what I mean. Whoever says 'if he is walking, he is moving' wishes to prove something, so that when I concede that this combined statement is true he only needs to assert that he is walking and the conclusion that he is moving follows and cannot now be denied, or he need only assert that he is not moving and the conclusion that he is not walking must be agreed to. Or, to put it another way, one can say 'that man is walking.' This is a simple statement. But if I concede its truth, then he can add a further statement: 'whoever is walking is moving.' And if I agree to this, even though the two statements now conceded were stated singly, there follows from the connection of them a conclusion, which must be agreed to, namely, 'therefore, that man is moving.'

Chapter IV. THE PARTS OF DIALECTIC

Having given this brief exposition, let us now consider the parts [of dialectic] one by one. The first division is twofold: one concerning those things which are spoken simply, and this is, as it were, the raw material of dialectic; the other concerning those things which are spoken in combination, and in this we see, as it were, the finished product of dialectic. The part of dialectic which is about simple words is called 'on naming.' That which concerns combined words is divided into three parts. Leaving aside that combining of words which does not make a complete statement, there is, first, that which makes a complete statement but in such a way as not to require questioning or disputing. The part of dialectic concerning such statements is called 'on expressing.' There is, second, that combining of words which makes a complete statement in such a way that a judgment is made in respect of simple statements. The part of dialectic concerning such statements is called 'on asserting.' Finally, there are words which make a statement in such a way that a judgment is made in respect of the connection of statements in it so as to

mam, vocatur de proloquiorum summa. Has ergo singulas partes diligentius explicemus.

5. Verbum est uniuscuiusque rei signum, quod ab audiente possit intellegi, a loquente prolatum. Res est quidquid vel sentitur vel intellegitur vel latet. Signum est quod et se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit. Loqui est articulata voce signum dare. Articulatam autem dico quae comprehendi litteris potest. Haec omnia quae definita sunt, utrum recte definita sint et utrum hactenus verba definitionis aliis definitionibus persequenda fuerint, ille indicabit locus, quo definiendi disciplina tractatur. Nunc quod instat accipe intentus. Omne verbum sonat. Cum enim est in scripto, non verbum sed verbi signum est; quippe inspectis a legente litteris occurrit animo, quid voce prorumpat. Quid enim aliud litterae scriptae quam se ipsas oculis, praeter se voces animo ostendunt. Et paulo ante diximus signum esse quod se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit. Quae legimus igitur non verba sunt sed signa verborum. Sed ut, ipsa littera cum sit pars minima vocis articulatae, abutimur tamen hoc vocabulo, ut appellemus litteram etiam cum scriptam videmus, quamvis omnino tacita sit neque ulla pars vocis sed signum partis vocis appareat, ita etiam verbum appellatur cum scriptum est, quamvis verbi signum id est signum significantis vocis non < verbum > eluceat. Ergo ut coeperam dicere omne verbum sonat. Sed quod sonat nihil ad dialecticam. De sono enim verbi agitur, cum quaeritur vel animadvertitur, qualiter vocalium vel dispositione leniatur vel concursione dehiscat, item consonantium vel interpositione nodetur vel congestione asperetur, et quot vel qualibus syllabis constet, ubi poeticus rhythmus accentusque, < quae > a grammaticis solarum aurium tractantur negotia. Et tamen cum de his disputatur, praeter dialecticam non est. Haec enim scientia disputandi est. Sed cum verba sint < signa > rerum, quando de ipsis obtinent, verborum autem illa, quibus de his disputatur - nam cum de verbis loqui nisi verbis nequeamus et cum loquimur non nisi de aliquibus rebus loquimur - occurrit animo ita esse verba signa rerum, ut res esse non desinant. Cum ergo verbum ore procedit, si propter se procedit id est ut de ipso verbo aliquid quaeratur aut disputetur, res est utique disputationi quaestionique subiecta, sed ipsa res verbum vocatur. Quidquid autem ex verbo non aures sed animus sentit et ipso animo tenetur inclusum, dicibile vocatur. Cum vero verbum procedit non propter se sed propter aliud

arrive at a conclusion. The part of dialectic dealing with such statements is called 'on concluding from assertions.' Therefore we shall carefully set forth these parts, one by one.

Chapter V. SIGNIFICATION

A word is a sign of any sort of thing. It is spoken by a speaker and can be understood by a hearer. A thing is whatever is sensed or is understood or is hidden.² A sign is something which is itself sensed and which indicates to the mind something beyond the sign itself.³ To speak is to give a sign by means of an articulate utterance. By an articulate utterance I mean one which can be expressed in letters.⁴ Whether all these things that have been defined have been correctly defined and whether the words used in definition so far will have to be followed by other definitions, will be shown in the passage in which the discipline of defining is discussed. ⁵ For the present, pay strict attention to the material at hand. Every word is a sound, for when it is written it is not a word but the sign of a word. When we read, the letters we see suggest to the mind the sounds of the utterance.⁶ For written letters indicate to the eyes something other than themselves and indicate to the mind utterances beyond themselves. Now we have just said that a sign is something which is itself sensed and which indicates to the mind something beyond the sign itself. Therefore, what we read are not words but signs of words. For we misuse the term 'letter' when we call what we see written down a letter, for it is completely silent and is no part of an utterance but appears as the sign of a part of an utterance; whereas a letter as such is the smallest part of an articulate utterance. In the same way [we misuse the term 'word'] when we call what we see written down a word, for it appears as the sign of a word, that is, not as a word but as the sign of a significant utterance. Therefore, as I said above, every word is a sound. But sounds are not the concern of dialectic. We concern ourselves with the sound of words when we ask about or attend to the use of vowels to make speech lighter, or to the combination of vowels in a word, or again to the arrangement of consonants for articulation, or their concentration for asperity of speech, to the number and quality of syllables, or the matter of poetic rhythm and accent. All such matters having to do with hearing alone are treated by the grammarian. Nevertheless, when there is dispute about these subjects, it is a concern of dialectic, for dialectic is the science of disputing. Words are signs of things whenever they refer to them, even though those [words] by which we dispute about [words] are [signs] of words. For since we are unable to speak of words except by words and since we do not speak unless we speak of some things, the mind recognizes that words are signs of things, without ceasing to be things. When, therefore, a word is uttered for its own sake, that is, so that something is being asked or argued about the word itself, clearly it is the thing which is the subject of disputation and inquiry; but the thing in this case is called a verbum.⁷ Now that which the mind not the ears perceives from the word and which is held

aliquid significandum, dictio vocatur. Res autem ipsa, quae iam verbum non est neque verbi in mente conceptio, sive habeat verbum quo significari possit, sive non habeat, nihil aliud quam res vocatur proprio iam nomine. Haec ergo quattuor distincta teneantur; verbum, dicibile, dictio, res. Quod dixi verbum, et verbum est et verbum significat. Quod dixi dicibile, verbum est, nec tamen verbum, sed quod in verbo intellegitur et animo continetur, significat. Quod dixi dictionem, verbum est, sed quod iam illa duo simul id est et ipsum verbum et quod fit in animo per verbum significat. Quod dixi rem, verbum est, quod praeter illa tria quae dicta sunt quidquid restat significat. Sed exemplis haec illustranda esse perspicio. Fac igitur a quoquam grammatico - puerum interrogatum hoc modo: " arma quae pars orationis est? " quod dictum est " arma ", propter se dictum est id est verbum propter ipsum verbum. Cetera vero, quod ait " quae pars orationis ", non propter se, sed propter verbum, quod " arma " dictum est, vel animo sensa vel voce prolata sunt. Sed cum animo sensa sunt, ante vocem dicibilia erunt cum autem propter id quod dixi proruperunt in vocem, dictiones factae sunt. Ipsum vero " arma " quod hic verbum est, cum a Vergilio pronuntiatum est, dictio fuit: non enim propter se prolatum est, sed ut eo significarentur vel bella quae gessit Aeneas vel scutum vel cetera quae Vulcanus heroi fabricatus est. Ipsa vero bella vel arma, quae gesta aut ingestata sunt ab Aenea - ipsa inquam quae, cum gererentur atque essent, videbantur, quaeque si nunc adessent vel digito monstrare possemus aut tangere, quae etiamsi non cogitentur non eo tamen fit ut non fuerint - ipsa ergo per se nec verba sunt nec dicibilia nec dictiones, sed res quae iam proprio nomine res vocantur. Tractandum est igitur nobis in hac parte dialecticae de verbis, de dicibilibus, de dictionibus, de rebus. In quibus omnibus cum partim verba significantur partim non verba, nihil est tamen, de quo non verbis disputare necesse sit. Itaque de his primo disputetur per quae de ceteris disputare conceditur.

within the mind itself is called a dicibile. When a word is spoken not for its own sake but for the sake of signifying something else, it is called a dictio. The thing itself which is neither a word nor the conception of a word in the mind, whether or not it has a word by which it can be signified, is called nothing but a res in the proper sense of the name. Therefore, these four are to be kept distinct: the verbum, the dicibile, the dictio, and the res. 'Verbum' both is a word and signifies a word 'Dicibile' is a word; however, it does not signify a word but what is understood in the word and contained in the mind 'Dictio' is also a word, but it signifies both the first two, that is, the word itself and what is brought about in the mind by means of the word. 'Res' is a word which signifies whatever remains beyond the three that have been mentioned. But I recognize that these must be illustrated by examples. Let us take as an example a grammarian questioning a boy in this manner: "What part of speech is 'arma'?" 8 'Arma' is said for its own sake, the word for the sake of the word itself. The other words that he speaks, 'what part of speech,' whether they are understood by the mind or uttered by the voice, are not an end in themselves but concern the word 'arma.' Now when we consider words as perceived in the mind, prior to utterance they are dicibilia, but when they are uttered, as I have said, they become dictiones. As for 'arma,' in the context we supposed, it is a verbum, but when it was uttered by Vergil it was a dictio, for it was not said for its own sake but in order to signify either the wars which Aeneas waged, or his shield, or the other arms which Vulcan made for the hero. These wars or weapons, which were waged or worn by Aeneas, which were seen when they were waged or when they were, which, if they were now present, we could touch or point to, which, even if they were not thought of, would not be prevented from having existed-these things are neither verba nor dicibilia nor dictiones; they are things which are called 'res' in the proper sense of the name. In this part of dialectic we must treat of verba, dicibilia, dictiones, and res. 9 Among all these it is sometimes words that are signified, sometimes not; but there is nothing about which it is not necessary to dispute with words. Therefore we will first dispute about words, by means of which, as all agree, other disputes are carried out.

The Teacher

1.1-7.20

11.36-14.46

Augustine, 1968. *The Teacher; The Free Choice of the Will; Grace and Free Will* (The Fathers of the Church. A New Translation), trans. R. P. Russell. Washington (DC): The Catholic University of America Press.

De Magistro (389)

Loquentes signis utimur (1, 1-7, 20)

Loquentes aut docemus aut commemoramus.

1. 1. AUGUSTINUS: *Quid tibi videmur efficere velle cum loquimur?*

ADEODATUS: *Quantum quidem mihi nunc occurrit, aut docere, aut discere.*

Aug. - *Unum horum video et assentior: nam loquendo nos docere velle manifestum est; discere autem quomodo?*

Ad. - *Quo tandem censes, nisi cum interrogamus?*

Aug. - *Etiam tunc nihil aliud quam docere nos velle intellego. Nam quaero abs te, utrum ob aliam causam interroges, nisi ut eum quem interrogas doceas quid velis?*

Ad. - *Verum dicis.*

Aug. - *Vides ergo iam nihil nos locutione, nisi ut doceamus appetere.*

Ad. - *Non plane video: nam si nihil est aliud loqui quam verba promere, video nos id facere cum cantamus. Quod cum soli saepe facimus, nullo praesente qui discat, non puto nos docere aliquid velle.*

Aug. - *At ego puto esse quoddam genus docendi per commemorationem, magnum sane, quod in nostra hac sermocinatione res ipsa indicabit. Sed si tu non arbitraris nos discere cum recordamur, nec docere illum qui commemorat, non resisto tibi: et duas iam loquendi causas constituo, aut ut doceamus, aut ut commemoremus vel alios vel nosmetipsos; quod etiam dum cantamus, efficimus: an tibi non videtur?*

Ad. - *Non prorsus: nam rarum admodum est, ut ego cantem commemorandi me gratia, sed tantummodo delectandi.*

Aug. - *Video quid sentias. Sed nonne attendis id quod te delectat in cantu modulationem quamdam esse soni; quae quoniam verbis et addi et detrahi potest, aliud est loqui, aliud est cantare? Nam et tibiis et cithara cantatur, et aves cantant, et nos interdum sine verbis musicum aliquid sonamus, qui sonus cantus dici potest, locutio non potest: an quidquam est quod contradicas?*

Ad. - *Nihil sane.*

Orantes non necessario loquimur.

1. 2. Aug. - *Videtur ergo tibi, nisi aut docendi, aut commemorandi causa non esse institutam locutionem?*

Ad. - *Videretur, nisi me moveret quod dum oramus, utique loquimur; nec tamen Deum aut doceri aliquid a nobis, aut commemorari fas est credere.*

Aug. - *Nescire te arbitror non ob aliud nobis praeceptum esse ut in clausis cubiculis oremus 1, quo nomine significantur mentis penetralia, nisi quod Deus, ut nobis quod cupimus praestet, commemorari aut doceri nostra locutione non quaerit. Qui enim loquitur, suae voluntatis signum foras dat per articulatam sonum: Deus autem in ipsis rationalis animae secretis, qui homo interior vocatur, et quaerendus et deprecandus est; haec enim sua templa esse voluit. An apud Apostolum non legisti: Nescitis quia templum Dei estis, et spiritus Dei habitat in vobis 2; et: In interiore homine habitare Christum? 3. Nec in propheta animadvertisti: Dicite in cordibus vestris, et in cubilibus vestris compungimini: sacrificate sacrificium iustitiae, et sperate in Domino? 4. Ubi putas sacrificium iustitiae sacrificari, nisi in templo mentis, et in cubilibus cordis? Ubi autem sacrificandum est, ibi et orandum. Quare non opus est locutione cum oramus, id est sonantibus verbis, nisi forte, sicut sacerdotes faciunt, significandae mentis suae causa, non ut Deus, sed ut homines audiant, et consensione quadam per commemorationem suspendantur in Deum: an tu aliud existimas?*

Ad. - *Omnino assentior.*

Aug. - *Non te ergo movet quod summus Magister cum orare doceret discipulos, verba quaedam docuit 5; in quo nihil aliud videtur fecisse, quam docuisse quomodo in orando loqui oporteret?*

Ad. - *Nihil me omnino istud movet: non enim verba, sed res ipsas eos verbis docuit, quibus et seipsi commonefacerent, a quo, et quid esset orandum, cum in penetralibus, ut dictum est, mentis orarent.*

Aug. - *Recte intellegis: simul enim te credo animadvertere, etiamsi quisquam contendat, quamvis nullum edamus sonum, tamen quia ipsa verba cogitamus, nos intus apud animum loqui, sic quoque locutione nihil aliud agere quam commonere, cum memoria cui verba inhaerent, ea revolvendo facit venire in mentem res ipsas quarum signa sunt verba.*

Ad. - *Intellego ac sequor.*

Verba signa sunt...

2. 3. Aug. - *Constat ergo inter nos verba signa esse.*

Ad. - *Constat.*

Aug. - *Quid? signum, nisi aliquid significet, potest esse signum?*

Ad. - *Non potest.*

Aug. - *Quot verba sunt in hoc versu,*

Si nihil ex tanta Superis placet urbe relinqui 6?

Ad. - *Octo.*

Aug. - *Octo ergo signa sunt.*

Ad. - *Ita est.*

Aug. - *Credo te hunc versum intellegere.*

Ad. - *Satis arbitror.*

Aug. - *Dic mihi quid singula verba significant.*

Ad. - *Video quidem quid significet, si; sed nullum aliud verbum, quo id exponi possit, invenio.*

Aug. - *Saltem illud invenis, quidquid significatur hoc verbo, ubinam sit?*

Ad. - *Videtur mihi quod, si, dubitationem significet: iam dubitatio, ubi nisi in animo est?*

Aug. - *Accipio interim; persequere caetera.*

Ad. - *Nihil, quid aliud significat, nisi id quod non est?*

Aug. - *Verum fortasse dicis: sed revocat me ab assentiendo quod superius concessisti, non esse signum nisi aliquid significet; quod autem non est, nullo modo esse aliquid potest. Quare secundum verbum in hoc versu non est signum, quia non significat aliquid; et falso inter nos constitit, quod omnia verba signa sint, aut omne signum aliquid significet.*

Ad. - *Nimis quidem urges; sed quando non habemus quid significemus, omnino stulte verbum aliquod promimus: tu autem nunc mecum loquendo, credo quod nullum sonum frustra emittis, sed omnibus quae ore tuo erumpunt, signum mihi das ut intellegam aliquid; quapropter non te oportet istas duas syllabas enuntiare dum loqueris, si per eas non significas quidquam. Si autem vides necessariam per eas enuntiationem fieri, nosque doceri vel commoneri cum auribus insonant, vides etiam profecto quid velim dicere, sed explicare non possum.*

Aug. - *Quid igitur facimus? An affectionem animi quamdam, cum rem non videt, et tamen non esse invenit, aut invenisse se putat, hoc verbo significari dicimus potius, quam rem ipsam quae nulla est?*

Ad. - *Istud ipsum est fortasse quod explicare moliebar.*

Aug. - *Transeamus ergo hinc, quoquo modo se habet, ne res absurdissima nobis accidat.*

Ad. - *Quae tandem?*

Aug. - *Si nihil nos teneat, et moras patiamur.*

Ad. - *Ridiculum hoc quidem est, et tamen nescio quomodo video posse contingere; imo plane video contigisse.*

...quibus aut alia signa.

2. 4. Aug. - *Suo loco genus hoc repugnantiae, si Deus siverit, planius intellegemus: nunc ad illum versum te refer, et conare, ut potes, caetera eius verba quid significant pandere.*

Ad. - *Tertia praepositio est, ex, pro qua, de, possumus, ut arbitror, dicere.*

Aug. - *Non id quaero, ut pro una voce notissima aliam vocem aequae notissimam, quae idem significet dicas; si tamen idem significat: sed interim concedamus ita esse. Certe si poeta iste non, ex tanta urbe, sed, de tanta, dixisset,*

quaereremque abs te quid, de, significaret; diceres, ex, cum haec duo verba essent, id est signa, unum aliquid, ut tu putas, significantia: ego autem idipsum, nescio quid unum, quod his duobus signis significatur, inquiero.

Ad. - Mihi videtur secretionem quamdam significare ab ea re in qua fuerat aliquid, quod ex illa esse dicitur, sive illa non maneat, ut in hoc versu, non manente urbe, poterant aliqui ex illa esse Troiani: sive maneat, sicut ex urbe Roma dicimus esse negotiatores in Africa.

Aug. - Ut concedam tibi haec ita esse, nec enumerem quam multa fortasse praeter hanc tuam regulam reperiantur; illud certe tibi attendere facile est, exposuisse te verbis verba, id est signis signa, eisdemque notissimis notissima: ego autem illa ipsa quorum haec signa sunt, mihi, si posses, vellem ut ostenderes.

...aut res significantur...

3. 5. Ad. - Miror te nescire, vel potius simulare nescientem, responsione mea fieri quod vis omnino non posse; siquidem sermocinamur, ubi non possumus respondere nisi verbis. Tu autem res quaeris eas quae, quodlibet sint, verba certe non sunt, quas tamen ex me tu quoque verbis quaeris. Prior itaque tu sine verbis quaere, ut ego deinde ista conditione respondeam.

Aug. - Iure agis, fateor: sed si quaererem istae tres syllabae quid significant, cum dicitur, Paries, nonne posses digito ostendere, ut ego prorsus rem ipsam viderem, cuius signum est hoc trisyllabum verbum, demonstrante te, nulla tamen verba referente.

Ad. - Hoc in solis nominibus quibus corpora significantur, si eadem corpora praesentia sint, fieri posse concedo.

Aug. - Num colorem corpus dicimus, an non potius quamdam corporis qualitatem?

Ad. - Ita est.

Aug. - Cur ergo et hic digito demonstrari potest? An addis corporibus etiam corporum qualitates, ut nihilominus etiam istae cum praesentes sunt, doceri sine verbis possint?

Ad. - Ego cum corpora dicerem, omnia corporalia intellegi volebam, id est omnia quae in corporibus sentiuntur.

Aug. - Considera tamen, utrum etiam hinc aliqua tibi excipienda sint.

Ad. - Bene admones: non enim omnia corporalia, sed omnia visibilia dicere debui. Fateor enim sonum, odorem, saporem, gravitatem, calorem, et alia quae ad caeteros sensus pertinent, quamquam sentiri sine corporibus nequeant, et propterea sint corporalia, non tamen digito posse monstrari.

Aug. - Nunquamne vidisti ut homines cum surdis gestu quasi sermocinentur, ipsique surdi non minus gestu, vel quaerant, vel respondeant, vel doceant, vel indicent aut omnia quae volunt, aut certe plurima? Quod cum fit, non utique sola visibilia sine verbis ostenduntur, sed et soni et sapes, et caetera huius modi. Nam et histriones totas in theatris fabulas sine verbis saltando plerumque aperiant et exponunt.

Ad. - Nihil habeo quod contradicam, nisi quod illud, ex, non modo ego, sed nec ipse quidem saltator histrio tibi sine verbis quid significet posset ostendere.

...aut etiam agendo significamus.

3. 6. Aug. - Verum fortasse dicis: sed fingamus eum posse; non, ut arbitror, dubitas, quisquis ille motus corporis fuerit, quo mihi rem quae hoc verbo significatur, demonstrare conabitur, non ipsam rem futuram esse, sed signum. Quare hic quoque non quidem verbo verbum, sed tamen signo signum nihilominus indicabit; ut et hoc monosyllabum, ex, et ille gestus, unam rem quamdam significant, quam mihi ego vellem non significando monstrari.

Ad. - Qui potest quod quaeris, oro te?

Aug. - Quomodo paries potuit.

Ad. - Ne ipse quidem, quantum ratio progrediens docuit, ostendi sine signo potest. Nam et intentio digiti non est utique paries, sed signum datur per quod paries possit videri. Nihil itaque video quod sine signis ostendi queat.

Aug. - Quid, si ex te quaererem quid sit ambulare, surgesque et id ageres? nonne re ipsa potius quam verbis ad me docendum, aut ullis aliis signis uteris?

Ad. - Fateor ita esse, et pudet me rem tam in promptu positam non vidisse: ex qua etiam mihi millia rerum iam occurrunt, quae ipsae per se valeant, non per signa monstrari, ut edere, bibere, sedere, stare, clamare, et innumerabilia caetera.

Aug. - Age, nunc dic mihi, si omnino nesciens huius verbi vim, abs te ambulante quaererem quid sit ambulare, quomodo me doceres?

Ad. - Idipsum agerem aliquanto celerius, ut post interrogationem tuam aliqua novitate admoneris; et tamen nihil aliud fieret, quam id quod deberet ostendi.

Aug. - Scisne aliud esse ambulare, aliud festinare? Nam et qui ambulat, non statim festinat; et qui festinat, non continuo ambulat: dicimus enim et in scribendo et in legendo, aliisque innumerabilibus rebus festinationem. Quare cum illud quod agebas, celerius ageres post interrogationem meam, putarem ambulare nihil esse aliud quam festinare: id enim novi addideras; et ob hoc fallerer.

Ad. - Fateor rem non posse nos monstrare sine signo, si cum id agimus interrogemur: si enim nihil addamus, putabit qui rogat, nolle nos ostendere, contemptoque se, in eo quod agebamus perseverare. Sed si de his roget quae agere possumus, nec eo tamen tempore quo agimus roget, possumus post eius interrogationem id agendo, re ipsa potius quam signo demonstrare quod rogat: nisi forte loquentem me interroget quid sit loqui; quidquid enim dixerō, ut eum doceam, loquar necesse est: ex quo securus docebo, donec ei planum faciam quod vult, non recedens a re ipsa quam sibi voluit demonstrari, nec signa quaerens quibus eam ostendam praeter ipsam.

Ergo tripartita signorum distributio.

4. 7. Aug. - Acutissime omnino: quare vide utrum conveniat iam inter nos ea posse demonstrari sine signis, quae aut non agimus cum interrogamur, et tamen statim agere possumus, aut ipsa signa forte agimus. Cum enim loquimur, signa facimus, de quo dictum est significare.

Ad. - Convenit.

Aug. - Cum ergo de quibusdam signis quaeritur, possunt signis signa monstrari: cum autem de rebus quae signa non sunt, aut eas agendo post inquisitionem si agi possunt, aut signa dando per quae animadverti queant.

Ad. - Ita est.

Aug. - In hac igitur tripartita distributione prius illud consideremus, si placet, quod signis signa monstrantur: num enim sola verba sunt signa?

Ad. - Non.

Aug. - Videtur ergo mihi loquendo nos aut verba ipsa signare verbis, aut alia signa, velut gestum cum dicimus aut litteram; nam his duobus verbis quae significantur, nihilominus signa sunt: aut aliquid aliud quod signum non sit, velut cum dicimus, Lapis; hoc enim verbum signum est, nam significat aliquid, sed id quod eo significatur, non continuo signum est: quod tamen genus, id est cum verbis ea quae signa non sunt significantur, non pertinet ad hanc partem quam discutere proposuimus. Suscepimus enim considerare illud, quod signis signa monstrantur, et partes in eo duas comperimus, cum aut eadem aut alia signa signis docemus vel commemoramus: an non tibi videtur?

Ad. - Manifestum est.

Signa aut alia signa aut res significant.

4. 8. Aug. - Dic ergo signa quae verba sunt, ad quem sensum pertineant.

Ad. - Ad auditum.

Aug. - Quid gestus?

Ad. - Ad visum.

Aug. - Quid, cum verba scripta invenimus? num verba non sunt, an signa verborum verius intelleguntur? ut verbum sit quod cum aliquo significato articulata voce profertur; vox autem nullo alio sensu quam auditu percipi potest: ita fit ut cum scribitur verbum, signum fiat oculis, quo illud quod ad aures pertinet, veniat in mentem.

Ad. - Omnino assentior.

Aug. - Id quoque te arbitror assentiri, cum dicimus, Nomen, significare nos aliquid.

Ad. - Verum est.

Aug. - Quid tandem?

Ad. - Id scilicet quod quidque appellatur, velut Romulus, Roma, virtus, fluvius, et innumerabilia caetera.

Aug. - Num ista quatuor nomina nullas res significant?

Ad. - Imo aliquas.

Aug. - Num nihil distat inter haec nomina, et eas res quae his significantur?

Ad. - Imo plurimum.

Aug. - Vellem abs te audire, quidnam id sit.

Ad. - Hoc vel in primis, quod haec signa sunt, illa non sunt.

Aug. - *Placetne appellemus significabilia ea quae signis significari possunt et signa non sunt, sicut ea quae videri possunt, visibilia nominamus, ut de his deinceps commodius disseramus?*

Ad. - *Placet vero.*

Aug. - *Quid? illa quatuor signa quae paulo ante pronuntiasti, nullone alio signo significantur?*

Ad. - *Miror quod iam mihi excidisse arbitraris, quod ea quae scribuntur, eorum quae voce proferuntur, signorum signa esse comperimus.*

Aug. - *Dic inter ista quid distet?*

Ad. - *Quod illa visibilia sunt, haec audibilia. Cur enim et hoc nomen non admittas, si admisimus significabilia?*

Aug. - *Prorsus admitto, et gratum habeo. Sed rursus quaero, quatuor haec signa nullone alio signo audibili significari queant, ut visibilia recordatus es?*

Ad. - *Hoc quoque recentius dictum recorder. Nam nomen responderam significare aliquid, et huic significationi quatuor ista subieceram; et illud autem et haec, si quidem voce proferuntur, audibilia esse cognosco.*

Aug. - *Quid ergo inter audibile signum et audibilia significata, quae rursus signa sunt, interest?*

Ad. - *Inter illud quidem quod dicimus: "Nomen", et haec quatuor quae significationi eius subiecemus, hoc distare video, quod illud audibile signum est signorum audibilium: haec vero audibilia quidem signa sunt, non tamen signorum, sed rerum partim visibilium, sicut est Romulus, Roma, fluvius; partim intellegibilium, sicut est virtus.*

Verbum est signum universaliter significans.

4. 9. Aug. - *Accipio et proba: sed scisne omnia quae voce articulata cum aliquo significato proferuntur, verba appellari?*

Ad. - *Scio.*

Aug. - *Ergo et nomen verbum est, quandoquidem id videmus cum aliquo significato articulata voce proferri; et cum dicimus disertum hominem bonis verbis uti, etiam nominibus utique utitur; et cum seni domino apud Terentium servus retulit: Bona verba quaeso 7, multa ille etiam nomina dixerat.*

Ad. - *Assentior.*

Aug. - *Concedis igitur iis duabus syllabis quas edimus, cum dicimus, Verbum, nomen quoque significari, et ob hoc illud huius signum esse.*

Ad. - *Concedo.*

Aug. - *Hoc quoque respondeas velim. Cum verbum signum sit nominis, et nomen signum sit fluminis, et flumen signum sit rei quae iam videri potest, ut inter hanc rem et flumen, id est signum eius, et inter hoc signum et nomen quod huius signi signum est dixisti quid intersit; quid interesse arbitraris inter signum nominis, quod verbum esse comperimus, et ipsum nomen cuius signum est?*

Ad. - *Hoc distare intellego, quod ea quae significantur nomine, etiam verbo significantur; ut enim nomen est verbum, ita et flumen verbum est: quae autem verbo significantur, non omnia significantur et nomine. Nam et illud, si, quod in capite habet abs te propositus versus, et hoc, ex, de quo iam diu agentes in haec duce ratione pervenimus, verba sunt, nec tamen nomina; et talia multa inveniuntur. Quamobrem cum omnia nomina verba sint, non autem omnia verba nomina sint, planum esse arbitror quid inter verbum distet et nomen, id est inter signum signi eius quod nulla alia signa significat, et signum signi eius quod rursus alia significat.*

Aug. - *Concedisne omnem equum animal esse, nec tamen omne animal equum esse?*

Ad. - *Quis dubitaverit?*

Aug. - *Hoc ergo inter nomen et verbum, quod inter equum et animal interest. Nisi forte ab assentiendo id te revocat, quod dicimus et alio modo verbum, quo significantur ea quae per tempora declinantur, ut scribo scripsi, lego legi, quae manifestum est non esse nomina.*

Ad. - *Dixisti omnino quod me dubitare faciebat.*

Aug. - *Ne te istud moveat. Dicimus enim et signa universaliter omnia quae significant aliquid, ubi etiam verba esse invenimus. Dicimus item signa militaria, quae iam proprie signa nominantur, quo verba non pertinent. Et tamen si tibi dicerem, ut omnis equus animal, non autem omne animal equus est, ita omne verbum signum, non autem omne signum verbum est, nihil, ut opinor, dubitares.*

Ad. - *Iam intellego, et prorsus assentior, hoc interesse inter universale illud verbum et nomen, quod inter animal et equum.*

Signa dantur quae seipsa significant...

4. 10. Aug. - Scisne etiam, cum dicimus, Animal, aliud esse hoc trisyllabum nomen, quod voce prolatum est, aliud id quod significatur?

Ad. - Iam hoc supra concessi de omnibus signis et significabilibus.

Aug. - Num omnia signa tibi videntur aliud significare quam sunt, sicut hoc trisyllabum, cum dicimus, Animal, nullo modo idem significat quod est ipsum?

Ad. - Non sane: nam cum dicimus, Signum, non solum signa caetera quaecumque sunt, sed etiam seipsum significat; est enim verbum, et utique omnia verba signa sunt.

Aug. - Quid? in hoc disyllabo cum dicimus, Verbum, nonne tale aliquid contingit? Nam si omne quod cum aliquo significato articulata voce profertur, hoc disyllabo significatur, etiam ipsum hoc genere includitur.

Ad. - Ita est.

Aug. - Quid? nomen nonne similiter habet? Nam et omnium generum nomina significat, et ipsum nomen generis neutri nomen est. An, si ex te quaererem quae pars orationis nomen, posses mihi respondere recte, nisi, nomen?

Ad. - Verum dicis.

Aug. - Sunt ergo signa quae inter alia quae significant, et seipsa significant.

Ad. - Sunt.

Aug. - Num tale tibi videtur hoc quadrisyllabum signum, cum dicimus: "coniunctio"?

Ad. - Nullo modo: nam ea quae significat, non sunt nomina; hoc autem nomen est.

...et quae ad invicem...

5. 11. Aug. - Bene attendisti: nunc illud vide, utrum inveniantur signa quae se invicem significant, ut quemadmodum hoc ab illo, sic illud ab hoc significetur: non enim ita sunt inter se hoc quadrisyllabum, cum dicimus: "coniunctio", et illa quae ab hoc significantur, cum dicimus, Si, vel, nam, namque, nisi, ergo, quoniam, et similia; nam haec illo uno significantur, nullo autem horum unum illud quadrisyllabum significatur.

Ad. - Video, et quaenam signa sint se invicem significantia, cupio cognoscere.

Aug. - Tu ergo nescis, cum dicimus, Nomen et verbum, duo verba nos dicere?

Ad. - Scio.

Aug. - Quid? illud nescis, cum dicimus: "nomen" et "verbum", duo nomina nos dicere?

Ad. - Id quoque scio.

Aug. - Scis igitur tam nomen verbo, quam etiam verbum nomine significari.

Ad. - Assentior.

Aug. - Potesne dicere, excepto eo quod diverse scribuntur et sonant, quid inter se differant?

Ad. - Possum fortasse; nam id esse video quod paulo ante dixi. Verba enim cum dicimus, omne quod articulata voce cum aliquo significato profertur, significamus; unde omne nomen, et ipsum cum dicimus: "nomen", verbum est: at non omne verbum nomen est, quamvis nomen sit, cum dicimus: "verbum".

...sicut est verbum et nomen.

5. 12. Aug. - Quid, si quisquam tibi affirmet et probet, ut omne nomen verbum est, ita omne verbum nomen esse? poterisne invenire quid distent, praeter diversum in litteris sonum?

Ad. - Non potero, nec omnino distare aliquid puto.

Aug. - Quid, si omnia quidem quae voce articulata cum aliquo significato proferuntur, et verba sunt et nomina; sed tamen alia de causa verba, et alia de causa nomina sunt? nihilne distabit inter nomen et verbum?

Ad. - Quomodo istud sit non intellego.

Aug. - Hoc saltem intellegis, omne coloratum visibile esse, et omne visibile coloratum, quamvis haec duo verba distincte differenterque significant.

Ad. - Intellego.

Aug. - Quid si ergo ita et omne verbum nomen, et omne nomen verbum est, quamvis haec ipsa duo nomina, vel duo verba, id est nomen et verbum, differentem habeant significationem?

Ad. - Iam video posse id accidere: sed quomodo id accidat, exspecto ut ostendas.

Aug. - Omne quod cum aliquo significato articulata voce prorumpit, animadvertis, ut opinor, et aurem verberare, ut sentire; et memoriae mandari, ut nosci possit.

Ad. - Animadverto.

Aug. - Duo ergo quaedam contingunt, cum aliquid tali voce proferimus.

Ad. - Ita est.

Aug. - Quid, si horum duorum ex uno appellata sunt verba, ex altero nomina; verba scilicet a verberando, nomina vero a noscendo, ut illud primum ab auribus, hoc autem secundum ab animo vocari meruerit?

Esse omne verbum qua significat.

5. 13. Ad. - Concedam, cum ostenderis quomodo recte possimus omnia verba nomina dicere.

Aug. - Facile est: nam credo te accepisse ac tenere pronomen dictum, quod pro ipso nomine valeat, rem tamen notet minus plena significatione quam nomen. Nam, ut opinor, definivit ille ita, quem grammatico reddidisti: Pronomen est pars orationis, quae pro ipso posita nomine, minus quidem plene, idem tamen significat.

Ad. - Recordor et probo.

Aug. - Vides igitur secundum hanc definitionem nullis nisi nominibus servire, et pro his solis poni posse pronomina, velut cum dicimus, Hic vir, ipse rex, eadem mulier, hoc aurum, illud argentum: hic, ipse, eadem, hoc, illud pronomina esse; vir, rex, mulier, aurum, argentum, nomina, quibus plenius quam illis pronomina res significatae sunt.

Ad. - Video et assentior.

Aug. - Tu ergo nunc mihi paucas coniunctiones quaslibet enuntia.

Ad. - Et, que, at, atque.

Aug. - Haec omnia quae dixisti, nonne tibi videntur esse nomina?

Ad. - Non omnino.

Aug. - Ego saltem tibi recte locutus videor, cum dicerem, Haec omnia quae dixisti?

Ad. - Recte prorsus; et iam intellego quam mirabiliter ostenderis me nomina enuntiasse: non enim aliter de his recte dici potuisset: "Haec omnia". Sed enim vereor adhuc, ne propterea mihi recte locutus videaris, quod has quatuor coniunctiones etiam verba esse non nego; ut ideo de his recte dici potuerit: "Haec omnia", quoniam recte dicitur: "Haec verba omnia". Si autem a me quaeras quae sit pars orationis, Verba; nihil aliud respondebo quam, Nomen. Quare huic nomini fortasse pronomen adiunctum est, ut illa recta esset locutio tua.

...demonstrant dictum Pauli...

5. 14. Aug. - Acute quidem falleris, sed ut falli desinas, acutius attende quod dicam, si tamen id dicere, ut volo, valero: nam verbis de verbis agere tam implicatum est, quam digitos digitis inserere et confricare; ubi vix dignoscitur, nisi ab eo ipso qui id agit, qui digiti pruriant, et qui auxiliuntur prurientibus.

Ad. - En toto animo adsum, nam ista haec similitudo me intentissimum fecit.

Aug. - Verba certe sono, et litteris constant.

Ad. - Ita est.

Aug. - Ergo ut ea potissimum auctoritate utamur, quae nobis carissima est, cum ait Paulus apostolus: Non erat in Christo Est et Non, sed Est in illo erat 8, non opinor, putandum est tres istas litteras, quas enuntiamus cum dicimus, est, fuisse in Christo, sed illud potius quod istis tribus litteris significatur.

Ad. - Verum dicis.

Aug. - Intellegis igitur eum qui ait: Est in illo erat, nihil aliud dixisse quam: "Est appellatur quod in illo erat": tamquam si dixisset: "Virtus in illo erat"; non utique aliud dixisse acciperetur, nisi, virtus appellatur quod in illo erat: ne duas istas syllabas quas enuntiamus, cum dicimus: "Virtus", et non illud quod his duabus syllabis significatur, in illo fuisse arbitraremur.

Ad. - Intellego ac sequor.

Aug. - Quid? illud nonne intellegis etiam nihil interesse utrum quisque dicat: "Virtus appellatur", an "Virtus nominatur"?

Ad. - Manifestum est.

Aug. - Ergo ita manifestum est, nihil interesse utrum quis dicat: "Est appellatur", an "Est nominatur quod in illo erat".

Ad. - Video et hic nihil distare.

Aug. - Iamne etiam vides quid velim ostendere?

Ad. - Nondum sane.

Aug. - Itane tu non vides nomen esse id quo res aliqua nominatur?

Ad. - *Hoc plane nihil certius video.*

Aug. - *Vides ergo, "Est" nomen esse, siquidem illud quod erat in illo, "Est" nominatur.*

Ad. - *Negare non possum.*

Aug. - *At si ex te quaererem quae sit pars orationis, "Est"; non opinor nomen, sed verbum esse diceres, cum id ratio etiam nomen esse docuerit.*

Ad. - *Ita est prorsus ut dicis.*

Aug. - *Num adhuc dubitas alias quoque partes orationis eodem modo, quo demonstravimus, nomina esse?*

Ad. - *Non dubito, quandoquidem fateor ea significare aliquid Si autem res ipsae quas significant, quid singulae appellentur, id est nominentur, interroges; respondere non possum, nisi eas ipsas partes orationis, quas nomina non vocamus, sed, ut cerno, vocare convincimur.*

...collatio cum graecorum lingua...

5. 15. Aug. - *Nihilne te movet, ne quis existat qui nostram istam rationem labefactet dicendo, Apostolis non verborum, sed rerum auctoritatem esse tribuendam; quamobrem fundamentum persuasionis huius non tam esse firmum quam putamus: fieri enim posse ut Paulus, quamquam vixerit praeceperitque rectissime, minus tamen recte locutus sit, cum ait: "Est in illo erat"; praesertim cum se ipse imperitum sermone fateatur? 9 quo tandem modo istum refellendum arbitraris?*

Ad. - *Nihil habeo quod contradicam, et te oro ut aliquem de illis reperias, quibus verborum notitia summa conceditur, cuius auctoritate potius id quod cupis efficias.*

Aug. - *Minus enim tibi videtur idonea, remotis auctoritatibus, ipsa ratio, qua demonstratur omnibus partibus orationis significari aliquid, et ex eo appellari; si autem appellari, et nominari; si nominari, nomine utique nominari: quod in diversis linguis facillime iudicatur. Quis enim non videat, si quaeras quid Graeci nominent quod nos nominamus "Quis", responderi, quid Graeci nominent quod nos nominamus "Volo", responderi, quid Graeci nominent quod nos nominamus "Bene", responderi, quid Graeci nominent quod nos nominamus "Scriptum", responderi, quid Graeci nominent quod nos nominamus "Et", responderi, quid Graeci nominent quod nos nominamus "Ab", responderi, quid Graeci nominent quod nos nominamus "Heu", responderi, atque in his omnibus partibus orationis, quas nunc enumeravi, recte loqui eum qui sic interroget: quod, nisi nomina essent, fieri non posset? Hac ergo ratione Paulum apostolum recte locutum esse, cum remotis omnium eloquentium auctoritatibus obtinere possimus; quid opus est quaerere cuius persona sententia nostra fulciatur?*

...doctrina Tullii et magistrorum.

5. 16. *Sed ne quis tardior aut impudentior nondum cedat, asseratque, nisi illis auctoribus, quibus verborum leges consensu omnium tribuuntur, nullo modo esse cessurum; quid in latina lingua excellentius Cicerone inveniri potest? At hic in suis nobilissimis orationibus quas Verrinas vocant, "coram", praepositionem, sive illo loco adverbium sit, nomen appellavit 10. Verumtamen quia fieri potest ut ego illum locum minus bene intellegam, exponaturque alias aliter, vel a me vel ab alio; est ad quod responderi posse nihil puto. Tradunt enim nobilissimi disputationum magistri, nomine et verbo plenam constare sententiam, quae affirmari negarique possit: quod genus idem Tullius quodam loco pronuntiatum vocat 11: et cum verbi tertia persona est, nominativum cum ea casum nominis aiunt esse oportere; et recte aiunt: quod mecum si consideres, velut cum dicimus: "Homo sedet", "Equus currit", agnoscis, ut opinor, duo esse pronuntiatum.*

Ad. - *Agnosco.*

Aug. - *Cernis in singulis singula esse nomina, in uno "homo", in altero "equus"; et verba singula, in uno "sedet", in altero "currit"?*

Ad. - *Cerno.*

Aug. - *Ergo si dicerem, sedet tantum, aut currit tantum, recte a me quaereris, quis vel quid; ut responderem: "homo", vel "equus", vel "animal", vel quodlibet aliud, quo possit nomen redditum verbo implere pronuntiatum, id est illam sententiam quae affirmari et negari potest.*

Ad. - *Intellego.*

Aug. - *Attende caetera, et finge nos videre aliquid longius, et incertum habere utrum animal sit an saxum, vel quid aliud, meque tibi dicere: "Quia homo est, animal est"; nonne temere dicerem?*

Ad. - *Temere omnino: sed non temere plane diceres: "Si homo est, animal est".*

Aug. - Recte dicis. Itaque in locutione tua placet mihi "Si"; placet et tibi: utrique autem nostrum in mea displicet "Quia".

Ad. - Assentior.

Aug. - Vide iam utrum istae duae sententiae plena pronuntiata sint: "Placet Si", "Displicet, quia".

Ad. - Plena omnino.

Aug. - Age, nunc dic mihi quae ibi sint verba, quae nomina.

Ad. - Verba ibi video esse "placet", et "displicet": nomina vero quid aliud quam "si", et "quia"?

Aug. - Has ergo duas coniunctiones etiam nomina esse satis probatum est.

Ad. - Prorsus satis.

Aug. - Potesne ipse per te in aliis partibus orationis hoc idem ad eandem regulam docere?

Ad. - Possum.

Ad invicem se significant nomen et vocabulum.

6. 17. Aug. - Transeamus ergo hinc, et iam dic mihi utrum sicut omnia verba nomina, et omnia nomina verba esse comperimus, ita tibi et omnia nomina vocabula, et omnia vocabula nomina esse videantur.

Ad. - Plane inter haec quid distet praeter diversum syllabarum sonum non video.

Aug. - Nec ego interim resisto, quamquam non desint qui etiam significatione ista discernunt, quorum sententiam modo considerare non opus est. Sed certe animadvertis ad ea iam signa nos pervenisse, quae se invicem significant, nulla praeter sonum distantia, et quae seipsa significant cum caeteris omnibus partibus orationis.

Ad. - Non intellego.

Aug. - Non ergo intellegis et nomen vocabulo et vocabulum nomine significari; et ita ut praeter sonum litterarum nihil intersit, quantum ad generale nomen pertinet: nam et speciale nomen dicimus, quod inter octo partes orationis ita est, ut alias septem non contineat.

Ad. - Intellego.

Aug. - At hoc est quod dixi, se invicem significare vocabulum et nomen.

Quaedam idem sunt praeter sonum.

6. 18. Ad. - Teneo, sed quaero quid dixeris, Cum etiam seipsa significant cum aliis partibus orationis.

Aug. - Nonne superior ratio docuit nos, omnes partes orationis, et nomina posse dici et vocabula, id est et nomine et vocabulo posse significari?

Ad. - Ita est.

Aug. - Quid? ipsum nomen, id est sonum istum duabus syllabis expressum, si ex te quaeram quid appelles, nonne recte mihi respondebis, Nomen?

Ad. - Recte.

Aug. - Num ita se significat hoc signum quod quatuor syllabis enuntiamus cum dicimus: "coniunctio"? Hoc enim nomen inter illa quae significat, numerari non potest.

Ad. - Recte accipio.

Aug. - Id est quod dictum est nomen seipsum significare cum aliis quae significat; quod etiam de vocabulo licet per teipsum intellegas.

Ad. - Iam facile est: sed illud mihi nunc venit in mentem, nomen et generaliter et specialiter dici; vocabulum autem inter octo partes orationis non accipi: quare hoc quoque inter se praeter diversum sonum differre arbitror.

Aug. - Quid? nomen et distare inter se aliquid putas praeter sonum, quo etiam linguae discernuntur latina atque graeca?

Ad. - Hic vero nihil aliud intellego.

Aug. - Perventum est ergo ad ea signa quae et seipsa significant, et aliud ab alio invicem significetur, et quidquid ab uno hoc et ab alio; et nihil praeter sonum inter se differant: nam hoc quartum modo invenimus; tria enim superiora, et de nomine et verbo intelleguntur.

Ad. - Omnino perventum.

Adeodatus brevissime de locutione...

7. 19. Aug. - *Iam quae sermocinando invenerimus, velim recenseas.*

Ad. - Faciam quantum possum. Nam primo omnium recordor aliquandiu nos quaesisse quam ob causam loquamur, inventumque esse docendi commemorandive gratia nos loqui, quandoquidem nec cum interrogamus, aliud agimus quam ut ille qui interrogatur discat quid velimus audire; et in cantando, quod delectationis causa facere videmur, non sit proprium locutionis; in orando Deo, quem doceri aut commemorari existimare non possumus, id verba valeant, ut vel nos ipsos commonefaciamus, vel alii commoneantur doceanturve per nos. Deinde cum satis constitisset verba nihil aliud esse quam signa; ea vero quae non aliquid significant, signa esse non posse, proposuisti versum, cuius verba singula quid significarent, conarer ostendere: is autem erat:

Si nihil ex tanta superis placet urbe relinqui 12.

Cuius secundum verbum quamvis notissimum et manifestissimum, quid tamen significaret, non reperiebamus. Cumque mihi videretur non frustra nos id in loquendo interponere, sed quod eo aliquid doceamus audientem, ipsam mentis affectionem, cum rem quam quaerit, non esse invenit, vel invenisse se putat, hoc verbo fortasse indicari; respondisti tu quidem, sed tamen nescio quam profunditatem quaestionis ioco evitans, in aliud tempus illustrandam distulisti: nec me debiti quoque tui oblitum putes. Inde tertium in versu verbum cum satagerem exponere, urgebar abs te, ut non verbum aliud quod idem valeret, sed rem ipsam potius quae per verba significaretur ostenderem. Cumque id sermocinantibus nobis fieri non posse dixissem, ventum est ad ea quae interrogantibus digito monstrantur. Haec ego corporalia esse omnia arbitrabar, sed invenimus sola visibilia. Hinc nescio quomodo ad surdos et histriones devenimus, qui non quae sola videri possunt, sed multa praeterea ac prope omnia quae loquimur, gestu sine voce significant; eosdem tamen gestus signa esse comperimus. Tum rursus quaerere coepimus, quomodo res ipsas quae signis significantur, sine ullis signis valeremus ostendere, cum et ille paries, et color, et omne visibile, quod intentione digiti ostenditur, signo quodam convinceretur ostendi. Hic ego errans cum inveniri tale nihil posse dixissem, tandem inter nos constitit, ea posse demonstrari sine signo, quae cum a nobis quaeruntur, non agimus, et post inquisitionem agere possumus; locutionem tamen ex eo non esse genere: siquidem et loquentes cum interrogamur quid sit locutio, istam per seipsam demonstrare facile esse satis apparuit.

...et signis loquitur.

7. 20. *Ex quo admoniti sumus aut signis signa monstrari, aut signis alia quae signa non sunt, aut etiam sine signo res quas agere post interrogationem possumus: horumque trium primum diligentius considerandum discutiendumque suscepimus. Qua disputatione declaratum est, partim esse signa, quae ab iis signis quae significarent, significari vicissim non possent, ut est hoc quadrisyllabum cum: "coniunctio", dicimus: partim quae possent, ut cum dicimus: "signum", etiam verbum significamus; et cum dicimus: "verbum", etiam signum significamus; nam signum et verbum, et duo signa, et duo verba sunt. In hoc autem genere, quo invicem se signa significant, quaedam non tantum, quaedam tantum, quaedam vero etiam idem valere monstratum est. Etenim hoc disyllabum, quod sonat cum dicimus: "signum", prorsus omnia quibus quidque significatur significat: non autem omnium signorum signum est cum dicimus: "verbum", sed tantum eorum quae articulata voce proferuntur. Unde manifestum est, quamvis et verbum signo, et signum verbo, id est et duae istae syllabae illis, et illae istis significantur, plus tamen signum valere quam verbum, plura scilicet illis duabus syllabis, quam istis significantibus. Tantumdem autem valet generale verbum, et generale nomen. Docuit enim ratio omnes partes orationis etiam nomina esse, quod et pronomina his addi possunt, et de omnibus dici potest quod aliquid nominent, et nulla earum sit quae non verbo adiuncto pronuntiatum possit implere. Sed cum tantumdem valeant nomen et verbum, eo quod omnia quae verba sunt, sint etiam nomina; non tamen idem valent. Alia quippe de causa verba, et alia nomina nuncupari, satis probabiliter disputatum est. Siquidem alterum horum ad auris verberationem, alterum ad animi commemorationem notandam esse compertum, vel ex hoc intellegi potest, quod in loquendo rectissime dicimus: "Quod est huic rei nomen", rem memoriae mandare cupientes; "Quod est autem huic rei verbum", dicere non solemus. Quae vero non solum tantumdem, sed etiam idem omnino significant, et inter quae nihil praeter litterarum distet sonum, nomen et invenimus. Illud sane mihi elapsum erat an hoc genere, in quo invicem se significant, nullum nos signum comperisse, quod non inter caetera quae significat, se quoque significet. Haec quantum potui recordatus sum. Tu iam videris, quem nihil puto in hoc sermone nisi scientem certumque dixisse, utrum ista bene ordinateque digesserim.*

...

Quid doceat magister qui interius exterius loquitur (11, 36-14, 46)

Verbis non quae significantur...

11. 36. *Hactenus verba valuerunt, quibus ut plurimum tribuam, admonent tantum ut quaeramus res, non exhibent ut noverimus. Is me autem aliquid docet, qui vel oculis, vel ulli corporis sensui, vel ipsi etiam menti praebet ea quae cognoscere volo. Verbis igitur nisi verba non discimus, imo sonitum strepitumque verborum: nam si ea quae signa non sunt, verba esse non possunt, quamvis iam auditum verbum, nescio tamen verbum esse, donec quid significet sciam. Rebus ergo cognitis, verborum quoque cognitio perficitur; verbis vero auditis, nec verba discuntur. Non enim ea verba quae novimus, discimus; aut quae non novimus, didicisse nos possumus confiteri, nisi eorum significatione percepta, quae non auditione vocum emissarum, sed rerum significatarum cognitione contingit. Verissima quippe ratio est, et verissime dicitur, cum verba proferuntur, aut scire nos quid significant, aut nescire: si scimus, commemorari potius quam discere; si autem nescimus, ne commemorari quidem, sed fortasse ad quaerendum admoneri.*

...sed per se res discimus.

11. 37. *Quod si dixeris, tegmina quidem illa capitum, quorum nomen sono tantum tenemus, non nos posse nisi visa cognoscere, neque nomen ipsum plenius nisi ipsis cognitis nosse: quod tamen de ipsis pueris accepimus, ut regem ac flammam fide ac religione superaverint, quas laudes Deo cecinerint, quos honores ab ipso etiam inimico meruerint, num aliter nisi per verba didicimus? Respondebo, cuncta quae illis verbis significata sunt, in nostra notitia iam fuisse. Nam quid sint tres pueri, quid fornax, quid ignis, quid rex, quid denique illaesi ab igne, caeteraque omnia iam tenebam quae verba illa significant. Ananias vero, et Azarias et Misael tam mihi ignoti sunt quam illae sarabarae; nec ad eos cognoscendos haec me nomina quidquam adiuverunt aut adiuvere iam potuerunt. Haec autem omnia quae in illa leguntur historia, ita illo tempore facta esse, ut scripta sunt, credere me potius quam scire fateor: neque istam differentiam iidem ipsi quibus credimus nescierunt. Ait enim propheta: Nisi credideritis, non intellegetis 17; quod non dixisset profecto, si nihil distare iudicasset. Quod ergo intellego, id etiam credo: at non omne quod credo, etiam intellego. Omne autem quod intellego, scio: non omne quod credo, scio. Nec ideo nescio quam sit utile credere etiam multa quae nescio; cui utilitati hanc quoque adiungo de tribus pueris historiam: quare pleraque rerum cum scire non possim, quanta tamen utilitate credantur, scio.*

In interiore homine docet Christus.

11. 38. *De universis autem quae intellegimus non loquentem qui personat foris, sed intus ipsi menti praesidentem consulimus veritatem, verbis fortasse ut consulamus admoniti. Ille autem qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus est Christus, id est incommutabilis Dei Virtus atque sempiterna Sapientia 18: quam quidem omnis rationalis anima consulit; sed tantum cuique panditur, quantum capere propter propriam, sive malam sive bonam voluntatem potest. Et si quando fallitur, non fit vitio consultae veritatis, ut neque huius, quae foris est, lucis vitium est, quod corporei oculi saepe falluntur: quam lucem de rebus visibilibus consuli fatemur, ut eas nobis quantum cernere valemus, ostendat.*

Nec sensibilia...

12. 39. *Quod si et de coloribus lucem, et de caeteris quae per corpus sentimus, elementa huius mundi eademque corpora quae sentimus, sensusque ipsos quibus tamquam interpretibus ad talia noscenda mens utitur; de his autem quae intelleguntur, interiorem veritatem ratione consulimus: quid dici potest unde clareat, verbis nos aliquid discere praeter ipsum qui aures percutit sonum? Namque omnia quae percipimus, aut sensu corporis, aut mente percipimus. Illa sensibilia, haec intellegibilia; sive, ut more auctorum nostrorum loquar, illa carnalia, haec spiritalia nominamus. De illis dum interrogamur, respondemus, si praesto sunt ea quae sentimus; velut cum a nobis quaeritur intuentibus lunam novam, qualis aut ubi sit. Hic ille qui interrogat, si non videt, credit verbis, et saepe non credit: discit autem nullo modo, nisi et ipse quod dicitur videat; ubi iam non verbis sed rebus ipsis et sensibus discit. Nam verba eadem sonant videnti, quae non videnti etiam sonuerunt. Cum vero non de iis quae coram sentimus, sed de his quae aliquando sensimus quaeritur; non iam res ipsas, sed imagines ab iis impressas memoriaeque mandatas loquimur: quae omnino quomodo vera dicamus, cum falsa intueamur, ignoro; nisi quia non nos ea videre ac sentire, sed vidisse ac sensisse*

narramus. Ita illas imagines in memoriae penetralibus rerum ante sensarum quaedam documenta gestamus, quae animo contemplantes bona conscientia non mentimur cum loquimur: sed nobis sunt ista documenta; is enim qui audit, si ea sensit atque adfuit, non discit meis verbis, sed recognoscit ablati secum et ipse imaginibus: si autem illa non sensit, quis non eum credere potius verbis quam discere intellegat?

...nec intellegibilia verbis docemus.

12. 40. Cum vero de iis agitur quae mente conspicimus, id est intellectu atque ratione, ea quidem loquimur quae praesentia contuemur in illa interiore luce veritatis, qua ipse qui dicitur homo interior, illustratur et fruitur: sed tunc quoque noster auditor, si et ipse illa secreto ac simplici oculo videt; novit quod dico sua contemplatione, non verbis meis. Ergo ne hunc quidem doceo vera dicens, vera intuentem; docetur enim non verbis meis, sed ipsis rebus, Deo intus pandente, manifestis: itaque de his etiam interrogatus respondere posset. Quid autem absurdus quam eum putare locutione mea doceri, qui posset, antequam loquerer, ea ipsa interrogatus exponere? Nam quod saepe contingit, ut interrogatus aliquid neget, atque ad id fatendum aliis interrogationibus urgeatur, fit hoc imbecillitate cernentis, qui de re tota illam lucem consulere non potest: quod ut partibus faciat, admonetur, cum de iisdem istis partibus interrogatur, quibus illa summa constat, quam totam cernere non valebat. Quo si verbis perducitur eius qui interrogat, non tamen docentibus verbis, sed eo modo inquiringibus, quo modo est ille a quo quaeritur, intus discere idoneus; velut si abs te quaererem hoc ipsum quod agitur, utrumnam verbis doceri nihil possit, et absurdum tibi primo videretur non valenti totum conspicerem: sic ergo quaerere oportuit, ut tuae sese vires habent ad audiendum illum intus magistrum, ut dicerem: "Ea quae me loquente vera esse confiteris, et certus es, et te illa nosse confirmas, unde didicisti?" responderes fortasse quod ego docuissem. Tum ego subnecterem: "Quid si me hominem volantem vidisse dicerem, itane te certum verba mea redderent, quemadmodum si audires sapientes homines stultis esse meliores?" Negares profecto et responderes, illud te non credere, aut etiamsi crederes ignorare, hoc autem certissime scire. Ex hoc iam nimirum intellegeres, neque in illo quod me affirmante ignorares, neque in hoc quod optime scires, aliquid te didicisse verbis meis; quandoquidem etiam interrogatus de singulis, et illud ignotum, et hoc tibi notum esse iurares. Tum vero totum illud quod negaveras fatereris, cum haec ex quibus constat, clara et certa esse cognosceres; omnia scilicet quae loquimur, aut ignorare auditorem utrum vera sint, aut falsa esse non ignorare, aut scire vera esse. Horum trium in primo aut credere, aut opinari, aut dubitare; in secundo adversari atque renuere; in tertio attestari: nusquam igitur discere. Quia et ille qui post verba nostra rem nescit, et qui se falsa novit audisse, et qui posset interrogatus eadem respondere quae dicta sunt, nihil verbis meis didicisse convincitur.

Nec ex verbis discimus.

13. 41. Quamobrem in iis etiam quae mente cernuntur, frustra cernentis loquelas audit quisquis ea cernere non potest, nisi quia talia quamdiu ignorantur utile est credere: quisquis autem cernere potest, intus est discipulus veritatis, foris iudex loquentis, vel potius ipsius locutionis. Nam plerumque scit illa quae dicta sunt, eo ipso nesciente quae dixit; veluti si quisquam Epicureis credens et mortalem animam putans, eas rationes quae de immortalitate eius a prudentioribus tractatae sunt, eloquatur, illo audiente qui spiritalia contueri potest; iudicat iste eum vera dicere: at ille qui dicit, utrum vera dicat ignorat, imo etiam falsissima existimat: num igitur putandus est ea docere quae nescit? Atqui iisdem verbis utitur, quibus uti etiam sciens posset.

Loquentium mens non ostenditur.

13. 42. Quare iam ne hoc quidem relinquitur verbis, ut his saltem loquentis animus indicetur; si quidem incertum est utrum ea quae loquitur, sciat. Adde mentientes atque fallentes, per quos facile intellegas non modo non aperiri, verum etiam occultari animum verbis. Nam nullo modo ambigo id conari verba veracium, et quodammodo profiteri, ut animus loquentis appareat; quod obtinerent omnibus concedentibus, si loqui mentientibus non liceret. Quamquam saepe experti fuimus, et in nobis et in aliis, non earum rerum quae cogitantur, verba proferri: quod duobus modis posse accidere video, cum aut sermo memoriae mandatus et saepe decursus, alia cogitandis ore funditur; quod nobis cum hymnum canimus saepe contingit: aut cum alia pro aliis verba praeter voluntatem nostram linguae ipsius errore prosiliunt; nam hic quoque non earum rerum signa quas in animo habemus, audiuntur. Nam mentientes quidem cogitant etiam de iis rebus quas loquuntur, ut tametsi nesciamus an verum dicant, sciamus tamen eos in animo habere

quod dicunt, si non eis aliquid duorum quae dixi accidat: quae si quis et interdum accidere contendit, et cum accidit apparere, quamquam saepe occultum est, et saepe me fefellit audientem, non resisto.

Quandoque audientes falluntur.

13. 43. Sed his accedit aliud genus, sane late patens, et semen innumerabilium dissensionum atque certaminum: cum ille qui loquitur, eadem quidem significat quae cogitat, sed plerumque tantum sibi et aliis quibusdam; ei vero cui loquitur et item aliis nonnullis, non idem significat. Dixerit enim aliquis audientibus nobis, ab aliquibus belluis hominem virtute superari; nos illico ferre non possumus, et hanc tam falsam pestiferamque sententiam magna intentione refellimus: cum ille fortasse virtutem, vires corporis vocet, et hoc nomine id quod cogitavit enuntiet, nec mentiatur, nec erret in rebus, nec aliud aliquid volvens animo, mandata memoriae verba contextit, nec linguae lapsu aliud quamolvebat sonet; sed tantummodo rem quam cogitat, alio quam nos nomine appellat: de qua illi statim assentiremur, si eius cogitationem possemus inspicere, quam verbis iam prolatis explicataque sententia sua, nondum nobis pandere valuit. Huic errori definitiones mederi posse dicunt, ut in hac quaestione si definiret quid sit virtus; eluceret, aiunt, non de re, sed de verbo esse controversiam: quod ut concedam ita esse, quotusquisque bonus definitor inveniri potest? et tamen adversus disciplinam definiendi multa disputata sunt; quae neque hoc loco tractare opportunum est, nec usquequaque a me probantur.

Quandoque non recte audiunt.

13. 44. Omitto quod multa non bene audimus, et quasi de auditis diu multumque contendimus; velut tu nuper verbo quodam punico, cum ego misericordiam dixissem, pietatem significari te audisse dicebas ab eis quibus haec lingua magis nota esset: ego autem resistens, quid acceperis tibi omnino excidisse asserebam; visus enim mihi eras non pietatem dixisse, sed fidem, cum et coniunctissimus mihi assideres, et nullo modo haec duo nomina similitudine soni aurem decipiant. Diu te tamen arbitratus sum nescire quid tibi dictum sit, cum ego nescirem quid dixeris: nam si te bene audissem, nequaquam mihi videretur absurdum pietatem et misericordiam uno vocabulo punice vocari. Haec plerumque accidunt; sed ea, ut dixi, omittamus, ne calumniam verbis de audientis negligentia, vel etiam de surditate hominum videar commovere: illa magis angunt quae superius enumeravi, ubi verbis liquidissime aure perceptis et latinis non valemus, cum eiusdem linguae simus, loquentium cogitata cognoscere.

Discens non discit quae docens cogitat...

13. 45. Sed ecce iam remitto et concedo, cum verba eius auditu cui nota sunt, accepta fuerint, posse illi esse notum de iis rebus quas significant, loquentem cogitavisse: num ideo etiam quod nunc quaeritur, utrum vera dixerit, discit?

14. 45. Num hoc magistri profitentur, ut cogitata eorum, ac non ipsae disciplinae quas loquendo se tradere putant, percipiantur atque teneantur? Nam quis tam stulte curiosus est, qui filium suum mittat in scholam, ut quid magister cogitet discat? At istas omnes disciplinas quas se docere profitentur, ipsiusque virtutis atque sapientiae, cum verbis explicaverint; tum illi qui discipuli vocantur, utrum vera dicta sint, apud semetipsos considerant, interiorem scilicet illam veritatem pro viribus intuentes. Tunc ergo discunt: et cum vera dicta esse intus invenerint, laudant, nescientes non se doctores potius laudare quam doctos; si tamen et illi quod loquuntur sciunt. Falluntur autem homines, ut eos qui non sunt magistros vocent, quia plerumque inter tempus locutionis et tempus cognitionis, nulla mora interponitur; et quoniam post admonitionem sermocinantis cito intus discunt, foris se ab eo qui admonuit, didicisse arbitrantur.

...sed admonetur intus redire.

14. 46. Sed de tota utilitate verborum, quae si bene consideretur non parva est, alias, si Deus siverit, requiremus. Nunc enim ne plus eis quam oportet tribueremus, admonui te; ut iam non crederemus tantum, sed etiam intellegere inciperemus quam vere scriptum sit auctoritate divina, ne nobis quemquam magistrum dicamus in terris, quod unus omnium magister in coelis sit 19. Quid sit autem in coelis, docebit ipse a quo etiam per homines signis admonemur et foris, ut ad eum intro conversi erudiamur: quem diligere ac nosse beata vita est, quam se omnes clamant quaerere, pauci autem sunt qui eam vere se invenisse laetentur. Sed iam mihi dicas velim, quid de hoc toto meo sermone sentias. Si enim vera esse quae dicta sunt nosti, etiam de singulis sententiis interrogatus ea te scire dixisses: vides ergo a quo

ista didiceris; neque enim a me, cui roganti omnia responderes. Si autem vera esse non nosti, nec ego nec ille te docuit: sed ego, quia nunquam possum docere; ille, quia tu adhuc non potes discere.

Ad. - Ego vero didici admonitione verborum tuorum, nihil aliud verbis quam admoneri hominem ut discat, et perparum esse quod per locutionem aliquanta cogitatio loquentis apparet: utrum autem vera dicantur, eum docere solum, qui se intus habitare, cum foris loqueretur, admonuit; quem iam, favente ipso, tanto ardentius diligam, quanto ero in discendo provector. Verumtamen huic orationi tuae, qua perpetua usus es, ob hoc habeo maxime gratiam, quod omnia quae contradicere paratus eram, praeoccupavit atque dissolvit; nihilque omnino abs te derelictum est, quod me dubium faciebat, de quo non ita mihi responderet secretum illud oraculum, ut tuis verbis asserebatur.

Laiko ir amžinybės sampratos bei jų jungtys

Confessionum (397-401)

Quid faciebat Deus, antequam feceret caelum et terram?

XI.10.12. Nonne ecce pleni sunt vetustatis suae 65 qui nobis dicunt: "Quid faciebat Deus, antequam faceret caelum et terram 66? Si enim vacabat, inquirunt, et non operabatur aliquid, cur non sic semper et deinceps, quemadmodum retro semper cessavit ab opere 67? Si enim ullus motus in Deo novus exstitit et voluntas nova, ut creaturam conderet, quam numquam ante condiderat, quomodo iam vera aeternitas, ubi oritur voluntas, quae non erat? Neque enim voluntas Dei creatura est, sed ante creaturam, quia non crearetur aliquid nisi creatoris voluntas praecederet. Ad ipsam ergo Dei substantiam pertinet voluntas eius. Quod si exortum est aliquid in Dei substantia, quod prius non erat, non veraciter dicitur aeterna illa substantia; si autem Dei voluntas sempiterna erat, ut esset creatura, cur non sempiterna et creatura?"

Tempus transit aeternitas stat.

11. 13. Qui haec dicunt, nondum te intellegunt, o sapientia Dei 68, lux mentium, nondum intellegunt, quomodo fiant, quae per te atque in te fiunt, et conantur aeterna sapere, sed adhuc in praeteritis et futuris rerum motibus cor eorum volitat et adhuc vanum est 69. Quis tenebit illud et figet illud, ut paululum stet et paululum rapiat splendorem semper stantis aeternitatis et comparet cum temporibus numquam stantibus et videat esse incomparabilem et videat longum tempus nisi ex multis praetereuntibus motibus, quae simul extendi non possunt, longum non fieri; non autem praeterire quidquam in aeterno, sed totum esse praesens; nullum vero tempus totum esse praesens; et videat omne praeteritum propelli ex futuro et omne futurum ex praeterito consequi et omne praeteritum ac futurum ab eo, quod semper est praesens, creari et excurrere? Quis tenebit cor hominis, ut stet et videat, quomodo stans dictet futura et praeterita tempora nec futura nec praeterita aeternitas? Numquid manus mea valet 70 hoc aut manus oris mei per loquelas agit tam grandem rem?

The Confessions

“What was God doing before that?” Meaningless question

XI.10.12. People who ask us, “What was God doing before he made heaven and earth?” are obviously full of their stale old nature.†58 “If he was at leisure,” they say, “and not making anything, why did he not continue so thereafter and for ever, just as he had always done nothing prior to that? If some change took place in God, and some new volition emerged to inaugurate created being, a thing he had never done before, then an act of will was arising in him which had not previously been present, and in that case how would he truly be eternal? God's will is not a created thing; it exists prior to the act of creation, because nothing would be created unless the creator first willed it. Now, God's will belongs to the very substance of God. But if some element appears in God's substance that was previously not there, that substance cannot accurately be called eternal. On the other hand, if God's will that creation should occur is eternal, why is creation not eternal as well?”

11, 13. People who take that line do not yet understand you, O Wisdom of God and Light of our minds. They do not yet understand how things which receive their being through you and in you come into existence; they strive to be wise about eternal realities, but their heart flutters about between the changes of past and future found in created things, and an empty heart it remains.†59 Who is to take hold of it and peg it down, that it may stand still for a little while and capture, if only briefly, the splendor of that eternity which stands for ever, and compare it with the fugitive moments that never stand still, and find it incomparable, and come to see that a long time is not long except in virtue of a great number of passing moments which cannot all run their course at once? They would see that in eternity nothing passes, for the whole is present, whereas time cannot be present all at once. Can they not see that whatever is past has been pushed out of the way by what was future, and all the future follows on the heels of the past, and the whole of both past and future flows forth from him who is always present, and is by him created? Who shall take hold of the human heart, to make it stand still and see how eternity, which stands firm, has neither future nor past, but ordains future and past times? Has my hand the strength for this, or my mouth the persuasiveness to achieve such a thing?

12, 14. However, I will set about replying to the questioner who asks, “What was God doing before he made heaven and earth?” But I will not respond with that joke someone is said to have

Nihil Deus ante tempus egit.

12. 14. Ecce respondeo dicenti: "Quid faciebat Deus, antequam faceret caelum et terram 71?" Respondeo non illud, quod quidam respondisse perhibetur ioculariter eludens quaestionis violentiam: "Alta, inquit, scrutantibus gehennas parabat". Aliud est videre, aliud est ridere. Haec non respondeo. Libentius enim responderim: "Nescio, quod nescio" quam illud, unde irridetur qui alta interrogavit et laudatur qui falsa respondit. Sed dico te, Deus noster, omnis creaturae creatorem et, si caeli et terrae nomine omnis creatura intellegitur, audenter dico: "Antequam faceret Deus caelum et terram, non faciebat aliquid". Si enim faciebat, quid nisi creaturam faciebat? Et utinam sic sciam, quidquid utiliter scire cupio, quemadmodum scio, quod nulla fiebat creatura, antequam fieret ulla creatura.

Nullum tempus est, quod Deus non faciat.

13. 15. At si cuiusquam volatilis sensus vagatur per imagines retro temporum et te, Deum omnipotentem et omnireantem et omnitenentem, caeli et terrae artificem, ab opere 72 tanto, antequam id faceres, per innumerabilia saecula cessasse miratur, evigilet atque attendat, quia falsa miratur. Nam unde poterant innumerabilia saecula praeterire, quae ipse non feceras, cum sis omnium saeculorum auctor et conditor? Aut quae tempora fuissent, quae abs te condita non essent? Aut quomodo praeterirent, si numquam fuissent? Cum ergo sis operator omnium temporum, si fuit aliquod tempus, antequam faceres caelum et terram 73, cur dicitur, quod ab opere cessabas? Id ipsum enim tempus tu feceras, nec praeterire potuerunt tempora, antequam faceres tempora. Si autem ante caelum et terram nullum erat tempus, cur quaeritur, quid tunc faciebas? Non enim erat tunc, ubi non erat tempus.

Deus tempora aeternitate praecedit.

13. 16. Nec tu tempore tempora praecedis: alioquin non omnia tempora praecederes. Sed praecedis omnia praeterita celsitudine semper praesentis aeternitatis et superas omnia futura, quia illa futura sunt, et cum venerint, praeterita erunt; tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficiunt 74. Anni tui nec eunt nec veniunt: isti enim nostri eunt et veniunt, ut omnes veniant. Anni tui omnes simul stant, quoniam stant, nec euntes a venientibus excluduntur, quia non transeunt; isti autem nostri omnes erunt, cum omnes non erunt. Anni tui dies unus 75, et dies

made: "He was getting hell ready for people who inquisitively peer into deep matters"; for this is to evade the force of the question. It is one thing to see the solution, and something different to make fun of the problem. So I will not give that reply. I would rather have answered, "What I do not know, I do not know," than have cracked a joke that exposed a serious questioner to ridicule and won applause for giving an untrue answer. Instead I will state that you, our God, are the creator of every created thing; and, if we take "heaven and earth" to cover all that is created, I boldly make this assertion: Before God made heaven and earth, he was not doing anything; for if he was doing or making something, what else would he be doing but creating? And no creature was made before any creature was made. I wish I could know everything that I desire to know to my own profit with the same certainty with which I know that.

13, 15. If any giddy-minded person wanders off into fantasy about epochs of time before creation, and finds it amazing that you, God almighty, who are the creator of all things, you who are the architect of heaven and earth and hold everything in your hand, should through measureless ages have been at rest before undertaking this huge task, such a person should wake up and realize that his amazement is misplaced. How could measureless ages have passed by if you had not made them, since you are the author and creator of the ages?†60 Or what epochs of time could have existed, that had not been created by you? And how could they have passed by, if they had never existed? If there was a "time" before you made heaven and earth, how can it be said that you were not at work then, you who are the initiator of all times? For of course you would have made that time too; there could not have been any passing times before you created times. If, therefore, there was no time before heaven and earth came to be, how can anyone ask what you were doing then? There was no such thing as "then" when there was no time.

16. Nor can it be said that you are "earlier in time" than all eras of time, for that would mean that there was some kind of time already in existence before you. You have precedence over the past by the loftiness of your ever-present eternity, and you live beyond all the future, because future times are future, but as soon as they have arrived they will be past, whereas you are ever the same, and your years fail not.†61 Your years do not come and go. Our years pass and new ones arrive only so that all may come in turn, but your years stand all at once, because they are stable: there is no pushing out of vanishing years by those that are coming on, because with you none are transient. In our case, our years will be complete only when there are none left. Your years are a single day,†62 and this day of yours is not a daily recurrence, but a simple "Today," because your Today does not give way to tomorrow, nor follow yesterday. Your Today is eternity, and therefore your Son, to whom you

tuus non quotidie, sed hodie, quia hodiernus tuus non cedit crastino; neque enim succedit hesterno. Hodiernus tuus aeternitas: ideo coaeternum genuisti, cui dixisti: Ego hodie genui te 76. Omnia tempora tu fecisti et ante omnia tempora tu es, nec aliquo tempore non erat tempus.

Quid sit tempus.

14. 17. Nullo ergo tempore non feceras aliquid, quia ipsum tempus tu feceras. Et nulla tempora tibi coaeterna sunt, quia tu permanes; at illa si permanerent, non essent tempora. Quid est enim tempus? Quis hoc facile breviterque explicaverit? Quis hoc ad verbum de illo proferendum vel cogitatione comprehenderit? Quid autem familiarius et notius in loquendo commemoramus quam tempus? Et intellegimus utique, cum id loquimur, intellegimus etiam, cum alio loquente id audimus. Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio; fidenter tamen dico scire me, quod, si nihil praeteriret, non esset praeteritum tempus, et si nihil adveniret, non esset futurum tempus, et si nihil esset, non esset praesens tempus. Duo ergo illa tempora, praeteritum et futurum, quomodo sunt, quando et praeteritum iam non est et futurum nondum est? Praesens autem si semper esset praesens nec in praeteritum transiret, non iam esset tempus, sed aeternitas. Si ergo praesens, ut tempus sit, ideo fit, quia in praeteritum transit, quomodo et hoc esse dicimus, cui causa, ut sit, illa est, quia non erit, ut scilicet non vere dicamus tempus esse, nisi quia tendit non esse?

Qua ratione tempus sit longum vel breve.

15. 18. Et tamen dicimus longum tempus et breve tempus neque hoc nisi de praeterito aut futuro dicimus. Praeteritum tempus longum verbi gratia vocamus ante centum annos, futurum itidem longum post centum annos, breve autem praeteritum sic, ut puta dicamus ante decem dies, et breve futurum post decem dies. Sed quo pacto longum est aut breve, quod non est? Praeteritum enim iam non est et futurum nondum est. Non itaque dicamus: "Longum est", sed dicamus de praeterito: "Longum fuit", et de futuro: "Longum erit". Domine meus, lux mea 77, nonne et hic veritas tua deridebit hominem? Quod enim longum fuit praeteritum tempus, cum iam esset praeteritum, longum fuit, an cum adhuc praesens esset? Tunc enim poterat esse longum, quando erat, quod esset longum: praeteritum vero iam non erat; unde nec longum esse poterat, quod omnino non

said, Today have I begotten you, †63 is coeternal with you. You have made all eras of time and you are before all time, and there was never a "time" when time did not exist.

Time, a creature of God—what is it?

14, 17. There was therefore never any time when you had not made anything, because you made time itself. And no phases of time are coeternal with you, for you abide, and if they likewise were to abide, they would not be time. For what is time? Who could find any quick or easy answer to that? Who could even grasp it in his thought clearly enough to put the matter into words? Yet is there anything to which we refer in conversation with more familiarity, any matter of more common experience, than time? And we know perfectly well what we mean when we speak of it, and understand just as well when we hear someone else refer to it. What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to someone who asks me, I do not know. I can state with confidence, however, that this much I do know: if nothing passed away there would be no past time; if there was nothing still on its way there would be no future time; and if nothing existed, there would be no present time. Now, what about those two times, past and future: in what sense do they have real being, if the past no longer exists and the future does not exist yet? As for present time, if that were always present and never slipped away into the past, it would not be time at all; it would be eternity. If, therefore, the present's only claim to be called "time" is that it is slipping away into the past, how can we assert that this thing is, when its only title to being is that it will soon cease to be? In other words, we cannot really say that time exists, except because it tends to non-being. †64

15, 18. Nonetheless we speak of a long time or a short time, and we do so only of time past or time in the future. For example, we call a hundred years ago a long time in the past, and likewise a hundred years hence a long time in the future; but we call—say—ten days ago a short time past, and ten days hence a short time in the future. But on what grounds can something that does not exist be called long or short? The past no longer exists and the future does not exist yet. We ought not, therefore, to say, "That is a long time," but, when speaking of the past, we should say, "That was long," and of the future, "That will be long." O my Lord, my light, †65 will your truth not deride us humans for speaking so? This long time in the past: was it long when it was already past, or earlier than that, when it was still present? If the latter, yes, then it might have been long, because there was something to be long; but if it was already past it no longer existed, and therefore could not have been long, since it was not in existence at all. We ought not, therefore, to say, "That era in the past was a long one," for we shall not find anything that was long, for since that point at which it became past time it has no longer had any being.

erat. Non ergo dicamus: "Longum fuit praeteritum tempus" (neque enim inueniemus, quid fuerit longum, quando, ex quo praeteritum est, non est), sed dicamus: "Longum fuit illud praesens tempus", quia cum praesens esset, longum erat. Nondum enim praeterierat, ut non esset, et ideo erat, quod longum esse posset; postea vero quam praeteriit, simul et longum esse destitit, quod esse destitit.

Utrum praesens tempus possit esse longum.

15. 19. Videamus ergo, anima humana, utrum praesens tempus possit esse longum: datum enim tibi est sentire moras atque metiri. Quid respondebis mihi? An centum anni praesentes longum tempus est? Vide prius, utrum possint praesentes esse centum anni. Si enim primus eorum annus agitur, ipse praesens est, nonaginta vero et novem futuri sunt, et ideo nondum sunt: si autem secundus annus agitur, iam unus est praeteritus, alter praesens, ceteri futuri. Atque ita mediorum quemlibet centenarii huius numeri annum praesentem posuerimus; ante illum praeteriti erunt, post illum futuri. Quocirca centum anni praesentes esse non poterunt. Vide saltem, utrum qui agitur unus ipse sit praesens. Et eius enim si primus agitur mensis, futuri sunt ceteri, si secundus, iam et primus praeteriit et reliqui nondum sunt. Ergo nec annus, qui agitur, totus est praesens, et si non totus est praesens, non annus est praesens. Duodecim enim menses annus est, quorum quilibet unus mensis, qui agitur, ipse praesens est, ceteri aut praeteriti aut futuri. Quamquam neque mensis, qui agitur, praesens est, sed unus dies; si primus, futuris ceteris, si novissimus, praeteritis ceteris, si mediorum quilibet, inter praeteritos et futuros.

15. 20. Ecce praesens tempus, quod solum inueniebamus longum appellandum, vix ad unius diei spatium contractum est. Sed discutiamus etiam ipsum, quia nec unus dies totus est praesens. Nocturnis enim et diurnis horis omnibus viginti quattuor expletur, quarum prima ceteras futuras habet, novissima praeteritas, aliqua vero interiectarum ante se praeteritas, post se futuras. Et ipsa una hora fugitivis particulis agitur: quidquid eius avolavit, praeteritum est, quidquid ei restat, futurum. Si quid intellegitur temporis, quod in nullas iam vel minutissimas momentorum partes dividi possit, id solum est, quod praesens dicatur; quod tamen ita raptim a futuro in praeteritum transvolat, ut nulla morula extendatur. Nam si extenditur, dividitur in praeteritum et futurum: praesens autem

Rather, we ought to say, "That era of time was long while present," because while it was present it was long. It had not yet passed away and so passed out of existence, and so there was something there which could be long. But when it passed away it ceased to be long at that very point when it ceased to be at all.

19. Now, human mind, let us consider whether present time can be long, as you seem to think it can, since you have been granted the power to be aware of duration and to measure it. Answer my questions, then. Is the present century a long period of time? Before you say yes, reflect whether a hundred years can be present. If the first of them is running its course, that year is present, but ninety-nine others are future and therefore as yet have no being. If the second year is running its course, one year is already past, another is present, and the remainder are still to come. In the same fashion we may represent any one of the intervening years of the century as present, and always the years that preceded it will be past, and those that follow it future. Evidently, then, a hundred years cannot be present. Well then, consider whether the one current year at least can be present. If we are in the first month of it, the other months are in the future; if we are in the second, the first month is already past and the rest do not yet exist. Even the current year, then, is not present in its totality, and if it is not present in its totality, the year is not present; for a year consists of twelve months, and while any one of them is current that one is present, but the others are either past or future. But we must go further, and notice that the current month is not in fact present, because only one day of it is: if we are on the first day, the rest are future; if on the last, the others are past; if on any day in the middle, we shall be midway between past and future days.

20. Look where this leaves us. We saw earlier that present time was the only one of the three that might properly be called long, and now this present time has been pared down to the span of a bare day. But let us take the discussion further, because not even a single day is present all at once. It is made up of night hours and day hours, twenty-four in all. From the standpoint of the first hour all the rest are still future; the last hour looks to all those already past; and any one we pick in between has some before it, others to follow. Even a single hour runs its course through fleeing minutes: whatever portion of it has flown is now past, and what remains is future. If we can conceive of a moment in time which cannot be further divided into even the tiniest of minute particles, that alone can be rightly termed the present; yet even this flies by from the future into the past with such haste that it seems to last no time at all. Even if it has some duration, that too is divisible into past and future; hence the present is reduced to vanishing-point. What kind of time, then, can be referred to as "a long time"? Future time, perhaps? Then we must not say, "That is a long time," because there is as yet nothing to be long; we will have to say, "That will be long."

nullum habet spatium. Ubi est ergo tempus, quod longum dicamus? An futurum? Non quidem dicimus: "longum est", quia nondum est quod longum sit, sed dicimus: "longum erit". Quando igitur erit? Si enim et tunc adhuc futurum erit, non erit longum, quia quid sit longum nondum erit; si autem tunc erit longum, cum ex futuro quod nondum est esse iam coeperit et praesens factum erit, ut possit esse quod longum sit, iam superioribus vocibus clamat praesens tempus longum se esse non posse.

Praeteriens tempus metimur.

16. 21. Et tamen, Domine, sentimus intervalla temporum et comparamus sibimet et dicimus alia longiora et alia breviora. Metimur etiam, quanto sit longius aut brevius illud tempus quam illud et respondemus duplum esse hoc vel triplum, illud autem simplum aut tantum hoc esse quantum illud. Sed praetereuntia metimur tempora, cum sentiendo metimur; praeterita vero, quae iam non sunt, aut futura, quae nondum sunt, quis metiri potest, nisi forte audebit quis dicere metiri posse quod non est? Cum ergo praeterit tempus, sentiri et metiri potest, cum autem praeterierit, quoniam non est, non potest.

Sunt videlicet futura et praeterita.

17. 22. Quaero, pater, non affirmo: Deus meus, praeside mihi et rege me 78. Quisnam est, qui dicat mihi non esse tria tempora, sicut pueri didicimus puerosque docuimus, praeteritum, praesens et futurum, sed tantum praesens, quoniam illa duo non sunt? An et ipsa sunt, sed ex aliquo procedit occulto, cum ex futuro fit praesens, et in aliquod recedit occultum, cum ex praesenti fit praeteritum? Nam ubi ea viderunt qui futura cecinerunt, si nondum sunt? Neque enim potest videri id quod non est. Et qui narrant praeterita, non utique vera narrant, si animo illa non cernerent; quae si nulla essent, cerni omnino non possent. Sunt ergo et futura et praeterita.

Praeterita et futura, ubicumque sunt, sunt praesentia.

18. 23. Sine me, Domine, amplius quaerere, spes mea 79; non conturbetur intentio mea. Si enim sunt futura et praeterita, volo scire, ubi sint. Quod si nondum valeo, scio tamen, ubicumque sunt, non ibi ea futura esse aut praeterita, sed praesentia. Nam si et ibi futura sunt, nondum ibi sunt, si et ibi praeterita sunt, iam non ibi sunt. Ubicumque ergo sunt,

But when will it be so? If at the point of speaking that period is still in the future, it will not be long, because nothing yet exists to be long; if, however, at the moment when we speak it has begun to exist by emerging from the non-existent future, and so has become present, so that there is something in existence to be long, then this present time proclaims itself incapable of being long for the reasons already discussed.

16, 21. All the same, Lord, we are conscious of intervals of time, and we compare them with each other and pronounce some longer, others shorter. We also calculate by how much this period of time is longer or shorter than that other, and we report that the one is twice or three times as long as the other, or that it is the same length. But when we measure periods of time by our awareness of them, what we measure is passing time. Could anyone measure past periods that no longer exist, or future periods that do not yet exist? Only someone who is bold enough to claim that what has no being can be measured. So then, while time is passing it can be felt and measured, but once past it cannot, because it no longer exists.

17, 22. I am asking questions, Father, not making assertions: rule me, O my God, and shepherd me.†67 For who would make so bold as to tell me that there are not really three tenses or times—past, present and future—as we learned as children and as we in our turn have taught our children, but that there is only present, since the other two do not exist? Or is the truth perhaps that they do exist, but that when a future thing becomes present it emerges from some hiding-place, and then retreats into another hiding-place when it moves from the present into the past? Where, otherwise, did soothsayers see future events, if they do not yet exist? What has no being cannot be seen. Nor would people who tell stories about the past be telling true tales if they had no vision of those past events in their minds; and if the events in question were non-existent they could not be seen. The future and the past must exist, then?

18, 23. Allow me, Lord, to press the question further: O my hope,†68 do not let me lose the thread. If future and past things do exist, I want to know where they are. If this is not yet within my compass, I do know at any rate that, wherever they are, they are not there as future or past, but as present. For if in that place too future things are future, they are not there yet; and if there too past things are past, they are there no longer. Clearly, then, wherever they are and whatever they are, they can only be present. Nonetheless, when a true account is given of past events, what is brought forth from the memory is not the events themselves, which have passed away, but words formed from images of those events which as they happened and went on their way left some kind of traces in the mind through the medium of the senses. This is the case with my childhood, which no longer exists: it belongs to past time which exists no longer, but when I recall it and tell the story I contemplate the

quaecumque sunt, non sunt nisi praesentia. Quamquam praeterita cum vera narrantur, ex memoria proferuntur non res ipsae, quae praeterierunt, sed verba concepta ex imaginibus earum, quae in animo velut vestigia per sensus praetereundo fixerunt. Pueritia quippe mea, quae iam non est, in tempore praeterito est, quod iam non est; imaginem vero eius, cum eam recolo et narro, in praesenti tempore intueor, quia est adhuc in memoria mea. Utrum similis sit causa etiam praedicendorum futurorum, ut rerum, quae nondum sunt, iam existentes praesentiantur imagines, confiteor, Deus meus, nescio. Illud sane scio, nos plerumque praemeditari futuras actiones nostras eamque praemeditationem esse praesentem, actionem autem, quam praemeditamur, nondum esse, quia futura est; quam cum aggressi fuerimus et quod praemeditabamur agere coeperimus, tunc erit illa actio, quia tunc non futura, sed praesens erit.

De arcana praesensione futurorum.

18.24. Quoquo modo se itaque habeat arcana praesensio futurorum, videri nisi quod est non potest. Quod autem iam est, non futurum sed praesens est. Cum ergo videri dicuntur futura, non ipsa, quae nondum sunt, id est quae futura sunt, sed eorum causae vel signa forsitan videntur, quae iam sunt; ideo non futura, sed praesentia sunt iam videntibus, ex quibus futura praedicantur animo concepta. Quae rursus conceptiones iam sunt, et eas praesentes apud se intuentur qui illa praedicunt. Loquatur mihi aliquod exemplum tanta rerum numerositas. Intueor auroram: oriturum solem praenuntio. Quod intueor, praesens est, quod praenuntio, futurum; non sol futurus, qui iam est, sed ortus eius, qui nondum est; tamen etiam ortum ipsum nisi animo imaginarer, sicut modo cum id loquor, non eum possem praedicere. Sed nec illa aurora, quam in caelo video, solis ortus est, quamvis eum praecedat, nec illa imaginatio in animo meo; quae duo praesentia cernuntur, ut futurus ille ante dicatur. Futura ergo nondum sunt, et si nondum sunt, non sunt, et si non sunt, videri omnino non possunt; sed praedici possunt ex praesentibus, quae iam sunt et videntur.

Quomodo Deus futura docet?

19. 25. Tu, itaque, regnator creaturae tuae, quis est modus, quo doces animas ea quae futura sunt? Docuisti enim Prophetas tuos. Quisnam ille modus est, quo doces futura, cui futurum quidquam non est?

image of it which is still in my memory.†69 Whether something similar occurs in the prediction of future events, in that the seer has a presentiment of images which exist already, I confess, O my God, that I do not know. But this I undoubtedly do know, that we often plan our future actions beforehand, and that the plans in our mind are present to us, though the action we are planning has as yet no being, because it is future. When we set about it, and begin to do what we were planning, then the action will have real being, because then it will be not future but present.

24. However the mysterious presentiment of future events may be explained, only what exists can be seen. But what already exists is not future but present. Therefore when it is claimed that future events are seen, it is not that these things are seen in themselves, because they have as yet no existence, being still future. It may be, however, that their causes, or signs of them, are seen, because these already exist; hence they are not future but present to the people who discern them, and from them future events may take shape in the mind and can be foretold. These ideas in the mind also exist already, and can be inwardly contemplated by people who predict the future. Let me take an example from a wealth of such occurrences. I watch the dawn, and I give advance notice that the sun is about to rise. What I am looking at is present; what I foretell is future. Not that the sun is future, of course—no, that exists already, but its rising is future; it has not yet happened, yet unless I could imagine the sunrise in my mind, as I do now while I speak of it, I would be unable to forecast it. The dawn, which I am watching in the sky, is not the sunrise, but only precedes it; and similarly the picture I have in my mind is not the sunrise either. But these two realities are present and open to observation, so that the future event can be announced before its time. We must conclude, then, that future events have no being as yet, and if they have no being yet they do not exist, and if they do not exist it is absolutely impossible for anyone to see them. But they can be predicted on the basis of other things which are already present and hence can be seen.

19, 25. You are the king of your creation; tell me, then: how do you instruct people's minds about the future? You did so teach the prophets. What method can you adopt for teaching what is future, when to you nothing is future at all? Would it be better to say that you teach what is present but has a bearing on the future? Yes, because what does not exist obviously cannot be taught. This method of yours is far above the reach of my mind; it is too much for me†71 and of myself I cannot see it, but I will see it with your help, when you grant me this gift, O gracious light of my secret eyes.†72

20, 26. What is now clear and unmistakable is that neither things past nor things future have any existence, and that it is inaccurate to say, "There are three tenses or times: past, present

Vel potius de futuris doces praesentia? Nam quod non est, nec doceri utique potest. Nimis longe est modus iste ab acie mea; invaluit ex me non potero ad illum 80; potero autem ex te, cum dederis tu, dulce lumen occultorum oculorum meorum 81.

Non proprie tempora dicuntur esse tria.

20. 26. *Quod autem nunc liquet et claret, nec futura sunt nec praeterita, nec proprie dicitur: tempora sunt tria, praeteritum, praesens et futurum, sed fortasse proprie diceretur: tempora sunt tria, praesens de praeteritis, praesens de praesentibus, praesens de futuris. Sunt enim haec in anima tria quaedam et alibi ea non video, praesens de praeteritis memoria, praesens de praesentibus contuitus, praesens de futuris exspectatio. Si haec permittimur dicere, tria tempora video fateorque, tria sunt. Dicatur etiam: "Tempora sunt tria, praeteritum, praesens et futurum", sicut abutitur consuetudo; dicatur. Ecce non curo nec resisto nec reprehendo, dum tamen intellegatur quod dicitur, neque id, quod futurum est, esse iam, neque id, quod praeteritum est. Pauca sunt enim, quae proprie loquimur, plura non proprie, sed agnoscitur quid velimus.*

Tempus metimur in aliquo spatio.

21. 27. *Dixi ergo paulo ante 82, quod praetereuntia tempora metimur, ut possimus dicere duplum esse hoc temporis ad illud simplum aut tantum hoc quantum illud et si quid aliud de partibus temporum possumus renuntiare metiundo. Quocirca, ut dicebam, praetereuntia metimur tempora, et si quis mihi dicat: "Unde scis?", respondeam: "Scio, quia metimur, nec metiri quae non sunt possumus, et non sunt praeterita vel futura". Praesens vero tempus quomodo metimur, quando non habet spatium? Metimur ergo, cum praeterit, cum autem praeterierit, non metitur; quid enim metiatur, non erit. Sed unde et qua et quo praeterit, cum metitur? Unde nisi ex futuro? Qua nisi per praesens? Quo nisi in praeteritum? Ex illo ergo, quod nondum est, per illud, quod spatio caret, in illud, quod iam non est. Quid autem metimur nisi tempus in aliquo spatio? Neque enim dicimus simpla et dupla et tripla et aequalia et si quid hoc modo in tempore dicimus nisi spatia temporum. In quo ergo spatio metimur tempus praeteriens? Utrum in futuro, unde praeterit? Sed quod nondum est, non metimur. An in praesenti, qua praeterit? Sed nullum spatium non metimur. An in*

and future," though it might properly be said, "There are three tenses or times: the present of past things, the present of present things, and the present of future things." These are three realities in the mind, but nowhere else as far as I can see, for the present of past things is memory, the present of present things is attention, and the present of future things is expectation.†73 If we are allowed to put it that way, I do see three tenses or times, and admit that they are three. Very well, then, let the phrase pass: "There are three tenses or times: past, present and future," as common usage improperly has it: let people go on saying this. I do not mind, nor will I put up any opposition or offer correction, provided we understand what we are saying, and do not assert that either the future or the past exists now. There are few things, in fact, which we state accurately; far more we express loosely, but what we mean is understood.

21, 27. I said just now†74 that we measure periods of time as they pass, so as to declare this interval twice as long as that, or this equal to that, and report anything else about segments of time that our measurements have revealed. It follows, then, that we measure these intervals of time as they are passing by, as I remarked, and if anyone asks me, "How do you know that?" I must be allowed to reply, "I know it because we do in fact measure them; but what does not exist we cannot measure, and past and future do not exist." But how can we measure present time, when it has no extension?†75 We can only hope to measure it as it passes by, because once it has passed by there will be no measuring; it will not exist to be measured. But when it is measured, where does it come from, by what path does it pass, and whither go? Where from, if not from the future? By what path, if not the present? Whither, if not into the past? It comes, then, from what is not yet real, travels through what occupies no space, and is bound for what is no longer real. But what are we trying to measure, if not time that does have some extension? We speak of "half as long," "double the time," "three times as long," "equal in length," and make similar statements about time only in reference to extended time, or duration. Where then is this duration which will give us a chance to measure passing time? In the future, whence it has come to pass us by? But we do not measure what does not yet exist. In the present, perhaps, through which it passes on its way? But where there is no extension we cannot measure. In the past, then, to which it has gone? But we cannot measure what no longer exists.

22, 28. My mind is on fire to solve this most intricate enigma. O Lord, my God, my good Father, through Christ I beg you not to shut against me the door to these truths, so familiar yet so mysterious. Do not slam the door in the face of my desire, nor forbid me entrance to that place where I may watch these things grow luminous as your mercy sheds its light upon them, Lord. To whom should I put my questions about them? And to whom

praeterito, quo praeterit? Sed quod iam non est, non metimur.

Deus reseret quae Augustinus cupit cognoscere.

22. 28. *Exarsit animus meus nosse istuc implicatissimum aenigma. Noli claudere, Domine Deus meus, bone Pater, per Christum obsecro, noli claudere desiderio meo ista et usitata et abdita, quominus in ea penetret et dilucescant allucente misericordia tua, Domine. Quem percontabor de his? Et cui fructuosius confitebor imperitiam meam nisi tibi, cui non sunt molesta studia mea flammantia vehementer in Scripturas tuas? Da quod amo: amo enim, et hoc tu dedisti. Da, Pater, qui vere nosti data bona dare filiis tuis 83, da, quoniam suscepi cognoscere et labor est ante me 84, donec aperias 85. Per Christum obsecro, in nomine eius sancti sanctorum nemo mihi obstrepat. Et ego credidi, propter quod et loquor 86. Haec est spes mea; ad hanc vivo, ut contempler delectationem Domini 87. Ecce veteres posuisti dies meos 88 et transeunt, et quomodo, nescio. Et dicimus tempus et tempus, tempora et tempora: "Quandiu dixit hoc ille", "Quandiu fecit hoc ille" et: "Quam longo tempore illud non vidi", et: "Duplum temporis habet haec syllaba ad illam simplam brevem". Dicimus haec et audivimus haec et intellegimur et intellegimus. Manifestissima et usitatissima sunt, et eadem rursus nimis latent et nova est inventio eorum.*

Num motus sit tempus.

23. 29. *Audivi a quodam homine docto, quod solis et lunae ac siderum motus ipsa sint tempora, et non adnui. Cur enim non potius omnium corporum motus sint tempora? An vero, si cessarent caeli lumina et moveretur rota figuli, non esset tempus, quo metiremur eos gyros et diceremus aut aequalibus morulis agi, aut si alias tardius, alias velocius moveretur, alios magis diuturnos esse, alios minus? Aut cum haec diceremus, non et nos in tempore loqueremur aut essent in verbis nostris aliae longae syllabae, aliae breves, nisi quia illae longiore tempore sonuissent, istae breviores? Deus, dona hominibus videre in parvo communes notitias rerum parvarum atque magnarum. Sunt sidera et luminaria caeli in signis et in temporibus et in diebus et in annis 89. Sunt vero; sed nec ego dixerim circuitum illius ligneolae rotae diem esse, nec tamen ideo tempus non esse ille dixerit.*

should I confess my stupidity with greater profit than to you, who do not weary of my intense, burning interest in your scriptures? Give me what I love; for I love indeed, and this love you have given me. Give this to me, Father, for you truly know how to give good gifts to your children;†76 give me this gift, for I have only just begun to understand, and the labor is too much for me†77 until you open the door.†78 Through Christ I implore you, in the name of that holy of holies,†79 let no noisy person stand in my way. I too have believed, and so I too speak.†80 This is my hope, for this I live: to contemplate the delight of the Lord.†81 See how old you have made my days;†82 they are slipping away and I know not how. We speak of one time and another time, of this period of time or that; we ask, "How long did that man speak?" or "How long did he take to do it?" We say, "What a long time it is since I saw so-and-so," and "This syllable has twice the length of that short one." We say these things and listen to them, we are understood and we understand. They are perfectly plain and fully familiar, yet at the same time deeply mysterious, and we still need to discover their meaning.

Movements of the heavenly bodies are not time itself, but only markers of it

23, 29. I was once told by a certain learned man that the movements of the sun, moon and stars themselves constitute time. I did not agree with him. Why, in that case, should not the movements of all corporeal things constitute time? Suppose the luminaries of heaven were to halt, but a potter's wheel went on turning, would there not still be time by which we could measure those rotations, and say either that all of them took the same time, or (if the speed of the wheel varied) that some were of longer duration, others shorter? And when we said this, would we too not be speaking within time; and in the words we used, would there not be some long syllables and some short; and why could that be said of them, unless because some of them had taken a longer time to pronounce than others? Through this small thing, O God, grant our human minds insight into the principles common to small things and great. The stars and the other luminaries in the sky are there to mark our times and days and years. Yes, granted; but as I would not assert that the revolution of that little wooden wheel itself constituted a day, so my learned informant on the other hand had no business to say that its gyrations did not occupy a space of time.

30. I want to know the essence and nature of time, whereby we measure the movement of bodies and say, for instance, that one movement lasts twice as long as another. Now I have a question to ask. Taking the word "day" to apply not only to the period of sunlight on earth—day as opposed to night, that is—but to the sun's whole course from the east and back to the east again, in the sense that we say, "So many days elapsed," meaning to

23. 30. *Ego scire cupio vim naturamque temporis, quo metimur corporum motus et dicimus illum motum verbi gratia tempore duplo esse diuturniorem quam istum. Nam quaero, quoniam dies dicitur non tantum mora solis super terram, secundum quod aliud est dies, aliud nox, sed etiam totius eius circuitus ab Oriente usque Orientem, secundum quod dicimus: "Tot dies transierunt" (cum suis enim noctibus dicuntur tot dies, nec extra reputantur spatia noctium) quoniam ergo dies expletur motu solis atque circuitu ab Oriente usque Orientem, quaero, utrum motus ipse sit dies an mora ipsa, quanta peragitur, an utrumque. Si enim primum dies esset, dies ergo esset, etiamsi tanto spatio temporis sol cursum illum peregisset, quantum est horae unius. Si secundum, non ergo esset dies, si ab ortu solis usque in ortum alterum tam brevis mora esset, quam est horae unius, sed vicies et quater circuiret sol, ut expleret diem. Si utrumque, nec ille appellaretur dies, si horae spatio sol totum suum gyrum circuiret, nec ille, si sole cessante tantum temporis praeteriret, quanto peragere sol totum ambitum de mane in mane assolet. Non itaque nunc quaeram, quid sit illud, quod vocatur dies, sed quid sit tempus, quo metientes solis circuitum diceremus eum dimidio spatio temporis peractum minus quam solet, si tanto spatio temporis peractus esset, quanto peraguntur horae duodecim, et utrumque tempus comparantes diceremus illud simplum, hoc duplum, etiamsi aliquando illo simplo, aliquando isto duplo sol ab Oriente usque Orientem circuiret. Nemo ergo mihi dicat caelestium corporum motus esse tempora, quia et cuiusdam voto cum sol stetisset, ut victoriosum proelium perageret, sol stabat 90, sed tempus ibat. Per suum quippe spatium temporis, quod ei sufficeret, illa pugna gesta atque finita est. Video igitur tempus quamdam esse distentionem. Sed video? An videre mihi videor? Tu demonstrabis, Lux, Veritas 91.*

Tempore metimur quamdiu corpora moventur.

24. 31. *Iubes ut approbem, si quis dicat tempus esse motum corporis? Non iubes. Nam corpus nullum nisi in tempore moveri audio: tu dicis. Ipsum autem corporis motum tempus esse non audio: non tu dicis. Cum enim movetur corpus, tempore metior, quamdiu moveatur, ex quo moveri incipit, donec desinat. Et si non vidi, ex quo coepit, et perseverat moveri, ut non videam, cum desinit, non valeo metiri, nisi forte ex quo videre incipio, donec desinam. Quod si diu video, tantummodo longum tempus esse renuntio, non autem, quantum sit, quia et quantum cum*

include the nights, and not reckoning the nights as extra time over and above the days; taking it, then, that the movement of the sun in its circular course from the east back to the east completes a day, this is my question: is it the movement itself that constitutes a day? Or the time it takes? Or both? If the movement constitutes a day, then it would still be one day if the sun were to achieve its circuit in an interval of time equivalent to a single hour. If it is the time it takes, there would not be a day if the space between one sunrise and the next were as short as an hour; the sun would have to go round twenty-four times to make up a day. If both were required—a complete circuit of the sun and the customary duration of this—we could not call it a day if the sun traveled through its whole circuit in the space of an hour, nor could we if the sun stopped and as much time elapsed as it usually takes to run its whole course from morning to morning. My question now is not, therefore, what is it that we call a day, but what is time itself, the time whereby we would be able to measure the sun's revolution and say that it had been completed in only half the usual time, if the circuit had occupied only that space of time represented by twelve hours? We could compare the two periods in terms of time and say that one was twice the length of the other, and this would still be possible even if the sun sometimes took the single period, and sometimes the double, to circle from the east and back to the east again. Let no one tell me, then, that time is simply the motion of the heavenly bodies. After all, at the prayer of a certain man the sun halted so that he could press home the battle to victory.†83 The sun stood still, but time flowed on its way, and that fight had all the time it needed to be carried through to the finish. I see, therefore, that time is a kind of strain or tension.†84 But do I really see it? Or only seem to see? You will show me, O Light, O Truth.

24. 31. Are you commanding me to agree with someone who says that time is the motion of a body? You do not so command me. No corporeal object moves except within time: this is what I hear; this is what you tell me. But that a corporeal object's movement is itself time I do not hear; this you do not say. When a body moves, I measure in terms of time how long it is in motion, from the moment when it begins until its motion ceases. If I did not notice when it began, and it continues to move without my seeing when it stops, I cannot measure the time, except perhaps the interval between the moment when I began to watch and that when I ceased to observe it. If my observation is prolonged, I can only say that the process went on for a long time; I cannot say exactly how long, because when we add a definite indication of a length of time we do so by reference to some agreed standard. "This is as long as that," we say; or "This is twice as long as that other," or something similar. If, on the other hand, we have been able to note the position of some corporeal object when it moves (or when parts of it move, if, for example, it is being turned on a lathe), and we have observed its starting-point and its point of arrival, then

dicimus, collatione dicimus, velut: "Tantum hoc, quantum illud", aut: "Duplum hoc ad illud", et si quid aliud isto modo. Si autem notare potuerimus locorum spatia, unde et quo veniat corpus, quod movetur, vel partes eius, si tamquam in torno movetur, possumus dicere, quantum sit temporis, ex quo ab illo loco usque ad illum locum motus corporis vel partis eius effectus est. Cum itaque aliud sit motus corporis, aliud, quo metimur quandiu sit, quis non sentiat, quid horum potius tempus dicendum sit? Nam si et varie corpus aliquando movetur, aliquando stat, non solum motum eius, sed etiam statum tempore metimur et dicimus: "Tantum stetit, quantum motum est", aut: "Duplo vel triplo stetit ad id quod motum est" et si quid aliud nostra dimensio sive comprehenderit sive existimaverit, ut dici solet plus minus. Non est ergo tempus corporis motus.

Lux mentis Dominus.

25. 32. *Et confiteor tibi, Domine 92, ignorare me adhuc, quid sit tempus, et rursus confiteor tibi, Domine, scire me in tempore ista dicere et diu me iam loqui de tempore atque ipsum diu non esse diu nisi mora temporis. Quomodo igitur hoc scio, quando quid sit tempus nescio? An forte nescio, quemadmodum dicam quod scio? Ei mihi, qui nescio saltem quid nesciam! Ecce, Deus meus, coram te, quia non mentior 93; sicut loquor, ita est cor meum. Tu illuminabis lucernam meam, Domine, Deus meus, illuminabis tenebras meas 94.*

Tempus tempore metimur.

26. 33. *Nonne tibi confitetur anima mea confessione veridica metiri me tempora? Itane, Deus meus, metior et quid metiar nescio. Metior motum corporis tempore. Item ipsum tempus nonne metior? An vero corporis motum metirer, quandiu sit et quandiu hinc illuc perveniat, nisi tempus, in quo movetur, metirer? Ipsum ergo tempus unde metior? An tempore brevior metimur longius sicut spatium cubiti spatium transtri? Sic enim videmur spatium brevis syllabae metiri spatium longae syllabae atque id duplum dicere. Ita metimur spatia carminum spatiis versuum, et spatia versuum spatiis pedum, et spatia pedum spatiis syllabarum, et spatia longarum spatiis brevium, non in paginis (nam eo modo loca metimur, non tempora) sed cum voces pronuntiando transeunt et dicimus: "Longum carmen est, nam tot versibus contextitur; longi versus, nam tot pedibus constant; longi pedes, nam tot syllabis tenduntur; longa syllaba est, nam dupla est ad brevem." Sed neque ita*

we are able to state how much time has elapsed while the movement of the object was effected from the one place to the other, or how long it has taken to revolve on its axis. Therefore if the motion of an object is one thing, and the standard by which we measure its duration another, is it not obvious which of the two has the stronger claim to be called time? Moreover, if the motion is irregular, so that the object is sometimes moving and sometimes stationary, we measure not only its motion but also its static periods in terms of time, and say, "Its stationary periods were equivalent in length to its phases of motion," or "It was stationary for two or three times as long as it was in motion," or whatever else our calculation has ascertained or estimated roughly—more or less, as we customarily say. Clearly, then, time is not the movement of any corporeal object.

25, 32. I confess to you, Lord,^{†85} that even today I am still ignorant of what time is; but I praise you, Lord, for the fact that I know I am making this avowal within time, and for my realization that within time I am talking about time at such length, and that I know this "length" itself is long only because time has been passing all the while. But how can I know that, when I do not know what time is? Or perhaps I simply do not know how to articulate what I know? Woe is me, for I do not even know what I do not know! Behold me here before you, O my God; see that I do not lie.^{†86} As I speak, this is the true state of my heart. You, you alone, will light my lamp, O Lord; O my God, you will illumine my darkness.^{†87}

Perhaps time is tension of our consciousness

26, 33. Am I not making a truthful confession to you when I praise you for my ability to measure time? But this must mean, O my God, that though I can measure it, I do not know what I am measuring! I measure the movement of a body in terms of time, but surely I am by that same calculation measuring time itself? Would it be possible for me to measure a body's motion, to calculate how long it lasts and how long the object takes to travel from here to there, without also measuring the time within which the motion occurs? With what, then, do I measure time itself? Do we measure a longer time by the standard of a shorter, as we use the cubit to measure the span of a cross-beam? That indeed seems to be how we measure the quantity of a long syllable by that of a short syllable, and decide that the former is twice as long. Similarly we measure the length of poems by the length of their lines, and the length of the lines by the length of the feet, and the length of each foot by the length of its syllables, and the length of a long syllable by that of a short syllable. We do not reckon by the number of pages—that would be to impose a spatial, not a temporal standard—but by the pronunciation as voices recite them and die away. We declare, "That is a lengthy poem, for it consists of so many lines; the lines are long, since each is composed of so many

comprehenditur certa mensura temporis, quandoquidem fieri potest, ut ampliore spatio temporis personet versus brevior, si productius pronuntietur, quam longior, si correptius. Ita carmen, ita pes, ita syllaba. Inde mihi visum est nihil esse aliud tempus quam distentionem: sed cuius rei, nescio, et mirum, si non ipsius animi. Quid enim metior, obsecro, Deus meus, et dico aut indefinite: "Longius est hoc tempus quam illud", aut etiam definite: "Duplum est hoc ad illud?". Tempus metior, scio; sed non metior futurum, quia nondum est, non metior praesens, quia nullo spatio tenditur, non metior praeteritum, quia iam non est. Quid ergo metior? An praetereuntia tempora, non praeterita? Sic enim dixeram 95.

Quid metimur cum tempora metimur?

27. 34. Insiste, anime meus, et attende fortiter: Deus adiutor noster 96; ipse fecit nos, et non nos 97. Attende, ubi albescit veritas. Ecce puta vox corporis incipit sonare et sonat et adhuc sonat et ecce desinit, iamque silentium est, et vox illa praeterita est et non est iam vox. Futura erat, antequam sonaret, et non poterat metiri, quia nondum erat, et nunc non potest, quia iam non est. Tunc ergo poterat, cum sonabat, quia tunc erat, quae metiri posset. Sed et tunc non stabat; ibat enim et praeteribat. An ideo magis poterat? Praeteriens enim tendebatur in aliquod spatium temporis, quo metiri posset, quoniam praesens nullum habet spatium. Si ergo tunc poterat, ecce puta altera coepit sonare et adhuc sonat continuato tenore sine ulla distinctione: metiamur eam, dum sonat; cum enim sonare cessaverit, iam praeterita erit et non erit, quae possit metiri. Metiamur plane et dicamus quanta sit. Sed adhuc sonat nec metiri potest nisi ab initio sui, quo sonare coepit, usque ad finem, quo desinit. Ipsum quippe intervallum metimur ab aliquo initio usque ad aliquem finem. Quapropter vox, quae nondum finita est, metiri non potest, ut dicatur, quam longa vel brevis sit, nec dici aut aequalis alicui aut ad aliquam simpla vel dupla vel quid aliud. Cum autem finita fuerit, iam non erit. Quo pacto igitur metiri poterit? Et metimur tamen tempora, nec ea, quae nondum sunt, nec ea, quae iam non sunt, nec ea, quae nulla mora extenduntur, nec ea, quae terminos non habent. Nec futura ergo nec praeterita nec praesentia nec praetereuntia tempora metimur et metimur tamen tempora.

27. 35. Deus creator omnium 98: versus iste octo syllabarum brevibus et longis alternat syllabis;

feet; the feet are long, since each extends over so many syllables; and a syllable is long, when it is twice the quantity of a short one.” But the mensuration of time by these methods yields no result that is absolute, since it may happen that the sound of a shorter line, spoken with a drawl, actually lasts longer than that of a longer one hurried over. The same holds for the whole poem, a foot, and a syllable. I have therefore come to the conclusion that time is nothing other than tension: but tension of what, I do not know, and I would be very surprised if it is not tension of consciousness itself.†88 What am I measuring, I beg you to tell me, my God, when I say in imprecise terms, “This is longer than that,” or even, precisely, “This is twice that”? That I am measuring time, I know; but I am not measuring future time, because it does not yet exist, nor present time, which is a point without extension, nor past time, which exists no more. What, then, am I measuring? Time as it passes by, but not once it has passed? That was what I said earlier.†89

27, 34. Stick to it, now, my mind, and pay close attention. God is our ally;†90 and he made us, not we ourselves.†91 Mark where truth brightens to the dawn! Suppose now that a physical voice begins to sound... and goes on sounding... and is still sounding... and now stops. Now there is silence, and that voice is past and is a voice no longer. Before it sounded forth it was a future thing, so it could not be measured because it did not yet exist; neither can it be now, because it exists no more. Perhaps, then, it could be measured while it was sounding forth, because something did then exist that could be measured? But at that time it was not standing still; it was but a fleeting thing that was speeding on its way. Was it therefore any more measurable while sounding than before or after? Only as something transient was it extended over a period of time whereby it might be measured—only as transient, because the present moment has no duration. If it is argued that the sound could, nevertheless, be measured while it lasted, consider this: another voice begins to sound and is still sounding in a continuous, steady tone. Let us measure it, then, while it is sounding, for once it has fallen silent it will be a thing of the past, and nothing measurable will then exist. By all means let us measure it now, and state how long it lasts. Ah, but it is still sounding, and there is no way of timing it except from its beginning, when the sound originated, to its end, when it ceases. Obviously we measure any interval of time from some inception to some ending. Hence the sound of a voice which has not yet finished cannot be measured in such a way that anyone can say how long or how short it is, nor can it be declared to be of the same length as something else, or half the length, or twice the length, or anything of the kind. But once finished, it will not exist. So by what criteria will it then be subject to measurement? All the same we do measure periods of time, not periods which as yet have no being, nor those which have ceased to be, nor those which have no duration, nor

quattuor itaque breves, prima, tertia, quinta, septima, simplae sunt ad quattuor longas, secundam, quartam, sextam, octavam. Hae singulae ad illas singulas duplum habent temporis; pronuntio et renuntio, et ita est, quantum sentitur sensu manifesto. Quantum sensus manifestus est, brevi syllaba longam metior eamque sentio habere bis tantum. Sed cum altera post alteram sonat, si prior brevis, longa posterior, quomodo tenebo brevem et quomodo eam longae metiens applicabo, ut inveniam, quod bis tantum habeat, quandoquidem longa sonare non incipit, nisi brevis sonare destiterit? Ipsamque longam num praesentem metior, quando nisi finitam non metior? Eius autem finitio praeteritio est. Quid ergo est, quod metior? Ubi est qua metior brevis? Ubi est longa, quam metior? Ambae sonuerunt, avolaverunt, praeterierunt, iam non sunt; et ego metior fidenterque respondeo, quantum exercitato sensu fiditur, illam simplam esse, illam duplam, in spatio scilicet temporis. Neque hoc possum, nisi quia praeterierunt et finitae sunt. Non ergo ipsas, quae iam non sunt, sed aliquid in memoria mea metior, quod infixum manet.

In animo nostro tempora metimur.

27. 36. *In te, anime meus, tempora metior. Noli mihi obstrepere, quod est: noli tibi obstrepere turbis affectionum tuarum. In te, inquam, tempora metior. Affectionem, quam res praetereuntes in te faciunt et, cum illae praeterierint, manet, ipsam metior praesentem, non ea quae praeterierunt, ut fieret; ipsam metior, cum tempora metior. Ergo aut ipsa sunt tempora, aut non tempora metior. Quid cum metimur silentia et dicimus illud silentium tantum tenuisse temporis, quantum illa vox tenuit, nonne cogitationem tendimus ad mensuram vocis, quasi sonaret, ut aliquid de intervallis silentiorum in spatio temporis renuntiare possimus? Nam et voce atque ore cessante peragimus cogitando carmina et versus et quemque sermonem motionumque dimensiones quaslibet et de spatiis temporum, quantum illud ad illud sit, renuntiamus non aliter, ac si ea sonando diceremus. Voluerit aliquis edere longiusculam vocem et constituerit praemeditando, quam longa futura sit, egit utique iste spatium temporis in silentio memoriaeque commendans coepit edere illam vocem, quae sonat, donec ad propositum terminum perducatur: immo sonuit et sonabit; nam quod eius iam peractum est, utique sonuit, quod autem restat, sonabit atque ita peragitur, dum praesens intentio futurum in*

those which have no terminus. We measure neither future nor past nor present nor passing time. Yet time we do measure.

35. Take the line, Deus, creator omnium.†92 This line consists of eight syllables, short and long alternating. The four short ones—the first, third, fifth and seventh—are thus half the length of the four long ones—the second, fourth, sixth and eighth. Each of these latter lasts twice as long as each of the former; I have only to pronounce the line to report that this is the case, insofar as clear sense-perception can verify it. Relying on this unmistakable evidence of my ear I measure each long syllable by the criterion of a short one, and perceive that it is twice the quantity. But the syllables make themselves heard in succession; and if the first is short and the second long, how am I to hold on to the short one, how am I to apply it to the long one as a measuring-rod in order to discover that the long one has twice the quantity, when the long one does not begin to sound until the short one has ceased? Am I to measure the long one while it is present? Impossible, because I cannot measure something unfinished. But its completion is its passing away, so what now exists for me to measure? Where is the short syllable I was going to use as a standard? What has become of the long one I want to measure? Both have made their sound, and flown away, and passed by, and exist no more; yet I do my calculation and confidently assert that insofar as the testimony of my trained ear can be trusted, the short is half the long, the long twice the short; and obviously I am speaking about a space of time. I can only do this because the syllables have passed away and are completed. Evidently, then, what I am measuring is not the syllables themselves, which no longer exist, but something in my memory, something fixed and permanent there.

36. In you, my mind, I measure time. Do not interrupt me by clamoring that time has objective existence, nor hinder yourself with the hurly-burly of your impressions. In you, I say, do I measure time. What I measure is the impression which passing phenomena leave in you, which abides after they have passed by: that is what I measure as a present reality, not the things that passed by so that the impression could be formed. The impression itself is what I measure when I measure intervals of time. Hence either time is this impression, or what I measure is not time. What about when we measure silences, and say that this silent pause lasted as long as that sound? Do we not strain our thought to retain the feeling of a sound's duration, as though it were still audible, so as to be able to estimate the intervals of silence in relation to the whole space of time in question? Without any articulate word or even opening our mouths we go over in our minds poems, their lines, a speech, and we assess their developmental patterns and the time they occupied in relation to one another; and our estimate is no different from what it would have been if we had been reciting them aloud. Suppose a person wishes to utter a fairly long sound, and has

praeteritum traicit deminutione futuri crescente praeterito, donec consumptione futuri sit totum praeteritum.

Expectatio, adtentio, memoria.

28. 37. *Sed quomodo minuitur aut consumitur futurum, quod nondum est, aut quomodo crescit praeteritum, quod iam non est, nisi quia in animo, qui illud agit, tria sunt? Nam et exspectat et attendit et meminit, ut id quod exspectat per id quod attendit transeat in id quod meminerit. Quis igitur negat futura nondum esse? Sed tamen iam est in animo exspectatio futurorum. Et quis negat praeterita iam non esse? Sed tamen adhuc est in animo memoria praeteritorum. Et quis negat praesens tempus carere spatio, quia in puncto praeterit? Sed tamen perdurat attentio, per quam pergat abesse quod aderit. Non igitur longum tempus futurum, quod non est, sed longum futurum longa exspectatio futuri est, neque longum praeteritum tempus, quod non est, sed longum praeteritum longa memoria praeteriti est.*

Post distentionem vitae, o si in Deum confluamus!

28. 38. *Dicturus sum canticum, quod novi: antequam incipiam, in totum exspectatio mea tenditur, cum autem coepero, quantum ex illa in praeteritum decerpsero, tenditur et memoria mea, atque distenditur vita huius actionis meae in memoriam propter quod dixi et in exspectationem propter quod dicturus sum; praesens tamen adest attentio mea, per quam traicitur quod erat futurum, ut fiat praeteritum. Quod quanto magis agitur et agitur, tanto breviata exspectatione prolongatur memoria, donec tota exspectatio consumatur, cum tota illa actio finita transierit in memoriam. Et quod in toto cantico, hoc in singulis particulis eius fit atque in singulis syllabis eius, hoc in actione longiore, cuius forte particula est illud canticum, hoc in tota vita hominis, cuius partes sunt omnes actiones hominis, hoc in toto saeculo filiorum hominum 99, cuius partes sunt omnes vitae hominum.*

determined beforehand in his own mind how long it is to be. He must have first thought through that period of time in silence and committed the impression of it to memory; then he begins to utter the sound, which continues until it reaches the predetermined end. Or rather, it does not “continue,” because the sound is evidently both something already heard and something still to be heard, for the part of it already completed is sound that has been, but the part that remains is sound still to be. Thus it is carried through as our present awareness drags what is future into the past. As the future dwindles the past grows, until the future is used up altogether and the whole thing is past.

28, 37. But how can a future which does not yet exist dwindle or be used up, and how can a past which no longer exists grow? Only because there are three realities in the mind which conducts this operation. The mind expects, and attends, and remembers, so that what it expects passes by way of what it attends to into what it remembers. No one, surely, would deny that the future is as yet non-existent? Yet an expectation of future events does exist in the mind. And would anyone deny that the past has ceased to be? Yet the memory of past events still lives on in the mind. And who would deny that the present has no duration, since it passes in an instant? Yet our attention does endure, and through our attention what is still to be makes its way into the state where it is no more. It is not, therefore, future time which is long, for it does not exist; a long future is simply an expectation of the future which represents it as long. Nor is the past a long period of time, because it does not exist at all; a long past is simply a memory of the past which represents it as long.

38. Suppose I have to recite a poem I know by heart. Before I begin, my expectation is directed to the whole poem, but once I have begun, whatever I have plucked away from the domain of expectation and tossed behind me to the past becomes the business of my memory, and the vital energy of what I am doing is in tension between the two of them: it strains toward my memory because of the part I have already recited, and to my expectation on account of the part I still have to speak. But my attention is present all the while, for the future is being channeled through it to become the past. As the poem goes on and on, expectation is curtailed and memory prolonged, until expectation is entirely used up, when the whole completed action has passed into memory. What is true of the poem as a whole is true equally of its individual stanzas and syllables. The same is true of the whole long performance, in which this poem may be a single item. The same thing happens in the entirety of a person's life, of which all his actions are parts; and the same in the entire sweep of human history, the parts of which are individual human lives.

De Civitate Dei contra Paganos (413-427)

Dei opus aliud non est ab eius arte.

XI. 21. Quid est enim aliud intellegendum in eo, quod per omnia dicitur: Vidit Deus quia bonum est, nisi operis approbatio secundum artem facti, quae Sapientia Dei est? Deus autem usque adeo non cum factum est, tunc didicit bonum, ut nihil eorum fieret, si ei fuisset incognitum. Dum ergo videt quia bonum est, quod, nisi vidisset antequam fieret, non utique fieret: docet bonum esse, non discit. Et Plato quidem plus ausus est dicere, elatum esse scilicet Deum gaudio mundi universitate perfecta. Ubi et ipse non usque adeo desipiebat, ut putaret Deum sui operis novitate factum beatiorem; sed sic ostendere voluit artifici suo placuisse iam factum, quod placuerat in arte faciendum; non quod ullo modo Dei scientia varietur, ut aliud in ea faciant quae nondum sunt, aliud quae iam sunt, aliud quae fuerunt; non enim more nostro ille vel quod futurum est prospicit, vel quod praesens est aspicit, vel quod praeteritum est respicit; sed alio modo quodam a nostrarum cogitationum consuetudine longe alteque diverso. Ille quippe non ex hoc in illud cogitatione mutata, sed omnino incommutabiliter videt; ita ut illa quidem, quae temporaliter fiunt, et futura nondum sint et praesentia iam sint et praeterita iam non sint, ipse vero haec omnia stabili ac sempiterna praesentia comprehendat; nec aliter oculis, aliter mente; non enim ex animo constat et corpore; nec aliter nunc et aliter antea et aliter postea; quoniam non sicut nostra, ita eius quoque scientia trium temporum, praesentis videlicet et praeteriti vel futuri, varietate mutatur, apud quem non est immutatio nec momenti obumbratio. Neque enim eius intentio de cogitatione in cogitationem transit, in cuius incorporeo contuitu simul adsunt cuncta quae novit; quoniam tempora ita novit nullis suis temporalibus notionibus, quem ad modum temporalia movet nullis suis temporalibus motibus. Ibi ergo vidit bonum esse quod fecit, ubi bonum esse vidit ut faceret; nec quia factum vidit scientiam duplicavit vel ex aliqua parte auxit, tamquam minoris scientiae fuerit priusquam faceret quod videret, qui tam perfecte non operaretur, nisi tam perfecta scientia, cui nihil ex eius operibus adderetur. Quapropter, si tantummodo nobis insinuandum esset quis fecerit lucem, sufficeret dicere, fecit Deus lucem; si autem non solum quis fecerit, verum etiam per quid fecerit, satis esset ita enuntiari: Et dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux; ut non tantum Deum, sed etiam per Verbum lucem

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XI.21. The only meaning we can give to the constant refrain, 'God saw that it was good,' is God's approval of a work as having been fashioned in accordance with that art which is His own wisdom. So far is it from being true that God first learned that His work was good after it was made that, had He not known this already, not one of the things He made would have been created. Since, therefore, what He sees is good would not have made unless He had seen that it was good before He made it, we must say: He teaches, He does not learn, that it is good. Plato dared to use an even stronger expression, namely, that, at the completion of creation, God was elated with delight. Obviously, he was not foolish enough to think that God's beatitude was increased by the novelty of His work; he merely wished to indicate that God rejoiced in His finished product, just as, like an artist, He had been pleased in designing it. Plato does not imply in any way that the knowledge of God is subject to change, as though non-existing, existing, and no-longer-existing things were known with different kinds of cognition. For, not in our way does God look forward to the future; see the present, and look back upon the past, but in a manner remotely and profoundly unlike our way of thinking. God's mind does not pass from one thought to another. His vision is utterly unchangeable. Thus, He comprehends all that takes place in time—the not-yet-existing future, the existing present, and the no-longer-existing past—in an immutable and eternal present. He does not see differently with the eyes and the mind, for He is not composed of soul and body. Nor is there any then, now, and afterwards in His knowledge, for, unlike ours, it suffers no change with triple time—present, past, and future. With Him, 'there is no change, nor shadow of alteration.' Neither does His attention pass from thought to thought, for His knowledge embraces everything in a single spiritual intuition. His knowledge of what happens in time, like His movement of what changes in time, is completely independent of time. That is why it was one and the same to God to see that what He had made was good and to see that it was good to make it. When He saw what He had made, His knowledge was neither doubled nor in any way increased—in the sense that it could have been less before He made what He saw. For He could not have been so perfect a Creator without so perfect a knowledge that nothing could be added to it by seeing what He created. Hence, we can see that, if the only truth Scripture needed to tell us was who created the light, it would have sufficed to say: God made the light. And if there was also a reason for telling us how God made it, it was enough to report: 'God said, "Let there be light," and there was light.' Thus, we would know not only that God created the light but that He did so by means of the Word. But, since there are three truths concerning every creature which we needed to know — namely: Who made it? How did he make it? and Why? — Scripture relates: 'God said, "Let there be light," and there was light. God

fecisse nossemus. Quia vero tria quaedam maxime scienda de creatura nobis oportuit intimari, quis eam fecerit, per quid fecerit, quare fecerit: Dixit Deus, inquit: Fiat lux, et facta est lux. Et vidit Deus lucem quia bona est. Si ergo quaerimus, quis fecerit: Deus est; si per quid fecerit: Dixit: Fiat, et facta est; si quare fecerit: Quia bona est. Nec auctor est excellentior Deo, nec ars efficacior Dei Verbo, nec causa melior quam ut bonum crearetur a Deo bono. Hanc etiam Plato causam condendi mundi iustissimam dicit, ut a bono Deo bona opera fierent; sive ista legerit, sive ab his qui legerant forte cognoverit; sive acerrimo ingenio invisibilia Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspexerit, sive ab his qui ista conspexerant et ipse didicerit.

saw that the light was good.' So, if we ask, 'who made it?' the answer is 'God'; if we ask, 'how?' the answer is that God said: 'Let it be. And it was done'; if we ask, 'why?' the answer is 'Because it is good.' There is no Creator higher than God, no art more efficacious than the Word of God, no better reason why something good should be created than that the God who creates is good. Even Plato says that the best reason for creating the world is that good things should be made by a good God. It may be that he read this Scriptural passage or learned it from those who had, or, by his own keen insight, he clearly saw that 'the invisible things' of God are 'understood by the things that are made,' or, perhaps, he learned from others who had clearly seen this.

De Civitate Dei contra Paganos (413-427)

Altitudinem Dei investigare non possumus.

XII.14. Quid autem mirum est, si in his circuitibus errantes nec aditum nec exitum inveniunt? quia genus humanum atque ista nostra mortalitas nec quo initio coepta sit sciunt, nec quo fine claudatur; quando quidem altitudinem Dei penetrare non possunt, qua, cum ipse sit aeternus et sine initio, ab aliquo tamen initio exorsus est tempora et hominem, quem numquam antea fecerat, fecit in tempore, non tamen novo et repentino, sed immutabili aeternoque consilio. Quis hanc valeat altitudinem investigabilem vestigare et inscrutabilem perscrutari, secundum quam Deus hominem temporalem, ante quem nemo umquam hominum fuit, non mutabili voluntate in tempore condidit et genus humanum ex uno multiplicavit? Quando quidem Psalmus ipse cum praemisisset atque dixisset: Tu, Domine, servabis nos et custodies nos a generatione hac et in aeternum, ac deinde repercussisset eos, in quorum stulta impiaque doctrina nulla liberationis et beatitudinis animae servatur aeternitas, continuo subiciens: In circuitu impii ambulat: tamquam ei diceretur: Quid ergo tu credis, sentis, intellegis? numquidnam existimandum est subito Deo placuisse hominem facere, quem numquam antea infinita retro aeternitate fecisset, cui nihil novi accidere potest, in quo mutabile aliquid non est? continuo respondit ad ipsum Deum loquens: Secundum altitudinem tuam multiplicasti filios hominum 23. Sentiant, inquit, homines quod putant, et quod eis placet opinentur et disputent: Secundum altitudinem tuam, quam nullus potest nosse hominum, multiplicasti filios hominum. Valde quippe altum est et semper fuisse, et hominem, quem

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Chapter 14.— Of the Creation of the Human Race in Time, and How This Was Effected Without Any New Design or Change of Purpose on God's Part.

XII.14. What wonder is it if, entangled in these circles, they find neither entrance nor egress? For they know not how the human race, and this mortal condition of ours, took its origin, nor how it will be brought to an end, since they cannot penetrate the inscrutable wisdom of God. For, though Himself eternal, and without beginning, yet He caused time to have a beginning; and man, whom He had not previously made He made in time, not from a new and sudden resolution, but by His unchangeable and eternal design. Who can search out the unsearchable depth of this purpose, who can scrutinize the inscrutable wisdom, wherewith God, without change of will, created man, who had never before been, and gave him an existence in time, and increased the human race from one individual? For the Psalmist himself, when he had first said, "You shall keep us, O Lord, You shall preserve us from this generation for ever," and had then rebuked those whose foolish and impious doctrine preserves for the soul no eternal deliverance and blessedness adds immediately, "The wicked walk in a circle." Then, as if it were said to him, "What then do you believe, feel, know? Are we to believe that it suddenly occurred to God to create man, whom He had never before made in a past eternity—God, to whom nothing new can occur, and in whom is no changeableness?" the Psalmist goes on to reply, as if addressing God Himself, "According to the depth of Your wisdom You have multiplied the children of men." Let men, he seems to say, fancy what they please, let them conjecture and dispute as seems good to them, but You have multiplied the children of men according to the depth of your wisdom, which no man can comprehend. For this is a depth indeed, that God always has been, and that man, whom He had

numquam fecerat, ex aliquo tempore primum facere voluisse, nec consilium voluntatemque mutasse.

Deus semper est Dominus.

15. 1. Ego quidem sicut Dominum Deum aliquando dominum non fuisse dicere non audeo, ita hominem numquam antea fuisse et ex quodam tempore primum hominem creatum esse dubitare non debeo. Sed cum cogito cuius rei dominus semper fuerit, si semper creatura non fuit, affirmare aliquid pertimesco, quia et me ipsum intueor et scriptum esse recolo: Quis hominum potest scire consilium Dei, aut quis poterit cogitare quid velit Dominus? Cogitationes enim mortalium timidae et incertae adinventiones nostrae. Corruptibile enim corpus aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem 24. Ex his igitur, quae in hac terrena inhabitatione multa cogito (ideo utique multa, quia unum, quod ex illis vel praeter illa, quod forte non cogito, verum est, invenire non possum), si dixero semper fuisse creaturam, cuius dominus esset, qui semper est dominus nec dominus umquam non fuit; sed nunc illam, nunc aliam per alia atque alia temporum spatia, ne aliquam Creatori coaeternam esse dicamus, quod fides ratioque sana condemnat: cavendum est, ne sit absurdum et a luce veritatis alienum mortalem quidem per vices temporum semper fuisse creaturam, decedentem aliam, aliam succedentem; immortalem vero non esse coepisse, nisi cum ad nostrum saeculum ventum est, quando et angeli creati sunt, si eos recte lux illa primum facta significat aut illud potius caelum, de quo dictum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram 25, cum tamen non fuerint, antequam fierent, ne immortales, si semper fuisse dicuntur, Deo coaeterni esse credantur. Si autem dixero non in tempore creatos angelos, sed ante omnia tempora et ipsos fuisse, quorum Deus dominus esset, qui numquam nisi dominus fuit: quaeretur a me etiam, si ante omnia tempora facti sunt, utrum semper potuerint esse qui facti sunt. Hic respondendum forte videatur: Quo modo non semper, cum id, quod est omni tempore, non inconvenienter semper esse dicatur? Usque adeo autem isti omni tempore fuerunt, ut etiam ante omnia tempora facti sint; si tamen a caelo coepta sunt tempora, et illi iam erant ante caelum. At si tempus non a caelo, verum et ante caelum fuit; non quidem in horis et diebus et mensibus et annis (nam istae dimensiones temporalium spatiorum, quae usitate ac proprie dicuntur tempora, manifestum est quod a motu siderum coeperint; unde et Deus, cum haec

never made before, He willed to make in time, and this without changing His design and will.

Chapter 15.— Whether We are to Believe that God, as He Has Always Been Sovereign Lord, Has Always Had Creatures Over Whom He Exercised His Sovereignty; And in What Sense We Can Say that the Creature Has Always Been, and Yet Cannot Say It is Co-Eternal.

For my own part, indeed, as I dare not say that there ever was a time when the Lord God was not Lord, so I ought not to doubt that man had no existence before time, and was first created in time. But when I consider what God could be the Lord of, if there was not always some creature, I shrink from making any assertion, remembering my own insignificance, and that it is written, "What man is he that can know the counsel of God? Or who can think what the will of the Lord is? For the thoughts of mortal men are timid, and our devices are but uncertain. For the corruptible body presses down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weighs down the mind that muses upon many things." Wisdom 9:13-15 Many things certainly do I muse upon in this earthly tabernacle, because the one thing which is true among the many, or beyond the many, I cannot find. If, then, among these many thoughts, I say that there have always been creatures for Him to be Lord of, who is always and ever has been Lord, but that these creatures have not always been the same, but succeeded one another (for we would not seem to say that any is co-eternal with the Creator, an assertion condemned equally by faith and sound reason), I must take care lest I fall into the absurd and ignorant error of maintaining that by these successions and changes mortal creatures have always existed, whereas the immortal creatures had not begun to exist until the date of our own world, when the angels were created; if at least the angels are intended by that light which was first made, or, rather, by that heaven of which it is said, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." Genesis 1:1 The angels, at least did not exist before they were created; for if we say that they have always existed, we shall seem to make them co-eternal with the Creator. Again, if I say that the angels were not created in time, but existed before all times, as those over whom God, who has ever been Sovereign, exercised His sovereignty, then I shall be asked whether, if they were created before all time, they, being creatures, could possibly always exist. It may perhaps be replied, Why not always, since that which is in all time may very properly be said to be "always?" Now so true is it that these angels have existed in all time that even before time was they were created; if at least time began with the heavens, and the angels existed before the heavens. And if time was even before the heavenly bodies, not indeed marked by hours, days, months, and years — for these measures of time's periods which are commonly and properly called times, did manifestly begin with the motion of the heavenly bodies, and so God said, when He appointed them,

institueret, dixit: Et sint in signa et in tempora et in dies et in annos 26), sed in aliquo mutabili motu, cuius aliud prius, aliud posterius praeterit, eo quod simul esse non possunt; si ergo ante caelum in angelicis motibus tale aliquid fuit et ideo tempus iam fuit atque angeli, ex quo facti sunt, temporaliter movebantur: etiam sic omni tempore fuerunt, quando quidem cum illis facta sunt tempora. Quis autem dicat: Non semper fuit, quod omni tempore fuit?

Semper Domino angeli servierunt sed in tempore.

15. 2. Sed si hoc respondero, dicetur mihi: Quomodo ergo non coaeterni Creatori, si semper ille, semper illi fuerunt? Quomodo etiam creati dicendi sunt, si semper fuisse intelleguntur? Ad hoc quid respondebitur? An dicendum est et semper eos fuisse, quoniam omni tempore fuerunt, qui cum tempore facti sunt, aut cum quibus facta sunt tempora, et tamen creatos? Neque enim et ipsa tempora creata esse negabimus, quamvis omni tempore tempus fuisse nemo ambigat. Nam si non omni tempore fuit tempus, erat ergo tempus, quando nullum erat tempus. Quis hoc stultissimus dixerit? Possumus enim recte dicere: Erat tempus, quando non erat Roma; erat tempus, quando non erat Ierusalem; erat tempus, quando non erat Abraham; erat tempus, quando non erat homo, et si quid huiusmodi; postremo si non cum initio temporis, sed post aliquod tempus factus est mundus, possumus dicere: Erat tempus, quando non erat mundus; at vero: Erat tempus, quando nullum erat tempus, tam inconvenienter dicimus, ac si quisquam dicat: Erat homo, quando nullus erat homo, aut: Erat iste mundus, quando iste non erat mundus. Si enim de alio atque alio intellegatur, potest dici aliquo modo, hoc est: Erat alius homo, quando non erat iste homo; sic ergo: Erat aliud tempus, quando non erat hoc tempus, recte possumus dicere; at vero: Erat tempus, quando nullum erat tempus, quis vel insipientissimus dixerit? Sicut ergo dicimus creatum tempus, cum ideo semper fuisse dicatur, quia omni tempore tempus fuit: ita non est consequens, ut, si semper fuerunt angeli, ideo non sint creati, ut propterea semper fuisse dicantur, quia omni tempore fuerunt, et propterea omni tempore fuerunt, quia nullo modo sine his ipsa tempora esse potuerunt. Ubi enim nulla creatura est, cuius mutabilibus motibus tempora peragantur, tempora omnino esse non possunt; ac per hoc etsi semper fuerunt, creati sunt, nec si semper fuerunt, ideo Creatori coaeterni sunt. Ille enim semper fuit aeternitate immutabili; isti autem

"Let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years," Genesis 1:14 — if, I say, time was before these heavenly bodies by some changing movement, whose parts succeeded one another and could not exist simultaneously, and if there was some such movement among the angels which necessitated the existence of time, and that they from their very creation should be subject to these temporal changes, then they have existed in all time, for time came into being along with them. And who will say that what was in all time, was not always? But if I make such a reply, it will be said to me, How, then, are they not co-eternal with the Creator, if He and they always have been? How even can they be said to have been created, if we are to understand that they have always existed? What shall we reply to this? Shall we say that both statements are true? That they always have been, since they have been in all time, they being created along with time, or time along with them, and yet that also they were created? For, similarly, we will not deny that time itself was created, though no one doubts that time has been in all time; for if it has not been in all time, then there was a time when there was no time. But the most foolish person could not make such an assertion. For we can reasonably say there was a time when Rome was not; there was a time when Jerusalem was not; there was a time when Abraham was not; there was a time when man was not, and so on: in fine, if the world was not made at the commencement of time, but after some time had elapsed, we can say there was a time when the world was not. But to say there was a time when time was not, is as absurd as to say there was a man when there was no man; or, this world was when this world was not. For if we are not referring to the same object, the form of expression may be used, as, there was another man when this man was not. Thus we can reasonably say there was another time when this time was not; but not the merest simpleton could say there was a time when there was no time. As, then, we say that time was created, though we also say that it always has been, since in all time time has been, so it does not follow that if the angels have always been, they were therefore not created. For we say that they have always been, because they have been in all time; and we say they have been in all time, because time itself could no wise be without them. For where there is no creature whose changing movements admit of succession, there cannot be time at all. And consequently, even if they have always existed, they were created; neither, if they have always existed, are they therefore co-eternal with the Creator. For He has always existed in unchangeable eternity; while they were created, and are said to have been always, because they have been in all time, time being impossible without the creature. But time passing away by its changefulness, cannot be co-eternal with changeless eternity. And consequently, though the immortality of the angels does not pass in time, does not become past as if now it were not, nor has a future as if it were not yet, still their movements, which are the basis of time, do pass from future to past; and therefore they cannot be co-eternal with the Creator,

facti sunt; sed ideo semper fuisse dicuntur, quia omni tempore fuerunt, sine quibus tempora nullo modo esse potuerunt; tempus autem quoniam mutabilitate transcurrit, aeternitati immutabili non potest esse coaeternum. Ac per hoc etiamsi immortalitas angelorum non transit in tempore, nec praeterita est quasi iam non sit, nec futura quasi nondum sit: tamen eorum motus, quibus tempora peraguntur, ex futuro in praeteritum transeunt, et ideo Creatori, in cuius motu dicendum non est vel fuisse quod iam non sit, vel futurum esse quod nondum sit, coaeterni esse non possunt.

Ratio nescit tempora aeternitati coaequare.

15. 3. Quapropter si Deus semper dominus fuit, semper habuit creaturam suo dominatui servientem; verumtamen non de ipso genitam, sed ab ipso de nihilo factam nec ei coaeternam; erat quippe ante illam, quamvis nullo tempore sine illa; non eam spatio trascurrente, sed manente perpetuitate praecedens. Sed hoc si respondero eis qui requirunt, quomodo semper creator, semper dominus fuit, si creatura serviens non semper fuit; aut quomodo creata est et non potius creatori coaeterna est, si semper fuit: vereor ne facilius iudicem affirmare quod nescio, quam docere quod scio. Redeo igitur ad id, quod Creator noster scire nos voluit; illa vero, quae vel sapientioribus in hac vita scire permisit vel omnino perfectis in alia vita scienda servavit, ultra vires meas esse confiteor. Sed ideo putavi sine affirmatione tractanda, ut qui haec legunt videant a quibus quaestionum periculis debeant temperare, nec ad omnia se idoneos arbitrentur potiusque intellegant quam sit Apostolo obtemperandum praecipienti salubriter, ubi ait: Dico autem per gratiam Dei quae data est mihi omnibus qui sunt in vobis, non plus sapere quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad temperantiam, unicuique sicut Deus partitus est mensuram fidei 27. Si enim pro viribus suis alatur infans, fiet, ut crescendo plus capiat; si autem vires suae capacitatis excedat, deficiet antequam crescat.

Nihil creaturae Creatori est coaeternum.

16. Quae saecula praeterierint antequam genus institueretur humanum, me fateor ignorare; non tamen dubito nihil omnino creaturae Creatori esse coaeternum. Dicit etiam Apostolus tempora aeterna, nec ea futura, sed, quod magis est mirandum, praeterita. Sic enim ait: In spem vitae aeternae, quam promisit non mendax Deus ante tempora

in whose movement we cannot say that there has been that which now is not, or shall be that which is not yet. Wherefore, if God always has been Lord, He has always had creatures under His dominion — creatures, however, not begotten of Him, but created by Him out of nothing; nor co-eternal with Him, for He was before them though at no time without them, because He preceded them, not by the lapse of time, but by His abiding eternity. But if I make this reply to those who demand how He was always Creator, always Lord, if there were not always a subject creation; or how this was created, and not rather co-eternal with its Creator, if it always was, I fear I may be accused of recklessly affirming what I know not, instead of teaching what I know. I return, therefore, to that which our Creator has seen fit that we should know; and those things which He has allowed the abler men to know in this life, or has reserved to be known in the next by the perfected saints, I acknowledge to be beyond my capacity. But I have thought it right to discuss these matters without making positive assertions, that they who read may be warned to abstain from hazardous questions, and may not deem themselves fit for everything. Let them rather endeavor to obey the wholesome injunction of the apostle, when he says, "For I say, through the grace given unto me, to every man that is among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think; but to think soberly, according as God has dealt to every man the measure of faith." Romans 12:3 For if an infant receive nourishment suited to its strength, it becomes capable, as it grows, of taking more; but if its strength and capacity be overtaxed, it dwines away in place of growing.

Chapter 16.— How We are to Understand God's Promise of Life Eternal, Which Was Uttered Before the "Eternal Times."

I own that I do not know what ages passed before the human race was created, yet I have no doubt that no created thing is co-eternal with the Creator. But even the apostle speaks of time as eternal, and this with reference, not to the future, but, which is more surprising, to the past. For he says, "In hope of eternal life, which God that cannot lie promised before the eternal times, but has in due times manifested His word." You see he says that in the past there have been eternal times, which, however, were not co-eternal with God. And since God before these eternal times not only existed, but also, "promised" life eternal, which He manifested in its own times (that is to say, in due times), what else is this than His word? For this is life eternal. But then, how did He promise; for the promise was made to men, and yet they had no existence before eternal times? Does this not mean that, in His own eternity, and in His co-eternal word, that which was to be in its own time was already predestined and fixed?

Chapter 17.— What Defence is Made by Sound Faith Regarding God's Unchangeable Counsel and Will, Against the

aeterna; manifestavit autem temporibus suis verbum suum 28. Ecce dixit retro quod fuerint tempora aeterna, quae tamen non fuerint Deo coaeterna, si quidem ille ante tempora aeterna non solum erat, verum etiam promisit vitam aeternam, quam manifestavit temporibus suis, id est congruis, quid aliud quam Verbum suum? Hoc est enim vita aeterna. Quomodo autem promisit, cum hominibus utique promiserit, qui nondum erant ante tempora aeterna, nisi quia in eius aeternitate atque in ipso Verbo eius eidem coaeterno iam praedestinatione fixum erat, quod suo tempore futurum erat?

Circuitus redeuntium temporum...

17. 1. Illud quoque non dubito, antequam homo primus creatus esset, numquam quemquam fuisse hominem; nec eundem ipsum nescio quibus circuitibus nescio quotiens revolutum, nec alium aliquem natura similem. Neque ab hac fide me philosophorum argumenta deterrent, quorum acutissimum illud putatur, quod dicunt nulla infinita ulla scientia posse comprehendere; ac per hoc Deus, inquiunt, rerum quas facit omnium finitarum omnes finitas apud se rationes habet; bonitas autem eius numquam vacua fuisse credenda est, ne sit temporalis eius operatio, cuius retro fuerit aeterna cessatio, quasi paenituerit eum prioris sine initio vacationis ac propterea sit operis aggressus initium; et ideo necesse est, inquiunt, eadem semper repeti eademque semper repetenda transcurrere, vel manente mundo mutabiliter, qui licet numquam non fuerit et sine initio temporis tamen factus est, vel eius quoque ortu et occasu semper illis circuitibus repetito semperque repetendo; ne videlicet, si aliquando primum Dei opera coepta dicuntur, priorem suam sine initio vacationem tamquam inertem ac desidiosam et ideo sibi displicentem damnasse quodam modo atque ob hoc mutasse credatur; si autem semper quidem temporalia, sed alia atque alia perhibetur operatus ac sic aliquando etiam ad hominem faciendum, quem numquam antea fecerat, pervenisse, non scientia, qua putant non posse quaecumque infinita comprehendere, sed quasi ad horam, sicut veniebat in mentem, fortuita quadam inconstantia videatur fecisse quae fecit. Porro si illi circuitus admittantur, inquiunt, quibus vel manente mundo vel ipso quoque revolvibiles ortus suos et occasus eisdem circuitibus inserente eadem temporalia repetuntur, nec ignavum otium, praesertim tam longae sine initio diuturnitatis, Deo tribuitur, nec improvida temeritas operum suorum; quoniam si non eadem repetantur, non possunt

Reasonings of Those Who Hold that the Works of God are Eternally Repeated in Revolving Cycles that Restore All Things as They Were.

Of this, too, I have no doubt, that before the first man was created, there never had been a man at all, neither this same man himself recurring by I know not what cycles, and having made I know not how many revolutions, nor any other of similar nature. From this belief I am not frightened by philosophical arguments, among which that is reckoned the most acute which is founded on the assertion that the infinite cannot be comprehended by any mode of knowledge. Consequently, they argue, God has in his own mind finite conceptions of all finite things which He makes. Now it cannot be supposed that His goodness was ever idle; for if it were, there should be ascribed to Him an awakening to activity in time, from a past eternity of inactivity, as if He repented of an idleness that had no beginning, and proceeded, therefore, to make a beginning of work. This being the case, they say it must be that the same things are always repeated, and that as they pass, so they are destined always to return, whether amidst all these changes the world remains the same — the world which has always been, and yet was created, — or that the world in these revolutions is perpetually dying out and being renewed; otherwise, if we point to a time when the works of God were begun, it would be believed that He considered His past eternal leisure to be inert and indolent, and therefore condemned and altered it as displeasing to Himself. Now if God is supposed to have been indeed always making temporal things, but different from one another, and one after the other, so, that He thus came at last to make man, whom He had never made before, then it may seem that He made man not with knowledge (for they suppose no knowledge can comprehend the infinite succession of creatures), but at the dictate of the hour, as it struck him at the moment, with a sudden and accidental change of mind. On the other hand, say they, if those cycles be admitted, and if we suppose that the same temporal things are repeated, while the world either remains identical through all these rotations, or else dies away and is renewed, then there is ascribed to God neither the slothful ease of a past eternity, nor a rash and unforeseen creation. And if the same things be not thus repeated in cycles, then they cannot by any science or prescience be comprehended in their endless diversity. Even though reason could not refute, faith would smile at these argumentations, with which the godless endeavor to turn our simple piety from the right way, that we may walk with them "in a circle." But by the help of the Lord our God, even reason, and that readily enough, shatters these revolving circles which conjecture frames. For that which specially leads these men astray to refer their own circles to the straight path of truth, is, that they measure by their own human, changeable, and narrow intellect the divine mind, which is absolutely unchangeable, infinitely capacious, and without succession of thought,

infinita diversitate variata ulla eius scientia vel praescientia comprehendi.

... refutantur quia immutabilis est mens divina.

17. 2. Has argumentationes, quibus impii nostram simplicem pietatem, ut cum illis in circuitu ambulemus 29, de via recta conantur avertere, si ratio refutare non posset, fides irridere deberet. Huc accedit, quod in adiutorio Domini Dei nostri hos volubiles circulos, quos opinio confingit, ratio manifesta confringit. Hinc enim maxime isti errant, ut in circuitu falso ambulare quam vero et recto itinere malint, quod mentem divinam omnino immutabilem, cuiuslibet infinitatis capacem et innumera omnia sine cogitationis alternatione numerantem, de sua humana mutabili angustaque metiuntur; et fit illis quod ait Apostolus: Comparantes enim semetipsos sibimetipsis non intellegunt 30. Nam quia illis quidquid novi faciendum venit in mentem, novo consilio faciunt (mutabiles quippe mentes gerunt): profecto non Deum, quem cogitare non possunt, sed semetipsos pro illo cogitantes, non illum, sed se ipsos, nec illi, sed sibi comparant. Nobis autem fas non est credere, aliter affici Deum cum vacat, aliter cum operatur; quia nec affici dicendus est, tamquam in eius natura fiat aliquid, quod ante non fuerit. Patitur quippe qui afficitur, et mutabile est omne quod aliquid patitur. Non itaque in eius vacatione cogitetur ignavia desidia inertia, sicut nec in eius opere labor conatus industria. Novit quiescens agere et agens quiescere. Potest ad opus novum non novum, sed sempiternum adhibere consilium; nec paenitendo, quia prius cessaverat, coepit facere quod non fecerat. Sed et si prius cessavit et posterius operatus est (quod nescio quemadmodum ab homine possit intellegi): hoc procul dubio, quod dicitur prius et posterius, in rebus prius non existentibus et posterius existentibus fuit; in illo autem non alteram praecedentem altera subsequens mutavit aut abstulit voluntatem, sed una eademque sempiterna et immutabili voluntate res, quas condidit, et ut prius non essent egit, quamdiu non fuerunt, et ut posterius essent, quando esse coeperunt, hinc eis, qui talia videre possunt, mirabiliter fortassis ostendens, quam non eis indiguerit, sed eas gratuita bonitate condiderit, cum sine illis ex aeternitate initio carente in non minore beatitate permansit.

Omnis infinitas Deo finita est.

counting all things without number. So that saying of the apostle comes true of them, for, "comparing themselves with themselves, they do not understand." For because they do, in virtue of a new purpose, whatever new thing has occurred to them to be done (their minds being changeable), they conclude it is so with God; and thus compare, not God — for they cannot conceive God, but think of one like themselves when they think of Him — not God, but themselves, and not with Him, but with themselves. For our part, we dare not believe that God is affected in one way when He works, in another when He rests. Indeed, to say that He is affected at all, is an abuse of language, since it implies that there comes to be something in His nature which was not there before. For he who is affected is acted upon, and whatever is acted upon is changeable. His leisure, therefore, is no laziness, indolence, inactivity; as in His work is no labor, effort, industry. He can act while He reposes, and repose while He acts. He can begin a new work with (not a new, but) an eternal design; and what He has not made before, He does not now begin to make because He repents of His former repose. But when one speaks of His former repose and subsequent operation (and I know not how men can understand these things), this "former" and "subsequent" are applied only to the things created, which formerly did not exist, and subsequently came into existence. But in God the former purpose is not altered and obliterated by the subsequent and different purpose, but by one and the same eternal and unchangeable will He effected regarding the things He created, both that formerly, so long as they were not, they should not be, and that subsequently, when they began to be, they should come into existence. And thus, perhaps, He would show, in a very striking way, to those who have eyes for such things, how independent He is of what He makes, and how it is of His own gratuitous goodness He creates, since from eternity He dwelt without creatures in no less perfect a blessedness.

Chapter 18.— Against Those Who Assert that Things that are Infinite Cannot Be Comprehended by the Knowledge of God.

As for their other assertion, that God's knowledge cannot comprehend things infinite, it only remains for them to affirm, in order that they may sound the depths of their impiety, that God does not know all numbers. For it is very certain that they are infinite; since, no matter of what number you suppose an end to be made, this number can be, I will not say, increased by the addition of one more, but however great it be, and however vast be the multitude of which it is the rational and scientific expression, it can still be not only doubled, but even multiplied. Moreover, each number is so defined by its own properties, that no two numbers are equal. They are therefore both unequal and different from one another; and while they are simply finite, collectively they are infinite. Does God, therefore, not know numbers on account of this infinity; and does His knowledge extend only to a certain height in numbers,

18. *Illud autem aliud quod dicunt, nec Dei scientia quae infinita sunt posse comprehendere: restat eis, ut dicere audeant atque huic se voragini profundae impietatis immergant, quod non omnes numeros Deus noverit. Eos quippe infinitos esse, certissimum est; quoniam in quocumque numero finem faciendum putaveris, idem ipse, non dico uno addito augeri, sed quamlibet sit magnus et quamlibet ingentem multitudinem continens, in ipsa ratione atque scientia numerorum non solum duplicari, verum etiam multiplicari potest. Ita vero suis quisque numerus proprietatibus terminatur, ut nullus eorum par esse cuicumque alteri possit. Ergo et dispar es inter se atque diversi sunt, et singuli quique finiti sunt, et omnes infiniti sunt. Itane numeros propter infinitatem nescit omnes Deus, et usque ad quamdam summam numerorum scientia Dei pervenit, ceteros ignorat? Quis hoc etiam dementissimus dixerit? Nec audebunt isti contemnere numeros et eos dicere ad Dei scientiam non pertinere, apud quos Plato Deum magna auctoritate commendat mundum numeris fabricantem 31. Et apud nos Deo dictum legitur: Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti 32; de quo et propheta dicit: Qui profert numero saeculum 33, et Salvator in Evangelio: Capilli, inquit, vestri omnes numerati sunt 34. Absit itaque ut dubitemus, quod ei notus sit omnis numerus, cuius intellegentiae, sicut in Psalmo canitur, non est numerus 35. Infinitas itaque numeri, quamvis infinitorum numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei, cuius intellegentiae non est numerus. Quapropter si, quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis comprehensione finitur: profecto et omnis infinitas quodam ineffabili modo Deo finita est, quia scientiae ipsius incomprehensibilis non est. Quare si infinitas numerorum scientiae Dei, qua comprehenditur, esse non potest infinita: qui tandem nos sumus homunculi, qui eius scientiae limites figere praesumamus, dicentes quod, nisi eisdem circuitibus temporum eadem temporalia repetantur, non potest Deus cuncta quae facit vel praescire ut faciat, vel scire cum fecerit? cuius sapientia simpliciter multiplex et uniformiter multiformis tam incomprehensibili comprehensione omnia incomprehensibilia comprehendit, ut, quaecumque nova et dissimilia consequentia praecedentibus si semper facere vellet, inordinata et improvisa habere non posset, nec ea provideret ex proximo tempore, sed aeterna praescientia contineret.*

while of the rest He is ignorant? Who is so left to himself as to say so? Yet they can hardly pretend to put numbers out of the question, or maintain that they have nothing to do with the knowledge of God; for Plato, their great authority, represents God as framing the world on numerical principles: and in our books also it is said to God, "You have ordered all things in number, and measure, and weight." Wisdom 11:20 The prophet also says, Who brings out their host by number. Isaiah 40:26 And the Saviour says in the Gospel, "The very hairs of your head are all numbered." Matthew 10:30 Far be it, then, from us to doubt that all number is known to Him "whose understanding," according to the Psalmist, "is infinite." The infinity of number, though there be no numbering of infinite numbers, is yet not incomprehensible by Him whose understanding is infinite. And thus, if everything which is comprehended is defined or made finite by the comprehension of him who knows it, then all infinity is in some ineffable way made finite to God, for it is comprehensible by His knowledge. Wherefore, if the infinity of numbers cannot be infinite to the knowledge of God, by which it is comprehended, what are we poor creatures that we should presume to fix limits to His knowledge, and say that unless the same temporal thing be repeated by the same periodic revolutions, God cannot either foreknow His creatures that He may make them, or know them when He has made them? God, whose knowledge is simply manifold, and uniform in its variety, comprehends all incomprehensibles with so incomprehensible a comprehension, that though He willed always to make His later works novel and unlike what went before them, He could not produce them without order and foresight, nor conceive them suddenly, but by His eternal foreknowledge.

19. *Quod incommutabile est æternum est; semper enim eiusdem modi est. Quod autem commutabile est tempori obnoxium est; non enim semper eiusdem modi est, et ideo æternum non recte dicitur. Quod enim mutatur non manet; quod non manet non est æternum. Idque inter immortale et æternum interest, quod omne æternum immortale est, non omne immortale satis subtiliter æternum dicitur, quia et si semper aliquid vivat, tamen si mutabilitatem patiatur, non proprie æternum appellatur, quia non semper eiusdem modi est; quamvis immortale, quia semper vivit, recte dici possit. Vocatur tamen æternum interdum etiam quod immortale est. Illud vero quod et mutationem patitur et animæ præsentia, cum anima non sit, vivere dicitur, neque immortale ullo modo et multo minus æternum intellegi potest. In æterno enim, cum proprie dicitur, neque quidquam præteritum quasi transierit, neque quidquam futurum quasi nondum sit, sed quidquid est, tantummodo est.*

19. Whatever is unchangeable is eternal, for it exists always in the same way. But whatever is changeable is subject to time, for it does not exist always in the same way, and therefore it is not rightly called eternal. For whatever changes does not abide; whatever does not abide is not eternal. And there is this difference between what is immortal and what is eternal: everything that is eternal is immortal, but not everything that is immortal is with sufficient accuracy called eternal, because if something undergoes change, even if it is always alive, it is not properly called eternal because it does not exist always in the same way; yet it can rightly be called immortal because it is always alive. Nonetheless what is immortal can sometimes also be called eternal. But that which both undergoes change and is said to be alive thanks to the presence of a soul, although it is not a soul, can in no way be understood as immortal and much less as eternal. For in what is eternal, as is properly said, there is neither anything past, as if it had ceased, nor anything future, as if it did not yet exist, but it is what simply exists.

Dievo samprata: *Una essentia, tres Personae****Confessionum (397-401)***

Augustini cogitata de Deo.

VII.1.1. Iam mortua erat adulescentia mea mala et nefanda, et ibam in iuventutem, quanto aetate maior, tanto vanitate turpior, qui cogitare aliquid substantiae nisi tale non poteram, quale per hos oculos videri solet. Non te cogitabam, Deus, in figura corporis humani, ex quo audire aliquid de sapientia coepi; semper hoc fugi et gaudebam me hoc repperisse in fide spiritualis matris nostrae, catholicae tuae; sed quid te aliud cogitarem non occurrebat. Et conabar cogitare te homo et talis homo, summum et solum et verum Deum I, et te incorruptibilem et inviolabilem et incommutabilem totis medullis credebam, quia nesciens, unde et quomodo, plane tamen videbam et certus eram id, quod corrumpi potest, deterius esse quam id quod non potest, et quod violari non potest, incunctanter praeponebam violabili, et quod nullam patitur mutationem, melius esse quam id quod mutari potest. Clamabat violenter cor meum 2 adversus omnia phantasmata mea et hoc uno ictu conabar abigere circumvolantem turbam immunditiae ab acie mentis meae: et vix dimota in ictu oculi 3 ecce conglobata rursus aderat et irruerat in aspectum meum et obnubilabat eum, ut quamvis non forma humani corporis, corporeum tamen aliquid cogitare cogerer per spatia locorum sive infusum mundo sive etiam extra mundum per infinita diffusum, etiam ipsum incorruptibile et inviolabile et incommutabile, quod corruptibili et violabili et commutabili praeponebam, quoniam quidquid privabam spatiis talibus, nihil mihi esse videbatur, sed prorsus nihil, ne inane quidem, tamquam si corpus auferatur loco et maneat locus omni corpore vacuatus et terreno et humido et aereo et caelesti, sed tamen sit locus inanis tamquam spatiosum nihil.

1. 2. Ego itaque incrassatus corde 4 nec mihimet ipsi vel ipse conspicuus, quidquid non per aliquanta spatia tenderetur vel diffunderetur vel conglobaretur vel tumeret vel tale aliquid caperet aut capere posset, nihil prorsus esse arbitrabar. Per quales enim formas ire solent oculi mei, per tales imagines ibat cor meum, nec videbam hanc eandem intentionem, qua illas ipsas imagines formabam, non esse tale aliquid; quae tamen ipsas non formaret, nisi esset magnum aliquid.

The Confessions

VII.1.1. By now my misspent, impious adolescence was dead, and I was entering the period of youth,†1 but as I advanced in age I sank ignobly into foolishness, for I was unable to grasp the idea of substance except as something we can see with our bodily eyes. I was no longer representing you to myself in the shape of a human body, O God, for since beginning to acquire some inkling of philosophy I always shunned this illusion, and now I was rejoicing to find a different view in the belief of our spiritual mother, your Catholic Church. Yet no alternative way of thinking about you had occurred to me; and here was I, a mere human, and a sinful one at that, striving to comprehend you, the supreme, sole, true God.†2

Materialistic notions of God insufficient

From the core of my being I believed you to be imperishable, inviolable and unchangeable, because although I did not understand why or how this could be, I saw quite plainly and with full conviction that anything perishable is inferior to what is imperishable, and I unhesitatingly reckoned the inviolable higher than anything subject to violation, and what is constant and unchanging better than what can be changed.†3 My heart cried out in vehement protest against all the phantom shapes that thronged my imagination, and I strove with this single weapon to beat away from the gaze of my mind the cloud of filth that hovered round me,†4 but hardly had I got rid of it than in another twinkling of an eye†5 it was back again, clotted together, invading and clogging my vision, so that even though I was no longer hampered by the image of a human body, I was still forced to imagine something corporeal spread out in space, whether infused into the world or even diffused through the infinity outside it. This was still the case even though I recognized that this substance was imperishable, inviolable and immutable (necessarily so, being superior to anything perishable, subject to violation or changeable); because anything to which I must deny these spatial dimensions seemed to me to be nothing at all, absolutely nothing, not even a void such as might be left if every kind of body—earthly, watery, aerial or heavenly—were removed from it, for though such a place would be a nothingness, it would still have the quality of space.

2. Whatever was not stretched out in space, or diffused or compacted or inflated or possessed of some such qualities, or at least capable of possessing them, I judged to be nothing at

Ita etiam te, vita vitae meae, grandem per infinita spatia undique cogitabam penetrare totam mundi molem et extra eam quaquaversum per immensa sine termino, ut haberet te terra, haberet caelum, haberent omnia et illa finirentur in te, tu autem nusquam. Sicut autem luci solis non obsisteret aeris corpus, aeris huius, qui supra terram est, quominus per eum traiceretur penetrans eum non dirrumpendo aut concidendo, sed implendo eum totum, sic tibi putabam non solum caeli et aeris et maris sed etiam terrae corpus pervium et ex omnibus maximis minimisque partibus penetrabile ad capiendam praesentiam tuam, occulta inspiratione intrinsecus et extrinsecus administrantem omnia, quae creasti. Ita suspicabar, quia cogitare aliud non poteram; nam falsum erat. Illo enim modo maior pars terrae maiorem tui partem haberet et minorem minor, atque ita te plena essent omnia, ut amplius tui caperet elephanti corpus quam passeris, quo esset isto grandius grandioremque occuparet locum, atque ita frustatim partibus mundi magnis magnas, brevibus breves partes tuas praesentes faceres. Non est autem ita. Sed nondum illuminaveras tenebras meas 5.

Quo argumento Manichaeorum doctrinam de substantia Dei Nebridius confutaverit.

2. 3. Sat erat mihi, Domine, adversus illos deceptos deceptores et loquaces mutos 6, quoniam non ex eis sonabat verbum tuum, sat erat ergo illud quod iam diu ab usque Carthagine a Nebridio proponi solebat et omnes, qui audieramus, concussi sumus; quid erat tibi factura nescio qua gens tenebrarum, quam ex adversa mole solent opponere, si tu cum ea pugnare noluisses? Si enim responderetur aliquid fuisse nocituram, violabilis tu et corruptibilis fores. Si autem nihil ea nocere potuisse diceretur, nulla afferretur causa pugnandi et ita pugnandi, ut quaedam portio tua et membrum tuum vel proles de ipsa substantia tua misceretur adversis potestatibus et non a te creatis naturis atque in tantum ab eis corrumperetur et commutaretur in deterius, ut a beatitudine in miseriam verteretur et indigeret auxilio, quo erui purgarique posset, et hanc esse animam, cui tuus sermo servienti liber et contaminatae purus et corruptae integer subveniret, sed et ipse corruptibilis, quia ex una eademque substantia. Itaque si te, quidquid es, id est substantiam tuam, qua es, incorruptibilem dicerent, falsa esse illa omnia et execrabilia; si autem corruptibilem, id ipsum iam falsum et prima voce abominandum. Sat erat ergo istuc adversus eos omni modo evomendos a pressura pectoris, quia non

all. Yet in so thinking I was gross of heart†6 and not even luminous to myself; for as my eyes were accustomed to roam among material forms, so did my mind among the images of them, yet I could not see that this very act of perception, whereby I formed those images, was different from them in kind. Yet my mind would never have been able to form them unless it was itself a reality, and a great one. Hence I thought that even you, Life of my life, were a vast reality spread throughout space in every direction: I thought that you penetrated the whole mass of the earth and the immense, unbounded spaces beyond it on all sides, that earth, sky and all things were full of you, and that they found their limits in you, while you yourself had no limit anywhere. Since material air—I mean the atmosphere above the earth—posed no barrier to the sun's light, which was able to penetrate and pass through it, filling it entirely without bursting it apart or tearing it, I assumed that not only the material sky, air and sea, but even the material earth, were similarly traversable by you, penetrable and open in all their greatest and tiniest parts to your presence, which secretly breathes through them within and without, controlling all that you have made. I held this view only because I was unable to think in any other way; it was false, because on that showing a larger part of the earth would contain a larger portion of you, and a smaller a lesser portion, and all things would be full of you in such a way that an elephant's body would contain a larger amount of you than a sparrow's, because it is bigger and takes up more space. You would be distributed piecemeal throughout the elements of the world, with greater parts of yourself present where there is plenty of room, and smaller parts in more cramped places. Obviously this is not the case. You had not yet illumined my darkness.†7

2, 3. I had a sufficient argument, Lord, against those self-deceived deceivers†8 who, though so talkative, were dumb because your word did not sound forth from them. Yes, I had a sufficient argument, one which Nebridius had been wont to propose ever since our days in Carthage, which left us all shaken who heard it. Those so-called powers of darkness, whom they always postulate as a horde deployed in opposition to you: what would they have done to you if you had refused to fight? If the reply is that they could have inflicted some injury on you, it would imply that you are subject to violation and therefore destructible. If, on the other hand, it is denied that they had power to injure you, there would have been no point in fighting.†9 Yet the fighting is alleged to have been so intense that some portion of yourself, a limb perhaps, or an offspring of your very substance, became entangled with hostile powers and with the natures of beings not created by you, and was by them so far corrupted and changed for the worse that its beatitude was turned to misery, and it could be rescued and purified only with help; and this portion is supposed to be the soul, enslaved, defiled,

habebant, qua exirent sine horribili sacrilegio cordis et linguae sentiendo de te ista et loquendo.

corrupt, and in need of aid from your Word, which must necessarily be free, pure and unscathed if it is to help, and yet, since it is of the same nature as the soul, must be equally corrupt itself! It follows that if they admitted that, whatever you are, you are incorruptible (your substance, that is, by which you exist), this whole rigmarole would be shown up as untrue and to be rejected with loathing; but if they alleged that you are corruptible, their position would already be false and no sooner stated than to be condemned. The foregoing argument was therefore quite sufficient, and I ought to have squeezed these people from my gullet and vomited them out, for no escape was left them from the horrible sacrilege of heart and tongue they were committing by thinking and speaking of you in this fashion.

De Civitate Dei contra Paganos (413-427)

Deus unus est et trinus...

XI.10.1. Est itaque bonum solum simplex et ob hoc solum incommutabile, quod est Deus. Ab hoc bono creata sunt omnia bona, sed non simplicia et ob hoc mutabilia. Creata sane, inquam, id est facta, non genita. Quod enim de simplici bono genitum est, pariter simplex est et hoc est quod illud de quo genitum est; quae duo Patrem et Filium dicimus; et utrumque hoc cum Spiritu suo unus est Deus; qui Spiritus Patris et Filii Spiritus Sanctus propria quadam notione huius nominis in sacris Litteris nuncupatur. Alius est autem quam Pater et Filius, quia nec Pater est nec Filius; sed Alius dixi, non Aliud, quia et hoc pariter simplex pariterque incommutabile bonum est et coaeternum. Et haec Trinitas unus est Deus; nec ideo non simplex, quia Trinitas. Neque enim propter hoc naturam istam boni simplicem dicimus, quia Pater in ea solus aut solus Filius aut solus Spiritus Sanctus, aut vero sola est ista nominis Trinitas sine subsistentia personarum, sicut Sabelliani haeretici putaverunt; sed ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam quod habet hoc est, excepto quod relative quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur. Nam utique Pater habet Filium, nec tamen ipse est Filius, et Filius habet Patrem, nec tamen ipse est Pater. In quo ergo ad semetipsum dicitur, non ad alterum, hoc est quod habet; sicut ad se ipsum dicitur vivus habendo utique vitam, et eadem vita ipse est.

... Cuius natura simplex est et immutabilis...

10. 2. Propter hoc itaque natura dicitur simplex, cui non sit aliquid habere, quod vel possit amittere; vel aliud sit habens, aliud quod habet; sicut vas aliquem liquorem aut corpus colorem aut aer lucem sive

The City of God

Chapter 10.— Of the Simple and Unchangeable Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, One God, in Whom Substance and Quality are Identical.

XI.10.1. There is, accordingly, a good which is alone simple, and therefore alone unchangeable, and this is God. By this Good have all others been created, but not simple, and therefore not unchangeable. "Created," I say — that is, made, not begotten. For that which is begotten of the simple Good is simple as itself, and the same as itself. These two we call the Father and the Son; and both together with the Holy Spirit are one God; and to this Spirit the epithet Holy is in Scripture, as it were, appropriated. And He is another than the Father and the Son, for He is neither the Father nor the Son. I say "another," not "another thing," because He is equally with them the simple Good, unchangeable and co-eternal. And this Trinity is one God; and none the less simple because a Trinity. For we do not say that the nature of the good is simple, because the Father alone possesses it, or the Son alone, or the Holy Ghost alone; nor do we say, with the Sabellian heretics, that it is only nominally a Trinity, and has no real distinction of persons; but we say it is simple, because it is what it has, with the exception of the relation of the persons to one another. For, in regard to this relation, it is true that the Father has a Son, and yet is not Himself the Son; and the Son has a Father, and is not Himself the Father. But, as regards Himself, irrespective of relation to the other, each is what He has; thus, He is in Himself living, for He has life, and is Himself the Life which He has. It is for this reason, then, that the nature of the Trinity is called simple, because it has not anything which it can lose, and because it is not one thing and its contents another, as a cup and the liquor, or a body and its color, or the air and the light or heat of it, or a mind and its wisdom. For none of these is what it has: the cup is not liquor, nor the body color, nor the air light and heat, nor the mind wisdom. And hence they can be deprived of what

fervorem aut anima sapientiam. Nihil enim horum est id quod habet; nam neque vas liquor est nec corpus color nec aer lux sive fervor neque anima sapientia est. Hinc est quod etiam privari possunt rebus, quas habent, et in alios habitus vel qualitates verti atque mutari, ut et vas evacuetur umore quo plenum est, et corpus decoloretur et aer tenebrescat sive frigescat et anima desipiat. Sed etsi sit corpus incorruptibile, quale sanctis in resurrectione promittitur, habet quidem ipsius incorruptionis inamissibilem qualitatem, sed manente substantia corporali non hoc est, quod ipsa incorruptio. Nam illa etiam per singulas partes corporis tota est nec alibi maior, alibi minor; neque enim ulla pars est incorruptior quam altera; corpus vero ipsum maius est in toto quam in parte; et cum alia pars est in eo amplior, alia minor, non ea quae amplior est incorruptior quam quae minor. Aliud est itaque corpus, quod non ubique sui totum est, alia incorruptio, quae ubique eius tota est, quia omnis pars incorruptibilis corporis etiam ceteris inaequalis aequaliter incorrupta est. Neque enim verbi gratia, quia digitus minor est quam tota manus, ideo incorruptibilior manus quam digitus. Ita cum sint inaequales manus et digitus, aequalis est tamen incorruptibilitas manus et digiti. Ac per hoc quamvis a corpore incorruptibili inseparabilis incorruptibilitas sit, aliud est tamen substantia, qua corpus dicitur, aliud qualitas eius, qua incorruptibile nuncupatur. Et ideo etiam sic non hoc est quod habet. Anima quoque ipsa, etiamsi semper sit sapiens, sicut erit cum liberabitur in aeternum, participatione tamen incommutabilis sapientiae sapiens erit, quae non est quod ipsa. Neque enim si aer infusa luce numquam deseratur, ideo non aliud est ipse, aliud lux qua illuminatur. Neque hoc ita dixerim, quasi aer sit anima, quod putaverunt quidam qui non potuerunt incorpoream cogitare naturam. Sed habent haec ad illa etiam in magna disparilitate quamdam similitudinem, ut non inconvenienter dicatur sic illuminari animam incorpoream luce incorporea simplicis sapientiae Dei, sicut illuminatur aeris corpus luce corporea; et sicut aer tenebrescit ista luce desertus (nam nihil sunt aliud quae dicuntur locorum quorumque corporalium tenebrae quam aer carens luce), ita tenebrescere animam sapientiae luce privatam.

... et in eo omnium rerum rationes.

10. 3. Secundum hoc ergo dicuntur illa simplicia, quae principaliter vereque divina sunt, quod non aliud est in eis qualitas, aliud substantia, nec aliorum participatione vel divina vel sapientia vel beata sunt.

they have, and can be turned or changed into other qualities and states, so that the cup may be emptied of the liquid of which it is full, the body be discolored, the air darkened, the mind grow silly. The incorruptible body which is promised to the saints in the resurrection cannot, indeed, lose its quality of incorruption, but the bodily substance and the quality of incorruption are not the same thing. For the quality of incorruption resides entire in each several part, not greater in one and less in another; for no part is more incorruptible than another. The body, indeed, is itself greater in whole than in part; and one part of it is larger, another smaller, yet is not the larger more incorruptible than the smaller. The body, then, which is not in each of its parts a whole body, is one thing; incorruptibility, which is throughout complete, is another thing — for every part of the incorruptible body, however unequal to the rest otherwise, is equally incorrupt. For the hand, e.g., is not more incorrupt than the finger because it is larger than the finger; so, though finger and hand are unequal, their incorruptibility is equal. Thus, although incorruptibility is inseparable from an incorruptible body, yet the substance of the body is one thing, the quality of incorruption another. And therefore the body is not what it has. The soul itself, too, though it be always wise (as it will be eternally when it is redeemed), will be so by participating in the unchangeable wisdom, which it is not; for though the air be never robbed of the light that is shed abroad in it, it is not on that account the same thing as the light. I do not mean that the soul is air, as has been supposed by some who could not conceive a spiritual nature; but, with much dissimilarity, the two things have a kind of likeness, which makes it suitable to say that the immaterial soul is illumined with the immaterial light of the simple wisdom of God, as the material air is irradiated with material light, and that, as the air, when deprived of this light, grows dark, (for material darkness is nothing else than air wanting light,) so the soul, deprived of the light of wisdom, grows dark. According to this, then, those things which are essentially and truly divine are called simple, because in them quality and substance are identical, and because they are divine, or wise, or blessed in themselves, and without extraneous supplement. In Holy Scripture, it is true, the Spirit of wisdom is called "manifold" Wisdom 7:22 because it contains many things in it; but what it contains it also is, and it being one is all these things. For neither are there many wisdoms, but one, in which are untold and infinite treasures of things intellectual, wherein are all invisible and unchangeable reasons of things visible and changeable which were created by it. For God made nothing unwittingly; not even a human workman can be said to do so. But if He knew all that He made, He made only those things which He had known. Whence flows a very striking but true conclusion, that this world could not be known to us unless it existed, but could not have existed unless it had been known to God.

Ceterum dictus est in Scripturis sanctis Spiritus sapientiae multiplex 27, eo quod multa in sese habeat; sed quae habet, haec et est, et ea omnia unus est. Neque enim multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt infiniti quidam eique finiti thesauri rerum intellegibilium, in quibus sunt omnes invisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum etiam visibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt. Quoniam Deus non aliquid nesciens fecit, quod nec de quolibet homine artifice recte dici potest; porro si sciens fecit omnia, ea utique fecit quae noverat. Ex quo occurrit animo quiddam mirum, sed tamen verum, quod iste mundus nobis notus esse non posset, nisi esset; Deo autem nisi notus esset, esse non posset.

De Trinitate (399-422/426)

Quid a Deo, quid a lectoribus Augustinus exposcat.

V.1. 1. Hinc iam exordiens ea dicere, quae dici ut cogitantur vel ab homine aliquo, vel certe a nobis non omni modo possunt; quamvis et ipsa nostra cogitatio, cum de Deo Trinitate cogitamus, longe se illi de quo cogitat, imparem sentiat, neque ut est eum capiat sed, ut scriptum est, etiam a tantis quantus Paulus Apostolus hic erat, per speculum in aenigmate¹ videatur, primum ab ipso Domino Deo nostro, de quo semper cogitare debemus, et de quo digne cogitare non possumus, cui laudando reddenda est omni tempore benedictio², et cui enuntiando nulla competit dictio, et adiutorium ad intellegenda atque explicanda quae intendo, et veniam precor sicubi offendo. Memor enim sum, non solum voluntatis, verum etiam infirmitatis meae. Ab his etiam qui ista lecturi sunt, ut ignoscant peto, ubi me magis voluisse quam potuisse dicere adverterint, quod vel ipsi melius intellegunt, vel propter mei eloquii difficultatem non intellegunt; sicut ego eis ignosco ubi propter suam tarditatem intellegere non possunt.

Deus aliquid longe melius meliore nostro.

1. 2. Facilius autem nobis invicem ignoscimus, si noverimus, aut certe credendo firmum tenuerimus ea quae de natura incommutabili et invisibili summeque vivente ac sibi sufficiente dicuntur, non ex consuetudine visibilium atque mutabilium et mortalium vel egenarum rerum esse metienda. Sed cum in his etiam quae nostris corporalibus adjacent sensibus, vel quod nos ipsi in interiore homine sumus, scientia comprehendendis laboremus, nec sufficiamus; non tamen impudenter in illa quae supra sunt divina et ineffabilia pietas fidelis ardescit, non

On the Trinity

Prologue

V.1.1. From now on I will be attempting to say things that cannot altogether be said as they are thought by a man—or at least as they are thought by me. In any case, when we think about God the trinity we are aware that our thoughts are quite inadequate to their object, and incapable of grasping him as he is; even by men of the calibre of the apostle Paul he can only be seen, as it says, like a puzzling reflection in a mirror (1 Cor 13:12). Now since we ought to think about the Lord our God always, and can never think about him as he deserves; since at all times we should be praising him and blessing him, and yet no words of ours are capable of expressing him, I begin by asking him to help me understand and explain what I have in mind and to pardon any blunders I may make. For I am as keenly aware of my weakness as of my willingness. And I also ask my readers to forgive me, wherever they notice that I am trying and failing to say something which they understand better, or which they are prevented from understanding because I express myself so badly; just as I will forgive them when they are too slow on the uptake to understand what I am saying.

2. We will find it easier to excuse one another if we know, or at least firmly believe and maintain, that whatever we say about that unchanging and invisible nature, that supreme and all-sufficient life, cannot be measured by the standard of things visible, changeable, mortal and deficient. Indeed we find ourselves unequal, except with much difficulty, to achieving a scientific comprehension of what is accessible to our bodily senses or of what we ourselves are in the inner man. Yet for all that there is no effrontery in burning to know, out of faithful piety, the divine and inexpressible truth that is above us, provided the mind is fired by the grace of our creator and savior, and not inflated by arrogant confidence in its own powers. In any case, what intellectual capacity has a

quam suarum virium inflat arrogantia ,sed quam gratia ipsius Creatoris et Salvatoris inflammat. Nam quo intellectu homo Deum capit qui ipsum intellectum suum quo eum vult capere nondum capit? Si autem hunc iam capit, attendat diligenter nihil eo esse in sua natura melius, et videat utrum ibi videat ulla lineamenta formarum, nitores colorum, spatiosam granditatem, partium distantiam, molis distensionem, aliquas per locorum intervalla motiones ,vel quid eiusmodi. Nihil certe istorum invenimus in eo, quo in natura nostra nihil melius invenimus, id est, in nostro intellectu, quo sapientiam capimus quantae capaces sumus. Quod ergo non invenimus in meliore nostro, non debemus in illo quaerere, quod longe melius est meliore nostro; ut sic intellegamus Deum, si possumus, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum³, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem, nihilque patientem. Quisquis Deum ita cogitat, etsi nondum potest omni modo invenire quid sit; pie tamen cavet, quantum potest, aliquid de illo sentire quod non sit⁴.

Deus est ipsum esse.

2. 3. Est tamen sine dubitatione substantia, vel, si melius hoc appellatur, essentia, quam Graeci ουσία vocant. Sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere dicta est sapientia, et ab eo quod est scire dicta est scientia, ita ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia⁵. Et quis magis est, quam ille qui dixit famulo suo Moysi: Ego sum qui sum⁶, et: Dices filiis Israel: Qui est misit me ad vos⁷? Sed aliae quae dicuntur essentiae, sive substantiae capiunt accidentias quibus in eis fiat vel magna vel quantacumque mutatio; Deo autem aliquid eiusmodi accidere non potest. Et ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia, quae Deus est, cui profecto ipsum esse, unde essentia nominata est, maxime ac verissime competit. Quod enim mutatur, non servat ipsum esse; et quod mutari potest, etiamsi non mutetur, potest quod fuerat non esse; ac per hoc illud solum quod non tantum non mutatur, verum etiam mutari omnino non potest, sine scrupulo occurrit quod verissime dicatur esse.

Arianorum argumentum.

3. 4. Quamobrem ut iam etiam de his quae nec dicuntur ut cogitantur nec cogitantur ut sunt, respondere incipiamus fidei nostrae adversariis; inter multa quae Ariani adversus catholicam fidem solent disputare, hoc sibi maxime callidissimum

man got to grasp God with, if his own intellect with which he wishes to grasp him still eludes his grasp? If he does comprehend his own intellect, he should bear firmly in mind that it is the best thing in his nature, and then ask himself whether he can see in it lines, shapes, bright colors, space, size, distinction of parts, extension of bulk, movement from place to place, or anything of that sort. We certainly find none of these things in what we find to be the best thing in our nature, that is in our intellect, in which we hold however much wisdom we have the capacity for. So what we do not find in our better part we should not look for in that which is far and away better than our better part. Thus we should understand God, if we can and as far as we can, to be good without quality, great without quantity, creative without need or necessity, presiding†1 without position, holding all things together without possession, wholly everywhere without place, everlasting without time, without any change in himself making changeable things, and undergoing nothing.†2 Whoever thinks of God like that may not yet be able to discover altogether what he is, but is at least piously on his guard against thinking about him anything that he is not.†3

Chapter 1: On the basis of the principle, common to both parties, that nothing is predicated of God by way of modification of the divine being,...

2, 3. There is at least no doubt that God is substance, or perhaps a better word would be being; at any rate what the Greeks call ousia. Just as we get the word "wisdom" from "wise," and "knowledge" from "know," so we have the word "being" from "be."†4 And who can more be than he that said to his servant,†5 I am who I am, and, Tell the sons of Israel, He who is sent me to you (Ex 3:14)? Now other things that we call beings or substances admit of modifications,†6 by which they are modified and changed to a great or small extent. But God cannot be modified in any way, and therefore the substance or being which is God is alone unchangeable, and therefore it pertains to it most truly and supremely to be, from which comes the name "being." Anything that changes does not keep its being, and anything that can change even though it does not, is able to not be what it was; and thus only that which not only does not but also absolutely cannot change deserves without qualification to be said really and truly to be.

3, 4. It is about these things which cannot be expressed as they are thought and cannot be thought as they are that we must now begin to reply to the critics of our faith. Now among the many objections which the Arians are in the habit of leveling against the Catholic faith, the most cunning and ingenious device they think they can bring to bear is the following argument: "Whatever is said or understood about

machinamentum proponere videntur, cum dicunt: "Quidquid de Deo dicitur vel intellegitur, non secundum accidens, sed secundum substantiam dicitur. Quapropter ingenitum esse Patri secundum substantiam est, et genitum esse Filio secundum substantiam est. Diversum est autem ingenitum esse et genitum esse; diversa est ergo substantia Patris et Filii"⁸. Quibus respondemus: "Si quidquid de Deo dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur; ergo quod dictum est: Ego et Pater unum sumus⁹, secundum substantiam dictum est". Una est igitur substantia Patris et Filii. Aut si hoc non secundum substantiam dictum est, dicitur ergo aliquid de Deo non secundum substantiam; et ideo iam non cogimur secundum substantiam intellegere ingenitum et genitum. Item dictum est de Filio: Non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo¹⁰. Quaerimus secundum quid aequalis. Si enim non secundum substantiam dicitur aequalis, admittunt ut dicatur aliquid de Deo, non secundum substantiam; admittant ergo non secundum substantiam dici ingenitum et genitum. Quod si propterea non admittunt, quia omnia de Deo secundum substantiam dici volunt, secundum substantiam Filius aequalis est Patri.

Accidens arguit semper aliquam rei mutationem.

4. 5. Accidens autem dici, non solet nisi quod aliqua mutatione eius rei cui accidit amitti potest. Nam etsi quaedam dicuntur accidentia inseparabilia, quae appellantur graece ἄχόριστα, sicuti est plumae corvi color niger; amittit eum tamen, non quidem quamdiu pluma est, sed quia non semper est pluma. Quapropter ipsa materies mutabilis est, et ex eo quod desinit esse illud animal vel illa pluma, totumque illud corpus in terram mutatur et vertitur¹¹, amittit utique etiam illum colorem. Quamvis et accidens quod separabile dicitur, non separatione, sed mutatione amittatur; sicuti est capillis hominum nigritudo, quoniam dum capilli sunt possunt albescere; separabile accidens dicitur, sed diligenter intuentibus satis apparet, non separatione quasi emigrare aliquid a capite dum canescit, ut nigritudo inde candore succedente discedat et aliquo eat, sed illam qualitatem coloris ibi verti atque mutari. Nihil itaque accidens in Deo, quia nihil mutabile aut amissibile. Quod si et illud dici accidens placet, quod licet non amittatur, minuitur tamen vel augetur, sicuti est animae vita (nam et quamdiu anima est, tamdiu vivit, et quia semper anima est, semper vivit, sed quia magis vivit cum sapit, minusque dum desipit, fit etiam hic aliqua mutatio, non ut desit vita, sicuti deest insipienti

God is said substance-wise, not modification-wise. Therefore the Father is unbegotten substance-wise, and the Son is begotten substance-wise. But being unbegotten is different from being begotten; therefore the Father's substance is different from the Son's." We answer: If everything that is said about God is said substance-wise, then I and the Father are one (Jn 10:30) was said substance-wise. So the substance of the Father and of the Son is one. Or if this is not said substance-wise, then there are some things that are not said about God substance-wise, and therefore we are not obliged to understand unbegotten and begotten substance-wise. Again, it is said of the Son, He thought it no robbery to be equal to God (Phil 2:6). What-wise equal? If he is not called equal substance-wise, then they are admitting that something is not said about God substance-wise; so they should admit that unbegotten and begotten need not be said substance-wise. But if they will not admit it, because they insist on everything being said about God substance-wise, then the Son is equal to the Father substance-wise.

4, 5. We usually give the name "modification" to something that can be lost by some change of the thing it modifies. Even though some modifications are called inseparable, *achorista* in Greek, like the color black in a crow's feather, it does lose it, not indeed as long as it is a feather, but because it is not always a feather. The stuff it is made of is changeable, and so the moment it ceases to be that animal or that feather, and that whole body turns and changes into earth†7 it loses of course that color. As a matter of fact, even a modification that is called separable is not lost by separation but by change—like the blackness of people's hair which can turn white while still remaining hair. It is called a separable modification, but if we stop to think for a moment it will be evident that it is not a question of something being separated and departing from the head, or of blackness leaving and going somewhere else when whiteness takes its place but of that quality of color turning and changing there in the same place. So there is no modification in God because there is nothing in him that can be changed or lost. You may also like to call anything that diminishes and grows a modification even though it cannot be lost, like the life of the soul—for the soul lives as long as it is soul, and since it is always soul it always lives; but it lives more when it is wise and less when it is unwise. So even here you have a change, not indeed one by which life is lost as wisdom is lost by the unwise, but one by which it diminishes. Well, there is nothing like that either with God, because he remains absolutely unchangeable.

6. Nothing therefore is said of him modification-wise because nothing modifies him, but this does not mean that everything said of him is said substance-wise. It is true that with created and changeable things anything that is not said substance-wise can only be said modification-wise. Everything that can

sapientia, sed ut minus sit), nec tale aliquid in Deo fit, quia omnino incommutabilis manet.

In Deo nihil secundum accidens dicitur, sed secundum substantiam aut secundum relativum, quod non est accidens, quia non est mutabile.

5. 6. *Quamobrem nihil in eo secundum accidens dicitur, quia nihil ei accidit; nec tamen omne quod dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur. In rebus enim creatis atque mutabilibus quod non secundum substantiam dicitur, restat ut secundum accidens dicatur. Omnia enim accidunt eis, quae vel amitti possunt vel minui, et magnitudines et qualitates; et quod dicitur ad aliquid sicut amicitiae, propinquitates, servitutes, similitudines, aequalitates, et si qua huiusmodi; et situs et habitus, et loca et tempora, et opera atque passiones¹². In Deo autem nihil quidem secundum accidens dicitur, quia nihil in eo mutabile est; nec tamen omne quod dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur. Dicitur enim ad aliquid¹³ sicut Pater ad Filium, et Filius ad Patrem, quod non est accidens: quia et ille semper Pater, et ille semper Filius; et non ita semper quasi ex quo natus est Filius, aut ex eo quod numquam desinat esse Filius, Pater esse non desinat Pater, sed ex eo quod semper natus est Filius, nec coepit umquam esse Filius. Quod si aliquando esse coepisset, aut aliquando esse desineret Filius, secundum accidens diceretur. Si vero quod dicitur Pater, ad se ipsum diceretur, non ad Filium; et quod dicitur Filius, ad se ipsum diceretur, non ad Patrem; secundum substantiam diceretur et ille Pater et ille Filius. Sed quia et Pater non dicitur Pater nisi ex eo quod est ei Filius, et Filius non dicitur nisi ex eo quod habet Patrem, non secundum substantiam haec dicuntur; quia non quisque eorum ad se ipsum, sed ad invicem atque ad alterutrum ista dicuntur; neque secundum accidens, quia et quod dicitur Pater, et quod dicitur Filius, aeternum atque incommutabile est eis. Quamobrem quamvis diversum sit Patrem esse et Filium esse, non est tamen diversa substantia, quia hoc non secundum substantiam dicuntur, sed secundum relativum; quod tamen relativum non est accidens quia non est mutabile.*

Arianorum argumentum de "Ingenito".

6. 7. *Si autem huic sic putant resistendum esse sermoni, quod Pater quidem ad Filium dicitur, et Filius ad Patrem, ingenitus tamen et genitus ad se ipsos dicuntur non ad alterutrum; non enim hoc est dicere ingenitum quod est Patrem dicere; quia et si Filium non genuisset nihil prohiberet dicere eum*

be lost or diminished is a modification of such things, such as sizes and qualities, and whatever is said with reference to something else†8 like friendships, proximities, subordinations, likenesses, equalities, and anything of that sort; as also positions, possessions, places, times, doings, and undergoings. With God, though, nothing is said modification-wise, because there is nothing changeable with him. And yet not everything that is said of him is said substance-wise. Some things are said with reference to something else, like Father with reference to Son and Son with reference to Father; and this is not said modification-wise, because the one is always Father and the other always Son—not “always” in the sense that he is Son from the moment he is born or†10 that the Father does not cease to be Father from the moment the Son does not cease to be Son, but in the sense that the Son is always born and never began to be Son. If he had some time begun or some time ceased to be Son, it would be predicated modification-wise. If on the other hand what is called Father were called so with reference to itself and not to the Son, and what is called Son were called so with reference to itself and not to the Father, the one would be called Father and the other Son substance-wise. But since the Father is only called so because he has a Son, and the Son is only called so because he has a Father, these things are not said substance-wise, as neither is said with reference to itself but only with reference to the other. Nor are they said modification-wise, because what is signified by calling them Father and Son belongs to them eternally and unchangeably. Therefore, although being Father is different from being Son, there is no difference of substance, because they are not called these things substance-wise but relationship-wise; and yet this relationship is not a modification, because it is not changeable.

6, 7. They may argue back against this line of reasoning by saying that while indeed “Father” is said with reference to “Son” and “Son” with reference to “Father,” “unbegotten” and “begotten” are said with reference to themselves and not to each other. To call him unbegotten is not the same as calling him Father, because there would be nothing to stop you calling him unbegotten even if he had not begotten a son; and if someone does beget a son it does not follow that he is unbegotten, since men who are begotten by other men beget yet others themselves. So they say, “Father is said with reference to Son and Son with reference to Father; but unbegotten is said with reference to itself and begotten is said with reference to itself. And so if whatever is said with reference to itself is said substance-wise; and if being unbegotten is different from being begotten, then there is here a difference of substance.” If that is what they say, then I grant that they are saying something about “unbegotten” that will have to be looked at more closely, because being father does not necessarily follow on being unbegotten nor being

ingenitum, et si gignat quisque filium non ex eo ipse est ingenuus, quia geniti homines ex aliis hominibus, gignunt et ipsi alios; inquit ergo: "Pater ad Filium dicitur, et Filius ad Patrem; ingenuus autem ad se ipsum et genitus ad se ipsum dicitur. Et ideo si quidquid ad se ipsum dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur; diversum est autem ingenuus esse et genitum esse; diversa igitur substantia est". Hoc si dicunt non intellegunt de ingenito quidem aliquid se dicere quod diligentius pertractandum sit, quia nec ideo quisque pater quia ingenuus nec ingenuus ideo quia pater, et propterea non ad aliquid sed ad se dici putatur ingenuus; genitum vero mira caecitate non advertunt dici non posse, nisi ad aliquid. Ideo quippe filius quia genitus, et quia filius utique genitus. Sicut autem filius ad patrem, sic genitus ad genitorem refertur, et sicut pater ad filium ita genitor ad genitum. Ideoque alia notio est qua intellegitur genitor, alia qua ingenuus. Nam quamvis de Patre Deo utrumque dicatur, illud tamen ad genitum, id est ad Filium dicitur, quod nec illi negant; hoc autem quod ingenuus dicitur ad se ipsum dici perhibent. Dicunt ergo: "Si aliquid ad se ipsum dicitur Pater, quod ad se ipsum dici non potest Filius, et quidquid ad se ipsum dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur, et ad se ipsum dicitur ingenuus, quod dici non potest Filius, ergo secundum substantiam dicitur ingenuus, quod Filius quia dici non potest, non est eiusdem substantiae"¹⁴. Cui versutiae respondetur ita ut ipsi cogantur dicere secundum quid sit aequalis Filius Patri, utrum secundum id quod ad se dicitur an secundum id quod ad Patrem dicitur. Non enim secundum id quod ad Patrem dicitur, quoniam ad patrem filius dicitur; ille autem non filius sed pater est. Quia non sic ad se dicuntur pater et filius quomodo amici aut vicini. Relative quippe amicus dicitur ad amicum, et si aequaliter se diligunt, eadem in utroque amicitia est; et relative vicinus dicitur ad vicinum, et quia aequaliter sibi vicini sunt (quantum enim iste illi, tantum et ille huic vicinatur), eadem in utroque vicinitas. Quia vero Filius non ad Filium relative dicitur sed ad Patrem, non secundum hoc quod ad Patrem dicitur aequalis est Filius Patri. Restat ut secundum id aequalis sit quod ad se dicitur. Quidquid autem ad se dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur. Restat ergo ut secundum substantiam sit aequalis. Eadem est igitur utriusque substantia. Cum vero ingenuus dicitur Pater, non quid sit, sed quid non sit dicitur¹⁵. Cum autem relativum negatur, non secundum substantiam negatur quia ipsum relativum non secundum substantiam dicitur.

unbegotten follow on being father; and therefore it might be thought that unbegotten is said with reference to self and not to another. But they are marvelously blind if they fail to notice that begotten can only be said with reference to another. Being son is a consequence of being begotten, and being begotten is implied by being son. Just as "son" is referred to "father," so is "begotten" referred to "begetter," and as father is to son, so is begetter to begotten. So two distinct notions are conveyed by "begetter" and "unbegotten." Both indeed are said of God the Father, but the first is said with reference to the begotten, that is to the Son, and they do not deny this; while as for "unbegotten," they maintain that this is said with reference to self. So they say: "If the Father is called anything with reference to himself that the Son cannot be called with reference to himself; and if anything said with reference to self is said substance-wise, and 'unbegotten' which cannot be said of the Son is said with reference to self; then 'unbegotten' is said substance-wise, and because the Son cannot be called this, he is not of the same substance." The answer to this subtlety is to oblige them to tell us what makes the Son equal to the Father;†11 is it what is said of him with reference to himself, or what is said of him with reference to the Father? Well, it cannot be what he is called with reference to the Father, because with reference to the Father he is called Son; and in this respect the other is not Son but Father, for father and son do not have the same sort of reference to each other as friends or neighbors. Friend of course has reference to friend, and if they love each other equally, there is the same friendship in each; and neighbor has reference to neighbor, and because they neighbor equally on each other (A is as near to B as B is to A), there is the same neighborliness in each. But because son does not have reference to son but to father, it cannot be what he is called with reference to the Father that makes the Son equal to the Father. It remains that what makes him equal must be what he is called with reference to himself. But whatever he is called with reference to himself he is called substance-wise. So it follows that he is equal substance-wise. Therefore the substance of each of them is the same. And when the Father is called unbegotten, it is not being stated what he is, but what he is not. And when a relationship is denied it is not denied substance-wise, because the relationship itself is not affirmed substance-wise.

7, 8. This point must be illustrated by examples. But first we must just establish that when we say "begotten" we mean the same as when we say "son." Being son is a consequence of being begotten, and being begotten is implied by being son. To call something unbegotten, then, is to show that it is not son. But while one can talk correctly about begotten and unbegotten, and while "son" is a perfectly good English word, our normal habits of speech will scarcely allow us to talk about "unson." But it makes no difference to the meaning

Negativa particula id tantum negatur, quod sine illa aiebatur.

7. 8. *Hoc exemplis planum faciendum est. Ac primum videndum est hoc significari cum dicitur genitus, quod significatur cum dicitur filius. Ideo enim filius quia genitus, et quia filius utique genitus. Quod ergo dicitur ingenitus, hoc ostenditur quod non sit filius. Sed genitus et ingenitus commode dicuntur; filius autem latine dicitur, sed "infilius" ut dicatur non admittit loquendi consuetudo. Nihil tamen intellectui demitur si dicatur non Filius, quemadmodum etiam si dicatur non genitus pro eo quod dicitur ingenitus nihil aliud dicitur. Sic enim et vicinus et amicus relative dicuntur, nec tamen potest "invicinus" dici, quomodo dicitur inimicus. Quamobrem non est in rebus considerandum quid vel sinat vel non sinat dici usus sermonis nostri, sed quis rerum ipsarum intellectus eluceat. Non ergo iam dicamus ingenitum quamvis dici latine possit, sed pro eo dicamus non genitum quod tantum valet. Num ergo aliud dicimus quam non filium? Negativa porro ista particula non id efficit ut quod sine illa relative dicitur eadem praeposita substantialiter dicatur, sed id tantum negatur quod sine illa aiebatur, sicut in ceteris praedicamentis. Velut cum dicimus: "Homo est", substantiam designamus. Qui ergo dicit: "Non homo est", non aliud genus praedicamenti enuntiat, sed tantum illud negat. Sicut ergo secundum substantiam aio: "Homo est", sic secundum substantiam nego cum dico: "Non homo est". Et cum quaeritur, quantus sit et aio: "Quadripedalis est", id est quattuor pedum, secundum qualitatem aio, qui dicit: "Non quadripedalis est", secundum quantitatem negat. "Candidus est", secundum qualitatem aio; "Non candidus est", secundum qualitatem nego. "Propinquus est", secundum relativum aio; "Non propinquus est", secundum relativum nego. Secundum situm aio cum dico: "Iacet", secundum situm nego cum dico: "Non iacet". Secundum habitum aio cum dico: "Armatus est"; secundum habitum nego cum dico: "Non armatus est", tantumdem autem valet si dicam: "Inermis est". Secundum tempus aio cum dico: "Hesternus est"; secundum tempus nego cum dico: "Non hesternus est". Et cum dico: "Romae est", secundum locum aio; et secundum locum nego cum dico: "Non Romae est". Secundum id quod est facere aio cum dico: "Caedit"; si autem dicam: "Non caedit", secundum id quod est facere nego, ut ostendam non hoc facere. Et cum dico: "Vapulat", secundum praedicamentum aio quod pati vocatur; et secundum id nego cum dico: "Non vapulat". Et omnino nullum praedicamenti genus est secundum quod aliquid aiere volumus, nisi ut secundum id ipsum praedicamentum*

if one says "not son," just as if you say "not begotten" instead of "unbegotten" you are not saying anything different. There are similar limitations with the relationship words "friend" and "neighbor." One can use the negative adjectives "unfriendly" and "unneighborly" to correspond with "friendly" and "neighborly," but scarcely the negative nouns "unfriend" and "unneighbor."[†] 12 It is as well to realize that what matters in considering actual things is not what our language usage will or will not allow, but what meanings emerge from the things themselves. So let us stop saying unbegotten, although we can say it in English, and instead let us say not begotten, which has the same value. Are we saying anything else than not son? Now this negative particle does not have the effect that something said without it relationship-wise is said substance-wise with it; its effect is simply to deny what without it is affirmed, as in all other predications. Thus when we say "It is a man," we indicate substance. If you say "It is not a man," you do not state another kind of predication, you merely deny this one. As I affirm substance-wise "It is a man," so I deny substance-wise when I say "It is not a man." And when you ask how big he is and I affirm "He is four foot"—that is, four feet tall[†] 13—someone who says "He is not four foot" is denying quantity-wise. "He is white" I affirm quality-wise; "He is not white" I deny quality-wise. "He is near" I affirm relationship-wise; "He is not near" I deny relationship-wise. I affirm position-wise when I say "He is lying down"; I deny position-wise when I say "He is not lying down." I affirm possession-wise when I say "He is armed"; I deny possession-wise when I say "He is not armed"—and it would be exactly the same if I said "He is unarmed." I affirm time-wise when I say "He was born yesterday"; I deny time-wise when I say "He was not born yesterday." When I say "He is in Rome," I affirm place-wise; I deny place-wise when I say "He is not in Rome" I affirm action-wise when I say "He is beating"; but if I say "He is not beating" I deny action-wise to show that he is not acting like this. And when I say "He is being beaten" I affirm with the predication that is called passion; and I deny in the same way when I say "He is not being beaten." In a word, there is no kind of predication we may care to affirm with, which we are not obliged equally to employ if we wish to insert the negative particle. This being so, if I affirmed substance-wise by saying "son," I would deny substance-wise by saying "not son." But because in fact I affirm relationship-wise when I say "son," since I refer it to father, I deny relationship-wise when I say "He is not a son," since I am referring the negation to parent, in wishing to declare that he has not got a parent. But if what is meant by saying "son" can be said just as well by saying "begotten" as I remarked above, then one can say "not son" just as well by saying "not begotten." Now we deny relationship-wise when we say "not son"; therefore we deny relationship-wise when we say "not begotten." And what does unbegotten mean but not begotten? So we do not leave the predication of

*negare convincamur si praeponere negativam particulam voluerimus*¹⁶. *Quae cum ita sint*¹⁷, *si substantialiter aierem dicendo "Filius" substantialiter negarem dicendo "Non filius" Quia vero relative aio cum dico: "Filius est", ad Patrem enim refero; relative nego si dico: "Non filius est", ad parentem enim eandem negationem refero, volens ostendere quod ei parens non sit. At si quantum valet quod dicitur "filius", tantundem valet quod dicitur "genitus", sicut praelocuti sumus, tantundem ergo valet quod dicitur "non genitus" quantum valet quod dicitur "non filius". Relative autem negamus dicendo "non filius"; relative igitur negamus dicendo "non genitus". Ingenitus porro quid est, nisi non genitus? Non ergo receditur a relativo praedicamento cum ingenitus dicitur. Sicut enim genitus non ad se ipsum dicitur, sed quod ex genitore sit; ita cum dicitur ingenitus non ad se ipsum dicitur sed quod ex genitore non sit ostenditur. In eodem tamen praedicamento quod relativum vocatur utraque significatio vertitur. Quod autem relative pronuntiatur non indicat substantiam. Ita quamvis diversum sit genitus et ingenitus, non indicat diversam substantiam, quia sicut filius ad patrem et non filius ad non patrem refertur, ita genitus ad genitorem, et non genitus ad non genitorem referatur necesse est.*

Aliqua dicuntur in Deo secundum substantiam, aliqua secundum relationem, aliqua translate.

8. 9. *Quapropter illud praecipue teneamus, quidquid ad se dicitur praestantissima illa et divina sublimitas substantialiter dici; quod autem ad aliquid*¹⁸ *non substantialiter, sed relative; tantamque vim esse eiusdem substantiae in Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, ut quidquid de singulis ad se ipsos dicitur, non pluraliter in summa, sed singulariter accipiatur. Quemadmodum enim Deus est Pater, et Filius Deus est, et Spiritus Sanctus Deus est, quod secundum substantiam dici nemo dubitat, non tamen tres deos sed unum Deum dicimus eam ipsam praestantissimam Trinitatem. Ita magnus Pater, magnus Filius, magnus et Spiritus Sanctus; nec tamen tres magni sed unus magnus. Non enim de Patre solo sicut illi perverse sentiunt, sed de Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto scriptum est: Tu es solus Deus, magnus*¹⁹. *Et bonus Pater, bonus Filius, bonus et Spiritus Sanctus; nec tres boni, sed unus bonus, de quo dictum est: Nemo bonus, nisi unus Deus*²⁰. *Etenim Dominus Iesus ne ab illo qui dixerat: Magister bone*²¹, *tamquam hominem compellans secundum hominem tantummodo intellexeretur, ideo non ait: "Nemo bonus nisi solus Pater", sed: Nemo bonus nisi unus Deus. In Patris*

relationship when we say unbegotten. Just as begotten is not said with reference to self but means being from a begetter, so unbegotten is not said with reference to self but simply means not being from a begetter. Each meaning belongs to the predication that is called relationship. And what is stated relationship-wise does not designate substance. So although begotten differs from unbegotten, it does not indicate a different substance, because just as son refers to father, and not son to not father, so begotten must refer to begetter, and not begotten to not begetter.†14

Chapter 2: The use of substantive predications of God is examined in more detail,...

8, 9. The chief point then that we must maintain is that whatever that supreme and divine majesty is called with reference to itself is said substance-wise; whatever it is called with reference to another is said not substance- but relationship-wise; and that such is the force of the expression "of the same substance" in Father and Son and Holy Spirit, that whatever is said with reference to self about each of them is to be taken as adding up in all three to a singular and not to a plural. Thus the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God, and no one denies that this is said substance-wise; and yet we say that this supreme triad is not three Gods but one God. Likewise the Father is great, the Son is great, the Holy Spirit too is great; yet there are not three great ones but one great one. It is not, after all, about the Father alone that scripture says You alone are the great God (Ps 86:10), as they perversely consider, but about Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Again, the Father is good, the Son is good, the Holy Spirit too is good; yet there are not three good ones but one good one, of whom it is said No one is good but the one God (Mk 10:18; Lk 18:19). When the Lord Jesus was accosted just as a man by the young man who said Good master, he did not want to be taken for just a man, and so he significantly said, not "No one is good but the Father alone," but No one is good but the one God (Mk 10:18; Lk 18:19). The name "Father" signifies only the Father in himself†15 but the name "God" includes him and the Son and the Holy Spirit, because the one God is a trinity. As for position, possession, times, and places, they are not stated properly about God but by way of metaphor and simile. Thus he is said to be seated on the cherubim (Ps 80:2), which is said with reference to position; and the deep is his clothing like a garment (Ps 104:6) which refers to possession; and Your years will not fail (Ps 102:28) which refers to time; and If I climb up to heaven you are there (Ps 139:8) which refers to place. As far, though, as making or doing is concerned, perhaps this can be said with complete truth only about God; he alone makes and is not made, nor does he suffer or undergo anything so far as his substance by which he is God is concerned. So then, the Father is almighty, the Son is

enim nomine ipse per se Pater pronuntiatur, in Dei vero et ipse et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, quia Trinitas unus Deus. Situs vero et habitus et loca et tempora non proprie sed translate ac per similitudines dicuntur in Deo. Nam et sedere super cherubim²² dicitur, quod ad situm dicitur; et: Abyssus tamquam vestimentum amictus ipsius²³, quod ad habitum; et: Anni tui non deficient²⁴, quod ad tempus; et: Si ascendero in caelum, tu ibi es²⁵, quod ad locum. Quod autem ad faciendum attinet fortassis de solo Deo verissime dicitur; solus enim Deus facit et ipse non fit, neque patitur quantum ad eius substantiam pertinet qua Deus est. Itaque omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens Spiritus Sanctus, nec tamen tres omnipotentes sed unus Omnipotens; ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia; ipsi gloria²⁶. Quidquid ergo ad se ipsum dicitur Deus, et de singulis Personis singulariter dicitur, Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, et simul de ipsa Trinitate, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicitur. Quoniam quippe non aliud est Deo esse et aliud magnum esse, sed hoc idem illi est esse quod magnum esse, propterea sicut non dicimus tres essentias, sic non dicimus tres magnitudines, sed unam essentiam et unam magnitudinem. Essentiam dico quae οὐσία graece dicitur, quam usitatus, substantiam, vocamus.

Una essentia, tres Personae.

8. 10. Dicunt quidem et illi ὑπόστασις, sed nescio quid volunt interesse inter οὐσία et ὑπόστασις ita ut plerique nostri qui haec graeco tractant eloquio dicere consuerint **μίαν οὐσίαν, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις**, quod est latine: unam essentiam, tres substantias.

9. 10. Sed quia nostra loquendi consuetudo iam obtinuit ut hoc intellegatur cum dicimus essentiam quod intellegitur cum dicimus substantiam, non audemus dicere unam essentiam, tres substantias, sed unam essentiam, vel substantiam, tres autem personas; multi Latini ista tractantes et digni auctoritate dixerunt, cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent quo enuntiarent verbis quod sine verbis intellegebant. Revera enim quod Pater non sit Filius, et Filius non sit Pater, et Spiritus Sanctus ille qui etiam donum Dei²⁷ vocatur, nec Pater sit nec Filius, tres utique sunt. Ideoque pluraliter dictum est: Ego et Pater unum sumus²⁸. Non enim dixit: "Unum est", quod Sabelliani dicunt²⁹, sed unum sumus. Tamen cum quaeritur quid Tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen "tres personae", non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur.

almighty, the Holy Spirit is almighty; yet there are not three almighties but one almighty; from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things: to him be glory (Rom 11:36). So whatever God is called with reference to self is both said three times over†16 about each of the persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and at the same time is said in the singular and not the plural about the trinity. As it is not one thing for God to be and another for him to be great, but being is for Him the same thing as being great, for that reason we do not say three greatnesses any more than we say three beings, but one being and one greatness. By "being" I mean here what is called ousia in Greek, which we more usually call substance.

10. The Greeks also have another word, hypostasis, but they make a distinction that is rather obscure to me between ousia and hypostasis, so that most of our people†17 who treat of these matters in Greek are accustomed to say mia ousia, treis hypostaseis, which in English is literally one being, three substances.†18

9 But because we have grown accustomed in our usage to meaning the same thing by "being" as by "substance," we do not dare say one being, three substances. Rather, one being or substance, three persons†19 is what many Latin authors, whose authority carries weight, have said when treating of these matters, being able to find no more suitable way of expressing in words what they understood without words. In very truth, because the Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Father, and the Holy Spirit who is also called the gift of God (Acts 8:20; Jn 4:10) is neither the Father nor the Son, they are certainly three. That is why it is said in the plural I and the Father are one (Jn 10:30). He did not say "is one," which the Sabellians say, but "are one." Yet when you ask "Three what?" human speech labors under a great dearth of words. So we say three persons, not in order to say that precisely, but in order not to be reduced to silence.

10, 11. To return to the point I was discussing: just as we do not say three beings, neither do we say three greatnesses or three great ones. In things that are great by partaking of greatness, things where being is one thing and being great another, like a great house and a great mountain and a great heart, in such things greatness is one thing and that which is great with this greatness is another—thus greatness is certainly not the same thing as a great house. True greatness is that by which not only is a great house great or any great mountain great, but by which anything at all is great that is called great, so that greatness is one thing and things that are called great by it another. This greatness of course is primarily great and much more excellently so than the things that are great by partaking of it. God however is not great with a greatness which he is not himself, as though God were to participate in it to be great; otherwise this greatness would be

In Deo non tres magnitudines, neque tres magni.

10. 11. Sicut ergo non dicimus tres essentias, ita non dicimus tres magnitudines neque tres magnos. In rebus enim quae participatione magnitudinis magnae sunt quibus aliud est esse, aliud magnas esse sicut magna domus et magnus mons et magnus animus, in his ergo rebus aliud est magnitudo, aliud quod ab ea magnitudine magnum est, et prorsus non hoc est magnitudo quod est magna domus. Sed illa est vera magnitudo qua non solum magna est domus quae magna est et qua magnus est mons quisquis magnus est, sed etiam qua magnum est quicquid aliud magnum dicitur, ut aliud sit ipsa magnitudo, aliud ea quae ab illa magna dicuntur. Quae magnitudo utique primitus magna est multoque excellentius quam ea quae participatione eius magna sunt. Deus autem quia non ea magnitudine magnus est quae non est quod ipse, ut quasi particeps eius sit Deus cum magnus est (alioquin illa erit maior magnitudo quam Deus; Deo autem non est aliquid maius), ea igitur magnitudine magnus est qua ipse est eadem magnitudo. Et ideo sicut non dicimus tres essentias, sic nec tres magnitudines; hoc est enim Deo esse quod est magnum esse. Eadem causa nec magnos tres dicimus, sed unum magnum, quia non participatione magnitudinis Deus magnus est, sed se ipso magno magnus est quia ipse sua est magnitudo. Hoc et de bonitate et de aeternitate et de omnipotentia Dei dictum sit omnibusque omnino praedicamentis, quae de Deo possunt pronuntiari, quod ad se ipsum dicitur non translate ac per similitudinem sed proprie, si tamen de illo proprie aliquid ore hominis dici potest.

Quid in Trinitate relative dicatur. Relatio non apparet cum dicitur "Spiritus Sanctus" apparet autem cum dicitur "Donum".

11. 12. Quod autem proprie singula in eadem Trinitate dicuntur nullo modo ad se ipsa, sed ad invicem aut ad creaturam dicuntur, et ideo relative non substantialiter ea dici manifestum est. Sicut enim Trinitas unus Deus dicitur magnus, bonus, aeternus, omnipotens, idemque ipse sua sic dici potest deitas, ipse sua magnitudo, ipse sua bonitas, ipse sua aeternitas, ipse sua omnipotentia; non sic dici potest Trinitas Pater, nisi forte translate ad creaturam propter adoptionem filiorum. Quod enim scriptum est: Audi, Israel: Dominus Deus tuus Dominus unus est³⁰, non utique excepto Filio aut excepto Spiritu Sancto oportet intellegi, quem unum Dominum Deum nostrum, recte dicimus etiam: Patrem nostrum³¹, per

greater than God. But there is nothing greater than God. So he is great with a greatness by which he is himself this same greatness. And that is why we do not say three greatnesses any more than we say three beings; for God it is the same thing to be as to be great. For the same reason we do not say three great ones but one great one, because God is not great by participating in greatness, but he is great with his great self because he is his own greatness. The same must be said about goodness and eternity and omnipotence and about absolutely all the predications that can be stated of God, because it is all said with reference to himself, and not metaphorically either or in simile but properly—if anything, that is, can be said properly about him by a human tongue.

Chapter 3: The use of relative predications about God is examined in more detail;...

11, 12. But as for the things each of the three in this triad is called that are proper or peculiar to himself, such things are never said with reference to self but only with reference to each other or to creation,†20 and therefore it is clear that they are said by way of relationship and not by way of substance. The triad, the one God, is called great, good, eternal, omnipotent, and he can also be called his own godhead, his own greatness, his own goodness, his own eternity, his own omnipotence; but the triad cannot in the same way be called Father, except perhaps metaphorically with reference to creation because of the adoption of sons.†21 The text Hear, O Israel: the Lord your God is one Lord (Dt 6:4) is not to be understood as excluding the Son or excluding the Holy Spirit, and this one Lord we rightly call our Father as well because he regenerates us by his grace.

In no way at all, however, can the trinity be called Son. As for Holy Spirit, in terms of the text God is spirit (Jn 4:24),†22 the triad can as a whole be called this, because both Father and Son are also spirit. So because Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God, and because God of course is holy and God is spirit, the triad can be called both holy and spirit. And yet that Holy Spirit whom we understand as being not the triad but in the triad, insofar as he is properly or peculiarly called the Holy Spirit, is so called relationship-wise, being referred to both Father and Son, since the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son.†23 This relationship, to be sure, is not apparent in this particular name, but it is apparent when he is called the gift of God (Acts 8:20; Jn 4:10). He is the gift of the Father and of the Son, because on the one hand he proceeds from the Father (Jn 15:26), as the Lord says; and on the other the apostle's words, Whoever does not have the Spirit of Christ is not one of his (Rom 8:9), are spoken of the Holy Spirit. So when we say "the gift of the giver" and "the giver of the gift," we say each with reference to the other. So the Holy Spirit is a kind of inexpressible communion or fellowship of Father and Son,†24 and perhaps

gratiam suam nos regenerantem. Trinitas autem Filius nullo modo dici potest³². Spiritus vero Sanctus, secundum id quod scriptum est: Quoniam Deus Spiritus est³³, potest quidem universaliter dici quia et Pater Spiritus et Filius Spiritus, et Pater sanctus et Filius sanctus. Itaque Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, quoniam unus Deus et utique Deus sanctus est, et Deus Spiritus est potest appellari Trinitas et Spiritus et Sanctus³⁴. Sed tamen ille Spiritus Sanctus qui non Trinitas sed in Trinitate intellegitur in eo quod proprie dicitur Spiritus Sanctus, relative dicitur cum et ad Patrem et ad Filium refertur, quia Spiritus Sanctus et Patris et Filii Spiritus est³⁵. Sed ipsa relatio non apparet in hoc nomine; apparet autem cum dicitur donum Dei³⁶. Donum enim est Patris et Filii, quia et a Patre procedit,³⁷ sicut Dominus dicit, et quod Apostolus ait: Qui Spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius³⁸, de ipso utique Spiritu Sancto ait. "Donum" ergo "donatoris" et "donator doni", cum dicimus, relative utrumque ad invicem dicimus. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus ineffabilis quaedam Patris Filiique communio, et ideo fortasse sic appellatur, quia Patri et Filio potest eadem appellatio convenire. Nam hoc ipse proprie dicitur quod illi communiter quia et Pater spiritus et Filius spiritus, et Pater sanctus, et Filius sanctus. Ut ergo ex nomine quod utrique convenit, utriusque communio significetur, vocatur donum amborum Spiritus Sanctus. Et haec Trinitas unus Deus, solus, bonus, magnus, aeternus, omnipotens; ipse sibi unitas, deitas, magnitudo, bonitas, aeternitas, omnipotentia.

In multis relativis non invenitur vocabulum quo sibi vicissim respondeant quae ad se referuntur.

12. 13. Nec movere debet, quoniam diximus relative dici Spiritum Sanctum, (non ipsam Trinitatem sed eum qui est in Trinitate), quia non ei videtur vicissim respondere vocabulum eius ad quem refertur. Non enim, sicut dicimus servum domini et dominum servi, filium patris et patrem filii, quoniam ista relative dicuntur, ita etiam hic possumus dicere. Dicimus enim Spiritum Sanctum Patris³⁹, sed non vicissim dicimus Patrem Spiritus Sancti, ne filius eius intellegatur Spiritus Sanctus. Item dicimus Spiritum sanctum Filii⁴⁰, sed non dicimus Filium Spiritus sancti ne pater eius intellegatur Spiritus Sanctus. In multis enim relativis hoc contingit, ut non inveniatur vocabulum quo sibi vicissim respondeant quae ad se referuntur. Quid enim tam manifeste relative dicitur quam pignus? Ad id quippe refertur cuius pignus est, et semper pignus alicuius rei pignus est. Num ergo cum dicimus pignus Patris et Filii⁴¹, possumus vicissim

he is given this name just because the same name can be applied to the Father and the Son. He is properly called what they are called in common, seeing that both Father and Son are holy and both Father and Son are spirit. So to signify the communion of them both by a name which applies to them both, the gift of both is called the Holy Spirit. And this three is one only God, good, great, eternal, omnipotent; his own unity, godhead, greatness, goodness, eternity, omnipotence.

13. Nor should the reader be worried by our saying that Holy Spirit (not the triad itself but the one member of the triad) is said relationship-wise, on the grounds that there does not seem to be a corresponding name to which this one is referred. As we say servant of the master, so we say master of the servant, and likewise son of the father and father of the son, because these are all said relationship-wise; and it is true that we cannot say the same in this case. We say the Holy Spirit of the Father, but we do not reverse it and say the Father of the Holy Spirit, or then we should take the Holy Spirit to be his son. Again, we say the Holy Spirit of the Son, but we do not say the Son of the Holy Spirit, or we should take the Holy Spirit to be his father. But this happens in many relationships, where we cannot find two corresponding words to be referred to each other. Could anything more obviously be said relationship-wise than "pledge"? It is referred to that which it is a pledge of, and a pledge is always a pledge of something. So then when we say pledge of the Father and of the Son†25 can we turn it round and say Father of the pledge or Son of the pledge? When however we say gift of the Father and of the Son, it is true that we cannot say Father of the gift or Son of the gift, but to get a correspondence here we say gift of the giver and giver of the gift. Here in fact we can find an ordinary word, but in the other two cases we cannot.

13, 14. Coming now to the Father, he is called Father relationship-wise, and he is also called origin relationship-wise, and perhaps other things too. But he is called Father with reference to the Son, origin with reference to all things that are from him. Again, the Son is so called relationship-wise; he is also called Word and image relationship-wise, and with all these names he is referred to the Father, while the Father himself is called none of these things. The Son, however, is also called origin; when he was asked Who are you? He replied, The origin, because†26 I am also speaking to you (Jn 8:25).†27 But surely not the origin of the Father? No, he wanted to indicate that he is the creator when he said he was the origin, just as the Father is the origin of creation because all things are from him. For creator is said with reference to creation as master is with reference to servant. And so when we call both the Father origin and the Son origin, we are not saying two origins of creation, because Father and Son are together one origin with reference to creation, just as they are one creator, one God. Furthermore,

dicere Patrem pignoris aut Filium pignoris? At vero cum dicimus donum Patris et Filii, non quidem possumus dicere Patrem doni aut Filium doni, sed ut haec vicissim respondeant, dicimus donum donatoris, et donatorem doni; quia hic potuit inveniri usitatum vocabulum, illic non potuit.

Principium in Trinitate relative dicitur.

13. 14. Dicitur ergo relative Pater idemque relative dicitur principium, et si quid forte aliud; sed Pater ad Filium dicitur, principium vero ad omnia quae ab ipso sunt. Item dicitur relative Filius; relative dicitur et Verbum et Imago, et in omnibus his vocabulis ad Patrem refertur; nihil autem horum Pater dicitur. Et principium dicitur Filius; cum enim diceretur ei: Tu quis es?, respondit: Principium, qui et loquor vobis⁴². Sed numquid Patris principium? Creatorem se quippe ostendere voluit, cum se dixit esse principium, sicut et Pater principium est creaturae, eo quod ab ipso sunt omnia. Nam et creator relative dicitur ad creaturam, sicut dominus ad servum. Et ideo cum dicimus et Patrem principium⁴³, et Filium principium⁴⁴, non duo principia creaturae dicimus, quia Pater et Filius simul ad creaturam unum principium est, sicut unus Creator⁴⁵, sicut unus Deus. Si autem quidquid in se manet et gignit aliquid vel operatur, principium est ei rei quam gignit vel ei quam operatur; non possumus negare etiam Spiritum Sanctum recte dici principium, quia non eum separamus ab appellatione Creatoris. Et scriptum est de illo quod operetur⁴⁶, et utique in se manens operatur; non enim in aliquid eorum quae operatur ipse mutatur et vertitur⁴⁷. Et quae operatur vide: Unicuique autem, inquit, datur manifestatio Spiritus ad utilitatem. Alii quidem datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae; alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem Spiritum; alteri autem fides in eodem Spiritu; alii donatio curationum in uno Spiritu; alii operationes virtutum; alii prophetia; alii diiudicatio spirituum; alteri genera linguarum. Omnia autem haec operatur unus atque idem Spiritus, dividens propria unicuique prout vult⁴⁸, utique sicut Deus. Quis enim tanta illa potest operari nisi Deus? Idem autem Deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus⁴⁹. Nam et singillatim si interrogemur de Spiritu Sancto, verissime respondemus quod Deus sit, et cum Patre et Filio simul unus Deus est⁵⁰. Unum ergo principium ad creaturam dicitur Deus, non duo vel tria principia.

Pater et Filius principium Spiritus Sancti.

14. 15. Ad se autem invicem in Trinitate si gignens ad id quod gignit principium est, Pater ad Filium

if anything that abides in itself and produces or achieves something is the origin of the thing it produces or achieves, we cannot deny the Holy Spirit the right to be called origin either, because we do not exclude him from the title of creator. It is written of him that he achieves, and of course he abides in himself as he achieves; he does not turn or change into any of the things that he achieves. Observe what he achieves: To each one, it says, is given a manifestation of the Spirit for advantage. To one is given through the Spirit a word of wisdom; to another a word of knowledge according to the same Spirit; to another faith in the same Spirit; to another the gift of healing in the one Spirit; to another workings of mighty deeds, to another prophecy, to another discrimination of spirits, to another varieties of tongues. But all these things are achieved by one and the same Spirit distributing them severally to each just as he wills (1 Cor 12:7-11)—as God of course. Who but God can achieve such great things? It is the same God who achieves all things in all of us (1 Cor 12:6). If, after all, we are asked specifically about the Holy Spirit, we reply with perfect truth that he is God, and with the Father and the Son he is together one God. So God is called one origin with reference to creation, not two or three origins.

14, 15. But to return to the mutual relationships within the trinity: if the producer is the origin with reference to what it produces, then the Father is origin with reference to the Son, because he produced or begot him. But whether the Father is origin with respect to the Holy Spirit because it is said that He proceeds from the Father (Jn 15:26), that is quite a question. If it is so, then he will be origin not only for what he begets or makes, but also for what he gives. And here perhaps some light begins to dawn as far as it is possible on a problem that often worries many people, namely why the Holy Spirit too is not a son, seeing that he too comes forth from the Father, as it says in the gospel. †28 He comes forth, you see, not as being born but as being given, and so he is not called son, because he was not born like the only begotten Son, nor made and born adoptively by grace †29 like us. What was born of the Father is referred to the Father alone when he is called Son, and therefore he is the Father's Son and not ours too. But what has been given is referred both to him who gave and to those it was given to; and so the Holy Spirit is not only called the Spirit of the Father and the Son who gave him, but also our Spirit who received him. It is like salvation, which is called the salvation of the Lord who gives salvation, and also our salvation because we receive it. So the Spirit is both God's who gave it and ours who received it. I do not mean that spirit of ours by which we are, which is also called the spirit of man which is in him (1 Cor 2:11); this Holy Spirit is ours in a different way, the way in which we say Give us our bread (Mt 6:11; Lk 11:3). Though as a matter of fact we also received that spirit which is called the spirit of man; What have you, it says, that you did not receive (1 Cor 4:7)? But what we

principium est quia genuit eum. Utrum autem et ad Spiritum Sanctum principium sit Pater, quoniam dictum est: De Patre procedit⁵¹, non parva quaestio est. Quia si ita est, non iam principium ei tantum rei erit quam gignit aut facit, sed etiam ei quam dat. Ubi et illud elucescit, ut potest, quod solet multos movere, cur non sit Filius etiam Spiritus Sanctus, cum et ipse a Patre exeat, sicut in Evangelio legitur⁵². Exit enim, non quomodo natus, sed quomodo datus, et ideo non dicitur Filius quia neque natus est sicut Unigenitus, neque factus ut per gratiam in adoptionem nasceretur sicuti nos⁵³. Quod enim de Patre natum est, ad Patrem solum refertur cum dicitur Filius, et ideo Filius Patris est, non et noster⁵⁴. Quod autem datum est et ad eum qui dedit refertur et ad eos quibus dedit; itaque Spiritus Sanctus non tantum Patris et Filii qui dederunt, sed etiam noster dicitur qui accepimus⁵⁵, sicut dicitur: Domini salus⁵⁶ qui dat salutem, eadem etiam nostra salus⁵⁷ est qui accepimus. Spiritus ergo et Dei qui dedit, et noster qui accepimus. Non ille spiritus noster quo sumus, quia ipse spiritus est hominis qui in ipso est⁵⁸, sed alio modo iste noster, quo dicimus et: Panem nostrum da nobis⁵⁹. Quamquam et illum spiritum qui hominis dicitur, utique accepimus. Quid enim habes, inquit, quod non accepisti⁶⁰? Sed aliud est quod accepimus ut essemus, aliud quod accepimus ut sancti essemus. Unde scriptum est et de Ioanne quod in spiritu et virtute Eliae⁶¹ veniret; dictus est Eliae spiritus, sed Spiritus Sanctus quem accepit Elias. Hoc et de Moysse intellegendum est, cum ait ei Dominus: Tollam de spiritu tuo et dabo eis⁶², hoc est dabo illis de Spiritu Sancto quem iam tibi dedi. Si ergo et quod datur principium habet eum a quo datur quia non aliunde accepit illud quod ab ipso procedit, fatendum est Patrem et Filium principium esse Spiritus Sancti, non duo principia, sed sicut Pater et Filius unus Deus, et ad creaturam relative unus Creator et unus Dominus, sic relative ad Spiritum Sanctum unum principium; ad creaturam vero Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unum principium sicut unus Creator et unus Dominus.

An Spiritus Sanctus esset donum et antequam daretur.

15. 16. *Interiorius autem quaeritur, utrum quemadmodum Filius non hoc tantum habet nascendo ut Filius sit, sed omnino ut sit; sic et Spiritus Sanctus eo quo datur habeat, non tantum ut donum sit, sed omnino ut sit; utrum ergo erat antequam daretur sed nondum erat donum, an eo ipso quo daturus erat eum Deus iam donum erat, et antequam daretur. Sed si non procedit nisi cum datur, nec procederet utique priusquam esset cui daretur. Quomodo iam erat ipsa*

received in order to be is one thing, what we received in order to be holy is another. So then, it is said of John that he would come in the Spirit and power of Elijah (Lk 1:17); it is called the Spirit of Elijah, but it means the Holy Spirit which Elijah received. The same is to be understood of Moses when the Lord said to him, I will take some of your Spirit and give it to them (Nm 11:17), that is, "I will give them a share in the Holy Spirit which I have already given to you." If therefore what is given also has him it is given by as its origin, because it did not receive its proceeding from him from anywhere else,†30 we must confess that the Father and the Son are the origin of the Holy Spirit; not two origins, but just as Father and Son are one God, and with reference to creation one creator and one lord, so with reference to the Holy Spirit they are one origin; but with reference to creation Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit are one origin, just as they are one creator and one lord.

15, 16. Now an even deeper†31 question arises: the Son by being born not only gets his being the Son but quite simply his being; does the Holy Spirit in the same way not only get his being gift by being given, but also quite simply his being? In that case we go on to ask whether he was even before he was given, but was not yet gift, or whether perhaps even before he was given he was gift because God was going to give him. But if he only proceeds when he is given, he would surely not proceed before there was anyone for him to be given to. How could he already be that divine substance, if he only is by being given, just as the Son gets his being that substance by being born, and does not just get being Son, which is said relationship-wise? Or is the answer that the Holy Spirit always proceeds and proceeds from eternity, not from a point of time; but because he so proceeds as to be giveable, he was already gift even before there was anyone to give him to? There is a difference between calling something a gift, and calling it a donation; it can be a gift even before it is given, but it cannot be called in any way a donation unless it has been given.†32

Chapter 4: A problem is discussed which is raised by those names that refer God to creation.

16, 17. We should not be disturbed at the Holy Spirit, although he is coeternal with the Father and the Son, being said to be something from a point of time, like this name we have just used of "donation." The Spirit, to make myself clear, is everlastingly gift, but donation only from a point of time. But what about "lord"? If a man is not called a lord except from the moment he begins to have a slave, then this relationship title too belongs to God from a point of time, since the creation he is lord of is not from everlasting. But then how will we be able to maintain that relationship terms are not modifications with God, since nothing happens to him

substantia si non est nisi quia datur, sicut Filius non tantum ut sit Filius, quod relative dicitur, sed omnino ut sit ipsa substantia nascendo habet? An semper procedit Spiritus Sanctus, et non ex tempore, sed ab aeternitate procedit; sed quia sic procedebat, ut esset donabile, iam donum erat et antequam esset cui daretur⁶³? Aliter enim intellegitur cum dicitur donum, aliter cum dicitur donatum. Nam donum potest esse et antequam detur; donatum autem nisi datum fuerit nullo modo dici potest⁶⁴.

Quod de Deo ex tempore dicitur relative dicitur, non accidentaliter, quia in creatura fit mutatio, non in Deo.

16. 17. *Nec moveat quod Spiritus Sanctus, cum sit coaeternus Patri et Filio, dicitur tamen aliquid ex tempore veluti hoc ipsum quod donatum diximus. Nam sempiternae Spiritus donum, temporaliter autem donatum⁶⁵. Nam et si dominus non dicitur, nisi cum habere incipit servum, etiam ista appellatio relativa ex tempore est Deo; non enim sempiterna creatura est cuius est ille Dominus. Quomodo ergo obtinebimus nec ipsa relativa esse accidentia, quoniam nihil accidit Deo temporaliter, quia non est mutabilis sicut in exordio huius disputationis tractavimus? Ecce Dominum esse non sempiternum habet ne cogamur etiam creaturam sempiternam dicere, quia ille sempiternae non dominaretur nisi etiam ista sempiternae famularetur. Sicut autem non potest esse servus, qui non habet dominum, sic nec dominus qui non habet servum. Et quisquis exstiterit qui aeternum quidem Deum solum dicat, tempora autem non esse aeterna propter varietatem et mutabilitatem, sed tamen tempora non in tempore esse coepisse (non enim erat tempus antequam inciperent tempora, et ideo non in tempore accidit Deo ut Dominus esset, quia ipsorum temporum Dominus erat, quae utique non in tempore esse coeperunt), quid respondebit de homine qui in tempore factus est, cuius utique Dominus non erat antequam esset cui esset? Certe vel ut Dominus hominis esset ex tempore accidit Deo, et ut omnis auferri videatur controversia, certe ut tuus Dominus esset, aut meus, qui modo esse coepimus, ex tempore accidit Deo. Aut si et hoc propter obscuram quaestionem animae videtur incertum, quid ut esset Dominus populi Israel? Quia etsi iam erat animae natura quam ille populus habebat (quomodo non quaerimus), tamen ille populus nondum erat, et quando esse coepit apparet. Postremo ut Dominus esset huius arboris et huius segetis, ex tempore accidit, quae modo esse coeperunt. Quia etsi materies ipsa iam erat, aliud est tamen dominum esse materiae,*

in time because he is not changeable, as we established at the beginning of this discussion? Look, this is the problem: He cannot be everlastingly lord, or we would be compelled to say that creation is everlasting, because he would only be everlastingly lord if creation were everlastingly serving him. As there cannot be a slave who has not got a lord, so there cannot be a lord who has not got a slave.†33 Someone may now stand up and say that indeed God alone is eternal, and time is not eternal because of variability and changeableness, and yet that time did not begin to be in time (there was not any time for time to begin in before time began); and therefore it did not happen to God in time to be lord, because he was lord of time which did not begin to be in time. But what will he say about man, who certainly was made in time, and whose lord God was not before he, man, existed? Certainly it happened to God in time to be at least the lord of man; and to put the issue beyond all doubt, it happens to God in time to be my lord or your lord, seeing that we came to be pretty recently. Well, perhaps even this might be doubtful, given that there is a knotty question about the soul.†34 But then what about his being the Lord of the people of Israel? Even granting that the nature of the soul, which that people had, already existed—how, we will not inquire—yet that people did not yet exist, and we can point clearly to the moment when it began to be. Anyway to settle the matter, it happens to him in time to be the lord of this tree or of this crop of corn which has only recently begun to be. Even if the material it is made of was already there before, it is one thing to be lord of the material, another to be lord of the formed nature. Even man is at one time lord or owner of the wood and at another lord or owner of the chest; although the chest is made from the wood, he was not owner of the chest while he was just owner of the wood. How then are we going to be able to maintain that nothing is said of God by way of modification? Well, we say that nothing happens to his nature to change it, and so these are not relationship modifications which happen with some change in the things they are predicated of. Thus it is true a man is called friend by way of relationship, and he does not begin to be a friend until he begins to be friendly; so there is some change in his will involved in his being called friend. But when a coin is called the price of something it is so called relationship-wise, and yet in this case no change occurs in it when it begins to be a price; and the same is true of pledge and similar things.†35 So if a coin can be talked of in relationship terms so often without any change in its form or nature as coin occurring whenever it starts or stops being talked of like that, how much more readily should we accept a similar position about the unchangeable substance of God? Thus when he is called something with reference to creation, while indeed he begins to be called it in time, we should understand that this does not involve anything happening to God's own substance, but only to the created thing to which the relationship predicated of

aliud esse dominum iam factae naturae. Alio enim tempore est etiam homo dominus ligni, et alio tempore est dominus arcae, quamvis ex ipso ligno fabricatae, quod utique non erat cum ligni dominus iam esset. Quomodo igitur obtinebimus nihil secundum accidens dici Deum, nisi quia ipsius naturae nihil accidit quo mutetur, ut ea sint accidentia relativa, quae cum aliqua mutatione rerum de quibus dicuntur accidunt? Sicut amicus relative dicitur, neque enim esse incipit nisi cum amare coeperit; fit ergo aliqua mutatio voluntatis ut amicus dicatur. Nummus autem cum dicitur pretium, relative dicitur, nec tamen mutatus est cum esse coepit pretium neque cum dicitur pignus et si qua similia. Si ergo nummus potest nulla sui mutatione totiens dici relative, ut neque cum incipit dici neque cum desinit aliquid in eius natura vel forma qua nummus est mutationis fiat; quanto facilius de illa incommutabili Dei substantia debemus accipere, ut ita dicatur relative aliquid ad creaturam ut, quamvis temporaliter incipiat dici, non tamen ipsi substantiae Dei accidisse intellegatur, sed illi creaturae ad quam dicitur? Domine, inquit, refugium factum es nobis ⁶⁶. Refugium ergo nostrum Deus, relative dicitur ad nos enim refertur; et tunc refugium nostrum fit cum ad eum refugimus. Numquid tunc fit aliquid in eius natura quod antequam ad eum refugeremus non erat? In nobis ergo fit aliqua mutatio; deteriores enim fuimus antequam ad eum refugeremus, et efficimur ad eum refugiendo meliores; in illo autem nulla. Sic et Pater noster esse incipit cum per eius gratiam regeneramur, quoniam dedit nobis potestatem filios Dei fieri ⁶⁷. Substantia itaque nostra mutatur in melius, cum filii eius efficimur; simul ille Pater noster esse incipit, sed nulla suae commutatione substantiae. Quod ergo temporaliter dici incipit Deus quod antea non dicebatur manifestum est relative dici, non tamen secundum accidens Dei quod ei aliquid acciderit, sed plane secundum accidens eius ad quod dici aliquid Deus incipit relative. Et quod amicus Dei ⁶⁸, iustus esse incipit ipse mutatur; Deus autem absit ut temporaliter aliquem diligat, quasi nova dilectione quae in ipso ante non erat apud quem nec praeterita transierunt, et futura iam facta sunt. Itaque omnes sanctos suos ante mundi constitutionem dilexit ⁶⁹, sicut praedestinavit, sed cum convertuntur et inveniunt illum, tunc incipere ab eo diligere dicuntur, ut eo modo dicatur quo potest humano affectu capi quod dicitur. Sic etiam cum iratus malis dicitur et placidus bonis, illi mutantur non ipse; sicut lux infirmis oculis aspera, firmis lenis est, ipsorum scilicet mutatione, non sua.

him refers. Lord, says the psalm, you have become our refuge (Ps 90:1). God is called our refuge by way of relationship; the name has reference to us. And he becomes our refuge when we take refuge in him. Does this mean that something happens then in his nature, which was not there before we took refuge in him? No, the change takes place in us; we were worse before we took refuge in him, and we become better by taking refuge in him. But in him, no change at all. So too, he begins to be our Father when we are born again by his grace, because He gave us the right to become sons of God (Jn 1:12). So our substance changes for the better when we are made his sons; at the same time he begins to be our Father, but without any change in his substance. So it is clear that anything that can begin to be said about God in time which was not said about him before is said by way of relationship, and yet not by way of a modification of God, as though something has modified him. It is however said by way of a modification of that with reference to which God begins to be called it. That a just man begins to be called the friend of God means that he changes. But it is unthinkable that God should love someone temporally, as though with a new love that was not in him before, seeing that with him things past do not pass, and things future have already happened. So he loved all his saints before the foundation of the world (Jn 17:24; Eph 1:4), as he predestined them; but when they are converted and find him, then they are said to begin to be loved by him, in order to state the thing in a way that can be grasped by human feeling. So too when he is said to be angry with the wicked and pleased with the good, they change, not he; just as light is harsh to weak eyes, pleasant to strong; but it is the eyes, not the light, that change.

Aristotelis Decem categorias solus legit.

IV.16. 28. Et quid mihi proderat 91, quod annos natus ferme viginti, cum in manus meas venissent Aristotelica quaedam, quas appellant Decem categorias (quarum nomine, cum eas rhetor Carthaginensis, magister meus, buccis typho crepantibus commemoraret et alii qui docti habebantur, tamquam in nescio quid magnum et divinum suspensus inhiabam) legi eas solus et intellexi? Quas cum contulisset cum eis, qui se dicebant vix eas magistris eruditissimis non loquentibus tantum, sed multa in pulvere depingentibus intellexisse, nihil inde aliud mihi dicere potuerunt, quam ego solus apud me ipsum legens cognoveram, et satis aperte mihi videbantur loquentes de substantiis, sicuti est homo, et quae in illis essent, sicuti est figura hominis, qualis sit et statura, quot pedum sit, et cognatio, cuius frater sit, aut ubi sit constitutus aut quando natus, aut stet aut sedeat, aut calciatus vel armatus sit aut aliquid faciat aut patiat aliquid, et quaecumque in his novem generibus, quorum exempli gratia quaedam posui, vel in ipso substantiae genere innumerabilia reperiuntur.

16. 29. Quid hoc mihi proderat, quando et oberat, cum etiam te, Deus meus, mirabiliter simplicem atque incommutabilem, illis decem praedicamentis putas quidquid esset omnino comprehensum, sic intellegere conarer, quasi et tu subiectus esses magnitudini tuae aut pulchritudini, ut illa essent in te quasi in subiecto sicut in corpore, cum tua magnitudo et tua pulchritudo tu ipse sis, corpus autem non eo sit magnum et pulchrum, quo corpus est, quia etsi minus magnum et minus pulchrum esset, nihilominus corpus esset? Falsitas enim erat, quam de te cogitabam, non veritas, et figmenta miseriae meae, non firmamenta beatitudinis tuae. Iusseras enim, et ita fiebat in me, ut terra spinas et tribulos pareret mihi et cum labore pervenirem ad panem meum 92.

Omnes libros liberalium artium per se ipsum legit.

16. 30. Et quid mihi proderat, quod omnes libros artium, quas liberales vocant, tunc nequissimus malarum cupiditatum servus per me ipsum legi et intellexi, quoscumque legere potui? Et gaudebam in eis et nesciebam, unde esset quidquid ibi verum et certum esset. Dorsum enim habebam ad lumen et ad ea, quae illuminantur, faciem; unde ipsa facies mea, qua illuminata cernebam, non illuminabatur. Quidquid de arte loquendi et disserendi, quidquid de dimensionibus figurarum et de musicis et de numeris

He reads Aristotle's Categories

IV.16.28. When I was about twenty a certain writing of Aristotle had been put into my hands, entitled The Ten Categories. What a proud mouthful it was when my rhetoric master at Carthage, and others reputedly learned, rattled off the list of them! At the very name of the book I would hang on his words agape, as though expecting some important divine revelation. Yet I read them in private and understood them, though I wonder now what profit that was to me.†77 When I compared notes with other students, who admitted that they had scarcely understood the Categories from the most expert masters—masters who not only gave oral instruction but even drew plenty of diagrams in the dust—I found that they were unable to tell me anything that I had not already grasped from my private reading. The categories seemed clear enough to me as they spoke of substances (a man, for example) and of accidents inhering in them, such as his appearance (what he is like), his stature (how many feet high), his relationship (whose brother), where he is, when he was born, his posture (standing or sitting), whether he is wearing sandals or is armed, whether he is doing anything or whether anything is being done to him; or spoke of any of the innumerable attributes to be found in any of these nine categories, a few of which I have mentioned by way of example, or in the main genus of substance.

29. What profit had it been to me? Supposing that these ten predicates covered everything that exists, I mistakenly attempted to understand even you, my God, in terms of them, you who are wonderfully simple and changeless, imagining that you were the subject of your greatness and beauty, and that those attributes inhered in you as in their subject, as they might in a material thing. I did not realize that you are yourself identical with your greatness and beauty, whereas a material thing is not great and beautiful simply because it is that thing, because even if it were smaller or less beautiful it would still be the material thing it is. No, the reading had been no profit to me—a hindrance, rather. My conclusions about you were falsehood, not truth, the figments of my misery, not the firmament of your happiness. As you had commanded, so did it befall me: the earth brought forth thorns and thistles for me, and I garnered my bread by much labor.†78

30. Furthermore, what profit was it to me that I, rascally slave of selfish ambitions that I was, read and understood by myself as many books as I could get concerning the so-called liberal arts? I enjoyed these, not recognizing the source of whatever elements of truth and certainty they contained. I had turned my back to the light and my face to the things it illuminated, and so no light played upon my own face, or on the eyes that perceived them.†79 Whatever I understood of the arts of grammar and rhetoric, of dialectic, geometry, music and

sine magna difficultate nullo hominum tradente intellexi, scis tu, Domine Deus 93 meus, quia et celeritas intellegendi et dispiciendi acumen donum tuum est. Sed non inde sacrificabam tibi 94. Itaque mihi non ad usum, sed ad perniciem magis valebat, quia tam bonam partem substantiae meae satégi habere in potestate et fortitudinem meam non ad te custodiebam 95, sed profectus sum abs te in longinquam regionem, ut eam dissiparem in meretrices cupiditates 96. Nam quid mihi proderat bona res non utenti bene? Non enim sentiebam illas artes etiam ab studiosis et ingeniosis difficillime intellegi, nisi cum eis eadem conabar exponere et erat ille excellentissimus in eis, qui me exponentem non tardius sequeretur.

Ingenium doctrinaque nihil prosunt cum a Deo longe recessimus.

16. 31. Sed quid mihi hoc proderat putanti, quod tu, Domine Deus Veritas, corpus esses lucidum et immensum et ego frustum de illo corpore? Nimia perversitas! Sed sic eram nec erubesco, Deus meus, confiteri tibi in me misericordias tuas 97 et invocare te, qui non erubui tunc profiteri hominibus blasphemias meas et latrare adversum te 98. Quid ergo tunc mihi proderat ingenium per illas doctrinas agile et nullo adminiculo humani magisterii tot nodosissimi libri enodati, cum deformiter et sacrilega turpitudine in doctrina pietatis errarem? Aut quid tantum oberat parvulis tuis longe tardius ingenium, cum a te longe non recederent, ut in nido Ecclesiae tuae tuti plumescerent et alas caritatis alimento sanae fidei nutrent 99? O Domine Deus noster, in velamento alarum tuarum speremus, et protege nos 100, et porta nos. Tu portabis et parvulos et usque ad canos tu portabis 101, quoniam firmitas nostra quando tu es, tunc est firmitas, cum autem nostra est, infirmitas est. Vivit apud te semper bonum nostrum, et quia inde aversi sumus, perversi sumus. Revertamur iam, Domine, ut non evertamur, quia vivit apud te sine ullo defectu bonum nostrum, quod tu ipse es 102, et non timemus, ne non sit quo redeamus, quia nos inde ruimus; nobis autem absentibus non ruit domus nostra, aeternitas tua.

arithmetic,†80 without much difficulty or tuition from anyone, I understood because my swift intelligence and keen wits were your gift; you know it, O Lord my God. Yet from this gift I offered you no sacrifice. It therefore worked not to my advantage but rather to my harm, because I took care that this excellent part of my substance†81 should be under my own control, and I did not guard my strength by approaching you,†82 but left you and set out for a distant land to squander it there on the quest for meretricious gratifications. What profit was this good gift to me when I failed to use it well? It only made me less able to appreciate how very difficult these liberal arts were for even the most zealous and clever to understand. I found this out only when I tried to expound them to my pupils, among whom only the brightest could follow my explanation without dragging.

31. But what profit was that to me, since I supposed that you, my God, you who are truth, were an immense, luminous body, and that I was a particle of it? What outrageous perversity! But that is what I was like, and I am not ashamed to confess to you your own deeds of mercy toward me and to invoke you, my God, since I was not ashamed then to profess to my human hearers my own blasphemous views and to bay doglike against you. What profit to me then was the ingenuity that nimbly picked its way amid those teachings, and the plethora of intricate books I had unraveled without human tuition to support me, if I was crippled and led astray by sacrilegious depravity where the teachings of true godliness were concerned? On the other hand, what disadvantage was it to your little ones that they were much more slow-minded than I? They did not forsake you, but stayed safely in the nest of your Church†83 to grow their plumage and strengthen the wings of their charity on the wholesome nourishment of the faith.†84

O Lord our God,
grant us to trust in your overshadowing wings:
protect us beneath them and bear us up.†85
You will carry us as little children,
and even to our grey-headed age you will carry us still.
When you are our strong security, that is strength indeed,
but when our security is in ourselves, that is but weakness.
Our good abides ever in your keeping,
but in diverting our steps from you we have grown perverse.
Let us turn back to you at last, Lord, that we be not overturned.

Unspoilt, our good abides with you,
for you are yourself our good.
We need not fear to find no home again
because we have fallen away from it;
while we are absent our home falls not to ruins,
for our home is your eternity.†86

Proto triadinē struktūra**Triada mens - amor sui - notitia sui****Confessionum (397-401)**

Imago Trinitatis in hominibus adumbrata.

XIII.11.12. Trinitatem omnipotentem quis intelleget? Et quis non loquitur eam, si tamen eam? Rara anima, quaecumque de illa loquitur, scit quod loquitur. Et contendunt et dimicant, et nemo sine pace videt istam visionem. Vellem, ut haec tria cogitarent homines in se ipsis. Longe aliud sunt ista tria quam illa Trinitas, sed dico, ubi se exerceant et probent et sentiant, quam longe sunt. Dico autem haec tria: esse, nosse, velle. Sum enim et scio et volo: sum sciens et volens et scio esse me et velle et volo esse et scire. In his igitur tribus quam sit inseparabilis vita et una vita et una mens et una essentia, quam denique inseparabilis distinctio et tamen distinctio, videat qui potest. Certe coram se est; attendat in se et videat 56 et dicat mihi. Sed cum invenerit in his aliquid et dixerit, non iam se putet invenisse illud, quod supra ista est incommutabile, quod est incommutabiliter et scit incommutabiliter et vult incommutabiliter; et utrum propter tria haec et ibi trinitas, an in singulis haec tria, ut terna singulorum sint, an utrumque miris modis simpliciter et multipliciter infinito in se sibi fine, quo est et sibi notum est et sibi sufficit incommutabiliter id ipsum copiosa unitatis magnitudine, quis facile cogitaverit? Quis ullo modo dixerit? Quis quolibet modo temere pronuntiaverit?

De Trinitate (399-422/426)

Proemium In Trinitate dicuntur distincte quae relative dicuntur ad invicem, sed nulla diversitas essentiae.

VIII.1.1. Diximus alibi 1 ea dici proprie in illa Trinitate distincte ad singulas Personas pertinentia quae, relative dicuntur ad invicem, sicut Pater et Filius et utriusque Donum 2 Spiritus Sanctus; non enim Pater Trinitas, aut Filius Trinitas, aut Trinitas

The Confessions

XIII.11.12. Can anyone comprehend the almighty Trinity? Everyone talks about it—but is it really the Trinity of which they talk? Rare indeed is the person who understands the subject of his discourse, when he speaks of that. People argue and wrangle over it, yet no one sees that vision unless he is at peace. I wish they would turn their attention to the triad they have within themselves. It is, to be sure, a triad far distant from the Trinity, but I propose it as a topic on which they may exercise their minds, by way of experiment and in order to make clear to themselves how great the difference is. The triad I mean is being, knowledge and will.†48 I am, and I know, and I will. Knowingly and willingly I exist; I know that I am and that I will; I will to be and to know. Let anyone with the wit to see it observe how in these three there is one inseparable life: there is one life, one mind and one essence. How inseparable they are in their distinctness! Yet distinction there is. Everyone has himself readily available for inspection; let each, then, scrutinize himself, and see what he can find, and tell me. But when he has verified this unity between his powers, he must not suppose that what he has discovered is that which exists immutably above our creaturely minds, that which unchangeably is and unchangeably knows and unchangeably wills. Do these three coexistent acts constitute the Trinity? Or are all three found in each Person, so that each is this triple reality? Or are both these propositions true, the simplicity and the complexity being reconciled in some way beyond our comprehension, since the Persons are defined by their mutual relationships yet infinite in themselves? Thus the Godhead exists and is known to itself and is its own all-sufficient joy without variation for ever, Being-Itself in the manifold greatness of its unity. Who can find any way to express this truth? Who dare make any assertion about it?

On the Trinity

VIII.1. We have remarked elsewhere that any names that are predicated with reference to each other like Father and Son and the gift of each, the Holy Spirit, are said properly in that triad or trinity, that is, they belong distinctly to the several persons; the trinity is not Father, the trinity is not Son, nor is the trinity Gift. But whatever they are each and severally called with reference to self the trinity is also called, not three such in the plural but one such; thus the Father is God, the

Donum. Quod vero ad se dicuntur singuli non dici pluraliter tres, sed unum ipsam Trinitatem, sicut Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus Sanctus; et bonus Pater, bonus Filius, bonus Spiritus Sanctus; et omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens Spiritus Sanctus; nec tamen tres dii aut tres boni aut tres omnipotentes, sed unus Deus, bonus, omnipotens 3, ipsa Trinitas, et quidquid aliud non ad invicem relative, sed ad se singuli dicuntur. Hoc enim secundum essentiam dicuntur, quia hoc est ibi esse quod magnum esse, quod bonum, quod sapientem esse, et quidquid aliud ad se unaquaeque ibi Persona vel ipsa Trinitas dicitur. Ideoque dici tres Personas vel tres substantias 4, non ut aliqua intellegatur diversitas essentiae, sed ut vel uno aliquo vocabulo responderi possit cum dicitur quid Tres vel quid tria; tantamque esse aequalitatem in ea Trinitate, ut non solum Pater non sit maior quam Filius, quod attinet ad divinitatem, sed nec Pater et Filius simul maius aliquid sint quam Spiritus Sanctus, aut singula quaeque Persona quaelibet trium minus aliquid sit quam ipsa Trinitas. Dicta sunt haec, et si saepius versando repetantur, familiarius quidem innotescunt; sed et modus aliquis adhibendus est Deoque supplicandum devotissima pietate ut intellectum aperiat et studium contentionis absumat quo possit mente cerni essentia veritatis, sine ulla mole, sine ulla mutabilitate. Nunc itaque in quantum ipse adiuvat Creator mire misericors attendamus haec quae modo interiore quam superiora tractabimus, cum sint eadem, servata illa regula ut quod intellectui nostro nondum eluxerit a firmitate fidei non dimittatur.

In Trinitate non sunt maius aliquid duae aut tres Personae quam una earum.

1. 2. Dicimus enim non esse in hac Trinitate maius aliquid duas aut tres Personas quam unam earum; quod non capit consuetudo carnalis 5, non ob aliud, nisi quia vera quae creata sunt sentit ut potest; veritatem autem ipsam qua creata sunt non potest intueri; nam si posset, nullo modo esset lux ista corporea manifestior quam hoc quod diximus. In substantia quippe veritatis, quoniam sola vere est, non est maior aliqua, nisi quae verius est. Quidquid autem intellegibile atque incommutabile est, non aliud alio verius est, quia aequae incommutabiliter aeternum est; nec quod ibi magnum dicitur, aliunde magnum est, quam eo quo vere est. Quapropter ubi magnitudo ipsa veritas est, quidquid plus habet magnitudinis, necesse est plus habeat veritatis; quidquid ergo plus veritatis non habet, non habet etiam plus magnitudinis. Porro, quidquid plus habet veritatis, profecto verius est, sicut

Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God; and the Father is good, the Son is good, the Holy Spirit is good; and the Father is almighty, the Son is almighty, the Holy Spirit is almighty; yet there are not three Gods, or three good ones, or three almighty ones, but one God, good and almighty, the trinity itself;†1 and the same goes for anything else that they are each called not with reference to one another but to self. For they are called such things with respect to being, because in this case to be is the same as to be great, to be good, to be wise, and to be anything else that each person or the trinity itself is called with reference to self. And the reason there are said to be three persons or three substances is not to signify any diversity of being, but to have at least one word to answer with when asked three what or three who. And finally we observed that so total is the equality in this triad that not only is the Father not greater than the Son as far as divinity is concerned, but also Father and Son together are not greater than the Holy Spirit, nor any single person of the three less than the trinity itself. All this has been said, and if it has been repeated rather often in various ways, this only means that we become all the more familiar with it. But we must put some limits to repetition, and beseech God as devoutly and earnestly as we can to open our understandings and temper our fondness for controversy, so that our minds may be able to perceive the essence or being of truth without any mass, without any changeableness.†2 Now therefore, as far as the wonderfully merciful creator may assist us, let us turn our attention to the things we are going to discuss†3 in a more inward manner than the things that have been discussed above, though in fact they are the same things; but let us all the while still keep to the rule that just because a thing is not yet clear to our understanding, we must not therefore dismiss it from the firm assent of our faith.†4

Chapter 1: God is nothing else but truth, and if we can see truth, we can see God; but our inner eyes are too weak to be able to gaze on truth itself.

1.2. We are saying then that in this trinity two or three persons are not any greater than one of them alone, and a flesh-bound habit of thought cannot grasp this for the simple reason that, while it perceives as far as its powers extend true things that have been created, it cannot gaze upon the truth itself which they were created by. If it were able to, then this physical light around us would in no way at all be clearer or more obvious than what we have just said. Now in the substance of truth, since the only way it is truly, nothing is greater unless it is more truly. And where things are intelligible†5 and unchangeable one is not truer than another, because each is equally unchangeably eternal; and what makes a thing great in this sphere is simply the fact that it truly is. So where greatness is simply truth itself, anything that has more greatness must have more truth; and anything that does not

maius est quod plus habet magnitudinis; hoc ergo ibi est maius quod verius. Non autem verius est Pater et Filius simul, quam singulus Pater, aut singulus Filius. Non igitur maius aliquid utrumque simul, quam singulum eorum. Et quoniam aequae vere est etiam Spiritus Sanctus, nec Pater et Filius simul maius aliquid est quam ipse, quia nec verius. Pater quoque et Spiritus Sanctus simul, quoniam veritate non superant Filium; non enim verius sunt, nec magnitudine superant. Atque ita Filius et Spiritus Sanctus simul tam magnum aliquid sunt quam Pater solus, quia tam vere sunt. Sic et ipsa Trinitas tam magnum est, quam unaquaeque ibi Persona. Non enim ibi maior est, quae verior non est, ubi est ipsa veritas magnitudo. Quia in essentia veritatis, hoc est verum esse quod est esse; et hoc est esse quod est magnum esse; hoc ergo magnum esse, quod verum esse. Quod igitur ibi aequae verum est, etiam aequae magnum sit necesse est.

Deus Veritas.

2. 3. In corporibus autem fieri potest ut aequae verum sit hoc aurum atque illud, sed maius hoc sit quam illud, quia non eadem ibi est magnitudo quae veritas; aliudque illi est aurum esse, aliud magnum esse. Sic et in animi natura, secundum quod dicitur magnus animus, non secundum hoc dicitur verus animus. Animum enim verum habet etiam qui non est magnanimus; quandoquidem corporis et animi essentia, non est ipsius veritatis essentia, sicuti est Trinitas, Deus unus, solus, magnus, verus, verax, veritas. Quem si cogitare conamur, quantum sinit et donat, nullus cogitetur per locorum spatia contactus aut complexus, quasi trium corporum; nulla compago iuncturae, sicut tricorporeum Geryonem fabulae ferunt 6; sed quidquid animo tale occurrerit, ut maius sit in tribus quam in singulis, minusque in uno quam in duobus, sine ulla dubitatione respuat; ita enim respuitur omne corporeum. In spiritalibus autem omne mutabile quod occurrerit, non putetur Deus. Non enim parvae notitiae pars est, cum de profundo isto in illam summitatem respiramus, si antequam scire possimus quid sit Deus, possumus iam scire quid non sit. Non est enim certe nec terra, nec caelum, nec quasi terra et caelum, nec tale aliquid quale videmus in caelo, nec quidquid tale non videmus et est fortassis in caelo. Nec si augeas imaginatione cogitationis lucem solis, quantum potes, sive quo sit maior, sive quo sit clarior, millies tantum, aut innumerabiliter, neque hoc est Deus. Nec sicut cogitantur Angeli mundi spiritus caelestia corpora inspirantes, atque ad arbitrium quo serviunt Deo mutantur atque versantes

have more truth does not have more greatness. Then of course whatever has more truth is truer, just as whatever has more greatness is greater; so in this sphere greater is the same as truer. But now the Father and the Son together do not be more truly than the Father alone or the Son alone. So both together are not something greater than each one of them singly. And since the Holy Spirit equally truly is, Father and Son together are not something greater than he is, because neither are they something truer. Again, Father and Holy Spirit together do not excel the Son in truth since they do not be more truly; so neither do they excel him in greatness. And thus Son and Holy Spirit together are something as great as the Father alone, because they as truly are. So too the trinity itself is as great as any one person in it; what is not truer is not greater where greatness is truth itself, because in the essence or being of truth to be true is the same as to be, and to be is the same as to be great; so to be great is the same as to be true. Here then what is equally true must be equally great.

2, 3. But with bodies it can happen, for instance, that this gold is as equally true as that, and yet this is greater than that, because here greatness is not the same as truth and it is one thing for it to be gold, another to be great. So too with the nature of the human spirit†6 it is not called a true spirit by the same kind of token as it is called a great spirit. A man who is not great-spirited or magnanimous still has a true spirit. In both cases the reason is that the essence or being of body and of spirit is not the being or essence of truth; but the trinity is, which is the one, only, great God, true, truthful, truth. If we try to think of him as far as he allows and enables us to, we must not think of any special contact or intertwining as it were of three bodies, any fusion of joints in the manner in which the fables picture the three-bodied Geryon.†7 Any such thing that occurs to the mind so as to make the three bigger than any one of them, or one less than two, must be rejected without hesitation. Indeed any and every bodily conception is to be so rejected.

As for spiritual conceptions, anything that is changeable about them must not be thought to be God. For it is no small part of knowledge, when we emerge from these depths to breathe in that sublime atmosphere,†8 if before we can know what God is, we are at least able to know what he is not.†9 He is certainly not the earth, nor the heavens, nor like earth and heavens, nor any such thing as we see in the heavens, nor any such thing as we do not see in the heavens and yet may perhaps be there all the same. Nor if you increase the light of the sun in your imagination as much as you can, whether to make it greater or brighter a thousand times even or to infinity, not even that is God. Nor is he as you may think of angels, pure spirits “inspiring”†10 the heavenly bodies and changing and turning them as they judge best in their service of God; not even if all thousand times a thousand (Dn 7:10; Rv 5:11) of them were lumped together to make one, is God anything like that; not even if you think of these same spirits

7, neque si omnes, cum sint milia millium 8, in unum collati unus fiant, nec tale aliquid Deus est. Nec si eosdem spiritus sine corporibus cogites, quod quidem carnali cogitationi difficillimum est. Ecce vide, si potes, o anima praegravata corpore quod corrumpitur 9, et onusta terrenis cogitationibus multis et variis; ecce vide, si potes: Deus veritas est. Hoc enim scriptum est: Quoniam Deus lux est 10; non quomodo isti oculi vident, sed quomodo videt cor, cum audit: Veritas est. Noli quaerere quid sit veritas; statim enim se opponent caligines imaginum corporalium et nubila phantasmatum, et perturbabunt serenitatem, quae primo ictu diluxit tibi, cum dicerem: Veritas. Ecce in ipso primo ictu quo velut coruscatione perstringeris, cum dicitur: Veritas, mane si potes; sed non potes. Relaberis in ista solita atque terrena. Quo tandem pondere, quaeso, relaberis nisi sordium contractarum cupiditatis visco et peregrinationis erroribus 11?

De Trinitate (399-422/426)

De Trinitate quomodo inquirendum.

IX.1.1. Trinitatem certe quaerimus, non quamlibet, sed illam Trinitatem quae Deus est, versusque ac summus et solus Deus. Exspecta ergo, quisquis haec audis; adhuc enim quaerimus, et talia quaerentem nemo iuste reprehendit; si tamen in fide firmissimus quaerat, quod aut nosse aut eloqui difficillimum est. Affirmantem vero cito iusteque reprehendit, quisquis melius vel videt vel docet. Quaerite, inquit, Dominum, et vivet anima vestra 1. Et ne quisquam se tamquam apprehendisse temere gaudeat: Quaerite, inquit, faciem eius semper 2. Et Apostolus: Si quis se, inquit, putat aliquid scire, nondum scit quemadmodum scire oporteat. Quisquis autem diligit Deum, hic cognitus est ab illo 3. Nec sic quidem dixit: "Cognovit illum"; quae periculosa praesumptio est; sed: Cognitus est ab illo. Sic et alibi cum dixisset: Nunc autem cognoscentes Deum; statim corrigens: immo cogniti, inquit, a Deo 4. Maximeque illo loco: Fratres, inquit, ego me ipsum non arbitror apprehendisse; unum autem, quae retro oblitus, in ea quae ante sunt extentus secundum intentionem sequor ad palmam supernae vocationis Dei in Christo Iesu. Quotquot ergo perfecti hoc sapiamus 5. Perfectionem in hac vita dicit non aliud quam ea quae retro sunt oblivisci, et in ea quae ante sunt extendi secundum intentionem 6. Tutissima est enim quaerentis intentio, donec apprehendatur illud quo tendimus et quo extendimur. Sed ea recta intentio est, quae proficitur a fide. Certa enim fides utcumque inchoat cognitionem; cognitio vero certa non perficietur, nisi post hanc

as being without bodies, which is extremely difficult for flesh-bound thoughts to conceive of.†11 Come, see if you can, O soul weighed down with the body that decays (Wis 9:15) and burdened with many and variable earthy thoughts, come see it if you can—God is truth. For it is written that God is light (1 Jn 1:5) not such as these eyes see, but such as the mind sees when it hears†12 “He is truth.” Do not ask what truth is; immediately a fog of bodily images and a cloud of fancies will get in your way and disturb the bright fair weather that burst on you the first instant when I said “truth.” Come, hold it in that first moment in which so to speak you caught a flash from the corner of your eye when the word “truth” was spoken, stay there if you can. But you cannot; you slide back into these familiar and earthy things. And what weight is it, I ask, that drags you back but the birdlime of greed for the dirty junk you have picked up on your wayward wanderings?†13

On the Trinity

Prologue

IX.1. A trinity is certainly what we are looking for, and not any kind of trinity either but the one that God is, the true and supreme and only God. Wait for it then, whoever you are that are listening to this; we are still looking, and no one can fairly find fault with someone who is looking for such things as this, provided that in looking for something so difficult either to know or to express, he remains absolutely firm in faith. When a man actually affirms something, though, well then anyone who sees or teaches better can promptly and with justice find fault with him. Look for God,†1 it says, and your souls shall live; and in case anyone should be too quick to congratulate himself that he has got there, look for his face, it goes on, always (Ps 105:4). And the apostle says, If anybody thinks he knows anything, he does not yet know as he ought to know. But anyone who loves God, this man is known by him (1 Cor 8:2). Even in this case, you notice, he did not say “knows him,” which would be a dangerous piece of presumption, but “is known by him.” It is like another place where as soon as he had said But now knowing God, he corrected himself and said, or rather being known by God (Gal 4:9). Above all there is this text: Brothers, he says, I do not consider that I myself have got there; one thing, though, forgetting what lies behind, stretching out to what lies ahead I press on intently†2 to the palm of our upward calling from God in Christ Jesus. As many of us therefore as are perfect, let us set our minds on this (Phil-3:13). Perfection in this life, he is saying, is nothing but forgetting what lies behind and stretching out to what lies ahead intently. The safest intent, after all, until we finally get where we are intent on getting and where we are stretching out to, is that of the seeker. And the right intent is the one that

vitam, cum videbimus facie ad faciem 7. Hoc ergo sapiamus, ut noverimus tutiorem esse affectum vera quaerendi, quam incognita pro cognitis praesumendi. Sic ergo quaeramus tamquam inventuri; et sic inveniamus, tamquam quaesituri. Cum enim consummaverit homo, tunc incipit 8. De credendis nulla infidelitate dubitemus, de intellegendis nulla temeritate affirmemus; in illis auctoritas tenenda est, in his veritas exquirenda. Quod ergo ad istam quaestionem attinet, credamus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum esse unum Deum, universae creaturae conditorem 9 atque rectorem; nec Patrem esse Filium, nec Spiritum Sanctum vel Patrem esse vel Filium; sed Trinitatem relatarum ad invicem personarum, et unitatem aequalis essentiae 10. Quaeramus hoc autem intellegere, ab eo ipso quem intellegere volumus, auxilium precantes, et quantum tribuitur quod intellegimus explicare tanta cura et sollicitudine pietatis, ut etiam si aliquid aliud pro alio dicimus, nihil tamen dicamus indignum. Ut si quid verbi gratia, de Patre dicimus, quod Patri proprie non conveniat, aut Filio conveniat, aut Spiritui Sancto, aut ipsi Trinitati; et si quid de Filio, quod Filio proprie non congruat, saltem congruat Patri aut Spiritui Sancto, aut Trinitati; item si quid de Spiritu Sancto, quod proprietatem Spiritus Sancti non doceat, non tamen alienum sit a Patre aut a Filio, aut ab uno Deo ipsa Trinitate. Veluti nunc cupimus videre utrum illa excellentissima caritas proprie Spiritus Sanctus sit. Quod si non est, aut Pater est caritas, aut Filius, aut ipsa Trinitas, quoniam resistere non possumus certissimae fidei, et validissimae auctoritati Scripturae dicentis: Deus caritas est 11. Non tamen debemus deviare sacrilego errore, ut aliquid de Trinitate dicamus quod non Creatori, sed creaturae potius 12, conveniat, aut inani cogitatione fingatur.

Mens et amor.

2. 2. Quae cum ita sint 13, attendamus ista tria, quae invenisse nobis videmur. Nondum de supernis loquimur, nondum de Deo Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto; sed de hac impari imagine, attamen imagine, id est homine; familiarius enim eam et facilius fortassis intuetur nostrae mentis infirmitas. Ecce ego qui hoc quaero, cum aliquid amo tria sunt: ego, et quod amo, et ipse amor. Non enim amo amorem, nisi amantem amem; nam non est amor, ubi nihil amatur. Tria ergo sunt: amans, et quod amatur, et amor. Quid, si non amem nisi me ipsum? Nonne duo erunt: quod amo, et amor? Amans enim et quod amatur, hoc idem est, quando se ipse amat; sicut amare et amari, eodem modo idipsum est cum se quisque amat. Eadem quippe

sets out from faith. The certitude of faith at least initiates knowledge; but the certitude of knowledge will not be completed until after this life when we see face to face (1 Cor 13:12). Let this then be what we set our minds on, to know that a disposition to look for the truth is safer than one to presuppose that we know what is in fact unknown. Let us therefore so look as men who are going to find, and so find as men who are going to go on looking. For when a man has finished, then it is that he is beginning (Sir 18:7).

About what is to be believed let us not have any faithless doubts, about what is to be understood let us not make any hasty affirmations; in the case of the former we must hold fast to authority, in the case of the latter we must search out the truth. As far then as this question of ours is concerned, let us believe that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God, maker and ruler of all creation; and that the Father is not the Son, and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but that they are a trinity of persons related to each other, and a unity of equal being. But let us seek to understand this, begging the help of him whom we wish to understand; and as far as is granted us†3 let us seek to explain what we understand with such a solicitous care for piety,†4 that even if we say something about one which really belongs to another, at least we say nothing unworthy. For example, if we say something about the Father which does not properly belong to the Father, let it belong at least to the Son or the Holy Spirit or the trinity itself; and if we say something about the Son which does not fit the Son, let it at least fit the Father or the Holy Spirit or the trinity; finally if we say something about the Holy Spirit which does not really express†5 what is proper to the Holy Spirit, let it not at any rate be alien to the Father or the Son or the one God the trinity itself. For instance, we are now eager to see whether this transcendent charity is peculiarly the Holy Spirit. If it is not, then at least either the Father is charity, or the Son or the trinity itself is, since we cannot withstand the certitude of faith and the great weight of scriptural authority which says God is charity (1 Jn 4:8.16). What we have to avoid is the sacrilegious mistake of saying anything about the trinity which does not belong to the creator but rather to the creature, or which is fabricated by vain imaginings.

Chapter 1:

Starting from the trinity, triad or trio with which he concluded Book VIII, namely lover, what is loved, and love; and confining himself to mens or mind as its subject, Augustine expands this trinity into the apter one of mind, its knowledge and its love of self, mens, notitia sui, amor sui; and he establishes that these three are one substance, consubstantial, coequal, coinherent, and yet also distinct, unconfused, and mutually related.

res bis dicitur, cum dicitur: "Amat se", et: "amatur a se". Tunc non est aliud atque aliud, amare et amari; sicut non est alius atque alius, amans et amatus. At vero amor, et quod amatur, etiam sic duo sunt. Non enim quisquis se amat amor est nisi cum amatur ipse amor. Aliud est autem amare se, aliud amare amorem suum. Non enim amatur amor, nisi iam aliquid amans; quia ubi nihil amatur, nullus est amor. Duo ergo sunt, cum se quisque amat: amor, et quod amatur. Tunc enim amans et quod amatur unum est. Unde videtur non esse consequens ut ubicumque amor fuerit, iam tria intellegatur. Auferamus enim ab hac consideratione cetera quae multa sunt, quibus homo constat 14; atque ut haec quae nunc requirimus, quantum in his rebus possumus, liquido reperiamus, de sola mente tractemus. Mens igitur cum amat se ipsam, duo quaedam ostendit: mentem, et amorem. Quid est autem amare se, nisi praesto sibi esse velle ad fruendum se? Et cum tantum se vult esse, quantum est, par menti voluntas est, et amanti amor aequalis. Et si aliqua substantia est amor, non est utique corpus, sed spiritus; nec mens corpus, sed spiritus est. Neque tamen amor et mens duo spiritus, sed unus spiritus; nec essentiae duae, sed una; et tamen duo quaedam unum sunt: amans, et amor; sive sic dicas: "quod amatur, et amor". Et haec quidem duo relative ad invicem dicuntur. Amans quippe ad amorem refertur, et amor ad amantem. Amans enim aliquo amore amat, et amor alicuius amantis est. Mens vero et spiritus non relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant. Non enim quia mens et spiritus alicuius hominis est, ideo mens et spiritus est. Retracto enim eo quod homo est, quod adiuncto corpore dicitur; retracto ergo corpore, mens et spiritus manet. Retracto autem amante, nullus est amor; et retracto amore, nullus est amans. Ideoque quantum ad invicem referuntur, duo sunt: quod autem ad se ipsa dicuntur, et singula spiritus, et simul utrumque unus spiritus; et singula mens, et simul utrumque una mens. Ubi ergo trinitas? Attendamus quantum possumus, et invocemus lucem sempiternam, ut illuminet tenebras nostras, et videamus in nobis quantum sinimur, imaginem Dei.

Mens et notitia.

3. 3. Mens enim amare se ipsam non potest, nisi etiam noverit se. Nam quomodo amat quod nescit? Aut si quisquam dicit ex notitia generali vel speciali mentem credere se esse talem, quales alias experta est, et ideo amare semetipsam, insipientissime loquitur. Unde enim mens aliquam mentem novit, si se non novit? Neque enim ut oculus corporis videt alios oculos, et se non videt; ita mens novit alias mentes, et ignorat

2. This being agreed, let us take another look at that trio which we seem to have found. We are not yet speaking of things above, of God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but about this disparate image, yet image nonetheless, which is man; it is likely to be easier, after all, and more familiar for our mind in its weakness to examine. Here you are then—when I who am engaged on this search love something, there are three: I myself, what I love, and love itself. For I do not love love unless I love it loving something, because there is no love where nothing is being loved.†6 So then there are three, the lover, and what is being loved, and love. But supposing I only love myself, are there now not two merely, what I love and love? Lover and what is being loved are the same thing when he loves himself, just as loving and being loved are likewise the same thing when someone loves himself. You are only saying the same thing twice when you say “he loves himself” and “he is loved by himself.” In this case loving and being loved are no more different things than lover and beloved are different people. Love, however, and what is being loved are still two things. For it is not the case that anyone who loves himself is love except when love loves itself.†7 It is one thing to love oneself and another to love one's love. For love is not loved unless it is already loving something, because where nothing is being loved there is no love. So there are two things when someone loves himself, namely love and what is being loved; for in this case lover and what is being loved are one thing. It seems then after all that there are not necessarily three things to be perceived wherever there is love. Now let us remove from our consideration of this matter all the many other things of which man consists, and to find what we are looking for with as much clarity as is possible in these matters, let us only discuss the mind.†8 So when the mind loves itself it reveals two things, mind and love. But what does loving itself mean but wanting to be available to itself in order to enjoy itself? And since it wants itself as much as it is, will exactly matches mind here, and love is equal to lover. And if love is a kind of substance,†9 it is certainly not body but spirit, just as mind too is not body but spirit. Love and mind, however, are not two spirits but one spirit, not two beings but one being; and yet they are two somethings, lover and love, or if you like beloved and loved. And these are called two things relatively to one another. Lover has reference to love, and love to lover; for lover loves with some love, and love is of some lover. Mind and spirit, however, are not said relatively but state being. It is not because it is mind and spirit of some man that it is mind and spirit. Take away its being man, which is said with the addition of body, take away body therefore, and mind and spirit remain. But take away lover and there is no love; take away love and there is no lover. So then, insofar as they are referred to each other they are two; but insofar as they are stated with reference to self they are each spirit and they are both together one spirit, they are each mind and both

semetipsam 16. Per oculos enim corporis corpora videmus, quia radios qui per eos emicant et quidquid cernimus tangunt 17, refringere ac retorquere in ipsos non possumus, nisi cum specula intuemur 18. Quod subtilissime obscurissimeque disseritur, donec apertissime demonstretur, vel ita se rem habere, vel non ita 19. Sed quoquo modo se habeat vis qua per oculos cernimus, ipsam certe vim, sive sint radii, sive aliud aliquid, oculis cernere non valemus; sed mente quaerimus, et si fieri potest, etiam hoc mente comprehendimus. Mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsam. Ergo et se ipsam per se ipsam novit, quoniam est incorporea 20. Nam si non se novit, non se amat.

Mens, amor et notitia eius tria quaedam sunt et haec tria unum sunt et cum perfecta sunt aequalia sunt.

4. 4. Sicut autem duo quaedam sunt, mens et amor eius, cum se amat; ita quaedam duo sunt, mens et notitia eius, cum se novit. Ipsa igitur mens et amor et notitia eius tria quaedam sunt, et haec tria unum sunt, et cum perfecta sunt, aequalia sunt. Si enim minus se amat quam est, ut verbi gratia, tantum se amet hominis mens, quantum amandum est corpus hominis, cum plus sit ipsa quam corpus; peccat, et non est perfectus amor eius. Item si amplius se amet quam est, velut si tantum se amet, quantum amandus est Deus, cum incomparabiliter minus sit ipsa quam Deus; etiam sic nimio peccat, et non perfectum habet amorem sui. Maiore autem perversitate et iniquitate peccat, cum corpus tantum amat, quantum amandus est Deus. Item notitia si minor est, quam est illud quod noscitur, et plene nosci potest, perfecta non est. Si autem maior est, iam superior est natura quae novit, quam illa quae nota est, sicut maior est notitia corporis, quam ipsum corpus quod ea notitia notum est. Illa enim vita quaedam est in ratione cognoscentis; corpus autem non est vita. Et vita quaelibet quolibet corpore maior est, non mole, sed vi. Mens vero cum se ipsa cognoscit, non se superat notitia sua; quia ipsa cognoscit, ipsa cognoscitur. Cum ergo se totam cognoscit, neque secum quidquam aliud, par illi est cognitio sua; quia neque ex alia natura est eius cognitio, cum se ipsa cognoscit. Et cum se totam nihilque amplius percipit, nec minor nec maior est. Recte igitur diximus, haec tria cum perfecta sunt, esse consequenter aequalia.

Haec substantia una, tria relative.

4. 5. Simul etiam admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in anima existere, et tamquam

together one mind. Where then is a trinity? Let us look into the matter as closely as we can, and call upon the everlasting light to enlighten our darkness (Ps 18:28), and let us see in ourselves as far as we are permitted the image of God.

3. Now the mind cannot love itself unless it also knows itself. How can it love what it does not know? Or if anyone says that in terms of general and specific notions the mind believes itself to be such as it has experienced others to be and so loves itself, he is talking very great nonsense. How can the mind know another mind if it does not know itself? You cannot say the mind knows other minds and is ignorant of itself in the same sort of way as the bodily eye sees other eyes and does not see itself. We see bodies with our bodily eyes because the rays which shoot out from them touch whatever we observe;†10 but we cannot snap off these rays and bend them back into our own eyes except when we look in a mirror. This question is discussed with great subtlety, and will continue to be so until it is clearly demonstrated that sight works like that or does not work like that. But whatever kind of power it is by which we see with our eyes, we certainly cannot see this power with our eyes, whether it is rays or anything else. What we look for it with is our minds, and if it can be done we grasp even this matter with our minds. So the mind itself assembles notions both of bodily things through the senses of the body, and of non-bodily things through itself. Therefore it knows itself, because it is non-bodily. Anyhow, if it does not know itself, it does not love itself.†11

4. Just as you have two somethings, mind and its love, when it loves itself, so you have two somethings, mind and its knowledge,†12 when it knows itself. The mind therefore and its love and knowledge are three somethings, and these three are one thing, and when they are complete they are equal. If the mind loves itself less than it is—for example if the mind of a man loves itself only as much as a man's body should be loved though it is itself something more than body—then it sins and its love is not complete. Again if it loves itself more than it is, for example if it loves itself as much as God is to be loved, though it is itself incomparably less than God, here too it sins by excess, and does not have a complete love of itself. It sins of course with even greater perversity and wickedness when it loves the body as much as God is to be loved.

Again, if knowledge is less than what is known and can be fully known, then it is not complete. If it is greater, that means that the nature which knows is greater than the nature which is known, as for example knowledge of a body is greater than the body which is known with that knowledge. For this knowledge is a kind of life in the reason of the knower, but body is not life. And any life is greater than any body not in mass but in force. But when mind knows itself it does not excel itself with its knowledge, since it is knowing and it is being known. So when it knows its whole self and nothing else together with itself, its knowledge exactly matches itself

involuta evolvi ut sentiantur et dinumerentur substantialiter, vel, ut ita dicam, essentialiter, non tamquam in subiecto, ut color, aut figura in corpore, aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas 21. Quidquid enim tale est, non excedit subiectum in quo est. Non enim color iste aut figura huius corporis potest esse et alterius corporis. Mens autem amore quo se amat, potest amare et aliud praeter se. Item non se solam cognoscit mens, sed et alia multa. Quamobrem non amor et cognitio tamquam in subiecto insunt menti, sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt, sicut ipsa mens; quia et si relative dicuntur ad invicem, in sua tamen sunt singula quaeque substantia. Non sicut color et coloratum relative ita dicuntur ad invicem, ut color in subiecto colorato sit, non habens in se ipso propriam substantiam; quoniam coloratum corpus substantia est, ille autem in substantia; sed sicut duo amici etiam duo sunt homines, quae sunt substantiae; cum homines non relative dicantur, amici autem relative.

Tria haec sunt inseparabilia.

4. 6. Sed item quamvis substantia sit amans vel sciens, substantia sit scientia, substantia sit amor, sed amans et amor, aut sciens et scientia relative ad se dicantur sicut amici; mens vero aut spiritus non sint relativa, sicut nec homines relativa sunt; non tamen sicut amici homines possunt seorsum esse ab invicem, sic amans et amor, aut sciens et scientia. Quamquam et amici corpore videntur separari posse, non animo, in quantum amici sunt, verumtamen fieri potest ut amicus amicum etiam odisse incipiat, et eo ipso amicus esse desinat, nesciente illo, et adhuc amante. Amor autem quo se mens amat si esse desinat, simul et illa desinit esse amans. Item notitia qua se mens novit, si esse desinat, simul et illa nosse se desinet. Sicut caput capitati alicuius utique caput est, et relative ad se dicuntur, quamvis etiam substantiae sint; nam et caput corpus est, et capitatum; et si non sit corpus, nec capitatum erit. Sed haec praecisione ab invicem separari possunt, illa non possunt.

Haec tria sunt unius eiusdemque substantiae, sed nulla commixtione confusa.

4. 7. Quod si sunt aliqua corpora quae secari omnino et dividi nequeunt, tamen nisi partibus suis constarent, corpora non essent. Pars ergo ad totum relative dicitur, quia omnis pars alicuius totius pars est, et totum omnibus partibus totum est. Sed quoniam et pars corpus est, et totum; non tantum ista relative dicuntur, sed etiam substantialiter sunt. Fortassis ergo mens totum est, et eius quasi partes amor quo se amat,

because its knowledge does not belong to another nature when it knows itself. And when it perceives its whole self and nothing else, it is neither less nor greater. So we have been right in saying that when these three are complete they are consequently equal.

5. At the same time we remind ourselves, if we are at all able to see it, that these things come to light in the soul—where they are, so to say, all rolled up and have to be unrolled in order to be perceived and enumerated—substantially or being-wise, if I may so put it, and not as in a subject, like color or shape in a body, or any other quality or quantity. Whatever is of this nature does not go beyond the subject in which it is; this color, or the shape of this body, cannot belong to another body too. But mind can also love something besides itself with the love it loves itself with. Again mind does not only know itself but many other things as well. Therefore love and knowledge are not in the mind as in a subject, but they too are substantially, just as mind itself is; and even if they are posited relatively to each other, still each of them is its own substance. It is not like color and the colored thing being posited relatively to each other in such a way that color is in the colored subject without having any proper substance in itself, since the colored body is the substance while color itself is in substance. But it is more like two friends also being two men which are substance things, since they are not called men relatively to each other but they are called friends relatively to each other.†13

6. The comparison holds further; lover or knower is substance, knowledge is substance and love is substance; yet lover and love, knower and knowledge are said with reference to each other, like friends. Mind and spirit, however, are not terms of reference, just as men are not terms of reference. Lover and love, though, or knower and knowledge, cannot be separated from each other as can two men who are friends. Yet even of friends you could say that they may seem to be separated in body, but they cannot be so in spirit insofar as they are friends. Still it can happen that friend begins to hate friend and thereby ceases to be friend, while the other does not know this and still loves him. But if the love which mind loves itself with ceases to be, then mind thereby ceases to be lover. Again if the knowledge mind knows itself with ceases to be, mind thereby ceases to know itself. Perhaps it is comparable to a head, which is of course the head of something headed. They are so called with reference to each other, though they are also both substances, since head is a body and so is the headed thing. And if there is no head,†14 neither will there be a headed thing. But these can be separated from each other by beheading, while in our case the pair cannot.

7. There may of course be some bodies that are quite impossible to cut up or divide;†15 but even so, if they did not consist of their parts they would not be bodies. So even in these the part is so called with reference to the whole, because

et scientia qua se novit, quibus duabus partibus illud totum constat? An tres sunt aequales partes, quibus totum unum complectitur? Sed nulla pars totum, cuius pars est, complectitur. Mens vero cum se totam novit, hoc est perfecte novit, per totum eius est notitia eius; et cum se perfecte amat, totam se amat, et per totum eius est amor eius. Num ergo sicut ex vino et aqua et melle una fit potio, et singula per totum sunt, et tamen tria sunt (nulla enim pars est potionis, quae non habeat haec tria; non enim iuncta velut si aqua et oleum essent, sed omnino commixta sunt; et substantiae sunt omnes, et totus ille liquor una quaedam est ex tribus confecta substantia); tale aliquid arbitrandum est esse simul haec tria: mentem, amorem, notitiam? Sed non unius substantiae sunt, aqua, vinum, et mel, quamvis ex eorum commixtione fiat una substantia potionis. Quomodo autem illa tria non sint eiusdem essentiae, non video; cum mens ipsa se amet, atque ipsa se noverit; atque ita sint haec tria, ut non alteri alicui rerum mens vel amata vel nota sit. Unius ergo eiusdemque essentiae necesse est haec tria sint; et ideo si tamquam commixtione confusa essent, nullo modo essent tria, nec referri ad invicem possent. Quemadmodum si ex uno eodemque auro tres anulos similes facias, quamvis connexos sibi, referuntur ad invicem, quod similes sunt; omnis enim similis alicui similis est, et trinitas anulorum est, et unum aurum. At si misceantur sibi, et per totam singuli massam suam conspergantur, intercidet illa trinitas, et omnino non erit; ac non solum unum aurum dicitur, sicut in illis tribus anulis dicebatur, sed iam nulla aurea tria.

Ea tria sunt singula in se ipsis et invicem tota in totis.

5. 8. *At in illis tribus, cum se novit mens et amat se, manet trinitas: mens, amor, notitia; et nulla commixtione confunditur, quamvis et singula sint in se ipsis, et invicem tota in totis, sive singula in binis, sive bina in singulis. Itaque omnia in omnibus 22. Nam et mens est utique in se ipsa quoniam ad se ipsam mens dicitur; quamvis noscens, vel nota, vel noscibilis ad suam notitiam relative dicitur; amans quoque et amata vel amabilis ad amorem referatur, quo se amat. Et notitia quamvis referatur ad mentem cognoscentem vel cognitam, tamen et ad se ipsam nota et noscens dicitur; non enim sibi est incognita notitia, qua se mens ipsa cognoscit. Et amor quamvis referatur ad mentem amantem, cuius amor est, tamen et ad se ipsum est amor, ut sit etiam in se ipso, quia et amor amatur, nec alio nisi amore amari potest, id est se ipso. Ita sunt haec singula in se ipsis. In alternis autem ita sunt, quia et mens amans in amore est, et amor in amantis notitia, et notitia in mente noscente. Singula*

every part is part of some whole and a whole is whole with all its parts. But as both part and whole are body, these are not only posited relatively to each other, they also are substantially. So perhaps the mind is a whole, and the love it loves itself with and the knowledge it knows itself with are quasi-parts of it, two parts of which the whole consists? Or are they three equal parts which make up one whole? But no part encompasses the whole it is a part of. When mind however knows its whole self, that is knows itself completely, its knowledge pervades the whole of it; and when it loves itself completely it loves its whole self and its love pervades the whole of it. Are we then to think of these three together, mind, love, knowledge, as being like one drink made out of wine and water and honey, in which each pervades the whole and yet they are three? After all, there is no part of the drink which does not have these three in it; they are not joined together as if they were water and oil but completely mixed up together, and they are all substances, and that liquid is some one substance made out of three. However, water, wine, and honey are not of one substance, even though one substance of a drink is made out of mixing them. As for our trio, though, I cannot see how they are not of the same being,[†] 16 since mind is itself loving itself and itself knowing itself, and these three are such by our definition that mind is not being loved or known by any other thing. So these three must be of one and the same being. And if they were confused together in a mixture they would no longer in any way be three, or be able to be referred to each other. This for the same reason as if you were to make three similar rings out of one and the same gold and link them together, they would be referred to each other as similar, since every similar is similar to something; and you would have a trinity of rings and one gold. But if they are mixed up together and each dispersed through the whole lump, then that trinity will collapse and simply cease to be; it will still be called one gold as it was called in those three rings, but now no longer three gold things as well.

8. But with these three, when mind knows and loves itself the trinity remains of mind, love, knowledge. Nor are they jumbled up together in any kind of mixture, though they are each one in itself and each whole in their total, whether each in the other two or the other two in each, in any case all in all. Thus mind is of course in itself, since it is called mind with reference to itself, though it is called knowing or known or knowable relative to its knowledge; also as loving and loved or lovable it is referred to the love it loves itself with. And while knowledge is referred to the mind knowing or known, it is also called knowing and known with reference to itself; the knowledge the mind knows itself with cannot be unknown to itself. And while love is referred to the mind loving, whose love it is, nonetheless it is also love with reference to itself, so that it is also in itself, because love too is loved, nor can it be loved with anything but love, that is with itself. Thus each

in binis ita sunt, quia mens quae se novit et amat, in amore et notitia sua est; et amor amantis mentis seseque scientis, in mente notitiaque eius est; et notitia mentis se scientis et amantis in mente atque in amore eius est, quia scientem se amat, et amantem se novit. Ac per hoc et bina in singulis, quia mens quae se novit et amat, cum sua notitia est in amore, et cum suo amore in notitia; amorque ipse et notitia simul sunt in mente, quae se amat et novit. Tota vero in totis quemadmodum sint, iam supra ostendimus cum se totam mens amat, et totam novit, et totum amorem suum novit, totamque amat notitiam suam, quando tria ista ad se ipsa perfecta sunt. Miro itaque modo tria ista inseparabilia sunt a semetipsis, et tamen eorum singulum quidque substantia est, et simul omnia una substantia vel essentia, cum et relative dicantur ad invicem.

Mentis duplex notitia.

6. 9. Sed cum se ipsam novit humana mens et amat se ipsam, non aliquid incommutabile novit et amat. Aliterque unusquisque homo loquendo enuntiat mentem suam, quid in se ipso agatur attendens; aliter autem humanam mentem speciali aut generali cognitione definit. Itaque cum mihi de sua propria loquitur, utrum intellegat hoc aut illud, an non intellegat, et utrum velit, an nolit hoc aut illud, credo; cum vero de humana specialiter aut generaliter verum dicit, agnosco et approbo. Unde manifestum est, aliud unumquemque videre in se, quod sibi alius dicenti credat, non tamen videat; aliud autem in ipsa veritate quod alius quoque possit intueri; quorum alterum mutari per tempora, alterum incommutabili aeternitate consistere. Neque enim oculis corporeis multas mentes videndo, per similitudinem colligimus generalem vel specialem mentis humanae notitiam; sed intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, definiamus, non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat.

De rationibus aeternis.

6. 10. Unde etiam phantasias rerum corporalium per corporis sensum haustas, et quodam modo infusas memoriae, ex quibus etiam ea quae non visa sunt, ficto phantasmate cogitantur, sive aliter quam sunt, sive fortuito sicuti sunt, aliis omnino regulis supra mentem nostram incommutabiliter manentibus, vel approbare apud nosmetipsos, vel improbare convincimur, cum recte aliquid approbamus aut improbamus. Nam et cum recolo Carthaginis moenia quae vidi, et cum

of them is in itself. But they are in each other too, because the mind loving is in love, and love is in the knowledge of the lover, and knowledge is in the mind knowing. They are each in the other two, because the mind which knows and loves itself is in its love and knowledge, and the love of the mind loving and knowing itself is in the mind and its knowledge, and the knowledge of the mind knowing and loving itself is in the mind and its love, because it loves itself knowing and knows itself loving. And hence also each pair is in the other single, because the mind which knows and loves itself is in love together with its knowledge and in knowledge together with its love; and love and knowledge are together in the mind which loves and knows itself. How they are all in all†17 of them we have already shown above; it is when the mind loves all itself and knows all itself and knows all its love and loves all its knowledge, when these three are complete with reference to themselves. In a wonderful way therefore these three are inseparable from each other, and yet each one of them is substance, and all together they are one substance or being, while they are also posited with reference to one another.†18

Chapter 2: The author further investigates the knowledge which the mind has of things, and concludes that it essentially consists in a judgment of truth or of value about things, which can properly be called a mental word, or *verbum mentis*, which is a mental image of the thing known in the light of eternal truth. This word is provisionally defined as *amata notitia*, loved knowledge.

9. But when the human mind knows itself and loves itself, it does not know and love something unchangeable. And a man is acting in one way when he looks at what is going on in himself and speaks to declare his mind; but in quite another when he defines the human mind in terms of specific or generic knowledge. So when he speaks to me about his own particular mind, saying whether he understands this or that or does not understand it, and whether he wishes or does not wish this or that, I believe it. When however he says something true, specifically or generically, about the human mind, I acknowledge and agree with it. Clearly then what anybody can see in himself, which someone else he tells it to can believe but not see, is one thing; what he sees in truth itself, which someone else can also gaze upon, is another. And one of these changes with time, while the other stands fast in unchangeable eternity. Nor do we assemble a specific or generic knowledge of the human mind by seeing many minds with our bodily eyes, but we gaze upon the inviolable truth from which we define as perfectly as we can, not what kind of thing any particular man's mind is, but what kind of thing by everlasting ideas it ought to be.†19

10. So too we absorb the images of bodily things through the senses of the body and transfer them somehow to the

tingo Alexandriae quae non vidi, easdemque imaginarias formas quasdam quibusdam praeferens, rationabiliter praefero. Viget et claret desuper iudicium veritatis, ac sui iuris incorruptissimis regulis firmum est; et si corporalium imaginum quasi quodam nubilo subtexitur, non tamen involvitur atque confunditur.

6. 11. Sed interest utrum ego sub illa vel in illa caligine, tamquam a caelo perspicuo secludar; an sicut in altissimis montibus accidere solet, inter utrumque aere libero fruens, et serenissimam lucem supra, et densissimas nebulas subter aspiciam. Nam unde in me fraterni amoris inflammatur ardor, cum audio virum aliquem pro fidei pulchritudine et firmitate acriora tormenta tolerasse? Et si mihi digito ostendatur ipse homo, studeo mihi coniungere, notum facere, amicitia colligare. Itaque si facultas datur, accedo, alloquor, sermonem confero, affectum meum in illum quibus verbis possum exprimo, vicissimque in eo fieri quem in me habeat atque exprimi volo, spiritalemque complexum credendo molior, quia pervestigare tam cito et cernere penitus eius interiora non possum. Amo itaque fidelem ac fortem virum amore casto atque germano. Quod si mihi inter nostras loquelas fateatur, aut incautus aliquo modo sese indicet, quod vel de Deo credat incongrua, atque in illo quoque aliquid carnale desideret, et pro tali errore illa pertulerit, vel speratae pecuniae cupiditate, vel inani aviditate laudis humanae; statim amor ille, quo in eum ferebar, offensus, et quasi percussus, atque ab indigno homine ablati, in ea forma permanet, ex qua eum talem credens amaveram. Nisi forte ad hoc amo iam, ut talis sit, cum talem non esse comperero. At in illo homine nihil mutatum est; mutari tamen potest, ut fiat quod eum iam esse credideram. In mente autem mea mutata est utique ipsa existimatio, quae de illo aliter se habebat, et aliter habet; idemque amor ab intentione perfruenti ad intentionem consulendi, incommutabili desuper iustitia iubente deflexus est. Ipsa vero forma inconcussae ac stabilis veritatis, et in qua fruerer homine bonum eum credens, et in qua consulo ut bonus sit, eadem luce incorruptibilis sincerissimaeque rationis et meae mentis aspectum, et illam phantasiae nubem, quam desuper cerno, cum eundem hominem quem videram cogito, imperturbabili aeternitate perfundit. Item cum arcum pulchre et aequabiliter intortum, quem vidi, verbi gratia, Carthagine, animo revolve, res quaedam menti nuntiata per oculos, memoriaeque transfusa, imaginarium conspectum facit. Sed aliud mente conspicio, secundum quod mihi opus illud placet; unde etiam si displiceret corrigerem. Itaque de istis

memory, and from them we fabricate images with which to think about things we have not seen, whether differently from what they actually are or by a chance in a million as they are; but whenever we correctly approve or disapprove of something represented by such images, we have the inescapable conviction that we make our judgment of approval or disapproval within ourselves by altogether different rules which abide unchangeably above our minds. Thus when I call to mind the ramparts of Carthage which I have seen, and also form a picture of those of Alexandria which I have not seen, and prefer some of these forms in my imagination to others, I make a rational preference. The judgment of truth is shining vigorously from above, and it is firmly supported by the wholly unbiased rules of its own proper law, and even if it is somewhat veiled by a kind of cloud of bodily images, still it is not entangled and confused by them.

11. But it does of course make some difference whether I am as it were shut off from the transparent sky under or in that fog, or whether as happens on high mountains I can enjoy the free atmosphere between the two, and look upon the fair light above and the swirling mists below. From where, after all, is the fire of brotherly love kindled in me when I hear about some man who has endured severe tortures in the fine constancy of his faith? And if this man is pointed out to me, I am dead set at once on getting in touch with him, on getting to know him, on binding him to myself in friendship. So when I get the chance I approach him, speak to him, engage him in conversation, express my regard for him with whatever words I can, and in turn I hope he will develop and express a regard for me; and I try to achieve spiritual rapport with him by believing his inner disposition, because I am quite unable in so short a time to judge it on the basis of thorough observation. And so I love a faithful and brave man with a chaste and brotherly love. But now suppose that in our mutual conversation he confesses or carelessly betrays himself in some fashion as having unworthy beliefs about God and looking for some material benefit from him, and as having suffered what he did for some such mistaken notion, whether in the greedy hope of financial gain or the vain pursuit of human praise; immediately that love which carried me out to him is brought up short and as it were repulsed and withdrawn from an unworthy man; but it remains fixed on that form by which I loved him while I believed him to be like it. Except of course that I might still love him hoping that he may become like it, though I have discovered him not to be like it. Yet in the man himself nothing has changed; though it could change so that he became what I believed he already was. In my mind however there is a change from the estimation which I had of him to the one I now have of him; and at the bidding from above of unchanging justice the same love of mine is deflected from the intention of enjoying him to the intention of counseling him. But the form itself of unshaken

secundum illam iudicamus, et illam cernimus rationalis mentis intuitu. Ista vero aut praesentia sensu corporis tangimus, aut imagines absentium fixas in memoria recordamur, aut ex earum similitudine talia fingimus, qualia nos ipsi, si vellemus atque possemus, etiam opere moliremur; aliter figurantes animo imagines corporum, aut per corpus corpora videntes; aliter autem rationes artemque ineffabiliter pulchram talium figurarum super aciem mentis simplici intellegentia capientes.

Verbum dicendo intus gignimus.

7. 12. In illa igitur aeterna veritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam secundum quam sumus, et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspiciamus; atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam, tamquam verbum apud nos habemus, et dicendo intus gignimus; nec a nobis nascendo discedit. Cum autem ad alios loquimur, verbo intus manenti ministerium vocis adhibemus, aut alicuius signi corporalis, ut per quandam commemorationem sensibilem tale aliquid fiat etiam in animo audientis, quale de loquentis animo non recedit. Nihil itaque agimus per membra corporis in factis dictisque nostris, quibus vel approbantur vel improbantur mores hominum, quod non verbo apud nos intus edito praevenimus. Nemo enim aliquid volens facit, quod non in corde suo prius dixerit.

7. 13. Quod verbum amore concipitur, sive creaturae, sive Creatoris, id est, aut naturae mutabilis, aut incommutabilis veritatis.

Verbum amore concipitur sive creaturae, sive Creatoris.

8. 13. Ergo aut cupiditate aut caritate; non quo non sit amanda creatura, sed si ad creatorem refertur ille amor, non iam cupiditas, sed caritas erit. Tunc enim est cupiditas, cum propter se amatur creatura. Tunc non utentem adiuvat, sed corrumpit fruentem. Cum ergo aut par nobis, aut inferior creatura sit, inferiore utendum est ad Deum; pari autem fruendum, sed in Deo. Sicut enim te ipso, non in te ipso frui debes, sed in eo qui fecit te; sic etiam illo quem diligis tamquam te ipsum. Et nobis ergo et fratribus in Domino fruamur, et inde nos nec ad nosmetipsos remittere, et quasi relaxare deorsum versus audeamus. Nascitur autem verbum, cum excogitatum placet, aut ad peccandum, aut ad recte faciendum. Verbum ergo nostrum et mentem de qua gignitur, quasi medius

and abiding truth, in which I would enjoy the man while I believed him to be good and in which I now counsel him to be good, continues unruffled as eternity to shed the same light of the purest incorruptible reason both on the vision of my mind and on that cloud of imagination which I perceive from above when I think of this man I had seen. Or take another example; I turn over in my mind an arch^{†20} I have seen in Carthage embellished with a beautifully intricate pattern; here a particular thing, brought to the mind's notice through the eyes and transferred to the memory, produces an observation in the imagination. But with the mind I observe something else, in terms of which I take pleasure in this work of art, in terms of which I would put it right if it displeased me. Thus it is that we make judgments about these things according to that form of truth, and we perceive that by insight of the rational mind. These things however we touch with our bodily sense when they are present, or recall their images fixed in the memory when they are absent, or else we fabricate composite images, from elements similar to these, of what we would try to put into effect in a work of our own if we had the will or the ability. But our shaping the images of bodies in our consciousness^{†21} or our seeing bodies through the body is one thing; quite another is our grasping by simple intelligence the proportions,^{†22} the inexpressibly beautiful art of such shapes, existing above the apex of the mind.

12. Thus it is that in that eternal truth according to which all temporal things were made we observe with the eye of the mind the form according to which we are and according to which we do anything with true and right reason, either in ourselves or in bodies.^{†23} And by this form we conceive true knowledge of things, which we have with us as a kind of word that we beget by uttering inwardly, and that does not depart from us when it is born. When we speak to others we put our voice or some bodily gesture at the disposal of the word that abides within, in order that by a kind of perceptible reminder the same sort of thing might happen in the mind of the listener as exists in and does not depart from the mind of the speaker. And so there is nothing that we do with our bodies in deeds or words to express approval or disapproval of the behavior of men, which we have not anticipated with a word uttered inside ourselves. Nobody voluntarily does anything that he has not previously uttered as a word in his heart.

13. This word is conceived in love of either the creature or the creator, that is of changeable nature or unchangeable truth; which means either in covetousness or in charity. Not that the creature is not to be loved, but if that love is related to the creator it will no longer be covetousness but charity. It is only covetousness when the creature is loved on its own account. In this case it does not help you in your use of it, but corrupts you in your enjoyment of it.^{†24} Now a creature can either be on a par with us or lower than us; the lower creature should be used to bring us to God, the creature on a par should

amor coniungit, seque cum eis tertium complexu incorporeo, sine ulla confusione constringit.

In amore spiritualium conceptum verbum et natum idipsum est; in amore carnalium alius conceptus verbi, alius partus.

9. 14. Conceptum autem verbum et natum idipsum est, cum voluntas in ipsa notitia conquiescit, quod fit in amore spiritualium. Qui enim, verbi gratia, perfecte novit, perfecteque amat iustitiam, iam iustus est, etiamsi nulla existat secundum eam forinsecus per membra corporis operandi necessitas. In amore autem carnalium temporaliumque rerum, sicut in ipsis animalium fetibus, alius est conceptus verbi, alius partus. Illic enim quod cupiendo concipitur, adipiscendo nascitur. Quoniam non sufficit avaritiae nosse et amare aurum, nisi et habeat; neque nosse et amare vesci, aut concumbere, nisi etiam id agat; neque nosse et amare honores et imperia, nisi proveniant. Quae tamen omnia, nec adepta sufficiunt: Qui enim biberit, inquit, ex hac aqua, sitiet iterum 23. Ideoque et in Psalmis: Concepit, inquit, dolorem, et peperit iniquitatem 24. Dolorem vel laborem dicit concipi, cum ea concipiuntur quae nosse ac velle non sufficit, et inardescit atque aegrotat animus indigentia, donec ad ea perveniat, et quasi pariat ea. Unde eleganter in latina lingua parta dicuntur et reperta atque comperta, quae verba quasi a partu ducta resonant. Quia concupiscentia cum conceperit, parit peccatum 25. Unde Dominus clamat: Venite ad me, omnes qui laboratis et onerati estis 26; et alio loco: Vae praegnantibus et mammantibus in illis diebus 27. Cum itaque ad partum verbi referret omnia vel recte facta vel peccata: Ex ore, inquit, tuo iustificaberis, et ex ore tuo condemnaberis 28; os volens intellegi, non hoc visibile, sed interius invisibile cogitationis et cordis.

An tantum amata notitia sit verbum mentis.

10. 15. Recte ergo quaeritur, utrum omnis notitia verbum, an tantum amata notitia. Novimus enim et ea quae odimus; sed nec concepta, nec parta dicenda sunt animo, quae nobis displicent. Non enim omnia quae quoquo modo tangunt, concipiuntur, ut tantum nota sint, non tamen verba dicantur; ista de quibus nunc agimus. Aliter enim dicuntur verba quae spatia temporum syllabis tenent, sive pronuntientur, sive cogitentur; aliter omne quod notum est, verbum dicitur animo impressum, quamdiu de memoria proferri et definiri potest, quamvis res ipsa displiceat; aliter cum placet quod mente concipitur. Secundum

be enjoyed, but in God. Just as you ought to enjoy yourself not in yourself but in him who made you, so too with the one whom you love as yourself. Let us then enjoy both ourselves and our brothers in the Lord, and from that level let us not dare to lower ourselves down even to our own, and so slacken off in a downward direction. Now this word†25 is born when on thinking over it we like it either for sinning or for doing good. So love, like something in the middle, joins together our word and the mind it is begotten from, and binds itself in with them as a third element in a non-bodily embrace, without any confusion.

14. But the conceived word and the born word are the same thing when the will rests in the act itself of knowing, which happens in the love of spiritual things. For example, someone who perfectly loves justice is thereby already just even if no occasion exists for him to do justice externally in bodily activity. But in the love of temporal and material things the conception of a word is one thing and its birth another, as it is with the breeding of animals. In this case the word is conceived by wanting and born by getting, as it is not enough for greed to know and love money unless it also has it, or to know and love eating or copulating unless it also does them, or to know and love honors and political power unless they are also forthcoming. Yet as a matter of fact none of these things satisfies even when you get it; Whoever drinks of this water, it says, will be thirsty again (Jn 4:13); and thus it says in the psalms, He conceived pain and brought forth iniquity (Ps 7:14). Pain or labor is said to be conceived when things are conceived that it is unsatisfying simply to know and want, and so the soul is in a burning fever of need until it gets hold of them and so to say brings them forth. So in Latin you can say rather elegantly that things which are reperta or comperta, words that sound as if they came from partus, are parta; or in English you could say that things which have been brought out or brought to light, in the sense of found out, have been brought forth, for when lust conceives it brings forth sin (Jas 1:15). So the Lord cries out, Come to me, all you that labor and are heavy burdened (Mt 11:28);†26 and in another place, Woe to those that are with child and giving suck in those days (Mt 24:19). And thus when he would refer all good deeds or sins to this bringing forth of a word, he said Out of your mouth you will be justified and out of your mouth you will be condemned (Mt 12:37); by “mouth” he wished to signify not this visible one but the inner invisible one of the thoughts and the heart.

15. It is right then to ask whether all knowledge is a word, or only loved knowledge. We also know what we hate, but we can scarcely talk of things we dislike being either conceived or brought forth by the consciousness. Not everything that touches our mind in any way is conceived, so it may only be known without being called the kind of word we are now talking about.†27 In one sense we give the name of word to whatever occupies a space of time with its syllables, whether

quod genus verbi accipiendum est quod ait Apostolus: Nemo dicit: Dominus Iesus, nisi in Spiritu Sancto 29; cum secundum aliam verbi notionem dicant hoc et illi, de quibus ipse Dominus ait: Non omnis qui mihi dicit: Domine, Domine, intrabit in regnum caelorum 30. Verumtamen cum et illa quae odimus, recte displicent, recteque improbantur, approbatur eorum improbatio, et placet, et verbum est. Neque vitiorum notitia nobis displicet, sed ipsa vitia. Nam placet mihi quod novi et definitio quid sit intemperantia; et hoc est verbum eius. Sicuti sunt in arte nota vitia, et recte approbatur eorum notitia cum discernit cognitor speciem privationemque virtutis, sicut aiere et negare, et esse et non esse; attamen virtute privari atque in vitium deficere damnabile est. Et definire intemperantiam, verbumque eius dicere, pertinet ad artem morum; esse autem intemperantem, ad id pertinet quod illa arte culpatur. Sicut nosse ac definire quid sit soloecismus, pertinet ad artem loquendi; facere autem, vitium est quod eadem arte reprehenditur. Verbum est igitur, quod nunc discernere et insinuare volumus, cum amore notitia. Cum itaque se mens novit et amat, iungitur ei amore verbum eius. Et quoniam amat notitiam et novit amorem, et verbum in amore est et amor in verbo, et utrumque in amante atque dicente.

Mentis notitia imago et verbum eius.

11. 16. Sed omnis secundum speciem notitia, similis est ei rei quam novit. Est enim alia notitia, secundum privationem, quam cum improbamus, loquimur. Et haec privationis improbatio speciem laudat, ideoque approbatur. Habet ergo animus nonnullam speciei notae similitudinem, sive cum ea placet, sive cum eius privatio displicet. Quocirca in quantum Deum novimus, similes sumus; sed non ad aequalitatem similes, quia nec tantum eum novimus, quantum ipse se. Et quemadmodum cum per sensum corporis discimus corpora, fit aliqua eorum similitudo in animo nostro, quae phantasia memoriae est; non enim omnino ipsa corpora in animo sunt, cum ea cogitamus; sed eorum similitudines, itaque cum eas pro illis approbamus, erramus; error est namque pro alio alterius approbatio; melior est tamen imaginatio corporis in animo, quam illa species corporis, in quantum haec in meliore natura est, id est in substantia vitali, sicuti est animus; ita cum Deum novimus, quamvis meliores efficiamur quam eramus antequam nossemus, maximeque cum eadem notitia etiam placita digneque amata verbum est, fitque aliqua Dei similitudo illa notitia; tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est; creatura quippe animus, Creator autem Deus. Ex quo colligitur, quia cum se

it is spoken aloud or merely thought; in another, everything that is known is called a word impressed on the consciousness, as long as it can be produced from the memory and described, even when we dislike it; but in the sense we are now using, that is called a word which we like when it is conceived by the mind.†28 It is in terms of this kind of word that we must take what the apostle says, Nobody says “Jesus is Lord” except in the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 12:3), though in terms of the other notion of word those people also say this of whom the Lord himself says, Not everyone who says to me “Lord” will enter the kingdom of heaven (Mt 7:21).

And yet even when we rightly dislike things we hate, and disapprove of them, we like and approve of our disapproval of them, and this is a word. Nor as a matter of fact is it the knowledge of vices that we dislike, but the vices themselves. It pleases me that I can know and define what immoderation is, and this is its word. In any art or craft the relevant faults are known, and knowledge of them is rightly applauded when the connoisseur distinguishes the quality†29 of some relevant excellence from the defect of it, on the analogy of affirming and denying, being and not being;†30 and yet for the practitioner to lack this excellence and lapse into this defect is a black mark against him. Now to define immoderation and utter its word belongs to the art of morals; but to be immoderate belongs to what that art condemns. Likewise to know and define what a solecism is belongs to the art of grammar; but to commit one is something that the same art reprehends. The kind of word then that we are now wishing to distinguish and propose is “knowledge with love.” So when the mind knows and loves itself, its word is joined to it with love. And since it loves knowledge and knows love, the word is in the love and the love in the word and both in the lover and the utterer.

16. But all positive knowledge of quality†31 is like the thing which it knows. There is another knowledge of defect which we express when we find fault, and this finding fault with defect commends the corresponding quality, and is therefore approved of. So the consciousness has some kind of likeness to the positive quality known, either when it takes pleasure in it or when it is displeased with the lack of it. It follows that insofar as we know God we are like him, but never like him to the point of equality, since we never know him as much as he himself is. When we learn about bodies through our bodily senses a kind of likeness of them occurs in our consciousness which is their image in the memory. The bodies themselves of course are certainly not in our consciousness when we think of them but their likenesses, and so when we make a judgment†32 on these instead of on those we make a mistake; that is what a mistake is, judging one thing for another. Yet for all that the image of the body in our consciousness is better than the reality of the body itself insofar as it is in a better nature, that is, in a living substance such as the

mens ipsa novit atque approbat, sic est eadem notitia verbum eius, ut ei sit par omnino et aequale, atque identidem; quia neque inferioris essentiae notitia est, sicut corporis; neque superioris, sicut Dei. Et cum habeat notitia similitudinem ad eam rem quam novit, hoc est, cuius notitia est; haec habet perfectam et aequalem, qua mens ipsa, quae novit, est nota. Ideoque et imago et verbum est, quia de illa exprimitur cum cognoscendo eidem coaequatur, et est gignenti aequale quod genitum est.

Cur mens amorem suum non gignit cum se amat?

12. 17. Quid ergo? Amor non erit imago? non verbum? non genitus? Cur enim mens notitiam suam gignit, cum se novit; et amorem suum non gignit, cum se amat? Nam si propterea est notionis suae causa, quia noscibilis est; amoris etiam sui causa est, quia est amabilis. Cur itaque non utrumque genuerit, difficile est dicere. Haec enim quaestio etiam de ipsa summa Trinitate, omnipotentissimo creatore Deo, ad cuius imaginem homo factus est 31, solet movere homines, quos veritas Dei per humanam locutionem invitat ad fidem, cur non Spiritus quoque Sanctus a Patre Deo genitus vel creditur vel intellegitur, ut filius etiam ipse dicatur? Quod nunc in mente humana utcumque vestigare conamur, ut ex inferiore imagine, in qua nobis familiaris natura ipsa nostra, quasi interrogata respondet, exercitatio mentis aciem ab illuminata creatura ad lumen incommutabile dirigamus; si tamen veritas ipsa persuaserit, sicut Dei Verbum 32 Filium esse nullus christianus dubitat, ita caritatem esse Spiritum Sanctum. Ergo ad illam imaginem quae creatura est, hoc est, ad rationalem mentem diligentius de hac re interrogandam considerandamque redeamus, ubi temporaliter existens nonnullarum rerum notitia, quae ante non erat, et aliquarum rerum amor, quae antea non amabantur, distinctius nobis aperit quid dicamus; quia et ipsi locutioni temporaliter dirigendae, facilius est ad explicandum res quae in ordine temporum comprehenditur.

Solutio quaestionis. Mens et notitia eius et amor tertius imago Trinitatis.

12. 18. Primo itaque manifestum sit, posse fieri ut sit aliquid scibile, id est, quod sciri possit, et tamen nesciatur; illud autem fieri non posse, ut sciatur quod scibile non fuerit. Unde liquido tenendum est quod omnis res quamcumque cognoscimus, congenerat in nobis notitiam sui. Ab utroque enim notitia paritur, a cognoscente et cognito 33. Itaque mens cum se ipsa

consciousness. By the same token when we know God we are indeed made better ourselves than we were before we knew him, especially when we like this knowledge and appropriately love it and it becomes a word and a kind of likeness to God; yet it remains inferior to God because it is an inferior nature, our consciousness being a creature, but God the creator. From this we can gather that when the mind knows and approves itself, this knowledge is its word in such a way that it matches it exactly and is equal to it and identical,^{†33} since it is neither knowledge of an inferior thing like body nor of a superior one like God. And while any knowledge has a likeness to the thing it knows, that is to the thing it is the knowledge of, this knowledge by which the knowing mind is known has a perfect and equal likeness. And the reason it is both image and word, is that it is expressed^{†34} from the mind when it is made equal to it by knowing it; and what is begotten is equal to the begetter.

Chapter 3: The author looks for a reason why love should not be called word, or image, nor said to be begotten or conceived, like knowledge; this being a question that exercises him greatly with respect to the Holy Spirit. The reader must decide for himself what he makes of the suggested answer.

17. What then about love? Will love not be image, nor word, nor begotten? Why does the mind beget its knowledge when it knows itself, and not beget its love when it loves itself? If the reason it is the cause of its notion of itself is that it is knowable, then equally it is the cause of its love of itself because it is lovable. So why it should not have begotten both it is difficult to say. The same question often bothers people about the supreme trinity, God the almighty creator to whose image man was made (Gn 9:6); the truth of God invites them by human speech to faith,^{†35} and they wonder why the Holy Spirit too may not be believed or understood to be begotten by the Father and so be called Son in his turn.

What we are now trying to do is to examine this question in the human mind; here our own nature can, so to say, answer our questions more familiarly; and so after practicing the mind's gaze on the lower image we may be able to shift it from the illuminated creature to the unchangeable illuminating light. This presupposes that truth itself has convinced us the Holy Spirit is charity, just as no Christian doubts that the Son is the Word of God. Let us return then to the created image, that is to say to the rational mind, and examine and question it more thoroughly about this matter. Here there exists in the time dimension a knowledge of some things that was not there before, and a love of some things that were not loved before. So this examination will reveal to us more distinctly what we are to say, since it is easier for speech which has to proceed in a time dimension to explain something which is comprehended in the time dimension.

cognoscit, sola parens est notitiae suae; et cognitum enim et cognitor ipsa est. Erat autem sibi ipsa noscibilis, et antequam se nosset; sed notitia sui non erat in ea, cum se ipsa non noverat. Quod ergo cognoscit se, parem sibi notitiam sui gignit; quia non minus se novit quam est, nec alterius essentiae est notitia eius, non solum quia ipsa novit, sed etiam quia se ipsam sicut supra diximus. Quid igitur de amore dicendum est, cur non etiam cum se amat, ipsum quoque amorem sui genuisse videatur? Erat enim amabilis sibi, et antequam se amaret, quia poterat se amare; sicut erat sibi noscibilis, et antequam se nosset, quia se poterat nosse. Nam si non sibi esset noscibilis, numquam se nosse potuisset; ita si non sibi esset amabilis, numquam se amare potuisset. Cur itaque amando se non genuisse dicatur amorem suum; sicut cognoscendo se genuit notitiam suam? An eo quidem manifeste ostenditur hoc amoris esse principium, unde procedit? Ab ipsa quippe mente procedit quae sibi est amabilis antequam se amet; atque ita principium est amoris sui, quo se amat. Sed ideo non recte dicitur genitus ab ea, sicut notitia sui qua se novit, quia notitia iam inventum est, quod partum vel repertum dicitur, quod saepe praecedat inquisitio eo fine quietura. Nam inquisitio est appetitus inveniendi, quod idem valet si dicas, reperiendi. Quae autem reperiuntur, quasi pariuntur, unde proli similia sunt; ubi, nisi in ipsa notitia? Ibi enim quasi expressa formantur. Nam etsi iam erant res quas quaerendo invenimus, notitia tamen ipsa non erat, quam sicut prolem nascentem deputamus. Porro appetitus ille, qui est in quaerendo, procedit a quaerente, et pendet quodam modo, neque requiescit fine quo intenditur, nisi id quod quaeritur inventum quaerenti copuletur. Qui appetitus, id est, inquisitio, quamvis amor esse non videatur, quod id quod notum est, amatur; hoc enim adhuc ut cognoscatur agitur; tamen ex eodem genere quiddam est. Nam voluntas iam dici potest, quia omnis qui quaerit invenire vult 34; et si id quaeritur quod ad notitiam pertineat, omnis qui quaerit nosse vult. Quod si ardentem atque instanter vult, studere dicitur; quod maxime in assequendis atque adipiscendis quibusque doctrinis dici solet. Partum ergo mentis antecedit appetitus quidam, quo id quod nosse volumus quaerendo et inveniando, nascitur proles ipsa notitia; ac per hoc appetitus ille quo concipitur pariturque notitia, partus et proles recte dici non potest. Idemque appetitus quo inhiatur rei cognoscendae, fit amor cognitae, dum tenet atque amplectitur placitam prolem, id est notitiam, gignentique coniungit. Et est quaedam imago Trinitatis, ipsa mens, et notitia eius, quod est proles eius ac de se ipsa verbum eius, et amor tertius,

18. First of all then let it be accepted that it can happen that something is knowable, that is can be known, and yet is not known. What cannot happen is that something is known that was not knowable. Evidently then we must hold that every single thing whatsoever that we know co-generates in us knowledge of itself; for knowledge issues from both, from the knower and the thing known. So when mind knows itself it is the sole parent of its knowledge, being itself the thing known and the knower. It was however knowable to itself even before it knew itself, but its knowledge of self was not in it while it did not know itself. Therefore as it gets to know itself it begets a knowledge of itself that totally matches itself, since it does not know itself less than it is, nor is its knowledge different in being from itself, not only because it is doing the knowing but also because what it is knowing is itself, as we have said before. What then is to be said about love, to show why even when the mind loves itself it cannot also be regarded as having begotten its love of itself? It was of course lovable to itself even before it loved itself, since it was able to love itself; just as it was knowable to itself even before it knew itself, since it was able to know itself. After all, if it had not been knowable to itself it could never have got to know itself; so too if it had not been lovable to itself it could never have loved itself. So why may it not be said to have begotten its love by loving itself, just as it begot its knowledge by knowing itself? Perhaps all that this clearly shows is that this is the origin of love from which it proceeds. For obviously it proceeds from the mind which is lovable to itself before it loves itself, and thus is the origin of the love of self with which it loves itself. But the reason it is not right to say that love is begotten by it like the knowledge of itself by which it knows itself, is that knowledge is a kind of finding out what is said to be brought forth or brought to light,†36 which is often preceded by an inquisitiveness†37 that is going to rest in that end. Inquisitiveness is an appetite for finding out, which amounts to the same thing as “bringing to light.” But things that are brought to light are so to speak brought forth, which makes them similar to offspring. And where does all this happen but in knowledge? It is there that they are as it were squeezed out†38 and formed. Even if the things we have found out by inquiry already existed, still knowledge of them did not yet exist, and it is this that we reckon as the offspring coming to birth. Now this appetite shown in inquiring proceeds from the inquirer, and it is left somewhat hanging in the air and does not rest assuaged in the end it is stretching out to, until what is being looked for has been found and is coupled with the inquirer. This appetite, that is inquisitiveness, does not indeed appear to be the love with which what is known is loved (this is still busy getting known), yet it is something of the same kind. It can already be called will because everyone who inquires wants to find out, and if what is being inquired about belongs to knowledge,†39 then everyone who inquires wants to know.

et haec tria unum 35 atque una substantia. Nec minor proles dum tantam se novit mens quanta est; nec minor amor, dum tantum se diligit quantum novit et quanta est.

If he urgently and passionately wants to know he is said to be studious, a term which is commonly used about the pursuit and acquisition of various kinds of learning. So parturition by the mind is preceded by a kind of appetite which prompts us to inquire and find out about what we want to know, and as a result knowledge itself is brought forth as offspring; and hence the appetite itself by which knowledge is conceived and brought forth cannot appropriately itself be called brood or offspring. The same appetite with which one longs open-mouthed to know a thing becomes love of the thing known when it holds and embraces the acceptable offspring, that is knowledge, and joins it to its begetter. And so you have a certain image of the trinity, the mind itself and its knowledge, which is its offspring and its word about itself, and love as the third element, and these three are one (1 Jn 5:8)†40 and are one substance. Nor is the offspring less than the mind so long as the mind knows itself as much as it is, nor is love any less so long as it loves itself as much as it knows and as much as it is.

De Civitate Dei contra Paganos (413-427)

Esse, nosse et diligere in Deo et in nobis.

XI.26. Et nos quidem in nobis, tametsi non aequalem, immo valde longeque distantem, neque coaeternam et, quo brevius totum dicitur, non eiusdem substantiae, cuius Deus est, tamen qua Deo nihil sit in rebus ab eo factis natura propinquius, imaginem Dei, hoc est illius summae Trinitatis, agnoscimus, adhuc reformatione perficiendam, ut sit etiam similitudine proxima. Nam et sumus et nos esse novimus et id esse ac nosse diligimus. In his autem tribus, quae dixi, nulla nos falsitas veri similis turbat. Non enim ea sicut illa, quae foris sunt, ullo sensu corporis tangimus, velut colores videndo, sonos audiendo, odores olfaciendo, saporos gustando, dura et mollia contrectando sentimus, quorum sensibilibus etiam imagines eis simillimas nec iam corporeas cogitatione versamus, memoria tenemus et per ipsas in istorum desideria concitamus; sed sine ulla phantasiarum vel phantasmatum imaginatione ludificatoria mihi esse me idque nosse et amare certissimum est. Nulla in his veris Academicorum argumenta formido dicentium: Quid si falleris? Si enim fallor, sum. Nam qui non est, utique nec falli potest; ac per hoc sum, si fallor. Quia ergo sum si fallor, quomodo esse me fallor, quando certum est me esse, si fallor? Quia igitur essem qui fallerer, etiamsi fallerer, procul dubio in eo, quod me novi esse, non fallor. Consequens est autem, ut etiam in eo, quod me novi nosse, non fallor. Sicut enim novi esse me, ita novi etiam hoc ipsum, nosse me. Eaque duo cum amo, eundem quoque amorem quiddam tertium nec imparis

The City of God

XI.26 We ourselves can recognize in ourselves an image of God, in the sense of an image of the Trinity. Of course, it is merely an image and, in fact, a very remote one. There is no question of identity nor of co-eternity nor, in one word, of consubstantiality with Him. Nevertheless, it is an image which by nature is nearer to God than anything else in all creation, and one that by transforming grace can be perfected into a still closer resemblance. For, we are, and we know that we are, and we love to be and to know that we are. And in this trinity of being, knowledge, and love there is not a shadow of illusion to disturb us. For, we do not reach these inner realities with our bodily senses as we do external objects, as, for example, color by seeing, sound by hearing, odor by smelling, flavor by tasting, hard or soft objects by touching. In the case of such sensible things, the best we can do is to form very close and immaterial images which help us to turn them over in our minds, to hold them in our memory, and thus to keep our love for them alive. But, without any illusion of image, fancy, or phantasm, I am certain that I am, that I know that I am, and that I love to be and to know. In the face of these truths, the quibbles of the skeptics lose their force. If they say; 'What if you are mistaken?'-well, if I am mistaken, I am. For, if one does not exist, he can by no means be mistaken. Therefore, I am, if I am mistaken. Because, therefore, I am, if I am mistaken, how can I be mistaken that I am, since it is certain that I am, if I am mistaken? And because, if I could be mistaken, I would have to be the one who is mistaken, therefore, I am most certainly not mistaken in knowing that I am. Nor, as a consequence, am I mistaken in knowing that I know. For, just as I know that I am, I also know that I know. And when I love both to be and to know,

aestimationis eis quas novi rebus adiungo. Neque enim fallor amare me, cum in his quae amo non fallar; quamquam etsi illa falsa essent, falsa me amare verum esset. Nam quo pacto recte reprehenderer et recte prohiberer ab amore falsorum, si me illa amare falsum esset? Cum vero illa vera atque certa sint, quis dubitet quod eorum, cum amantur, et ipse amor verus et certus est? Tam porro nemo est qui esse se nolit, quam nemo est qui non esse beatus velit. Quo modo enim potest beatus esse, si nihil sit?

Omnia esse volunt.

27. 1. Ita vero vi quadam naturali ipsum esse iucundum est, ut non ob aliud et hi qui miseri sunt nolint interire et, cum se miseros esse sentiant, non se ipsos de rebus, sed miseriam suam potius auferri velint. Illis etiam, qui et sibi miserrimi apparent et plane sunt et non solum a sapientibus, quoniam stulti, verum et ab his, qui se beatos putant, miseri iudicantur, quia pauperes atque mendici sunt, si quis immortalitatem daret, qua nec ipsa miseria moreretur, proposito sibi quod, si in eadem miseria semper esse nollent, nulli et nusquam essent futuri, sed omni modo perituri, profecto exsultarent laetitia et sic semper eligerent esse quam omnino non esse. Huius rei testis est notissimus sensus illorum. Unde enim mori metuunt et malunt in illa aerumna vivere, quam eam morte finire, nisi quia satis apparet quam refugiat natura non esse? Atque ideo cum se noverint esse morituros, pro magno beneficio sibi hanc impendi misericordiam desiderant, ut aliquanto productius in eadem miseria vivant tardiusque moriantur. Procul dubio ergo indicant, immortalitatem, saltem talem quae non habeat finem mendicitatis, quanta gratulatione susciperent. Quid? animalia omnia etiam irrationalia, quibus datum non est ista cogitare, ab immensis draconibus usque ad exiguos vermiculos nonne se esse velle atque ob hoc interitum fugere omnibus quibus possunt motibus indicant? Quid? arbusta omnesque frutices, quibus nullus est sensus ad vitandam manifesta motione perniciem, nonne ut in auras tutum cacuminis germen emittant, aliud terrae radicis affigunt, quo alimentum trahant atque ita suum quodam modo esse conservent? Ipsa postremo corpora, quibus non solum sensus, sed nec ulla saltem seminalis est vita, ita tamen vel exiliunt in superna vel in ima descendunt vel librantur in mediis, ut essentiam suam, ubi secundum naturam possunt esse, custodiant.

Omnia esse quodam modo noverunt.

then I add to the things I know a third and equally important knowledge, the fact that I love. Nor am I mistaken that I love, since I am not mistaken concerning the objects of my love. For, even though these objects were false, it would still be true that I loved illusions. For, if this were not true, how could I be reproved and prohibited from loving illusions? But, since these objects are true and certain, who can doubt that, when they are loved, the loving of them is also true and certain? Further, just as there is no one who does not wish to be happy, so there is no one who does not wish to exist. For, how can anyone be happy if he does not exist?

27. Merely to exist is, by the very nature of things, so pleasant that in itself it is enough to make even the wretched unwilling to die; for, even when they are conscious of their misery, what they want to put an end to is not themselves but the misery. This is even the case with those who not merely feel miserable but manifestly are so, men who seem fools, in the eyes of the wise, and paupers and beggars to those who consider themselves well off. For, if they had a choice between personal immortality, in which their unhappiness would never end, or complete and permanent annihilation if they objected to eternal misery, they would be delighted to choose to live forever in misery rather than not to exist at all. If proof were needed, appeal can be made to the wellknown feeling of these men. They are afraid to die, and prefer to live on in misfortune rather than to end it by death. This is proof enough that nature shrinks from annihilation. And even when they know that they must die, they beg for mercy and ask as a boon that death be delayed so that they may live a little longer in their misery. Without a doubt, they prove with what alacrity they would accept immortality at any rate, one that involved no worse affliction than perpetual indigence. Why, even irrational animals, with no mind to make such reflections, from the greatest serpents to the tiniest worms, show in every movement they can make that they long to live and escape destruction. Even trees and plants, that can make no conscious movement to avoid destruction, can, in some sense, be said to guard their own existence by guaranteeing sustenance. They attach their roots deep into the earth in order to thrust forth their branches safe into the air. Last of all, even material bodies, lacking sensation and every sign of life, at least rise upwards or sink downwards or remain balanced in between, as though seeking the place where they can best exist in accordance with their nature. If proof be needed how much human nature loves to know and hates to be mistaken, recall that there is not a man who would not rather be sad but sane than glad but mad. Now, this great and marvelous light of love and hate is peculiar to men alone among all the living animals. For, although some animals have much keener sight in penetrating the light of day, they cannot penetrate that spiritual light which, as it were, illumines our mind and makes us able to judge correctly of all other things. For the

27. 2. *Iam vero nosse quantum ametur quamque falli nolit humana natura, vel hinc intellegi potest, quod lamentari quisque sana mente mavult quam laetari in amentia. Quae vis magna atque mirabilis mortalibus praeter homini animantibus nulla est, licet eorum quibusdam ad istam lucem contuendam multo quam nobis sit acrior sensus oculorum; sed lucem illam incorpoream contingere nequeunt, qua mens nostra quodam modo radiatur, ut de his omnibus recte iudicare possimus. Nam in quantum eam capimus, in tantum id possumus. Verumtamen inest in sensibus irrationalium animantium, etsi scientia nullo modo, at certe quaedam scientiae similitudo; cetera autem rerum corporalium, non quia sentiunt, sed quia sentiuntur, sensibilia nuncupata sunt. Quorum in arbustis hoc simile est sensibus, quod aluntur et gignunt. Verumtamen et haec et omnia corporalia latentes in natura causas habent; sed formas suas, quibus mundi huius visibilis structura formosa est, sentiendas sensibus praebent, ut pro eo, quod nosse non possunt, quasi innotescere velle videantur. Sed nos ea sensu corporis ita capimus, ut de his non sensu corporis iudicemus. Habemus enim alium interioris hominis sensum isto longe praestantiozem, quo iusta et iniusta sentimus, iusta per intellegibilem speciem, iniusta per eius privationem. Ad huius sensus officium non acies pupulae, non foramen auriculae, non spiramenta narium, non gustus faucium, non ullus corporeus tactus accedit. Ibi me et esse et hoc nosse certus sum, et haec amo atque amare me similiter certus sum.*

Amor qui amat et amatur ad Deum fertur.

28. *Sed de duobus illis, essentia scilicet et notitia, quantum amentur in nobis, et quem ad modum etiam in ceteris rebus, quae infra sunt, eorum reperiatur, etsi differens, quaedam tamen similitudo, quantum suscepti huius operis ratio visa est postulare, satis diximus; de amore autem, quo amantur, utrum et ipse amor ametur, non dictum est. Amatur autem; et hinc probamus, quod in hominibus, qui rectius amantur, ipse magis amatur. Neque enim vir bonus merito dicitur qui scit quod bonum est, sed qui diligit. Cur ergo et in nobis ipsis non et ipsum amorem nos amare sentimus, quo amamus quidquid boni amamus? Est enim et amor, quo amatur et quod amandum non est, et istum amorem odit in se, qui illum diligit, quo id amatur quod amandum est. Possunt enim ambo esse in uno homine, et hoc bonum est homini, ut illo proficiente quo bene vivimus iste deficiat quo male vivimus, donec ad perfectum sanetur et in bonum commutetur omne quod vivimus. Si enim pecora*

faculty of judgment is in proportion to our capacity for this light. Nevertheless, although irrational animals do not have knowledge as such in their senses, at least they have something that is like knowledge, whereas purely material things are called sensible, not because they can sense, but only because they can be sensed. Plants have something like sensation only in so far as they take nourishment and reproduce. While the ultimate explanation of all such material things is a secret of nature, the things themselves openly reveal to our senses their forms which help to make the pattern of this visible world so beautiful. It is as though, in compensation for their own incapacity to know, they wanted to become known by us. However, although we perceive them by our bodily senses, we do not make judgments concerning them by our senses. For, we men have another and far higher perception which is interior, and by which we distinguish what is just from what is unjust-justice by means of an intellectual conception; what is unjust by the lack of such a form. The function of this sense is not aided by a keen eye, nor by ear, nose or palate, nor by any bodily touch. By it I am certain of my existence and of the knowledge of my existence. Moreover, I love these two and, in like manner, am certain that I love them.

28. The plan of my book does not call for further consideration of the measure of our love for our existence and knowledge, nor of the analogy to this love which can be found even on the lower levels of creation. However, nothing has been said to make clear whether the love by which our existence and the knowledge of it are loved is itself the object of love. The answer is yes; and the proof is this, that what is really loved, in men who deserve to be loved, is love itself. For, we do not call a man good because he knows what is good, but because he loves it. Why, then, do we not see that what we love in ourselves is the very love by which we love whatever is good? There is also a love by which we love what should not be loved. And a man hates this love in himself if he loves the love of whatever is good. Both loves can exist in one and the same person. This co-existence is good for a man in that he can, by increasing in himself the love of what is right, decrease his love of what is evil until his whole life has been transformed to good and brought to perfection. For, if we were beasts, we would love the carnal life of the senses which would be our sufficient good and, therefore, as soon as all was well with us, we would seek for nothing further. Likewise, if we were trees, we could not love by any conscious tendency; nevertheless, there would be a kind of striving for whatever would make us more abundant in our fruitfulness. Again, if we were stones or waves, winds or flames, or anything of this sort which is without sensation and life, we would nevertheless be endowed with a kind of attraction for our proper place in the order of nature. The specific gravity of a body is, as it were, its love, whether it

essemus, carnalem vitam et quod secundum sensum eius est amarem idque esset sufficiens bonum nostrum et secundum hoc, cum esset nobis bene, nihil aliud quaeremus. Item si arbores essemus, nihil quidem sentiente motu amare possemus, verumtamen id quasi appetere videremur, quo feracius essemus uberiusque fructuosae. Si essemus lapides aut fluctus aut ventus aut flamma vel quid huiusmodi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque vita, non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis appetitus. Nam velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum, sive deorsum gravitate sive sursum levitate nitantur. Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque fertur. Quoniam igitur homines sumus ad nostri Creatoris imaginem creati, cuius est vera aeternitas, aeterna veritas, aeterna et vera caritas, estque ipse aeterna et vera et cara Trinitas neque confusa neque separata: in his quidem rebus, quae infra nos sunt, quoniam et ipsa nec aliquo modo essent nec aliqua specie continerentur nec aliquem ordinem vel appeterent vel tenerent, nisi ab illo facta essent, qui summe est, qui summe sapiens est, qui summe bonus est, tamquam per omnia, quae fecit mirabili stabilitate, currentes quasi quaedam eius alibi magis, alibi minus impressa vestigia colligamus; in nobis autem ipsis eius imaginem contuentes tamquam minor ille evangelicus filius 56 ad nosmetipsos reversi surgamus et ad illum redeamus, a quo peccando recesseramus. Ibi esse nostrum non habebit mortem, ibi nosse nostrum non habebit errorem, ibi amare nostrum non habebit offensionem. Nunc autem tria ista nostra quamvis certa teneamus nec aliis ea credamus testibus, sed nos ipsi praesentia sentiamus atque interiore veracissimo cernamus aspectu, tamen, quamdiu futura vel utrum numquam defutura et quo si male, quo autem si bene agantur perventura sint, quoniam per nos ipsos nosse non possumus, alios hinc testes vel quaerimus vel habemus; de quorum fide cur nulla debeat esse dubitatio, non est iste, sed posterior erit diligentius disserendi locus. In hoc autem libro de civitate Dei, quae non peregrinatur in huius vitae mortalitate, sed immortalis semper in caelis est, id est de angelis sanctis Deo cohaerentibus, qui nec fuerunt umquam nec futuri sunt desertores, inter quos et illos, qui aeternam lucem deserentes tenebrae facti sunt, Deum primitus divisisse iam diximus, illo adiuvante quod coepimus ut possumus explicemus.

tends upward by its lightness or downward by its weight. For, a body is borne by gravity as a spirit by love, whichever way it is moved. It is, therefore, because we are men, created to the image of a Creator, whose eternity is true, His truth eternal, His love both eternal and true, a Creator who is the eternal, true, and lovable Trinity in whom there is neither confusion nor division, that, wherever we turn among the things which He created and conserved so wonderfully, we discover His footprints, whether lightly or plainly impressed. For, not one of all these things which are below us would either be, or belong to a particular species, or follow and observe any order, unless it has been created by Him whose existence, wisdom, and goodness are all transcendent. When, therefore, we contemplate His image in our very selves, let us, like the younger son in the Gospel, return to ourselves, rise and seek Him from whom we have departed by sin. In Him our existence will know no death, our knowledge embrace no error, our love meet no resistance. At present we are certain that we possess these three things, not by the testimony of others but by our own consciousness of their presence in our interior and unerring vision. Nevertheless, since we cannot know of ourselves how long they will last or whether they will never cease and what will result from our good or bad use of them, we seek for other witnesses if we have not already found them. Not now, but later, I shall carefully discuss the reasons why we should have unhesitating trust in these witnesses. But in this Book, God helping, I shall continue to discuss, to the best of my ability, the City of God, not as it is in the pilgrimage of this mortal life but as it is in the eternity of heaven. There it consists of the holy and faithful angels who never were nor ever will be deserters from God, and who, as I have already said, were separated by God, in the very beginning, from those who rejected the eternal light and were turned into darkness.

Proto triadiné struktūra

Triada memoria - intelligentia - voluntas

De Trinitate (399-422/426)

Amor studentis animi non est amor rei incognitae.

X.1. 1. Nunc ad ea ipsa consequenter enodatus explicanda limatior accedat intentio. Ac primum, quia rem prorsus ignotam amare omnino nullus potest, diligenter intuendum est cuiusmodi sit amor studentium, id est, non iam scientium, sed adhuc scire cupientium quamque doctrinam. Et in his quippe rebus in quibus non usitate dicitur studium, solent existere amores ex auditu, dum cuiusque pulchritudinis fama ad videndum ac fruendum animus accenditur, quia generaliter novit corporum pulchritudines, ex eo quod plurimas vidit, et inest intrinsecus unde approbetur, cui forinsecus inhiatur. Quod cum fit, non rei penitus incognitae amor excitatur, cuius genus ita notum est. Cum autem virum bonum amamus, cuius faciem non vidimus, ex notitia virtutum amamus, quas novimus in ipsa veritate. Ad doctrinas autem cognoscendas, plerumque nos laudantium atque praedicantium accendit auctoritas; et tamen nisi breviter impressam cuiusque doctrinae haberemus in animo notionem, nullo ad eam discendam studio flagraremus. Quis enim sciendae, verbi gratia, rhetoricae ullam curam et operam impenderet, nisi ante sciret eam dicendi esse scientiam? Aliquando etiam ipsarum doctrinarum fines auditos expertosve miramur, et ex hoc inardescimus facultatem comparare discendo, qua ad eos pervenire possimus. Tamquam si litteras nescienti dicatur quandam esse doctrinam, qua quisque valeat, quamvis longe absenti, verba mittere manu facta in silentio, quae rursus ille cui mittuntur, non auribus, sed oculis colligat, idque fieri videat. Nonne, dum concupiscit nosse quo id possit, omni studio circa illum finem movetur, quem iam notum tenet? Sic accenduntur studia discentium. Nam quod quisque prorsus ignorat, amare nullo pacto potest.

Signum.

1. 2. Ita etiam signum si quis audiat incognitum, veluti verbi alicuius sonum, quo quid significetur ignorat, cupit scire quidnam sit, id est, sonus ille cui rei commemorandae institutus sit; veluti audiat cum dicitur "temetum", et ignorans quid sit requirat. Iam itaque oportet ut noverit signum esse, id est, non esse inanem illam vocem, sed aliquid ea significari;

On the Trinity

X.1. We must go on now to remove some of the knots and polish some of the roughnesses out of our draft presentation of these matters. But first of all, remembering that absolutely no one can love a thing that is quite unknown, we must carefully examine what sort of love it is that the studious have, that is people who do not yet know but still desire to know some branch of learning. Even over matters where we do not usually talk about studiousness, love commonly results from hearing; thus the spirit^{†2} is roused by talk of someone's beauty to go and see and enjoy it, since it has a general knowledge of physical beauty, having seen many examples of it, and has something inside^{†3} by which to judge and approve of what it hungers for outside. When this happens love is not being aroused for something totally unknown, since the kind of thing it is is known in this way. And when we love a good man whose face we have not seen, we love him out of a knowledge of the virtues which we know in truth itself. As for branches of learning, our interest in studying them is very often aroused by the authority of those who commend and popularize them; and yet unless we had at least some slight notion of any subject impressed on our consciousness,^{†4} it would be quite impossible for us to be kindled with enthusiasm for studying it. Would anyone take any trouble or care to learn rhetoric, for example, unless he knew beforehand that it was the science of speaking? Sometimes too we are amazed at what we hear or experience about the results of these disciplines, and this makes us enthusiastic to acquire by study the means of being able to reach such results ourselves. Suppose someone who does not know about writing is told that it is a discipline by which you can make words in silence with your hand and send them to somebody else a long way away, and by which this person they are sent to can pick them up not with his ears but his eyes; surely when he longs to know how he can do that himself, his enthusiasm is stirred by that result which he has now got the message about. This is the kind of way the enthusiasm and studiousness of learners is enkindled. What you are absolutely ignorant of you simply cannot love in any sense whatever.

2. Thus suppose someone hears an unknown sign, like the sound of some word which he does not know the meaning of; he wants to know what it is, that is, what thing that sound was fixed on to remind us of; he hears someone say

alioquin iam notum est hoc trisyllabum, et articulatam speciem suam impressit animo per sensum aurium. Quid amplius in eo requiratur, quo magis innotescat, cuius omnes litterae omniaque soni spatia nota sunt; nisi quia simul innotuit signum esse, movitque sciendi cupiditatem, cuius rei signum sit? Quo igitur amplius notum est, sed non plene notum est, eo cupit animus de illo nosse quod reliquum est. Si enim tantummodo esse istam vocem nosset, eamque alicuius rei signum esse non nosset, nihil iam quaereret, sensibili re, quantum poterat, sentiendo percepta. Quia vero non solum esse vocem, sed et signum esse iam novit, perfecte id nosse vult; neque ullum perfecte signum noscitur, nisi cuius rei signum sit cognoscatur. Hoc ergo qui ardenti cura quaerit ut noverit, studioque accensus insistit, num potest dici esse sine amore? Quid igitur amat? Certe enim amari aliquid nisi notum non potest. Neque enim ille istas tres syllabas amat, quas iam notas habet. Quod si iam hoc in eis amat, quia scit eas significare aliquid; non inde nunc agitur, non enim hoc nosse quaerit; sed in eo quod scire studet, quid amet inquirimus, quod profecto nondum novit, et propterea miramur cur amet, quoniam firmissime novimus amari nisi nota non posse. Quid ergo amat, nisi quia novit atque intuetur in rationibus rerum quae sit pulchritudo doctrinae, qua continentur notitiae signorum omnium; et quae sit utilitas in ea peritia, qua inter se humana societas sensa communicat, ne sibi hominum coetus deteriores sint quavis solitudine, si cogitationes suas colloquendo non misceant? Hanc ergo speciem decoram et utilem cernit anima, et novit, et amat; eamque in se perfici studet, quantum potest, quisquis vocum significantium quaecumque ignorat, inquirat. Aliud est enim quod eam in veritatis luce conspicit, aliud quod in sua facultate concupiscit. Conspicit namque in luce veritatis quam magnum et quam bonum sit omnes omnium gentium linguas intellegere ac loqui, nullamque ut alienigenam audire, et a nullo ita audiri. Cuius notitiae decus cogitatione iam cernitur, amaturque res nota; quae ita conspicitur, atque inflammat studia discentium, ut circa eam moveantur, eique inhiant in omni opera quam impendunt consequendae tali facultati, ut etiam usu amplectantur quod ratione praenoscent; atque ita quisque, cui facultati spe propinquat, ei ferventius amore inardescit. Eis doctrinis quippe studet vehementius, quae capi posse non desperantur. Nam cuius rei adipiscendae spem quisque non gerit, aut tepide amat aut omnino non amat, quamvis quam pulchra sit videat. Quocirca, quia omnium linguarum scientia fere ab omnibus desperatur, suae gentis quisque maxime studet, ut noverit. Quod si et illi ad perfectum percipiendae se non sufficere sentit, nemo

“metheglin”†5 for example, and not knowing what it is he asks. Now he must already know that it is a sign, that is, that it means something and is not just that mere vocal noise ; otherwise he already knows this trisyllabic sound, and has its articulated form impressed on his consciousness through his sense of hearing . What more could he ask for in order to know it better, seeing that he knows all its letters and its stresses and quantities, were it not that he realized simultaneously that it was a sign, and was prompted by a desire to know what thing it was a sign of? The more therefore the thing is known without being fully known, the more does the intelligence desire to know what remains ; if it only knew that there was a vocal sound like this and did not know that it was the sign of something, it would not look further for anything else, having already perceived as much as it could about a sensible object by sensation. But as it knows that this is not just a vocal sound but also a sign, it wants to know it completely; and no sign is completely known unless it is known what thing it is the sign of. If a man then earnestly, enthusiastically, and persistently seeks to know this, can he be said to be without love? What does he love, in that case? It is quite certain that nothing can be loved unless it is known. On the other hand, he does not love those three syllables which he already has by heart —and if he does love in them the fact that he knows they mean something, that is not precisely what we are concerned with, because this is not what he wants to know. The object of our inquiry is what it is that he loves in that which he is studious to know. Clearly he does not know it yet, and so we are wondering why he loves it, since we know for certain that things cannot be loved unless they are known. So what does he love then? It must be that he knows and sees by insight in the very sense of things†6 how beautiful the discipline is that contains knowledge of all signs ; and how useful the skill is by which a human society communicates perceptions between its members, since otherwise an assembly of human beings would be worse for its members than any kind of solitude, if they could not exchange their thoughts by speaking to each other. This then is the lovely and useful form which the soul discerns and knows and loves, and anyone who inquires about the meaning of any words he does not know is studiously trying to perfect it in himself as far as he can; for it is one thing to observe it in the light of truth, another to desire to have it at one's disposal. What one observes in the light of truth is what a great and good thing it would be to understand and speak all the languages of all peoples, and so to hear nobody as a foreigner,†7 and to be heard by no one as such either. The loveliness of such knowledge is now perceived in thought, and the thing so known is loved. This in turn is contemplated, and so inflames the studiousness of learners that they get all excited about it and hunger for it in all the work they put into acquiring such a competence that they may embrace in actual use what they have prior

tamen tam desidiosus est huius notitiae, qui non, cum audierit incognitum verbum, velit nosse quid illud sit, et si potest, quaerat ac discat. Quod dum quaerit, utique in studio discendi est, et videtur amare rem incognitam; quod non ita est. Species namque illa tangit animum, quam novit et cogitat, in qua elucet decus consociandorum animorum in vocibus notis audiendis atque reddendis; eaque accendit studio quaerentem quidem quod ignorat, sed notam formam, quo id pertineat, intuentem et amantem. Itaque si quaerenti, verbi gratia, quid sit "temetum" (hoc enim exempli causa posueram), dicatur: "Quid ad te pertinet?"; respondebit: "Ne forte audiam loquentem et non intellegam, aut uspiam forte id legam, et quid scriptor senserit, nesciam". Quis tandem huic dicat et: "Noli intellegere quod audis; noli nosse quod legis"? Omnibus enim fere animis rationalibus in promptu est ad videndum huius peritiae pulchritudo, qua hominum inter se cogitata, significantium vocum enuntiatione noscuntur; propter hoc notum decus, et ob hoc amatum quia notum, studiose quaeritur verbum illud ignotum. Itaque cum audierit atque cognoverit "temetum" a veteribus vinum appellatum 1, sed iam ex usu loquendi quem nunc habemus, hoc vocabulum emortuum, propter nonnullos fortasse veterum libros sibi necessarium deputabit. Si autem et illos supervacaneos habet, forte iam nec dignum quod memoriae commendet existimat, quia videt ad illam speciem doctrinae quam notam mente intuetur atque amat, minime pertinere.

Nemo prorsus amat incognita.

1. 3. Quamobrem omnis amor studentis animi, hoc est volentis scire quod nescit, non est amor eius rei quam nescit, sed eius quam scit, propter quam vult scire quod nescit 2. Aut si tam curiosus est, ut non propter aliquam notam causam, sed solo amore rapiatur incognita sciendi; discernendus quidem est ab studiosi nomine iste curiosus, sed nec ipse amat incognita, immo congruentius dicitur: "Odit incognita", quae nulla esse vult, dum vult omnia cognita. Sed ne quisquam nobis difficiliorem referat quaestionem, asserens tam non posse quemquam odisse quod nescit, quam non potest amare quod nescit, non resistimus veris; sed intellegendum est, non hoc idem dici, cum dicitur: "Amat scire incognita", ac si diceretur: "Amat incognita". Illud enim fieri potest, ut amet quisque scire incognita; ut autem amet incognita, non potest. Non enim frustra ibi est positum "scire", quoniam qui scire amat incognita, non ipsa incognita, sed ipsum scire amat. Quod nisi haberet cognitum, neque scire se quidquam posset fidenter dicere, neque nescire.

knowledge of in reason; and the more hope anyone has of coming by such a competence the more ardent is his love for it. You put more passion into your study of a discipline if you do not despair of being able to master it. But if you have no hope at all of acquiring a thing, you are lukewarm in your love for it or you do not love it at all, even though you are quite aware how beautiful it is. And so it is that since practically everybody despairs of knowing all languages, you tend to be most studious about knowing the language of your own people. You may of course feel that you are not up to mastering it to perfection; but surely no one is so totally indifferent to this kind of knowledge that when he hears an unknown word he does not want to know what it is, and does not ask if he can and find out. When he does ask he is of course being studious to find out, and he appears to love something unknown, which is not the case. There is that form in contact with his consciousness which he knows and considers, in which is manifested the loveliness of linking minds together by hearing and exchanging known vocal sounds; it stimulates a certain studiousness in the man, who is indeed asking about something he does not know, but at the same time observing and loving a form he knows to which that something belongs. So when someone asks, for instance, what metheglin is (that was the example I suggested), and you reply, "What has that got to do with you?" he will no doubt answer, "I might hear someone use the word and not understand; or perhaps I might read it somewhere and not know what the writer meant." Would anyone, I ask you, round off the conversation by saying "Don't bother to understand what you hear; don't bother to know the meaning of what you read"? It is plain for almost any rational soul to see that there is a beauty about this skill that enables men to know each other's thoughts by uttering meaningful sounds; and because this beauty is known, and loved because known, this word that is unknown is studiously asked about. So when he hears and gets to know at last that metheglin is what the ancients called fermented liquors, but that the word has now died out of current use, he may reckon that he still needs to know it in order to read the classics. If however he regards these as superfluous, then he may not think it worth the trouble of committing this word to memory, seeing that it scarcely belongs after all to that form of learning which he knows and contemplates with the mind and loves.

3. And so we see that all the love of a studious spirit, that is of one who wishes to know what he does not know, is not love for the thing he does not know but for something he knows, on account of which he wants to know what he does not know. Even if he is so curious that he is carried away by the mere love of knowing unknown things for no known reason, such a curious man is indeed to be distinguished from the studious man; and yet not even he loves the unknown. Indeed it would be truer to say that he hates the unknown,

Non solum enim qui dicit: "Scio", et verum dicit, necesse est ut quid sit scire sciat; sed etiam qui dicit: "Nescio", idque fidenter et verum dicit, et scit verum se dicere, scit utique quid sit scire; quia et discernit abs sciente nescientem, cum veraciter se intuens dicit: "Nescio". Et cum id se scit verum dicere, unde sciret, si quid sit scire nesciret?

Exempla.

2. 4. Quilibet igitur studiosus, quilibet curiosus non amat incognita, etiam cum ardentissimo appetitu instat scire quod nescit 3. Aut enim iam genere notum habet quod amat, idque nosse expetit, etiam in aliqua singula, vel in singulis rebus, quae illi nondum notae forte laudantur, fingitque animo imaginariam formam qua excitetur in amorem. Unde autem fingit, nisi ex his quae iam noverat? Cuius tamen formae animo figuratae atque in cogitatione notissimae, si eam quae laudabatur dissimilem invenerit, fortasse non amabit. Quod si amaverit, ex illo amare incipiet ex quo didicit. Paulo ante quippe alia erat quae amabatur, quam sibi animus formans exhibere consueverat. Si autem illi formae similem invenerit quam fama praedicaverat, cui vere possit dicere: "Iam te amabam"; nec tunc utique amabat incognitam, quam in illa similitudine noverat. Aut in specie sempiternae rationis videmus aliquid et ibi amamus, quod cum expressum in aliqua rei temporalis effigie, illis qui experti sunt laudantibus credimus et amamus, non aliquid amamus incognitum, unde iam supra satis disseruimus. Aut aliquid notum amamus propter quod ignotum aliquid quaerimus; cuius ignoti amor nequaquam nos tenet, sed illius cogniti, quo pertinere novimus, ut illud etiam quod adhuc ignotum quaerimus, noverimus; sicut de incognito verbo paulo ante locutus sum. Aut ipsum scire quisque amat, quod nulli scire aliquid cupienti esse incognitum potest. His causis videntur amare incognita, qui scire aliquid volunt quod nesciunt, et propter ardentiores quaerendi appetitum sine amore esse dici non possunt. Sed quam se res aliter habeat, neque omnino quidquam ametur incognitum, arbitror me persuasisse verum diligenter intuentibus. Sed quia exempla quae dedimus, eorum sunt qui aliquid quod ipsi non sunt nosse cupiunt; videndum est ne forte aliquod novum genus appareat, cum se ipsa mens nosse desiderat 4.

Quaerens seipsam, mens iam se novit.

3. 5. Quid ergo amat mens, cum ardentem se ipsam quaerit ut noverit, dum incognita sibi est? Ecce enim mens semetipsam quaerit ut noverit, et inflammatur

since he would like nothing to be unknown and everything known. In case anyone should throw the question back to us with an added complication, and say that it is as impossible to hate what you do not know as to love what you do not know, we will not deny the truth of this, but merely make the point that to say "He loves to know the unknown" is not the same as saying "He loves the unknown"; it can happen that a man loves to know the unknown, but that he should love the unknown is impossible. "To know" is not put groundlessly in that first sentence, because the man who loves to know the unknown loves not the unknown but the actual knowing. And unless he had known what this was, he would not be able to say with confidence either that he knew something or that he did not know something. It is not only the man who says, and says truly, "I know" that must know what knowing is; the man who also says "I don't know," and says it confidently and truly and knows he is saying the truth, this man too obviously knows what knowing is, because he distinguishes one who does not know from one who does when he looks honestly at himself and says "I don't know." He knows what he says is true; how could he know this if he did not know what knowing was?

4. So no studios man, no curious man whatever loves the unknown even when he exhibits a ravenous appetite for knowing what he is ignorant of. Either he already has a general kind of knowledge of what he loves and longs to know it in some particular or in all particulars which are still unknown to him and have perhaps been recommended to his attention; so he fabricates in his consciousness some imaginary form which will stir him to love such particulars. And what can he fabricate such a form out of but things he already knew? And if he discovers that the thing recommended to him is different from this form he has shaped in his consciousness and got to know so well in his thoughts, perhaps he will not love it; if he does love it, he will begin to love it from the moment he gets to know it. A little earlier there was something else he loved, which his consciousness was in the habit of fashioning and showing him. If however he finds that the thing which reports had spoken so well of is like that form he had imagined, so that he can truly say to it, "I have already loved you," even then he was not loving something unknown because he knew it in that likeness. Or else we see something in the form of everlasting reason, and then we believe and love some expression of it in the formation of some temporal thing when we hear the praises of those who have experienced this particular; here too we are not loving something unknown, as we have already sufficiently explained above. Or else we love something known and because of it look for something unknown, and it is not at all the love of this unknown thing that holds us but love of that known thing; for we know that it is relevant to it that we should know this unknown thing

hoc studio 5. Amat igitur: sed quid amat? Si se ipsam, quomodo, cum se nondum noverit, nec quisquam possit amare quod nescit? An ei fama praedicavit speciem suam, sicut de absentibus solemus audire? Forte ergo non se amat, sed quod de se fingit, hoc amat, longe fortasse aliud quam ipsa est. Aut si se mens sui similem fingit, et ideo cum hoc figmentum amat, se amat antequam noverit; quia id quod sui simile est intuetur; novit ergo alias mentes ex quibus se fingat, et genere ipso sibi nota est. Cur ergo cum alias mentes novit, se non novit, cum se ipsa nihil sibi possit esse praesentius? Quod si ut oculis corporis magis alii oculi noti sunt, quam ipsi sibi; non se ergo quaerat numquam inventura 6. Numquam enim se oculi praeter specula videbunt; nec ullo modo putandum est etiam rebus incorporeis contemplandis tale aliquid adhiberi, ut mens tamquam in speculo se noverit 7. An in ratione veritatis aeternae videt quam speciosum sit nosse semetipsam, et hoc amat quod videt, studetque in se fieri quia, quamvis sibi nota non sit, notum ei tamen est quam bonum sit, ut sibi nota sit? Et hoc quidem permirabile est, nondum se nosse, et quam sit pulchrum se nosse, iam nosse. An aliquem finem optimum, id est securitatem et beatitudinem suam videt, per quandam occultam memoriam, quae in longinqua eam progressam non deseruit, et credit ad eundem finem, nisi se ipsam cognoverit, se pervenire non posse 8? Ita dum illud amat, hoc quaerit; et notum amat illud, propter quod quaerit ignotum. Sed cur memoria beatitudinis suae potuit, et memoria sui cum ea perdurare non potuit, ut tam se nosset quae vult pervenire, quam novit illud quo vult pervenire? An cum se nosse 9 amat, non se quam nondum novit, sed ipsum nosse amat; acerbiusque tolerat se ipsam deesse scientiae suae, qua vult cuncta comprehendere? Novit autem quid sit nosse, et dum hoc amat quod novit, etiam se cupit nosse. Ubi ergo nosse suum novit, si se non novit 10? Nam novit quod alia noverit 11, se autem non noverit; hinc enim novit et quid sit nosse. Quo pacto igitur se aliquid scientem scit, quae se ipsam nescit? Neque enim alteram mentem scientem scit, sed se ipsam. Scit igitur se ipsam. Deinde cum se quaerit ut noverit, quaerentem se iam novit. Iam se ergo novit. Quapropter non potest omnino nescire se, quae dum se nescientem scit, se utique scit. Si autem se nescientem nesciat, non se quaeret ut sciat. Quapropter eo ipso quo se quaerit, magis se sibi notam quam ignotam esse convincitur. Novit enim se quaerentem atque nescientem, dum se quaerit ut noverit.

Totam se novit.

that we are looking for, as I have just illustrated in the case of the unknown word. Or else everybody loves knowing, which cannot be unknown to anyone desirous of knowing the unknown. These are the reasons why people who want to know something they do not know seem to love the unknown; and because of their keen appetite for inquiry they cannot be said to be without love. But if you look at the matter carefully I think I have truly made out the case for saying that in fact it is otherwise, and nothing at all is loved if it is unknown. However, the examples I have given are of people wanting to know something which they are not themselves; so we must see if some new issue does not arise when the mind desires to know itself.

5. What is it then that the mind loves when it ardently seeks to know itself while still unknown to itself? Here you have the mind seeking to know itself and all afire with this studious concern. So it is loving. But what is it loving? If itself, how, since it does not yet know itself and no one can love what he does not know? Has some report told the praises of its beauty, in the way we often hear about absent people? Perhaps then it does not love itself, but loves something it has imagined about itself, very different perhaps from what it really is. Or it may be that what the mind imagines itself as being is really like itself, and so when it loves this image it is loving itself before it knows itself, because it is looking at what is like itself; in this case it knows other minds from which it forms an image of itself, and so it is already known to itself in general terms. Seeing that it knows other minds, then, why does it not know itself, since nothing could be more present to it than itself? Or if it is like the eyes of the body which know other eyes better than themselves, then it should stop looking for itself because it is never going to find itself; eyes will never see themselves except in mirrors, and it is not to be supposed that in the contemplation of non-bodily things a similar device can be provided, so that the mind can know itself as in a mirror. Can it be that it sees in the canon of eternal truth how beautiful it is to know oneself, and that it loves this thing that it sees and is at pains to bring it about in itself, because although it does not know itself, it knows how good it would be to know itself? But this is passing strange, not yet to know oneself, and already to know how beautiful it is to know oneself. Perhaps then the mind sees some excellent end, that is its own security and happiness, through some obscure memory which has not deserted it on its travels to far countries†8 and it believes it can only reach this end by knowing itself. Thus while it loves this end it seeks knowledge of itself, and it is on account of the known thing it loves that it seeks the unknown. But why in this case could the memory of its happiness remain with it while the memory of itself could not, so that as well as knowing that which it wants to reach it might also know itself who wants to reach? Or is it that when it loves knowing itself it is not itself that it

4. 6. *Quid ergo dicemus 12? An quod ex parte se novit, ex parte non novit 13? Sed absurdum est dicere, non eam totam scire quod scit. Non dico: "Totum scit"; sed: "Quod scit tota scit". Cum itaque aliquid de se scit, quod nisi tota non potest, totam se scit. Scit autem se aliquid scientem, nec potest quidquam scire nisi tota. Scit se igitur totam. Deinde quid eius ei tam notum est, quam se vivere? Non potest autem et mens esse, et non vivere, quando habet etiam amplius ut intellegat; nam et animae bestiarum vivunt, sed non intellegunt. Sicut ergo mens tota mens est, sic tota vivit. Novit autem vivere se. Totam se igitur novit. Postremo cum se nosse 14 mens quaerit, mentem se esse iam novit; alioquin utrum se quaerat ignorat, et aliud pro alio forsitan quaerat. Fieri enim potest ut ipsa non sit mens, atque ita dum mentem nosse quaerit, non se ipsam quaerat. Quapropter, quoniam cum quaerit mens quid sit mens, novit quod se quaerat profecto novit quod ipsa sit mens. Porro si hoc in se novit quod mens est, et tota mens est, totam se novit. Sed ecce non se noverit esse mentem, cum autem se quaerit; hoc tantummodo noverit quod se quaerat. Potest enim etiam sic aliud pro alio quaerere, si hoc nescit; ut autem non quaerat aliud pro alio, procul dubio novit quid quaerat. At si novit quid quaerat, et se ipsam quaerit, se ipsam utique novit. Quid ergo adhuc quaerit? Quod si ex parte se novit, ex parte autem adhuc quaerit 15, non se ipsam, sed partem suam quaerit. Cum enim ea ipsa dicitur, tota dicitur. Deinde quia novit nondum se a se inventam totam, novit quanta sit tota. Atque ita quaerit quod deest, quemadmodum solemus quaerere, ut veniat in mentem quod excidit, nec tamen penitus excidit; quia potest recognosci, cum venerit, hoc esse quod quaerebatur. Sed quomodo mens veniat in mentem, quasi possit mens in mente non esse? Huc accedit, quia si parte inventa, non se totam quaerit; tamen tota se quaerit. Tota ergo sibi praesto est, et quid adhuc quaeratur non est; hoc enim deest quod quaeritur, non illa quae quaerit. Cum itaque tota se quaerit, nihil eius deest. Aut si non tota se quaerit, sed pars quae inventa est quaerit partem quae nondum inventa est; non se ergo mens quaerit, cuius se nulla pars quaerit. Pars enim quae inventa est, non se quaerit; pars autem quae nondum inventa est, nec ipsa se quaerit, quoniam ab ea quae iam inventa est, parte quaeritur. Quocirca, quia nec tota se quaerit mens, nec pars eius ulla se quaerit, se mens omnino non quaerit.*

Animae cur praecipitur ut se cognoscat. Aliud est nosse aliud cogitare. Unde errores mentis de se ipsa.

loves, which it does not yet know, but the very knowing; and it finds it a bitter pill to swallow that it should itself be missing from its knowledge, with which it wishes to comprehend all things? It knows what knowing is, and while it loves this that it knows it also longs to know itself. But where in this case does it know its knowing, if it does not know itself? Well, it knows that it knows other things, but does not know itself; thus it also knows what knowing is. How comes it then that a mind which does not know itself knows itself knowing something else? It is not that it knows another mind knowing, but itself knowing. Therefore it knows itself. And then when it seeks to know itself, it already knows itself seeking. So it already knows itself. It follows then that it simply cannot not know itself, since by the very fact of knowing itself not knowing, it knows itself. If it did not know itself not knowing, it would not seek to know itself. For it knows itself seeking and not knowing, while it seeks to know itself.

6. What are we to say then? That the mind knows itself in part and does not know itself in part? But it is absurd to say that the whole of it does not know what it knows: I am not saying "It knows the whole," but "What it knows, the whole of it knows." And so when it knows some of itself, which only the whole of it can do, it knows its whole self. For it knows itself knowing something, and only the whole of it can know something; so it knows the whole of itself. Again, what is so known to the mind as that it is alive? It cannot both be mind and not be alive, particularly as it has in addition the fact that it is intelligent; even the souls of animals live, though they are not intelligent. So just as the whole mind is, in the same way the whole mind lives. But it knows that it lives; therefore it knows its whole self. Finally, when the mind seeks to know itself it already knows that it is mind; otherwise it would not know whether it was seeking itself, and might perhaps be seeking something else by mistake. It might happen after all that it was not itself mind, and so while it was seeking to know mind it would not be seeking itself. Therefore since the mind seeking what mind is knows that it is seeking itself, it follows that it knows itself to be mind. Accordingly, if it knows about itself that it is mind and that the whole of it is mind, it knows the whole of itself. But all right then, let us suppose it does not know it is mind; all it knows when it is looking for itself is that it is looking for itself. In this way it is possible for it in ignorance to look for one thing in mistake for another; but if it is not going to look for one thing in mistake for another, then without a shadow of doubt it must know what it is looking for. But if it knows what it is looking for, and it is looking for itself, then of course it knows itself. In that case, why does it go on looking? If it knows itself in part and goes on looking for itself in part, then it is not looking for itself but for its part; for when we say "itself" we mean "the whole of itself." Accordingly, as it knows that the

5. 7. *Ut quid ergo ei praeceptum est, ut se ipsa cognoscat? Credo, ut se cogitet, et secundum naturam suam vivat, id est, ut secundum suam naturam ordinari appetat, sub eo scilicet cui subdenda est, supra ea quibus praeponenda est; sub illo a quo regi debet, supra ea quae regere debet. Multa enim per cupiditatem pravam, tamquam sui sit oblita, sic agit. Videt enim quaedam intrinsecus pulchra, in praestantiore natura quae Deus est. Et cum stare debeat ut eis fruatur, volens ea sibi tribuere, et non ex illo similis illius, sed ex se ipsa esse quod ille est, avertitur ab eo, moveturque et labitur in minus et minus, quod putatur amplius et amplius; quia nec ipsa sibi, nec ei quidquam sufficit recedenti ab illo qui solus sufficit 16. Ideoque per egestatem ac difficultatem fit nimis intenta in actiones suas et inquietas delectationes quas per eas colligit; atque ita cupiditate acquirendi notitias ex his quae foris sunt, quorum cognitum genus amat et sentit amitti posse, nisi impensa cura teneantur, perdit securitatem, tantoque se ipsam minus cogitat, quanto magis secreta est quod se non possit amittere. Ita cum aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare (neque enim multarum doctrinarum peritum, ignorare grammaticam dicimus, cum eam non cogitat quia de medicinae arte tunc cogitat); cum ergo aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare, tanta vis est amoris, ut ea quae cum amore diu cogitaverit, eisque curae glutino inhaeserit, attrahat se cum etiam cum ad se cogitandam quodam modo redit. Et quia illa corpora sunt, quae foris per sensus carnis adamavit, eorumque diuturna quadam familiaritate implicata est, nec se cum potest introrsus tamquam in regionem incorporeae naturae ipsa corpora inferre, imagines eorum convolvit et rapit factas in semetipsa de semetipsa. Dat enim eis formandis quiddam substantiae suae; servat autem aliquid quo libere de specie talium imaginum iudicet, et hoc est magis mens, id est rationalis intelligentia,, quae servatur ut iudicet. Nam illas animae partes quae corporum similitudinibus informantur, etiam cum bestiis nos communes habere sentimus.*

6. 8. *Errat autem mens, cum se istis imaginibus tanto amore coniungit, ut etiam se esse aliquid huiusmodi existimet. Ita enim conformatur eis quodam modo, non id existendo, sed putando; non quo se imaginem putet, sed omnino illud ipsum cuius imaginem se cum habet. Viget quippe in ea iudicium discernendi corpus quod foris relinquit, ab imagine quam de illo se cum gerit; nisi cum ita exprimentur eadem imagines tamquam foris sentiantur, non intus cogitentur, sicut dormientibus, aut furentibus, aut in aliqua extasi accidere solet.*

whole of itself has not yet been found by itself, it must know how much the whole is. And so it must be looking for what is still missing, in the way we are in the habit of looking for something to come back to our minds that has slipped out of them; something that has not wholly slipped out of them, since when it comes back to us it can be recognized as what we were looking for. But how can the mind come back to the mind, as though the mind were able not to be in the mind? What it comes to is that if it is not looking for its whole self because it has already found part of itself, at least the whole of it is looking for itself. In that case the whole of it is available to itself, and so there is nothing that still needs to be looked for, since anything that is being looked for is missing, and what is doing the looking is not. So as the whole mind is doing the looking for itself, none of it is missing. Or if it is not the whole of it that is doing the looking, but the part that has been found is looking for the part that has not yet been found, then the mind is not looking for itself, because no part of it is looking for itself. The part that has been found is not looking for itself; nor is the part that has not yet been found looking for itself, since it is being looked for by the part that has already been found. So it would follow that since neither the whole mind is looking for itself, nor any part of it looking for itself, the mind is quite simply not looking for itself.

7. Why then is the mind commanded to know itself?†9 I believe it means that it should think about itself and live according to its nature, that is it should want to be placed according to its nature, under him it should be subject to and over all that it should be in control of; under him it should be ruled by, over all that it ought to rule. In fact many of the things it does show that it has twisted its desires the wrong way round as though it had forgotten itself. Thus, for example, it sees certain inner beauties in that more excellent nature which is God; but instead of staying still and enjoying them as it ought to, it wants to claim them for itself, and rather than be like him by his gift it wants to be what he is by its own right. So it turns away from him and slithers and slides down into less and less which is imagined to be more and more; it can find satisfaction neither in itself nor in anything else as it gets further away from him who alone can satisfy it. So it is that in its destitution and distress it becomes excessively intent on its own actions and the disturbing pleasures it culls from them; being greedy to acquire knowledge of all sorts from things outside itself, which it loves as known in a general way and feels can easily be lost unless it takes great care to hold onto them, it loses its carefree sense of security, and thinks of itself all the less the more secure it is in its sense that it cannot lose itself†10 So then it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think about oneself—after all we do not say that a man learned in many subjects does not know the art of grammar just because he does not think about it when he is thinking about the art of

Philosophorum falsae opiniones de mentis substantia.

7. 9. *Cum itaque se tale aliquid putat, corpus esse se putat. Et quia sibi bene conscia est principatus sui quo corpus regit, hinc factum est ut quidam quaerent 17 quid corporis amplius valet in corpore, et hoc esse mentem, vel omnino totam animam existimarent 18. Itaque alii sanguinem, alii cerebrum, alii cor, non sicut Scriptura dicit: Confitebor tibi, Domine, in toto corde meo 19; et: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo 20; hoc enim abutendo vel transferendo vocabulo dicitur a corpore ad animum; sed ipsam omnino particulam corporis quam in visceribus dilaniatis videmus, eam esse putaverunt. Alii ex minutissimis individuisque corpusculis, quas atomos dicunt 21 concurrentibus in se atque cohaerentibus, eam confici crediderunt. Alii aerem, alii ignem substantiam eius esse dixerunt. Alii eam nullam esse substantiam, quia nisi corpus nullam substantiam poterant cogitare, et eam corpus esse non inveniebant; sed ipsam temperationem corporis nostri vel compagem primordiorum, quibus ista caro tamquam connectitur, esse opinati sunt. Eique omnes eam mortalem esse senserunt, quia sive corpus esset, sive aliqua compositio corporis, non posset utique immortaliter permanere 22. Qui vero eius substantiam vitam quamdam nequaquam corpoream; quandoquidem vitam omne vivum corpus animantem ac vivificantem esse repperunt; consequenter et immortalem, quia vita carere vita non potest, ut quisque potuit, probare conati sunt 23. Nam de quinto illo nescio quo corpore, quod notissimis quattuor huius mundi elementis quidam coniungentes, hinc animam esse dixerunt 24, hoc loco diu disserendum non puto. Aut enim hoc vocant corpus quod nos, cuius in loci spatio pars toto minor est, et in illis adnumerandi sunt qui mentem corpoream esse crediderunt; aut si vel omnem substantiam, vel omnem mutabilem substantiam corpus appellant, cum sciant non omnem locorum spatiis aliqua longitudine et latitudine et altitudine contineri, non cum eis de vocabuli quaestione pugnandum est.*

Error ex eo venit quod mens se ipsam cogitans alienum quiddam sibi adiungit.

7. 10. *In his omnibus sentiis quisquis videt mentis naturam et esse substantiam, et non esse corpoream, id est, non minore sui parte minus occupare loci spatium, maiusque maiore; simul oportet videat eos qui opinantur esse corpoream, non ob hoc errare, quod mens desit eorum notitiae, sed quod adiungunt*

medicine; so it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think about oneself. Yet such is the force of love that when the mind has been thinking about things with love for a long time and has got stuck to them with the glue of care, it drags them along with itself even when it returns after a fashion to thinking about itself. Now these things are bodies which it has fallen in love with outside itself through the senses of the flesh and got involved with through a kind of long familiarity. But it cannot bring these bodies themselves back inside with it into the region, so to say, of its non-bodily nature; so it wraps up their images and clutches them to itself, images made in itself out of itself. For it gives something of its own substance to their formation; but it also keeps something apart by which it can freely make judgments on the specific bearing of such images; and this is more truly mind, that is rational intelligence which is kept free to judge with. For we observe that we share even with animals those other parts of the soul which are impressed with the likenesses of bodies.

8. But the mind is mistaken when it joins itself to these images with such extravagant love that it even comes to think it is itself something of the same sort. Thus it gets conformed to them in a certain fashion, not by being what they are but by thinking it is—not of course that it thinks itself to be an image but simply to be that of which it has the image by it. Naturally it is capable of the judgment which distinguishes the body it leaves outside itself from the image of it which it carried with it inside, except in cases where such images are reproduced as if they were being felt outside and not thought up inside, as commonly happens to people who are asleep, or raving, or in an ecstasy. So in short, when the mind thinks of itself like that, it thinks it is a body.

9. And because it is perfectly conscious of the control it exercises over the body, it has come about that some people started looking for some part of the body that had the highest value in the body, and imagined that this was mind, or quite simply the whole soul.†11 Thus some thought it is the blood, others the brain, others the heart—not in the sense in which scripture says I will confess to you, Lord, with all my heart (Ps 9:2), and You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart (Dt 6:5); here the word is being used improperly or by transference from body to soul.†12 No, they mean quite simply that organ of the body which we can see when carcasses are gutted. Others believed that it is put together from minute indivisible corpuscles, which they called “atoms,” coming together and coalescing. Some said its substance is air, some fire. Others said it is not a substance at all, because the only substance they could conceive was body and they found no evidence that mind is body. Instead they supposed that it is the very organization of the body, or the structure of primordial elements which so to say holds this flesh together. All these of course conceived it to be mortal,

ea sine quibus nullam possunt cogitare naturam. Sine phantasiis enim corporum quidquid iussi fuerint cogitare, nihil omnino esse arbitrantur. Ideoque non se, tamquam sibi desit, mens requirat. Quid enim tam cognitioni adest, quam id quod menti adest? aut quid tam menti adest, quam ipsa mens? Unde et ipsa quae appellatur inventio, si verbi originem retractemus, quid aliud resonat, nisi quia invenire est in id venire quod quaeritur? Propterea, quae quasi ultro in mentem veniunt, non usitate dicuntur inventa, quamvis cognita dici possint; quia non in ea quaerendo tendebamus, ut in ea veniremus, hoc est, ea inveniremus. Quapropter, sicut ea quae oculis aut ullo alio corporis sensu requiruntur, ipsa mens quaerit (ipsa enim etiam sensum carnis intendit, tunc autem invenit, cum in ea quae requiruntur idem sensus venit); sic alia quae non corporeo sensu internuntio, sed per se ipsam nosse debet, cum in ea venit, invenit; aut in superiore substantia, id est in Deo, aut in ceteris animae partibus, sicut de ipsis imaginibus corporum cum iudicat; intus enim in anima eas invenit per corpus impressas.

Quomodo seipsam mens inquirat.

8. 11. *Ergo se ipsam quemadmodum quaerat et inveniat, mirabilis quaestio est, quo tendat ut quaerat, aut quo veniat ut inveniat. Quid enim tam in mente quam mens est? Sed quia in his est quae cum amore cogitat, sensibilibus autem, id est corporalibus, cum amore assuefacta est, non valet sine imaginibus eorum esse in semetipsa. Hinc ei oboritur erroris dedecus, dum rerum sensarum imagines discernere a se non potest, ut se solam videat. Cohaeserunt enim mirabiliter glutino amoris. Et haec est eis immunditia, quoniam dum se solam nititur cogitare, hoc se putat esse sine quo se non potest cogitare. Cum igitur ei praecipitur ut se ipsam cognoscat, non se tamquam sibi detracta sit quaerat; sed id quod sibi addidit detrahat 25. Interior est enim ipsa, non solum quam ista sensibilia quae manifeste foris sunt, sed etiam quam imagines eorum, quae in parte quadam sunt animae, quam habent et bestiae, quamvis intelligentia careant, quae mentis est propria. Cum ergo sit mens interior, quodam modo exit a semetipsa, cum in haec quasi vestigia multarum intentionum exserit amoris affectum. Quae vestigia tamquam imprimuntur memoriae, quando haec quae foris sunt corporalia sentiuntur, ut etiam cum absunt ista, praesto sint tamen imagines eorum cogitantibus. Cognoscat ergo semetipsam 26, nec quasi absentem se quaerat, sed intentionem voluntatis qua per alia vagabatur statuat in se ipsa et se cogitet. Ita videbit quod numquam se*

since whether it is body or some arrangement of body, it cannot continue immortally. Others however found the substance of mind to be life and not in the least bodily, seeing that it is life that animates and vivifies every living body. These tried, as best as each of them could, to prove that mind is immortal, since life cannot lack life. Some of them said the soul is heaven knows what fifth kind of body†13 which they add to the four elements of the world that we all know about; but I do not think this is the place to discuss that at any length. For either they mean the same as we do by body, that is something whose part in a localized space is smaller than the whole, and hence are to be counted among those who have fancied that mind is something bodily; or if they call every substance, or at least every changeable substance, body, while knowing that not every changeable substance is contained three-dimensionally in localized space, then there is no point in fighting them over a matter of words.

10. Looking at all these opinions, anyone who sees that mind is in nature both substance and not body, that is that it does not occupy a smaller space with its smaller part and a bigger space with its bigger one, should also see at the same time that those who think it is body do not make their mistake because mind is not available to their knowledge, but because they add those things to it without which they cannot think about any nature; if they are told to think about something without imagining bodies, they suppose that it is simply nothing. Therefore the mind does not have to look for itself as if it were not available to itself. What after all is so present to knowledge as what is present to mind, and what is so present to mind as the mind itself? Now let us trace the origin of the word inventio (finding);†14 surely it suggests that invenire (finding) is simply venire in (coming on) what you are looking for. The reason then why things that seem to come of their own accord into the mind are not usually said to be inventa (found), although they can certainly be said to be known, is that we were not approaching them in a search in order to venire in them, that is to invenire them. Now it is the mind that looks for things that are being looked for by the eyes or any other sense of the body (since it is the mind which directs the sense of the flesh); and it is the mind that finds what is being looked for when the sense comes upon it. So too, when the mind comes on other things that it has to know by itself and not through the intermediary of a bodily sense, it finds them either in a higher substance, that is in God, or in other parts of the soul, as when it makes a judgment about the images of bodies; it finds them within, impressed by bodies on the soul.

11. So now then, in considering how the mind is to look for itself and find itself, we are faced with a very odd question: where does it go to look for, and where does it come in order to come upon itself? What after all can be as much in the mind

non amaverit, numquam nescierit; sed aliud secum amando cum eo se confudit et concrevit quodam modo; atque ita dum sicut unum diversa complectitur, unum putavit esse quae diversa sunt.

Mens eo ipso se cognoscit quo intellegit praeceptum se cognoscendi.

9. 12. *Non itaque velut absentem se quaerat cernere, sed praesentem se curet discernere. Nec se quasi non norit cognoscat, sed ab eo quod alterum novit dignoscat 27. Ipsum enim quod audit: Cognosce te ipsam 28, quomodo agere curabit, si nescit, aut quid sit: Cognosce; aut quid sit: Te ipsam? Si autem utrumque novit, novit et se ipsam; quia non ita dicitur menti: Cognosce te ipsam, sicut dicitur: "Cognosce Cherubim et Seraphim"; de absentibus enim illis credimus, secundum quod caelestes quaedam potestates esse praedicantur. Neque sicut dicitur: "Cognosce voluntatem illius hominis", quae nobis nec ad sentiendum ullo modo, nec ad intellegendum praesto est, nisi corporalibus signis editis; et hoc ita, ut magis credamus, quam intellegamus 29. Neque ita ut dicitur homini: "Vide faciem tuam"; quod nisi in speculo fieri non potest. Nam et ipsa nostra facies absens ab aspectu nostro est, quia non ibi est quo ille dirigi potest. Sed cum dicitur menti: Cognosce te ipsam 30, eo ictu quo intellegit quod dictum est: Te ipsam, cognoscit se ipsam; nec ob aliud, quam eo quod sibi praesens est. Si autem quod dictum est non intellegit, non utique facit. Hoc igitur ei praecipitur ut faciat, quod cum praeceptum ipsum intellegit facit.*

Mens omnis de seipsa tria certo scit, intellegere, esse et vivere.

10. 13. *Non ergo adiungat aliud ad id quod se ipsam cognoscit, cum audit ut se ipsam cognoscat. Certe enim novit sibi dici, sibi scilicet quae est, et vivit, et intellegit. Sed est et cadaver, vivit et pecus; intellegit autem nec cadaver, nec pecus. Sic ergo se esse et vivere scit, quomodo est et vivit, intellegentia. Cum ergo, verbi gratia, mens aerem se putat, aerem intellegere putat, se tamen intellegere scit; aerem autem se esse non scit, sed putat. Secernat quod se putat, cernat quod scit; hoc ei remaneat, unde ne illi quidem dubitaverunt, qui aliud atque aliud corpus esse mentem putaverunt 31. Neque enim omnis mens aerem se esse existimat, sed aliae ignem, aliae cerebrum, aliaeque aliud corpus, et aliud aliae, sicut supra commemoravi; omnes tamen se intellegere noverunt, et esse et vivere; sed intellegere ad quod intellegunt referunt 32, esse autem et vivere ad se*

as mind? But it is also in the things that it thinks about with love, and it has got used to loving sensible, that is bodily things; so it is unable to be in itself without their images. Hence arises its shameful mistake, that it cannot make itself out among the images of the things it has perceived with the senses, and see itself alone; they are all stuck astonishingly fast together with the glue of love. And this is its^{†15} impurity, that while it attempts to think of itself alone, it supposes itself to be that without which it is unable to think of itself. So when it is bidden to know itself, it should not start looking for itself as though it had drawn off from itself, but should draw off what it has added to itself. For it is more inward, not only than these sensible things^{†16} which are obviously outside, but also than their images which are in a part of the soul that animals have too, though they lack intelligence which is proper to mind. While then mind is at the inner level, it comes out of itself in a kind of way when it puts out feelings of love toward these images which are like the traces of its many interests. These traces are as it were imprinted on the memory when these bodily things outside are perceived by the senses, so that even when these things themselves are absent their images are available to be thought about. Let the mind then recognize itself and not go looking for itself as if it were absent, but rather turn on to itself the interest of its will, which had it straying about through other things, and think about itself. In this way it will see that there never was a time when it did not love itself, when it did not know itself. What it did was to mix itself up with something else that it loved together with itself and to coalesce with it in some way or other; and as a result, by comprising divergent things as a unity in itself, it came to think that these things which really are divergent were one with itself.

12. Let the mind then not go looking for a look at itself as if it were absent, but rather take pains to tell itself apart as present. Let it not try to learn itself as if it did not know itself, but rather to discern itself from what it knows to be other.^{†17} How will it see to act on the command it hears, Know thyself,^{†18} if it does not know what "know" is or what "thyself" is? If however it knows both, then it knows itself. The mind you see is not told Know thyself in the same way as it might be told "Know the cherubim and seraphim"; of them, as absent beings, we believe what they are declared to be, that they are certain heavenly powers. Nor is it like being told "Know the will of that man," which is not available in any way to our sense perceptions, nor even to our intelligence unless certain bodily signs of it are given, and this in such a way that we must rather believe than be intellectually aware of what it is. Nor is it like a man being told "Look at your face," which he can only do in a mirror; even our own face is absent from our sight, because it is not in a place our sight can be directed at. But when the mind is told Know thyself, it knows itself the very moment it understands what "thyself"

ipsas. Et nulli est dubium, nec quemquam intellegere qui non vivat, nec quemquam vivere qui non sit. Ergo consequenter et esse et vivere id quod intellegit, non sicuti est cadaver quod non vivit, nec sicuti vivit anima quae non intellegit, sed proprio quodam eodemque praestantiore modo. Item velle se sciunt, neque hoc posse quemquam qui non sit et qui non vivat, pariter sciunt; itemque ipsam voluntatem referunt ad aliquid, quod ea voluntate volunt. Meminisse etiam se sciunt; simulque sciunt quod nemo meminisset, nisi esset ac viveret; sed et ipsam memoriam referimus ad aliquid, quod ea meminimus. Duobus igitur horum trium, memoria et intellegentia, multarum rerum notitia atque scientia continentur; voluntas autem adest, per quam fruamur eis vel utamur. Fruimur enim cognitis, in quibus voluntas ipsis propter se ipsa delectata conquiescit; utimur vero eis quae ad aliud referimus quo fruendum est. Nec est alia vita hominum vitiosa atque culpabilis, quam male utens et male fruens. De qua re non est nunc disserendi locus.

Qui dubitat, vivit.

10. 14. Sed quoniam de natura mentis agitur, removeamus a consideratione nostra omnes notitias quae capiuntur extrinsecus per sensus corporis; et ea quae posuimus, omnes mentes de se ipsis nosse certasque esse, diligentius attendamus. Utrum enim aeris sit vis vivendi, reminiscendi, intellegendi, volendi, cogitandi, sciendi, iudicandi; an ignis, an cerebri, an sanguinis, an atomorum, an praeter usitata quattuor elementa quinti nescio cuius corporis, an ipsius carnis nostrae compago vel temperamentum haec efficere valeat, dubitaverunt homines; et alius hoc, alius illud affirmare conatus est. Vivere se tamen et meminisse, et intellegere, et velle, et cogitare, et scire, et iudicare quis dubitet? Quandoquidem etiam si dubitat, vivit; si dubitat, unde dubitet meminit; si dubitat, dubitare se intellegit; si dubitat, certus esse vult; si dubitat, cogitat; si dubitat, scit se nescire; si dubitat, iudicat non se temere consentire oportere. Quisquis igitur alicunde dubitat, de his omnibus dubitare non debet; quae si non essent, de ulla re dubitare non posset.

10. 15. Haec omnia, qui vel corpus vel compositionem seu temperationem corporis esse mentem putant, in subiecto esse volunt videri, ut substantia sit aer, vel ignis, sive aliud aliquod corpus, quod mentem putant; intellegentia vero ita insit huic corpori, sicut qualitas eius; ut illud subiectum sit, haec in subiecto; subiectum scilicet mens quam corpus esse arbitrantur, in subiecto autem intellegentia, sive quid aliud eorum

is, and for no other reason than that it is present to itself. If it does not understand what is said, then naturally it does not do it. So it is being commanded to do something which it automatically does the moment it understands the command.

13. Let it therefore avoid joining anything else to its knowing of itself when it hears the command to know itself. It knows for certain the command is being given to itself, the self which is and lives and understands. But a carcass is too, and a beast lives too; neither carcass nor beast though understands. So the mind knows that it is and that it lives, in the way intelligence is and lives. And so when it thinks, for example, that it is air, it thinks it understands air, it knows it understands itself; and it does not know but only thinks it is air. Let it set aside what it thinks it is, and mark what it knows it is;†19 in this way it will be left with something that even people who have thought mind is this or that sort of body can have no doubt about. After all, not every mind supposes it is air; some have supposed it to be fire, others brain, others this body and others that, as I described it all above.†20 But all these minds have known that they understand, and are, and live; though of course they have related understanding to what they understand, being and living to themselves.†21 And none of them have doubted that no one understands who does not live, and no one lives who does not be. The consequence is that whatever understands also is and lives, not as a carcass is which does not live, nor as a soul†22 lives which does not understand, but in its own proper and more excellent way. Again they know that they will, and they know likewise that no one can do this who does not be and does not live, and again they relate this will to something that they want with this will.†23 They also know that they remember, and at the same time they know that no one would remember unless he was and unless he lived. This memory too we relate to something that we remember with it. Two of these three, memory and understanding, contain the awareness and knowledge of many things; will is there for us to enjoy them or use them. We enjoy things we know when the will reposes in them because it is delighted by them for their own sakes; we use things when we refer them to something else we would like to enjoy. And what makes the life of men vicious and reprehensible is nothing but using things badly and enjoying them badly; but this is not the place to discuss that.†24

14. But we are concerned now with the nature of mind; so let us put aside all consideration of things we know outwardly through the senses of the body, and concentrate our attention on what we have stated that all minds know for certain about themselves. Whether the power of living, remembering, understanding, willing, thinking, knowing, judging comes from air, or fire, or brain, or blood, or atoms, or heaven knows what fifth kind of body besides the four common elements;

quae certa nobis esse commemoravimus. Iuxta opinantur etiam illi qui mentem ipsam negant esse corpus, sed compaginem aut temperationem corporis. Hoc enim interest, quod illi mentem ipsam dicunt esse substantiam, in quo subiecto sit intellegentia; isti autem ipsam mentem in subiecto esse dicunt, corpore scilicet cuius compositio vel temperatio est. Unde consequenter etiam intellegentiam quid aliud quam in eodem subiecto corpore existimant?

Cum se mens novit, substantiam suam novit.

10. 16. Qui omnes non advertunt, mentem nosse se etiam cum quaerit se, sicut iam ostendimus. Nullo modo autem recte dicitur sciri aliqua res, dum eius ignoratur substantia. Quapropter, dum se mens novit, substantiam suam novit; et cum de se certa est, de substantia sua certa est. Certa est autem de se, sicut convincunt ea quae supra dicta sunt. Nec omnino certa est, utrum aer, an ignis sit, an aliquod corpus, vel aliquid corporis. Non est igitur aliquid eorum. Totumque illud quod se iubetur ut noverit, ad hoc pertinet ut certa sit non se esse aliquid eorum de quibus incerta est, idque solum esse se certa sit, quod solum esse se certa est. Sic enim cogitat ignem aut aerem, et quidquid aliud corporis cogitat. Neque ullo modo fieri posset ut ita cogitaret id quod ipsa est, quemadmodum cogitat, id quod ipsa non est. Per phantasiam quippe imaginariam cogitat haec omnia, sive ignem, sive aerem, sive illud vel illud corpus, partemve illam, seu compaginem temperationemque corporis; nec utique ista omnia, sed aliquid horum esse dicitur. Si quid autem horum esset, aliter id quam cetera cogitaret, non scilicet per imaginale figmentum, sicut cogitantur absentia, quae sensu corporis tacta sunt, sive omnino ipsa, sive eiusdem generis aliqua; sed quadam interiore, non simulata, sed vera praesentia (non enim quidquam illi est se ipsa praesentius); sicut cogitat vivere se, et meminisse, et intellegere, et velle se. Novit enim haec in se, nec imaginatur quasi extra se illa sensu tetigerit, sicut corporalia quaeque tanguntur. Ex quorum cogitationibus si nihil sibi affingat, ut tale aliquid esse se putet, quidquid ei de se remanet, hoc solum ipsa est.

Memoria, intellegentia, voluntas.

11. 17. Remotis igitur paulisper ceteris, quorum mens de se ipsa certa est, tria haec potissimum considerata tractemus, memoriam, intellegentiam, voluntatem 33. In his enim tribus inspicere solent etiam ingenia parvulorum cuiusmodi praeferant indolem. Quanto quippe tenacius et facilius puer meminit, quantoque

or whether the very structure or organization of our flesh can produce these things; people have hesitated about all this, and some have tried to establish one answer, others another. Nobody surely doubts, however, that he lives and remembers and understands and wills and thinks and knows and judges. At least, even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he is doubting; if he doubts, he understands he is doubting; if he doubts, he has a will to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows he does not know; if he doubts, he judges he ought not to give a hasty assent. You may have your doubts about anything else, but you should have no doubts about these; if they were not certain, you would not be able to doubt anything.†25

15. Those who think mind is a body or an arrangement or organization of body would like these things to be regarded as “being in a subject”; thus the substance would be air or fire or any other body they think mind is, while understanding would be in this body as a quality of it, so that this body would be the subject and understanding would be in the subject; that is to say, mind which they consider to be a body would be the subject, and understanding or any of those other things we have mentioned, as being what we are certain about, would be in the subject. Those who deny that mind is a body but say it is the structure or organization of the body will have a similar view. The difference between them is that the former say the mind itself is the substance which understanding is in as in a subject; while the latter say that mind itself is in a subject, namely the body whose structure or organization it is. It follows surely that they must suppose understanding to be in the same subject, namely the body.

16. But what none of them notice is that the mind knows itself even when it is looking for itself, as we have shown above. Now properly speaking a thing cannot in any way be said to be known while its substance is unknown. Therefore when mind knows itself it knows its substance, and when it is certain of itself it is certain of its substance. But it is certain of itself, as everything said above convincingly demonstrates. Nor is it in the least certain whether it is air or fire or any kind of body or anything appertaining to body. Therefore it is not any of these things.†26 The whole point of its being commanded to know itself comes to this: it should be certain that it is none of the things about which it is uncertain, and it should be certain that it is that alone which alone it is certain that it is. For instance, it thinks fire in the same sort of way as it thinks air or anything else that belongs to body; but it could not possibly happen that it should think what it is itself in the same way as it thinks what it is not. It thinks all these other things with the images of the imagination, whether fire or air or this or that body or part of a body or structure and organization of a body; nor of course is it ever said to be all these things but only one or other of them. But if it were one

acrius intellegit, et studet ardentius, tanto est laudabilioris ingenii. Cum vero de cuiusque doctrina quaeritur, non quanta firmitate ac facilitate meminerit, vel quanto acumine intellegat; sed quid meminerit, et quid intellegat quaeritur. Et quia non tantum quam doctus sit, consideratur laudabilis animus, sed etiam quam bonus; non tantum quid meminerit et quid intellegat, verum etiam quid velit attenditur; non quanta flagrantia velit, sed quid velit prius, deinde quantum velit. Tunc enim laudandus est animus vehementer amans, cum id quod amat vehementer amandum est. Cum ergo dicuntur haec tria: ingenium, doctrina, usus 34, primum horum consideratur in illis tribus quid possit quisque memoria, intellegentia, voluntate. Secundum eorum consideratur, quid habeat quisque in memoria, et intellegentia, quo studiosa voluntate pervenerit. Iam vero usus tertius in voluntate est, pertractante illa quae memoria et intellegentia continentur, sive ad aliquid ea referat, sive eorum fine delectata conquiescat. Uti est enim assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis; frui est autem uti cum gaudio, non adhuc spei, sed iam rei 35. Proinde omnis qui fruitur, utitur; assumit enim aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, cum fine delectationis. Non autem omnis qui utitur fruitur, si id quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit, non propter illud ipsum, sed propter aliud appetivit.

Unum sunt essentialiter, tria relative.

11. 18. Haec igitur tria, memoria, intellegentia, voluntas, quoniam non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita; nec tres mentes, sed una mens, consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt, sed una substantia 36. Memoria quippe, quod vita et mens et substantia dicitur, ad se ipsam dicitur; quod vero memoria dicitur, ad aliquid relative dicitur. Hoc de intellegentia quoque et de voluntate dixerim; et intellegentia quippe et voluntas ad aliquid dicitur. Vita est autem unaquaeque ad se ipsam, et mens, et essentia. Quocirca tria haec eo sunt unum 37, quo una vita, una mens, una essentia; et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula dicuntur, etiam simul, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicuntur. Eo vero tria quo ad se invicem referuntur. Quae si aequalia non essent, non solum singula singulis, sed etiam omnibus singula; non utique se invicem caperent. Neque enim tantum a singulis singula, verum etiam a singulis omnia capiuntur. Memini enim me habere memoriam, et intellegentiam, et voluntatem; et intellego me intellegere, et velle, atque meminisse; et volo me velle, et meminisse, et intellegere, totamque meam

of these things it would think that thing differently from the others, not that is to say with a construct of the imagination as absent things are thought that have been contacted by one of the senses of the body, either actually themselves or something of the same kind; but with some inner, non-simulated but true presence (nothing after all is more present to it than itself), in the same way as it thinks its living and remembering and understanding and willing. It knows these things in itself, it does not form images of them as though it had touched them with the senses outside itself, as it touches any bodily things. If it refrains from affixing to itself any of these image-bound objects of its thoughts in such a way as to think it is that sort of thing, then whatever is left to it of itself, that alone is what it is.

17. Now let us put aside for the moment the other things which the mind is certain about as regards itself, and just discuss these three, memory, understanding, and will. It is usual to examine these three things in children, to see what kind of promise they show. The more easily and firmly a boy remembers things and the more acutely he understands and the keener his application to study, the more admirable is considered his disposition. On the other hand, when one inquires about someone's learning, one does not ask how easily or tenaciously he remembers things or how sharply he understands, but what he remembers and what he understands. And because a person's character^{†27} is considered praiseworthy according to how good it is as well as how learned, one pays attention to what he wills as well as to what he remembers and understands. Not with what ardor he wills, but first of all what he wills, and only then how much. A character after all is only to be praised for loving passionately when what it loves deserves to be passionately loved. So when one talks about these three things in a person, disposition, learning, practice,^{†28} one judges the first according to what he can do with his memory, his understanding, and his will; one estimates the second according to what he actually has in his memory and understanding, and where he has got to with his will to study; the third however is to be found in the use the will now makes of what the memory and understanding hold, whether it refers them to something else or whether it takes delight in them as ends in themselves. To use something is to put it at the will's disposal; to enjoy it is to use it with an actual, not merely anticipated joy.^{†29} Hence everyone who enjoys, uses; for he puts something at the disposal of the will for purposes of enjoyment. But not everyone who uses, enjoys, not if he wants what he puts at the disposal of the will for the sake of something else and not for its own.

18. These three then, memory, understanding, and will, are not three lives but one life, nor three minds but one mind. So it follows of course that they are not three substances but one

memoriam, et intellegentiam, et voluntatem simul memini 38. Quod enim memoriae meae non memini, non est in memoria mea. Nihil autem tam in memoria, quam ipsa memoria est. Totam igitur memini. Item quidquid intellego, intellegere me scio et scio me velle quidquid volo; quidquid autem scio memini. Totam igitur intellegentiam, totamque voluntatem meam memini. Similiter cum haec tria intellego, tota simul intellego. Neque enim quidquam intellegibilium non intellego, nisi quod ignoro. Quod autem ignoro, nec memini nec volo. Quidquid itaque intellegibilium non intellego, consequenter etiam nec memini, nec volo. Quidquid ergo intellegibilium memini et volo, consequenter intellego. Voluntas etiam mea totam intellegentiam totamque memoriam meam capit, dum toto utor quod intellego et memini. Quapropter quando invicem a singulis et tota et omnia capiuntur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis, et tota singula simul omnibus totis; et haec tria unum 39, una vita, una mens, una essentia.

Mens imago Trinitatis in sui ipsius memoria, intellegentia et voluntate.

12. 19. Iamne igitur ascendendum est qualibuscumque intentionis viribus ad illam summam et altissimam essentiam, cuius impar imago est humana mens, sed tamen imago? An adhuc eadem tria distinctius declaranda sunt in anima, per illa quae extrinsecus sensu corporis capimus, ubi temporaliter imprimuntur rerum corporearum notitia? Mentem quippe ipsam in memoria et intellegentia et voluntate suimetipsius talem reperiebamus, ut quoniam semper se nosse semperque se ipsam velle comprehendebatur, simul etiam semper sui meminisse, semperque se ipsam intellegere et amare comprehenderetur; quamvis non semper se cogitare discretam ab eis quae non sunt, quod ipsa est. Ac per hoc difficile in ea dignoscitur memoria sui, et intelligentia sui. Quasi enim non sint haec duo, sed unum duobus vocabulis appelletur, sic apparet in ea re ubi valde ista coniuncta sunt, et aliud alio nullo praeceditur tempore; amorque ipse non ita sentitur esse, cum eum non prodit indigentia, quoniam semper praesto est quod amatur. Quapropter etiam tardioribus dilucescere haec possunt, dum ea tractantur quae ad animum tempore accedunt et quae illi temporaliter accidunt, cum meminit quod antea non meminerat, et cum videt quod antea non videbat, et cum amat quod antea non amabat. Sed aliud haec tractatio iam poscit exordium, propter huius libelli modum.

substance. When memory is called life, and mind, and substance, it is called so with reference to itself; but when it is called memory it is called so with reference to another. I can say the same about understanding and will; both understanding and will are so called with reference to another. But each of them is life and mind and being with reference to itself. For this reason these three are one in that they are one life, one mind, one being; and whatever else they are called together with reference to self, they are called it in the singular, not in the plural. But they are three in that they have reference to each other. And if they were not equal, not only each to the other but also each to them all together, they would not of course contain each other. In fact though they are not only each contained by each, they are all contained by each as well. After all, I remember that I have memory and understanding and will, and I understand that I understand and will and remember, and I will that I will and remember and understand, and I remember my whole memory and understanding and will all together. If there is any of my memory that I do not remember, then it is not in my memory. But nothing is more in the memory than memory itself. Therefore I remember the whole of it. Again, whatever I understand I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will; and whatever I know I remember. So I remember my whole understanding and my whole will.

Likewise when I understand these three I understand the whole of them together. For the only understandable things I do not understand are the ones I am ignorant of. But what I am ignorant of I neither remember nor will. So it follows that any understandable thing which I do not understand, I do not remember or will either. Therefore whatever understandable thing I remember and will I also understand in consequence. My will also contains my whole understanding and my whole memory while I use the whole of what I understand and remember. Therefore since they are each and all and wholly contained by each, they are each and all equal to each and all, and each and all equal to all of them together, and these three are one, one life, one mind, one being.

19. Are we already then in a position to rise with all our powers of concentration to that supreme and most high being of which the human mind is the unequal image, but the image nonetheless? Or have we still to clarify the distinctions between these three in the soul by comparing them with our sensitive grasp of things outside, in which the awareness of bodily things is imprinted on us in a time sequence? We were in the process, you remember, of bringing the mind to light in its memory and understanding and will of itself, and discovering that since it was seen always to know itself and always to will itself, it must at the same time be seen always to remember itself and always to understand and love itself,†30 although it does not always think about itself distinctly from things that are not what it is. And thus it seems

to be difficult to distinguish in it between its memory of itself and its understanding of itself. That these are not in fact two things, but one thing called by two names, is the impression you might get in this case where they are joined together very closely and one is not prior at all in time to the other; love too is not felt so obviously to be present when no neediness exhibits it, because what is being loved is always to hand. And so even those who are slower on the uptake will find some light shed on these matters if we discuss things that are added to our awareness in time, and what happens to it in a time sequence when it remembers something it did not remember before, and sees something it did not see before, and loves something it did not love before. But this discussion calls for another commencement, since this book is already long enough.

De Trinitate (399-422/426)

XIV. 4. 7. Inter cetera ergo in libro decimo diximus, hominis mentem nosse semetipsam 30. Nihil enim tam novit mens, quam id quod sibi praesto est: nec menti magis quidquam praesto est, quam ipsa sibi. Et alia, quantum satis visum est, adhibuimus documenta, quibus hoc certissime probaretur.

An etiam mens infantis se nosse credenda est?

5. 7. Quid itaque dicendum est de infantis mente, ita adhuc parvuli et in tam magna demersi rerum ignorantia, ut illius mentis tenebras mens hominis quae aliquid novit exhorreat? An etiam ipsa se nosse credenda est, sed intenta nimis in eas res quas per corporis sensus tanto maiore, quanto noviore coepit delectatione sentire, non ignorare se potest, sed cogitare se non potest? Quanta porro intentione in ista quae foris sunt sensibilia feratur, vel hinc solum conici potest, quod lucis huius hauriendae sic avida est, ut si quisquam minus cautus aut nesciens quid inde possit accidere, nocturnum lumen posuerit ubi iacet infans, in ea parte ad quam iacentis oculi possint retorqueri, nec cervix possit inflecti, sic eius inde non removetur aspectus, ut nonnullos ex hoc etiam strabones fieri noverimus, eam formam tenentibus oculis, quam teneris et mollibus consuetudo quodam modo infixit. Ita et in alios corporis sensus, quantum sinit illa aetas, intentione se quasi coarctant animae parvulorum, ut quidquid per carnem offendit aut allicit, hoc solum abhorreant vehementer aut appetant: sua vero interiora non cogitent, nec possint admoneri ut hoc faciant; quia nondum admonentis signa noverunt, ubi praecipuum locum verba obtinent, quae sicut alia prorsus nesciunt. Quod autem aliud sit non se nosse,

On the Trinity

XIV.7 Among other things, then, we said in the tenth book that man's mind knows itself. The mind knows nothing so well as what is present to it, and nothing is more present to the mind than itself. And we produced other arguments as much as seemed sufficient to prove this with considerable certainty. So what then is to be said about the mind of an infant which is still so small and sunk in such vast ignorance of things that the mind of a man which knows anything shudders at the darkness of that infant mind? Must we perhaps believe that it too knows itself, but that it is wholly preoccupied with the things it is beginning to perceive through the senses of the body with a delight that is all the greater for being new; and so it is not a question of its being able to be ignorant of itself, but of its not being able to think about itself? You can at least gather how intently it is drawn to sensible things from its avidity for drinking in lights. This is such that if anyone is careless enough, or ignorant enough of the consequences, to place a night-light where a baby is lying in such a position that the infant can twist its eyes to the light without being able to turn its neck, it will fix its gaze on it so unremittingly that it will develop a permanent squint, as we know has happened in some cases; the eyes retaining the position which habit fixed them in while still soft and tender. It is the same with the other senses of the body into which the souls of infants compress themselves, so to speak, with all the intensity that that age is capable of, so that they passionately shrink from or grab at whatever offends or attracts the flesh and that alone, but never think of their inner selves. Nor can they be admonished to do this, because they do not know the signs used by the admonisher, among which words have the chief place, and they are as utterly ignorant of these as of anything else.†11 But in any case, that it is one thing not to know oneself and another not to think about oneself we have already shown in the same volume.

aliud non se cogitare, iam in eodem volumine ostendimus 31.

5. 8. *Sed hanc aetatem omittamus, quae nec interrogari potest quid in se agatur, et nos ipsi eius valde obliti sumus. Hinc tantum certos nos esse suffecerit, quod cum homo de animi sui natura cogitare potuerit, atque invenire quod verum est, alibi non inveniet, quam penes se ipsum. Inveniet autem, non quod nesciebat, sed unde non cogitabat. Quid enim scimus, si quod est in nostra mente nescimus; cum omnia quae scimus, non nisi mente scire possimus?*

In mente se ipsam cogitante quaedam trinitas existit.

6. 8. *Tanta est tamen cogitationis vis, ut nec ipsa mens quodam modo se in conspectu suo ponat, nisi quando se cogitat: ac per hoc ita nihil in conspectu mentis est, nisi unde cogitatur, ut nec ipsa mens, qua cogitatur quidquid cogitatur, aliter possit esse in conspectu suo, nisi se ipsam cogitando. Quomodo autem, quando se non cogitat, in conspectu suo non sit, cum sine se ipsa nunquam esse possit, quasi aliud sit ipsa, aliud conspectus eius, invenire non possum. Hoc quippe de oculo corporis non absurde dicitur: ipse quippe oculus loco suo fixus est in corpore, aspectus autem eius in ea quae extra sunt tenditur, et usque in sidera extenditur. Nec est oculus in conspectu suo; quandoquidem non conspicit se ipsum, nisi speculo obiecto, unde iam locuti sumus 32: quod non fit utique quando se mens in suo conspectu sui cogitatione constituit. Numquid ergo alia sua parte aliam partem suam videt, cum se conspicit cogitando, sicut aliis membris nostris, qui sunt oculi, alia membra nostra conspicimus, quae in nostro possunt esse conspectu? Quid dici absurdius vel sentiri potest? Unde igitur aufertur mens, nisi a se ipsa? et ubi ponitur in conspectu suo, nisi ante se ipsam? Non ergo ibi erit ubi erat, quando in conspectu suo non erat; quia hic posita, inde sublata est. Sed si conspicienda migravit, conspectura ubi manebit? An quasi geminatur, ut et illic sit et hic, id est, et ubi conspiciere, et ubi conspici possit; ut in se sit conspiciens, ante se conspiciua? Nihil horum nobis veritas consulta respondet: quoniam quando isto modo cogitamus, non nisi corporum fictas imagines cogitamus, quod mentem non esse paucis certissimum est mentibus, a quibus potest de hac re veritas consuli. Proinde restat ut aliquid pertinens ad eius naturam sit conspectus eius, et in eam, quando se cogitat, non quasi per loci spatium, sed incorporea conversione revocetur 33. Cum vero non se cogitat, non sit quidem in conspectu*

8. Let us leave this age of infancy aside, though, as we cannot ask it questions about what is going on in it and we ourselves have thoroughly forgotten it. It is enough to assure ourselves that when a human being is able to think about the nature of his consciousness and find out what is true about it, he will not find it anywhere else but inside himself. And what he will find out is not what he did not know before but what he did not think about before. What after all do we know, if we do not know what is in our own mind, seeing that whatever we know we can only know it with the mind? Such however is the force of thought that the mind cannot even set itself in some fashion in its own view except when it thinks about itself. Nothing is in the mind's view except what is being thought about, and this means that not even the mind itself, which does the thinking about anything that is being thought about, can be in its own view except by thinking about itself. Though as a matter of fact, how it can not be in its own view when it is not thinking about itself, seeing that it can never be without itself, as though it were one thing and its view another, I cannot really fathom. To be sure, this can be said without absurdity about the eye of the body. The eye is fixed in its place in the body, and its gaze is drawn to things outside, is drawn out indeed as far as the stars. Nor is the eye in its own view, seeing that it has not got a view of itself except when presented with a mirror, which we have already spoken about.^{†12} But this clearly does not happen when the mind sets itself in its own view by thinking about itself. Does it then see one part of itself with another part of itself when it gets a view of itself by thinking, just as with some parts of our bodies which are the eyes we get a view of the other parts of our bodies which can be in our view? What an absurd idea! Where then is the mind taken from except from itself, and where is it set in its own view except in front of itself? So presumably it will no longer be where it was while it was not in its own view, because it has been set here and taken away from there. But if it has changed places in order to be viewed, where will it stay in order to view? Does it double up, as it were, in order to be both there and here, that is both where it can view and where it can be viewed, so that in itself it is viewing and in front of itself it is viewable? When we consult truth it gives us none of these answers because when we think in this fashion we only think the fabricated images of bodies, and to the few minds which are able to consult truth about this matter it is absolutely certain that mind is not that. So the only alternative left is that its view is something that belongs to its own nature, and that when the mind thinks about itself its view is drawn back to itself not through an interval of space, but by a kind of non-bodily turning round. But when it is not thinking about itself, it is indeed not in its own view, nor is its gaze being formed from itself, and yet it still knows itself by being somehow its own memory of itself. It is like a man learned in many disciplines; everything he knows is contained in his memory, but nothing is in the view of his

suo, nec de illa suus formetur obtutus, sed tamen noverit se tamquam ipsa sit sibi memoria sui. Sicut multarum disciplinarum peritus ea quae novit, eius memoria continentur, nec est inde aliquid in conspectu mentis eius, nisi unde cogitat; cetera in arcana quadam notitia sunt recondita, quae memoria nuncupatur. Ideo trinitatem sic commendabamus, ut illud unde formatur cogitantis obtutus, in memoria poneremus; ipsam vero conformationem, tamquam imaginem quae inde imprimitur; et illud quo utrumque coniungitur, amorem seu voluntatem. Mens igitur quando cogitatione se conspicit, intellegit se et recognoscit: gignit ergo hunc intellectum et cognitionem suam. Res quippe incorporea intellecta conspicitur, et intellegendo cognoscitur. Nec ita sane gignit istam notitiam suam mens, quando cogitando intellectam se conspicit, tamquam sibi ante incognita fuerit: sed ita sibi nota erat, quemadmodum notae sunt res quae memoria continentur, etiamsi non cogitentur: quoniam dicimus hominem nosse litteras, etiam cum de aliis rebus, non de litteris cogitat. Haec autem duo, gignens et genitum, dilectione tertia copulantur, quae nihil est aliud quam voluntas fruendum aliquid appetens vel tenens. Ideoque etiam illis tribus nominibus insinuandam mentis putavimus trinitatem, memoria, intellegentia, voluntate 34.

Aliud se nosse, aliud se cogitare: mens semper sui meminit, semper se novit et amat.

6. 9. Sed quoniam mentem semper sui meminisse, semperque se ipsam intellegere et amare, quamvis non semper se cogitare discretam ab eis quae non sunt quod ipsa est, circa eiusdem libri decimi finem diximus 35: quaerendum est quonam modo ad cogitationem pertineat intellectus; notitia vero cuiusque rei, quae inest menti, etiam quando non de ipsa cogitatur, ad solam dicatur memoriam pertinere. Si enim hoc ita est, non habebat haec tria, ut et sui meminisset, et se intellegeret, et amaret: sed meminerat tantum sui, et postea cum cogitare se coepit, tunc se intellexit atque dilexit.

7. 9. Quapropter diligentius illud consideremus exemplum, quod adhibuimus, ubi ostenderetur aliud esse rem quamque non nosse, aliud non cogitare; fierique posse ut noverit homo aliquid quod non cogitat, quando aliunde, non inde cogitat. Duarum ergo vel plurium disciplinarum peritus, quando unam cogitat, aliam vel alias etiam si non cogitat, novit tamen. Sed numquid recte possumus dicere, Iste musicus novit quidem musicam, sed nunc eam non intellegit, quia eam non cogitat; intellegit autem nunc

mind except what he is actually thinking about. The rest is stacked away in a kind of confidential file of awareness †13 which is called memory. That is why we were constantly presenting a trinity in this way, placing in the memory that from which the gaze of thought is formed, treating the actual conformation as the image that is printed off from it, and finding the thing that joins both together to be love or will . So when the mind views itself by thought, it understands and recognizes itself; thus it begets this understanding and self-recognition . It is a non-bodily thing that is being understood and viewed, and recognized in the understanding. When the mind by thinking views and understands itself, it does not beget this awareness of itself as though it had previously been unknown to itself ; it was already known to itself in the way that things are known which are contained in the memory even when they are not being thought about . We say a man knows letters even when he is thinking about other things, not letters. These two, begetter and begotten, are coupled together by love as the third, and this is nothing but the will seeking or holding something to be enjoyed. This is why we thought the trinity of the mind should be put forward under these three names, memory, understanding, and will.

9. We said toward the end of the tenth book, however, that the mind always remembers, always understands and loves itself, even though it does not always think about itself as distinct from things that are not what it is. So we must go on to inquire in what way understanding belongs to thought , while awareness of anything that is in the mind even while it is not being thought about is said to belong only to memory. If this is so, then it did not always have these three in such a way that it remembered, understood, and loved itself, but it only remembered itself, and then came to understand and love itself when it began afterward to think about itself. So let us look a little more closely at the example we employed to show that it is one thing not to know something, another not to think about it, and that it can happen that a man knows something which he does not think about when he is thinking about something else. This man then, learned in two or more disciplines, when he thinks about one of them, he still knows the other or the others even if he is not thinking about them. But can we be correct in saying “This musician certainly knows music, but he does not understand it now because he is not thinking about it; what he understands now is geometry, because that is what he is thinking about”? The absurdity of the sentence is plain to see. What about it if we say “This musician certainly knows music, but he does not love it now because he is not thinking about it; what he loves now is geometry, because that is what he is thinking about now”? Equally absurd, surely. We are however absolutely correct if we say “This man you see now talking about geometry is also an accomplished musician. He remembers the subject, understands it, and loves it; but although he knows and loves

geometricam, hanc enim nunc cogitat? Absurda est, quantum apparet, ista sententia. Quid etiam illa, si dicamus, Iste musicus novit quidem musicam, sed nunc eam non amat, quando eam non cogitat; amat autem nunc geometricam, quoniam nunc ipsam cogitat: nonne similiter absurda est? Rectissime vero dicimus: Iste quem perspicis de geometrica disputantem, etiam perfectus est musicus; nam et meminit disciplinae eius, et intellegit eam et diligit: sed quamvis eam noverit et amet, nunc illam non cogitat, quoniam geometricam de qua disputat, cogitat. Hinc admonemur esse nobis in abdito mentis quarundam rerum quasdam notitias, et tunc quodam modo procedere in medium, atque in conspectu mentis velut apertius constitui, quando cogitantur: tunc enim se ipsa mens, et meminisse, et intellegere, et amare invenit, etiam unde non cogitabat, quando aliud cogitabat. Sed unde diu non cogitaverimus, et unde cogitare nisi commoniti non valemus, id nos nescio quo eodemque miro modo, si potest dici, scire nescimus. Denique recte ab eo qui commemorat, ei quem commemorat dicitur: "Scis hoc, sed scire te nescis; commemorabo, et invenies te scientem quod te nescire putaveras" 36. Id agunt et litterae, quae de his rebus conscriptae sunt, quas res duce ratione veras esse invenit lector: non quas veras esse credit ei qui scripsit, sicut legitur historia; sed quas veras esse etiam ipse invenit, sive apud se, sive in ipsa mentis duce veritate. Qui vero nec admonitus valet ista contueri, magna caecitate cordis, tenebris ignorantiae demersus est altius, et mirabilior divina ope indiget, ut possit ad veram sapientiam pervenire.

7. 10. *Propter hoc itaque volui de cogitatione adhibere qualecumque documentum, quo posset ostendi quomodo ex iis quae memoria continentur, recordantis acies informetur, et tale aliquid gignatur ubi homo cogitat, quale in illo erat ubi ante cogitationem meminerat: quia facilius dignoscitur, quod tempore accedit, et ubi parens prolem spatio temporis antecedit. Nam si nos referamus ad interiorem mentis memoriam qua sui meminit, et interiorem intellegentiam qua se intellegit, et interiorem voluntatem qua se diligit, ubi haec tria simul semper sunt, et semper simul fuerunt ex quo esse coeperunt, sive cogitarentur, sive non cogitarentur; videbitur quidem imago illius trinitatis et ad solam memoriam pertinere: sed quia ibi verbum esse sine cogitatione non potest (cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus, etiam illo interiore verbo quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam), in tribus potius illis imago ista cognoscitur, memoria scilicet, intellegentia, voluntate. Hanc autem nunc dico intellegentiam, qua*

it he is not thinking about it now , because he is thinking about the geometry which he is discussing.” This tells us that in the recesses of the mind there are various awarenesses of various things, and that they come out somehow into the open and are set as it were more clearly in the mind's view when they are thought about; it is then that the mind discovers it remembers and understands and loves something too, which it was not thinking about while it was thinking about something else. But if it is something that we have not thought about for a long time and are unable to think about unless we are reminded of it, then in heaven knows what curious way it is something, if you can say this, that we do not know we know. At least it is quite correct for the man who is doing the reminding to say to the man he reminds, “You know this, but you do not know that you know it; I will remind you, and you will discover that you know what you supposed you did not know .” Literature performs precisely this function, when it is about things that the reader discovers under the guidance of reason to be true, not simply believing the writer that they are true as when he reads history, but himself discovering with the writer that they are true, and discovering it either in himself or in truth itself guiding†14 the mind. But anyone who is unable to see these things even when he is reminded of them and has his attention drawn to them, is suffering from great blindness of heart and sunk very deep in the darkness of ignorance, and needs very special aid from God to be able to attain true wisdom.

10. The reason why I wanted to introduce some sort of example of thought which could show how the attention is informed in recollection by the things contained in the memory, and how something is begotten where a man does his thinking that is like what was in him where he was only remembering before thinking , is that the distinction is easier to observe where something crops up in time and where parent precedes offspring by an interval of time. For if we refer to the inner memory of the mind with which it remembers itself and the inner understanding with which it understands itself and the inner will with which it loves itself, where these three are simultaneously together and always have been simultaneously together from the moment they began to be, whether they were being thought about or not, it will indeed seem that the image of that other trinity belongs only to the memory. But because there can be no word in it without thought—we think everything we say, including what we say with that inner word that is not part of any people's language—it is rather in these three that this image is to be recognized, namely memory, understanding, and will. And here I mean the understanding we understand with as we think, that is when things are brought up that were to hand in the memory but were not being thought about, and our thought is formed from them ; and the will or love or esteem I mean is the one that joins this offspring to its parent and is

intelligimus cogitantes, id est, quando eis repertis quae memoriae praesto fuerant, sed non cogitabantur, cogitatio nostra formatur; et eam voluntatem, sive amorem, vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit, et quodam modo utrisque communis est. Hinc factum est ut etiam per exteriora sensibilia quae per oculos carnis videntur, legentium ducerem tarditatem, in undecimo scilicet libro 37; atque inde cum eis ingrederer ad hominis interioris eam potentiam qua ratiocinatur de temporalibus rebus, differens illam principaliter dominantem qua contemplatur aeterna: atque id duobus voluminibus egi, duodecimo utrumque discernens, quorum unum est superius, alterum inferius, quod superiori subditum esse debet; tertio decimo autem de munere inferioris, quo humanarum rerum scientia salubris continetur, ut in hac temporali vita id agamus quo consequamur aeternam, quanta potui veritate ac brevitate disserui: quandoquidem rem tam multiplicem atque copiosam, multorum atque magnorum disputationibus multis magnisque celebratam, uno strictim volumine inclusi, ostendens etiam in ipsa trinitatem, sed nondum quae Dei sit imago dicenda.

In principali mentis humanae quaerenda imago Dei. Mens eo ipso imago Dei est quo eius capax est.

8. 11. Nunc vero ad eam iam pervenimus disputationem, ubi principale mentis humanae, quo novit Deum vel potest nosse, considerandum suscepimus, ut in eo reperiamus imaginem Dei 38. Quamvis enim mens humana non sit illius naturae cuius est Deus: imago tamen naturae eius qua natura melior nulla est, ibi quaerenda et invenienda est in nobis, quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius. Sed prius mens in se ipsa consideranda est antequam sit particeps Dei, et in ea reperienda est imago eius. Diximus 39 enim eam etsi amissa Dei participatione obsoletam atque deformem, Dei tamen imaginem permanere. Eo quippe ipso imago eius est, quo eius capax est, eiusque particeps esse potest; quod tam magnum bonum, nisi per hoc quod imago eius est, non potest. Ecce ergo mens meminit sui, intellegit se, diligit se: hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem; nondum quidem Deum, sed iam imaginem Dei. Non forinsecus accepit memoria quod teneret, nec foris invenit quod aspiceret intellectus, sicut corporis oculus: nec ista duo, velut formam corporis, et eam quae inde facta est in acie contuentis, voluntas foris iunxit: nec imaginem rei quae foris visa est, quodam modo raptam et in memoria reconditam cogitatio cum ad eam converteretur, invenit, et inde formatus est

in a certain measure common to them both. It was from this point that I started to lead my slower readers^{†15} through outward sensible things that are seen with the eyes, in the eleventh book if you remember. And from there I entered with them into that power of the inner man by which he reasons about temporal things, leaving aside for the time being that chief or dominant power by which he contemplates eternal things. I did this in two volumes, distinguishing in the twelfth between these two powers or functions, of which one is the higher the other the lower, which ought to be subordinate to the higher ; and in the thirteenth I discussed as truly and as briefly as I could the lower function which includes the salutary knowledge of human affairs, which we need in order to act in this temporal life in a way that will gain us eternal life. At least I succeeded in compressing into one slight volume a vast and many-sided subject which has been debated in many great discussions by many great men ,^{†16} and I showed that here too there is a trinity, but not yet one that can be called the image of God.

8, 11. But now we have come to the point of discussing the chief capacity of the human mind, with which it knows God or can know him, and we have undertaken to consider it in order to discover in it the image of God. For although the human mind is not of the same nature as God, still the image of that nature than which no nature is better is to be sought and found in that part of us than which our nature also has nothing better. But first of all the mind must be considered in itself, and God's image discovered in it before it participates in him . For we have said that even when it has lost its participation in him it still remains the image of God, even though worn out and distorted. It is his image insofar as it is capable of him and can participate in him ; indeed it cannot achieve so great a good except by being his image. Here we are then with the mind remembering itself, understanding itself, loving itself. If we see this we see a trinity , not yet God of course, but already the image of God. It was not from outside that this memory received what it was to retain, nor was it outside that the understanding found what it was to look at, like the eyes of the body, nor was it outside that the will joined these two together like the form of the body and the form derived from it in the gaze of the onlooker. Nor was it the image of a thing that had been seen outside , caught in a certain fashion and stacked away in the memory, which thought discovered when it turned to it, and from which the inner gaze was informed in recollection, with the will as third element joining the two together. This we showed is what happened in those trinities which were discovered in bodily things or drawn inside in a certain way through the senses of the body from bodies , all of which we discussed in the eleventh book. Nor is it like what happened or appeared when we were discussing that knowledge which is one of the resources^{†17} of the inner man and had to be

recordantis obtutus, iungente utrumque tertia voluntate: sicut in eis ostendebamus trinitatibus fieri, quae in rebus corporalibus reperiebantur, vel ex corporibus per sensum corporis introrsus quodam modo trahebantur; de quibus omnibus in libro undecimo disseruimus 40: nec sicut fiebat vel apparebat, quando de illa scientia disserebamus, iam in hominis interioris opibus constituta, quae distinguenda fuit a sapientia; unde quae sciuntur, velut adventicia sunt in animo, sive cognitione historica illata, ut sunt facta et dicta, quae tempore peraguntur et transeunt, vel in natura rerum suis locis et regionibus constituta sunt, sive in ipso homine quae non erant oriuntur, aut aliis docentibus aut cogitationibus propriis, sicut fides, quam plurimum in libro tertio decimo commendavimus 41; sicut virtutes, quibus, si verae sunt, in hac mortalitate ideo bene vivitur, ut beate in illa quae divinitus promittitur immortalitate vivatur. Haec atque huiusmodi habent in tempore ordinem suum, in quo nobis trinitas memoriae visionis et amoris facilius apparebat. Nam quaedam eorum praeviunt cognitionem discentium. Sunt enim cognoscibilia, et antequam cognoscantur, sui que cognitionem in discentibus gignant. Sunt autem vel in locis suis, vel quae tempore praeterierunt: quamvis quae praeterierunt, non ipsa sint, sed eorum quaedam signa praeteritorum, quibus visis vel auditis cognoscantur fuisse atque transisse. Quae signa vel in locis sita sunt, sicut monumenta mortuorum, et quaecumque similia: vel in litteris fide dignis, sicut est omnis gravis et approbandae auctoritatis historia: vel in animis eorum qui ea iam noverunt; eis quippe iam nota, et aliis utique sunt noscibilia, quorum scientiam praevenerunt, et qui ea nosse, illis quibus nota sunt docentibus, possunt. Quae omnia, et quando discuntur, quamdam faciunt trinitatem, specie sua quae noscibilis fuit etiam antequam nosceretur, eique adiuncta cognitione discentis quae tunc esse incipit quando discitur, ac tertia voluntate quae utrumque coniungit. Et cum cognita fuerint, alia trinitas, dum recoluntur, fit iam interius in ipso animo, ex iis imaginibus quae cum discerentur sunt impressae in memoria, et informatione cogitationis ad ea converso recordantis aspectu, et ex voluntate quae tertia duo ista coniungit. Ea vero quae oriuntur in animo ubi non fuerunt, sicut fides, et cetera huiusmodi, etsi adventicia videntur, cum doctrina inseruntur; non tamen foris posita vel foris peracta sunt, sicut illa quae creduntur; sed intus omnino in ipso animo esse coeperunt. Fides enim non est quod creditur, sed qua creditur: et illud creditur, illa conspicitur. Tamen quia esse coepit in animo, qui iam erat animus antequam in illo ista esse coepisset, adventicium quiddam videtur,

distinguished from wisdom. Here the things that are known are adventitious to the consciousness, whether they have been brought in by the acquisition of historical^{†18} knowledge, like deeds and sayings which occur in time and pass away, or things in nature which occur in their own localities and regions; or whether they are things that have arisen in a man that were not there before, either from the teaching of others or from his own reflections, like faith which we commended extensively in the thirteenth book, or like the virtues which if genuine insure that you live in this mortality in such a way that you will live happily in that immortality which is promised by God. Now all these and similar cases proceed in a temporal order, one thing after another, which makes it much easier for us to observe the trinity of memory, sight, and love. Thus some of them precede the knowledge that learns about them; they are knowable even before they get known and beget awareness of themselves in the learner. They are there already, either in their own places, or in past time—though of course those in past time are not actually there themselves, but only some sort of signs of their past existence, sight or sound of which produces knowledge that they existed and passed away. Such signs are either put up in places, like tombstones and similar monuments, or to be found in trustworthy writings like any history of sound and approved authority; or even in the minds of those who know them already—they are already known to these people and knowable to others whose knowledge they precede, and who can get to know them if they are taught by those to whom they are already known. All these things produce a kind of trinity when they are learnt, consisting of the look which was knowable even before it was known, and of the learner's awareness joined to this, which begins to be when the thing is learnt, and the will as third element which joins the two together. And after these things are known another trinity is produced inside in the consciousness itself when they are called to mind, one consisting of the images which were impressed on the memory when they were learnt, and of the conformation of thought recalling them with a backward look at them, and of the will as third element which joins these two together. As for things that arise in the consciousness where they were not to be found before, like faith and similar things, they do indeed seem to be adventitious when they are inserted by teaching, and yet they were never positioned outside, or performed outside like the things that are believed, but quite simply began to be inside in the consciousness itself.^{†19} Faith is not what one believes but what one believes with; what one believes is believed, what one believes with is seen. And yet because it begins to be in the consciousness which was already a consciousness before faith began to be in it, it seems to be something adventitious, and will be regarded as one of the things in the past when sight succeeds it and it ceases to be; and it produces one trinity now when through being present it is retained,

et in praeteritis habebitur, quando succedente specie iam esse destiterit: aliamque nunc trinitatem facit per suam praesentiam, retenta, conspecta, dilecta; aliam tunc faciet per quoddam sui vestigium, quod in memoria praeteriens de reliquerit, sicut iam supra dictum est 42.

An virtutes desinant esse cum ad aeterna perduxerint?

9. 12. Utrum autem tunc etiam virtutes, quibus in hac mortalitate bene vivitur, quia et ipsae incipiunt esse in animo, qui cum sine illis prius esset, tamen animus erat, desinant esse cum ad aeterna perduxerint, nonnulla quaestio est. Quibusdam enim visum est desituras: et de tribus quidem, prudentia, fortitudine, temperantia, cum hoc dicitur, non nihil dici videtur; iustitia vero immortalis est, et magis tunc perficietur in nobis, quam esse cessabit 43. De omnibus tamen quatuor magnus auctor eloquentiae Tullius 44 in Hortensio dialogo disputans: Si nobis, inquit, cum ex hac vita emigraverimus, in beatorum insulis immortale aevum, ut fabulae ferunt, degere liceret, quid opus esset eloquentia, cum iudicia nulla fierent; aut ipsis etiam virtutibus? Nec enim fortitudine egeremus, nullo proposito aut labore aut periculo; nec iustitia, cum esset nihil quod appeteretur alieni; nec temperantia, quae regeret eas quae nullae essent libidines; nec prudentia quidem egeremus, nullo delectu proposito bonorum et malorum. Una igitur essemus beati cognitione naturae et scientia, qua sola etiam deorum est vita laudanda. Ex quo intellegi potest, cetera necessitatis esse, unum hoc voluntatis 45. Ita ille tantus orator, cum philosophiam praedicaret, recolens ea quae a philosophis acceperat, et praeclare ac suaviter explicans, in hac tantum vita, quam videmus aerumnis et erroribus plenam, omnes quatuor necessarias dixit esse virtutes: nullam vero earum, cum ex hac vita emigrabimus, si liceat ibi vivere ubi vivitur beate; sed bonos animos sola beatos esse cognitione et scientia, hoc est contemplatione naturae qua nihil est melius et amabilius; ea est natura, quae creavit omnes ceteras, instituitque naturas. Cui regenti esse subditum, si iustitiae est, immortalis est omnino iustitia: nec in illa esse beatitudine desinet, sed talis ac tanta erit, ut perfectior et maior esse non possit. Fortassis et aliae tres virtutes, prudentia sine ullo iam periculo erroris, fortitudo sine molestia tolerandorum malorum, temperantia sine repugnatione libidinum, erunt in illa felicitate: ut prudentiae sit nullum bonum Deo praeponere vel aequare; fortitudinis, ei firmissime cohaerere; temperantiae, nullo defectu noxio delectari. Nunc autem quod agit iustitia in

looked at, and loved; it will produce another one then through a kind of trace of itself which it will leave behind in the memory as it passes away, as we have already stated above.†20

9, 12. The virtues too, by which one lives well in this mortal state, begin to be in the consciousness, which was already there without them and was still consciousness; but whether they too cease to be when they have brought you to eternity is quite a question. Some people think they will come to an end, and when this is said about three of them, sagacity, courage, and moderation, there does seem to be a point there. Justice however is immortal, and will rather than be perfected in us than cease to be. “Tully, the great master of eloquence,”†21 discusses all four of them in his dialogue Hortensius. He says: If we were allowed when we move on from this life, to spend an immortal age in the isles of the blessed, as the legends declare, what need would there be of eloquence, seeing that there would be no trials or courts? Or for that matter, even of the virtues? We would need no courage where no danger or difficulty faced us; no justice, since there would be no property belonging to others which we could covet; no moderation, to control non-existent lusts; we should not even need any sagacity, not being faced with any choices to be made of good things or bad. So we would be happy with one single awareness of nature, one knowledge, which is the only thing that even the life of the gods is to be praised for. From which we can gather that other things are a matter of necessity, this one thing†22 a matter to be willed for its own sake. Thus this great orator, reflecting on what he had learnt from the philosophers and explaining it with such grace and distinction, sang the praises of philosophy;†23 and in doing so he stated that the four virtues are necessary only in this life, which we observe to be full of trials and errors; and that none of them is necessary when we move on from this life, if we are allowed to live where one can live happily; but that good souls are happy with awareness and knowledge, that is to say, with the contemplation of nature, in which nothing is better or more to be loved than the nature which created and established all other natures. But if being subject to this nature is what justice means, then justice is quite simply immortal, and will not cease to be in that state of happiness but will be such that it could not be greater or more perfect. Perhaps then the other three virtues too will continue in that state of bliss, sagacity without any danger now of mistakes, courage without any annoyance of evils to be borne, moderation without any recalcitrant lusts to control. Sagacity will mean not putting any good above or on a level with God, courage will mean cleaving to him with absolute constancy, moderation will mean taking pleasure in no guilty failing. As for what justice does now in succoring the unfortunate, sagacity in taking precautions against pitfalls, courage in enduring trials,

subveniendo miseris, quod prudentia in praecavendis insidiis, quod fortitudo in perferendis molestiis, quod temperantia in coercendis delectationibus pravis, non ibi erit, ubi nihil omnino mali erit. Ac per hoc ista virtutum opera, quae huic mortali vitae sunt necessaria, sicut fides ad quam referenda sunt, in praeteritis habebuntur: et aliam nunc faciunt trinitatem, cum ea praesentia tenemus, aspiciamus, amamus; aliam tunc factura sunt, cum ea non esse, sed fuisse, per quaedam eorum vestigia, quae praetereundo in memoria derelinquent, reperiemus: quia et tunc trinitas erit, cum illud quaecumque vestigium et memoriter retinebitur, et agnoscetur veraciter, et hoc utrumque tertia voluntate iungetur.

Trinitas mentis non adventicia.

10. 13. In omnium istarum, quas commemoravimus, temporalium rerum scientia, quaedam cognoscibilia cognitionem interpositione temporis antecedunt; sicut sunt ea sensibilia quae iam erant in rebus, antequam cognoscerentur; vel ea omnia quae per historiam cognoscuntur: quaedam vero simul esse incipiunt; velut si aliquid visibile, quod omnino non erat, ante nostros oculos oriatur, cognitionem nostram utique non praecedit; aut si aliquid sonet, ubi adest auditor, simul profecto incipiunt esse, simulque desinunt et sonus et eius auditus. Verumtamen sive tempore praecedentia, sive simul esse incipientia cognoscibilia cognitionem gignunt, non cognitione gignuntur. Cognitione vero facta, cum ea quae cognovimus, posita in memoria recordatione revisuntur; quis non videat priorem esse tempore in memoria retentionem, quam in recordatione visionem, et huius utriusque tertia voluntate iunctionem? Porro autem in mente non sic est: neque enim adventicia sibi ipsa est, quasi ad se ipsam quae iam erat, venerit aliunde eadem ipsa quae non erat; aut non aliunde venerit, sed in se ipsa quae iam erat, nata sit ea ipsa quae non erat; sicut in mente quae iam erat, oritur fides quae non erat: aut post cognitionem sui recordando se ipsam velut in memoria sua constitutam videt, quasi non ibi fuerit antequam se ipsam cognosceret; cum profecto ex quo esse coepit, numquam sui meminisse, numquam se intellegere, numquam se amare destiterit, sicut iam ostendimus. Ac per hoc quando ad se ipsam cogitatione convertitur, fit trinitas, in qua iam et verbum possit intellegi: formatur quippe ex ipsa cogitatione, voluntate utrumque iungente. Ibi ergo magis agnoscenda est imago quam quaerimus.

An et praesentium sit memoria.

moderation in curbing crooked pleasures, there will be none of this where there is quite simply nothing evil. And so these activities of the virtues which are necessary for this mortal life, like faith to which they should all be related, will be reckoned as things of the past. They†24 produce one trinity now when we retain them, look at them, and love them as present; they will produce another one then, when we shall discover them not to be but to have been, by the kind of traces they will leave behind in the memory as they pass away. For then too a trinity will emerge when this kind of trace is both retained in memory and recognized as true and each is joined to the other by will as the third element.

10, 13. In the knowledge of all these temporal things we have mentioned, some knowables precede awareness of them by an interval of time, like those sensible objects that already existed in things before they were perceived, or all the things one comes to know about through history; others begin to be at the same time as the knowledge of them, as though something visible which simply did not exist before were to spring up before our eyes, which would clearly not precede our awareness of it; or as though a noise were to be made in the presence of a listener, in which case both sound and the hearing of it would begin to be simultaneously and cease to be simultaneously. In either case, whether they precede in time or begin to be simultaneously, the knowables beget the knowledge, not the knowledge the knowables. As for the awareness that arises when things that we know and have deposited in memory are looked at again in recollection, anyone can see that retention in the memory is prior in time to sight in recollection and the conjunction of them both by will as the third element. Now in the case of the mind it is not so. The mind, after all, is not adventitious to itself, as though to the mind which already was came from somewhere else the same mind which was not yet; or as though it did not come from somewhere else, but in the mind which already was should be born the same mind which was not yet, just as in the mind which already was arises faith which was not before; or as though after getting to know itself it should by recollection see itself fixed in its own memory, as if it had not been there before it had got to know itself. The truth of course is that from the moment it began to be it never stopped remembering itself, never stopped understanding itself, never stopped loving itself, as we have already shown. And therefore when it turns to itself in thought, a trinity is formed in which a word too can be perceived. It is formed of course out of the very act of thought, with the will joining the two together. It is here then more than anywhere that we should recognize the image we are looking for.†25

11, 14. Someone is going to say, "This is not really memory, by which you say that the mind which is always present to itself remembers itself; memory is of things past, not things

11. 14. *Sed dicet aliquis: Non est ista memoria, qua mens sui meminisse perhibetur, quae sibi semper est praesens. Memoria enim praeteritorum est, non praesentium: nam quidam cum de virtutibus agerent, in quibus est etiam Tullius 46, in tria ista prudentiam dividerunt, memoriam, intellegentiam, providentiam: memoriam scilicet praeteritis, intellegentiam praesentibus, providentiam rebus tribuentes futuris, quam non habent certam nisi praescii futurorum; quod non est munus hominum, nisi detur desuper, ut Prophetis. Unde Scriptura sapientiae de hominibus agens: Cogitationes, inquit, mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae 47. Memoria vero de praeteritis, et intellegentia de praesentibus certa est, sed praesentibus utique incorporalibus rebus: nam corporales corporalium praesentes sunt aspectibus oculorum. Sed qui dicit memoriam non esse praesentium, attendat quemadmodum dictum sit in ipsis saecularibus litteris, ubi maioris fuit curae verborum integritas quam veritas rerum: Nec talia passus Ulixes, Oblitusve sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto 48.*

Vergilius enim cum sui oblitum diceret Ulixem, quid aliud intellegi voluit, nisi quod meminisset sui? Cum ergo sibi praesens esset, nullo modo sui meminisset, nisi ad res praesentes memoria pertineret. Quapropter sicut in rebus praeteritis ea memoria dicitur, qua fit ut valeant recoli et recordari: sic in re praesenti quod sibi est mens, memoria sine absurditate dicenda est, qua sibi praesto est ut sua cogitatione possit intellegi, et utrumque sui amore coniungi.

De Trinitate (399-422/426)

XV.6.9 Hanc ergo sapientiam quod est Deus, quomodo intellegimus esse Trinitatem? Non dixi: "Quomodo credimus?" nam hoc inter fideles non debet habere quaestionem: sed si aliquo modo per intellegentiam possumus videre quod credimus, quis iste erit modus?

In homine Trinitatis adumbratio.

6. 10. Si enim recolamus ubi nostro intellectui coeperit in his libris Trinitas apparere, octavus occurrit. Ibi quippe, ut potuimus, disputando erigere tentavimus mentis intentionem ad intellegendam illam praestantissimam immutabilemque naturam, quod nostra mens non est. Quam tamen sic intuebamur, ut nec longe a nobis esset, et supra nos esset, non loco, sed ipsa sui venerabili mirabilique praestantia, ita ut apud nos esse suo praesenti lumine videretur. In qua

present.” Some writers treating of the virtues, Tully among them, divided sagacity into these three parts: memory, understanding, and foresight; assigning memory to things past, understanding to things present, and foresight to things future.†26 No one has certainty in this last quality except those who have foreknowledge of the future, and this is not a gift enjoyed by men unless they are given it from above, like the prophets. So the book of Wisdom, talking about men, says, The thoughts of mortals are timid and our foresight unsure (Wis 9:14). Memory however of past things and understanding of present ones you can be certain about—by present things I mean here non-bodily ones, for it is to the sight of the bodily eyes that bodily things are present.

But if you insist that memory is not of things present, please observe the way secular literature uses words, where there is more concern for the correctness of words than for the truth of things:

such things did Ulysses endure,
did the man of Ithaca
get himself in that momentous hazard.†27

When Virgil said that Ulysses did not forget himself, what can he have meant us to understand but that he remembered himself? As he was present to himself, he could not at all have remembered himself unless memory also belonged to things present. As regards things past one means by memory that which makes it possible for them to be recalled and thought over again; so as regards something present, which is what the mind is to itself, one may talk without absurdity of memory as that by which the mind is available to itself, ready to be understood by its thought about itself, and for both to be conjoined by its love of itself.

On the Trinity

XV.9 So how then are we going to understand this wisdom, which God is, to be a triad? I did not say “How are we going to believe?” Among the believers this should be no problem. But if there is some way in which we can see intellectually what we believe, what might this way be?

10. If we try to recall where it was in these books that a trinity first began to appear to our understanding, it will occur to us that it was in the eighth book. There we attempted as best we could to raise the attention of the mind by our discussion to understand that supremely eminent and unchangeable nature which our mind is not. We observed it as both not being far away from us and yet being above us, not spacially but in its august and marvelous eminence, and in such a way that it also seemed to be with or in us by the presence of its light. However, no trinity was yet apparent to us in this, because we could not hold the gaze of our mind fixed on looking for one

tamen nobis adhuc nulla Trinitas apparebat, quia non ad eam quaerendam in fulgore illo firmam mentis aciem tenebamus: tantum quia non erat aliqua moles, ubi credi oporteret magnitudinem duorum vel trium plus esse quam unius, cernebamur utcumque. Sed ubi ventum est ad caritatem, quae in sancta Scriptura Deus dicta est 55, eluxit paululum Trinitas, id est, amans, et quod amatur, et amor 56. Sed quia lux illa ineffabilis nostrum reverberabat obtutum, et ei nondum posse obtemperari nostrae mentis quodam modo vincebatur infirmitas, ad ipsius nostrae mentis, secundum quam factus est homo ad imaginem Dei 57, velut familiariorem considerationem, reficiendae laborantis intentionis causa, inter coeptum dispositumque refleximus: et inde in creatura, quod nos sumus, ut invisibilia Dei, per ea quae facta sunt, conspiciere intellecta possemus 58, immorati sumus a nono usque ad quartum decimum librum. Et ecce iam quantum necesse fuerat, aut forte plus quam necesse fuerat, exercitata in inferioribus intelligentia, ad summam Trinitatem quae Deus est, conspiciendam nos erigere volumus, nec valemus. Num enim sicut certissimas videmus trinitates, sive quae forinsecus de rebus corporalibus fiunt, sive cum ea ipsa quae forinsecus sensa sunt cogitantur; sive cum illa quae oriuntur in animo, nec pertinent ad corporis sensus, sicut fides, sicut virtutes quae sunt artes agenda vitae, manifesta ratione cernuntur et scientia continentur; sive cum mens ipsa qua novimus quidquid nosse nos veraciter dicimus, sibi cognita est, vel se cogitat, sive cum aliquid quod ipsa non est, aeternum atque incommutabile conspicit: num ergo sicut in his omnibus certissimas videmus trinitates, quia in nobis fiunt vel in nobis sunt, cum ista meminimus, aspiciamus, volumus, ita videmus etiam Trinitatem Deum, quia et illic intellegendo conspiciamus tamquam dicentem, et verbum eius, id est, Patrem et Filium, atque inde procedentem caritatem utrique communem, scilicet Spiritum Sanctum? An trinitates istas ad sensus nostros vel ad animum pertinentes videmus potius quam credimus, Deum vero esse Trinitatem credimus potius quam videmus? Quod si ita est, profecto aut invisibilia eius, per ea quae facta sunt, nulla intellecta conspiciamus 59; aut si ulla conspiciamus; non in eis conspiciamus Trinitatem, et est illic quod conspiciamus, est quod etiam non conspectum credere debeamus. Conspicere autem nos immutabile bonum, quod nos non sumus, liber octavus ostendit 60; et quartus decimus, cum de sapientia quae homini ex Deo est loqueremur, admonuit 61. Cur itaque ibi non agnoscimus Trinitatem? An haec sapientia quae Deus dicitur, non se intellegit, non se diligit? Quis hoc dixerit? Aut quis est qui non videat,

in that dazzling brilliance; all we were able to perceive was that there is no mass there in which we would have to believe that the size of two or three is something more than that of one. But when we came to charity, which is called God in holy scripture,†14 the glimmerings of a trinity began to appear, namely lover and what is loved and love. However, that inexpressible light beat back our gaze, and somehow convinced us that the weakness of our mind could not yet be attuned to it. So to relax our concentration we turned ourselves back in reflection, between the beginning and the completion of our search, to what could be called the more familiar consideration of our own mind insofar as man has been made to the image of God.†15 And from then on we lingered over the creature which we ourselves are from the ninth to the fourteenth book in order to descry if we could the invisible things of God by understanding them through those that have been made.†16

So here we are, after exercising our understanding as much as was necessary, and perhaps more than was necessary in these lower things, wishing and not being able to raise ourselves to a sight of that supreme trinity which is God. To be sure, we plainly see some evident trinities, either ones produced outside from bodily things, or ones we see when things that have been sensed outside are thought about; or when things that spring up in the consciousness like faith, like the virtues which are arts of living, are perceived directly by reason and grasped by knowledge; or when the mind itself, by which we know whatever we can say we truly know, is known to itself or thinks about itself; or when it observes something eternal and unchangeable which it itself is not. But just because we see these evident trinities, since they happen in us or are in us when we remember and behold and will these things, does it mean that we also see God as trinity in the same way, since there too we intellectually observe one as uttering, and his Word (that is the Father and the Son) and the charity common to them both proceeding thence, namely the Holy Spirit? Or is it that we see rather than believe these trinities which belong to our senses or our consciousness, while we believe rather than see that God is a trinity? If this is so, it either means that we descry none of his invisible things by understanding them through those that were made,†17 or that if we descry some of them we do not descry trinity among them, and so there is something there which we can descry, and something also which being undescried we must just believe. But the eighth book showed that we do descry the unchanging good which we are not, and so did the fourteenth persuade us of this when we were talking about the wisdom which man has from God.†18 Why then should we not recognize a trinity there? Could it be that this other wisdom which is called God does not understand itself, does not love itself? Who would ever say such a thing? Or does anybody fail to see that where there is no knowledge there cannot possibly be any wisdom? Or is it to be supposed that

ubi nulla scientia est, nullo modo esse sapientiam? Aut vero putandum est, sapientiam quae Deus est, scire alia et nescire se ipsam, vel diligere alia nec diligere se ipsam? Quae si dici sive credi stultum et impium est; ecce ergo Trinitas, sapientia scilicet, et notitia sui, et dilectio sui. Sic enim et in homine invenimus trinitatem, id est, mentem, et notitiam qua se novit, et dilectionem qua se diligit 62.

Sed ista adumbratio est deficiens et inadeguata.

7. 11. Sed haec tria ita sunt in homine, ut non ipsa sint homo. Homo est enim, sicut veteres definierunt, animal rationale mortale 63. Illa ergo excellunt in homine, non ipsa sunt homo 64. Et una persona, id est singulus quisque homo, habet illa tria in mente vel mentem. Quod si etiam sic definiamus hominem, ut dicamus: "Homo est substantia rationalis constans ex anima et corpore" 65; non est dubium hominem habere animam quae non est corpus, habere corpus quod non est anima. Ac per hoc illa tria non homo sunt, sed hominis sunt, vel in homine sunt. Detracto etiam corpore, si sola anima cogitetur, aliquid eius est mens, tamquam caput eius, vel oculus, vel facies: sed non haec ut corpora cogitanda sunt. Non igitur anima, sed quod excellit in anima mens vocatur 66. Numquid autem possumus dicere Trinitatem sic esse in Deo, ut aliquid Dei sit, nec ipsa sit Deus? Quapropter singulus quisque homo, qui non secundum omnia quae ad naturam pertinent eius, sed secundum solam mentem imago Dei dicitur, una persona est, et imago est Trinitatis in mente. Trinitas vero illa cuius imago est, nihil aliud est tota quam Deus, nihil est aliud tota quam Trinitas. Nec aliquid ad naturam Dei pertinet, quod ad illam non pertineat Trinitatem: et tres personae sunt unius essentiae 67, non sicut singulus quisque homo una persona.

7. 12. Itemque in hoc magna distantia est, quod sive mentem dicamus in homine, eiusque notitiam, et dilectionem, sive memoriam, intellegentiam, voluntatem 68, nihil mentis meminimus nisi per memoriam, nec intellegimus nisi per intellegentiam, nec amamus nisi per voluntatem 69. At vero in illa Trinitate quis audeat dicere Patrem, nec se ipsum, nec Filium, nec Spiritum Sanctum intellegere nisi per Filium, vel diligere nisi per Spiritum Sanctum, per se autem meminisse tantummodo vel sui vel Filii vel Spiritus Sancti; eodemque modo Filium nec sui nec Patris meminisse nisi per Patrem, nec diligere nisi per Spiritum Sanctum, per se autem non nisi intellegere et Patrem et se ipsum et Spiritum Sanctum; similiter et Spiritum Sanctum per Patrem meminisse et Patris et

the wisdom which God knows other things and does not know itself, or loves other things and does not love itself? It would be folly and impiety to say or believe such a thing. So there we have a trinity, namely wisdom and its knowledge of itself and its love of itself. We found a similar trinity in man, namely the mind, and the knowledge it knows itself with, and the love it loves itself with.

7, 11. However, these three are in man without themselves being man. For man, as the ancients defined him, is a rational, mortal animal.†19 So these three are what is most eminent in man, but not man himself. And one person, that is any single man, has them in his mind, or as his mind.†20 We could also define man like this and say, "Man is a rational substance consisting of soul and body."†21 In this case there is no doubt that man has a soul which is not body and a body which is not soul. Thus here too those three things are not man but something of man's or in man. Leave the body aside and think only about the soul, and mind is something that belongs to it, like its head or its eye or its face—but you must not think of these comparisons in a material way. So it is not the soul but what is pre-eminent in the soul that is called mind. But can we possibly say that a trinity is in God in such a way that it is something of God's, and is not itself just God? And so any single man, who is not called the image of God in terms of everything that belongs to his nature but only in terms of his mind, is one person and is the image of the trinity in his mind. But that trinity he is the image of is nothing but wholly and simply God, nothing but wholly and simply trinity. Nor is there anything belonging to God's nature which does not belong to that trinity; and there are three persons of one being, not, like any single man, just one person.

12. Again there is this enormous difference, that whether we talk about mind in man and its knowledge and love, or whether about memory, understanding, will, we remember nothing of the mind except through memory, and understand nothing except through understanding, and love nothing except through will. But who would presume to say that in that trinity the Father does not understand either himself or the Son or the Holy Spirit except through the Son, or love except through the Holy Spirit, but only remembers either himself or the Son or the Holy Spirit through himself? Or, in the same way, that the Son does not remember either himself or the Father except through the Father, and only loves through the Holy Spirit, while through himself he only understands both the Father and himself and the Holy Spirit? And likewise that the Holy Spirit remembers the Father and the Son and himself through the Father, and understands the Father and the Son and himself through the Son, while through himself he only loves both himself and the Father and the Son? All this, as though the Father were his own memory and the Son's and the Holy Spirit's, while the Son would be

Filii et sui, et per Filium intellegere et Patrem et Filium et se ipsum, per se autem non nisi diligere et se et Patrem et Filium: tamquam memoria sit Pater et sua et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, Filius autem intellegentia et sua et Patris et Spiritus Sancti, Spiritus vero Sanctus caritas et sua et Patris et Filii? Quis haec in illa Trinitate opinari vel affirmare praesumat? Si enim solus ibi Filius intellegit, et sibi et Patri et Spiritui Sancto, ad illam reditur absurditatem, ut Pater non sit sapiens de se ipso, sed de Filio; nec sapientia sapientiam genuerit, sed ea sapientia Pater dicatur sapiens esse quam genuit. Ubi enim non est intellegentia, nec sapientia potest esse: ac per hoc si Pater non intellegit ipse sibi, sed Filius intellegit Patri, profecto Filius Patrem sapientem facit. Et si hoc est Deo esse quod sapere, et ea illi essentia est quae sapientia, non Filius a Patre, quod verum est; sed a Filio potius habet Pater essentiam, quod absurdissimum atque falsissimum est. Hanc absurditatem nos in libro septimo discussisse, convicisse, abiecisse certissimum est 70. Est ergo Deus Pater sapiens, ea qua ipse sua est sapientia, et Filius sapientia Patris de sapientia quod est Pater, de quo genitus est Filius. Quocirca consequenter est et intellegens Pater ea qua ipse sua est intellegentia; neque enim esset sapiens qui non esset intellegens: Filius autem intellegentia Patris de intellegentia genitus quod est Pater. Hoc et de memoria non inconvenienter dici potest. Quomodo est enim sapiens qui nihil meminit, vel sui non meminit? Proinde, quia sapientia Pater, sapientia Filius 71, sicut sui meminit Pater, ita et Filius: et sicut sui et Filii meminit Pater, memoria non Filii, sed sua; ita sui et Patris meminit Filius, memoria non Patris, sed sua. Dilectio quoque ubi nulla est, quis ullam dicat esse sapientiam? Ex quo colligitur ita esse Patrem dilectionem suam, ut intellegentiam et memoriam suam. Ecce ergo tria illa, id est, memoria, intellegentia, dilectio sive voluntas in illa summa et immutabili essentia quod est Deus, non Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt, sed Pater solus. Et quia Filius quoque sapientia est genita de sapientia 72, sicut nec Pater ei, nec Spiritus Sanctus ei intellegit, sed ipse sibi; ita nec Pater ei meminit, nec Spiritus Sanctus ei diligit, sed ipse sibi: sua enim est et ipse memoria, sua intellegentia, sua dilectio; sed ita se habere, de Patre illi est, de quo natus est. Spiritus etiam Sanctus quia sapientia est procedens de sapientia 73, non Patrem habet memoriam, et Filium intellegentiam, et se dilectionem; neque enim sapientia esset, si alius ei meminisset, eique alius intellegeret, ac tantummodo sibi ipse diligeret: sed ipse habet haec tria, et ea sic habet, ut haec ipsa ipse sit. Verumtamen ut ita sit, inde illi est unde procedit.

his own understanding and the Father's and the Holy Spirit's, and the Holy Spirit his own and the Father's and the Son's charity. Who would presume to imagine or affirm such a view about that trinity? If the Son alone there does the understanding for himself and the Father and the Holy Spirit, we are back at that absurdity of the Father not being wise with himself but with the Son, and of wisdom not begetting wisdom, but of the Father being called wise with the wisdom he has begotten. For where there is no understanding there cannot be any wisdom, and thus if the Father does not do his understanding for himself, but the Son does it for the Father, it follows that it is the Son who makes the Father wise. And if for God to be is the same as to be wise, it is not the Son who has being from the Father (which is the true position) but rather the Father who has being from the Son, which is the height of absurdity and falsehood. We discussed, showed up, and rejected this absurdity with complete finality in the seventh book.†22 So therefore, God the Father is wise with the wisdom by which he is his own wisdom, and the Son is wisdom from the wisdom of the Father, which is the Father from whom he is begotten as Son. The consequence is that the Father understands with the understanding by which he is his own understanding—he would not be wise unless he also understood. But the Son is understanding, begotten from the understanding of the Father, which is the Father. The same point could appropriately be made about memory. How can one who does not remember anything, or at least does not remember himself, be wise? It follows then that because the Father is wisdom and the Son is wisdom, the Son does his own remembering†23 just as the Father does; and just as the Father remembers himself and the Son with his own memory not the Son's, so the Son remembers himself and the Father with his own memory not the Father's. Again, who will say that there is any wisdom where there is no love? From this we can infer that the Father is his own love just as he is his own understanding and memory. So here we are then with these three, that is memory, understanding, love or will in that supreme and unchangeable being which God is, and they are not the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit but the Father alone. And because the Son too is wisdom, begotten of wisdom, it means the Father does not do his remembering for him or the Holy Spirit his loving any more than the Father or the Holy Spirit do his understanding, but he does it all for himself; he is his own memory, his own understanding, his own love, but his being all this comes to him from the Father of whom he is born. The Holy Spirit too does not have the Father for memory and the Son for understanding and himself for love, because he is wisdom proceeding from wisdom; and he would not be wisdom if another did his remembering and another his understanding for him, and he himself only did his own loving. No, he himself has these three, and he has them in such a way that he is them. But its being so with him comes to him from where he proceeds from.†24

7. 13. *Quis ergo hominum potest istam sapientiam qua novit Deus omnia, ita ut nec ea quae dicuntur praeterita, ibi praetereant, nec ea quae dicuntur futura, quasi desint expectentur ut veniant, sed et praeterita et futura cum praesentibus sint cuncta praesentia; nec singula cogitentur, et ab aliis ad alia cogitando transeatur, sed in uno conspectu simul praesto sint universa: quis, inquam, hominum comprehendit istam sapientiam, eandemque prudentiam, eandemque scientiam; quandoquidem a nobis nec nostra comprehenditur? Ea quippe quae vel sensibus vel intellegentiae nostrae adsunt, possumus utcumque conspiciere: ea vero quae absunt, et tamen adfuerunt, per memoriam novimus, quae obliti non sumus. Nec ex futuris praeterita, sed futura ex praeteritis, non tamen firma cognitione conicimus. Nam quasdam cogitationes nostras, quas futuras vel manifestius atque certius proximas quasque prospicimus, memoria faciente id agimus, cum agere valemus quantum valemus, quae videtur non ad ea quae futura sunt, sed ad praeterita pertinere. Quod licet experiri in eis dictis vel canticis, quorum seriem memoriter reddimus. Nisi enim praevideremus cogitatione quod sequitur, non utique diceremus. Et tamen ut praevideamus, non providentia nos instruit, sed memoria. Nam donec finiatur omne quod dicimus, sive canimus, nihil est quod non provisum prospectumque proferatur. Et tamen cum id agimus, non dicimur providenter, sed memoriter canere vel dicere; et qui hoc in multis ita proferendis valent plurimum, non solet eorum providentia, sed memoria praedicari. Fieri ista in animo vel ab animo nostro novimus, et certissimi sumus: quomodo autem fiant, quanto attentius voluerimus advertere, tanto magis noster et sermo succumbit, et ipsa non perdurat intentio, ut ad liquidum aliquid nostra intellegentia, et si non lingua, perveniat. Et putamus nos, utrum Dei providentia eadem sit quae memoria et intellegentia, qui non singula cogitando aspicit, sed una, aeterna et immutabili atque ineffabili visione complectitur cuncta quae novit, tanta mentis infirmitate posse comprehendere? In hac igitur difficultate et angustiis libet exclamare ad Deum vivum: Mirificata est scientia tua ex me; invaluit, et non potero ad illam 74. Ex me quippe intellego quam sit mirabilis et incomprehensibilis scientia tua 75, qua me fecisti; quando nec me ipsum comprehendere valeo quem fecisti: et tamen in meditatione mea exardescit ignis 76, ut quaeram faciem tuam semper 77.*

...

13. Then how can this wisdom by which God knows all things in such a way that what is called future is not being waited for to happen as though it were not there yet, but things past and future are all present with things present; and things are not thought about one by one, with thought moving from one to another, but all things are grasped in one glance or view; how, I say, can any man comprehend this wisdom, which is simultaneously prudence, simultaneously knowledge,†25 seeing that we cannot even comprehend our own? Things that are present to our understanding or our senses we can at least observe; things that are absent but were present we know by memory, if we have not forgotten them. And we make a guess at future things from past things, not at the past from the future, but without any certainty of knowledge. There are some thoughts of ours which we can see as about to happen in the immediate future with considerable clarity and certainty; but we do this with the aid of memory when we are able to do it and as far as we are able, and yet memory seems to be concerned with the past and not the future. You can experience what I mean in speeches or songs which we render word for word by memory; clearly, unless we foresaw in thought what was to follow, we would not say it. And yet it is not foresight that instructs us how to foresee, but memory. Until we finish what we are reciting or singing, we have uttered nothing which we have not foreseen. And yet when we do this we are not said to recite or sing from foresight but from memory, and those who are very good at reciting many things of this sort are not usually admired for their foresight but for their memory. We know with complete certainty that these things happen in our consciousness, or proceed from our consciousness. But the more we desire to observe closely how they happen, the more our language begins to stagger, and our attention fails to persevere until our understanding if not our tongue can arrive at some clear result. And shall we suppose that with such feebleness of mental capacity we can comprehend how God's foresight is the same as his memory and his understanding, and how he does not observe things by thinking of them one by one, but embraces everything that he knows in one eternal, unchangeable, and inexpressible vision? It is a relief in this kind of difficulty and frustration to cry out to the living God, "Your knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is mighty and I cannot attain it (Ps 139:6) From myself indeed I understand how wonderful and incomprehensible is your knowledge with which you have made me, seeing that I am not even able to comprehend myself whom you have made; and yet a fire burns up in my meditation (Ps 39:3), causing me to seek your face always."†26

...

22, 42. But when these three things are found in one person, such as man is, someone could well say to us: "These three,

Sed quanta disparitas trinitatis quae in homine est a Trinitate quae Deus est.

22. 42. *Verum haec quando in una sunt persona, sicut est homo, potest nobis quispiam dicere: "Tria ista, memoria, intellectus, et amor, mea sunt, non sua; nec sibi, sed mihi agunt quod agunt, imo ego per illa. Ego enim memini per memoriam, intellego per intellegentiam, amo per amorem: et quando ad memoriam meam aciem cogitationis adverto, ac sic in corde meo dico quod scio, verbumque verum de scientia mea gignitur, utrumque meum est, et scientia utique et verbum. Ego enim scio, ego dico in meo corde quod scio. Et quando in memoria mea cogitando invenio iam me intellegere, iam me amare aliquid, qui intellectus et amor ibi erant et antequam inde cogitarem, intellectum meum et amorem meum invenio in memoria mea, quo ego intellego, ego amo, non ipsa. Item quando cogitatio memor est, et vult redire ad ea quae in memoria reliquerat, eaque intellecta conspicere 269 atque intus dicere, mea memoria memor est, et mea vult voluntate, non sua. Ipse quoque amor meus cum meminit atque intellegit quid appetere debeat, quid vitare, per meam, non per suam memoriam meminit; et per intellegentiam meam, non per suam, quidquid intellegenter amat, intellegit". Quod breviter dici potest: "Ego per omnia illa tria memini, ego intellego, ego diligo, qui nec memoria sum, nec intellegentia, nec dilectio, sed haec habeo". Ista ergo dici possunt ab una persona, quae habet haec tria, non ipsa est haec tria. In illius vero summae simplicitate naturae quae Deus est, quamvis unus sit Deus, tres tamen personae sunt, Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus.*

Disparitas eruitur.

23. 43. *Aliud est itaque trinitas res ipsa, aliud imago trinitatis in re alia, propter quam imaginem simul et illud in quo sunt haec tria, imago dicitur; sicut imago dicitur simul et tabula, et quod in ea pictum est; sed propter picturam quae in ea est, simul et tabula nomine imaginis appellatur. Verum in illa summa Trinitate, quae incomparabiliter rebus omnibus antecellit, tanta est inseparabilitas, ut cum trinitas hominum non possit dici unus homo; in illa unus Deus et dicatur et sit, nec in uno Deo sit illa Trinitas, sed unus Deus 270. Nec rursus quemadmodum ista imago quod est homo habens illa tria una persona est, ita est illa Trinitas: sed tres personae sunt, Pater Filii, et Filius Patris, et Spiritus Patris et Filii. Quamvis enim memoria hominis, et maxime illa quam pecora non habent, id est, qua res intellegibiles ita continentur, ut*

memory, understanding and love, are mine, not their own; and whatever they do, they do it for me and not for themselves—or rather, I do it through them. It is I who remember with memory, understand with understanding, love with love. And when I turn the focus of my thought onto memory, and thus utter in my heart what I know, and a true word is begotten of my knowledge, each is mine—both the knowledge, that is to say, and the word. For it is I who know, I who utter what I know in my heart. And when by thinking I find that I already understand, already love something in my memory, and that this understanding and love were there even before I thought about it, I find my understanding and my love in my memory, where it is I who understand, I who love, not they. Again, when my thought remembers and wishes to go back to what it had deposited in the memory, and on understanding it to observe it and utter it inwardly, it remembers with my memory and wishes with my will, not its own. My love too, when it remembers and understands what it ought to go for and what to avoid, remembers with my memory, not its own; and with my understanding, not its own, it understands whatever it understandingly loves." To put it in a nutshell we can say: "It is I who remember, I who understand, I who love with all three of these things—I who am not either memory or understanding or love, but have them." This can indeed be said by one person who has these things and is not himself these three things. But in the simplicity of that supreme nature which is God, although God is one the persons are three, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. So the trinity as a thing in itself is quite different from the image of the trinity in another thing. It is on account of this image that the thing in which these three are found is also simultaneously called image;†106 just as a canvas and what is painted on it are both called an image, but the canvas is only called an image simultaneously on account of the picture which is on it.

23, 43. But such is the inseparability that reigns in that supreme trinity which incomparably surpasses all things, that while a triad of men cannot be called a man, that triad is called, and is, one God. Nor is it a triad in one God—it is one God. Nor is that triad like this image, man, which is one person having those three things; on the contrary, it is three persons, the Father of the Son and the Son of the Father and the Spirit of the Father and the Son. It is true that man's memory (and particularly the kind of memory which animals do not have, in which intelligible things are contained that have not come into it through the senses of the body) has in its own little way some sort of likeness in this image trinity to the Father, however immeasurably inadequate the likeness may be. Again it is true that man's understanding, which is formed from memory by directing thought onto it when what is known is uttered, and which is an inner word of no particular language, has in its enormous inequality some kind

non in eam per sensus corporis venerint, habeat pro modulo suo in hac imagine Trinitatis incomparabiliter quidem imparem, sed tamen qualemcumque similitudinem Patris; itemque intellegentia hominis, quae per intentionem cogitationis inde formatur, quando quod scitur dicitur, et nullius linguae cordis verbum est, habeat in sua magna disparitate nonnullam similitudinem Filii; et amor hominis de scientia procedens, et memoriam intellegentiamque coniungens, tamquam parenti prolique communis, unde nec parens intellegitur esse, nec proles, habeat in hac imagine aliquam, licet valde imparem, similitudinem Spiritus Sancti: non tamen, sicut in ista imagine Trinitatis non haec tria unus homo, sed unius hominis sunt, ita in ipsa summa Trinitate cuius haec imago est, unius Dei sunt illa tria, sed unus Deus est, et tres sunt illae, non una persona. Quod sane mirabiliter ineffabile est, vel ineffabiliter mirabile, cum sit una persona haec imago Trinitatis, ipsa vero summa Trinitas tres personae sint, inseparabilior est illa Trinitas personarum trium, quam haec unius. Illa quippe in natura divinitatis, sive id melius dicitur deitatis, quod est, hoc est, atque incommutabiliter inter se ac semper aequalis est: nec aliquando non fuit, aut aliter fuit; nec aliquando non erit, aut aliter erit. Ista vero tria quae sunt in impari imagine, etsi non locis quoniam non sunt corpora, tamen inter se nunc in ista vita magnitudinibus separantur. Neque enim quia moles nullae ibi sunt, ideo non videmus in alio maiorem esse memoriam quam intellegentiam, in alio contra: in alio duo haec amoris magnitudine superari, sive sint ipsa duo inter se aequalia, sive non sint. Atque ita a singulis bina, et a binis singula, et a singulis singula, a maioribus minora vincuntur. Et quando inter se aequalia fuerint ab omni languore sanata, nec tunc aequabitur rei natura immutabili ea res quae per gratiam non mutatur: quia non aequatur creatura Creatori, et quando ab omni languore

of likeness to the Son; and that man's love, proceeding from knowledge and joining memory and understanding together, as being itself common to parent and offspring (which is why it cannot be itself regarded as either parent or offspring) has in this image some likeness, though a vastly unequal one, to the Holy Spirit. And yet, while in this image of the trinity these three are not one man but belong to one man, it is not likewise the case in that supreme trinity of which this is the image that those three belong to one God: they are one God and they are three persons, not one. It is certainly a marvelously inexpressible and an inexpressibly marvelous thing that while this image of the trinity is one person and that supreme trinity is three persons, that trinity of three persons should still be more inseparable than this trinity of one. In the nature of divinity, or of the deity if you prefer it,^{†107} that triad is what this nature is, and is unchangeable and always equal within itself; nor was it some time not or some time different. But these three in the unequal image may not indeed be separated from each other by space, since they are not bodies, yet now in this life they are separated among themselves by their respective "sizes." Just because there is no physical mass involved, it does not mean that we do not see that memory is bigger in one man than understanding, in another the other way round; that in a third both these are surpassed in size by love, whether the two of them are equal to each other or not.^{†108} And thus the lesser are outweighed by the greater, whether it is two by one or one by two or one by another. And even when the time comes that they are equal to each other, cured of all weakness, even then it will not be possible to equate with a thing unchangeable by nature a thing that is freed from change by grace, because creature is not to be equated with creator; and in any case, when it is cured of all weakness it will change.

Blogio problema

De moribus Ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum (387/388)

Summum bonum est id cui competit summe esse.

II.1.1. Nulli esse arbitror dubium cum de bonis et malis quaeritur, hoc genus quaestionis ad moralem pertinere disciplinam, in qua isto sermone versamur. Quamobrem vellem quidem, ut tam serenam mentis aciem homines ad haec investiganda deferrent, ut possent videre illud summum bonum, quo non est quidquam melius et superius, cui rationalis anima pura et perfecta subiungitur. Hoc enim intellecto atque perspecto simul viderent id esse quod summe ac primitus esse rectissime dicitur. Hoc enim maxime esse dicendum est, quod semper eodem modo sese habet, quod omnimodo sui simile est, quod nulla ex parte corrumpi ac mutari potest, quod non subiacet tempori, quod aliter nunc se habere quam habebat antea non potest. Id enim est quod esse verissime dicitur. Subest enim huic verbo manentis in se atque incommutabiliter sese habentis naturae significatio. Hanc nihil aliud quam Deum possumus dicere, cui si contrarium recte quaeras, nihil omnino est. Esse enim contrarium non habet nisi non esse. Nulla est ergo Deo natura contraria. Sed quoniam ad haec contemplanda sauciam et hebetem nugatoriis opinionibus et pravitate voluntatis aciem mentis afferimus, conemur quantum possumus ad qualemcumque tantae rei notitiam pervenire pedetemptim atque caute, non ut videntes sed ut palpantes solent quaerere.

Malum esse id quod est contra naturam dicunt verissime Manichaei...

2. 2. Saepe atque adeo paene semper, Manichaei, ab his quibus haeresim vestram persuadere molimini, requiritis unde sit malum. Putate me nunc primitus in vos incidisse; impetrem aliquid a vobis, si placet, ut etiam vos deposita paulisper opinione, qua vos ista scire opinamini, rem tantam mecum tamquam rudes indagare tentetis. Percunctamini me unde sit malum; at ego vicissim percunctor vos quid sit malum. Cuius est iustior inquisitio? Eorumne qui quaerunt unde sit, quod quid sit ignorant, an eius qui prius putat esse quaerendum quid sit, ut non ignotae rei - quod absurdum. est - origo quaeratur? Verissime, dicitis,

The Catholic Way of Life and the Manichean Way of Life

II.1.1. I think that no one has any doubt that, when one asks about good and evil, this kind of question pertains to the doctrine of morality, with which we are dealing in this discussion. Hence, I would certainly want people to bring such a clear gaze of their mind to the investigation of these ideas that they could see that highest good, than which there is nothing better or higher and to which the pure and perfect rational soul is subject. For, when they understood and saw this highest good, they would at the same time see that it is what is most correctly said to exist in the highest manner and primordially. After all, that should be said to exist most of all, which is always in the same way, which is in every respect like itself, which can in no respect be corrupted and changed, which is not subject to time, and which cannot now be otherwise than it was before. For that is what is said to exist most truly. Now, under this expression there falls what is meant by the nature of that which remains in itself and exists immutably. We can call this nature nothing other than God, and, if you look for something contrary to it, there is absolutely nothing. For being does not have any contrary except non-being. There is, therefore, no nature contrary to God. But because we bring to the contemplation of these matters a gaze of the mind that is wounded and dulled by trivial ideas and by the wickedness of the will, let us try, to the extent we can, to come gradually and cautiously to some sort of knowledge of so great a reality, not in the way that those with sight are accustomed to search but in the way that those who are groping do.

2, 2. Often and almost always you Manicheans ask those whom you are trying to win over to your heresy where evil comes from. Suppose that I have now met you for the first time. Let me, please, obtain something from you, namely, that you set aside for a while the opinion by which you suppose that you know these things and try, as if you were uneducated people, to investigate this important issue with me. You ask me where evil comes from, but I in turn ask you what evil is. Who has the fairer question? Those who ask where it comes from, though they are ignorant of what it is, or someone who thinks that we should first ask what it is in order to avoid asking about the origin of something of which we are ignorant? For that is absurd. Quite correctly, you say, for who is so mentally blind that he does not see that for each kind of thing what is contrary to its nature is evil? But, if you grant this, your heresy is demolished, for no nature is something

quis enim est ita mente caecus, qui non videat id cuique generi malum esse, quod contra eius naturam est? Sed hoc constituto evertitur haeresis vestra, nulla enim natura malum, si quod contra naturam est, id erit malum. Vos autem asseritis quamdam naturam atque substantiam malum esse. Accedit etiam illud, quod contra naturam quidquid est, utique naturae adversatur et eam perimere nititur. Tendit ergo id quod est facere, ut non sit. Nam et ipsa natura nihil est aliud quam id quod intelligitur in suo genere aliquid esse. Itaque ut nos iam novo nomine ab eo quod est esse, vocamus essentiam, quam plerumque etiam substantiam nominamus ita veteres qui haec nomina non habebant, pro essentia et substantia naturam vocabant. Id ipsum ergo malum est, si praeter pertinaciam velitis attendere, deficere ab essentia et ad id tendere ut non sit.

... sed hinc subvertitur eorum haeresis.

2. 3. Quocirca cum in Catholica dicitur omnium naturarum atque substantiarum esse auctorem Deum, simul intelligitur ab eis qui haec possunt intelligere, non esse Deum auctorem mali. Qui enim potest ille, qui omnium quae sunt causa est ut sint, causa esse rursus, ut non sint id est, ut ab essentia deficient et ad non esse tendant? Quod malum generale esse clamat verissima ratio. At vero illa vestra gens mali, quam vultis esse summum malum, quomodo erit contra naturam id est contra substantiam, cum eam naturam atque substantiam esse dicatis? Si enim contra se facit, ipsum esse sibi adimit; quod si perfecerit, tunc demum perveniet ad summum malum. Non autem perficiet, quia eam non modo esse verum etiam sempiternam esse vultis. Non potest igitur esse summum malum, quod perhibetur esse substantia.

2. 4. Sed quid faciam? Scio plures esse in vobis, qui haec intelligere omnino nequeant. Scio rursus esse quosdam, qui quamquam bono ingenio utcumque ista videant, mala tamen voluntate qua ipsum quoque ingenium sunt amissuri, pertinaciter agant et quaerant potius quid adversus ista dicant, quod tardis et imbecillis facile persuadeatur, quam vera esse consentiant. Non me tamen scripsisse poenitebit quod aut quisquam in vobis tandem non iniquo iudicio consideret vestrumque relinquat errorem, aut quod ingeniosi et Deo subditi atque adhuc ab studio vestro integri cum legerint, non possint vestris sermonibus decipi.

Malum si definitur id esse quod nocet, ex hoc rursus Manichaei revincuntur.

evil if what is contrary to nature is going to be evil. You, however, maintain that evil is a nature and a substance. Added to this there is also the fact that what is contrary to nature, whatever it is, is of course opposed to nature and strives to destroy it. It tends, therefore, to cause that which is not to be. For a nature is nothing else than that which is understood to be something in its own kind. And so, just as by a new term derived from being (esse) we now call "essence" what we usually also call "substance," so the ancients who did not have these terms used "nature" instead of "essence" and "substance." Evil itself, then, if you are willing to look beyond your obstinacy, is a falling away from being (essentia) and a tending toward non-being.

3. Hence, when in the Catholic Church it is said that God is the author of all natures and substances, it is at the same time understood by those who can understand this that God is not the author of evil. How, after all, can he who is the cause of the being of all the things that are also be the cause of their non-being, that is, of their falling away from being and tending toward non-being? The most correct reasoning cries out that this is evil in general. But how will that nation of evil of yours, which you want to be the greatest evil, be contrary to nature, that is, contrary to substance, since you say that it is a nature and a substance? For, if it acts against itself, it takes being from itself, and if it does this completely, it will ultimately come to the greatest evil. But it will not do this completely, because you want it not only to be but also to be everlasting. The greatest evil, therefore, cannot be what is called a substance.

4. But what am I to do? I know that there are many among you who cannot understand these ideas at all. I also know that there are some who, though they somehow see these points with their fine minds, still act stubbornly out of bad will, because of which they will also lose those fine minds. They seek what they might say against these ideas, which might easily convince the slow and feeble, rather than agree that these ideas are true. Yet I shall not regret having written something either in order that someone from among you may at last consider it with a fair judgment and leave your error or in order that talented persons who are subject to God and are still untainted by your influence may read it and be kept from being deceived by your words.

3, 5. Let us, then, investigate these points more carefully and, insofar as it is possible, more clearly. I ask you again what evil is. If you say that it is that which does harm, you will not be saying something false even here. But please pay attention; please be alert; please set aside partisanship and seek the truth — not for the sake of winning but for the sake of finding it. After all, whatever does harm deprives the thing that it harms of some good, for, if it does not take away any good, it

3. 5. *Quaeramus ergo ista diligentius et quantum fieri potest, planius. Percunctor vos iterum quid sit malum. Si dixeritis id quod nocet, neque hic mentiemini. Sed quaeso animadvertite, quaeso vigilate, quaeso deponite studia partium, et verum non vincendi sed inveniendi gratia quaerite. Quidquid enim nocet, bono aliquo privat eam rem cui nocet, nam si nullum bonum adimit, nihil prorsus nocet. Quid hoc apertius, obsecro vos? Quid planius? Quid tam expositum cuius mediocri intellectori, modo non pertinaci? Hoc autem posito videtur iam, ut opinor, quid sequatur. In illa quippe gente quam summum malum esse suspicamini, noceri cuiquam rei non potest, ubi nihil est boni. Quod si duae naturae sunt, ut affirmatis, regnum lucis et regnum tenebrarum, quoniam regnum lucis Deum esse fatemini, cui simplicem quamdam naturam conceditis, ita ut ibi non sit aliud alio deterius, confiteamini necesse est, quod vehementer quidem est adversum vos, sed tamen necesse est confiteamini, istam naturam, quam summum bonum non modo non negatis, sed etiam vehementer persuadere conamini, esse incommutabilem et impenetrabilem et incorruptibilem et inviolabilem; non enim aliter erit summum bonum, id est enim quo nihil sit. melius; tali autem naturae noceri nullo pacto potest. At si nocere bono privare est, sicut ostendi, noceri non potest regno tenebrarum, quia nihil ibi boni est; noceri non potest regno lucis, quia inviolabile est; cui nocebit igitur quod dicitis malum?*

Boni per se et participatione differentia.

4. 6. *Quamobrem cum vos expedire nequeatis, videte quam expedita sit sententia catholicae disciplinae, quae aliud dicit bonum quod summe ac per se bonum est, non. participatione alicuius boni, sed propria natura et essentia; aliud quod participando bonum est. et habendo; habet autem de illo summo bono ut bonum sit, in se tamen manente illo nihilque amittente. Hoc autem bonum quod postea diximus, creaturam vocat, cui noceri per defectum potest; cuius defectus auctor Deus non est, quia existendi et ut ita dicam essendi auctor est. Ita et malum ostenditur quomodo dicatur, non enim secundum essentiam, sed secundum privationem verissime dicitur; et natura cui noceri possit apparet. Non enim ipsa est summum malum, cui bonum adimitur dum. nocetur neque summum bonum, quae propterea deficere a bono potest, quia non existendo bonum, sed bonum habendo dicitur bona. Neque naturaliter bona res est, quae cum facta dicitur, utique ut bona esset accepit. Ita et Deus summum bonum est, et ea quae fecit bona sunt omnia, quamvis*

certainly does no harm. What could be more obvious than this, I ask you? What could be more clear? What could be so plain to a person of average intelligence, provided he is not obstinate? But, granted this point, I think that you already see what follows. In that nation, of course, which you suppose is the greatest evil, it is not possible that anything be harmed where there is nothing good. But if, as you state, there are two natures, the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness, since you say that the kingdom of light is God, to whom you grant a simple nature so that there is in him nothing inferior to anything else, you must admit something that is certainly very much opposed to you. But you must admit it nonetheless, namely, that this nature, which you not only do not deny but even vigorously strive to prove, is the highest good, is immutable, impenetrable, incorruptible, and inviolable. For otherwise it will not be the highest good; the highest good is, after all, that than which nothing is better. But such a nature can in no way be harmed. If, however, to harm something is to deprive it of a good, as I showed, the kingdom of darkness cannot be harmed because there is nothing good in it. The kingdom of light cannot be harmed because it is inviolable. To what, then, will that which you call evil do harm?

4. 6. Hence, since you cannot free yourselves from this problem, see how the statement of Catholic doctrine is set free. It says that the good that is supremely good and good through itself, not by participation in another good but by its own nature and essence, is something other than the good that is good by participating in and having good. But the latter has its being good from the highest good, while the highest good nonetheless remains in itself and loses nothing. Catholic doctrine calls this good that we mentioned second a creature, and it can be harmed by a defect. Of that defect God is not the author because he is the author of existing and, so to speak, of being. In that way we are shown how evil is spoken of, for it is most truly spoken of not as an essence but as a privation. And we see a nature that can be harmed. For the nature from which a good is taken away when it is harmed is not the greatest evil. And the nature that can fall away from the good, because it is said to be good not by being good but by having good, is not the highest good. Nor is that thing good by its nature. For, since it is said to have been made, it has, to be sure, received its being good. In that way God is the highest good, and the things that he made are all good, though they are not as good as he who made them is. After all, who would be so insane as to demand that products be equal to their maker and creatures to their creator? What more do you want? Or do you want something even clearer?

5. 7. I ask for the third time, then, what evil is. You will perhaps answer: corruption. And who would deny that this is evil in general. For it is contrary to nature; it is that which

non sint tam bona, quam est ille ipse qui fecit. Quis enim hoc tam insanus audet exigere, ut aequalia sint artifici opera et condita conditori? Quid amplius desideratis? An aliquid vultis etiam planius?

Malum si definitur esse corruptio, inde etiam funditus evertitur illorum haeresis.

5. 7. Quaeram ergo tertio quid sit malum. Respondebitis fortasse: corruptio. Quis et hoc negaverit, generale malum esse? Nam hoc est contra naturam, hoc est quod nocet. Sed corruptio non est in seipsa sed in aliqua substantia quam corrumpit; non enim substantia est ipsa corruptio. Ea res igitur quam corrumpit corruptio non est malum.; quod enim corrumpitur, integritate et sinceritate privatur. Quod ergo non habet ullam sinceritatem qua privetur, corrumpi non potest; quod autem habet, profecto bonum est participatione sinceritatis. Item quod corrumpitur, profecto pervertitur; quod autem pervertitur, privatur ordine; ordo autem bonum est. Non igitur quod corrumpitur, bono caret, eo namque ipso quo non caret, viduari dum corrumpitur potest. Gens ergo illa tenebrarum, si omni bono carebat, ut dicitis, corrumpi non poterat; non enim habebat quod ei posset auferre corruptio, quae si nihil auferat, non corrumpit. Audete iam dicere, si potestis, Deum et Dei regnum potuisse corrumpi, si diaboli regnum quale describitis, quomodo corrumpi posset non invenitis.

Corruptio quam rem afficiat, et quid sit.

6. 8. Quid ergo hinc lux catholica dicit? Quid putatis, nisi id quod veritas habet, corrumpi posse faciam substantiam, nam et illam non factam quae summum bonum est esse incorruptibilem, et ipsam corruptionem, quae summum malum est non posse corrumpi, sed hanc non esse substantiam? Si autem quaeritis quid sit, videte quo conetur perducere quae corrumpit? Ex seipsa enim afficit ea quae corrumpuntur. Deficiunt autem omnia per corruptionem ab eo quod erant et non permanere coguntur, non esse coguntur. Esse enim ad manendum refertur. Itaque quod summe et maxime esse dicitur, permanendo in se dicitur. Nam quod mutatur in melius, non quia manebat mutatur, sed quia pervertebatur in peius, id est ab essentia deficiebat; cuius defectionis auctor non est qui est auctor essentiae. Mutantur ergo quaedam in meliora et propterea tendunt esse nec dicuntur ista mutatione perverti sed reverti atque converti. Perversio enim contraria est ordinationi. Haec vero quae tendunt esse, ad ordinem tendunt; quem cum fuerint

does harm. But corruption is not found in itself but in some substance that it corrupts. For corruption itself is not a substance. The thing, then, that corruption corrupts is not something evil. For what is corrupted is deprived of integrity and purity. Something, therefore, that does not have any purity of which it might be deprived cannot be corrupted. But something that has some purity is, of course, good by reason of its participation in purity. Likewise, that which is corrupted is certainly perverted. But what is perverted is deprived of order. But order is something good. That which is corrupted, therefore, does not lack some good, for, when it is corrupted, it can only be stripped of what it does not lack. If that nation of darkness, as you say, lacked every good, it could not have been corrupted. For it did not have what corruption could take away from it, and, if corruption does not take anything away, it does not corrupt. Be so bold now as to say, if you can, that God and the kingdom of God could have been corrupted, if you do not find how the kingdom of the devil, as you describe it, could be corrupted.

6, 8. What, then, does the Catholic light say about this? What do you suppose but what the truth holds, that is, that a created substance can be corrupted, for that uncreated substance, which is the highest good, is incorruptible, and corruption itself, which is the greatest evil, cannot be corrupted, but that this latter is not a substance? But if you ask what it is, see to what it tries to bring the things that it corrupts. For of itself it affects the things that are corrupted. Through corruption, however, all things fall away from what they were, and they are forced not to remain; they are forced not to be. For to be means to remain. Therefore, that which is said to be in the highest and greatest way is said to be such by remaining in itself. For what is changed for the better is not changed because it remains, but because it was perverted to what is worse, that is, because it fell away from its essence. But he who is the author of the essence is not the author of this falling away from the essence. Some things, then, are changed for the better and, for this reason, they tend toward being and are not said to be perverted by this change but to turn back and to be converted. For perversion is contrary to order. But the things that tend toward being tend toward order, and, when they attain order, they attain being to the extent that a creature can attain it. Order, after all, brings what it orders to a certain fittingness. But to be is nothing else than to be one. And so anything is to the extent that it attains oneness. For the effect of oneness is the fittingness and harmony by which those things that are composite are insofar as they are. For simple things are by themselves because they are one. But those things that are not simple imitate oneness by the harmony of their parts, and they are to the extent that they attain it. Hence, the imposition of order forces them to be; a lack of order, then, forces them not to be. This is called perversion and corruption. Whatever, then, is corrupted tends toward non-

consecuta, ipsum esse consequuntur, quantum id creatura consequi potest. Ordo enim ad convenientiam quamdam quod ordinat redigit. Nihil est autem esse, quam unum esse. Itaque in quantum quidque unitatem adipiscitur, in tantum est. Unitatis est enim operatio, convenientia et concordia, qua sunt in quantum sunt ea quae composita sunt, nam simplicia per se sunt, quia una sunt; quae autem non sunt simplicia, concordia partium imitantur unitatem et in tantum sunt in quantum assequuntur. Quare ordinatio esse cogit, inordinatio ergo non esse; quae perversio etiam nominatur atque corruptio. Quidquid itaque corrumpitur, eo tendit, ut non sit. Iam vestrum est considerare quo cogat corruptio, ut possitis invenire summum malum; nam id est quo perducere corruptio nititur.

Dei bonitas non sinit rem ullam corruptione eo perduci ut non sit. Creare et condere quo differant.

7. 9. Sed Dei bonitas eo rem perduci non sinit et omnia deficientia sic ordinat, ut ibi sint ubi congruentissime possint esse, donec ordinatis motibus ad id recurrant unde defecerunt. Itaque etiam animas racionales, in quibus potentissimum est liberum arbitrium, deficientes a se in inferioribus creaturae gradibus ordinat, ubi esse tales decet. Fiunt ergo miserae divino iudicio, dum convenienter pro meritis ordinantur. Ex quo illud optime dictum est, quod insectari maxime soletis: Ego facio bona et creo mala 1. Creare namque dicitur condere et ordinare. Itaque in plerisque exemplaribus sic scriptum est: Ego facio bona et condo mala. Facere enim est, omnino quod non erat; condere autem, ordinare quod utcumque iam erat, ut melius magisque sit. Ea namque condit Deus, id est ordinat, cum dicit: Condo mala quae deficiunt, id est ad non esse tendunt, non ea quae ad id quo tendunt, pervenerunt. Dictum est enim: Nihil per divinam providentiam ad id ut non sit pervenire permittitur.

7. 10. Tractantur haec latius et uberius, sed dum vobiscum agitur, satis est. Ostendenda enim vobis ianua fuit, quam desperatis et desperandam facitis imperitis. Nam vos introducit nemo nisi voluntas bona, quam pacatam efficit divina clementia, sicut in Evangelio canitur: Gloria in excelsis Deo et in terra pax hominibus bonae voluntatis 2. Satis est, inquam, ut videatis nullum esse de bono et malo religiosae disputationis exitum, nisi quidquid est, in quantum est, ex Deo sit, in quantum autem ab essentia deficit, non sit ex Deo, sed tamen divina providentia semper, sicut universitati congruit, ordinetur. Quod si nondum videtis, quid amplius nunc faciam nescio, nisi ut

being. Now it is up to you to consider that to which corruption forces something in order that you may be able to find the greatest evil. For it is that to which corruption tries to bring it.

7, 9. But the goodness of God does not permit the situation to go so far, and it orders all the things that are falling away in such fashion that they may be where they can be most appropriately until by their well-ordered movements they return to that from which they fell away.¹ And so, when rational souls fall away from the goodness of God to lower levels of creation, the goodness of God also sets those souls, in which free choice is most powerful, in order where it is fitting that such souls should be. They are made unhappy by God's judgment, therefore, when they are set in order in a way that corresponds to their merits. For this reason the verse that you are accustomed to attack most of all is very well expressed: I make good things, and I create evil things (Is 45:7). For "to create" means "to establish" and "to set in order." In several manuscripts, therefore, it says: I make good things, and I establish evil things. For one makes what does not exist at all. But "to establish" means to set in order what already was in some way so that it might be better and greater. For God establishes those things, that is, sets them in order, when he says, I establish evil things — things that are falling away, that is, that are tending to non-being, not those that have arrived at that toward which they are tending. For it has been said that divine providence permits nothing to come to the point that it does not exist at all.

10. These ideas could be treated more extensively and fully, but when we are dealing with you, this is enough. For we had to show you the door, over which you despair and over which you cause the ignorant to despair. For nothing brings you inside but a good will that divine mercy has rendered peaceful, as the gospel sings: Glory on high to God, and on earth peace to men of good will (Lk 2:14). It is enough, I say, that you see that there is no way out of the religious discussion of good and evil except this: Whatever is, insofar as it is, comes from God, but, insofar as it falls away from being, it does not come from God. Divine providence always sets it in order, nonetheless, as is fitting for the universe. If you do not yet see this, I do not know what more I should do now except go over in more detail the ideas that have been stated. For only piety and purity bring one to the more important ideas.

8, 11. After all, when I ask what evil is, what else are you going to reply but either that it is contrary to nature or that it does harm or that it is corruption or something of the sort? I have pointed out how you meet with shipwreck with these answers, unless perhaps you reply (as you usually do), like a child with children, that fire, poison, a wild animal, and other

minutius etiam tractem ista quae dicta sunt. Non enim ad maiora nisi pietas mentem puritasque perducit.

Malum est, non substantia ulla, sed substantiae inimica inconvenientia.

8. 11. *Quid enim aliud, cum quaero quid sit malum, responsuri estis nisi aut quod contra naturam est, aut quod noceat aut corruptionem aut aliquid huiusmodi? At in his ostendi vestra naufragia, nisi forte ut soletis cum pueris pueriliter agere, respondebitis malum esse ignem, venenum, feram et cetera huiusmodi. Nam etiam de quodam dicente nullam substantiam malum esse, unus e primatibus huius haeresis, quem familiarius et crebrius audiebamus, dicebat: Vellem scorpionem in manu hominis ponere, ac videre utrum non subtraheret manum; quod si faceret, non verbis sed re ipsa convinceretur aliquam substantiam malum esse, quando quidem illud animal esse substantiam non negaret. Et dicebat haec non coram illo, sed cum ad eum nos commoti referremus quae ille dixisset; respondebat ergo, ut dixi, pueriliter pueris. Quis enim meliuscule imbutus et eruditus non videat per inconvenientiam corporalis temperationis haec laedere, ac rursus per convenientiam non laedere saepe etiam commoda non parva conferre? Nam si illud venenum per seipsum malum esset, eundem scorpionem magis priusque perimeret. At contra si ei penitus aliquo pacto detrahatur, sine dubitatione interiret. Ergo illius corpori malum est amittere quod nostro recipere; item illi bonum est habere id quo nobis carere. Erit igitur eadem res et bonum et malum? Nullo modo, sed malum est quod contra naturam est; hoc enim et bestiae illi et nobis malum est, id est ipsa inconvenientia, quae sine dubio non est substantia, immo est inimica substantiae. Unde est igitur? Attende quo cogat et discas, si tamen in te aliquid interioris luminis vivit. Non esse enim cogit omne quod perimit. Deus vero auctor essentiae est, nec aliqua essentia potest videri esse, quod in qua fuerit cogit non esse. Dicitur ergo aliquid unde non sit inconvenientia, nam unde sit nihil dici potest.*

8. 12. *Quaedam facinorosa mulier Atheniensis, ut prodit historia, venenum quod certo modulo damnati ut morerentur hauriebant, paulatim bibendo sine ullo vel levi incommodo valetudinis effecit ut biberet. Itaque cum esset aliquando damnata, legitimam illam quantitatem veneni quam consuetudine vicerat accepit ut ceteri nec ut ceteri exstincta est. Quod cum esset magno miraculo, missa est in exilium. Quid putamus, si venenum malum est, istam fecisse ut sibi malum non esset? Quid hoc absurdius? Sed quia inconvenientia*

things of this sort are evil. For one of the leaders of this heresy, whom we listened to rather frequently and in a quite friendly context, said of a certain person who said that no substance is an evil, "I would like to put a scorpion in that man's hand and see whether he would not pull his hand away. If he did so, he would show, not by words but by the action itself, that evil is a substance, since he would not deny that a living being is a substance." He did not say this in the man's presence but when we were disturbed and reported to him what the man had said; then he replied, as I have said, like a child with children. For who is endowed with a somewhat better mind and has received some education and fails to see that in one case these things do harm on account of the unsuitability of the body's condition and in another case do no harm on account of its suitability but often even confer no small advantages? For, if that venom were something evil in itself, it would instead first destroy the scorpion. But if the venom were somehow completely removed from it, the scorpion would undoubtedly perish. For the scorpion's body, then, it is evil to lose what it is evil for our body to receive. Likewise, it is good for it to have what it is good for us to be without. Will one and the same thing, then, be both good and evil? In no way. Rather, it is evil because it is contrary to a nature. For this is an evil both for that animal and for us, namely, the very unsuitability, which is certainly not a substance and in fact is inimical to a substance. Where does evil come from, then? Pay attention to what the argument forces you to and you will learn — at least if a glimmer of the inner light is alive in you. For everything that destroys something forces it not to be. But God is the author of being, nor can that which forces that in which it is present not to be, be thought to be some being. That from which unsuitability does not come is said to be something, therefore, for nothing can be said to be that from which it comes.

12. By drinking in small amounts the poison that condemned persons drank in the precise amount that would induce their death, a certain wicked woman of Athens, as history discloses, brought it about that she could drink it without any or only a slight impairment to her health.² And so, when she was finally condemned, she took like the others the prescribed amount of poison, whose effect she had overcome by having gotten used to it, so that she was not killed like the others. Since this was taken to be a great miracle, she was sent into exile. What are we to think? If poison is something evil, did she cause it not to be something evil? What would be more absurd? But because unsuitability is something evil, she brought it about instead that that body became suited to her body through becoming gradually accustomed to it. For when could that woman have been able to bring it about by any cleverness that that unsuitability would not harm her? Why? Because that which is truly and generally evil always does harm to everything. Oil is good for our bodies, but it is

malum est, fecit potius ut per moderatam consuetudinem illud corpus suo corpori conveniret. Nam quando illa qualibet calliditate posset efficere, ut sibi inconvenientia non noceret? Quid ita? Quia quod vere et generaliter malum est et semper et omnibus nocet. Oleum nostris corporibus commodum est, animalium autem multorum, quae sex pedes habent, vehementer adversum. Helleborum nonne alio modo cibus est, alio medicamentum, alio venenum? Salem immoderatus acceptum quis non venenum esse clamaverit? Quot autem et quanta corporis commoditates ex eo sint, numerare quis potest? Aqua maris terrenis animalibus cum bibitur, noxia est, multorum autem corporibus, dum illa humectantur, ac commodatissima et utilis, in utroque autem piscibus saluti et voluptati est. Panis hominem alit, accipitrem necat. Caenum ipsum, quod et haustum et olfactum graviter offendit et laedit, nonne et aestate tactum refrigerat et vulneribus quae ab igne acciderunt medicamentum est? Quid stercore aspernabilius? Quid cinere abiectius? At haec tantas agris utilitates afferunt, ut earum inventori, a quo etiam stercus nomen accepit, Stercutio divinos honores Romani deferendos putarent.

8. 13. *Sed quid parva colligam, quae sunt innumerabilia? Quattuor ipsa quae in promptu sunt elementa quis dubitet prodesse per convenientiam, inconvenienter autem adhibita vehementer adversa esse naturae? Nos qui aere vivimus, et terra et aqua obrutos necant, innumerabilia vero animalia per arenam laxioremque terram repunt vitaliter, pisces autem in hoc aere moriuntur. Ignis corpora nostra corrumpit, sed convenienter adhibitus et resumit a frigore et morbos innumerabiles pellit. Sol iste cui genu flectitis, quo vere nihil inter visibilia pulchrius invenitur, aquilarum oculos vegetat, nostros sauciat inspectus et tenebrat, sed fit per consuetudinem ut nos quoque in eo sine incommodo aciem figamus. Num ergo sinitis ut illi veneno eum comparemus, quod mulieri Atheniensi consuetudo fecit innoxium? Respicite igitur aliquando et advertite, si substantia ulla malum est ideo quod aliquem laedit, lucem quam colitis ab hoc crimine non posse defendi. Considerate potius hanc inconvenientiam universale malum esse, per quam solis radius tenebrescere oculos facit, cum eis nihil sit luce iucundius.*

Ne consistere quidem Manichaeorum fabulas de bonis et malis.

9. 14. *Haec dixi, ut si fieri potest tandem dicere desinatis malum esse terram per immensum*

very bad for the bodies of many living things that have six feet. Is not hellebore in one amount a food, in another a medicine, and in still another a poison? Who would not cry out that salt is a poison when ingested in too great a quantity? But who can count the many and great advantages to the body that come from it? When land animals drink sea water, it is harmful, but it is very beneficial and useful for the bodies of many others when they are bathed in it. Fish, however, find well-being and pleasure in both kinds of water. Bread nourishes a human being but kills a hawk. Does not excrement, which, if tasted or smelled, gravely offends and does injury, cool when touched in the summer and serve as a remedy for wounds caused by fire? What is more contemptible than dung? What is more lowly than ashes? But these bring such great benefits to fields that the Romans thought that they should offer divine honors to Stercutius, their inventor, from whom dung took its name.³

13. But why should I gather small examples, which are countless? Who would doubt that those four elements, which are readily available, are beneficial on account of their suitability but, when unsuitably used, are strongly opposed to nature? Earth and water kill us who live in the air, if they cover us over. But countless living beings creep through the sand and looser earth and live there, while fish die in this air. Fire destroys our bodies, but, when used suitably, it rescues us from the cold and wards off countless ills. This sun, to which you bend your knee, than which there is truly nothing more beautiful among visible things, enlivens the eyes of eagles but injures and dims our vision. Yet, through accustoming ourselves to it, we too are able to fix our gaze upon it without injury. You are not going to allow us, then, are you, to compare it with the poison that the Athenian woman rendered harmless by becoming accustomed to it? Consider at long last, then, and notice that, if any substance is an evil because it injures someone, the light that you worship cannot be defended from this accusation. See, rather, that this unsuitability, by which the ray of the sun causes eyes to go blind, though nothing is more pleasing to them than daylight, is evil in general.

9. 14. I have said these things in order that you might, if possible, stop saying that evil is a land immensely broad and long; that evil is a mind wandering through the land; that evil is the five caves of the elements, one full of darkness, another full of water, another full of the winds, another full of fire, and another full of smoke; that evil is the animals born in each of those elements, crawling ones in darkness, swimming ones in water, flying ones in the winds, four-legged ones in fire, two-legged ones in smoke. These beings, after all, could by no means exist as you describe them. For whatever is of such a kind is necessarily from the sovereign God insofar as it is, because of course it is good insofar as it is. For, if pain or

profundam et longam, malum esse mentem per terram vagantem, malum esse quinque antra elementorum, aliud tenebris, aliud aquis, aliud ventis, aliud igni, aliud fumo plenum, malum esse animalia in illis singulis nata elementis, serpentina in tenebris, natantia in aquis, volatilia in ventis, quadrupedia in igne, bipedia in fumo. Haec enim sicut a vobis describuntur, nullo modo esse poterunt; quoniam quidquid tale est in quantum est a summo Deo sit necesse est, quoniam in quantum est, utique bonum est. Si enim dolor et imbecillitas malum est, erant ibi animalia in tanta corporis firmitate, ut eorum abortivos fetus, postquam de his secundum vestram sectam fabricatus est mundus, de caelo in terram cecidisse et mori non potuisse dicatis. Si caecitas malum est, videbant, si surditas, audiebant. Si obmutescere aut mutum esse malum est, usque adeo signatae atque distinctae ibi voces erant, ut adversum Deum bellum gerere, sicut asseritis, eis in concione uno persuadente placuerit. Si sterilitas malum est, erat ibi filios procreandi magna fecunditas. Si exilium malum est, in sua terra erant suasque regiones incolebant. Si servitus malum est, erant ibi etiam qui regnabant. Si mors malum est, vivebant et ita vivebant, ut mentem ipsam prorsus nec post victoriam Dei ullo modo umquam mori posse praedicetis.

9. 15. Cur quaeso in summo malo invenio tanta bona his malis quae commemoravi contraria? Aut si haec non sunt mala, ullane tandem substantia in quantum substantia est, malum erit? Si malum imbecillitas non est, malumne erit corpus infirmum? Si malum caecitas non est, malumne erunt tenebrae? Si malum surditas non est, malumne erit surdus? Si malum non est mutum esse, malumne erit piscis? Si sterilitas malum non est, quomodo malum est animal sterile? Si exilium malum non est, quomodo malum est animal exulans, vel animal in exilium aliquem mittens? Si servitus malum non est, quomodo malum est animal serviens vel servire quempiam cogens? Si mors malum non est, quomodo malum est animal mortale vel inferens mortem? Si vero haec mala sunt, quomodo non erunt bona firmitas corporis, visus, auditus, locutio persuadens, fecunditas, solum genitale, libertas, vita, quae omnia in illo mali regno fuisse perhibetis et summum malum audetis asserere?

9. 16. Postremo si - quod omnino nemo umquam negavit - inconvenientia malum est, quid convenientius quam illa suis quibusque animalibus elementa, tenebrae serpentibus, aquae natantibus, venti volantibus, ignis edacioribus, fumus elatioribus? Tanta enim a vobis in discordiae gente concordia et

weakness is an evil, there were animals there with such great bodily strength that you say that, after the world was fashioned from them, according to your sect, their aborted fetuses fell from heaven to earth and were unable to die. If blindness is an evil, they saw; if deafness, they heard. If to become mute or to be mute is an evil, their voices were so clear and distinct there that they decided to wage war against God, as you claim, when they were persuaded by one of them in an assembly. If sterility is an evil, there was present there a great fecundity for procreating children. If exile is an evil, they were in their own land and were inhabiting their own regions. If slavery is an evil, there were those who reigned there. If death is an evil, they were living, and they were living in such a way that you might proclaim that their mind could in fact never die, not even after God's victory.

15. Why, I ask you, do I find in the greatest evil such great goods contrary to the evils that I mentioned? Or, if these are not evils, will any substance insofar as it is a substance ultimately be an evil? If weakness is not an evil, will a weak body be an evil? If blindness is not an evil, will darkness be an evil? If deafness is not an evil, will a deaf person be an evil? If to be mute is not an evil, will a fish be an evil? If sterility is not an evil, how is a sterile human being an evil? If exile is not an evil, how is a human being in exile or someone sending a human being into exile an evil? If slavery is not an evil, how is a human being in slavery or forcing someone to be a slave an evil? If death is not an evil, how is a mortal human being or one inflicting death an evil? But if these are evils, how will bodily strength, sight, hearing, persuasive speech, fecundity, one's native soil, freedom, and life be evils — all of which you say existed in that kingdom of evil and which you dare to claim are the greatest evil?

16. Finally, if unsuitability is an evil, which is something that no one has ever denied, what is more suitable than each of those elements for its animals — darkness for crawling ones, water for swimming ones, the winds for flying ones, fire for more hungry ones, smoke for prouder ones? For you describe such great concord in the nation of discord and such great order in the seat of disorder. If that which does harm is evil, I omit the most powerful argument that was stated above, that no harm could be done where no good was present, but, if this argument is not clear, certainly that previous one stands out and is seen by all because, as I said, all agree that what does harm is evil. Smoke did not harm two-footed animals in that nation; it begat, nourished, and sustained them without harm as they were born, grew up, and ruled. But now, after the good was mixed in with the evil, smoke has been made more harmful; we who are two-legged cannot endure it, to be sure; it blinds, suffocates, and kills us. Has such a great savagery been added to the evil elements by their mixture with good? Is there such a great perversity under the kingship of God?

tantus in perversitatis sede ordo describitur. Si quod nocet malum est, omitto illud valentissimum quod supra dictum est, noceri non potuisse, ubi nullum erat bonum; sed si hoc obscurum est, illud certe omnibus eminet et apparet, quia sicut dixi et ut omnes consentiunt, quod nocet est malum; fumus in illa gente bipedibus animalibus non nocebat, genuit ea et aluit atque sustinuit sine labe nascentia, crescentia, regnantia. Nunc vero postquam mixtum est bonum malo, nocentior fumus effectus est, sustineri a nobis qui certe bipedes sumus, non potest, excaecat, opprimit, necat. Tantane malis elementis commixtione boni accessit immanitas? Tanta Deo regnante perversitas?

9. 17. *Certe cur in ceteris videmus istam congruentiam, quae auctorem vestrum decepit atque illexit ad componenda mendacia? Cur, inquam, tenebrae serpentibus, aquae natantibus, venti volantibus congruunt, quadrupedem vero ignis incendit, et nos fumus suffocat? Quid quod etiam serpentes acutissime vident et praesentia solis exsultant ibique sunt abundantiores, ubi aer serenior difficilius et rarius nubem contrahit? Quid absurdius, quam ibi esse accommodatius et aptius incolas amatoresque tenebrarum, ubi lucis perspicuitate gaudetur? Quod si eos dicitis delectari potius calore quam lumine, multo congruentius in igne serpentes alacres natos quam tardum asinum diceretis; et tamen luci huic amicum quis aspidem neget, cum eius oculi aquilae oculis comparentur? Sed de bestiis videro. Nos ipsos consideremus, obsecro, sine pertinacia et tandem fabulis vanis et perniciosis animum exuamus. Quis enim tantam perversitatem ferat, qua dicitur in tenebrarum gente, cui nihil admixtum erat luminis, animalia bipedia tam firmam, tam vegetam, tam denique incredibilem vim habuisse in oculorum acie, ut et in tenebris suis viderent et purissimam, quae a vobis commendatur, regnorum Dei lucem - siquidem illam etiam talibus fuisse visibilem vultis- et aspicerent et considerarent et delectarentur et appetere, nostros autem oculos commixtione lucis, commixtione summi boni, commixtione denique Dei tam infirmos et imbecillos esse redditos, ut neque quidquam videamus in tenebris et solis aspectum nullo modo ferre possimus atque inde conversi etiam quae a nobis videbantur quaeramus?*

9. 18. *Haec dici possunt, etiam si corruptio malum est, quod aequae nemo ambigit, non enim tunc fumus corrumperebat genus animalium, quod modo corrumpit. Et ne pergam per singula, quod longum est et non necessarium, usque adeo minus erant corruptioni*

17. Why, at least do we see in the other things this suitability, which deceived your founder and led him to compose lies? Why, I ask, is darkness suited for serpents, water for fish, and wind for birds, whereas fire burns quadrupeds and smoke suffocates us? Why is it also that serpents see with great acuteness and exult in the presence of the sun and are found in greater abundance where the clearer air gathers clouds with greater difficulty and less often? What is more absurd than that animals which dwell in and love darkness are situated more suitably and fittingly where they can rejoice in the brightness of the light? But if you say that they rejoice more over the warmth than over the light, you should say that swift serpents are more suitably born in fire than the slow donkey, and yet who would deny that the asp is fond of this daylight since its eyes are compared to the eyes of an eagle? But I shall discuss the other animals later. Please let us consider ourselves without stubbornness and strip our minds of vain and destructive myths. For who would endure the great perversity by which it is said that in the nation of darkness, with which no light was mixed, two-legged living beings have such a strong, such a vital and, finally, such an incredible power in the gaze of their eyes, that even in their darkness they saw the purest light of the kingdom of God, which you praise — for you want it to be visible even to such beings — and that they gaze upon it, contemplate it, delight in it, and desire it? But our eyes have been rendered so weak and so feeble by a mixture with the light, by a mixture with the highest good, and finally by a mixture with God, that we see nothing at all in the dark and can in no way endure looking at the sun but turn away from it and seek even what we saw?

18. The same things can also be said if corruption is an evil, something about which no one is honestly in doubt. For then smoke did not corrupt the kind of animals that it now corrupts. And, to avoid going through the individual kinds, which would be long and unnecessary, the animals that you imagine were present there were so much less subject to corruption that their aborted fetuses, which were not yet ready to be born, could, after having been cast down from heaven to earth, live, generate, and again form a conspiracy. Of course they had their pristine strength, because they had been conceived before the mingling of good and evil. For you say that the animals that were born from them after this mingling are those that we now see are very weak and readily yielding to corruption. Who could tolerate this error any longer except someone who either does not see these points or has become hardened in opposition to all the weight of reason out of some incredible force of habit and association with you?

obnoxia, quae ibi animantia fuisse confingitis, ut abortivi eorum fetus nondum ad nascendum idonei de caelo in terram praecipitati et vivere et gignere, et rursus coniurare potuerint, habentes utique pristinam firmitatem, quia iam erant concepti ante commixtionem boni et mali; nam post istam concretionem quae de his nata sunt, ea dicitis esse animalia, quae nunc infirmissima et facile corruptioni cedentia videmus. Quis hunc diutius tolerare possit errorem, nisi qui aut ista non videt, aut nescio qua incredibili consuetudine ac familiaritate vobiscum contra omnes moles rationis obduruit?

De Vera Religione (390/391)

Omnis vita a Deo. Mors animae, nequitia.

11. 21. Nulla vita est quae non sit ex Deo quia Deus utique summa vita est et ipse fons vitae, nec aliqua vita in quantum vita est, malum est, sed in quantum vergit ad mortem: mors autem vitae non est, nisi nequitia, quae ab eo quod ne quidquam sit, dicta est; et ideo nequissimi homines, nihili homines appellantur. Vita ergo voluntario defectu deficiens ab illo qui eam fecit, et cuius essentia fruebatur, et volens contra Dei legem frui corporibus, quibus eam Deus praefecit, vergit ad nihilum; et haec est nequitia: non quia corpus iam nihilum est. Nam et ipsum habet aliquam concordiam partium suarum, sine qua omnino esse non posset. Ergo ab eo factum est et corpus, qui omnis concordiae caput est. Habet corpus quamdam pacem suae formae, sine qua prorsus nihil esset. Ergo ille est et corporis conditor, a quo pax omnis est, et qui forma est infabricata, atque omnium formosissima. Habet aliquam speciem, sine qua corpus non est corpus. Si ergo quaeritur quis instituerit corpus, ille quaeratur qui est omnium speciosissimus. Omnis enim species ab illo est. Quis est autem hic, nisi unus Deus, una veritas, una salus omnium, et prima atque summa essentia, ex qua est omne quidquid est, in quantum est; quia in quantum est quidquid est, bonum est.

11. 22. Et ideo ex Deo non est mors. Non enim Deus mortem fecit, nec laetatur in perditione vivorum 20: quoniam summa essentia esse facit omne quod est, unde et essentia dicitur. Mors autem non esse cogit quidquid moritur. Nam si ea quae moriuntur, penitus morerentur, ad nihilum sine dubio pervenirent; sed tantum moriuntur, quantum minus essentiae participant: quod brevius ita dici potest: tanto magis moriuntur, quanto minus sunt. Corpus autem minus est quam vita quaelibet; quoniam quantumcumque manet in specie, per vitam manet, sive qua

On Christian Belief

Life, Death, Nothingness and Wickedness

11.21. There is no life which is not from God, because God of course is supremely life and is himself the fountain of life (Ps 36:9); nor is any life, precisely as life, something evil, but only insofar as it tilts towards death. Now, the death of life is nothing but wickedness, which is so called from a word meaning worthless, and that's why the most wicked people are called worthless fellows or nihilists.⁴² So then, life, by a willful defection from the one who made it and whose very being it was enjoying, wishes against the law of God to enjoy bodies, which God put it in charge of, and so tilts towards nothingness. And that is wickedness, but not because the body is already nothing, since it too has a certain harmony of its parts without which it could not be at all. So the body too, then, was made by him who is the source of all harmony. The body gets a kind of peace from its shape, without which it would certainly be nothing. He therefore is the fashioner of the body also, from whom all peace is derived and who is shape unforged, and of all shapes the most shapely. The body has a certain look about it, without which a body isn't a body. If therefore you are inquiring about who instituted body, you should make your inquiries about the most good-looking of them all.⁴³ The good looks of all things, I mean, come from him. Now, who can this be but the one God, the one Truth, the one salvation of all things and the first and supreme Being, from which is everything whatever that exists, insofar as it exists, because insofar as it exists, whatever exists is good?

22. And that is why death is not from God, because God did not make death, nor does he delight in the destruction of the living (Wis 1:13), since the supreme Being makes everything to be that is, which is why he is also called Being. Death on the other hand forces whatever dies not to be, insofar as it dies. You see, if things that die were to die totally, they would without a doubt be reduced to nothing, but they only die to the extent that they participate less in being, which can be put

unumquodque animal, sive qua universa mundi natura administratur. Corpus ergo magis subiacet morti, et ideo vicinius est nihilo: quapropter vita, quae fructu corporis delectata negligit Deum, inclinatur ad nihilum, et ista est nequitia.

more briefly like this: They die the more the less they are. Now, body is less than any kind of life, because, when it keeps its specific appearance even to the slightest extent, it does so through life, whether that by which every animal or that by which the whole nature of the world is governed.⁴⁴ Body therefore is more prone to death and thus nearer to nothing. Accordingly, the life which by taking delight in the enjoyment of body is neglectful of God thereby makes a bow towards nothingness, and that is wickedness.

Confessionum (397-401)

Quamdiu sunt, res bonae sunt.

VII.12. 18. Et manifestatum est mihi, quoniam bona sunt, quae corrumpuntur, quae neque si summa bona essent, neque nisi bona essent, corrumpi possent, quia, si summa bona essent, incorruptibilia essent, si autem nulla bona essent, quid in eis corrumperetur, non esset. Nocet enim corruptio et, nisi bonum minueret, non noceret. Aut igitur nihil nocet corruptio, quod fieri non potest, aut, quod certissimum est, omnia, quae corrumpuntur, privantur bono. Si autem omni bono privabuntur, omnino non erunt. Si enim erunt et corrumpi iam non poterunt, meliora erunt, quia incorruptibiliter permanebunt. Et quid monstrosius quam ea dicere omni bono amisso facta meliora? Ergo si omni bono privabuntur, omnino nulla erunt; ergo quamdiu sunt, bona sunt. Ergo quaecumque sunt, bona sunt, malumque illud, quod quaerebam unde esset, non est substantia, quia, si substantia esset, bonum esset. Aut enim esset incorruptibilis substantia, magnum utique bonum, aut substantia corruptibilis esset, quae nisi bona esset, corrumpi non posset. Itaque vidi et manifestatum est mihi, quia omnia bona tu fecisti et prorsus nullae substantiae sunt, quas tu non fecisti. Et quoniam non aequalia omnia fecisti, ideo sunt omnia, quia singula bona sunt et simul omnia valde bona, quoniam fecit Deus noster omnia bona valde 69.

Nec in Deo nec in universa creatura eius est malum.

13. 19. Et tibi omnino non est malum, non solum tibi sed nec universae creaturae tuae, quia extra te non est aliquid, quod irrumpat et corrumpat ordinem, quem imposuisti ei. In partibus autem eius quaedam quibusdam quia non conveniunt, mala putantur; et eadem ipsa conveniunt aliis et bona sunt et in semet ipsis bona sunt. Et omnia haec, quae sibimet invicem non conveniunt, conveniunt inferiori parti rerum, quam terram dicimus, habentem caelum suum nubilosum atque ventosum congruum sibi. Et absit,

The Confessions

New light on the problem of evil

VII.12, 18. It was further made clear to me that things prone to destruction are good,^{†79} since this destructibility would be out of the question if they were either supremely good or not good at all; because if they were supremely good they would be indestructible, whereas if they were not good at all there would be nothing in them that could be destroyed. Destruction is obviously harmful, yet it can do harm only by diminishing the good. It follows, then, that either destruction harms nothing, which is impossible, or that all things which suffer harm are being deprived of some good; this conclusion is beyond cavil. If, however, they lose all their good, they will not exist at all, for if they were to continue in existence without being any longer subject to destruction, they would be better, because permanently indestructible; and what could be more outrageous than to declare them better for having lost everything that was good in them? Hence if they are deprived of all good, they will be simply non-existent; and so it follows that as long as they do exist, they are good. Everything that exists is good, then; and so evil, the source of which I was seeking, cannot be a substance, because if it were, it would be good. Either it would be an indestructible substance, and that would mean it was very good indeed, or it would be a substance liable to destruction—but then it would not be destructible unless it were good. I saw, then, for it was made clear to me, that you have made all good things, and that there are absolutely no substances that you have not made. I saw too that you have not made all things equal. They all exist because they are severally good but collectively very good, for our God has made all things exceedingly good.^{†80}

13, 19. For you evil has no being at all, and this is true not of yourself only but of everything you have created, since apart from you there is nothing that could burst in and disrupt the order you have imposed on it. In some parts of it certain things are regarded as evil because they do not suit certain others; but these same things do fit in elsewhere, and they are good there, and good in themselves. All these things that are at odds with each other belong to the lower part of creation that we call earth, which has its own cloudy, windy sky, as

iam ut dicerem: "Non essent ista", quia etsi sola ista cernerem, desiderarem quidem meliora, sed iam etiam de solis istis laudare te deberem, quoniam laudandum te ostendunt de terra dracones et omnes abyssi, ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus tempestatis, quae faciunt verbum tuum, montes et omnes colles, ligna fructifera et omnes cedri, bestiae et omnia pecora, reptilia et volatilia pinnata; reges terrae et omnes populi, principes et omnes iudices terrae, iuvenes et virgines, seniores cum iunioribus laudant nomen tuum 70. Cum vero etiam de caelis te laudent, laudent te, Deus noster, in excelsis omnes angeli tui, omnes Virtutes tuae, sol et luna, omnes stellae et lumen, caeli caelorum et aquae, quae super caelos sunt, laudent nomen 71 tuum; non iam desiderabam meliora, quia omnia cogitabam, et meliora quidem superiora quam inferiora, sed meliora omnia quam sola superiora iudicio saniore pendebam.

Insana Manichaeorum opinio de duabus substantiis.

14. 20. Non est sanitas 72 eis, quibus displicet aliquid creaturae tuae, sicut mihi non erat, cum displicerent multa, quae fecisti. Et quia non audebat anima mea, ut ei displiceret Deus meus, nolebat esse tuum quidquid ei displicebat. Et inde ierat in opinionem duarum substantiarum et non requiescebat et aliena loquebatur. Et inde rediens fecerat sibi Deum per infinita spatia locorum omnium et eum putaverat esse te et eum collocaverat in corde suo et facta erat rursus templum idoli sui 73 abominandum tibi. Sed posteaquam fovisti caput nescientis et clausisti oculos meos, ne viderent vanitatem 74, cessavi de me paululum, et consopita est insania mea; et evigilavi in te et vidi te infinitum aliter, et visus iste non a carne trahebatur.

Omnia vera sunt in quantum sunt.

15. 21. Et respexi alia et vidi tibi debere quia sunt et in te cuncta finita, sed aliter, non quasi in loco, sed quia tu es omnitenens manu veritate, et omnia vera sunt, in quantum sunt, nec quidquam est falsitas, nisi cum putatur esse quod non est. Et vidi, quia non solum locis sua quaeque suis conveniunt sed etiam temporibus et quia tu, qui solus aeternus es, non post innumerabilia spatia temporum coepisti operari, quia omnia spatia temporum, et quae praeterierunt et quae praeteribunt, nec abirent nec venirent nisi te operante et manente.

Iniquitas est perversitas detortae voluntatis.

befits it. Far be it from me ever to say, "These things ought not to be"; because even if I could see these things alone, and longed, certainly, for something better, it would already be incumbent on me to praise you for them alone; for on earth the dragons and all the depths proclaim you worthy of praise, as do the fire, hail, snow, ice and stormy winds that obey your word, the mountains and hills, fruit-bearing trees and all cedars, wild beasts and tame, creeping creatures and birds on the wing. Earth's kings and all its peoples, rulers and the world's judges, young men and maidens, old men and youths, all praise your name.†81 But since in heaven too your creatures praise you, our God, let all your angels tell your praises on high, let all your powers extol you, sun and moon, all stars and the light, the empyrean and the waters above the heavens: let them too praise your name.†82 No longer was I hankering for any elements to be better than they were, because I was now keeping the totality in view; and though I certainly esteemed the higher creatures above the lower, a more wholesome judgment showed me that the totality was better than the higher things on their own would have been.

14, 20. There is no wholesomeness†83 for those who find fault with anything you have created, as there was none for me when many of the things you have made displeased me. Since my soul did not dare to find my God displeasing, it was unwilling to admit that anything that displeased it was truly yours. This was why it had strayed away into believing in a duality of substances, but there it found no rest, and only mouthed the opinions of others. Turning back again it had made for itself a god extended through infinite space, all-pervasive, and had thought this god was you, and had set him up in its heart;†84 so it became yet again a temple for its own idol and an abomination in your sight. But when you cradled my stupid head and closed my eyes to the sight of vain things†85 so that I could absent me from myself awhile, and my unwholesome madness was lulled to sleep, then I awoke in you and saw you to be infinite, but in a different sense; and that vision in no way derived from the flesh.

15, 21. I turned my gaze to other things and saw that they owe their being to you and that all of them are by you defined, but in a particular sense: not as though contained in a place, but because you hold all things in your Truth as though in your hand; and all of them are true insofar as they exist, and nothing whatever is a deceit unless it is thought to be what it is not. I saw, further, that all things are set not only in their appropriate places but also in their proper times, and that you, who alone are eternal, did not set to work after incalculable stretches of time, because no stretches of time, neither those which have passed away nor those still to come, would pass or come except because you are at work and you abide eternally.

16. 22. *Et sensi expertus non esse mirum, quod palato non sano poena est et panis, qui sano suavis est, et oculis aegris odiosa lux, quae puris amabilis. Et iustitia tua displicet iniquis, nedum vipera et vermiculus, quae bona creasti, apta inferioribus creaturae tuae partibus, quibus et ipsi iniqui apti sunt, quanto dissimiliores sunt tibi, apti autem superioribus, quanto similiores fiunt tibi. Et quaesivi, quid esset iniquitas, et non inveni substantiam, sed a summa substantia, te Deo, detortae in infima voluntatis perversitatem proicientis intima sua 75 et tumescentis foras.*

Enchiridion ad Laurentium de Fide, Spe et Caritate (421-422)

Qualia bona sunt, quae a summa Trinitate creata sunt.

3. 10. *Ab hac summe et aequaliter et immutabiliter bona Trinitate creata sunt omnia, nec summe nec aequaliter nec immutabiliter bona, sed tamen bona etiam singula: simul vero universa valde bona 15, quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulchritudo.*

Qualiter Deus malum ordinet, vel quae sit definitio mali.

3. 11. *In qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona, ut magis placeant et laudabiliora sint dum comparantur malis. Neque enim Deus omnipotens quod etiam infideles fatentur: Rerum cui summa potestas 16 cum summe bonus sit, ullo modo sineret mali esse aliquid in operibus suis nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus ut bene faceret et de malo. Quid est autem aliud quod malum dicitur, nisi privatio boni? Nam sicut corporibus animalium nihil est aliud morbis et vulneribus affici quam sanitate privari (neque enim id agitur cum adhibetur curatio, ut mala ista quae inerant, id est morbi ac vulnera, recedant hinc et alibi sint, sed utique ut non sint; non enim ulla substantia, sed carnalis substantiae vitium est vulnus aut morbus, cum caro sit ipsa substantia, profecto aliquod bonum cui accidunt ista mala, id est privationes eius boni quod dicitur sanitas); ita et animorum quaecumque sunt vitia, naturalium sunt privationes bonorum: quae cum sanantur non aliquo transferuntur, sed ea quae ibi erant, nusquam erunt, quando in illa sanitate non erunt.*

16, 22. Drawing on my own experience I found it unsurprising that bread, which is pleasant to a healthy palate, is repugnant to a sick one, and that diseased eyes hate the light which to the unclouded is delightful. Villains find even your justice disagreeable, and snakes and maggots far more so, yet you have created these things good, and fit for the lower spheres of your world. Indeed, the villains themselves are fit only for these lower regions in the measure that they are unlike you, but for the higher when they come to resemble you more closely. I inquired then what villainy might be, but I found no substance, only the perversity of a will twisted away from you, God, the supreme substance, toward the depths—a will that throws away its life within†86 and swells with vanity abroad.

The Handbook on Faith, Hope and Love

10. The Supremely Good Creator Made All Things Good.

By the Trinity, thus supremely and equally and unchangeably good, all things were created; and these are not supremely and equally and unchangeably good, but yet they are good, even taken separately. Taken as a whole, however, they are very good, because their ensemble constitutes the universe in all its wonderful order and beauty.

11. What is Called Evil in the Universe is But the Absence of Good.

And in the universe, even that which is called evil, when it is regulated and put in its own place, only enhances our admiration of the good; for we enjoy and value the good more when we compare it with the evil. For the Almighty God, who, as even the heathen acknowledge, has supreme power over all things, being Himself supremely good, would never permit the existence of anything evil among His works, if He were not so omnipotent and good that He can bring good even out of evil. For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present — namely, the diseases and wounds — go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance, — the flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils — that is, privations of the good which we call health — are accidents. Just in the same way, what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. And when they are cured, they are not transferred elsewhere: when they cease to exist in the healthy soul, they cannot exist anywhere else.

Bonas esse omnes naturas a summo bono factas, quibus qua ex causa et qualiter corruptio noceat intimatur.

4. 12. *Naturae igitur omnes, quoniam naturarum prorsus omnium Conditor summe bonus est, bonae sunt. Sed quia non sicut earum Conditor summe atque incommutabiliter bonae sunt, ideo in eis et minui bonum et augeri potest. Sed bono minui malum est, quamvis quantumcumque minuatur remaneat aliquid necesse est (si adhuc natura est), unde natura sit. Neque enim, si qualiscumque et quantulacumque natura est, consumi bonum quo natura est, nisi et ipsa consumatur potest. Merito quippe natura incorrupta laudatur: porro si et incorruptibilis sit, quae corrumpi omnino non possit, multo est procul dubio laudabilior. Cum vero corrumpitur, ideo malum est eius corruptio quia eam qualicumque privat bono. Nam si nullo bono privat non nocet; nocet autem: adimit igitur bonum. Quamdiu itaque natura corrumpitur inest ei bonum quo privetur, ac per hoc si naturae aliquid remanebit quod iam corrumpi nequeat, profecto natura incorruptibilis erit, et ad hoc tam magnum bonum corruptione perveniet. At si corrumpi non desinet, nec bonum habere utique desinet quo eam possit privare corruptio. Quam si penitus totamque consumpserit, ideo nullum bonum inerit quia natura nulla erit. Quocirca bonum consumere corruptio non potest nisi consumendo naturam. Omnis ergo natura bonum est, magnum si corrumpi non potest, parvum si potest; negari tamen bonum esse, nisi stulte atque imperite, prorsus non potest. Quae si corruptione consumitur, nec ipsa corruptio remanebit, nulla ubi esse possit subsistente natura.*

Quod nullum possit esse malum si nullum sit bonum, et quod haec assertio sententiae propheticae non sit contraria.

4. 13. *Ac per hoc nullum est quod dicitur malum si nullum sit bonum. Sed bonum omni malo carens, integrum bonum est; cui verum inest malum, vitiatum vel vitiosum bonum est. Nec malum unquam potest esse ullum ubi bonum est nullum. Unde res mira conficitur, ut quia omnis natura in quantum natura est, bonum est, nihil aliud dici videatur cum vitiosa natura mala esse natura dicitur, nisi malum esse quod bonum est: nec malum esse nisi quod bonum est; quoniam omnis natura bonum est, nec res aliqua mala esset si res ipsa quae mala est natura non esset. Non igitur potest esse malum nisi aliquod bonum. Quod cum dici videatur absurde, connexio tamen ratiocinationis huius velut inevitabiliter nos compellit hoc dicere: et*

12. All Beings Were Made Good, But Not Being Made Perfectly Good, are Liable to Corruption.

All things that exist, therefore, seeing that the Creator of them all is supremely good, are themselves good. But because they are not, like their Creator, supremely and unchangeably good, their good may be diminished and increased. But for good to be diminished is an evil, although, however much it may be diminished, it is necessary, if the being is to continue, that some good should remain to constitute the being. For however small or of whatever kind the being may be, the good which makes it a being cannot be destroyed without destroying the being itself. An uncorrupted nature is justly held in esteem. But if, still further, it be incorruptible, it is undoubtedly considered of still higher value. When it is corrupted, however, its corruption is an evil, because it is deprived of some sort of good. For if it be deprived of no good, it receives no injury; but it does receive injury, therefore it is deprived of good. Therefore, so long as a being is in process of corruption, there is in it some good of which it is being deprived; and if a part of the being should remain which cannot be corrupted, this will certainly be an incorruptible being, and accordingly the process of corruption will result in the manifestation of this great good. But if it do not cease to be corrupted, neither can it cease to possess good of which corruption may deprive it. But if it should be thoroughly and completely consumed by corruption, there will then be no good left, because there will be no being. Wherefore corruption can consume the good only by consuming the being. Every being, therefore, is a good; a great good, if it can not be corrupted; a little good, if it can: but in any case, only the foolish or ignorant will deny that it is a good. And if it be wholly consumed by corruption, then the corruption itself must cease to exist, as there is no being left in which it can dwell.

13. There Can Be No Evil Where There is No Good; And an Evil Man is an Evil Good.

Accordingly, there is nothing of what we call evil, if there be nothing good. But a good which is wholly without evil is a perfect good. A good, on the other hand, which contains evil is a faulty or imperfect good; and there can be no evil where there is no good. From all this we arrive at the curious result: that since every being, so far as it is a being, is good, when we say that a faulty being is an evil being, we just seem to say that what is good is evil, and that nothing but what is good can be evil, seeing that every being is good, and that no evil can exist except in a being. Nothing, then, can be evil except something which is good. And although this, when stated, seems to be a contradiction, yet the strictness of reasoning leaves us no escape from the conclusion. We must, however, beware of incurring the prophetic condemnation: "Woe unto

cavendum est ne incidamus in illam sententiam propheticam ubi legitur: Vae iis qui dicunt quod bonum est malum, et quod malum est bonum; qui dicunt tenebras lucem, et lucem tenebras; qui dicunt dulce amarum, et amarum dulce 17. Et tamen Dominus ait: Malus homo de malo thesauro cordis sui profert mala 18. Quid est autem malus homo nisi mala natura, quia homo natura est? Porro si homo aliquod bonum est quia natura est, quid est malus homo nisi malum bonum? Tamen cum duo ista discernimus, invenimus nec ideo malum quia homo est, nec ideo bonum quia iniquus est, sed bonum quia homo, malum quia iniquus. Quisquis ergo dicit: " Malum est hominem esse ", aut: " Bonum est iniquum esse ", ipse incidit in propheticam illam sententiam: Vae his qui dicunt quod bonum est malum et quod malum est bonum; opus enim Dei culpatur quod est homo, et vitium hominis laudatur, quod est iniquitas. Omnis itaque natura, etiam si vitiosa est, in quantum natura est, bona est, in quantum vitiosa est, mala est.

Quod in bonis ac malis sibimet et contrariis dialecticorum regula deficiat, et quod sit corruptio, et quod ex bonis mala orta sint.

4. 14. *Quapropter in his contrariis quae mala et bona vocantur illa dialecticorum regula deficit qua dicuntur nulli rei duo simul inesse contraria. Nullus enim aer simul est et tenebrosus et lucidus: nullus cibus aut potus simul dulcis est et amarus: nullum corpus simul ubi album ibi et nigrum; nullum simul ubi deforme, ibi et formosum. Et hoc in multis ac paene omnibus contrariis reperitur, ut in una re simul esse non possint. Cum autem bona et mala nullus ambigat esse contraria, non solum simul esse possunt, sed mala omnino sine bonis et nisi in bonis esse non possunt, quamvis bona sine malis possint. Potest enim homo vel angelus non esse iniustus, iniustus autem non potest esse nisi homo vel angelus: et bonum quod homo, bonum quod angelus, malum quod iniustus. Et haec duo contraria ita simul sunt ut, si bonum non esset in quo esset, prorsus nec malum esse potuisset: quia non modo ubi consisteret, sed unde oreretur corruptio non haberet, nisi esset quod corrumpetur; quod nisi bonum esset, nec corrumpetur; quoniam nihil est aliud corruptio, quam boni exterminatio. Ex bonis igitur mala orta sunt, et nisi in aliquibus bonis non sunt. Nec erat alias unde oreretur ulla mali natura. Nam si esset, in quantum natura esset profecto bona esset; et aut incorruptibilis natura magnum esset bonum, aut etiam natura corruptibilis nullo modo esset nisi aliquod bonum, quod bonum corrumpendo posset ei nocere corruptio.*

them that call evil good, and good evil: that put darkness for light, and light for darkness: that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter." And yet our Lord says: "An evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart brings forth that which is evil." Now, what is evil man but an evil being? For a man is a being. Now, if a man is a good thing because he is a being, what is an evil man but an evil good? Yet, when we accurately distinguish these two things, we find that it is not because he is a man that he is an evil, or because he is wicked that he is a good; but that he is a good because he is a man, and an evil because he is wicked. Whoever, then, says, "To be a man is an evil," or, "To be wicked is a good," falls under the prophetic denunciation: "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil!" For he condemns the work of God, which is the man, and praises the defect of man, which is the wickedness. Therefore every being, even if it be a defective one, in so far as it is a being is good, and in so far as it is defective is evil.

14. Good and Evil are an Exception to the Rule that Contrary Attributes Cannot Be Predicated of the Same Subject. Evil Springs Up in What is Good, and Cannot Exist Except in What is Good.

Accordingly, in the case of these contraries which we call good and evil, the rule of theologians, that two contraries cannot be predicated at the same time of the same thing, does not hold. No weather is at the same time dark and bright: no food or drink is at the same time sweet and bitter: no body is at the same time and in the same place black and white: none is at the same time and in the same place deformed and beautiful. And this rule is found to hold in regard to many, indeed nearly all, contraries, that they cannot exist at the same time in any one thing. But although no one can doubt that good and evil are contraries, not only can they exist at the same time, but evil cannot exist without good, or in anything that is not good. Good, however, can exist without evil. For a man or an angel can exist without being wicked; but nothing can be wicked except a man or an angel: and so far as he is a man or an angel, he is good; so far as he is wicked, he is an evil. And these two contraries are so far co-existent, that if good did not exist in what is evil, neither could evil exist; because corruption could not have either a place to dwell in, or a source to spring from, if there were nothing that could be corrupted; and nothing can be corrupted except what is good, for corruption is nothing else but the destruction of good. From what is good, then, evils arose, and except in what is good they do not exist; nor was there any other source from which any evil nature could arise. For if there were, then, in so far as this was a being, it was certainly a good: and a being which was incorruptible would be a great good; and even one which was corruptible must be to some extent a good, for only by corrupting what was good in it could corruption do it harm.

Quomodo non sit contrarium dominicae sententiae qua dicit non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere cum dicuntur mala ex bonis esse orta.

4. 15. *Sed cum mala ex bonis orta esse dicimus, non putetur hoc dominicae sententiae refragari qua dixit: Non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere 19. Non potest enim, sicut Veritas ait, colligi uva de spinis 20, quia non potest nasci uva de spinis; sed ex bona terra et vites nasci posse videmus et spinas. Et eo modo, tamquam arbor mala, fructus bonos, id est opera bona, non potest facere voluntas mala, sed ex bona hominis natura oriri voluntas et bona potest et mala. Nec fuit prorsus unde primitus oriretur voluntas mala, nisi ex angeli et hominis natura bona. Quod et ipse Dominus eodem loco ubi de arbore et fructibus loquebatur apertissime ostendit. Ait enim: Aut facite arborem bonam et fructum eius bonum, aut facite arborem malam et fructum eius malum 21: satis admonens ex arbore quidem bona malos, aut ex mala bonos nasci fructus non posse, ex ipsa tamen terra cui loquebatur, utramque arborem posse.*

Non pertinere ad beatitudinem consequendam scire causas in mundo corporalium motionum.

5. 16. *Quae cum ita sint, quando nobis Maronis ille versus placet:*

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas 22, non nobis videatur ad felicitatem consequendam pertinere si sciamus causas magnarum in mundo corporalium motionum, quae abditissimis naturae sinibus occuluntur:

Unde tremor terris, qua vi maria alta tumescant, obicibus ruptis, rursusque in se ipsa residant 23, et cetera huiusmodi. Sed bonarum et malarum rerum causas nosse debemus, et id hactenus quatenus eas homini, in hac vita erroribus aerumnisque plenissima 24, ad eosdem errores et aerumnas evadendas nosse conceditur. Ad illam quippe felicitatem tendendum est ubi nulla quatiatur aerumna, nullo errore fallamur. Nam si causae corporalium motionum noscendae nobis essent, nullas magis nosse quam nostrae valetudinis deberemus; cum vero eis ignoratis medicos quaerimus, quis non videat quod de secretis caeli et terrae nos latet quanta sit patientia nesciendum?

...

Quae sint causae bonarum rerum et quae malarum.

15. The Preceding Argument is in No Wise Inconsistent with the Saying of Our Lord: "A Good Tree Cannot Bring Forth Evil Fruit."

But when we say that evil springs out of good, let it not be thought that this contradicts our Lord's saying: "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit." For, as He who is the Truth says, you cannot gather grapes of thorns, because grapes do not grow on thorns. But we see that on good soil both vines and thorns may be grown. And in the same way, just as an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit, so an evil will cannot produce good works. But from the nature of man, which is good, may spring either a good or an evil will. And certainly there was at first no source from which an evil will could spring, except the nature of angel or of man, which was good. And our Lord Himself clearly shows this in the very same place where He speaks about the tree and its fruit. For He says: "Either make the tree good, and his fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt," — clearly enough warning us that evil fruits do not grow on a good tree, nor good fruits on an evil tree; but that nevertheless the ground itself, by which He meant those whom He was then addressing, might grow either kind of trees.

16. It is Not Essential to Man's Happiness that He Should Know the Causes of Physical Convulsions; But It Is, that He Should Know the Causes of Good and Evil.

Now, in view of these considerations, when we are pleased with that line of Maro, "Happy the man who has attained to the knowledge of the causes of things," we should not suppose that it is necessary to happiness to know the causes of the great physical convulsions, causes which lie hidden in the most secret recesses of nature's kingdom, "whence comes the earthquake whose force makes the deep seas to swell and burst their barriers, and again to return upon themselves and settle down." But we ought to know the causes of good and evil as far as man may in this life know them, in order to avoid the mistakes and troubles of which this life is so full. For our aim must always be to reach that state of happiness in which no trouble shall distress us, and no error mislead us. If we must know the causes of physical convulsions, there are none which it concerns us more to know than those which affect our own health. But seeing that, in our ignorance of these, we are fain to resort to physicians, it would seem that we might bear with considerable patience our ignorance of the secrets that lie hidden in the earth and heavens.

...

23. Summary of the Results of the Preceding Discussion.

8. 23. *His itaque pro huius brevitatis necessitate tractatis, quoniam causae cognoscendae sunt rerum bonarum et malarum quantum viae satis est quae nos perducant ad regnum ubi erit vita sine morte, sine errore veritas, sine perturbatione felicitas, nequaquam dubitare debemus rerum quae ad nos pertinent bonarum causam non esse nisi bonitatem Dei; malarum vero ab immutabili bono deficientem boni mutabilis voluntatem, prius angeli, hominis postea.*

Quod sit primum creaturae rationalis malum vel quae hoc male secuta sint.

8. 24. *Hoc primum est creaturae rationalis malum, id est prima privatio boni. Deinde iam nolentibus subintravit ignorantia rerum agendarum et concupiscentia noxiarum, quibus comites subinferuntur error et dolor, quae duo mala quando imminetia sentiuntur, ea fugitantis animi motus vocatur metus. Porro animus cum adipiscitur concupita, quamvis perniciose et inania, quoniam id errore non sentit vel delectatione morbida vincitur vel vana etiam laetitia ventilatur. Ex his morborum non ubertatis sed indigentiae tamquam fontibus omnium miseria naturae rationalis emanat.*

...

Quod recta confessione credamus omnipotentem Deum benefacere etiam cum sinit fieri mala.

24. 96. *Nec dubitandum est Deum facere bene etiam sinendo fieri quaecumque fiunt male. Non enim hoc nisi iusto iudicio sinit, et profecto bonum est omne quod iustum est. Quamvis ergo ea quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt non sint bona tamen ut non sola bona sed etiam sint et mala, bonum est. Nam nisi esset hoc bonum, ut essent et mala, nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotente bono, cui procul dubio quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere. Hoc nisi credimus, periclitatur ipsum nostrae confessionis initium, qua nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere confitemur. Neque enim ob aliud veraciter vocatur omnipotens nisi quoniam quidquid vult potest, nec voluntate cuiuspiam creaturae voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus.*

...

Admiratio operum Dei qua fit ut de malis hominum voluntatibus bonam ipse voluntatem impleat suam.

As it is right that we should know the causes of good and evil, so much of them at least as will suffice for the way that leads us to the kingdom, where there will be life without the shadow of death, truth without any alloy of error, and happiness unbroken by any sorrow, I have discussed these subjects with the brevity which my limited space demanded. And I think there cannot now be any doubt, that the only cause of any good that we enjoy is the goodness of God, and that the only cause of evil is the falling away from the unchangeable good of a being made good but changeable, first in the case of an angel, and afterwards in the case of man.

24. The Secondary Causes of Evil are Ignorance and Lust.

This is the first evil that befell the intelligent creation — that is, its first privation of good. Following upon this crept in, and now even in opposition to man's will, ignorance of duty, and lust after what is hurtful: and these brought in their train error and suffering, which, when they are felt to be imminent, produce that shrinking of the mind which is called fear. Further, when the mind attains the objects of its desire, however hurtful or empty they may be, error prevents it from perceiving their true nature, or its perceptions are overborne by a diseased appetite, and so it is puffed up with a foolish joy. From these fountains of evil, which spring out of defect rather than superfluity, flows every form of misery that besets a rational nature.

...

96. The Omnipotent God Does Well Even in the Permission of Evil.

Nor can we doubt that God does well even in the permission of what is evil. For He permits it only in the justice of His judgment. And surely all that is just is good. Although, therefore, evil, in so far as it is evil, is not a good; yet the fact that evil as well as good exists, is a good. For if it were not a good that evil should exist, its existence would not be permitted by the omnipotent Good, who without doubt can as easily refuse to permit what He does not wish, as bring about what He does wish. And if we do not believe this, the very first sentence of our creed is endangered, wherein we profess to believe in God the Father Almighty. For He is not truly called Almighty if He cannot do whatsoever He pleases, or if the power of His almighty will is hindered by the will of any creature whatsoever.

...

100. The Will of God is Never Defeated, Though Much is Done that is Contrary to His Will.

26. 100. *Haec sunt magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius 250, et tam sapienter exquisita ut cum angelica et humana creatura peccasset, id est, non quod ille sed quod voluit ipsa fecisset, etiam per eandem creaturae voluntatem qua factum est quod Creator noluit, impleret ipse quod voluit, bene utens et malis tamquam summe bonus, ad eorum damnationem quos iuste praedestinavit ad poenam, et ad eorum salutem quos benigne praedestinavit ad gratiam. Quantum enim ad ipsos attinet, quod Deus noluit fecerunt; quantum vero ad omnipotentiam Dei, nullo modo id efficere valuerunt. Hoc quippe ipso quod contra voluntatem eius fecerunt, de ipsis facta est voluntas eius. Propterea namque magna opera Domini exquisita sunt in omnes voluntates eius ut miro et ineffabili modo non fiat praeter eius voluntatem quod etiam contra eius fit voluntatem, quia non fieret si non sineret, nec utique nolens sinit sed volens; nec sineret bonus fieri male, nisi omnipotens et de malo facere possit bene.*

De bonis voluntatibus hominum quod plerumque bonae voluntati Dei non conveniunt, et malis voluntatibus quae conveniunt.

26. 101. *Aliquando autem bona voluntate homo vult aliquid quod Deus non vult, etiam ipse bona multo amplius multoque certius voluntate: nam illius mala voluntas numquam esse potest, tamquam si bonus filius patrem vult vivere, quem Deus bona voluntate vult mori. Et rursus fieri potest ut hoc velit homo voluntate mala quod Deus vult bona, velut si malus filius velit mori patrem, velit hoc etiam Deus. Nempe ille vult quod non vult Deus, iste vero id quod vult et Deus, et tamen bonae Dei voluntati pietas illius potius consonat, quamvis aliud volentis, quam huius idem volentis impietas. Tantum interest quid velle homini, quid Deo congruat, et ad quem finem suam quisque referat voluntatem, ut approbetur vel improbetur. Nam Deus quasdam voluntates suas, utique bonas, implet per malorum hominum voluntates malas, sicut per Iudaeos malevolos bona voluntate Patris pro nobis Christus occisus est, quod tantum bonum factum est ut apostolus Petrus, quando id fieri volebat, satanas ab ipso qui occidi venerat diceretur 251. Quam bonae apparebant voluntates piorum fidelium qui volebant apostolum Paulum Hierusalem pergere ne ibi pateretur mala quae Agabus propheta praedixerat 252, et tamen haec illum Deus pati volebat pro annuntianda fide Christi, exercens martyrem Christi. Neque istam bonam voluntatem suam implevit per christianorum voluntates bonas sed*

These are the great works of the Lord, sought out according to all His pleasure, and so wisely sought out, that when the intelligent creation, both angelic and human, sinned, doing not His will but their own, He used the very will of the creature which was working in opposition to the Creator's will as an instrument for carrying out His will, the supremely Good thus turning to good account even what is evil, to the condemnation of those whom in His justice He has predestined to punishment, and to the salvation of those whom in His mercy He has predestined to grace. For, as far as relates to their own consciousness, these creatures did what God wished not to be done: but in view of God's omnipotence, they could in no wise effect their purpose. For in the very fact that they acted in opposition to His will, His will concerning them was fulfilled. And hence it is that "the works of the Lord are great, sought out according to all His pleasure," because in a way unspeakably strange and wonderful, even what is done in opposition to His will does not defeat His will. For it would not be done did He not permit it (and of course His permission is not unwilling, but willing); nor would a Good Being permit evil to be done only that in His omnipotence He can turn evil into good.

101. The Will of God, Which is Always Good, is Sometimes Fulfilled Through the Evil Will of Man.

Sometimes, however, a man in the goodness of his will desires something that God does not desire, even though God's will is also good, nay, much more fully and more surely good (for His will never can be evil): for example, if a good son is anxious that his father should live, when it is God's good will that he should die. Again, it is possible for a man with evil will to desire what God wills in His goodness: for example, if a bad son wishes his father to die, when this is also the will of God. It is plain that the former wishes what God does not wish, and that the latter wishes what God does wish; and yet the filial love of the former is more in harmony with the good will of God, though its desire is different from God's, than the want of filial affection of the latter, though its desire is the same as God's. So necessary is it, in determining whether a man's desire is one to be approved or disapproved, to consider what it is proper for man, and what it is proper for God, to desire, and what is in each case the real motive of the will. For God accomplishes some of His purposes, which of course are all good, through the evil desires of wicked men: for example, it was through the wicked designs of the Jews, working out the good purpose of the Father, that Christ was slain and this event was so truly good, that when the Apostle Peter expressed his unwillingness that it should take place, he was designated Satan by Him who had come to be slain. How good seemed the intentions of the pious believers who were unwilling that Paul should go up to Jerusalem lest the evils which Agabus had foretold should there befall him! And yet

per Iudaeorum malas, et ad eum potius pertinebant qui nolebant quod volebat, quam illi per quos volentes factum est quod volebat, quia id ipsum quidem, sed ipse per eos bona, illi autem mala voluntate fecerunt.

Quod quantaelibet sint voluntates quae convenient aut non convenient voluntati Dei, invicta semper sit voluntas Dei.

26. 102. *Sed quantaelibet sint voluntates vel angelorum vel hominum, vel bonorum vel malorum, vel illud quod Deus vel aliud volentes quam Deus, omnipotentis voluntas semper invicta est; quae mala esse numquam potest, quia etiam cum mala irrogat iusta est, et profecto quae iusta est mala non est. Deus igitur omnipotens, sive per misericordiam cuius vult miseretur, sive per iudicium quem vult obdurat, nec inique aliquid facit nec nisi volens quidquam facit, et omnia quaecumque vult facit.*

...

Qualem oportuit prius hominem fieri vel qualis postea futurus sit.

28. 105. *Sic enim oportebat prius hominem fieri ut et bene velle posset et male, nec gratis si bene nec impune si male. Postea vero sic erit ut male velle non possit, nec ideo libero carebit arbitrio. Multo quippe liberius erit arbitrium quod omnino non poterit servire peccato. Neque enim culpanda est voluntas, aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda non est, qua beati esse sic volumus ut esse miseri non solum nolimus sed nequaquam prorsus velle possimus. Sicut ergo anima nostra etiam nunc nolle infelicitatem, ita nolle iniquitatem semper habitura est. Sed ordo praetermittendus non fuit, in quo Deus voluit ostendere quam bonum sit animal rationale quod etiam non peccare possit, quamvis sit melius quod peccare non possit; sicut minor fuit immortalitas, sed tamen fuit, in qua posset etiam non mori, quamvis maior futura sit in qua non possit mori.*

it was God's purpose that he should suffer these evils for preaching the faith of Christ, and thereby become a witness for Christ. And this purpose of His, which was good, God did not fulfill through the good counsels of the Christians, but through the evil counsels of the Jews; so that those who opposed His purpose were more truly His servants than those who were the willing instruments of its accomplishment.

102. The Will of the Omnipotent God is Never Defeated, and is Never Evil.

But however strong may be the purposes either of angels or of men, whether of good or bad, whether these purposes fall in with the will of God or run counter to it, the will of the Omnipotent is never defeated; and His will never can be evil; because even when it inflicts evil it is just, and what is just is certainly not evil. The omnipotent God, then, whether in mercy He pities whom He will, or in judgment hardens whom He will, is never unjust in what He does, never does anything except of His own free-will, and never wills anything that He does not perform.

...

105. Man Was So Created as to Be Able to Choose Either Good or Evil: in the Future Life, the Choice of Evil Will Be Impossible.

Now it was expedient that man should be at first so created, as to have it in his power both to will what was right and to will what was wrong; not without reward if he willed the former, and not without punishment if he willed the latter. But in the future life it shall not be in his power to will evil; and yet this will constitute no restriction on the freedom of his will. On the contrary, his will shall be much freer when it shall be wholly impossible for him to be the slave of sin. We should never think of blaming the will, or saying that it was no will, or that it was not to be called free, when we so desire happiness, that not only do we shrink from misery, but find it utterly impossible to do otherwise. As, then, the soul even now finds it impossible to desire unhappiness, so in future it shall be wholly impossible for it to desire sin. But God's arrangement was not to be broken, according to which He willed to show how good is a rational being who is able even to refrain from sin, and yet how much better is one who cannot sin at all; just as that was an inferior sort of immortality, and yet it was immortality, when it was possible for man to avoid death, although there is reserved for the future a more perfect immortality, when it shall be impossible for man to die.

Žmogaus laisvos valios ir Dievo išankstinio žinojimo dermės problema

On the Free Choice of the Will

I.12.24-16.35

II.1.1-2.6

II.18.47-20.54

III.1.1-4.11

Augustine, 2010. *On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings*, ed., trans. P. King. New York: Cambridge University Press.

De Libero Arbitrio (387/388-395)

I.12.24-16.35

Nobis inest voluntas.

12. 24. *Verum illud quod me maxime movet, cur huiuscemodi acerbissimas poenas patiamur nos, qui certe stulti sumus, nec sapientes unquam fuimus, ut merito haec dicamur perpeti propter desertam virtutis arcem, et electam sub libidine servitutem, quin aperias disputando, si vales, nullo modo tibi differendum esse concesserim.*

Aug. - Ita istuc dicis, quasi liquido compertum habeas nunquam nos fuisse sapientes: attendis enim tempus ex quo in hanc vitam nati sumus. Sed cum sapientia in animo sit, utrum ante consortium huius corporis alia quadam vita vixerit animus, et an aliquando sapienter vixerit, magna quaestio est, magnum secretum, et suo considerandum loco: neque ideo tamen hoc quod nunc habemus in manibus impeditur, quominus aperiatur ut potest.

Voluntas bonum sibi est.

12. 25. *Nam quaero abs te, sitne aliqua nobis voluntas.*

Ev. - Nescio.

Aug. - Visne hoc scire?

Ev. - Et hoc nescio.

Aug. - Nihil ergo deinceps me interroges.

Ev. - Quare?

Aug. - Quia roganti tibi respondere non debeo, nisi volenti scire quod rogas. Deinde nisi velis ad sapientiam pervenire, sermo tecum de huiusmodi rebus non est habendus. Postremo meus amicus esse non poteris, nisi velis ut bene sit mihi. Iam vero de te tu ipse videris, utrum tibi voluntas nulla sit beatae vitae tuae.

Ev. - Fateor, negari non potest habere nos voluntatem: perge iam, videamus quid hinc conficias.

Aug. - Faciam: sed dic etiam prius, utrum et bonam voluntatem te habere sentias.

Ev. - Quid est bona voluntas?

Aug. - Voluntas qua appetimus recte honesteque vivere, et ad summam sapientiam pervenire. Modo tu vide utrum rectam honestamque non appetas vitam, aut esse sapiens non vehementer velis, aut certe negare audeas, cum haec volumus, nos habere voluntatem bonam.

Ev. - Nihil horum nego, et propterea me non solum voluntatem, sed etiam bonam voluntatem iam habere confiteor.

Aug. - Quanti pendis, oro te, hanc voluntatem? Numquidnam ei ulla ex parte divitias, aut honores, aut voluptates corporis, aut haec simul omnia conferenda arbitraris?

Ev. - Averterit Deus istam sceleratam dementiam.

Aug. - *Parumne ergo gaudendum est habere nos quiddam in animo, hanc ipsam dico bonam voluntatem, in cuius comparatione abiectissima sint ea quae commemoravimus, pro quibus adipiscendis multitudinem videmus hominum nullos labores, nulla pericula recusare?*

Ev. - *Gaudendum vero, ac plurimum.*

Aug. - *Quid? hoc gaudio qui non fruuntur, parvo damno eos affectos putas tanti boni?*

Ev. - *Imo maximo.*

Voluntas unum verum bonum.

12. 26. Aug. - *Vides igitur iam, ut existimo, in voluntate nostra esse constitutum, ut hoc vel fruamur vel careamus tanto et tam vero bono. Quid enim tam in voluntate, quam ipsa voluntas sita est? Quam quisque cum habet bonam, id certe habet quod terrenis omnibus regnis, voluptatibusque omnibus corporis longe anteponendum sit. Quisquis autem non habet, caret profecto illa re, quam praestantior omnibus bonis in potestate nostra non constitutis, sola illi voluntas per seipsam daret. Itaque cum se ipse miserrimum iudicet, si amiserit gloriosam famam, ingentes opes, et quaelibet corporis bona; tu eum non miserrimum iudicabis, etiamsi talibus abundet omnibus, cum iis inhaeret quae amittere facillime potest, neque dum vult habet, caret autem bona voluntate, quae nec comparanda est cum istis, et cum sit tam magnum bonum, velle solum opus est, ut habeatur?*

Ev. - *Verissimum est.*

Aug. - *Iure igitur ac merito stulti homines, tametsi nunquam fuerunt sapientes (hoc enim dubium et occultissimum est), huiusmodi afficiuntur miseria.*

Ev. - *Assentior.*

In potestate voluntatis sunt virtutes...

13. 27. Aug. - *Considera nunc utrum tibi videatur esse prudentia appetendarum et vitandarum rerum scientia.*

Ev. - *Videtur.*

Aug. - *Quid? fortitudo nonne illa est animae affectio, qua omnia incommoda et damna rerum non in nostra potestate constitutarum contemnimus?*

Ev. - *Ita existimo.*

Aug. - *Porro temperantia est affectio coercens et cohibens appetitum ab iis rebus quae turpiter appetuntur: an tu aliter putas?*

Ev. - *Imo ita ut dicis sentio.*

Aug. - *Iam iustitiam quid dicamus esse, nisi virtutem qua sua cuique tribuuntur?*

Ev. - *Nulla mihi alia iustitiae notio est.*

Aug. - *Quisquis ergo bonam habens voluntatem, de cuius excellentia iam diu loquimur, hanc unam dilectione amplectetur, qua interim melius nihil habet, hac sese oblectet, hac denique perfruatur et gaudeat, considerans eam et iudicans quanta sit, quamque invito illi eripi vel surripi nequeat; num dubitare poterimus istum adversari rebus omnibus, quae huic uni bono inimicae sunt?*

Ev. - *Necesse est omnino ut adversetur.*

Aug. - *Nullane hunc putamus praeditum esse prudentia, qui hoc bonum appetendum, et vitanda ea quae huic inimica sunt videt?*

Ev. - *Nulla modo mihi videtur hoc posse quisquam sine prudentia.*

Aug. - *Recte: sed cur non huic etiam fortitudinem tribuimus? Illa quippe omnia quae in potestate nostra non sunt, amare iste ac plurimi aestimare non potest. Mala enim voluntate amantur, cui tamquam inimicae carissimo suo bono resistat necesse est. Cum autem non amat haec, non dolet amissa, et omnino contemnit; quod opus esse fortitudinis, dictum atque concessum est.*

Ev. - *Tribuamus sane: non enim intellego quem fortem verius appellare possim, quam eum qui rebus iis quas neque ut adipiscamur, neque ut obtineamus in nobis situm est, aequo et tranquillo animo caret; quod hunc necessario facere compertum est.*

Aug. - *Vide iam nunc utrum ab eo temperantiam alienare possimus, cum ea sit virtus quae libidines cohibet. Quid autem tam inimicum bonae voluntati est quam libido? Ex quo profecto intellegis istum bonae voluntatis suae amatorem resistere omni modo, atque adversari libidinibus, et ideo iure temperantem vocari.*

Ev. - *Perge; assentior.*

Aug. - *Iustitia restat, quae quomodo desit huic homini, non sane video. Qui enim habet et diligit voluntatem bonam, et obsistit eis, ut dictum est, quae huic inimica sunt, male cuiquam velle non potest. Sequetur ergo ut nemini faciat iniuriam; quod nullo pacto potest, nisi qui sua cuique tribuerit: hoc autem ad iustitiam pertinere cum dicerem, approbasse te, ut puto, meministi.*

Ev. - *Ego vero memini et fateor in hoc homine, qui suam bonam voluntatem magni pendit et diligit, omnes quatuor virtutes quae abs te paulo ante, me assentiente, descriptae sunt, esse compertas.*

... beata...

13. 28. Aug. - *Quid igitur impedit cur huius vitam non concedamus esse laudabilem?*

Ev. - *Nihil prorsus; imo hortantur vel etiam cogunt omnia.*

Aug. - *Quid? vitam miseram potesne ullo modo non iudicare fugiendam?*

Ev. - *Et magnopere quidem iudico, nihilque aliud agendum existimo.*

Aug. - *At laudabilem non fugiendam profecto putas.*

Ev. - *Quin etiam appetendam sedulo existimo.*

Aug. - *Non ergo misera est quae laudabilis vita est.*

Ev. - *Hoc utique sequitur.*

Aug. - *Nihil iam, quantum opinor, difficile tibi ut assentiaris relinquatur, eam scilicet quae misera non est, beatam esse vitam.*

Ev. - *Manifestissimum est.*

Aug. - *Placet igitur beatum esse hominem dilectorem bonae voluntatis suae, et prae illa contemnentem quodcumque aliud bonum dicitur, cuius amissio potest accidere etiam cum voluntas tenendi manet.*

Ev. - *Quidni placeat, quo superiora quae concessimus, necessario trahunt?*

Aug. - *Bene intellegis: sed dic, quaeso, nonne bonam voluntatem suam diligere, et tam magni aestimare quam dictum est, etiam ipsa bona voluntas est?*

Ev. - *Verum dicis.*

Aug. - *Ac si hunc beatum recte iudicamus, nonne recte miserum, qui contrariae voluntatis est?*

Ev. - *Rectissime.*

Aug. - *Quid ergo causae est cur dubitandum putemus, etiamsi nunquam antea sapientes fuimus, voluntate nos tamen laudabilem et beatam vitam, voluntate turpem ac miseram mereri ac degere?*

Ev. - *Fateor huc certis et minime negandis rebus esse perventum.*

... et laudabilis vita...

13. 29. Aug. - *Vide etiam aliud: nam credo te memoria tenere quam dixerimus esse bonam voluntatem: opinor enim, ea dicta est qua recte atque honeste vivere appetimus.*

Ev. - *Ita memini.*

Aug. - *Hanc igitur voluntatem, si bona itidem voluntate diligamus atque amplectamur, rebusque omnibus quas retinere non quia volumus possumus, anteponamus; consequenter illae virtutes, ut ratio docuit, animum nostrum incolent, quas habere idipsum est recte honesteque vivere. Ex quo conficitur ut quisquis recte honesteque vult vivere, si id se velle prae fugacibus bonis velit, assequatur tantam rem tanta facilitate, ut nihil aliud ei quam ipsum velle sit habere quod voluit.*

Ev. - *Vere tibi dico, vix me contineo quin exclamem laetitia, repente mihi oborto tam magno, et tam in facili constituto bono.*

Aug. - *Atqui hoc ipsum gaudium, quod huius boni adeptione gignitur, cum tranquille et quiete atque constanter erigit animum, beata vita dicitur: nisi tu putas aliud esse beate vivere, quam veris bonis certisque gaudere.*

Ev. - *Ita sentio.*

... ipsumque beatae vitae desiderium.

14. 30. Aug. - *Recte: sed censesne quemquam hominum non omnibus modis velle atque optare vitam beatam?*

Ev. - *Quis dubitat omnem hominem velle?*

Aug. - *Cur igitur eam non adipiscuntur omnes? Dixeramus enim atque convenerat inter nos, voluntate illam mereri homines, voluntate etiam miseram, et sic mereri ut accipiant: nunc vero existit nescio qua repugnantia, et nisi diligenter dispiciamus, perturbare nititur superiorem tam evigilatam firmamque rationem. Quomodo enim voluntate quisque miseram vitam patitur, cum omnino nemo velit misere vivere? Aut quomodo voluntate beatam vitam consequitur homo, cum tam multi miseri sint, et beati omnes esse velint? An eo evenit, quod aliud est velle bene aut male, aliud mereri aliquid per bonam vel malam voluntatem? Nam illi qui beati sunt, quos etiam bonos esse oportet, non propterea sunt beati, quia beate vivere voluerunt; nam hoc volunt etiam mali: sed quia recte, quod mali nolunt. Quamobrem nihil mirum est quod miseri homines non adipiscuntur quod volunt, id est, beatam vitam. Illud enim cui comes est, et sine quo ea nemo dignus est, nemoque assequitur, recte scilicet vivere, non itidem volunt. Hoc enim aeterna lex illa, ad cuius considerationem redire iam tempus est, incommutabili stabilitate firmavit, ut in voluntate meritum sit; in beatitudine autem et miseria praemium atque supplicium. Itaque cum dicimus voluntate homines esse miseros, non ideo dicimus, quod miseri esse velint, sed quod in ea voluntate sunt, quam etiam eis invitis miseria sequatur necesse est. Quare non repugnat superiori rationi, quod volunt omnes beati esse, nec possunt; non enim volunt omnes recte vivere, cui uni voluntati vita beata debetur: nisi quid habes adversus haec dicere.*

Ev. - *Ego vero nihil.*

Sapientibus et insipientibus alia est lex.

15. 31. *Sed videamus iam quomodo haec ad propositam illam quaestionem de duabus legibus referantur.*

Aug. - *Fiat: sed dic mihi prius, utrum qui recte vivere diligit, eoque ita delectatur, ut non solum ei rectum sit, sed etiam dulce atque iucundum, amet hanc legem, habeatque carissimam, qua videt tributam esse bonae voluntati beatam vitam, malae miseram?*

Ev. - *Amat omnino ac vehementer: nam istam ipsam sequens ita vivit.*

Aug. - *Quid? cum hanc amat, mutabile aliquid amat ac temporale, an stabile ac sempiternum?*

Ev. - *Aeternum sane atque incommutabile.*

Aug. - *Quid illi qui in mala voluntate perseverantes, nihilominus beati esse cupiunt? possuntne amare istam legem, qua talibus hominibus miseria merito reperatur?*

Ev. - *Nulla modo, arbitror.*

Aug. - *Nihilne amant aliud?*

Ev. - *Imo plurima; ea scilicet in quibus adipiscendis vel retinendis mala voluntas illa persistit.*

Aug. - *Opinor te dicere divitias, honores, voluptates, et pulchritudinem corporis, caeteraque omnia quae possunt et volentes non adipisci, et amittere inviti.*

Ev. - *Ista ipsa sunt.*

Aug. - *Num haec aeterna esse censes, cum temporis volubilitati videas obnoxia?*

Ev. - *Quis hoc vel dementissimus senserit?*

Aug. - *Cum igitur manifestum sit alios esse homines amatores rerum aeternarum, alios temporalium, cumque duas leges esse convenerit, unam aeternam, aliam temporalem; si quid aequitatis sapis, quos istorum iudicas aeternae legi, quos temporali esse subdendos?*

Ev. - *Puto in promptu esse quod quaeris: nam beatos illos ob amorem ipsorum aeternorum sub aeterna lege agere existimo; miseris vero temporalis imponitur.*

Aug. - *Recte iudicas, dummodo illud inconcussum teneas, quod apertissime iam ratio demonstravit, eos qui temporali legi serviunt, non esse posse ab aeterna liberos; unde omnia quae iusta sunt, iusteque variantur, exprimi diximus: eos vero qui legi aeternae per bonam voluntatem haerent, temporalis legis non indigere, satis, ut apparet, intellegis.*

Ev. - *Teneo quod dicis.*

Lex temporalis rebus praeest...

15. 32. Aug. - *Iubet igitur aeterna lex avertere amorem a temporalibus, et eum mundatum convertere ad aeterna.*

Ev. - *Iubet vero.*

Aug. - *Quid deinde censes temporalem iubere, nisi ut haec quae ad tempus nostra dici possunt, quando eis homines cupiditate inhaerent, eo iure possideant, quo pax et societas humana servetur, quanta in his rebus servari potest? Ea sunt autem: primo, hoc corpus, et eius quae vocantur bona, ut integra valetudo, acumen sensuum, vires, pulchritudo, et si qua sunt caetera, partim necessaria bonis artibus, et ideo pluris pensanda, partim viliora. Deinde libertas, quae*

quidem nulla vera est, nisi beatorum, et legi aeternae adhaerentium: sed eam nunc libertatem commemoro, qua se liberos putant qui dominos homines non habent, et quam desiderant ii qui a dominis hominibus manumitti volunt. Deinde parentes, fratres, coniux, liberi, propinqui, affines, familiares, et quicumque nobis aliqua necessitudine adiuncti sunt. Ipsa denique civitas, quae parentis loco haberi solet; honores etiam et laus, et ea quae dicitur gloria popularis. Ad extremum pecunia, quo uno nomine continentur omnia quorum iure domini sumus, et quorum vendendorum aut donandorum habere potestatem videmur. Horum omnium quemadmodum lex illa sua cuique distribuatur, difficile et longum est explicare, et plane ad id quod proposuimus non necessarium. Satis est enim videre non ultra porrigi huius legis potestatem in vindicando, quam ut haec vel aliquid horum adimat atque auferat ei quem punit. Metu coercet ergo, et ad id quod vult, torquet ac retorquet miserorum animos, quibus regendis accommodata est. Dum enim haec amittere timent, tenent in his utendis quemdam modum aptum vinculo civitatis, qualis ex huiusmodi hominibus constitui potest. Non autem ulciscitur peccatum cum amantur ista, sed cum aliis per improbitatem auferuntur. Quamobrem vide utrum iam perventum sit ad id quod infinitum putabas. Institueramus enim quaerere, quatenus habeat ius ulciscendi ea lex qua populi terreni civitatesque gubernantur.
Ev. - Video perventum.

... qui non sunt in potestate nostra.

15. 33. Aug. - Vides ergo etiam illud, quod poena non esset, sive quae per iniuriam, sive quae per talem vindictam infertur hominibus, si eas res quae invito auferri possunt, non amarent?

Ev. - Id quoque video.

Aug. - Cum igitur eisdem rebus alius male, alius bene utatur; et is quidem qui male, amore his inhaereat atque implicetur, scilicet subditus eis rebus quas ei subditas esse oportebat, et ea bona sibi constituens, quibus ordinandis beneque tractandis ipse esse utique deberet bonum: ille autem qui recte his utitur, ostendat quidem bona esse, sed non sibi; non enim eum bonum melioremve faciunt, sed ab eo potius fiunt: et ideo non eis amore agglutinetur, neque velut membra sui animi faciat, quod fit amando, ne cum resecari coeperint, eum cruciatu ac tabe foedent; sed eis totus superferatur, et habere illa atque regere, cum opus est, paratus, et amittere ac non habere paratior: cum ergo haec ita sint, num aut argentum et aurum propter avaros accusandum putas, aut cibos propter voraces, aut vinum propter ebriosos, aut muliebres formas propter scortatores et adulteros, atque hoc modo caetera, cum praesertim videas et igne bene uti medicum, et pane scelerate veneficum?

Ev. - Verissimum est, non res ipsas, sed homines qui eis male utuntur esse culpandos.

Malum est aversio ab immutabili bono...

16. 34. Aug. - Recte: sed quoniam et quid valeat aeterna lex, ut opinor, videre iam coepimus, et quantum lex temporalis in vindicando progredi possit, inventum est; et rerum duo genera, aeternarum et temporalium, duoque rursus hominum, aliorum aeternas, aliorum temporales sequentium et diligentium, satis aperteque distincta sunt: quid autem quisque sectandum et amplectendum eligat, in voluntate esse positum constitit; nullaque re de arce dominandi, rectoque ordine mentem deponi, nisi voluntate: et est manifestum, non rem ullam, cum ea quisque male utitur, sed ipsum male utentem esse arguendum: referamus nos, si placet, ad quaestionem in exordio huius sermonis propositam, et videamus utrum soluta sit; nam quaerere institueramus quid sit male facere, et propter hoc omnia quae dicta sunt, diximus. Quocirca licet nunc animadvertere et considerare, utrum sit aliud male facere, quam neglectis rebus aeternis, quibus per seipsam mens fruitur, et per seipsam percipit, et quae amans amittere non potest, temporalia et quaeque per corpus hominis partem vilissimam sentiuntur, et nunquam esse certa possunt, quasi magna et miranda sectari. Nam hoc uno genere omnia malefacta, id est peccata, mihi videntur includi. Tibi autem quid videatur, exspecto cognoscere.

... et conversio ad immutabile.

16. 35. Ev. - Est ita ut dicis, et assentior, omnia peccata hoc uno genere contineri, cum quisque avertitur a divinis vereque manentibus, et ad mutabilia atque incerta convertitur. Quae quamquam in ordine suo recte locata sint, et suam quamdam pulchritudinem peragant; perversi tamen animi est et inordinati, eis sequendis subici, quibus ad nutum suum ducendis potius divino ordine ac iure praelatus est. Et illud simul mihi videre iam videor absolutum atque compertum, quod post illam quaestionem, quid sit male facere, deinceps quaerere institueramus, unde male facimus.

Nisi enim fallor, ut ratio tractata monstravit, id facimus ex libero voluntatis arbitrio. Sed quaero utrum ipsum liberum arbitrium, quo peccandi facultatem habere convincimur, oportuerit nobis dari ab eo qui nos fecit. Videmur enim non fuisse peccaturi, si isto careremus; et metuendum est ne hoc modo Deus etiam malefactorum nostrorum auctor existimetur.

Aug. - Nullo modo istuc timueris: sed ut diligentius requiratur, aliud tempus sumendum est. Nam haec sermocinatio modum terminumque iam desiderat; qua velim credas magnarum abditarumque rerum inquirendarum quasi fores esse pulsatas. In quarum penetralia cum Deo duce venire coeperimus, iudicabis profecto quantum inter hanc disputationem, et eas quae sequuntur intersit, quantumque illae praestent, non modo investigationis sagacitate, sed etiam maiestate rerum, et clarissima luce veritatis: pietas tantum adsit, ut nos divina providentia cursum quem instituimus, tenere et perficere permittat.

Ev. - Cedo voluntati tuae, et ei meam iudicio et voto libentissime adiungo.

II.1.1-2.6

An Deus dederit liberum arbitrium.

1. 1. Ev. - Iam, si fieri potest, explica mihi quare dederit Deus homini liberum voluntatis arbitrium: quod utique si non accepisset, peccare non posset.

Aug. - Iam enim certum tibi atque cognitum est, Deum dedisse homini hoc, quod dari debuisse non putas?

Ev. - Quantum in superiori libro intellegere mihi visus sum, et habemus liberum voluntatis arbitrium, et non nisi eo peccamus.

Aug. - Ego quoque memini iam nobis id factum esse perspicuum. Sed nunc interrogavi utrum hoc quod nos habere, et quo nos peccare manifestum est, Deum nobis dedisse scias.

Ev. - Nullum alium puto. Ab ipso enim sumus; et sive peccantes, sive recte facientes, ab illo poenam meremur aut praemium.

Aug. - Hoc quoque utrum liquido noveris, an auctoritate commotus libenter etiam incognitum credas, cupio scire.

Ev. - Auctoritati quidem me primum de hac re credidisse confirmo. Sed quid verius quam omne bonum ex Deo esse, et omne iustum bonum esse, et peccantibus poenam recteque facientibus praemium iustum esse? Ex quo conficitur a Deo affici, et peccantes miseria, et recte facientes beatitate.

Ex Deo est homo...

1. 2. Aug. - Nihil resisto: sed quaero illud alterum, quomodo noveris nos ab ipso esse. Neque enim hoc nunc, sed ab ipso nos vel poenam, vel praemium mereri explicasti.

Ev. - Hoc quoque non aliunde video esse manifestum, nisi quod iam constat Deum vindicare peccata. Siquidem ab illo est omnis iustitia. Non enim ut alicuius est bonitatis alienis praestare beneficia ita iustitiae vindicare in alienos. Unde manifestum est ad eum nos pertinere, quia non solum in nos benignissimus in praestando, sed etiam iustissimus in vindicando est. Deinde ex eo quod ego posui, tuque concessisti, omne bonum ex Deo esse, etiam hominem ex Deo esse intellegi potest. Homo enim ipse in quantum homo est, aliquid bonum est; quia recte vivere, cum vult, potest.

... et eius voluntas.

1. 3. Aug. - Plane si haec ita sunt, soluta quaestio est quam proposuisti. Si enim homo aliquid bonum est, et non posset, nisi cum vellet, recte facere, debuit habere liberam voluntatem, sine qua recte facere non posset. Non enim quia per illam etiam peccatur, ad hoc eam Deum dedisse credendum est. Satis ergo causae est cur dari debuerit, quoniam sine illa homo recte non potest vivere. Ad hoc autem datam vel hinc intellegi potest, quia si quis ea usus fuerit ad peccandum, divinitus in eum vindicatur. Quod iniuste fieret, si non solum ut recte viveretur, sed etiam ut peccaretur, libera esset voluntas data. Quomodo enim iuste vindicaretur in eum, qui ad hanc rem usus esset voluntate, ad quam rem data est? Nunc vero Deus cum peccantem punit, quid videtur tibi aliud dicere nisi, Cur non ad eam rem usus es libera voluntate, ad quam tibi eam dedi, hoc est ad recte faciendum? Deinde illud bonum, quo commendatur ipsa iustitia in damnandis peccatis recteque factis honorandis, quomodo esset, si homo careret libero voluntatis arbitrio? Non enim aut peccatum esset, aut recte factum, quod non fieret voluntate. Ac per hoc et poena iniusta esset et praemium, si homo voluntatem non haberet liberam. Debuit autem et in supplicio, et in praemio esse iustitia; quoniam hoc unum est bonorum quae sunt ex Deo. Debuit igitur Deus dare homini liberam voluntatem.

Cur ergo ea male utimur?

2. 4. *Ev. - Iam concedo eam Deum dedisse. Sed nonne tibi videtur, quaeso te, si ad recte faciendum data est, quod non debuerit ad peccandum posse converti? sic ut ipsa iustitia quae data est homini ad bene vivendum: numquid enim potest quispiam per iustitiam suam male vivere? Sic nemo posset per voluntatem peccare, si voluntas data est ad recte faciendum.*

Aug. - Donabit quidem Deus, ut spero, ut tibi valeam respondere, vel potius ut ipse tibi eadem, quae summa omnium magistra est, veritate intus docente respondeas. Sed paulisper mihi volo dicas, si id quod abs te quaesiveram, certum et cognitum tenes, Deum nobis dedisse liberam voluntatem, utrum oporteat dicere dari non debuisse, quod dedisse confitemur Deum. Si enim incertum est utrum dederit, recte quaerimus utrum bene sit data, ut cum invenerimus bene datam esse, inveniatur etiam illum dedisse, a quo animae data sunt omnia bona: si autem invenerimus non bene datam esse, non eum dedisse intellegamus, quem culpae nefas est. Si vero certum est quod ipse illam dederit, oportet fateamur, quoquo modo data est, neque non dari, neque aliter dari eam debuisse quam data est. Ille enim dedit, cuius factum recte reprehendi nullo pacto potest.

Fides quaeritur...

2. 5. *Ev. - Quamquam haec inconcussa fide teneam, tamen quia cognitione nondum teneo, ita quaeramus quasi omnia incerta sint. Video enim ex hoc quod incertum est, utrum ad recte faciendum voluntas libera data sit, cum per illam etiam peccare possimus, fieri etiam illud incertum, utrum dari debuerit. Si enim incertum est ad recte faciendum datam esse, incertum est etiam dari debuisse: ac per hoc etiam utrum eam Deus dederit, incertum erit; quia si incertum est dari debuisse, incertum est ab eo datam esse, quem nefas est credere dedisse aliquid quod dari non debuit.*

Aug. - Illud saltem tibi certum est, Deum esse.

Ev. - Etiam hoc non contemplando, sed credendo inconcussum teneo.

Aug. - Si quis ergo illorum insipientium, de quibus scriptum est, Dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus I, hoc tibi diceret, nec vellet tecum credere quod credis, sed cognoscere utrum vera credideris; relinqueresne hominem, an aliquo modo, quod inconcussum tenes, persuadendum esse arbitraberis; praesertim si ille non obluctari pervicaciter, sed studiose id vellet agnoscere?

Ev. - Hoc quod ultimum posuisti, satis me admonet quid ei respondere deberem. Certe enim quamvis esset absurdissimus, concederet mihi, cum doloso et pervicaci de nulla omnino et maxime de re tanta, non esse disserendum. Quo concesso, prior mecum ageret, ut sibi crederem bono animo eum istuc quaerere, neque aliquid in se, quod ad rem hanc attinet, doli ac pervicaciae latere. Tum ego demonstrarem, quod cuiusvis facillimum puto, quanto esset aequius, cum sibi de occultis animi sui quae ipse nosset, vellet alterum credere qui non nosset, ut etiam ipse tantorum virorum Libris, qui se cum Filio Dei vixisse testatum Litteris reliquerunt, esse Deum crederet; quia et ea se vidisse scripserunt, quae nullo modo fieri possent, si non esset Deus; et nimium stultus esset, si me reprehenderet quod illis crediderim, qui sibi vellet ut crederem. Iam vero quod recte reprehendere non valeret, nullo modo reperiret cur etiam nollet imitari.

Aug. - Si ergo utrum sit Deus, satis esse existimas, quod non temere tantis viris credendum esse iudicavimus; cur non, quaeso te, de iis quoque rebus, quas tamquam incertas et plane incognitas quaerere instituimus, similiter putas eorumdem virorum auctoritati sic esse credendum, ut de investigatione earum nihil amplius laboremus?

Ev. - Sed nos id quod credimus, nosse et intellegere cupimus.

... ut ad intellectum perveniamus.

2. 6. *Aug. - Recte meministi, quod etiam in exordio superioris disputationis a nobis positum esse, negare non possumus. Nisi enim et aliud esset credere, aliud intellegere, et primo credendum esset, quod magnum et divinum intellegere cuperemus, frustra propheta dixisset, Nisi credideritis, non intellegetis 2. Ipse quoque Dominus noster et dictis et factis ad credendum primo hortatus est, quos ad salutem vocavit. Sed postea cum de ipso dono loqueretur, quod erat daturus credentibus, non ait, Haec est autem vita aeterna ut credant; sed, Haec est, inquit, vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum 3. Deinde iam credentibus dicit, Quaerite et invenietis 4: nam neque inventum dici potest, quod incognitum creditur; neque quisquam inveniundo Deo fit idoneus, nisi ante crediderit quod est postea cogniturus. Quapropter Domini praeceptis obtemperantes quaeramus instanter. Quod enim hortante ipso*

quaerimus, eodem ipso demonstrante inueniemus, quantum haec in hac vita, et a nobis talibus inueniri queunt: nam et a melioribus etiam dum has terras incolunt, et certe a bonis et piis omnibus post hanc vitam, evidentius atque perfectius ista cerni obtinerique credendum est; et nobis ita fore sperandum, et ista contemptis terrenis et humanis, omni modo desideranda et diligenda sunt.

II.18.47-20.54

Bonum est voluntas...

18. 47. Ev. - Satis mihi persuasum esse fateor, et quemadmodum manifestum fiat, quantum in hac vita atque inter tales, quales nos sumus, potest, Deum esse, et ex Deo esse omnia bona: quandoquidem omnia quae sunt, sive quae intellegunt et vivunt et sunt, sive quae tantum vivunt et sunt, sive quae tantum sunt, ex Deo sunt. Nunc iam tertiam quaestionem videamus, utrum expediri possit, inter bona esse numerandam liberam voluntatem. Quo demonstrato, sine dubitatione concedam Deum dedisse nobis eam, darique oportuisse.

Aug. - Bene meministi proposita, et secundam quaestionem iam explicatam vigilanter animadvertisti: sed videre debuisti etiam istam tertiam iam solutam. Propterea quippe tibi videri dixeras, dari non debuisse liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quod eo quisque peccat. Cui sententiae tuae cum ego retulisset, recte fieri non posse, nisi eodem libero voluntatis arbitrio, atque ad id potius hoc Deum dedisse asseverarem; respondisti liberam voluntatem ita nobis dari debuisse, ut iustitia data est, qua nemo nisi recte potest uti. Quae responsio tua in tantos circuitus disputationis nos ire compulit, quibus tibi probaremus et maiora et minora bona non esse nisi ex Deo. Quod non tam dilucide ostendi posset, nisi prius adversus opiniones impiae stultitiae, qua dicit insipiens in corde suo, Non est Deus 12, qualiscumque de re tanta pro modulo nostro inita ratio, eodem ipso Deo in tam periculoso itinere nobis opitulante, in aliquid manifestum intenderetur. Quae duo tamen, id est, Deum esse, et omnia bona ex ipso esse, quamquam inconcussa fide etiam antea tenerentur, sic tamen tractata sunt, ut hoc quoque tertium, inter bona esse numerandam liberam voluntatem, manifestissime appareat.

... qua quandoque male utimur...

18. 48. Iam enim superiore disputatione patefactum est, constititque inter nos, naturam corporis inferiore gradu esse quam animi naturam, ac per hoc animum maius bonum esse quam corpus. Si ergo in corporis bonis inuenimus aliqua quibus non recte uti homo possit, nec tamen propterea dicimus non ea dari debuisse, quoniam esse confitemur bona; quid mirum si et in animo sunt quaedam bona, quibus etiam non recte uti possimus, sed quia bona sunt, non potuerunt dari nisi ab illo a quo sunt omnia bona? Vides enim quantum boni desit corpori cui desunt manus, et tamen manibus male utitur qui eis operatur vel saeva vel turpia. Sine pedibus aliquem si aspiceres, fatereris deesse integritati corporis plurimum bonum; et tamen eum qui ad nocendum cuiquam, vel seipsum dehonostandum pedibus uteretur, male uti pedibus non negares. Oculis hanc lucem videmus, formasque internoscimus corporum; idque et speciosissimum est in nostro corpore, unde in fastigio quodam dignitatis haec membra locata sunt; et ad salutem tuendam, multaue alia vitae commoda refert usus oculorum: oculis tamen plerique pleraque agunt turpiter, et eos militare cogunt libidini. Et vides quantum bonum desit in facie, si oculi desint: cum autem adsunt, quis hos dedit, nisi bonorum omnium largitor Deus? Quemadmodum ergo ista probas in corpore, et non intuens eos qui male his utuntur, laudas illum qui haec dedit bona: sic liberam voluntatem sine qua nemo potest recte vivere, oportet et bonum, et divinitus datum, et potius eos damnandos qui hoc bono male utuntur, quam eum qui dederit dare non debuisse fatearis.

... ergo bonum.

18. 49. Ev. - Prius ergo vellem ut mihi probares aliquid bonum esse liberam voluntatem, et ego concederem Deum illam dedisse nobis, quia fateor ex Deo omnia bona esse.

Aug. - Itane tandem non probavi tanto molimine superioris disputationis, cum omnem speciem formamque corporis a summa omnium rerum forma, id est a veritate, subsistere fatereris, et bonum esse concederes? Nam et capillos nostros numeratos esse, ipsa in Evangelio loquitur Veritas 13. De numeri autem summitate, et a fine usque ad finem pertendente potentia, quae locuti sumus, excidit tibi? Quae igitur ista est tanta perversitas, capillos nostros quamvis inter exigua et omnino abiectissima, tamen inter bona numerare, nec invenire cui auctori tribuantur nisi bonorum omnium conditori Deo, quia et maxima et minima bona ab illo sunt, a quo est omne bonum; et dubitare de libera

voluntate, sine qua recte vivi non posse concedunt, etiam qui pessime vivunt? Et certe nunc responde, quaeso, quid tibi melius esse videatur in nobis, sine quo recte vivi potest, an sine quo recte vivi non potest.

Ev. - Iamiam parce, quaeso; pudet caecitatis. Quis enim ambigat id longe esse praestantius, sine quo recta vita nulla est?

Aug. - Iam ergo tu negabis luscum hominem recte posse vivere?

Ev. - Absit tam immanis amentia.

Aug. - Cum ergo in corpore oculum concedas esse aliquod bonum, quo amisso tamen ad recte vivendum non impeditur; voluntas libera tibi videbitur nullum bonum, sine qua recte nemo vivit?

Bona non eiusdem sunt generis.

18. 50. Intueris enim iustitiam, qua nemo male utitur. Haec inter summa bona quae in ipso sunt homine numeratur, omnesque virtutes animi quibus ipsa recta vita et honesta constat. Nam neque prudentia, neque fortitudine, neque temperantia male quis utitur: etiam in his enim omnibus, sicut in ipsa quam tu commemorasti iustitia, recta ratio viget, sine qua virtutes esse non possunt. Recta autem ratione male uti nemo potest.

19. 50. Ista ergo magna bona sunt: sed meminisse te oportet, non solum magna, sed etiam minima bona non esse posse, nisi ab illo a quo sunt omnia bona, hoc est Deo. Id enim superior disputatio persuasit, cui totiens tamque laetus assensus es. Virtutes igitur quibus recte vivitur, magna bona sunt: species autem quorumlibet corporum, sine quibus recte vivi potest, minima bona sunt: potentiae vero animi sine quibus recte vivi non potest, media bona sunt. Virtutibus nemo male utitur: caeteris autem bonis, id est, mediis et minimis, non solum bene, sed etiam male quisque uti potest. Et ideo virtute nemo male utitur, quia opus virtutis est bonus usus istorum, quibus etiam non bene uti possumus. Nemo autem bene utendo male utitur. Quare abundantia et magnitudo bonitatis Dei non solum magna, sed etiam media et minima bona esse praestitit. Magis laudanda est bonitas eius in magnis quam in mediis, et magis in mediis quam in minimis bonis: sed magis in omnibus quam si non omnia tribuisset.

In voluntate se bene utente...

19. 51. Ev. - Assentior. Sed illud me movet, quoniam de libera voluntate quaestio est, et videmus ipsam bene uti caeteris vel non bene, quomodo et ipsa inter illa quibus utimur numeranda sit.

Aug. - Quomodo omnia quae ad scientiam cognoscimus, ratione cognoscimus, et tamen etiam ipsa ratio inter illa numeratur quae ratione cognoscimus. An oblitus es, cum quaereremus quae ratione cognoscantur, confessum te fuisse etiam rationem ratione cognosci? Noli ergo mirari si caeteris per liberam voluntatem utimur, etiam ipsa libera voluntate per eam ipsam uti nos posse; ut quodammodo se ipsa utatur voluntas quae utitur caeteris, sicut seipsam cognoscit ratio, quae cognoscit et caetera. Nam et memoria non solum caetera omnia, quae meminimus comprehendit; sed etiam quod non obliviscimur nos habere memoriam, ipsa se memoria quodammodo tenet in nobis, quae non solum aliorum, sed etiam sui meminit, vel potius nos et caetera et ipsam per ipsam meminimus.

... ipsa est sapientia et beata vita...

19. 52. Voluntas ergo quae medium bonum est, cum inhaeret incommutabili bono, eique communi non proprio, sicuti est illa de qua multum locuti sumus, et nihil digne diximus, veritas; tenet homo beatam vitam: eaque ipsa vita beata, id est animi affectio inhaerentis incommutabili bono, proprium et primum est hominis bonum. In eo sunt etiam virtutes omnes, quibus male uti nemo potest. Nam haec quamvis magna in homine et prima sint, propria tamen esse uniuscuiusque hominis, non communia, satis intellegitur. Veritate enim atque sapientia, quae communis est omnibus, omnes sapientes et beati fiunt, inhaerendo illi. Beatitudine autem alterius hominis non fit alter beatus; quia et cum eum imitatur ut sit, inde appetit beatus fieri, unde illum factum videt, illa scilicet incommutabili communique veritate. Neque prudentia cuiusquam fit prudens alius, aut fortis fortitudine, aut temperans temperantia, aut iustus iustitia hominis alterius quisquam efficitur; sed coaptando animum illis incommutabilibus regulis luminibusque virtutum, quae incorruptibiliter vivunt in ipsa veritate sapientiaque communi, quibus et ille coaptavit et fixit animum, quem istis virtutibus praeditum sibi ad imitandum proposuit.

... a qua quandoque avertitur.

19. 53. *Voluntas ergo adhaerens communi atque incommutabili bono, impetrat prima et magna hominis bona, cum ipsa sit medium quoddam bonum. Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono, et conversa ad proprium bonum, aut ad exterius, aut ad inferius, peccat. Ad proprium convertitur, cum suae potestatis vult esse; ad exterius, cum aliorum propria, vel quaecumque ad se non pertinent, cognoscere studet; ad inferius, cum voluptatem corporis diligit: atque ita homo superbus, et curiosus, et lascivus effectus, excipitur ab alia vita, quae in comparatione superioris vitae mors est; quae tamen regitur administratione divinae providentiae, quae congruis sedibus ordinat omnia, et pro meritis sua cuique distribuit. Ita fit ut neque illa bona quae a peccantibus appetuntur, ullo modo mala sint, neque ipsa voluntas libera, quam in bonis quibusdam mediis numerandam esse comperimus; sed malum sit aversio eius ab incommutabili bono, et conversio ad mutabilia bona: quae tamen aversio atque conversio, quoniam non cogitur, sed est voluntaria, digna et iusta eam miseriae poena subsequitur.*

Bonum ex Deo, defectus a nobis.

20. 54. *Sed tu fortasse quaesiturus es, quoniam movetur voluntas cum se avertit ab incommutabili bono ad mutabile bonum, unde iste motus existat; qui profecto malus est, tametsi voluntas libera, quia sine illa nec recte vivi potest, in bonis numeranda sit. Si enim motus iste, id est aversio voluntatis a Domino Deo, sine dubitatione peccatum est, num possumus auctorem peccati Deum dicere? Non erit ergo iste motus ex Deo. Unde igitur erit? Ita quaerenti tibi, si respondeam nescire me, fortasse eris tristior: sed tamen vera responderim. Sciri enim non potest quod nihil est. Tu tantum pietatem inconcussam tene, ut nullum tibi bonum vel sentienti, vel intelligenti, vel quoquo modo cogitanti occurrat quod non sit ex Deo. Ita enim nulla natura occurrit quae non sit ex Deo. Omnem quippe rem ubi mensuram et numerum et ordinem videris, Deo artifici tribuere ne cuncteris. Unde autem ista penitus detraxeris, nihil omnino remanebit: quia etsi remanserit aliqua formae alicuius inchoatio, ubi neque mensuram neque numerum neque ordinem invenias, quia ubicumque ista sunt, forma perfecta est; oportet auferas etiam ipsam inchoationem formae, quae tamquam materies ad perficiendum subiacere videtur artifici. Si enim formae perfectio bonum est, nonnullum iam bonum est et formae inchoatio. Ita, detracto penitus omni bono, non quidem nonnihil, sed omnino nihil remanebit. Omne autem bonum ex Deo: nulla ergo natura est quae non sit ex Deo. Motus ergo ille aversionis, quod fatemur esse peccatum, quoniam defectivus motus est, omnis autem defectus ex nihilo est, vide quo pertineat, et ad Deum non pertinere ne dubites. Qui tamen defectus quoniam est voluntarius, in nostra est positus potestate. Si enim times illum, oportet ut nolis; si autem nolis, non erit. Quid ergo securius quam esse in ea vita, ubi non possit tibi evenire quod non vis? Sed quoniam non sicut homo sponte cecidit, ita etiam sponte surgere potest; porrectam nobis desuper dexteram Dei, id est Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, fide firma teneamus, et exspectemus certa spe, et caritate ardenti desideremus. Si quid autem de origine peccati diligentius quaerendum adhuc putas (nam omnino ego iam opus esse non arbitrator): si quid tamen putas, in aliam disputationem differendum est.*
Ev. - Sequor sane voluntatem tuam, ut in tempus aliud, quod hinc moverit, differamus. Nam illud tibi non concesserim, ut satis iam inde quaesitum putes.

III.1.1-4.11

Ex necessitate motus inculpabilis.

1. 1. *Ev. - Quoniam satis mihi manifestatum est, inter bona, et ea quidem non minima, numerandam esse liberam voluntatem, ex quo etiam fateri cogimur eam divinitus datam esse, darique oportuisse: iam si opportunum existimas, cupio per te cognoscere unde ille motus existat, quo ipsa voluntas avertitur a communi atque incommutabili bono, et ad propria vel aliena vel infima, atque omnia commutabilia convertitur bona.*

Aug. - Quid enim opus est hoc scire?

Ev. - Quia si ita data est, ut naturalem habeat istum motum, iam necessitate ad haec convertitur; neque ulla culpa deprehendi potest, ubi natura necessitasque dominatur.

Aug. - Placetne tibi iste motus, an displicet?

Ev. - Displicet.

Aug. - Reprehendis ergo eum.

Ev. - Utique reprehendo.

Aug. - Reprehendis igitur animi motum inculpabilem.

Ev. - Inculpabilem animi motum non reprehendo, sed nescio an ulla culpa sit, relicto incommutabili bono ad commutabilia converti.

Aug. - Reprehendis ergo quod nescis.

Ev. - Noli verbo premere: ita enim dixi, Nescio an ulla culpa sit, ut intellegi voluerim sine dubio culpam esse. Nam hoc verbo quod dixi, Nescio, satis profecto irrisi dubitationem de re manifesta.

Aug. - Vide quid sit certissima veritas, quae te coegit tam cito oblivisci quod paulo ante dixisti. Si enim natura vel necessitate iste motus existit, culpabilis esse nullo pacto potest: tu vero esse culpabilem ita firmissime tenes, ut dubitationem de hac re tam certa etiam irridendam putaveris. Cur ergo tibi vel affirmandum, vel certe cum aliqua dubitatione dicendum visum est, quod perspicue falsum esse ipse convincis? Dixisti enim: Si ita data est voluntas libera, ut naturalem habeat istum motum, iam necessitate ad haec convertitur; neque ulla culpa deprehendi potest, ubi natura necessitasque dominatur. Nullo modo autem dubitare debuisti non esse ita datam, quando istum motum culpabilem esse non dubitas.

Ev. - Ego ipsum motum culpabilem dixi, et ideo mihi displicere, et reprehendendum esse dubitare non possum: animam vero quae isto motu ab incommutabili bono ad commutabilia detrahitur, nego esse culpandam, si eius natura talis est, ut eo necessario moveatur.

Ex libertate motus culpabilis...

1. 2. Aug. - Cuius est iste motus, quem profecto culpandum esse concedis?

Ev. - In animo eum video, sed cuius sit nescio.

Aug. - Numquid negas eo motu animum moveri?

Ev. - Non nego.

Aug. - Negas ergo motum quo movetur lapis, motum esse lapidis? Neque enim illum dico motum quo eum nos movemus, vel aliqua vi aliena movetur, veluti cum in coelum iacitur, sed eum quo ad terram nutu suo vergit et cadit.

Ev. - Non equidem nego motum quo ita ut dicis inclinatur, et ima petit, motum esse lapidis, sed naturalem. Si autem hoc modo etiam illum motum habet anima, profecto etiam ipse naturalis est; nec ex eo quod naturaliter movetur, recte vituperari potest: quia etiamsi ad perniciem movetur, naturae tamen suae necessitate compellitur. Porro quia istum motum non dubitamus esse culpabilem, omnimodo negandum est esse naturalem; et ideo non est similis illi motui quo naturaliter movetur lapis.

Aug. - Egimusne aliquid superioribus duabus disputationibus?

Ev. - Egimus sane.

Aug. - Credo ergo meminisse te, in prima disputatione satis esse compertum, nulla re fieri mentem servam libidinis, nisi propria voluntate: nam neque a superiore, neque ab aequali eam posse ad hoc dedecus cogi, quia iniustum est; neque ab inferiore, quia non potest. Restat igitur ut eius sit proprius iste motus, quo fruendi voluntatem ad creaturam a Creatore convertit: qui motus si culpae deputatur (unde qui dubitat, irrisione dignus tibi visus est), non est utique naturalis, sed voluntarius; in eoque similis est illi motui quo deorsum versus lapis fertur, quod sicut iste proprius est lapidis, sic ille animi: veruntamen in eo dissimilis, quod in potestate non habet lapis cohibere motum quo fertur inferius; animus vero dum non vult, non ita movetur, ut superioribus desertis inferiora diligit; et ideo lapidi naturalis est ille motus, animo vero iste voluntarius. Hinc est quod lapidem si quis dicat peccare, quod pondere suo tendit in infima, non dicam ipso lapide stolidior, sed profecto demens iudicatur: animum vero peccati arguimus, cum eum convincimus superioribus desertis ad fruendum inferiora praeponere. Propterea, quid opus est quaerere unde iste motus existat, quo voluntas avertitur ab incommutabili bono ad commutabile bonum, cum eum non nisi animi, et voluntarium, et ob hoc culpabilem esse fateamur; omnisque de hac re disciplina utilis ad id valeat, ut eo motu improbato atque cohibito, voluntatem nostram ad fruendum sempiterno bono, a lapsu temporalium convertamus?

... quia in arbitrio est voluntatis.

1. 3. Ev. - Video, et quodammodo tango, et teneo vera esse quae dicis: non enim quidquam tam firme atque intime sentio, quam me habere voluntatem, eaque me moveri ad aliquid fruendum; quid autem meum dicam, prorsus non invenio, si voluntas qua volo et nolo non est mea: quapropter cui tribuendum est, si quid per illam male facio, nisi mihi? Cum enim bonus Deus me fecerit, nec bene aliquid faciam nisi per voluntatem, ad hoc potius datam esse a bono Deo, satis apparet. Motus autem quo huc aut illuc voluntas convertitur, nisi esset voluntarius, atque in nostra positus potestate, neque laudandus cum ad superiora, neque culpandus homo esset cum ad inferiora detorquet quasi quemdam

cardinem voluntatis; neque omnino monendus esset ut istis neglectis aeterna vellet adipisci, atque ut male nollet vivere, vellet autem bene. Hoc autem monendum non esse hominem, quisquis existimat, de hominum numero exterminandus est.

Quid de Dei praescientia et libertate sentiendum?

2. 4. Quae cum ita sint, ineffabiliter me movet, quomodo fieri possit ut et Deus praescius sit omnium futurorum, et nos nulla necessitate peccemus. Quisquis enim dixerit aliter evenire posse aliquid quam Deus ante praescivit, praescientiam Dei destruere insanissima impietate molitur. Quapropter, si praescivit Deus peccatum esse bonum hominem, quod necesse est concedat mihi quisquis mecum omnium futurorum praescium fatetur Deum; si ergo ita est, non dico non eum faceret, bonum enim fecit, nec obesse quidquam Deo posset peccatum eius quem bonum ipse fecit: imo in quo faciendo bonitatem suam ostenderat, ostendit etiam in puniendo iustitiam, et liberando misericordiam: non itaque dico, non eum faceret; sed hoc dico, quoniam peccatum esse praesciverat, necesse erat id fieri, quod futurum esse praesciebat Deus. Quomodo est igitur voluntas libera ubi tam inevitabilis apparet necessitas?

Quid quibusdam visum sit.

2. 5. Aug. - Pulsasti vehementer misericordiam Dei. Adsit, aperiatque pulsantibus. Veruntamen maximam partem hominum ista quaestione torqueri non ob aliud crediderim, nisi quia non pie quaerunt, velocioresque sunt ad excusationem, quam ad confessionem peccatorum suorum. Aut enim nullam divinam providentiam praeesse rebus humanis libenter opinantur, dumque fortuitis committunt casibus et animos et corpora sua, tradunt se feriendos et dilaniandos libidinibus, divina iudicia negantes, humana fallentes, eos a quibus accusantur, fortunae patrocinio propulsare se putant; quam tamen caecam effingere ac pingere consuerunt, ut aut meliores ea sint a qua se regi arbitrantur, aut se quoque cum eadem caecitate et sentire ista fateantur et dicere. Nec enim talibus absurde etiam conceditur casibus eos agere omnia, quando agendo cadunt. Sed adversus hanc opinionem plenam stultissimi ac dementissimi erroris, satis, ut arbitror, secunda nostra sermocinatione dissertum est. Alii vero quamquam negare non audeant praesidere humanae vitae providentiam Dei, malunt tamen eam vel infirmam, vel iniustam, vel malam nefario errore credere, quam sua peccata pietate supplicii confiteri. Qui omnes si persuaderi sibi paterentur, ut cum de optimo et iustissimo et potentissimo cogitant, bonitatem et iustitiam et potentiam Dei longe maiorem superioremque esse crederent, quam quidquid cogitatione concipiunt; considerantesque semetipsos, gratias Deo se debere intellegent, etiamsi aliquid inferius eos voluisset esse quam sunt, omnibusque ossibus et medullis conscientiae suae clamarent: Ego dixi, Domine, miserere mei, cura animam meam, quia peccavi tibi 1: ita certis itineribus divinae misericordiae in sapientiam ducerentur, ut neque inventis rebus inflati, neque non inventis turbulenti, et cognoscendo instructiores fierent ad videndum, et ad quaerendum ignorando mitiores. Tibi vero cui iam hoc persuasum esse non dubito, vide quam facile de tam magna quaestione respondeam, cum mihi prior interroganti pauca responderis.

Deum praescire non adigit necessitatem.

3. 6. Certe enim hoc te movet, et hoc miraris, quomodo non sint contraria et repugnantia, ut et Deus praescius sit omnium futurorum, et nos non necessitate, sed voluntate peccemus. Si enim praescius est Deus, inquis, peccatum esse hominem, necesse est ut peccet: si autem necesse est, non ergo est in peccando voluntatis arbitrium, sed potius inevitabilis et fixa necessitas. Qua ratiocinatione hoc videlicet ne conficiatur times, ut aut Deus futurorum omnium praescius impie negetur, aut si hoc negare non possumus, fateamur non voluntate, sed necessitate peccari: an aliquid aliud te movet?

Ev. - Nihil interim aliud.

Aug. - Res ergo universas quarum Deus est praescius, non voluntate sed necessitate fieri putas.

Ev. - Omnino ita puto.

Aug. - Expergiscere tandem, teque ipsum paululum intueri, et dic mihi, si potes, qualem sis habiturus cras voluntatem, utrum peccandi, an recte faciendi.

Ev. - Nescio.

Aug. - Quid? Deum itidem nescire hoc putas?

Ev. - Nullo modo id putaverim.

Aug. - *Si ergo voluntatem tuam crastinam novit, et omnium hominum, sive qui sunt, sive qui futuri sunt, futuras praevidet voluntates, multo magis praevidet quid de iustis impiisque facturus sit.*

Ev. - *Prorsus si meorum operum praescium Deum dico, multo fidentius eum dixerim praescire opera sua, et quid sit facturus certissime praevidere.*

Aug. - *Nonne igitur caves ne tibi dicatur, etiam ipsum quaecumque facturus est, non voluntate sed necessitate facturum, si omnia quorum Deus praescius est, necessitate fiunt, non voluntate?*

Ev. - *Ego cum dicerem necessitate universa fieri quae Deus futura praescivit, ea sola intuebar quae in creatura eius fiunt, non autem quae in ipso: non enim ea fiunt, sed sunt sempiterna.*

Aug. - *Nihil ergo in sua creatura operatur Deus.*

Ev. - *Iam semel statuit quemadmodum feratur ordo eius universitatis quam condidit; neque enim aliquid nova voluntate administrat.*

Aug. - *Numquid neminem beatum facit?*

Ev. - *Facit vero.*

Aug. - *Tunc utique facit, quando ille fit.*

Ev. - *Ita est.*

Aug. - *Si igitur, verbi gratia, post annum beatus futurus es, post annum te beatum facturus est.*

Ev. - *Etiam.*

Aug. - *Iam ergo praescit hodie quod post annum facturus est.*

Ev. - *Semper hoc praescivit: nunc quoque hoc eum praescire consentio, si est ita futurum.*

Volumus etiam si Deus praescivit...

3. 7. Aug. - *Dic, quaeso, num tu creatura eius non es, aut tua beatitudo non in te fiet?*

Ev. - *Imo et creatura eius sum, et in me fiet quod beatus ero.*

Aug. - *Non ergo voluntate sed necessitate in te fiet beatitudo tua Deo faciente.*

Ev. - *Voluntas illius mihi est necessitas.*

Aug. - *Tu itaque invitus beatus eris.*

Ev. - *Mihi si esset potestas ut essem beatus, iam profecto essem: volo enim etiam nunc, et non sum, quia non ego, sed ille me beatum facit.*

Aug. - *Optime de te veritas clamat. Non enim posses aliud sentire esse in potestate nostra, nisi quod cum volumus facimus. Quapropter nihil tam in nostra potestate, quam ipsa voluntas est. Ea enim prorsus nullo intervallo, mox ut volumus praesto est. Et ideo recte possumus dicere, Non voluntate senescimus, sed necessitate; aut, non voluntate infirmamur, sed necessitate; aut, non voluntate morimur, sed necessitate; et si quid aliud huiusmodi: non voluntate autem volumus, quis vel delirus audeat dicere? Quamobrem, quamvis praesciat Deus nostras voluntates futuras, non ex eo tamen conficitur ut non voluntate aliquid velimus. Nam et de beatitudine quod dixisti, non abs teipso beatum fieri, ita dixisti, quasi hoc ego negaverim: sed dico, cum futurus es beatus, non te invitum, sed volentem futurum. Cum igitur praescius Deus sit futurae beatitudinis tuae, nec aliter aliquid fieri possit quam ille praescivit, alioquin nulla praescientia est; non tamen ex eo cogimur sentire, quod absurdissimum est et longe a veritate seclusum, non te volentem beatum futurum. Sicut autem voluntatem beatitudinis, cum esse coeperis beatus, non tibi aufert praescientia Dei, quae hodieque de tua futura beatitudine certa est: sic etiam voluntas culpabilis, si qua in te futura est, non propterea voluntas non erit, quoniam Deus eam futuram esse praescivit.*

... quia velle in nostra est potestate.

3. 8. *Attende enim, quaeso, quanta caecitate dicatur, Si praescivit Deus futuram voluntatem meam, quoniam nihil aliter potest fieri quam praescivit, necesse est ut velim quod ille praescivit: si autem necesse est, non iam voluntate, sed necessitate id me velle fatendum est. O stultitiam singularem! Quomodo ergo non potest aliud fieri quam praescivit Deus, si voluntas non erit, quam voluntatem futuram ille praesciverit? Omitto illud aequum monstruosum, quod paulo ante dixi eundem hominem dicere, Necesse est ut ita velim, qui necessitate supposita auferre nititur voluntatem. Si enim necesse est ut velit, unde volet cum voluntas non erit? Quod si non hoc modo dixerit, sed dixerit se, quia necesse est ut velit, ipsam voluntatem in potestate non habere; occurreret ex eo quod ipse dixisti, cum quaererem utrum invitus beatus futurus sis: respondisti enim quod iam esses beatus, si potestas esset; velle enim te, sed nondum posse dixisti. Ubi ego subieci de te clamasse veritatem: non enim negare possumus habere nos potestatem, nisi dum nobis non adest*

quod volumus; dum autem volumus, si voluntas ipsa deest nobis, non utique volumus. Quod si fieri non potest ut dum volumus non velimus, adest utique voluntas volentibus; nec aliud quidquam est in potestate, nisi quod volentibus adest. Voluntas igitur nostra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nostra potestate. Porro, quia est in potestate, libera est nobis. Non enim est nobis liberum, quod in potestate non habemus, aut potest non esse quod habemus. Ita fit ut et Deum non negemus esse praescium omnium futurorum, et nos tamen velimus quod volumus. Cum enim sit praescius voluntatis nostrae, cuius est praescius ipsa erit. Voluntas ergo erit, quia voluntatis est praescius. Nec voluntas esse poterit, si in potestate non erit. Ergo et potestatis est praescius. Non igitur per eius praescientiam mihi potestas adimitur, quae propterea mihi certior aderit, quia ille cuius praescientia non fallitur, adfuturam mihi esse praescivit.

Ev. - Ecce iam non nego ita necesse esse fieri quaecumque praescivit Deus, et ita eum peccata nostra praescire, ut maneat tamen nobis voluntas libera, atque in nostra posita potestate.

Necesse est Deum praescire...

4. 9. Aug. - Quid ergo te movet? an forte oblitus quid prima nostra disputatio peregit, negabis nullo cogente, aut superiore, aut inferiore, aut aequali, sed ea nos voluntate peccare?

Ev. - Nihil horum prorsus audeo negare: sed tamen, fateor, nondum video quomodo sibi non adversentur haec duo, praescientia Dei de peccatis nostris, et nostrum in peccando liberum arbitrium. Nam et iustum Deum necesse est fateamur, et praescium. Sed scire vellem qua iustitia puniat peccata quae necesse est fieri; aut quomodo non sit necesse fieri quae futura esse praescivit; aut quomodo non Creatori deputandum est, quidquid in eius creatura fieri necesse est.

... non cogit me peccare...

4. 10. Aug. - Unde tibi videtur adversum esse liberum arbitrium nostrum praescientiae Dei? quia praescientia est, an quia Dei praescientia est?

Ev. - Quia Dei potius.

Aug. - Quid ergo? si tu praescires peccaturum esse aliquem, non esset necesse ut peccaret?

Ev. - Imo necesse esset ut peccaret: non enim aliter esset praescientia mea, nisi certa praescirem.

Aug. - Non igitur quia Dei praescientia est, necesse est fieri quae praescierit, sed tantummodo quia praescientia est; quae si non certa praenoscit, utique nulla est.

Ev. - Consentio: sed quorsum ista?

Aug. - Quia, nisi fallor, non continuo tu peccare cogeres, quem peccaturum esse praescires; neque ipsa praescientia tua peccare eum cogeret, quamvis sine dubio peccaturus esset: non enim aliter id futurum esse praescires. Sicut itaque non sibi adversantur haec duo, ut tu praescientia tua noveris quod alius sua voluntate facturus est; ita Deus neminem ad peccandum cogens, praevidet tamen eos qui propria voluntate peccabunt.

... non aufert eum iuste puniturum.

4. 11. Cur ergo non vindicet iustus, quae fieri non cogit praescius? Sicut enim tu memoria tua non cogis facta esse quae praeterierunt; sic Deus praescientia sua non cogit facienda quae futura sunt. Et sicut tu quaedam quae fecisti meministi, nec tamen quae meministi omnia fecisti; ita Deus omnia quorum ipse auctor est praescit, nec tamen omnium quae praescit, ipse auctor est. Quorum autem non est malus auctor, iustus est ultor. Hinc ergo iam intellege qua iustitia Deus peccata puniat, quia quae novit futura, non facit: nam si propterea non debet retribuere supplicium peccantibus, quia praevidet peccaturos, nec recte facientibus debet praemia retribuere, quia et recte facturos nihilominus praevidet. Imo vero fateamur et ad praescientiam eius pertinere ne quid eum lateat futurorum, et ad iustitiam, ut peccatum, quia voluntate committitur, ita iudicio eius impune non fiat, sicut praescientia non cogitur fieri.

De Civitate Dei contra Paganos (413-427)

Cicero pro libera voluntate contra fatum...

V.9.1. *Hos Cicero ita redarguere nititur, ut non existimet aliquid se adversus eos valere, nisi auferat divinationem. Quam sic conatur auferre, ut neget esse scientiam futurorum, eamque omnibus viribus nullam esse omnino contendat, vel in homine vel in Deo, nullamque rerum praedictionem. Ita et Dei praescientiam negat et omnem prophetiam luce clariorem conatur evertere vanis argumentationibus et opponendo sibi quaedam oracula, quae facile possunt refelli; quae tamen nec ipsa convincit. In his autem mathematicorum coniecturis refutandis eius regnat oratio, quia vere tales sunt, ut se ipsae destruant et refellant. Multo sunt autem tolerabiliores, qui vel siderea fata constituunt, quam iste qui tollit praescientiam futurorum. Nam et confiteri esse deum et negare praescium futurorum apertissima insania est. Quod et ipse cum videret, etiam illud temptavit quod scriptum est: Dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus 15; sed non ex sua persona. Vidit enim quam esset invidiosum et molestum, ideoque Cottam fecit disputantem de hac re adversus Stoicos in libris De deorum natura et pro Lucilio Balbo, cui Stoicorum partes defendendas dedit, maluit ferre sententiam quam pro Cotta, qui nullam divinam naturam esse contendit 16. In libris vero De divinatione ex se ipso apertissime oppugnat praescientiam futurorum 17. Hoc autem totum facere videtur, ne fatum esse consentiat et perdat liberam voluntatem. Putat enim concessa scientia futurorum ita esse consequens fatum, ut negari omnino non possit. Sed quoquo modo se habeant tortuosissimae concertationes et disputationes philosophorum, nos ut confitemur summum et verum deum, ita voluntatem summamque potestatem ac praescientiam eius confitemur; nec timemus ne ideo non voluntate faciamus, quod voluntate facimus, quia id nos facturos ille praescivit, cuius praescientia falli non potest; quod Cicero timuit, ut oppugnaret praescientiam, et Stoici, ut non omnia necessitate fieri dicerent, quamvis omnia fato fieri contenderent.*

...negat et Deum futura nescire.

9. 2. *Quid est ergo, quod Cicero timuit in praescientia futurorum, ut eam labefactare disputatione detestabiliteretur? Videlicet quia, si praescita sunt omnia futura, hoc ordine venient, quo ventura esse praescita sunt; et si hoc ordine venient, certus est ordo rerum praescienti deo; et si certus est ordo rerum, certus est*

The City of God

Concerning the Foreknowledge of God and the Free Will of Man, in Opposition to the Definition of Cicero.

V.9.1. The manner in which Cicero addresses himself to the task of refuting the Stoics, shows that he did not think he could effect anything against them in argument unless he had first demolished divination. And this he attempts to accomplish by denying that there is any knowledge of future things, and maintains with all his might that there is no such knowledge either in God or man, and that there is no prediction of events. Thus he both denies the foreknowledge of God, and attempts by vain arguments, and by opposing to himself certain oracles very easy to be refuted, to overthrow all prophecy, even such as is clearer than the light (though even these oracles are not refuted by him). But, in refuting these conjectures of the mathematicians, his argument is triumphant, because truly these are such as destroy and refute themselves. Nevertheless, they are far more tolerable who assert the fatal influence of the stars than they who deny the foreknowledge of future events. For, to confess that God exists, and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things, is the most manifest folly. This Cicero himself saw, and therefore attempted to assert the doctrine embodied in the words of Scripture, "The fool has said in his heart, There is no God." That, however, he did not do in his own person, for he saw how odious and offensive such an opinion would be; and therefore, in his book on the nature of the gods, he makes Cotta dispute concerning this against the Stoics, and preferred to give his own opinion in favor of Lucilius Balbus, to whom he assigned the defense of the Stoical position, rather than in favor of Cotta, who maintained that no divinity exists. However, in his book on divination, he in his own person most openly opposes the doctrine of the prescience of future things. But all this he seems to do in order that he may not grant the doctrine of fate, and by so doing destroy free will. For he thinks that, the knowledge of future things being once conceded, fate follows as so necessary a consequence that it cannot be denied.

But, let these perplexing debates and disputations of the philosophers go on as they may, we, in order that we may confess the most high and true God Himself, do confess His will, supreme power, and prescience. Neither let us be afraid lest, after all, we do not do by will that which we do by will, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew that we would do it. It was this which Cicero was afraid of, and therefore opposed foreknowledge. The Stoics also maintained that all things do not come to pass by necessity, although they contended that all things happen according to destiny. What is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future things? Doubtless it was this — that if all future

ordo causarum; non enim fieri aliquid potest, quod non aliqua efficiens causa praecesserit; si autem certus est ordo causarum, quo fit omne quod fit, fato, inquit, fiunt omnia quae fiunt. Quod si ita est, nihil est in nostra potestate nullumque est arbitrium voluntatis; quod si concedimus, inquit 18, omnis humana vita subvertitur, frustra leges dantur, frustra obiurgationes laudes, vituperationes exhortationes adhibentur, neque ulla iustitia bonis praemia et malis supplicia constituta sunt. Haec ergo ne consequantur indigna et absurda et perniciose rebus humanis, non vult esse praescientiam futurorum; atque in has angustias coartat animum religiosum, ut unum eligat e duobus, aut esse aliquid in nostra voluntate, aut esse praescientiam futurorum, quoniam utrumque arbitratur esse non posse, sed si alterum confirmabitur, alterum tolli; si elegerimus praescientiam futurorum, tolli voluntatis arbitrium; si elegerimus voluntatis arbitrium, tolli praescientiam futurorum. Ipse itaque ut vir magnus et doctus et vitae humanae plurimum ac peritissime consulens ex his duobus elegit liberum voluntatis arbitrium; quod ut confirmaretur, negavit praescientiam futurorum atque ita, dum vult facere liberos, fecit sacrilegos. Religiosus autem animus utrumque eligat, utrumque confitetur et fide pietatis utrumque confirmat. Quo modo? inquit; nam si est praescientia futurorum, sequentur illa omnia, quae connexa sunt, donec eo perveniatur, ut nihil sit in nostra voluntate. Porro si est aliquid in nostra voluntate, eisdem recursis gradibus eo pervenitur, ut non sit praescientia futurorum. Nam per illa omnia sic recurritur: si est voluntatis arbitrium, non omnia fato fiunt; si non omnia fato fiunt, non est omnium certus ordo causarum; si certus causarum ordo non est, nec rerum certus est ordo praescienti Deo, quae fieri non possunt, nisi praecedentibus et efficientibus causis; si rerum ordo praescienti Deo certus non est, non omnia sic veniunt, ut ea ventura praescivit; porro si non omnia sic veniunt, ut ab illo ventura praescita sunt, non est, inquit, in Deo praescientia omnium futurorum 19.

Quae fides de libertate et praescientia.

9. 3. Nos adversus istos sacrilegos ausus atque impios et Deum dicimus omnia scire antequam fiant, et voluntate nos facere, quidquid a nobis non nisi volentibus fieri sentimus et novimus. Omnia vero fato fieri non dicimus, immo nulla fieri fato dicimus; quoniam fati nomen ubi solet a loquentibus poni, id est in constitutione siderum cum quisque conceptus aut natus est, quoniam res ipsa inaniter asseritur, nihil

things have been foreknown, they will happen in the order in which they have been foreknown; and if they come to pass in this order, there is a certain order of things foreknown by God; and if a certain order of things, then a certain order of causes, for nothing can happen which is not preceded by some efficient cause. But if there is a certain order of causes according to which everything happens which does happen, then by fate, says he, all things happen which do happen. But if this be so, then is there nothing in our own power, and there is no such thing as freedom of will; and if we grant that, says he, the whole economy of human life is subverted. In vain are laws enacted. In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings, exhortations had recourse to; and there is no justice whatever in the appointment of rewards for the good, and punishments for the wicked. And that consequences so disgraceful, and absurd, and pernicious to humanity may not follow, Cicero chooses to reject the foreknowledge of future things, and shuts up the religious mind to this alternative, to make choice between two things, either that something is in our own power, or that there is foreknowledge — both of which cannot be true; but if the one is affirmed, the other is thereby denied. He therefore, like a truly great and wise man, and one who consulted very much and very skillfully for the good of humanity, of those two chose the freedom of the will, to confirm which he denied the foreknowledge of future things; and thus, wishing to make men free he makes them sacrilegious. But the religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety. But how so? Says Cicero; for the knowledge of future things being granted, there follows a chain of consequences which ends in this, that there can be nothing depending on our own free wills. And further, if there is anything depending on our wills, we must go backwards by the same steps of reasoning till we arrive at the conclusion that there is no foreknowledge of future things. For we go backwards through all the steps in the following order:— If there is free will, all things do not happen according to fate; if all things do not happen according to fate, there is not a certain order of causes; and if there is not a certain order of causes, neither is there a certain order of things foreknown by God — for things cannot come to pass except they are preceded by efficient causes, — but, if there is no fixed and certain order of causes foreknown by God, all things cannot be said to happen according as He foreknew that they would happen. And further, if it is not true that all things happen just as they have been foreknown by Him, there is not, says he, in God any foreknowledge of future events.

Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we assert both that God knows all things before they come to pass, and that we do by our free will whatsoever we know and feel to be done by us only because we will it. But that all things come to pass by fate, we do not say; nay we affirm that

valere monstramus. Ordinem autem causarum, ubi voluntas Dei plurimum potest, neque negamus, neque fati vocabulo nuncupamus, nisi forte ut fatum a fando dictum intellegamus, id est a loquendo 20; non enim abnuere possumus esse scriptum in Litteris sanctis: Semel locutus est Deus, duo haec audivi, quoniam potestas Dei est, et tibi, Domine, misericordia, qui reddis unicuique secundum opera eius 21. Quod enim dictum est: Semel locutus est, intellegitur "immobiliter", hoc est incommutabiliter, "est locutus", sicut novit incommutabiliter omnia quae futura sunt et quae ipse facturus est. Hac itaque ratione possemus a fando fatum appellare, nisi hoc nomen iam in alia re soleret intellegi, quo corda hominum nolumus inclinari. Non est autem consequens, ut, si Deo certus est omnium ordo causarum, ideo nihil sit in nostrae voluntatis arbitrio. Et ipsae quippe nostrae voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo eiusque praescientia continetur, quoniam et humanae voluntates humanorum operum causae sunt; atque ita, qui omnes rerum causas praescivit, profecto in eis causis etiam nostras voluntates ignorare non potuit, quas nostrorum operum causas esse praescivit.

Deus praescit manente libera voluntate.

9. 4. Nam et illud, quod idem Cicero concedit, nihil fieri si causa efficiens non praecedat, satis est ad eum in hac quaestione redarguendum 22. Quid enim eum adiuvat, quod dicit nihil quidem fieri sine causa, sed non omnem causam esse fatalem, quia est causa fortuita, est naturalis, est voluntaria? Sufficit, quia omne, quod fit, non nisi causa praecedente fieri confitetur. Nos enim eas causas, quae dicuntur fortuitae, unde etiam fortuna nomen accepit, non esse dicimus nullas, sed latentes, easque tribuimus vel Dei veri vel quorumlibet spirituum voluntati, ipsasque naturales nequaquam ab illius voluntate seiungimus, qui est auctor omnis conditorque naturae. Iam vero causae voluntariae aut Dei sunt aut Angelorum aut hominum aut quorumque animalium, si tamen voluntates appellandae sunt animarum rationis expertium motus illi, quibus aliqua faciunt secundum naturam suam, cum quid vel appetunt vel evitant. Angelorum autem voluntates dico seu bonorum, quos Angelos Dei dicimus, seu malorum, quos angelos diaboli vel etiam daemones appellamus: sic et hominum, et bonorum scilicet et malorum. Ac per hoc colligitur non esse causas efficientes omnium quae fiunt nisi voluntarias, illius naturae scilicet, quae spiritus vitae est. Nam et aer iste seu ventus dicitur spiritus; sed quoniam corpus est, non est spiritus vitae. Spiritus ergo vitae, qui vivificat omnia

nothing comes to pass by fate; for we demonstrate that the name of fate, as it is wont to be used by those who speak of fate, meaning thereby the position of the stars at the time of each one's conception or birth, is an unmeaning word, for astrology itself is a delusion. But an order of causes in which the highest efficiency is attributed to the will of God, we neither deny nor do we designate it by the name of fate, unless, perhaps, we may understand fate to mean that which is spoken, deriving it from fari, to speak; for we cannot deny that it is written in the sacred Scriptures, "God has spoken once; these two things have I heard, that power belongs unto God. Also unto You, O God, belongs mercy: for You will render unto every man according to his works." Now the expression, "Once has He spoken," is to be understood as meaning "immovably," that is, unchangeably has He spoken, inasmuch as He knows unchangeably all things which shall be, and all things which He will do. We might, then, use the word fate in the sense it bears when derived from fari, to speak, had it not already come to be understood in another sense, into which I am unwilling that the hearts of men should unconsciously slide. But it does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of all causes, there must therefore be nothing depending on the free exercise of our own wills, for our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God, and is embraced by His foreknowledge, for human wills are also causes of human actions; and He who foreknew all the causes of things would certainly among those causes not have been ignorant of our wills. For even that very concession which Cicero himself makes is enough to refute him in this argument. For what does it help him to say that nothing takes place without a cause, but that every cause is not fatal, there being a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause? It is sufficient that he confesses that whatever happens must be preceded by a cause. For we say that those causes which are called fortuitous are not a mere name for the absence of causes, but are only latent, and we attribute them either to the will of the true God, or to that of spirits of some kind or other. And as to natural causes, we by no means separate them from the will of Him who is the author and framer of all nature. But now as to voluntary causes. They are referable either to God, or to angels, or to men, or to animals of whatever description, if indeed those instinctive movements of animals devoid of reason, by which, in accordance with their own nature, they seek or shun various things, are to be called wills. And when I speak of the wills of angels, I mean either the wills of good angels, whom we call the angels of God, or of the wicked angels, whom we call the angels of the devil, or demons. Also by the wills of men I mean the wills either of the good or of the wicked. And from this we conclude that there are no efficient causes of all things which come to pass unless voluntary causes, that is, such as belong to that nature which is the spirit of life. For the air or wind is called spirit, but,

creatorque est omnis corporis et omnis creati spiritus, ipse est Deus, spiritus utique non creatus. In eius voluntate summa potestas est, quae creatorum spirituum bonas voluntates adiuvat, malas iudicat, omnes ordinat et quibusdam tribuit potestates, quibusdam non tribuit. Sicut enim omnium naturarum creator est, ita omnium potestatum dator, non voluntatum. Malae quippe voluntates ab illo non sunt, quoniam contra naturam sunt, quae ab illo est. Corpora igitur magis subiacent voluntatibus, quaedam nostris, id est omnium animantium mortalium et magis hominum quam bestiarum; quaedam vero angelorum; sed omnia maxime Dei voluntati subdita sunt, cui etiam voluntates omnes subiciuntur, quia non habent potestatem nisi quam ille concedit. Causa itaque rerum, quae facit nec fit, Deus est; aliae vero causae et faciunt et fiunt, sicut sunt omnes creati spiritus, maxime rationales. Corporales autem causae, quae magis fiunt quam faciunt, non sunt inter causas efficientes annumerandae, quoniam hoc possunt, quod ex ipsis faciunt spirituum voluntates. Quo modo igitur ordo causarum, qui praescienti certus est deo, id efficit, ut nihil sit in nostra voluntate, cum in ipso causarum ordine magnum habeant locum nostrae voluntates? Contendat ergo Cicero cum eis, qui hunc causarum ordinem dicunt esse fatalem vel potius ipsum fati nomine appellant, quod nos abhorremus praecipue propter vocabulum, quod non in re vera consuevit intellegi. Quod vero negat ordinem omnium causarum esse certissimum et Dei praescientiae notissimum, plus eum quam Stoici detestamur. Aut enim esse Deum negat, quod quidem inducta alterius persona in libris De deorum natura facere molitus est; aut si esse confitetur deum, quem negat praescium futurorum, etiam sic nihil dicit aliud, quam quod ille dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus 23. Qui enim non est praescius omnium futurorum, non est utique Deus. Quapropter et voluntates nostrae tantum valent, quantum Deus eas valere voluit atque praescivit; et ideo quidquid valent, certissime valent, et quod facturae sunt, ipsae omnino facturae sunt, quia valituras atque facturas ille praescivit, cuius praescientia falli non potest. Quapropter si mihi fati nomen alicui rei adhibendum placeret, magis dicerem fatum esse infirmioris potentioris voluntatem, qui eum habet in potestate, quam illo causarum ordine, quem non usitato, sed suo more Stoici fatum appellant, arbitrium nostrae voluntatis auferri.

Simul esse possunt necessitas et voluntas libera...

inasmuch as it is a body, it is not the spirit of life. The spirit of life, therefore, which quickens all things, and is the creator of every body, and of every created spirit, is God Himself, the uncreated spirit. In His supreme will resides the power which acts on the wills of all created spirits, helping the good, judging the evil, controlling all, granting power to some, not granting it to others. For, as He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the bestower of all powers, not of all wills; for wicked wills are not from Him, being contrary to nature, which is from Him. As to bodies, they are more subject to wills: some to our wills, by which I mean the wills of all living mortal creatures, but more to the wills of men than of beasts. But all of them are most of all subject to the will of God, to whom all wills also are subject, since they have no power except what He has bestowed upon them. The cause of things, therefore, which makes but is made, is God; but all other causes both make and are made. Such are all created spirits, and especially the rational. Material causes, therefore, which may rather be said to be made than to make, are not to be reckoned among efficient causes, because they can only do what the wills of spirits do by them. How, then, does an order of causes which is certain to the foreknowledge of God necessitate that there should be nothing which is dependent on our wills, when our wills themselves have a very important place in the order of causes? Cicero, then, contends with those who call this order of causes fatal, or rather designate this order itself by the name of fate; to which we have an abhorrence, especially on account of the word, which men have become accustomed to understand as meaning what is not true. But, whereas he denies that the order of all causes is most certain, and perfectly clear to the prescience of God, we detest his opinion more than the Stoics do. For he either denies that God exists, — which, indeed, in an assumed personage, he has labored to do, in his book *De Natura Deorum*, — or if he confesses that He exists, but denies that He is prescient of future things, what is that but just "the fool saying in his heart there is no God?" For one who is not prescient of all future things is not God. Wherefore our wills also have just so much power as God willed and foreknew that they should have; and therefore whatever power they have, they have it within most certain limits; and whatever they are to do, they are most assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge is infallible foreknew that they would have the power to do it, and would do it. Wherefore, if I should choose to apply the name of fate to anything at all, I should rather say that fate belongs to the weaker of two parties, will to the stronger, who has the other in his power, than that the freedom of our will is excluded by that order of causes, which, by an unusual application of the word peculiar to themselves, the Stoics call Fate.

Chapter 10.— Whether Our Wills are Ruled by Necessity.

10. 1. *Unde nec illa necessitas formidanda est, quam formidando Stoici laboraverunt causas rerum ita distinguere, ut quasdam subtraherent necessitati, quasdam subderent, atque in his, quas esse sub necessitate noluerunt, posuerunt etiam nostras voluntates, ne videlicet non essent liberae, si subderentur necessitati. Si enim necessitas nostra illa dicenda est, quae non est in nostra potestate, sed etiamsi nolimus efficit quod potest, sicut est necessitas mortis: manifestum est voluntates nostras, quibus recte vel perperam vivitur, sub tali necessitate non esse. Multa enim facimus, quae si nollemus, non utique faceremus. Quo primitus pertinet ipsum velle; nam si volumus, est, si nolimus, non est; non enim vellemus, si nollemus. Si autem illa definitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse esse ut ita sit aliquid vel ita fiat, nescio cur eam timeamus, ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis. Neque enim et vitam Dei et praescientiam Dei sub necessitate ponimus, si dicamus necesse esse Deum semper vivere et cuncta praescire; sicut nec potestas eius minuitur, cum dicitur mori fallique non posse. Sic enim hoc non potest, ut potius, si posset, minoris esset utique potestatis. Recte quippe omnipotens dicitur, qui tamen mori et falli non potest. Dicitur enim omnipotens faciendo quod vult, non patiendo quod non vult; quod ei si accideret, nequaquam esset omnipotens. Unde propterea quaedam non potest, quia omnipotens est. Sic etiam cum dicimus necesse esse, ut, cum volumus, libero velimus arbitrio: et verum procul dubio dicimus, et non ideo ipsum liberum arbitrium necessitati subicimus, quae adimit libertatem. Sunt igitur nostrae voluntates et ipsae faciunt, quidquid volendo facimus, quod non fieret, si nollemus. Quidquid autem aliorum hominum voluntate nolens quisque patitur, etiam sic voluntas valet, etsi non illius, tamen hominis voluntas; sed potestas Dei. (nam si voluntas tantum esset nec posset quod vellet, potentiore voluntate impediretur; nec sic tamen voluntas nisi voluntas esset, nec alterius, sed eius esset qui vellet, etsi non posset implere quod vellet). Unde quidquid praeter suam voluntatem patitur homo, non debet tribuere humanis vel angelicis vel cuiusquam creati spiritus voluntatibus, sed eius potius, qui dat potestatem volentibus.*

...et Deum praescire.

10. 2. *Non ergo propterea nihil est in nostra voluntate, quia Deus praescivit quid futurum esset in nostra voluntate. Non enim, qui hoc praescivit, nihil praescivit. Porro si ille, qui praescivit quid futurum esset in nostra voluntate, non utique nihil, sed aliquid*

Wherefore, neither is that necessity to be feared, for dread of which the Stoics labored to make such distinctions among the causes of things as should enable them to rescue certain things from the dominion of necessity, and to subject others to it. Among those things which they wished not to be subject to necessity they placed our wills, knowing that they would not be free if subjected to necessity. For if that is to be called our necessity which is not in our power, but even though we be unwilling effects what it can effect — as, for instance, the necessity of death — it is manifest that our wills by which we live up-rightly or wickedly are not under such a necessity; for we do many things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself — for if we will, it is; if we will not, it is not — for we should not will if we were unwilling. But if we define necessity to be that according to which we say that it is necessary that anything be of such or such a nature, or be done in such and such a manner, I know not why we should have any dread of that necessity taking away the freedom of our will. For we do not put the life of God or the foreknowledge of God under necessity if we should say that it is necessary that God should live forever, and foreknow all things; as neither is His power diminished when we say that He cannot die or fall into error — for this is in such a way impossible to Him, that if it were possible for Him, He would be of less power. But assuredly He is rightly called omnipotent, though He can neither die nor fall into error. For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent. So also, when we say that it is necessary that, when we will, we will by free choice, in so saying we both affirm what is true beyond doubt, and do not still subject our wills thereby to a necessity which destroys liberty. Our wills, therefore, exist as wills, and do themselves whatever we do by willing, and which would not be done if we were unwilling. But when any one suffers anything, being unwilling by the will of another, even in that case will retains its essential validity, — we do not mean the will of the party who inflicts the suffering, for we resolve it into the power of God. For if a will should simply exist, but not be able to do what it wills, it would be overborne by a more powerful will. Nor would this be the case unless there had existed will, and that not the will of the other party, but the will of him who willed, but was not able to accomplish what he willed. Therefore, whatsoever a man suffers contrary to his own will, he ought not to attribute to the will of men, or of angels, or of any created spirit, but rather to His will who gives power to wills. It is not the case, therefore, that because God foreknew what would be in the power of our wills, there is for that reason nothing in the power of our wills. For he who foreknew this did not foreknow nothing. Moreover, if He who

praescivit: profecto et illo praesciente est aliquid in nostra voluntate. Quocirca nullo modo cogimur aut retenta praescientia Dei tollere voluntatis arbitrium aut retento voluntatis arbitrio Deum (quod nefas est) negare praescium futurorum; sed utrumque amplectimur, utrumque fideliter et veraciter confitemur; illud, ut bene credamus; hoc, ut bene vivamus. Male autem vivitur, si de Deo non bene creditur. Unde absit a nobis eius negare praescientiam, ut libere velimus, quo adiuvante sumus liberi vel erimus. Proinde non frustra sunt leges obiurgationes exhortationes laudes et vituperationes, quia et ipsas futuras esse praescivit, et valent plurimum, quantum eas valituras esse praescivit, et preces valent ad ea impetranda, quae se precantibus concessurum esse praescivit, et iuste praemia bonis factis et peccatis supplicia constituta sunt. Neque enim ideo <non> peccat homo, quia Deus illum peccaturum esse praescivit; immo ideo non dubitatur ipsum peccare, cum peccat, quia ille, cuius praescientia falli non potest, non fatum, non fortunam, non aliquid aliud, sed ipsum peccaturum esse praescivit. Qui si nolit, utique non peccat; sed si peccare noluerit, etiam hoc ille praescivit.

foreknew what would be in the power of our wills did not foreknow nothing, but something, assuredly, even though He did foreknow, there is something in the power of our wills. Therefore we are by no means compelled, either, retaining the prescience of God, to take away the freedom of the will, or, retaining the freedom of the will, to deny that He is prescient of future things, which is impious. But we embrace both. We faithfully and sincerely confess both. The former, that we may believe well; the latter, that we may live well. For he lives ill who does not believe well concerning God. Wherefore, be it far from us, in order to maintain our freedom, to deny the prescience of Him by whose help we are or shall be free. Consequently, it is not in vain that laws are enacted, and that reproaches, exhortations, praises, and vituperations are had recourse to; for these also He foreknew, and they are of great avail, even as great as He foreknew that they would be of. Prayers, also, are of avail to procure those things which He foreknew that He would grant to those who offered them; and with justice have rewards been appointed for good deeds, and punishments for sins. For a man does not therefore sin because God foreknew that he would sin. Nay, it cannot be doubted but that it is the man himself who sins when he does sin, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew not that fate, or fortune, or something else would sin, but that the man himself would sin, who, if he wills not, sins not. But if he shall not will to sin, even this did God foreknow.

Santykis tarp dviejų miestų: *civitas Dei, civitas terrena*

De Genesi ad Litteram libri duodecim (399-416)

Hominis tentatio ac lapsus secundum Gen 2, 25 - 3, 24.

XI.1.1. Et erant nudi ambo Adam et mulier eius, et non pudebat illos. Serpens autem erat prudentissimus omnium bestiarum quae sunt super terram, quas fecit Dominus Deus. Et dixit serpens mulieri: Quid, quia dixit Deus: Non edetis ab omni ligno paradisi? Et dixit mulier serpenti: A fructu ligni quod est in paradiso edemus, de fructu autem ligni quod est in medio paradisi, dixit Deus: Non edetis ex eo, neque tangetis illud, ne moriamini. Et dixit serpens mulieri: Non morte moriemini: sciebat enim Deus, quoniam qua die manducaveritis de eo, aperientur vobis oculi, et eritis tanquam dii, scientes bonum et malum. Et vidit mulier quia bonum lignum ad escam, et quia placet oculis videre, et decorum est cognoscere. Et sumens de fructu eius edit, et dedit viro suo secum, et ederunt. Et aperti sunt oculi amborum, et agnoverunt quia nudi erant, et consuerunt folia ficī, et fecerunt sibi campestria. Et audierunt vocem Domini Dei deambulantis in paradiso ad vesperam, et absconderunt se Adam et mulier eius a facie Domini Dei, in medio ligni paradisi...

...

Homo a tentatore deiectus quia superbus.

5.7. Nec arbitrandum est quod esset hominem deiecturus iste tentator, nisi praecessisset in anima hominis quaedam elatio comprimenda, ut per humiliationem peccati, quam de se falso praesumpserit, disceret. Verissime quippe dictum est: Ante ruinam exaltatur cor, et ante gloriam humiliatur 10. Et huius forte hominis vox est in Psalmo: Ego dixi in abundantia mea: Non movebor in aeternum 11. Deinde iam expertus quid mali habeat superba praesumptio propriae potestatis, et quid boni adiutorium gratiae Dei: Domine, inquit, in voluntate tua praestitisti decori meo virtutem; avertisti autem faciem tuam, et factus sum conturbatus 12. Sed sive illud de hoc homine, sive de alio dictum sit, extollenti se tamen animae, et nimium tanquam de propria virtute praefidenti, etiam experimento poenae fuerat demonstrandum quam non bene se habeat facta

The Literal Meaning of Genesis

The temptation and the fall of Adam and Eve (Genesis 2:25—3:24)

XI.1.1. And they were both naked, Adam and his wife, and they were not ashamed. Now the serpent was the cleverest of all the wild beasts that are upon the earth, which the Lord God had made. And the serpent said to the woman: Why is it that God said, You all shall not eat from the whole wood of Paradise? And the woman said to the serpent: From the fruit of the wood that is in Paradise we shall eat; but about the fruit of the tree that is in the middle of Paradise God said, You all shall not eat of it, nor shall you touch it, lest you die. And the serpent said to the woman: You shall not die the death; for God knew that on the day you take a bite of it your eyes will be opened, and you all will be like gods, knowing good and evil. And the woman saw that the tree was good for eating and that it was a pleasure for the eyes to see and was fine for gaining knowledge. And taking of its fruit she ate and gave also to her man with her, and they ate. And the eyes of both of them were opened, and they noticed that they were naked; and they sewed fig-leaves together and made themselves aprons. And they heard the voice of the Lord God strolling in Paradise in the evening, and they hid themselves, Adam and his wife, from the face of the Lord God in the middle of the wood of Paradise...

...

The first sin, before the act of disobedience, was pride

5.7. Nor is it to be supposed that this tempter was going to succeed in throwing the man, unless there was first in the man's soul a certain self-aggrandizement that needed to be stamped on, so that, humiliated by sin, he might learn how false and unjustified was his presumptuous opinion of himself. True indeed is the saying: The heart is exalted before ruin and humbled before glory (Prv 18:12); and perhaps it is this man whose voice is heard in the psalm: I myself said in my abundance: I shall not be shaken for ever; and who after experiencing what evil follows on proud self-reliance on his own powers, and what good on the assistance of God's grace, Lord, he says, by your will you have bestowed power on my comeliness; but you turned away your face and I became troubled (Ps 30:6-7). But whether that was said about this man or about another, the soul at any rate that exalted itself and was excessively over-confident, for instance, in its own

natura, si a faciente recesserit. Hinc enim etiam maxime commendatur quale bonum sit Deus, quando nulli ab eo recedenti bene est: quia et qui gaudent in mortiferis voluptatibus, esse sine dolorum timore non possunt; et qui omnino malum desertionis suae maiore superbiae stupore non sentiunt, aliis qui haec discernere noverunt, miseriores prorsus apparent; ut si nolunt recipere medicinam talia devitandi, valeant ad exemplum, quo possint talia devitari. Sicut enim apostolus Iacobus dicit: Unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus: deinde concupiscentia cum conceperit, parit peccatum; peccatum autem cum consummatum fuerit, generat mortem 13. Unde sanato superbiae tumore resurgitur, si voluntas quae ante experimentum defuit, ut permaneretur cum Deo, saltem post experimentum adsit, ut redeatur ad Deum.

Quid boni afferat tentatio.

6.8. Sic autem quidam moventur de hac primi hominis tentatione, quod eam fieri permiserit Deus, quasi nunc non videant universum genus humanum diaboli insidiis sine cessatione tentari. Cur et hoc permittit Deus? An quia probatur et exercetur virtus, et est palma gloriosior non consensisse tentatum, quam non potuisse tentari: cum etiam ipsi qui deserto Creatore eunt post tentatorem, magis magisque tentent eos qui in verbo Dei permanent, praebeantque illis contra cupiditatem devitationis exemplum, et incutiant contra superbiam timorem pium? Unde dicit Apostolus: Intendens teipsum, ne et tu tenteris 14. Mirum est enim quantum ista humilitas, qua subdimur Creatori, ne tamquam eius adiutorio non egentes de nostris viribus praesumamus, per Scripturas omnes divinas cura continua commendatur. Cum ergo etiam per iniustos iusti, ac per impios pii proficiant, frustra dicitur: Non crearet Deus, quos praesciebat malos futuros. Cur enim non crearet quos praesciebat bonis profuturos, ut et utiles eorum bonis voluntatibus exercendis admonendisque nascantur, et iuste pro sua mala voluntate puniantur?

Cur homo non talis creatus sit qui nollet umquam peccare.

7.9. Talem, inquit, faceret hominem, qui nollet omnino peccare. Ecce nos concedimus meliorem esse naturam quae omnino peccare nolit; concedant et ipsi non esse malam naturam quae sic facta est, ut posset non peccare si nollet, et iustam esse sententiam qua punita est, quae voluntate non necessitate peccavit. Sicut ergo ratio vera docet meliorem esse naturam

powers, had to be given a demonstration by experiencing punishment of precisely how not well a nature fares that has been made, if it draws away from the one that made it. This also brings home to us most effectively what sort of good it is that God must be, when nobody fares well who draws away from him. Those, you see, who wallow in the enjoyment of death-dealing pleasures, cannot escape the fear of the contrary pains; while as for those whose pride renders them even more insensitive, so that they fail totally to perceive what is so evil about their desertion of God, they do strike others, who have the discernment to note these things, as being indeed more wretched still. And so, even if they refuse to take the medicine of shunning such things, they are of use as an example of why such things should be shunned. This, after all, is like what the apostle James has to say: Each one is tempted on being dragged along and inveigled by his own concupiscence. Next, when concupiscence conceives she gives birth to sin; while sin, when he has matured, begets death (Jas 1:14-15). From this one can rise again when the tumor of pride has been healed if, where before the experience the will was lacking to remain with God, at least after the experience the will is there to go back to God.

More reflections on why God allows us to be tempted

6.8. Some people, though, are bothered about God's permitting the first man to be tempted in this way, without apparently noticing that the whole human race is incessantly being tempted by the devil's snares. Why does God permit this too? Is it because it is an effective test and exercise of virtue, and because the palm for not having given in when tempted is more glorious than for having been beyond the possibility of temptation? Even those, you see, who forsake the creator and go off behind the tempter, also put more and more temptations in the way of those who abide by the word of God, and present them with a good reason against any hankering after going astray, and hammer into them a godly fear of pride. It is in this connection that the apostle says: looking to yourself lest you also be tempted (Gal 6:1). It is, in fact, astonishing with what continuous care all the divine scriptures commend to us the humility of subjecting ourselves to the creator, in order to stop us from relying on our own spiritual resources, as though we had no need of his help. So then, considering that it is by means of the unjust that the just make progress, and the godly by means of the ungodly, it is pointless to say, "God should not have created people he knew beforehand were going to be bad." Why indeed should he not create people he knew were going to profit the good, so that they would first be born to act as useful warnings to the good and to be the means of training their wills in virtue, and then be punished for their own bad will?

quam prorsus nihil delectat illicitum; ita ratio vera nihilominus docet etiam illam bonam esse quae habet in potestate illicitam delectationem, si exstiterit, ita cohibere, ut non solum de caeteris licitis recteque factis, verum etiam de ipsius pravae delectationis cohibitione laetetur. Cum ergo haec natura bona sit, illa melior, cur illam solam, et non utramque potius faceret Deus? Ac per hoc qui parati erant de illa sola Deum laudare, uberius eum debent laudare de utraque. Illa quippe est in sanctis Angelis, haec in sanctis hominibus. Qui autem sibi partes iniquitatis elegerunt, laudabilemque naturam culpabili voluntate depravarunt. non quia praesciti sunt, ideo creati minime debuerunt: Habent enim et ipsi locum suum, quem in rebus impleant pro utilitate sanctorum. Nam Deus nec iustitia cuiusquam recti hominis eget; quanto minus iniquitate perversi?

Quare creati qui praesciebantur futuri mali.

8.10. Quis autem sobria consideratione dicat: Melius non crearet quem praesciebat ex alterius iniquitate posse corrigi, quam crearet etiam quem praesciebat pro sua iniquitate debere damnari? Hoc est enim dicere, melius non esse qui alterius malo bene utendo misericorditer coronaretur, quam esse etiam malum qui pro suo merito iuste puniretur. Cum enim ratio certa demonstrat duo quaedam non aequalia bona, sed unum superius, alterum inferius; non intellegunt tardi corde, cum dicunt: Utrumque tale esset; nihil se aliud dicere quam: Solum illud esset. Ac sic cum aequare volunt genera bonorum, numerum minuunt; et immoderate augendo unum genus, alterum tollunt. Quis autem hos audiret, si dicerent: Quoniam excellentior sensus est videndi quam audiendi, quatuor oculi essent, et aures non essent? Ita, si excellentior est creatura illa rationalis, quae sine ullius poenae comparatione, sine ulla superbia Deo subditur; aliqua vero in hominibus ita creata est, ut in se Dei beneficium non possit agnoscere, nisi alterius videndo supplicium, ut non altum sapiat, sed timeat 15, id est non de se praefidat, sed confidat in Deum; quis recte intellegens dicat: Talis esset ista qualis illa; nec videat se nihil aliud dicere quam: Non esset ista, sed sola esset illa? Quod si inerudite atque insipienter dicitur, cur ergo non crearet Deus etiam quos malos futuros esse praesciebat, volens ostendere iram et demonstrare potentiam suam, et ob hoc sustinens in multa patientia vasa irae, quae perfecta sunt in perditionem, ut notas faceret divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae, quae praeparavit in gloriam 16? Sic enim qui gloriatur, non nisi in Domino gloriatur 17, cum cognoscit non suum, sed illius esse, non solum ut

7.9. "He should have made man," they say, "such that he would have had no will to sin at all." Look, we for our part happily concede that a nature which cannot sin at all is the better one; let them concede in turn that a nature is not bad which has been so made that it would be able not to sin if it did not wish to, and that the sentence of punishment on it is a just one when it has sinned deliberately, not by any necessity. So then, just as true reason teaches that the creature which finds absolutely no joy in anything unlawful is the better one, so too nonetheless does true reason teach that that creature is also good which has it in its power to check unlawful enjoyment, and in such a way that it not only rejoices in other lawful ones and in things rightly done, but also in the checks it imposes on crooked, perverse joys. So then, since this nature is good, that one better, why should God only make that one, and not rather make them both? And accordingly those who were all set to praise God for that one alone ought to praise him all the more exuberantly for each of them: that one as it is found in the holy angels, this one in holy human beings while as for those who have chosen to join forces with iniquity and have distorted an admirable nature by means of a reprehensible will, the fact that God had foreknowledge of them is no reason at all why he should not have created them. They too, you see, have their place to fill in the scheme of things for the benefit of the saints. God, I mean to say, stands in no need even of the justice of any upright person; how much less of any person's iniquity!

The same, with the emphasis on the way in which bad people can be of service to the good

8.10. Is there anybody, though, who would say on sober second thoughts: "He would have done better not to create one he foreknew could be reformed by means of another's wickedness, than also to create one he foreknew would earn damnation for his wickedness"? This after all amounts to saying: "It would have been better for one person not to exist who would have been mercifully granted a heavenly crown for making good use of another's evil behavior, than for the evil person also to exist who would be justly punished for his deserts." When reason clearly presents us with two unequal goods, one superior, the other inferior, the dull-witted do not understand that when they say, "Each should have been like the better one," what they are really saying is, "There should only have been the better one." When they want to give equal value to different kinds of good, they just cut down the number, and by inordinately rating one of them too high, they merely eliminate the other. Who, though, would listen to them, if they said, "Since the sense of sight is better than that of hearing, it would have been better to have four eyes and no ears"? Thus the rational creature is indeed the more excellent which without any punishment to make comparisons with, without any pride, submits itself to God; but still there is also

sit, verum etiam ut non nisi ab illo bene sibi sit, a quo habet ut sit.

De eadem re.

8.11. Nimis itaque importune dicitur: Non essent quibus Deus tantam beneficentiam misericordiae suae tribueret, si aliter esse non possent, nisi essent et hi in quibus vindictae iustitiam demonstraret.

9.11. Cur enim non utrique potius essent, quando in utrisque et bonitas Dei et aequitas iure praedicatur? Dei praescientia et hominis libertas.

9.12. At enim si Deus vellet, etiam isti boni essent. Quanto melius hoc Deus voluit, ut quod vellent essent: sed boni infructuose, mali autem impune non essent, et in eo ipso aliis utiles essent? Sed praesciebat quod eorum futura esset voluntas mala. Praesciebat sane, et quia falli non potest eius praescientia, ideo non ipsius, sed eorum est voluntas mala. Cur ergo eos creavit, quos tales futuros esse praesciebat? Quia sicut praevidit quid mali essent facturi, sic etiam praevidit de malis factis eorum quid boni esset ipse factururus. Sic enim eos fecit, ut eis relinqueret unde et ipsi aliquid facerent, quo quidquid etiam culpabiliter eligerent, illum de se laudabiliter operantem invenirent. A se quippe habent voluntatem malam, ab illo autem et naturam bonam, et iustam poenam; sibi debitum locum, aliis exercitationis adminiculum et timoris exemplum.

Malorum voluntatem in bonum convertere potest Deus.

10.13. Sed posset, inquit, etiam ipsorum voluntatem in bonum convertere, quoniam omnipotens est. Posset plane. Cur ergo non fecit? Quia noluit. Cur noluerit, penes ipsum est. Debemus enim non plus sapere quam oportet sapere 18. Puto tamen paulo ante satis nos ostendisse non parvi boni esse rationalem creaturam, etiam istam quae malorum comparatione cavet malum: quod genus bonae creaturae utique non esset, si omnium malas voluntates in bonum Deus convertisset, et nulli iniquitati poenam debitam infligeret; ac sic non esset nisi solum illud genus, quod nulla vel peccati vel supplicii malorum comparatione proficeret. Ita velut aucta numerositate excellentioris generis, ipsorum generum bonorum numerus minueretur.

Malorum poenis Deum bonorum saluti consulere.

one that has been created among human beings which could not appreciate God's goodness to itself without observing the punishment inflicted on another, warning it not to be high-minded, but to fear (Rom 11:20), that is, not to be overconfidently reliant on self, but to rely on God. Could anybody with a proper understanding say, "This one should have been like that one," and fail to see that this amounts to saying, "This one should not have existed, but only that one"? But if this is in fact said by the illiterate and the foolish, the answer is: So why then should God not have created those he foreknew were going to be bad, wishing to display his wrath and demonstrate his power, and for this reason bearing in much patience with the vessels of wrath, which have been completed for perdition, in order to make known the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared beforehand for glory (Rom 9:22-23)? This, you see, is why the one who glories should glory only in the Lord (1 Cor 1:31), when he comes to know that it is not from himself but from God that he gets his very being; and what is more, that his well-being also comes only from the one from whom is derived his mere being.

11. And so it is altogether too thoughtlessly crude to say, "They should not exist," about those to whom God would give such a great demonstration of his mercy, if the only way for them to exist was for these others also to exist in whom he would vindicate and demonstrate his justice.

9. Why, after all, should not both sorts exist, when in each of them is justly displayed both God's goodness and fairness?

12. But then: "If God wished, these too would be good." How much better is what God actually did wish, that they should be what they wished; fruitlessly good, however, while their being bad would not go unpunished and would thereby be profitable for others! "But he knew beforehand that their will was going to be bad." He certainly did, and because he cannot be mistaken in his foreknowledge, that is why their will, not his, is bad. "So why then did he create them, foreknowing that they were going to be like that?" Because, just as he foreknew what bad things they were going to do, so he also foreknew what good he himself was going to do with their bad deeds. He made them, you see, in such a way as to leave to them the means of doing something by which they would discover that however reprehensible their choice, he would make admirable use of them. It is from themselves of course that they have a will that is bad, from him that they have both a nature that is good and a punishment that is just, the place that is their due, providing others with an aid to training in virtue and a salutary example to fear.

10.13. "But he could have changed even their will," he persists, "for the better, since he is all-powerful." He could

11.14. Ergo, inquit, est aliquid in operibus Dei, quod alterius malo indigeat, quo proficiat ad bonum? Itane obsurduerunt et excaecati sunt homines, nescio quo studio contentionis, ut non audiant vel videant, quibusdam punitis, quam plurimi corrigantur? Quis enim paganus, quis Iudaeus, quis haereticus non hoc in domo sua quotidie probet? Verum cum venitur ad disputationem inquisitionemque veritatis, nolunt advertere sensus suos homines, ex quo opere divinae providentiae in eos veniat imponendae commotio disciplinae; ut si non corriguntur qui puniuntur, eorum tamen exemplum caeteri metuant, valeatque ad eorum salutem iusta pernicies aliorum. Num enim malitiae eorum vel nequitiae Deus auctor est, de quorum iusta poena consulit, quibus hoc modo consulendum esse constituit? Non utique: sed cum eos vitiis propriis malos futuros esse praesciret, non eos tamen creare destitit; utilitati deputans eorum, quos in hoc genere creavit, ut ad bonum proficere, nisi malorum comparatione, non possent. Si enim non essent, nulli rei utique prodessent. Parumne boni est actum ut sint, qui certe illi generi utiles sunt; quod genus quisquis non vult ut sit, nihil aliud agit, nisi ut ipse in eo non sit?

Dei praescientia ac providentia.

11.15. Magna opera Domini; exquisita in omnes voluntates eius 19: praevidet bonos futuros, et creat; praevidet malos futuros, et creat: seipsum ad fruendum praebens bonis, multa munerum suorum largiens et malis, misericorditer ignoscens: iuste ulciscens; itemque misericorditer ulciscens, iuste ignoscens: nihil metuens de cuiusquam malitia, nihil indigens de cuiusquam iustitia; nihil sibi consulens nec de operibus bonorum, et bonis consulens etiam de poenis malorum. Cur ergo non permetteret tentari hominem illa tentatione prodendum, convincendum, puniendum, cum superba concupiscentia propriae potestatis quod conceperat pareret, suoque fetu confunderetur 20, iustoque supplicio a superbiae atque inobedientiae malo posteros deterreret, quibus ea conscribenda et annuntianda parabantur?

Cur tentatio per serpentem fieri permissa.

12.16. Si autem quaeritur cur potissimum per serpentem diabolus tentare permissus sit; iam hoc significandi gratia factum esse, quem non admoneat Scriptura tantae auctoritatis, tantis divinitatis documentis agens in prophetando, quantis effectis iam mundus impletus est? Non quo diabolus aliquid ad instructionem nostram significare voluerit, sed cum

have done, certainly. "So why didn't he, then?" Because he didn't want to. Why he didn't want to is his secret. We ought not, after all, to be more wise than we have to be (Rom 12:3). All the same, I think I showed sufficiently a short while ago⁸ that even that rational creature is of no small value which shuns evil by a comparison of evils; and this kind of good creature would not exist if God Almighty had changed the bad wills of all people for the better, and did not inflict due punishment on any wickedness; and in this way there would only be the one kind of good rational creature, which makes progress without noting comparisons either with the sins of the wicked or the penalties they pay for them. This looks like increasing the number included in the more excellent kind by simply reducing the number of good kinds of creature.

That the good can benefit from the punishment of the wicked is a matter of common experience

11.14. "And so," they say, "there is something in the works of God, is there, which needs the evil of another to help it make progress to the good?" Have people grown so deaf and blind through heaven knows what dedication to controversy, that they can neither hear nor see how many are the people whose behavior improves on some being punished? I mean to say, is there a pagan, is there a Jew, is there a heretic who cannot prove the point daily in his own household? But when it comes to discussion and inquiry into the truth, people refuse to attend to their own senses, and to ask themselves what work of divine providence it is that winds them up to imposing discipline, so that even if those who are punished show no improvement, their example may nonetheless strike fear into the hearts of the others, and their justly deserved calamity may ensure the welfare of the rest. God, after all, is not the author, is he, of the ill-will or wickedness of those whose just punishment he uses in the interests of others, whose interests he has decided are to be served in this way? Of course not. But while he foreknew that they were going to be bad by their own vices, he did not for all that desist from creating them. Instead he assigned them to the benefit of those others whom he created in this group of people that would be unable to make progress towards the good without bad people to compare themselves with; after all, if they did not exist, they could of course not be of any use to any other thing. Was it a trifling good to ensure the existence of those who would assuredly benefit that kind of person? Anyone who does not want this kind to exist is only ensuring that he does not belong to it himself.

15. Great are the works of the Lord, precisely wrought for all his wishes (Ps 111:2). He foresees those who are going to be good and creates them; he foresees those who are going to be bad and creates them, bestowing himself on the good to be enjoyed by them, lavishing much of his bounty also on the

accedere ad tentandum non posset nisi permissus, num per aliud posset, nisi per quod permittebatur accedere? Quidquid igitur serpens ille significavit, ei providentiae tribuendum est, sub qua et ipse diabolus suam quidem habet cupiditatem nocendi; facultatem autem non nisi quae datur, vel ad subvertenda ac perdenda vasa irae, vel ad humilianda sive probanda vasa misericordiae. Natura itaque serpentis unde sit, novimus: produxit enim terra in verbo Dei omnia pecora, et bestias, et serpentes; quae universa creatura habens in se animam vivam irrationalem, universae rationali creaturae sive bonae sive malae voluntatis, lege divini ordinis subdita est 21. Quid ergo mirum si per serpentem aliquid agere permissus est diabolus, cum daemona in porcos intrare Christus ipse permiserit 22?

Diaboli naturam bonam esse quam a Deo creata sit.

13.17. Magis de ipsa natura diaboli scrupulosius quaeri solet, quam totam quidam haeretici, offensae molestia malae voluntatis eius, alienare conantur a creatura summi et veri Dei, et alterum ei dare principium, quod sit contra Deum. Non enim valent intellegere, omne quod est, in quantum aliqua substantia est, et bonum esse, et nisi ab illo vero Deo, a quo omne bonum est, esse non posse: malam vero voluntatem inordinate moveri, bona inferiora superioribus praeponendo; atque ita factum esse ut rationalis creaturae spiritus, sua potestate propter excellentiam delectatus, tumesceret superbia, per quam caderet a beatitudine spiritalis paradisi, et invidentia contabesceret. In quo tamen bonum est hoc ipsum quod vivit, et vivificat corpus, sive aereum, sicut ipsius diaboli vel daemonum spiritus, sive terrenum, sicut hominis anima, cuiusvis etiam maligni atque perversi. Ita dum nolunt aliquid, quod Deus fecerit, propria voluntate peccare, ipsius Dei substantiam dicunt primo necessitate, et post inexpiabiliter voluntate corruptam atque perversam. Sed de istorum dementissimo errore alias iam diximus multa.

Superbiam causam angelicae ruinae fuisse.

14.18. In hoc autem opere quaerendum est secundum sanctam Scripturam, quid de diabolo dicendum sit. Primo, utrum ab initio ipsius mundi sua potestate delectatus abstinerit ab illa societate et caritate, qua beati sunt Angeli qui fruuntur Deo; an aliquo tempore in sancto coetu fuerit Angelorum, etiam ipse pariter iustus, et pariter beatus. Nonnulli enim dicunt ipsum ei fuisse casum a supernis sedibus, quod inviderit homini factum ad imaginem Dei. Porro autem invidia

bad, pardoning with mercy, taking vengeance with justice—and again taking vengeance with mercy, pardoning with justice; having nothing to fear from anyone's malice, nothing he needs from anyone's justice; not serving his own interests even with the works of the good, and serving the interests of the good even with the works of the bad. So then, why should he not allow the man to be tempted, and by that temptation to be duly shown up, convicted, punished, when the proud concupiscence or lust for his own independent power and authority brought forth what it had conceived, and he was put to confusion by that progeny?⁹ In this way his descendants, for whom the writing and publishing of this story was being prepared, would have the deterrent of the distress so justly inflicted on him, to keep them from pride and the evil of disobedience.

Why a serpent, particularly?

12.16. If however you ask why it was a serpent, particularly, that the devil was permitted to employ for the temptation, the answer is that this was done for the sake of some deeper meaning. Who could fail to see that this is a lesson which has all the authority of scripture behind it, conveying by prophecy as many and as great proofs of divinity as already fill the world with its effects? Not that the devil wished to signify something for our instruction; but seeing that he could not proceed to the business of temptation unless permitted, he surely could not use any other instrument, could he, than the one permitted? So whatever meaning it is that was signified by that serpent, it is to be credited to the same providence as that under which the devil himself has indeed his own longing to do harm, but only the actual ability to do so which is given him, either for the perdition of the vessels of wrath, or for the humbling or testing of the vessels of mercy (Rom 9:22.23). As for the serpent's nature, then, we know where it came from; the earth, you see, produced at God's word all cattle and serpents and wild beasts;¹⁰ and the whole section of creation that has in it a living, non-rational soul is subject by the law of God's plan to the rational creation, whether that is of a good or a bad disposition. So why be surprised if the devil should be permitted to do something by means of a serpent, when Christ himself allowed demons to enter pigs?¹¹

Of the nature of the devil himself, and of his sin

13.17. It is the general practice to inquire more minutely into the devil's own nature, which some heretics, put off by the vexing problem of his evil will, strive to remove entirely from the creation of the supreme and true God, and to provide with another source, which is God's opposite. They are incapable, you see, of understanding that everything that is, insofar as it is a substance, is not only good but also unable to exist at all, unless it comes from that true God from whom every good

sequitur superbiam, non praecedit: non enim causa superbiendi est invidia, sed causa invidendi superbia. Cum igitur superbia sit amor excellentiae propriae, invidentia vero sit odium felicitatis alienae, quid unde nascatur satis in promptu est. Amando enim quisque excellentiam suam, vel paribus invidet, quod ei coaequantur; vel inferioribus, ne sibi coaequantur; vel superioribus, quod eis non coaequetur. Superbiendo igitur invidus, non invidendo quisque superbus est. Superbiam amoremque sui perversum fontes esse omnium malorum.

15.19. Merito initium omnis peccati superbiam Scriptura definivit, dicens: Initium omnis peccati superbia 23. Cui testimonio non inconvenienter aptatur etiam illud quod Apostolus ait: Radix omnium malorum est avaritia 24; si avaritiam generalem intellegamus, qua quisque appetit aliquid amplius quam oportet, propter excellentiam suam, et quemdam propriae rei amorem: cui sapienter nomen latina lingua indidit, cum appellavit privatum, quod potius a detrimento quam ab incremento dictum elucet. Omnis enim privatio minuit. Unde itaque vult eminere superbia inde in angustias egestatemque contruditur, cum ex communi ad proprium damnoso sui amore redigitur. Specialis est autem avaritia, quae usitatus appellatur amor pecuniae. Cuius nomine Apostolus per speciem genus significans, universalem avaritiam volebat intellegi dicendo: Radix omnium malorum est avaritia. Hac enim et diabolus cecidit, qui utique non amavit pecuniam, sed propriam potestatem. Proinde perversus sui amor privat sancta societate turgidum spiritum, eumque coarctat miseria iam per iniquitatem satiari cupientem. Hinc alio loco cum dixisset: Erunt enim homines seipsos amantes; continuo subiecit, amatores pecuniae 25, ab illa generali avaritia cuius superbia caput est, ad hanc specialem descendens quae propria hominum est. Neque enim essent etiam homines amatores pecuniae, nisi eo se putarent excellentiores, quo ditiores. Cui morbo contraria caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt 26, id est non privata excellentia laetatur: merito ergo et non inflatur 27.

Amores duo, civitates duae.

15.20. Hi duo amores, quorum alter sanctus est, alter immundus; alter socialis, alter privatus; alter communi utilitati consulens propter supernam societatem, alter etiam rem communem in potestatem propriam redigens propter arrogantem dominationem; alter subditus, alter aemulus Deo; alter tranquillus, alter turbulentus; alter pacificus, alter seditiosus; alter veritatem laudibus errantium

comes, while a bad will is one that is inordinately disposed to prefer lower goods to higher ones; and that thus it came to pass that a spirit of the rational creation, delighting in its own power as surpassing that of all other creatures, became swollen with pride and thereby fell from the bliss of the spiritual paradise, and was eaten up by jealousy. All the same, there is in such a spirit this goodness that it has life and gives life to a body, whether an airy one, like the spirits of the devil himself and the demons, or an earthy one like the soul of any human being, even an evil and crooked one. Thus it is, that while these heretics will not have anything that God made sinning by its own will, they say that the substance of God himself was first of necessity and then of its own will irremediably corrupted and distorted. But of these people's raving lunacy and their error I have already had much to say elsewhere.

14.18. In this work, however, our task is to inquire, in the light of holy scripture, what has to be said about the devil. In the first place, whether it was from the very beginning of creation that delighting in his own power he withdrew from that fellowship and charity which is bliss for the angels who enjoy God, or whether he himself too was for some time in the holy company of angels, equally just and enjoying equal bliss. Several authors say, you see, that what brought about his fall from the supernal regions was his jealous grudging of the man being made to the image of God. But against that is the fact that jealousy or envy comes after pride, not before it; jealousy after all does not cause pride, but pride does cause jealousy. Since pride, then, is the love of one's own superiority, while jealousy is the hatred of another's good fortune, it is easy to see which comes from which. I mean, anyone in love with his own superiority will be jealous of his peers because they are treated as his equals, and of his inferiors in case they should become his equals, and of his superiors because he is not treated as their equal. Thus it is pride that makes people jealous, not jealousy that makes them proud.

Intermezzo on pride and avarice

15.19. Rightly has scripture designated pride as the beginning of all sin, saying, The beginning of all sin is pride (Sir 10:13). Into this text can be slotted rather neatly that other one also from the apostle: The root of all evils is avarice (1 Tm 6:10), if we understand avarice in a general sense as what goads people to go for anything more greedily than is right because of their superiority and a kind of love for their very own property. The Latin—and English—languages have given such property a very shrewd name by calling it "private," a word clearly suggesting loss rather than gain in value; every privation, after all, spells diminution. And so the very means by which pride aims at pre-eminence serve to thrust it down

praeferens, alter quoquo modo laudis avidus; alter amicalis, alter invidus; alter hoc volens proximo quod sibi, alter subicere proximum sibi; alter propter proximi utilitatem regens proximum, alter propter suam: praecesserunt in Angelis; alter in bonis, alter in malis; et distinxerunt conditas in genere humano civitates duas, sub admirabili et ineffabili providentia Dei, cuncta, quae creat, administrantis et ordinantis, alteram iustorum, alteram iniquorum. Quarum etiam quadam temporali commixtione peragitur saeculum, donec ultimo iudicio separentur, et altera coniuncta Angelis bonis in rege suo vitam consequatur aeternam, altera coniuncta angelis malis in ignem cum rege suo mittatur aeternum. De quibus duabus civitatibus latius fortasse alio loco, si Dominus voluerit, disseremus.

into sore straits and want, when its ruinous self-love removes it from what is common to what is its own property. There is a particular sort of avarice, though, which is more usually called love of money,¹⁶ and it was by this name, signifying the general by the particular, that the apostle wished universal avarice to be understood, when he said, The root of all evil is avarice. It was through this also that the devil fell—not of course that he loved money, but his own personal power. Accordingly his twisted love of self deprives that swollen, puffed-up spirit of holy companions, and confines him, so eager to sate himself through wickedness, in an ever hungry wretchedness. Thus it is that the apostle, after saying in another place, For there will be people who love themselves, added straightaway, lovers of money, coming down from that general avarice, of which pride is the source, to this particular kind which is proper to humanity. Not even human beings, after all, would be lovers of money, unless they thought that the richer they were, the more superior they would be too. In contrast with this disease charity does not seek her own, that is, does not rejoice in private pre-eminence and superiority; and rightly therefore is also not puffed up (1 Cor 13:5.4).

15.20. These two loves — of which one is holy, the other unclean, one social, the other private, one taking thought for the common good because of the companionship in the upper regions, the other putting even what is common at its own personal disposal because of its lordly arrogance; one of them God's subject, the other his rival, one of them calm, the other turbulent, one peaceable, the other rebellious; one of them setting more store by the truth than by the praises of those who stray from it, the other greedy for praise by whatever means, one friendly, the other jealous, one of them wanting for its neighbor what it wants for itself, the other wanting to subject its neighbor to itself; one of them exercising authority over its neighbor for its neighbor's good, the other for its own — these two loves were first manifested in the angels, one in the good, the other in the bad, and then distinguished the two cities, one of the just, the other of the wicked, founded in the human race under the wonderful and inexpressible providence of God as he administers and directs everything he has created. These two cities are mixed up together in the world while time runs its course, until they are sorted out by the last judgment, and one of them, joined to the good angels, attains eternal life in its king, while the other, joined to the bad angels, is dispatched with its king into the eternal fire. About these two cities we shall perhaps have more to say, ranging more widely over the subject, if the Lord so wishes, in another place.

De Civitate Dei contra Paganos (413-427)

Quae sit in secunda libri parte disputatio

XI.1. Civitatem Dei dicimus, cuius ea Scriptura testis est, quae non fortuitis motibus animorum, sed plane summae dispositione providentiae super omnes omnium gentium litteras, omnia sibi genera ingeniorum humanorum divina excellens auctoritate subiecit. Ibi quippe scriptum est: Gloriosa dicta sunt de te, civitas Dei 1; et in alio Psalmo legitur: Magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis in civitate Dei nostri, in monte sancto eius, dilatans exultationes universae terrae 2; et paulo post in eodem Psalmo: Sicut audivimus, ita et vidimus, in civitate Domini virtutum, in civitate Dei nostri; Deus fundavit eam in aeternum 3; item in alio: Fluminis impetus laetificat civitatem Dei, sanctificavit tabernaculum suum Altissimus; Deus in medio eius non commovebitur 4. His atque huiusmodi testimoniis, quae omnia commemorare nimis longum est, didicimus esse quamdam civitatem Dei, cuius cives esse concupivimus illo amore, quem nobis illius conditor inspiravit. Huic conditori sanctae civitatis, cives terrenae civitatis deos suos praeferunt, ignorantes eum esse Deum deorum 5, non deorum falsorum, hoc est impiorum et superborum, qui eius incommutabili omnibusque communi luce privati, et ob hoc ad quamdam egenam potestatem redacti, suas quodam modo privatas potentias consecantur, honoresque divinos a deceptis subditis quaerunt; sed deorum piorum atque sanctorum, qui potius se ipsos uni subdere quam multos sibi, potiusque Deum colere quam pro Deo coli delectantur.

Sed huius sanctae civitatis inimicis decem superioribus libris, quantum potuimus, Domino et Rege nostro adiuvante, respondimus. Nunc vero quid a me iam exspectetur agnoscens, meique non immemor debiti, de duarum civitatum, terrenae scilicet et caelestis, quas in hoc interim saeculo perplexas quodam modo diximus invicemque permixtas, exortu et excursu et debitis finibus, quantum valuero, disputare, eius ipsius Domini et Regis nostri ubique opitulatione fretus, adgrediar, primumque dicam, quem ad modum exordia duarum istarum civitatum in angelorum diversitate praecesserint.

Deus nobis locutus est...

2. Magnum est et admodum rarum universam creaturam corpoream et incorpoream consideratam compertamque mutabilem intentione mentis excedere,

The City of God

XI.1. The expression 'City of God,' which I have been using is justified by that Scripture whose divine authority puts it above the literature of all other people and brings under its sway every type of human genius – and that, not by some casual intellectual reaction, but by a disposition of Divine Providence. For, in this Scripture, we read: 'Glorious things are said of thee, O city of God'; and, in another psalm: 'Great is the Lord, and exceedingly to be praised in the city of our God, in His holy mountain, increasing the joy of the whole earth'; and, a little later in the same psalm: 'As we have heard, so have we seen, in the city of the Lord of hosts, in the city of our God: God hath founded it for ever'; and in another text: 'The stream of the river maketh the city of God joyful: the most High hath sanctified his own tabernacle. God is in the midst thereof, it shall not be moved.'" Through these and similar passages too numerous to quote, we learn of the existence of a City of God whose Founder has inspired us with a love and longing to become its citizens. The inhabitants of the earthly city who prefer their own gods to the Founder of the holy City do not realize that He is the God of gods – though not, of course, of those false, wicked and proud gods who, because they have been deprived of that unchangeable light which was meant for all, are reduced to a pitiful power and, therefore, are eager for some sort of influence and demand divine honors from their deluded subjects. He is the God of those reverent and holy gods who prefer to obey and worship one God rather than to have many others obeying and worshipping them.

In the ten preceding Books, I have done my best, with the help of our Lord and King, to refute the enemies of this City. Now, however, realizing what is expected of me and recalling what I promised, I shall begin to discuss, as well as I can, the origin, history, and destiny of the respective cities, earthly and heavenly, which, as I have said, are at present inextricably intermingled, one with the other. First, I shall explain how these two cities originated when the angels took opposing sides.

2. Rarely and only with great effort does a mind, which has contemplated both the material and spiritual creation of the universe and discovered the mutability of all things, soar to the unchangeable substance of God and there learn that He is the sole Creator of every nature that is not divine. For, God does not speak with man through the medium of matter, with vibrations of air causing His voice to be heard by the ears of the body, nor does He use apparitions resembling bodies such as we see in dreams or in some such way—for in this latter case the speaking is to seeming ears, through a seeming medium

atque ad incommutabilem Dei substantiam pervenire, et illic discere ex ipso, quod cunctam naturam, quae non est quod ipse, non fecit nisi ipse. Sic enim Deus cum homine non per aliquam creaturam loquitur corporalem, corporalibus instrepens auribus, ut inter sonantem et audientem aëria spatia verberentur, neque per eius modi spiritalem, quae corporum similitudinibus figuratur, sicut in somnis vel quo alio tali modo; nam et sic velut corporis auribus loquitur, quia velut per corpus loquitur et velut interposito corporalium locorum intervallo; multum enim similia sunt talia visa corporibus; sed loquitur ipsa veritate, si quis sit idoneus ad audiendum mente, non corpore. Ad illud enim hominis ita loquitur, quod in homine ceteris, quibus homo constat, est melius, et quo ipse Deus solus est melior. Cum enim homo rectissime intellegatur vel, si hoc non potest, saltem credatur factus ad imaginem Dei 6 : profecto ea sui parte est propinquior superiori Deo, qua superat inferiores suas, quas etiam cum pecoribus communes habet. Sed quia ipsa mens, cui ratio et intellegentia naturaliter inest, vitiiis quibusdam tenebrosis et veteribus invalida est, non solum ad inhaerendum fruendo, verum etiam ad perferendum incommutabile lumen, donec de die in diem renovata atque sanata fiat tantae felicitatis capax, fide primum fuerat imbuenda atque purganda. In qua ut fidentius ambularet ad veritatem, ipsa veritas, Deus Dei Filius, homine adsumpto, non Deo consumpto, eandem constituit et fundavit fidem, ut ad hominis Deum iter esset homini per hominem Deum. Hic est enim mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus 7. Per hoc enim mediator, per quod homo, per hoc et via 8. Quoniam si inter eum qui tendit et illud quo tendit, via media est, spes est perveniendi; si autem desit, aut ignoretur qua eundum sit, quid prodest nosse quo eundum sit? Sola est autem adversus omnes errores via munitissima, ut idem ipse sit Deus et homo; quo itur Deus, qua itur homo.

... sacra Scriptura teste.

3. Hic prius per Prophetas, deinde per se ipsum, postea per Apostolos, quantum satis esse iudicavit, locutus, etiam Scripturam condidit, quae canonica nominatur, eminentissimae auctoritatis, cui fidem habemus de his rebus, quas ignorare non expedit, nec per nos ipsos nosse idonei sumus. Nam si ea sciri possunt testibus nobis, quae remota non sunt a sensibus nostris, sive interioribus sive etiam exterioribus (unde et praesentia nuncupantur, quod ita ea dicimus esse prae sensibus, sicut prae oculis) quae remota sunt a sensibus nostris, quoniam nostro testimonio

with a seeming material space intervening, since such apparitions are very similar to material objects. But He speaks by means of the truth itself, and to all who can hear with the mind rather than with the body. For, He speaks to that part of man which is most excellent and which has nothing superior to it except God Himself. Now, since it is right to think or, if that is impossible, to believe that man was created to the image of God, surely man comes closer to God by that part of him which transcends those lower faculties which he has in common even with the beasts. But, since the mind, which was meant to be reasonable and intelligent, has, by dark and inveterate vices, become too weak to adhere joyously to His unchangeable light (or even to bear it) until, by gradual renewal and healing, it is made fit for such happiness, its first need was to be instructed by faith and purified. It was in order to make the mind able to advance more confidently toward the truth that Truth itself, the divine Son of God, put on humanity without putting off His divinity! And built this firm path of faith so that man, by means of the God-man, could find his way to man's God. I speak of the 'Mediator between God and men, himself man, Christ Jesus.' For it is as man that He is the Mediator and as man that He is the way. Where there is a way between a traveler and his destination, he can hope to reach it, but, if there is no way or if he does not know which way to take, what is the good of knowing the destination? Now, there is one way and one way alone that can save us from all aberrations, the Way which is both God and man-God as the goal and man as the means to reach it.

3. This Mediator, first through the Prophets, then by His own lips, afterwards through the Apostles, revealed whatever He considered necessary. He also inspired the Scripture, which is regarded as canonical and of supreme authority and to which we give credence concerning all those truths we ought to know and yet, of ourselves, are unable to learn. We can know by our own witness things which are presented to our senses, either interior or exterior. In fact, we say a thing is 'present' because it is 'presented' to our senses. For example, anything before our very eyes is said to be present. But, when things are not present to our senses, we cannot know them on our own authority. So we seek out and believe witnesses to whose senses, we believe, these things are or were present. Thus, in the case of visible objects which we have not seen, we trust those who have seen them. The same is true of things known by the other senses. So, too, in the case of realities perceived by the mind and spirit, the mind is an interior sense and we speak of a man of 'good sense.' If our preceptions are of invisible things remote from our own interior sense, we ought to believe either those who have learned these truths as revealed in the Incorporeal Light or those who contemplate these truths in an abiding Vision of God.

scire non possumus, de his alios testes requirimus eisque credimus, a quorum sensibus remota esse vel fuisse non credimus. Sicut ergo de visibilibus, quae non vidimus, eis credimus, qui viderunt, atque ita de ceteris, quae ad suum quemque sensum corporis pertinent: ita de his, quae animo ac mente sentiuntur (quia et ipse rectissime dicitur sensus, unde et sententia vocabulum accepit), hoc est de invisibilibus quae a nostro sensu interiore remota sunt, his nos oportet credere, qui haec in illo incorporeo lumine disposita didicerunt, vel manentia contuentur.

De Civitate Dei contra Paganos (413-427)

Ex rebus gestis duae civitates evidentur.

XIV.1. Diximus iam superioribus libris I ad humanum genus non solum naturae similitudine sociandum, verum etiam quadam cognationis necessitudine in unitatem concordem pacis vinculo colligandum ex homine uno Deum voluisse homines instituere, neque hoc genus fuisse in singulis quibusque moriturum, nisi duo primi, quorum creatus est unus ex nullo, altera ex illo, id inoboedientia meruissent, a quibus admissum est tam grande peccatum, ut in deterius eo natura mutaretur humana, etiam in posteros obligatione peccati et mortis necessitate transmissa. Mortis autem regnum in homines usque adeo dominatum est, ut omnes in secundam quoque mortem, cuius nullus est finis, poena debita praecipites ageret, nisi inde quosdam indebita Dei gratia liberaret. Ac per hoc factum est, ut, cum tot tantaeque gentes per terrarum orbem diversis ritibus moribusque viventes multiplici linguarum armorum vestium sint varietate distinctae, non tamen amplius quam duo quaedam genera humanae societatis existerent, quas civitates duas secundum Scripturas nostras merito appellare possemus. Una quippe est hominum secundum carnem, altera secundum spiritum vivere in sui cuiusque generis pace volentium et, cum id quod expetunt assequuntur, in sui cuiusque generis pace viventium.

Quid sit secundum carnem vivere.

2. 1. Prius ergo videndum est, quid sit secundum carnem, quid secundum spiritum vivere. Quisquis enim hoc quod diximus prima fronte inspicit, vel non recolens vel minus advertens quemadmodum Scripturae sanctae loquantur, potest putare philosophos quidem Epicureos secundum carnem vivere, quia summum bonum hominis in corporis voluptate posuerunt, et si qui alii sunt, qui quoquo

The City of God

XIV.1 I have already said, in previous Books, that God had two purposes in deriving all men from one man. His first purpose was to give unity to the human race by the likeness of nature. His second purpose was to bind mankind by the bond of peace, through blood relationship, into one harmonious whole. I have said further that no member of this race would ever have died had not the first two – one created from nothing and the second from the first – merited this death by disobedience. The sin which they committed was so great that it impaired all human nature in this sense, that the nature has been transmitted to posterity with a propensity to sin and a necessity to die. Moreover, the kingdom of death so dominated men that all would have been hurled, by a just punishment, into a second and endless death had not some been saved from this by the gratuitous grace of God. This is the reason why, for all the difference of the many and very great nations throughout the world in religion and morals, language, weapons, and dress, there exist no more than the two kinds of society, which, according to our Scriptures, we have rightly called the two cities. One city is that of men who live according to the flesh. The other is of men who live according to the spirit. Each of them chooses its own kind of peace and, when they attain what they desire, each lives in the peace of its own choosing.

2. Our immediate task, then, must be to see what it means to live, first, according to the flesh and, second, according to the spirit. It would be a mistake for anyone to take what I have said at face value and without recalling or sufficiently considering the manner of speech used in Holy Scripture, imagining that it is the Epicurean philosophers who live according to the flesh simply because they place man's highest good in material pleasure. The same might be thought of any others who, in one way or another, think that the good of the body is man's highest good. So, too, of that great mass of men who do not dogmatize or philosophize about it but who are so inclined to sensuality that they cannot enjoy

modo corporis bonum summum bonum esse hominis opinati sunt, et eorum omne vulgus, qui non aliquo dogmate vel eo modo philosophantur, sed proclives ad libidinem nisi ex voluptatibus, quas corporeis sensibus capiunt, gaudere nesciunt; Stoicos autem, qui summum bonum hominis in animo ponunt, secundum spiritum vivere, quia et hominis animus quid est nisi spiritus? Sed sicut loquitur Scriptura divina, secundum carnem vivere utrique monstrantur. Carnem quippe appellat non solum corpus terreni atque mortalis animantis (veluti cum dicit: Non omnis caro eadem caro; alia quidem hominis, alia autem caro pecoris, alia volucrum, alia piscium 2), sed et aliis multis modis significatione huius nominis utitur, inter quos varios locutionis modos saepe etiam ipsum hominem, id est naturam hominis, carnem nuncupat, modo locutionis a parte totum, quale est: Ex operibus legis non iustificabitur omnis caro 3. Quid enim voluit intellegi nisi omnis homo? Quod apertius paulo post ait: In lege nemo iustificatur 4, et ad Galatas: Scientes autem quia non iustificatur homo ex operibus legis 5. Secundum hoc intellegitur: Et Verbum caro factum est 6, id est homo; quod non recte accipientes quidam putaverunt Christo humanam animam defuisse. Sicut enim a toto pars accipitur, ubi Mariae Magdalene verba in Evangelio leguntur dicentis: Tulerunt Dominum meum et nescio ubi posuerunt eum 7; cum de sola Christi carne loqueretur, quam sepultam de monumento putabat ablatam: ita et a parte totum carne nominata intellegitur homo, sicuti ea sunt quae supra commemoravimus.

Quae sint opera carnis Paulus edisserit.

2. 2. Cum igitur multis modis, quos perscrutari et colligere longum est, divina Scriptura nuncupet carnem: quid sit secundum carnem vivere (quod profecto malum est, cum ipsa carnis natura non sit malum) ut indagare possimus, inspiciamus diligenter illum locum epistulae Pauli apostoli quam scripsit ad Galatas, ubi ait: Manifesta autem sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicationes, immunditiae, luxuria, idolorum servitus, veneficia, inimicitiae, contentiones, aemulationes, animositates, dissentiones, haereses, invidiae, ebrietates, comisationes et his similia; quae praedico vobis, sicut praedixi, quoniam qui talia agunt regnum Dei non possidebunt 8. Iste totus epistulae apostolicae locus, quantum ad rem praesentem satis esse videbitur, consideratus poterit hanc dissolvere quaestionem, quid sit secundum carnem vivere. In operibus namque carnis, quae manifesta esse dixit eaque commemorata damnavit, non illa tantum invenimus, quae ad voluptatem

anything unless they can experience it with their senses. It would be no less a mistake to imagine, because the Stoics place man's highest good in the soul (and because 'soul' and 'spirit' mean the same), that, therefore, it is the Stoics who live according to the spirit. The fact is the language of Sacred Scripture clearly proves that both of these classes live according to the flesh. Scripture uses the word flesh not only in reference to the body of an earthly and mortal animal, but also to man, that is, to human nature. We have an example of the former in the words: 'All flesh is not the same flesh, but there is one flesh of men, another of beasts, another of birds, another of fishes'; but it often uses the word flesh, with many other meanings, to denote man himself. In this case, the 'body' of man is used in the sense of a part for the whole, as for example: 'For by the works of the Law, no flesh shall be justified.' What Scripture means here is 'no man.' In fact, a little further on, it says more plainly: 'By the Law no man is justified before God.' And in the Epistle to the Galatians, we read: 'But we know that man is not justified by the works of the Law.' In this sense we understand the expression, 'And the Word was made flesh'-that is, man. It was a misunderstanding of the meaning here that led some to think that Christ had no human soul. In the same way, the whole is used for a part in the words of Mary Magdalene in the Gospel, when she says: 'They have taken away my Lord and I do not know where they have laid him';⁶ here, Scripture was speaking only of the body of Christ, which was buried and which she thought had been taken away from the tomb. In the same way, a part is used for the whole when the entire man is understood from the term flesh, as in these extracts quoted above. Sacred Scripture, then, uses the word flesh in so many meanings that it would be tedious to assemble and examine them all. However, if we wish to investigate what it means to 'live according to the flesh' -remembering that such living is sinful, although flesh is not by nature evil-we should carefully consider a passage in the Epistle which Paul the Apostle wrote to the Galatians: 'Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are: immorality, uncleanness, licentiousness, idolatry, witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, jealousies, anger, quarrels, factions, parties, envies, murders, drunkenness, carousings, and suchlike. And concerning these I warn you, as I have warned you, that they who do such things will not attain the kingdom of God.' If we reflect upon this whole text from the apostolic Epistle, in relation to the point of issue, we shall discover that it is all we need to determine what it means to live according to the flesh. In the works of the flesh which St. Paul said were manifest and which he enumerated and condemned, we find, of course, those which pertain to carnal pleasures, such as immorality, uncleanness, licentiousness, drunkenness, carousings, but we also find others, not related to the gratification of the body, which give evidence of the vices of the soul. It is clear enough to everyone that idolatry, witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, jealousies, anger,

pertinent carnis, sicuti sunt fornicationes, immunditiae, luxuria, ebrietates, comisationes; verum etiam illa, quibus animi vitia demonstrantur a voluptate carnis aliena. Quis enim servitutem, quae idolis exhibetur, veneficia, inimicitias, contentiones, aemulationes, animositates, dissentiones, haereses, invidias, non potius intellegat animi vitia esse quam carnis? Quando quidem fieri potest, ut propter idololatricam vel haeresis alicuius errorem a voluptatibus corporis temperetur; et tamen etiam tunc homo, quamvis carnis libidines continere atque cohibere videatur, secundum carnem vivere hac apostolica auctoritate vincitur, et in eo, quod abstinet a voluptatibus carnis, damnabilia opera carnis agere demonstratur. Quis inimicitias non in animo habeat? aut quis ita loquatur, ut inimico suo vel quem putat inimicum dicat: Malam carnem, ac non potius: Malum animum habes adversus me? Postremo sicut carnalitates, ut ita dicam, si quis audisset, non dubitaret carni tribuere, ita nemo dubitat animositates ad animum pertinere. Cur ergo haec omnia et his similia doctor gentium in fide et veritate 9 opera carnis appellat, nisi quia eo locutionis modo, quo totum significatur a parte, ipsum hominem vult nomine carnis intellegi?

Corpus potest immortalitate vestiri.

3. 1. Quod si quisquam dicit carnem causam esse in malis moribus quorumcumque vitiorum, eo quod anima carne affecta sic vivit, profecto non universam hominis naturam diligenter advertit. Nam corpus quidem corruptibile aggravat animam. Unde etiam idem Apostolus agens de hoc corruptibili corpore, de quo paulo ante dixerat: Etsi exterior homo noster corrumpitur 10 : Scimus, inquit, quia, si terrena nostra domus habitationis resolvatur, aedificationem habemus ex Deo, domum non manu factam aeternam in caelis. Etenim in hoc ingemiscimus, habitaculum nostrum quod de caelo est superindui cupientes; si tamen et induti, non nudi inveniamur. Etenim qui sumus in hac habitatione, ingemiscimus gravati, in quo nolumus exspoliari, sed supervestiri, ut absorbeatur mortale a vita 11. Et aggravamur ergo corruptibili corpore, et ipsius aggravationis causam non naturam substantiamque corporis, sed eius corruptionem scientes nolumus corpore spoliari, sed eius immortalitate vestiri. Et tunc enim erit, sed quia corruptibile non erit, non gravabit. Aggravat ergo nunc animam corpus corruptibile, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem 12. Verumtamen qui omnia mala animae ex corpore putant accidisse, in errore sunt.

quarrels, factions, parties, envies are vices of the soul rather than of the body. For it is possible for a person to abstain from bodily indulgence by reason of idolatry or some heretical error. Such a person may seem to be subduing and curbing the desires of the flesh, yet even then he is guilty (according to this same apostolic authority) of living according to the flesh; the very fact that he is refraining from the pleasures of the flesh is the proof that he is performing detestable works of the flesh. If a man entertains enmity, does he not entertain it in his mind? No one would say to any enemy-real or imagined -'You show a bad flesh toward me.' He would say: 'Your mind is ill-disposed to me.' Finally, just as anyone who hears of sins of carnality (if I may use the word) immediately attributes them to the flesh, so no one doubts that sins of animosity belong to the mind. Why, then, does the Doctor of the Gentiles say that all such vices are, in faith and in fact, works of the flesh? His only reason is that by his figurative use of a part for the whole he wants us to interpret the word 'flesh' as meaning the whole of human nature.

3. Should anyone say that the cause of vices and evil habits lies in the flesh because it is only when the soul is influenced by the flesh that it lives then in such a manner, he cannot have sufficiently considered the entire nature of man. It is true that 'the corruptible body is a load upon the soul.' But notice that the Apostle who, in discussing the corruptible body, had used the words, 'Even though our outer man is decaying,' goes on, a little further, to declare: 'For we know that if the earthly house in which we dwell be destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made by human hands, eternal in the heavens. And indeed, in this present state we groan, yearning to be clothed over with that dwelling of ours which is from heaven; if indeed we shall be found clothed, and not naked. For we who are in this tent sigh under our burden, because we do not wish to be unclothed, but rather clothed over, that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life.' On the one hand, our corruptible body may be a burden on our soul; on the other hand, the cause of this encumbrance is not in the nature and substance of the body, and, therefore, aware as we are of its corruption, we do not desire to be divested of the body but rather to be clothed with its immortality. In immortal life we shall have a body, but it will no longer be a burden since it will no longer be corruptible. Now, however, 'the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things.' Yet, it is an error to suppose that all the evils of the soul proceed from the body. Virgil, it is true, seems to express a different idea, following Plato in his luminous lines:

'A fiery vigor of celestial birth
Endows these seeds so slowed by weight of earth
Or body's drag; and so they ever lie
In bondage to dull limbs that one day die.'

Non omnia vitia ex carne.

3. 2. *Quamvis enim Virgilius Platoniam videatur
luculentis versibus explicare sententiam dicens:*

*Igneus est ollis vigor et caelestis origo
Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant
Terrenique hebetant artus moribundaque membra,*

*omnesque illas notissimas quattuor animi
perturbationes, cupiditatem, timorem, laetitiam,
tristitiam, quasi origines omnium peccatorum atque
vitiatorum volens intellegi ex corpore accidere
subiungat et dicat:*

*Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, nec
auras
Suspiciunt, clausae tenebris et carcere caeco 13;*

*tamen aliter se habet fides nostra. Nam corruptio
corporis, quae aggravat animam 14, non peccati primi
est causa, sed poena; nec caro corruptibilis animam
peccatricem, sed anima peccatrix fecit esse
corruptibilem carnem. Ex qua corruptione carnis licet
existant quaedam incitamenta vitiatorum et ipsa
desideria vitiosa, non tamen omnia vitae iniquae vitia
tribuenda sunt carni, ne ab his omnibus purgemus
diabolum, qui non habet carnem. Etsi enim diabolus
fornicator vel ebriosus vel si quid huiusmodi mali est,
quod ad carnis pertinet voluptates, non potest dici,
cum sit etiam talium peccatorum suasor et instigator
occultus: est tamen maxime superbus atque invidus.
Quae illum vitiositas sic obtinuit, ut propter hanc esset
in carceribus caliginosi huius aeterno supplicio
destinatus. Haec autem vitia, quae tenent in diabolo
principatum, carni tribuit Apostolus, quam certum est
diabolum non habere. Dicit enim inimicitias,
contentiones, aemulationes, animositates, invidias
opera esse carnis 15; quorum omnium malorum caput
atque origo superbia est, quae sine carne regnat in
diabolo. Quis autem illo est inimicior sanctis? Quis
adversus eos contentiosior, animosior et magis
aemulus atque invidus invenitur? At haec omnia cum
habeat sine carne, quomodo sunt ista opera carnis,
nisi quia opera sunt hominis, quem, sicut dixi, nomine
carnis appellat? Non enim habendo carnem, quam
non habet diabolus, sed vivendo secundum se ipsum,
hoc est secundum hominem, factus est homo similis
diabolo; quia et ille secundum se ipsum vivere voluit,
quando in veritate non stetit, ut non de Dei, sed de suo
mendacium loqueretur, qui non solum mendax, verum
etiam mendacii pater est 16. Primus est quippe*

And, as if he wanted us to believe that the four most common emotions of the soul-desire, fear, joy, and sadness which are the causes of all sins and vices, spring from the body, he continues with the verse:

'Thus do they fear and hope, rejoice and grieve,
Blind in the gloomy jail they cannot leave.'

So Virgil. Our faith teaches something very different. For the corruption of the body, which is a burden on the soul, is not the cause but the punishment of Adam's first sin. Moreover, it was not the corruptible flesh that made the soul sinful; on the contrary, it was the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible. Though some incitements to vice and vicious desires are attributable to the corruption of the flesh, nevertheless, we should not ascribe to the flesh all the evils of a wicked life. Else, we free the Devil from all such passions, since he has no flesh. It is true that the Devil cannot be said to be addicted to debauchery, drunkenness, or any others of the vices which pertain to bodily pleasure-much as he secretly prompts and provokes us to such sins-but he is most certainly filled with pride and envy. It is because these passions so possessed the Devil that he is doomed to eternal punishment in the prison of the gloomy air. It is true that the Apostle attributes to the flesh (which Satan certainly does not possess) those vices which dominate the Devil. He says, in fact, that 'enmities,' 'contentions,' 'jealousies,' 'anger,' and 'quarrels' are the works of the flesh, whereas the origin of all these evils is pride-a vice which rules over the Devil who has no flesh. For, who is a worse enemy to the saints than he? Who is more contentious toward them, more wrathful, jealous, and quarrelsome? Now, since the Devil has all of these vices but has no flesh, they can only be the works of the flesh in the sense that they are the works of man. Actually as I have mentioned, Paul often refers to man under the name of 'flesh.' It was not by reason of the flesh-which the Devil does not possess--but by reason of a man's desire to live according to himself, that is, according to man, that man made himself like the Devil. For, the Devil wished to live according to himself when he did not abide in the truth. So that, when he told a lie, it was not of God's doing but of his own, for the Devil is not only a liar but is also 'the father of lies.'⁶ This means that he was the first liar. Lying began with him, as all sin began with him.

4. When a man lives 'according to man' and not 'according to God' he is like the Devil. For, even an angel had to live according to God and not according to an angel if he were to remain steadfast in the truth, speaking the truth out of God's grace and not lying out of his own weakness. The same Apostle elsewhere says of man: 'Yet if God's truth has abounded through my lie.'¹ Notice that he says 'my lie' and

mentitus, et a quo peccatum, ab illo coepit esse mendacium.

Omne peccatum est mendacium.

XIV.4.1. Cum ergo vivit homo secundum hominem, non secundum Deum, similis est diabolo; quia nec angelo secundum angelum, sed secundum Deum vivendum fuit, ut staret in veritate et veritatem de illius, non de suo mendacium loqueretur. Nam et de homine alio loco idem Apostolus ait: Si autem veritas Dei in meo mendacio abundavit 17. Nostrum dixit mendacium, veritatem Dei. Cum itaque vivit homo secundum veritatem, non vivit secundum se ipsum, sed secundum Deum. Deus est enim qui dixit: Ego sum veritas 18. Cum vero vivit secundum se ipsum, hoc est secundum hominem, non secundum Deum, profecto secundum mendacium vivit; non quia homo ipse mendacium est, cum sit eius auctor et creator Deus, qui non est utique auctor creatorque mendacii, sed quia homo ita factus est rectus, ut non secundum se ipsum, sed secundum eum, a quo factus est, viveret, id est illius potius quam suam faceret voluntatem: non ita vivere, quemadmodum est factus ut viveret, hoc est mendacium. Beatus quippe vult esse etiam non sic vivendo ut possit esse. Quid est ista voluntate mendacius? Unde non frustra dici potest omne peccatum esse mendacium. Non enim fit peccatum nisi ea voluntate, qua volumus ut bene sit nobis vel nolumus ut male sit nobis. Ergo mendacium est, quod, cum fiat ut bene sit nobis, hinc potius male est nobis, vel cum fiat, ut melius sit nobis, hinc potius peius est nobis. Unde hoc, nisi quia de Deo potest bene esse homini, quem delinquendo deserit, non de se ipso, secundum quem vivendo delinquit?

Vivit quis secundum carnem aut secundum spiritum.

4. 2. Quod itaque diximus, hinc exstitisse duas civitates diversas inter se atque contrarias, quod alii secundum carnem, alii secundum spiritum viverent 19 : potest etiam isto modo dici quod alii secundum hominem, alii secundum Deum vivant. Apertissime quippe Paulus ad Corinthios dicit: Cum enim sint inter vos aemulatio et contentio, nonne carnales estis et secundum hominem ambulatis? 20 Quod ergo est ambulare secundum hominem, hoc est esse carnalem, quod a carne, id est a parte hominis, intellegitur homo. Eisdem ipsos quippe dixit superius animales, quos postea carnales, ita loquens: Quis enim scit, inquit, hominum, quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est? Sic et quae Dei sunt, nemo scit nisi spiritus Dei. Nos autem, inquit, non spiritum huius mundi

'God's truth.' So, then, when a man lives according to truth, he lives not according to himself but according to God. For it was God who said: 'I am the truth.'² When man lives according to himself, that is to say, according to human ways and not according to God's will, then surely he lives according to falsehood. Man himself, of course, is not a lie, since God who is his Author and Creator could not be the Author and Creator of a lie. Rather, man has been so constituted in truth that he was meant to live not according to himself but to Him who made him—that is, he was meant to do the will of God rather than his own. It is a lie not to live as a man was created to live. Man indeed desires happiness even when he does so live as to make happiness impossible. What could be more of a lie than a desire like that? This is the reason why every sin can be called a lie. For, when we choose to sin, what we want is to get some good or get rid of something bad. The lie is in this, that what is done for our good ends in something bad, or what is done to make things better ends by making them worse. Why this paradox, except that the happiness of man can come not from himself but only from God, and that to live according to oneself is to sin, and to sin is to lose God? When, therefore, we said that two contrary and opposing cities arose because some men live according to the flesh and other live according to the spirit, we could equally well have said that they arose because some live according to man and others according to God. St. Paul says frankly to the Corinthians: 'Since there are jealousy and strife among you, are you not carnal, and walking as mere men?'³ Thus, to walk as a mere man is the same as to be carnal, for by 'flesh,' taking a part for the whole, a man is meant. Notice that those very men whom the Apostle designates as carnal he had previously called animal, as in the text: 'Who among men knows the things of a man save the spirit of the man which is in him? Even so, the things of God no one knows but the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the spirit that is from God, that we may know the things that have been given us by God. These things we also speak, not in words taught by human wisdom, but in the learning of the spirit, combining spiritual with spiritual. But the animal man does not perceive the things that are of the spirit of God, for it is foolishness to him.'⁴ It is to these same 'animal' men that he later says: 'And I, brethren, could not speak to you as to spiritual men but only as carnal.'⁵ In both cases we have the same figure of speech, using a part for the whole. For, either the soul or the flesh, which are the parts of man, can be used for the whole, that is, to mean man. Thus the animal man is not one thing and the carnal another, but both are one and the same, namely, man living according to man. So, too, it is men who are meant in the following texts: 'By the works of the Law no human flesh shall be justified'⁶ and 'seventy-five souls went down into Egypt with Jacob.'⁷ In one passage, 'no flesh' means 'no man'; in the other, 'seventy-five souls' means seventy-five men.

accepimus, sed spiritum qui ex Deo est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis; quae et loquimur, non in sapientiae humanae doctis verbis, sed doctis spiritu, spiritualibus spiritalia comparantes. Animalis autem homo non percipit quae sunt spiritus Dei; stultitia est enim illi 21. Talibus igitur, id est animalibus, paulo post dicit: Et ego, fratres, non potui loqui vobis quasi spiritualibus, sed quasi carnalibus 22; et illud et hoc eodem loquendi modo, id est a parte totum. Et ab anima namque et a carne, quae sunt partes hominis, potest totum significari, quod est homo; atque ita non est aliud animalis homo, aliud carnalis, sed idem ipsum est utrumque, id est secundum hominem vivens homo; sicut non aliud quam homines significantur, sive ubi legitur: Ex operibus legis non iustificabitur omnis caro 23, sive quod scriptum est: Septuaginta quinque animae descenderunt cum Iacob in Egyptum 24. Et ibi enim per omnem carnem omnis homo, et ibi per septuaginta quinque animas septuaginta quinque homines intelleguntur. Et quod dictum est: Non in sapientiae humanae doctis verbis, potuit dici: Non in sapientiae carnalis; sicut quod dictum est: Secundum hominem ambulatis, potuit dici: Secundum carnem. Magis autem hoc apparuit in his quae subiunxit: Cum enim quis dicat: Ego quidem sum Pauli, alius autem: Ego Apollo, nonne homines estis? 25 Quod dicebat: Animales estis, et: Carnales estis, expressius dixit: Homines estis, quod est: Secundum hominem vivitis, non secundum Deum, secundum quem si viveretis, dii essetis.

Qui sint motus in redeuntibus animabus apud Platonicos.

5. Non igitur opus est in peccatis vitiisque nostris ad Creatoris iniuriam carnis accusare naturam, quae in genere atque ordine suo bona est; sed deserto Creatore bono vivere secundum creatum bonum non est bonum, sive quisque secundum carnem sive secundum animam sive secundum totum hominem, qui ex anima constat et carne (unde et nomine solius animae et nomine solius carnis significari potest) eligat vivere. Nam qui velut summum bonum laudat animae naturam et tamquam malum naturam carnis accusat, profecto et animam carnaliter appetit et carnem carnaliter fugit, quoniam id vanitate sentit humana, non veritate divina. Non quidem Platonici sicut Manichaei desipiunt, ut tamquam mali naturam terrena corpora detestentur, cum omnia elementa, quibus iste mundus visibilis contrectabilisque compactus est, qualitatesque eorum Deo artificii tribuant; verum tamen ex terrenis artibus moribundisque membris sic affici animas opinantur,

Moreover, in the text, 'not in words taught by human wisdom,' 'carnal wisdom' could have been used, just as in the text, 'you walk according to man,' 'according to the flesh' could have been said. This fact appears more apparent as the Apostle continues: 'Whenever one says, "I am of Paul" but another "I am of Apollos," are you not mere man?'⁸ What he had implied by the expressions 'you are animal' and 'you are carnal,' he now states more clearly in the words 'you are men'- that is to say, 'You are living according to the ways of men not according to the will of God, for if you lived according to Him you would be gods.'

5. We ought not, therefore, to blame our sins and defects on the nature of the flesh, for this is to disparage the Creator. The flesh, in its own kind and order, is good. But what is not good is to abandon the Goodness of the Creator in pursuit of some created good, whether by living deliberately according to the flesh, or according to the soul, or according to the entire man, which is made up of soul and flesh and which is the reason why either 'soul' alone or 'flesh' alone can mean a man. Anyone, then, who extols the nature of the soul as the highest good and condemns the nature of the flesh as evil is as carnal in his love for the soul as he is in his hatred for the flesh, because his thoughts flow from human vanity and not from divine Truth. However, unlike the Manichaeans, Platonists are not so senseless as to despise earthly bodies as though their nature derived from a evil principle. The Platonists attribute to God, the Maker, all the elements together with their qualities that make up this visible and tangible universe. Nevertheless, they think that our souls are so influenced by 'the earthly limbs and mortal members'¹ of our bodies that from these arise the diseases of desires and fears, of joy and sadness-the four perturbations (as Cicero calls them) or passions (to use the common expression borrowed from the Greeks) which comprehend the whole defectiveness of human behavior. Now, if this is true, why should Virgil's Aeneas, learning from his father in the lower world that souls are to return to their bodies, cry out in surprise:

'O Father, do you mean, we must believe
That souls, for upper air, this realm would leave,
And with slow-moving bodies reunite?
Whence comes this baleful longing for the light?'

Is it possible that this baleful longing, born of 'earthly limbs and mortal members,' still survives in the much vaunted purity of Platonic souls? Does not Virgil tell us that, when these souls begin to desire a return to their bodies, they have already been purged of every such kind of bodily disease? From this it is clear that, even if the belief, which is absolutely unfounded, were true, namely, that there exists this unceasing alternation of purification and defilement in the souls which depart from and return to their bodies, no one could rightly

ut hinc eis sint morbi cupiditatum et timorum et laetitiae sive tristitiae; quibus quattuor vel perturbationibus, ut Cicero appellat 26, vel passionibus, ut plerique verbum e verbo Graeco exprimunt, omnis humanorum morum vitiositas continetur. Quod si ita est, quid est quod Aeneas apud Virgilium, cum audisset a patre apud inferos animas rursus ad corpora redituras, hanc opinionem miratur exclamans:

O pater, anne aliquas ad caelum hinc ire putandum est Sublimes animas iterumque ad tarda reverti Corpora? Quae lucis miseris tam dira cupido? 27

Numquidnam haec tam dira cupido ex terrenis artibus moribundisque membris adhuc inest animarum illi praedicatissimae puritati? Nonne ab huiusmodi corporeis, ut dicit, pestibus omnibus eas asserit esse purgatas, cum rursus incipiunt in corpora velle reverti? Unde colligitur, etiamsi ita se haberet, quod est omnino vanissimum, vicissim alternans incessabiliter euntium atque redeuntium animarum mundatio et inquinatio, non potuisse veraciter dici omnes culpabiles atque vitiosos motus animarum eis ex terrenis corporibus inolescere, si quidem secundum ipsos illa, ut locutor nobilis ait, dira cupido usque adeo non est ex corpore, ut ab omni corporea peste purgatam et extra omne corpus animam constitutam ipsa esse compellat in corpore. Unde etiam illis fatentibus non ex carne tantum afficitur anima, ut cupiat, metuat, laetetur, aegrescat, verum etiam ex se ipsa his potest motibus agitari.

...

Quae duae civitates sint.

28. *Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. Denique illa in se ipsa, haec in Domino gloriatur. Illa enim quaerit ab hominibus gloriam; huic autem Deus conscientiae testis maxima est gloria. Illa in gloria sua exaltat caput suum; haec dicit Deo suo: Gloria mea et exaltans caput meum 157. Illi in principibus eius vel in eis quas subiugat nationibus dominandi libido dominatur; in hac serviunt invicem in caritate et praepositi consulendo et subditi obtemperando. Illa in suis potentibus diligit virtutem suam; haec dicit Deo suo: Diligam te, Domine, virtus mea 158. Ideoque in illa sapientes eius secundum hominem viventes aut corporis aut animi sui bona aut utriusque sectati sunt, aut qui potuerunt cognoscere Deum, non ut Deum honoraverunt aut gratias egerunt, sed evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis, et obscuratum est insipiens cor*

say that all culpable and corrupt emotions of our souls have their roots in our earthly bodies. For, here we have the Platonists themselves, through the mouth of their noble spokesman, teaching that this direful desire has so little to do with the body that it compels even the soul already purified of every bodily disease and now subsisting independently of any kind of body to seek an existence in a body. We conclude, therefore, from their own admission that it is not only because of the flesh that the soul is moved by desires and fears, by joy and sorrow, but that it can also be agitated by these same emotions welling up within the soul itself.

...

28. What we see, then, is that two societies have issued from two kinds of love. Worldly society has flowered from a selfish love which dared to despise even God, whereas the communion of saints is rooted in a love of God that is ready to trample on self. In a word, this latter relies on the Lord, whereas the other boasts that it can get along by itself. The city of man seeks the praise of men, whereas the height of glory for the other is to hear God in the witness of conscience. The one lifts up its head in its own boasting; the other says to God: 'Thou art my glory, thou liftest up my head.' In the city of the world both the rulers themselves and the people they dominate are dominated by the lust for domination; whereas in the City of God all citizens serve one another in charity, whether they serve by the responsibilities of office or by the duties of obedience. The one city loves its leaders as symbols of its own strength; the other says to its God: 'I love thee, O Lord, my strength.' Hence, even the wise men in the city of man live according to man, and their only goal has been the goods of their bodies or of the mind or of both; though some of them have reached a knowledge of God, 'they did not glorify him as God or give thanks but became vain in their reasonings, and their senseless minds have been darkened. For while professing to be wise' (that is to say, while glorying in their own wisdom, under the domination of pride), 'they have become fools, and they have changed the glory of the incorruptible God for an image made like to corruptible man and to birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things' (meaning that they either led their people, or imitated them, in adoring idols shaped like these things), 'and they worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator who is blessed forever.' In the City of God, on the contrary, there is no merely human wisdom, but there is a piety which worships the true God as He should be worshiped and has as its goal that reward of all holiness whether in the society of saints on earth or in that of angels of heaven, which is 'that God may be all in all.'

eorum; dicentes se esse sapientes, id est dominante sibi superbia in sua sapientia sese extollentes, stulti facti sunt et immutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium: ad huiusmodi enim simulacra adoranda vel duces populorum vel sectatores fuerunt: et coluerunt atque servierunt creaturae potius quam Creatori, qui est benedictus in saecula 159. In hac autem nulla est hominis sapientia nisi pietas, qua recte colitur verus Deus, id exspectans praemium in societate sanctorum non solum hominum, verum etiam angelorum, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus 160.

De Civitate Dei contra Paganos (413-427)

Quae sit pax ordo pietas in utraque civitate.

XIX.17. Sed domus hominum, qui non vivunt ex fide, pacem terrenam ex huius temporalis vitae rebus commodisque sectatur; domus autem hominum ex fide viventium exspectat ea, quae in futurum aeterna promissa sunt, terrenisque rebus ac temporalibus tamquam peregrina utitur, non quibus capiatur et avertatur quo tendit in Deum, sed quibus sustentetur ad facilius toleranda minimeque augenda onera corporis corruptibilis, quod aggravat animam 47. Idcirco rerum vitae huic mortali necessarium utrisque hominibus et utrique domui communis est usus; sed finis utendi cuique suus proprius multumque diversus. Ita etiam terrena civitas, quae non vivit ex fide, terrenam pacem appetit in eoque defigit imperandi oboediendique concordiam civium, ut sit eis de rebus ad mortalem vitam pertinentibus humanarum quaedam compositio voluntatum. Civitas autem caelestis vel potius pars eius, quae in hac mortalitate peregrinatur et vivit ex fide, etiam ista pace necesse est utatur, donec ipsa, cui talis pax necessaria est, mortalitas transeat; ac per hoc, dum apud terrenam civitatem velut captivam vitam suae peregrinationis agit, iam promissione redemptionis et dono spiritali tamquam pignore accepto legibus terrenae civitatis, quibus haec administrantur, quae sustentandae mortali vitae accommodata sunt, obtemperare non dubitat, ut, quoniam communis est ipsa mortalitas, servetur in rebus ad eam pertinentibus inter civitatem utramque concordia. Verum quia terrena civitas habuit quosdam suos sapientes, quos divina improbat disciplina, qui vel suspicati vel decepti a daemonibus crederent multos deos conciliandos esse rebus humanis atque ad eorum diversa quodam modo officia diversa subdita pertinere, ad alium corpus, ad alium animum, inque

The City of God

XIX.17. While the homes of unbelieving men are intent upon acquiring temporal peace out of the possessions and comforts of this temporal life, the families which live according to faith look ahead to the good things of heaven promised as imperishable, and use material and temporal goods in the spirit of pilgrims, not as snares or obstructions to block their way to God, but simply as helps to ease and never to increase the burdens of this corruptible body which weighs down the soul. Both types of homes and their masters have this in common, that they must use things essential to this mortal life. But the respective purposes to which they put them are characteristic and very different. So, too, the earthly city which does not live by faith seeks only an earthly peace, and limits the goal of its peace, of its harmony of authority and obedience among its citizens, to the voluntary and collective attainment of objectives necessary to mortal existence. The heavenly City, meanwhile – or, rather, that part that is on pilgrimage in mortal life and lives by faith – must use this earthly peace until such time as our mortality which needs such peace has passed away. As a consequence, so long as her life in the earthly city is that of a captive and an alien (although she has the promise of ultimate delivery and the gift of the Spirit as a pledge), she has no hesitation about keeping in step with the civil law which governs matters pertaining to our existence here below. For, as mortal life is the same for all, there ought to be common cause between the two cities in what concerns our purely human living. Now comes the difficulty. The city of this world, to begin with, has had certain 'wise men' of its own mold, whom true religion must reject, because either out of their own daydreaming or out of demonic deception these wise men came to believe that a multiplicity of divinities was allied with human life, with different duties, in some strange arrangement, and different assignments: this one over the body, that one over the mind; in the body itself, one over the head, another over the neck,

*ipso corpore ad alium caput, ad alium cervicem et cetera singula ad singulos; similiter in animo ad alium ingenium, ad alium doctrinam, ad alium iram, ad alium concupiscentiam; inque ipsis rebus vitae adiacentibus ad alium pecus, ad alium triticum, ad alium vinum, ad alium oleum, ad alium silvas, ad alium nummos, ad alium navigationem, ad alium bella atque victorias, ad alium coniugia, ad alium partum ac fecunditatem et ad alios alia cetera; caelestis autem civitas cum unum Deum solum colendum nosset eique tantum modo serviendum servitute illa, quae Graece **λατρεία** dicitur et non nisi Deo debetur, fideli pietate censeret; factum est, ut religionis leges cum terrena civitate non posset habere communes proque his ab ea dissentire haberet necesse atque oneri esse diversa sentientibus eorumque iras et odia et persecutionum impetus sustinere, nisi cum animos adversantium aliquando terrore suae multitudinis et semper divino adiutorio propulsaret. Haec ergo caelestis civitas dum peregrinatur in terra, ex omnibus gentibus cives evocat atque in omnibus linguis peregrinam colligit societatem, non curans quidquid in moribus, legibus institutisque diversum est, quibus pax terrena vel conquiritur vel tenetur, nihil eorum rescindens vel destruens, immo etiam servans ac sequens, quod licet diversum in diversis nationibus, ad unum tamen eundemque finem terrena pacis intenditur, si religionem, qua unus summus et verus Deus colendus docetur, non impedit. Utitur ergo etiam caelestis civitas in hac sua peregrinatione pace terrena et de rebus ad mortalem hominum naturam pertinentibus humanarum voluntatum compositionem, quantum salva pietate ac religione conceditur, tuetur atque appetit eamque terrenam pacem refert ad caelestem pacem, quae vere ita pax est, ut rationalis dumtaxat creaturae sola pax habenda atque dicenda sit, ordinatissima scilicet et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et invicem in Deo; quo cum ventum erit, non erit vita mortalis, sed plane certeque vitalis, nec corpus animale, quod dum corrumpitur, aggravat animam, sed spiritale sine ulla indigentia ex omni parte subditum voluntati. Hanc pacem, dum peregrinatur in fide, habet atque ex hac fide iuste vivit, cum ad illam pacem adipiscendam refert quidquid bonarum actionum gerit erga Deum et proximum, quoniam vita civitatis utique socialis est.*

Contra Academicos quae sint dubitatio, evidentia, opinio.

18. Quod autem attinet ad illam differentiam, quam de Academicis novis Varro adhibuit, quibus incerta sunt omnia 48, omnino civitas Dei talem dubitationem

still others, one for each bodily part; in the mind, one over the intelligence, another over learning, another over temper, another over desire; in the realities, related to life, that lie about us, one over flocks and one over wheat, one over wine, one over oil, and another over forests, one over currency, another over navigation, and still another over warfare and victory, one over marriage, a different one over fecundity and childbirth, so on and so on. The heavenly City, on the contrary, knows and, by religious faith, believes that it must adore one God alone and serve Him with that complete dedication which the Greeks call *latreia* and which belongs to Him alone. As a result, she has been unable to share with the earthly city a common religious legislation, and has had no choice but to dissent on this score and so to become a nuisance to those who think otherwise. Hence, she has had to feel the weight of their anger, hatred, and violence, save in those instances when, by sheer numbers and God's help, which never fails, she has been able to scare off her opponents. So long, then, as the heavenly City is wayfaring on earth, she invites citizens from all nations and all tongues, and unites them into a single pilgrim band. She takes no issue with that diversity of customs, laws, and traditions whereby human peace is sought and maintained. Instead of nullifying or tearing down, she preserves and appropriates whatever in the diversities of divers races is aimed at one and the same objective of human peace, provided only that they do not stand in the way of the faith and worship of the one supreme and true God. Thus, the heavenly City, so long as it is wayfaring on earth, not only makes use of earthly peace but fosters and actively pursues along with other human beings a common platform in regard to all that concerns our purely human life and does not interfere with faith and worship. Of course, though, the City of God subordinates this earthly peace to that of heaven. For this is not merely true peace, but, strictly speaking, for any rational creature, the only real peace, since it is, as I said, 'the perfectly ordered and harmonious communion of those who find their joy in God and in one another in God.' When this peace is reached, man will be no longer haunted by death, but plainly and perpetually endowed with life, nor will his body, which now wastes away and weighs down the soul, be any longer animal, but spiritual, in need of nothing, and completely under the control of our will. This peace the pilgrim City already possesses by faith and it lives holily and according to this faith so long as, to attain its heavenly completion, it refers every good act done for God or for his fellow man. I say 'fellow man' because, of course, any community life must emphasize social relationships.

18. Turning now to that distinctive characteristic which Varro ascribes to the followers of the New Academy, namely, universal skepticism, the City of God shuns it as a form of insanity. Its knowledge of truth, gleaned by intelligence and

tamquam dementiam detestatur, habens de rebus, quas mente atque ratione comprehendit, etiamsi parvam propter corpus corruptibile, quod aggravat animam (quoniam, sicut dicit Apostolus: Ex parte scimus 49), tamen certissimam scientiam, creditque sensibus in rei cuiusque evidentia, quibus per corpus animus utitur, quoniam miserabilius fallitur, qui numquam putat eis esse credendum 50; credit etiam Scripturis sanctis et veteribus et novis, quas "Canonicas" appellamus, unde fides ipsa concepta est, ex qua iustus vivit 51; per quam sine dubitatione ambulamus, quamdiu peregrinamur a Domino 52; qua salva atque certa de quibusdam rebus, quas neque sensu neque ratione percepimus neque nobis per Scripturam canonicam claruerunt nec per testes, quibus non credere absurdum est, in nostram notitiam pervenerunt, sine iusta reprehensione dubitamus.

...

In tempore pax est inter duas civitates.

26. *Quocirca ut vita carnis anima est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est, de quo dicunt sacrae litterae Hebraeorum: Beatus populus, cuius est Dominus Deus ipsius 79. Miser igitur populus ab isto alienatus Deo. Diligit tamen etiam ipse quamdam pacem suam non improbandam, quam quidem non habebit in fine, quia non ea bene utitur ante finem. Hanc autem ut interim habeat in hac vita, etiam nostri interest; quoniam, quamdiu permixtae sunt ambae civitates, utimur et nos pace Babylonis; ex qua ita per fidem populus Dei liberatur, ut apud hanc interim peregrinetur. Propter quod et Apostolus admonuit Ecclesiam, ut oraret pro regibus eius atque sublimibus, addens et dicens: Ut quietam et tranquillam vitam agamus cum omni pietate et caritate 80, et propheta Hieremias, cum populo Dei veteri praenuntiaret captivitatem et divinitus imperaret, ut oboedienter irent in Babyloniam Deo suo etiam ista patientia servientes, monuit et ipse ut oraretur pro illa dicens: Quia in eius est pace pax vestra 81, utique interim temporalis, quae bonis malisque communis est.*

Quae vera est in terra pax ad finalem refertur.

27. *Pax autem nostra propria et hic est cum Deo per fidem et in aeternum erit cum illo per speciem 82. Sed hic sive illa communis sive nostra propria talis est pax, ut solacium miseriae sit potius quam beatitudinis gaudium. Ipsa quoque nostra iustitia, quamvis vera sit propter verum boni finem, ad quem refertur, tamen*

reasoning, is indeed slender because of the corruptible body weighing down the soul. As St. Paul says, 'We know in part.' Still, this knowledge is certain. Believers, moreover, trust the report of their bodily senses which sub serve the intelligence. If they are at times deceived, they are at least better off than those who maintain that the senses can never be trusted. The City of God believes the Old and New Testaments accepted as canonical. Out of these she formulates that faith according to which the just man lives. And in the light of this faith we walk forward without fear of stumbling so long as 'we are exiled from the Lord.' This perfectly certain faith apart, other things which have not been sensibly or intellectually experienced nor clearly revealed in canonical Scripture, nor vouched for by witnesses whom it is reasonable to believe—these we can doubt and nobody in justice can take us to task for this.

...

26. As the life of the body is the soul, so the 'blessed life' of a man is God. As the sacred writings of the Hebrews have it: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord.' Wretched, then, must be any people that is divorced from this God. Yet, even such a people cherishes a peace of its own which is not to be scorned although in the end it is not to be had because this peace, before the end, was abused. Meanwhile, it is to our advantage that there be such peace in this life. For, as long as the two cities are mingled together, we can make use of the peace of Babylon. Faith can assure our exodus from Babylon, but our pilgrim status, for the time being, makes us neighbors. All of this was in St. Paul's mind when he advised the Church to pray for this world's kings and high authorities – in order that 'we may lead a quiet and peaceful life in all piety and worthy behavior.' Jeremias, too, predicting the Babylonian captivity to the Old Testament Jews, gave them orders from God to go submissively and serve their God by such sufferings, and meanwhile to pray for Babylon. 'For in the peace thereof,' he said, 'shall be your peace'-referring, of course, to the peace of this world which the good and bad share in common.

27. The City of God, however, has a peace of its own, namely, peace with God in this world by faith and in the world to come by vision. Still, any peace we have on earth, whether the peace we share with Babylon or our own peace through faith, is more like a solace for unhappiness than the joy of beatitude. Even our virtue in this life, genuine as it is because it is referred to the true goal of every good, lies more in the pardoning of sins than in any perfection of virtues. Witness the prayer of God's whole City, wandering on earth and calling out to Him through all her members: 'Forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors.' This prayer is effective, not on the lips of those whose faith without works is dead, but

tanta est in hac vita, ut potius remissione peccatorum constet quam perfectione virtutum. Testis est oratio totius civitatis Dei, quae peregrinatur in terris. Per omnia quippe membra sua clamat ad Deum: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris 83. Nec pro eis est efficax haec oratio, quorum fides sine operibus mortua est 84; sed pro eis, quorum fides per dilectionem operatur 85. Quia enim Deo quidem subdita, in hac tamen condicione mortali et corpore corruptibili, quod aggravat animam 86, non perfecte vitiis imperat ratio, ideo necessaria est iustis talis oratio. Nam profecto quamquam imperetur, nequaquam sine conflictu vitiis imperatur; et utique subrepat aliquid in hoc loco infirmitatis etiam bene confligenti sive hostibus talibus victis subditisque dominantibus, unde si non facili operatione, certe labili locutione aut volatili cogitatione peccetur. Et ideo, quamdiu vitiis imperatur, plena pax non est, quia et illa, quae resistunt, periculoso debellantur proelio, et illa, quae victa sunt, nondum securo triumphantur otio, sed adhuc sollicito premuntur imperio. In his ergo temptationibus, de quibus omnibus in divinis eloquiis breviter dictum est: Numquid non temptatio est vita humana super terram? 87 quis ita vivere se praesumat, ut dicere Deo: Dimitte nobis debita nostra necesse non habeat nisi homo elatus? nec vero magnus, sed inflatus ac tumidus, cui per iustitiam resistit, qui gratiam largitur humilibus. Propter quod scriptum est: Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam 88. Hic itaque in unoquoque iustitia est, ut oboedienti Deus homini, animus corpori, ratio autem vitiis etiam repugnantibus imperet, vel subigendo vel resistendo, atque ut ab ipso Deo petatur et meritorum gratia et venia delictorum ac de acceptis bonis gratiarum actio persolvatur. In illa vero pace finali, quo referenda et cuius adipiscendae causa habenda est ista iustitia, quoniam sanata immortalitate atque incorruptione natura vitia non habebit nec unicuique nostrum vel ab alio vel a se ipso quippiam repugnabit, non opus erit ut ratio vitiis, quae nulla erunt, imperet; sed imperabit Deus homini, animus corpori, tantaque ibi erit oboediendi suavitas et facilitas, quanta vivendi regnandique felicitas. Et hoc illic in omnibus atque in singulis aeternum erit aeternumque esse certum erit, et ideo pax beatitudinis huius vel beatitudo pacis huius summum bonum erit.

Reprobis bellum et dolor in aeternitate.

28. Eorum autem, qui non pertinent ad istam civitatem Dei, erit e contrario miseria sempiterna, quae mors etiam secunda dicitur <^>89, quia nec anima ibi vivere dicenda est, quae a vita Dei alienata erit, nec

only on the lips of men whose faith works through charity. This prayer is necessary for the just because their reason, though submissive to God, has only imperfect mastery over their evil inclinations so long as they live in this world and in a corruptible body that 'is a load upon the soul.'⁴ Reason may give commands, but can exercise no control without a struggle. And, in this time of weakness, something will inevitably creep in to make the best of soldiers—whether in victory or still in battle with such foes—offend by some small slip of the tongue, some passing thought, if not by habitual actions. This explains why we can know no perfect peace so long as there are evil inclinations to master. Those which put up a fight are put down only in perilous conflict; those that are already overcome cannot be kept so if one relaxes, but only at the cost of vigilant control. These are the battles which Scripture sums up in the single phrase: 'The life of man upon earth is a warfare.' Who, then, save a proud man, will presume that he can live without needing to ask God: 'Forgive us our debts'? Not a great man, you may be sure, but one blown up with the wind of self-reliance—one whom God in His justice resists while He grants His grace to the humble. Hence, it is written: 'God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble.' This, then, in this world, is the life of virtue. When God commands, man obeys; when the soul commands, the body obeys; when reason rules, our passions, even when they fight back, must be conquered or resisted; man must beg God's grace to win merit and the remission of his sins and must thank God for the blessings he receives. But, in that final peace which is the end and purpose of all virtue here on earth, our nature, made whole by immortality and incorruption, will have no vices and experience no rebellion from within or without. There will be no need for reason to govern non-existent evil inclinations. God will hold sway over man, the soul over the body; and the happiness in eternal life and law will make obedience sweet and easy. And in each and all of us this condition will be everlasting, and we shall know it to be so. That is why the peace of such blessedness or the blessedness of such peace is to be our supreme good.

28. On the other hand, the doom in store for those who are not of the City of God is an unending wretchedness that is called 'the second death,' because neither the soul, cut off from the life of God, nor the body, pounded by perpetual pain, can there be said to live at all. And what will make that second death so hard to bear is that there will be no death to end it. Now, since unhappiness is the reverse of happiness, death of life, and war of peace, one may reasonably ask: If peace is praised and proclaimed as the highest good, what kind of warfare are we to think of as the highest evil? If this inquirer will reflect, he will realize that what is hurtful and destructive in warfare is mutual clash and conflict, and, hence, that no one can imagine a war more unbearably bitter than one in which the will and passions are at such odds that neither can

corpus, quod aeternis doloribus subiacebit; ac per hoc ideo durior ista secunda mors erit, quia finiri morte non poterit. Sed quoniam sicut miseria beatitudini et mors vitae, ita bellum paci videtur esse contrarium; merito quaeritur, sicut pax in bonorum finibus praedicata est atque laudata, quod vel quale bellum e contrario in finibus malorum possit intellegi. Verum qui hoc quaerit, attendat quid in bello noxium perniciosumque sit, et videbit nihil aliud quam rerum esse inter se adversitatem atque conflictum. Quod igitur bellum gravius et amarius cogitari potest, quam ubi voluntas sic adversa est passioni et passio voluntati, ut nullius earum victoria tales inimicitiae finiantur, et ubi sic confligit cum ipsa natura corporis vis doloris, ut neutrum alteri cedat? Hic enim quando contingit iste conflictus, aut dolor vincit et sensum mors adimit, aut natura vincit et dolorem sanitas tollit. Ibi autem et dolor permanet ut affligat, et natura perdurat ut sentiat; quia utrumque ideo non deficit, ne poena deficiat. Ad hos autem fines bonorum et malorum, illos expetendos, istos cavendos, quoniam per iudicium transibunt ad illos boni, ad istos mali; de hoc iudicio, quantum Deus donaverit, in consequenti volumine disputabo.

ever win the victory, and in which violent pain and the body's very nature will so clash that neither will ever yield. When this conflict occurs on earth, either pain wins and death puts an end to all feeling, or nature wins and health removes the pain. But, in hell, pain permanently afflicts and nature continues to feel it, for neither ever comes to term, since the punishment must never end. However, it is through the last judgment that good men achieve that highest good (which all should seek) and evil men that highest evil (which all should shun), and so, as God helps me, I shall discuss that judgment in the Book that comes next.

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