

## Viduramžių filosofijos tekstai – šv. Tomas Akvinietis

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## Tikėjimo ir proto santykis

### Summa Contra Gentiles I

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#### Caput 1

##### *Quod sit officium sapientis*

*Veritatem meditabitur guttur meum, et labia mea detestabuntur impium. Prov. 8-7.*

*Multitudinis usus, quem in rebus nominandis sequendum philosophus censet, communiter obtinuit ut sapientes dicantur qui res directe ordinant et eas bene gubernant. Unde inter alia quae homines de sapiente concipiunt, a philosopho ponitur quod sapientis est ordinare. Omnium autem ordinatorum ad finem, gubernationis et ordinis regulam ex fine sumi necesse est: tunc enim unaquaeque res optime disponitur cum ad suum finem convenienter ordinatur; finis enim est bonum uniuscuiusque. Unde videmus in artibus unam alterius esse gubernativam et quasi principem, ad quam pertinet eius finis: sicut medicinalis ars pigmentariae principatur et eam ordinat, propter hoc quod sanitas, circa quam medicinalis versatur, finis est omnium pigmentorum, quae arte pigmentaria conficiuntur. Et simile apparet in arte gubernatoria respectu navifactivae; et in militari respectu equestris et omnis bellici apparatus. Quae quidem artes aliis principantes architectonicae nominantur, quasi principales artes: unde et earum artifices, qui architectores vocantur, nomen sibi vindicant sapientum.*

*Quia vero praedicti artifices, singularium quarundam rerum fines pertractantes, ad finem universalem omnium non pertingunt, dicuntur quidem sapientes huius vel illius rei, secundum quem modum dicitur 1 Cor. 3-10, ut sapiens architectus, fundamentum posui; nomen autem simpliciter*

#### Chapter 1

##### THE OFFICE OF THE WISE MAN

“My mouth shall meditate truth, and my lips shall hate impiety” (Prov. 8:7).

[1] The usage of the multitude, which according to the Philosopher is to be followed in giving names to things, has commonly held that they are to be called wise who order things rightly and govern them well. Hence, among other things that men have conceived about the wise man, the Philosopher includes the notion that “it belongs to the wise man to order.” Now, the rule of government and order for all things directed to an end must be taken from the end. For, since the end of each thing is its good, a thing is then best disposed when it is fittingly ordered to its end. And so we see among the arts that one functions as the governor and the ruler of another because it controls its end. Thus, the art of medicine rules and orders the art of the chemist because health, with which medicine is concerned, is the end of all the medications prepared by the art of the chemist. A similar situation obtains in the art of ship navigation in relation to shipbuilding, and in the military art with respect to the equestrian art and the equipment of war. The arts that rule other arts are called architectonic, as being the ruling arts. That is why the artisans devoted to these arts, who are called master artisans, appropriate to themselves the name of wise men.

But, since these artisans are concerned, in each case, with the ends of certain particular things, they do not reach to the universal end of all things. They are therefore said to be wise with respect to this or that thing; in which sense it is said that “as a wise architect, I have laid the foundation” (1 Cor. 3:10). The name of the absolutely wise man, however, is reserved

*sapientis illi soli reservatur cuius consideratio circa finem universi versatur, qui item est universitatis principium; unde secundum philosophum, sapientis est causas altissimas considerare.*

*Finis autem ultimus uniuscuiusque rei est qui intenditur a primo auctore vel motore ipsius. Primus autem auctor et motor universi est intellectus, ut infra ostendetur. Oportet igitur ultimum finem universi esse bonum intellectus. Hoc autem est veritas. Oportet igitur veritatem esse ultimum finem totius universi; et circa eius considerationem principaliter sapientiam insistere. Et ideo ad veritatis manifestationem divina sapientia carne induta se venisse in mundum testatur, dicens, Ioan. 18-37: ego in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati.*

*Sed et primam philosophiam philosophus determinat esse scientiam veritatis; non cuiuslibet, sed eius veritatis quae est origo omnis veritatis, scilicet quae pertinet ad primum principium essendi omnibus; unde et sua veritas est omnis veritatis principium; sic enim est dispositio rerum in veritate sicut in esse.*

*Eiusdem autem est unum contrariorum prosequi et aliud refutare sicut medicina, quae sanitatem operatur, aegritudinem excludit. Unde sicut sapientis est veritatem praecipue de primo principio meditari et aliis disserere, ita eius est falsitatem contrariam impugnare.*

*Convenienter ergo ex ore sapientiae duplex sapientis officium in verbis propositis demonstratur: scilicet veritatem divinam, quae antonomastice est veritas, meditatam eloqui, quod tangit cum dicit, veritatem meditabitur guttur meum; et errorem contra veritatem impugnare, quod tangit cum dicit, et labia mea detestabuntur impium, per quod falsitas contra divinam veritatem designatur, quae religioni contraria est, quae etiam pietas nominatur, unde et falsitas contraria ei impietatis sibi nomen assumit.*

for him whose consideration is directed to the end of the universe, which is also the origin of the universe. That is why, according to the Philosopher, it belongs to the wise man to consider the highest causes.

[2] Now, the end of each thing is that which is intended by its first author or mover. But the first author and mover of the universe is an intellect, as will be later shown. The ultimate end of the universe must, therefore, be the good of an intellect. This good is truth. Truth must consequently be the ultimate end of the whole universe, and the consideration of the wise man aims principally at truth. So it is that, according to His own statement, divine Wisdom testifies that He has assumed flesh and come into the world in order to make the truth known: "For this was I born, and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth" (John 18:37).

The Philosopher himself establishes that first philosophy is the science of truth, not of any truth, but of that truth which is the origin of all truth, namely, which belongs to the first principle whereby all things are. The truth belonging to such a principle is, clearly, the source of all truth; for things have the same disposition in truth as in being.

[3] It belongs to one and the same science, however, both to pursue one of two contraries and to oppose the other. Medicine, for example, seeks to effect health and to eliminate illness. Hence, just as it belongs to the wise man to meditate especially on the truth belonging to the first principle and to teach it to others, so it belongs to him to refute the opposing falsehood.

[4] Appropriately, therefore, is the twofold office of the wise man shown from the mouth of Wisdom in our opening words: to meditate and speak forth of the divine truth, which is truth in person (Wisdom touches on this in the words my mouth shall meditate truth), and to refute the opposing error (which Wisdom touches on in the words and my lips shall hate impiety). By impiety is here meant falsehood against the divine truth. This falsehood is contrary to religion, which is likewise named piety. Hence, the falsehood contrary to it is called impiety.

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## Caput 2

### *Quae sit in hoc opere auctoris intentio*

*Inter omnia vero hominum studia sapientiae studium est perfectius, sublimius, utilius et iucundius.*

## Chapter 2

### THE AUTHOR'S INTENTION IN THE PRESENT WORK

[1] Among all human pursuits, the pursuit of wisdom is more perfect, more noble, more useful, and more full of joy.

*Perfectius quidem, quia in quantum homo sapientiae studium dat, in quantum verae beatitudinis iam aliquam partem habet unde sapiens dicit, beatus vir qui in sapientia morabitur, Eccli. 14-22.*

*Sublimius autem est quia per ipsum homo praecipue ad divinam similitudinem accedit, quae omnia in sapientia fecit: unde, quia similitudo causa est dilectionis, sapientiae studium praecipue Deo per amicitiam coniungit; propter quod Sap. 7-14 dicitur quod sapientia infinitus thesaurus est hominibus, quo qui usi sunt, facti sunt participes amicitiae Dei.*

*Utilius autem est quia per ipsam sapientiam ad immortalitatis regnum pervenitur: concupiscentia enim sapientiae deducet ad regnum perpetuum, Sap. 6-21.*

*Lucundius autem est quia non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius nec taedium convictus illius, sed laetitiam et gaudium, Sap. 8-16.*

*Assumpta igitur ex divina pietate fiducia sapientis officium prosequendi, quamvis proprias vires excedat, propositum nostrae intentionis est veritatem quam fides Catholica profitetur, pro nostro modulo manifestare, errores eliminando contrarios: ut enim verbis Hilarii utar, ego hoc vel praecipuum vitae meae officium debere me Deo conscius sum, ut eum omnis sermo meus et sensus loquatur.*

*Contra singulorum autem errores difficile est procedere, propter duo. Primo, quia non ita sunt nobis nota singulorum errantium dicta sacrilega ut ex his quae dicunt possimus rationes assumere ad eorum errores destruendos. Hoc enim modo usi sunt antiqui doctores in destructionem errorum gentilium quorum positiones scire poterant quia et ipsi gentiles fuerant, vel saltem inter gentiles conversati et in eorum doctrinis eruditi. Secundo, quia quidam eorum, ut Mahumetistae et Pagani, non conveniunt nobiscum in auctoritate alicuius Scripturae, per quam possint convinci, sicut contra Iudaeos disputare possumus per vetus testamentum, contra haereticos per novum. Hi vero neutrum recipiunt. Unde necesse est ad naturalem rationem recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur. Quae tamen in rebus divinis deficiens est.*

It is more perfect because, in so far as a man gives himself to the pursuit of wisdom, so far does he even now have some share in true beatitude. And so a wise man has said: "Blessed is the man that shall continue in wisdom" (Sirach 14:22).

It is more noble because through this pursuit man especially approaches to a likeness to God Who "made all things in wisdom" (Ps. 103:24). And since likeness is the cause of love, the pursuit of wisdom especially joins man to God in friendship. That is why it is said of wisdom that "she is an infinite treasure to men! which they that use become the friends of God" (Wis. 7:14).

It is more useful because through wisdom we arrive at the kingdom of immortality. For "the desire of wisdom leads to the everlasting kingdom" (Wis. 6:21).

It is more full of joy because "her conversation has no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness" (Wis. 7:16).

[2] And so, in the name of the divine Mercy, I have the confidence to embark upon the work of a wise man, even though this may surpass my powers, and I have set myself the task of making known, as far as my limited powers will allow, the truth that the Catholic faith professes, and of setting aside the errors that are opposed to it. To use the words of Hilary: "I am aware that I owe this to God as the chief duty of my life, that my every word and sense may speak of Him" [ *De Trinitate* I, 37].

[3] To proceed against individual errors, however, is a difficult business, and this for two reasons. In the first place, it is difficult because the sacrilegious remarks of individual men who have erred are not so well known to us so that we may use what they say as the basis of proceeding to a refutation of their errors. This is, indeed, the method that the ancient Doctors of the Church used in the refutation of the errors of the Gentiles. For they could know the positions taken by the Gentiles since they themselves had been Gentiles, or at least had lived among the Gentiles and had been instructed in their teaching. In the second place, it is difficult because some of them, such as the Mohammedans and the pagans, do not agree with us in accepting the authority of any Scripture, by which they may be convinced of their error. Thus, against the Jews we are able to argue by means of the Old Testament, while against heretics we are able to argue by means of the New Testament. But the Muslims and the pagans accept neither the one nor the other. We must, therefore, have recourse to the natural reason, to

which all men are forced to give their assent. However, it is true, in divine matters the natural reason has its failings.

*Simul autem veritatem aliquam investigantes ostendemus qui errores per eam excludantur: et quomodo demonstrativa veritas, fidei Christianae religionis concordet.*

[4] Now, while we are investigating some given truth, we shall also show what errors are set aside by it; and we shall likewise show how the truth that we come to know by demonstration is in accord with the Christian religion.

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### Caput 3

#### *Quis modus sit possibilis divinae veritatis manifestandae*

*Quia vero non omnis veritatis manifestandae modus est idem; disciplinati autem hominis est tantum de unoquoque fidem capere tentare, quantum natura rei permittit, ut a philosopho, optime dictum Boetius introducit, necesse est prius ostendere quis modus sit possibilis ad veritatem propositam manifestandam.*

*Est autem in his quae de Deo confitemur duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis.*

*Quod autem sint aliqua intelligibilium divinorum quae humanae rationis penitus excedant ingenium, evidentissime apparet. Cum enim principium totius scientiae quam de aliqua re ratio percipit, sit intellectus substantiae ipsius, eo quod, secundum doctrinam philosophi demonstrationis principium est quod quid est; oportet quod secundum modum quo substantia rei intelligitur, sit modus eorum quae de re illa cognoscuntur. Unde si intellectus humanus, alicuius rei substantiam comprehendit, puta lapidis vel trianguli, nullum intelligibilium illius rei facultatem humanae rationis excedet. Quod quidem nobis circa Deum non accidit. Nam ad substantiam ipsius capiendam intellectus humanus naturali virtute pertingere non potest: cum intellectus nostri, secundum modum praesentis vitae, cognitio a sensu incipiat; et ideo ea quae in sensu non cadunt, non possunt humano intellectu capi, nisi quatenus ex sensibilibus earum cognitio colligitur. Sensibilia autem ad hoc ducere intellectum nostrum non*

### Chapter 3

#### ON THE WAY IN WHICH DIVINE TRUTH IS TO BE MADE KNOWN

[1] The way of making truth known is not always the same, and, as the Philosopher has very well said, “it belongs to an educated man to seek such certitude in each thing as the nature of that thing allows.” The remark is also introduced by Boethius [ *De Trinitate* II]. But, since such is the case, we must first show what way is open to us in order that we may make known the truth which is our object.

[2] There is a twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God. Some truths about God exceed all the ability of the human reason. Such is the truth that God is triune. But there are some truths which the natural reason also is able to reach. Such are that God exists, that He is one, and the like. In fact, such truths about God have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, guided by the light of the natural reason.

[3] That there are certain truths about God that totally surpass man’s ability appears with the greatest evidence. Since, indeed, the principle of all knowledge that the reason perceives about some thing is the understanding of the very substance of that being (for according to Aristotle “what a thing is” is the principle of demonstration) [ *Posterior Analytics* II, 3], it is necessary that the way in which we understand the substance of a thing determines the way in which we know what belongs to it. Hence, if the human intellect comprehends the substance of some thing, for example, that of a stone or of a triangle, no intelligible characteristic belonging to that thing surpasses the grasp of the human reason. But this does not happen to us in the case of God. For the human intellect is not able to reach a comprehension of the divine substance through its natural power. For, according to its manner of knowing in the present life, the intellect depends on the sense for the origin of knowledge; and so those things that do not fall under the senses cannot be grasped by the human intellect except in so far as the knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things. Now, sensible things cannot lead the human intellect to the

*possunt ut in eis divina substantia videatur quid sit: cum sint effectus causae virtutem non aequantes. Ducitur tamen ex sensibilibus intellectus noster in divinam cognitionem ut cognoscat de Deo quia est, et alia huiusmodi quae oportet attribui primo principio. Sunt igitur quaedam intelligibilia divinorum quae humanae rationi sunt pervia; quaedam vero quae omnino vim humanae rationis excedunt.*

*Adhuc ex intellectu gradibus idem facile est videre. Duorum enim quorum unus alio rem aliquam intellectu subtilius intuetur, ille cuius intellectus est elevatior, multa intelligit quae alius omnino capere non potest: sicut patet in rustico, qui nullo modo philosophiae subtiles considerationes capere potest. Intellectus autem Angeli plus excedit intellectum humanum quam intellectus optimi philosophi intellectum rudissimi idiotae: quia haec distantia inter speciei humanae limites continetur, quos angelicus intellectus excedit. Cognoscit quidem Angelus Deum ex nobiliori effectu quam homo: quanto ipsa substantia Angeli, per quam in Dei cognitionem ducitur naturali cognitione, est dignior rebus sensibilibus et etiam ipsa anima, per quam intellectus humanus in Dei cognitionem ascendit. Multoque amplius intellectus divinus excedit angelicum quam angelicus humanum. Ipse enim intellectus divinus sua capacitate substantiam suam adaequat, et ideo perfecte de se intelligit quid est, et omnia cognoscit quae de ipso intelligibilia sunt: non autem naturali cognitione Angelus de Deo cognoscit quid est, quia et ipsa substantia Angeli, per quam in Dei cognitionem ducitur, est effectus causae virtutem non adaequans. Unde non omnia quae in seipso Deus intelligit, Angelus naturali cognitione capere potest: nec ad omnia quae Angelus sua naturali virtute intelligit, humana ratio sufficit capienda. Sicut igitur maximae amentiae esset idiota qui ea quae a philosopho proponuntur falsa esse assereret propter hoc quod ea capere non potest, ita, et multo amplius, nimiae stultitiae est homo si ea quae divinitus Angelorum ministerio revelantur falsa esse suspicatur ex hoc quod ratione investigari non possunt.*

*Adhuc idem manifeste apparet ex defectu quem in rebus cognoscendis quotidie experimur. Rerum enim sensibilibus plurimas proprietates ignoramus, earumque proprietatum quas sensu apprehendimus rationes perfecte in pluribus invenire non*

point of seeing in them the nature of the divine substance; for sensible things are effects that fall short of the power of their cause. Yet, beginning with sensible things, our intellect is led to the point of knowing about God that He exists, and other such characteristics that must be attributed to the First Principle. There are, consequently, some intelligible truths about God that are open to the human reason; but there are others that absolutely surpass its power.

[4] We may easily see the same point from the gradation of intellects. Consider the case of two persons of whom one has a more penetrating grasp of a thing by his intellect than, does the other. He who has the superior intellect understands many things that the other cannot grasp at all. Such is the case with a very simple person who cannot at all grasp the subtle speculations of philosophy. But the intellect of an angel surpasses the human intellect much more than the intellect of the greatest philosopher surpasses the intellect of the most uncultivated simple person; for the distance between the best philosopher and a simple person is contained within the limits of the human species, which the angelic intellect surpasses. For the angel knows God on the basis of a more noble effect than does man; and this by as much as the substance of an angel, through which the angel in his natural knowledge is led to the knowledge of God, is nobler than sensible things and even than the soul itself, through which the human intellect mounts to the knowledge of God. The divine intellect surpasses the angelic intellect much more than the angelic surpasses the human. For the divine intellect is in its capacity equal to its substance, and therefore it understands fully what it is, including all its intelligible attributes. But by his natural knowledge the angel does not know what God is, since the substance itself of the angel, through which he is led to the knowledge of God, is an effect that is not equal to the power of its cause. Hence, the angel is not able, by means of his natural knowledge, to grasp all the things that God understands in Himself; nor is the human reason sufficient to grasp all the things that the angel understands through his own natural power. Just as, therefore, it would be the height of folly for a simple person to assert that what a philosopher proposes is false on the ground that he himself cannot understand it, so (and even more so) it is the acme of stupidity for a man to suspect as false what is divinely revealed through the ministry of the angels simply because it cannot be investigated by reason.

[5] The same thing, moreover, appears quite clearly from the defect that we experience every day in our knowledge of things. We do not know a great many of the properties of sensible things, and in most cases we are not able to discover fully the natures of those properties that we apprehend by the

*possumus. Multo igitur amplius illius excellentissimae substantiae omnia intelligibilia humana ratio investigare non sufficit.*

*Huic etiam consonat dictum philosophi, qui in II Metaphys. asserit quod intellectus noster se habet ad prima entium, quae sunt manifestissima in natura, sicut oculus vespertilionis ad solem.*

*Huic etiam veritati sacra Scriptura testimonium perhibet. Dicitur enim Iob 11-7: forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes, et omnipotentem usque ad perfectum reperies? Et 36-26: ecce, Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram. Et I Cor. 13-9: ex parte cognoscimus.*

*Non igitur omne quod de Deo dicitur, quamvis ratione investigari non possit, statim quasi falsum abiiciendum est, ut Manichaei et plures infidelium putaverunt.*

sense. Much more is it the case, therefore, that the human reason is not equal to the task of investigating all the intelligible characteristics of that most excellent substance.

[6] The remark of Aristotle likewise agrees with this conclusion. He says that “our intellect is related to the prime beings, which are most evident in their nature, as the eye of an owl is related to the sun” [ *Metaphysics* Ia, 1]

[7] Sacred Scripture also gives testimony to this truth. We read in Job: “Do you think you can comprehend the depths of God, and find the limit of the Almighty?” (11:7). And again: “Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge” (Job 36:26). And St. Paul: “We know in part” (1 Cor. 13:9).

[8] We should not, therefore, immediately reject as false, following the opinion of the Manicheans and many unbelievers, everything that is said about God even though it cannot be investigated by reason.

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#### Caput 4

#### Chapter 4

##### ***Quod veritas divinatorum ad quam naturalis ratio pertingit convenienter hominibus credenda proponitur***

##### **THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT GOD TO WHICH THE NATURAL REASON REACHES IS FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MEN FOR BELIEF**

*Duplici igitur veritate divinatorum intelligibilium existente, una ad quam rationis inquisitio pertingere potest, altera quae omne ingenium humanae rationis excedit, utraque convenienter divinitus homini credenda proponitur. Hoc autem de illa primo ostendendum est quae inquisitioni rationis pervia esse potest: ne forte alicui videatur, ex quo ratione haberi potest, frustra id supernaturali inspiratione credendum traditum esse.*

[1] Since, therefore, there exists a twofold truth concerning the divine being, one to which the inquiry of the reason can reach, the other which surpasses the whole ability of the human reason, it is fitting that both of these truths be proposed to man divinely for belief. This point must first be shown concerning the truth that is open to the inquiry of the reason; otherwise, it might perhaps seem to someone that, since such a truth can be known by the reason, it was uselessly given to men through a supernatural inspiration as an object of belief.

*Sequerentur autem tria inconvenientia si huiusmodi veritas solummodo rationi inquirenda relinqueretur.*

[2] Yet, if this truth were left solely as a matter of inquiry for the human reason, three awkward consequences would follow.

*Unum est quod paucis hominibus Dei cognitio inesset. A fructu enim studiosae inquisitionis, qui est inventio veritatis, plurimi impediuntur tribus de causis. Quidam siquidem propter complexionis indispositionem, ex qua multi naturaliter sunt indispositi ad sciendum: unde nullo studio ad hoc pertingere possent ut summum gradum humanae cognitionis attingerent, qui in cognoscendo Deum*

[3] The first is that few men would possess the knowledge of God. For there are three reasons why most men are cut off from the fruit of diligent inquiry which is the discovery of truth. Some do not have the physical disposition for such work. As a result, there are many who are naturally not fitted to pursue knowledge; and so, however much they tried, they would be unable to reach the highest level of human knowledge which consists in knowing God. Others are cut off from pursuing this truth by the

*consistit. Quidam vero impediuntur necessitate rei familiaris. Oportet enim esse inter homines aliquos qui temporalibus administrandis insistant, qui tantum tempus in otio contemplativae inquisitionis non possent expendere ut ad summum fastigium humanae inquisitionis pertingerent, scilicet Dei cognitionem. Quidam autem impediuntur pigritia. Ad cognitionem enim eorum quae de Deo ratio investigare potest, multa praecognoscere oportet: cum fere totius philosophiae consideratio ad Dei cognitionem ordinetur; propter quod metaphysica, quae circa divina versatur, inter philosophiae partes ultima remanet addiscenda. Sic ergo non nisi cum magno labore studii ad praedictae veritatis inquisitionem perveniri potest. Quem quidem laborem pauci subire volunt pro amore scientiae, cuius tamen mentibus hominum naturalem Deus inseruit appetitum.*

*Secundum inconveniens est quod illi qui ad praedictae veritatis inventionem pervenirent, vix post longum tempus pertingerent. Tum propter huius veritatis profunditatem, ad quam capiendam per viam rationis non nisi post longum exercitium intellectus humanus idoneus invenitur. Tum etiam propter multa quae praeelegantur, ut dictum est. Tum etiam propter hoc quod tempore iuventutis, dum diversis motibus passionum anima fluctuat, non est apta ad tam altae veritatis cognitionem, sed in quiescendo fit prudens et sciens, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Remaneret igitur humanum genus, si sola rationis via ad Deum cognoscendum pateret, in maximis ignorantiae tenebris: cum Dei cognitio, quae homines maxime perfectos et bonos facit, non nisi quibusdam paucis, et his etiam post temporis longitudinem proveniret.*

*Tertium inconveniens est quod investigationi rationis humanae plerumque falsitas admiscetur, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri in iudicando, et phantasmatum permixtionem. Et ideo apud multos in dubitatione remanent ea quae sunt etiam verissime demonstrata, dum vim demonstrationis ignorant; et praecipue cum videant a diversis qui sapientes dicuntur, diversa doceri. Inter multa etiam vera quae demonstrantur, immiscetur aliquando aliquid falsum, quod non demonstratur, sed aliqua probabili vel sophistica ratione asseritur, quae interdum demonstratio reputatur. Et ideo oportuit*

necessities imposed upon them by their daily lives. For some men must devote themselves to taking care of temporal matters. Such men would not be able to give so much time to the leisure of contemplative inquiry as to reach the highest peak at which human investigation can arrive, namely, the knowledge of God. Finally, there are some who are cut off by indolence. In order to know the things that the reason can investigate concerning God, a knowledge of many things must already be possessed. For almost all of philosophy is directed towards the knowledge of God, and that is why metaphysics, which deals with divine things, is the last part of philosophy to be learned. This means that we are able to arrive at the inquiry concerning the aforementioned truth only on the basis of a great deal of labor spent in study. Now, those who wish to undergo such a labor for the mere love of knowledge are few, even though God has inserted into the minds of men a natural appetite for knowledge.

[4] The second awkward effect is that those who would come to discover the abovementioned truth would barely reach it after a great deal of time. The reasons are several. There is the profundity of this truth, which the human intellect is made capable of grasping by natural inquiry only after a long training. Then, there are many things that must be presupposed, as we have said. There is also the fact that, in youth, when the soul is swayed by the various movements of the passions, it is not in a suitable state for the knowledge of such lofty truth. On the contrary, "one becomes wise and knowing in repose," as it is said in the *Physics* [VII, 3]. The result is this. If the only way open to us for the knowledge of God were solely that of the reason, the human race would remain in the blackest shadows of ignorance. For then the knowledge of God, which especially renders men perfect and good, would come to be possessed only by a few, and these few would require a great deal of time in order to reach it.

[5] The third awkward effect is this. The investigation of the human reason for the most part has falsity present within it, and this is due partly to the weakness of our intellect in judgment, and partly to the admixture of images. The result is that many, remaining ignorant of the power of demonstration, would hold in doubt those things that have been most truly demonstrated. This would be particularly the case since they see that, among those who are reputed to be wise men, each one teaches his own brand of doctrine. Furthermore, with the many truths that are demonstrated, there sometimes is mingled something that is false, which is not demonstrated but rather asserted on the basis of some probable or sophistical argument, which yet has the credit of being a demonstration. That is why it was necessary



*per viam fidei fixam certitudinem et puram veritatem de rebus divinis hominibus exhiberi.*

*Salubriter ergo divina providit clementia ut ea etiam quae ratio investigare potest, fide tenenda praeciperet: ut sic omnes de facili possent divinae cognitionis participes esse et absque dubitatione et errore.*

*Hinc est quod Ephes. 4-17 dicitur: iam non ambuletis sicut et gentes ambulant in vanitate sensus sui, tenebris obscuratum habentes intellectum. Et Isaiae 54-13: ponam universos filios tuos doctos a domino.*

that the unshakeable certitude and pure truth concerning divine things should be presented to men by way of faith.

[6] Beneficially, therefore, did the divine Mercy provide that it should instruct us to hold by faith even those truths that the human reason is able to investigate. In this way, all men would easily be able to have a share in the knowledge of God, and this without uncertainty and error.

[7] Hence it is written: “Henceforward walk not as the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind, having their understanding darkened” (Eph. 4:17-18). And again: “All your children shall be taught of the Lord” (Is. 54:13).

## Caput 5

### ***Quod ea quae ratione investigari non possunt convenienter fide tenenda hominibus proponuntur***

*Videtur autem quibusdam fortasse non debere homini ad credendum proponi illa quae ratio investigare non sufficit cum divina sapientia unicuique secundum modum suae naturae provideat. Et ideo demonstrandum est quod necessarium sit homini divinitus credenda proponi etiam illa quae rationem excedunt.*

*Nullus enim desiderio et studio in aliquid tendit nisi sit ei praecognitum. Quia ergo ad altius bonum quam experiri in praesenti vita possit humana fragilitas, homines per divinam providentiam ordinantur, ut in sequentibus investigabitur, oportuit mentem evocari in aliquid altius quam ratio nostra in praesenti possit pertingere, ut sic disceret aliquid desiderare, et studio tendere in aliquid quod totum statum praesentis vitae excedit. Et hoc praecipue Christianae religioni competit, quae singulariter bona spiritualia et aeterna promittit: unde et in ea plurima humanum sensum excedentia proponuntur. Lex autem vetus, quae temporalia promissa habebat, pauca proposuit quae humanae rationis inquisitionem excederent. Secundum etiam hunc modum philosophis cura fuit, ad hoc ut homines a sensibilibus delectationibus ad honestatem perducerent, ostendere esse alia bona his sensibilibus potiora, quorum gustu multo suavius qui vacant activis vel contemplativis virtutibus delectantur.*

## Chapter 5

### **THAT THE TRUTHS THE HUMAN REASON IS NOT ABLE TO INVESTIGATE ARE FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MEN FOR BELIEF**

[1] Now, perhaps some will think that men should not be asked to believe what the reason is not adequate to investigate, since the divine Wisdom provides in the case of each thing according to the mode of its nature. We must therefore prove that it is necessary for man to receive from God as objects of belief even those truths that are above the human reason.

[2] No one tends with desire and zeal towards something that is not already known to him. But, as we shall examine later on in this work, men are ordained by the divine Providence towards a higher good than human fragility can experience in the present life. That is why it was necessary for the human mind to be called to something higher than the human reason here and now can reach, so that it would thus learn to desire something and with zeal tend towards something that surpasses the whole state of the present life. This belongs especially to the Christian religion, which in a unique way promises spiritual and eternal goods. And so there are many things proposed to men in it that transcend human sense. The Old Law, on the other hand, whose promises were of a temporal character, contained very few proposals that transcended the inquiry of the human reason. Following this same direction, the philosophers themselves, in order that they might lead men from the pleasure of sensible things to virtue, were concerned to show that there were in existence other goods of a higher nature than these things of sense, and that those who gave themselves to the active or contemplative virtues would find much sweeter enjoyment in the taste of these higher goods.

*Est etiam necessarium huiusmodi veritatem ad credendum hominibus proponi ad Dei cognitionem veriorem habendam. Tunc enim solum Deum vere cognoscimus quando ipsum esse credimus supra omne id quod de Deo cogitari ab homine possibile est: eo quod naturalem hominis cognitionem divina substantia excedit, ut supra ostensum est. Per hoc ergo quod homini de Deo aliqua proponuntur quae rationem excedunt, firmatur in homine opinio quod Deus sit aliquid supra id quod cogitare potest.*

*Alia etiam utilitas inde provenit, scilicet praesumptionis repressio, quae est mater erroris. Sunt enim quidam tantum de suo ingenio praesumentes ut totam rerum naturam se reputent suo intellectu posse metiri, aestimantes scilicet totum esse verum quod eis videtur et falsum quod eis non videtur. Ut ergo ab hac praesumptione humanus animus liberatus ad modestam inquisitionem veritatis perveniat, necessarium fuit homini proponi quaedam divinitus quae omnino intellectum eius excederent.*

*Apparet etiam alia utilitas ex dictis philosophi in X Ethicor. Cum enim Simonides quidam homini praetermittendam divinam cognitionem persuaderet et humanis rebus ingenium applicandum, oportere inquiens humana sapere hominem et mortalia mortalem; contra eum philosophus dicit quod homo debet se ad immortalia et divina trahere quantum potest. Unde in XI de Animal. dicit, quod, quamvis parum sit quod de substantiis superioribus percipimus, tamen illud modicum est magis amatum et desideratum omni cognitione quam de substantiis inferioribus habemus. Dicit etiam in II Cael. et Mund. quod cum de corporibus caelestibus quaestiones possint solvi parva et topica solutione, contingit auditori ut vehemens sit gaudium eius. Ex quibus omnibus apparet quod de rebus nobilissimis quantumcumque imperfecta cognitio maximam perfectionem animae confert.*

*Et ideo, quamvis ea quae supra rationem sunt ratio humana plene capere non possit, tamen multum sibi perfectionis acquiritur si saltem ea qualitercumque teneat fide.*

*Et ideo dicitur Eccli. 3-25: plurima supra sensum hominis ostensa sunt tibi. Et 1 Cor. 2-11 quae sunt Dei nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei; nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum suum.*

[3] It is also necessary that such truth be proposed to men for belief so that they may have a truer knowledge of God. For then only do we know God truly when we believe Him to be above everything that it is possible for man to think about Him; for, as we have shown, the divine substance surpasses the natural knowledge of which man is capable. Hence, by the fact that some things about God are proposed to man that surpass his reason, there is strengthened in man the view that God is something above what he can think.

[4] Another benefit that comes from the revelation to men of truths that exceed the reason is the curbing of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some who have such a presumptuous opinion of their own ability that they deem themselves able to measure the nature of everything; I mean to say that, in their estimation, everything is true that seems to them so, and everything is false that does not. So that the human mind, therefore, might be freed from this presumption and come to a humble inquiry after truth, it was necessary that some things should be proposed to man by God that would completely surpass his intellect.

[5] A still further benefit may also be seen in what Aristotle says in the *Ethics* [X, 7]. There was a certain Simonides who exhorted people to put aside the knowledge of divine things and to apply their talents to human occupations. He said that “he who is a man should know human things, and he who is mortal, things that are mortal.” Against Simonides Aristotle says that “man should draw himself towards what is immortal and divine as much as he can.” And so he says in the *De animalibus* [I, 5] that, although what we know of the higher substances is very little, yet that little is loved and desired more than all the knowledge that we have about less noble substances. He also says in the *De caelo et mundo* [II, 12] that when questions about the heavenly bodies can be given even a modest and merely plausible solution, he who hears this experiences intense joy. From all these considerations it is clear that even the most imperfect knowledge about the most noble realities brings the greatest perfection to the soul. Therefore, although the human reason cannot grasp fully the truths that are above it, yet, if it somehow holds these truths at least by faith, it acquires great perfection for itself.

[6] Therefore it is written: “For many things are shown to you above the understanding of men” (Sirach 3:75). Again: “So the things that are of God no man knows but the Spirit of God. But to us God has revealed them by His Spirit” (1 Cor. 2:11, 10).

*Quod assentire his quae sunt fidei non est  
levitatis quamvis supra rationem sint*

**THAT TO GIVE ASSENT TO THE TRUTHS OF  
FAITH IS NOT FOOLISHNESS EVEN THOUGH  
THEY ARE ABOVE REASON**

*Huiusmodi autem veritati, cui ratio humana  
experimentum non praebet, fidem adhibentes non  
leviter credunt, quasi indoctas fabulas secuti, ut 2  
Petr. 1-16, dicitur.*

[1] Those who place their faith in this truth, however, “for  
which the human reason offers no experimental evidence,” do  
not believe foolishly, as though “following artificial fables” (2  
Peter 2:16).

*Haec enim divinae sapientiae secreta ipsa divina  
sapientia, quae omnia plenissime novit, dignata est  
hominibus revelare: quae sui praesentiam et  
doctrinae et inspirationis veritatem, convenientibus  
argumentis ostendit, dum ad confirmandum ea quae  
naturalem cognitionem excedunt, opera visibiliter  
ostendit quae totius naturae superant facultatem;  
videlicet in mirabili curatione languorum,  
mortuorum suscitatione, caelestium corporum  
mirabili immutatione; et, quod est mirabilius,  
humanarum mentium inspiratione, ut idiotae et  
simplices, dono spiritus sancti repleti, summam  
sapientiam et facultatem in instanti consequerentur.  
Quibus inspectis, praedictae probationis efficacia,  
non armorum violentia, non voluptatum  
promissione, et, quod est mirabilissimum, inter  
persecutorum tyrannidem, innumerabilis turba non  
solum simplicium, sed sapientissimorum hominum,  
ad fidem Christianam convolvavit, in qua omnem  
humanum intellectum excedentia praedicantur,  
voluptates carnis cohibentur et omnia quae in  
mundo sunt contemni docentur; quibus animos  
mortalium assentire et maximum miraculorum est,  
et manifestum divinae inspirationis opus, ut,  
contemptis visibilibus, sola invisibilia cupiantur.  
Hoc autem non subito neque a casu, sed ex divina  
dispositione factum esse, manifestum est ex hoc  
quod hoc se facturum Deus multis ante  
prophetarum praedixit oraculis, quorum libri penes  
nos in veneratione habentur, utpote nostrae fidei  
testimonium adhibentes.*

For these “secrets of divine Wisdom” (Job 11:6) the divine  
Wisdom itself, which knows all things to the full, has deigned  
to reveal to men. It reveals its own presence, as well as the  
truth of its teaching and inspiration, by fitting arguments; and  
in order to confirm those truths that exceed natural knowledge,  
it gives visible manifestation to works that surpass the ability  
of all nature. Thus, there are the wonderful cures of illnesses,  
there is the raising of the dead, and the wonderful immutation  
in the heavenly bodies; and what is more wonderful, there is  
the inspiration given to human minds, so that simple and  
untutored persons, filled with the gift of the Holy Spirit, come  
to possess instantaneously the highest wisdom and the readiest  
eloquence.

When these arguments were examined, through the efficacy of  
the abovementioned proof, and not the violent assault of arms  
or the promise of pleasure, and (what is most wonderful of all)  
in the midst of the tyranny of the persecutors, an innumerable  
throng of people, both simple and most learned, flocked to the  
Christian faith. In this faith there are truths preached that  
surpass every human intellect; the pleasures of the flesh are  
curbed; it is taught that the things of the world should be  
spurned. Now, for the minds of mortal men to assent to these  
things is the greatest of miracles, just as it is a manifest work  
of divine inspiration that, spurning visible things, men should  
seek only what is invisible. Now, that this has happened neither without preparation nor  
by chance, but as a result of the disposition of God, is clear  
from the fact that through many pronouncements of the  
ancient prophets God had foretold that He would do this. The  
books of these prophets are held in veneration among us  
Christians, since they give witness to our faith.

*Huius quidem confirmationis modus tangitur Hebr.  
2-3 quae, scilicet humana salus, cum initium  
accepisset enarrari per dominum, ab eis qui  
audierunt in nos confirmata est, contestante Deo  
signis et portentis et variis spiritus sancti  
distributionibus.*

[2] The manner of this confirmation is touched on by St. Paul:  
“Which,” that is, human salvation, “having begun to be  
declared by the Lord, was confirmed to us by them that hear  
Him: God also bearing them witness of signs, and wonders,  
and divers miracles, and distributions of the Holy Spirit” (Heb.  
7:3-4).

*Haec autem tam mirabilis mundi conversio ad fidem  
Christianam indicium certissimum est  
praeteritorum signorum: ut ea ulterius iterari*

[3] This wonderful conversion of the world to the Christian  
faith is the clearest witness of the signs given in the past; so  
that it is not necessary that they should be further repeated,

*necesse non sit, cum in suo effectu appareant evidenter. Esset enim omnibus signis mirabilibus si ad credendum tam ardua, et ad operandum tam difficilia, et ad sperandum tam alta, mundus absque mirabilibus signis inductus fuisset a simplicibus et ignobilibus hominibus. Quamvis non cesset Deus etiam nostris temporibus, ad confirmationem fidei, per sanctos suos miracula operari.*

*Hi vero qui sectas errorum introduxerunt processerunt via contraria: ut patet in Mahumeto qui carnalium voluptatum promissis, ad quorum desiderium carnalis concupiscentia instigat, populus illexit. Praecepta etiam tradidit promissis conformia, voluptati carnali habenas relaxans, in quibus in promptu est a carnalibus hominibus obediri. Documenta etiam veritatis non attulit nisi quae de facili a quolibet mediocriter sapiente naturali ingenio cognosci possint: quin potius vera quae docuit multis fabulis et falsissimis doctrinis immiscuit. Signa etiam non adhibuit supernaturaliter facta, quibus solis divinae inspirationi conveniens testimonium adhibetur, dum operatio visibilis quae non potest esse nisi divina, ostendit doctorem veritatis invisibiliter inspiratum: sed dixit se in armorum potentia missum, quae signa etiam latronibus et tyrannis non desunt. Ei etiam non aliqui sapientes, in rebus divinis et humanis exercitati, a principio crediderunt: sed homines bestiales in desertis morantes, omnis doctrinae divinae prorsus ignari, per quorum multitudinem alios armorum violentia in suam legem coegit. Nulla etiam divina oracula praecedentium prophetarum ei testimonium perhibent: quin potius quasi omnia veteris et novi testamenti documenta fabulosa narratione depravat, ut patet eius legem inspicienti. Unde astuto consilio libros veteris et novi testamenti suis sequacibus non reliquit legendos, ne per eos falsitatis argueretur. Et sic patet quod eius dictis fidem adhibentes leviter credunt.*

since they appear most clearly in their effect. For it would be truly more wonderful than all signs if the world had been led by simple and humble men to believe such lofty truths, to accomplish such difficult actions, and to have such high hopes. Yet it is also a fact that, even in our own time, God does not cease to work miracles through His saints for the confirmation of the faith.

[4] On the other hand, those who founded sects committed to erroneous doctrines proceeded in a way that is opposite to this. The point is clear in the case of Muhammad. He seduced the people by promises of carnal pleasure to which the concupiscence of the flesh goads us. His teaching also contained precepts that were in conformity with his promises, and he gave free rein to carnal pleasure. In all this, as is not unexpected, he was obeyed by carnal men. As for proofs of the truth of his doctrine, he brought forward only such as could be grasped by the natural ability of anyone with a very modest wisdom. Indeed, the truths that he taught he mingled with many fables and with doctrines of the greatest falsity. He did not bring forth any signs produced in a supernatural way, which alone fittingly gives witness to divine inspiration; for a visible action that can be only divine reveals an invisibly inspired teacher of truth. On the contrary, Muhammad said that he was sent in the power of his arms—which are signs not lacking even to robbers and tyrants. What is more, no wise men, men trained in things divine and human, believed in him from the beginning. Those who believed in him were brutal men and desert wanderers, utterly ignorant of all divine teaching, through whose numbers Muhammad forced others to become his followers by the violence of his arms. Nor do divine pronouncements on the part of preceding prophets offer him any witness. On the contrary, he perverts almost all the testimonies of the Old and New Testaments by making them into fabrications of his own, as can be seen by anyone who examines his law. It was, therefore, a shrewd decision on his part to forbid his followers to read the Old and New Testaments, lest these books convict him of falsity. It is thus clear that those who place any faith in his words believe foolishly.

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## Caput 7

## Chapter 7

### *Quod veritati fidei Christianae non contrariatur veritas rationis*

### **THAT THE TRUTH OF REASON IS NOT OPPOSED TO THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH**

*Quamvis autem praedicta veritas fidei Christianae humanae rationis capacitatem excedat, haec tamen quae ratio naturaliter indita habet, huic veritati contraria esse non possunt.*

[1] Now, although the truth of the Christian faith which we have discussed surpasses the capacity of the reason, nevertheless that truth that the human reason is naturally endowed to know cannot be opposed to the truth of the Christian faith.

*Ea enim quae naturaliter rationi sunt insita, verissima esse constat: in tantum ut nec esse falsa sit possibile cogitare. Nec id quod fide tenetur, cum tam evidenter divinitus confirmatum sit, fas est credere esse falsum. Quia igitur solum falsum vero contrarium est, ut ex eorum definitionibus inspectis manifeste apparet, impossibile est illis principiis quae ratio naturaliter cognoscit, praedictam veritatem fidei contrariam esse.*

*Item. Illud idem quod inducitur in animam discipuli a docente, doctoris scientia continet: nisi doceat fecte, quod de Deo nefas est dicere. Principiorum autem naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus est indita: cum ipse Deus sit nostrae auctor naturae. Haec ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quicquid igitur principiis huiusmodi contrarium est, divinae sapientiae contrariatur. Non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea igitur quae ex revelatione divina per fidem tenentur, non possunt naturali cognitioni esse contraria.*

*Adhuc. Contrariis rationibus intellectus noster ligatur, ut ad veri cognitionem procedere nequeat. Si igitur contrariae cognitiones nobis a Deo immitterentur, ex hoc a veritatis cognitione noster intellectus impediretur. Quod a Deo esse non potest.*

*Amplius. Ea quae sunt naturalia mutari non possunt, natura manente. Contrariae autem opiniones simul eidem inesse non possunt. Non igitur contra cognitionem naturalem aliqua opinio vel fides homini a Deo immittitur.*

*Et ideo apostolus dicit, Rom. 10-8: prope est verbum in corde tuo et in ore tuo: hoc est verbum fidei, quod praedicamus. Sed quia superat rationem, a nonnullis reputatur quasi contrarium. Quod esse non potest.*

*Huic etiam auctoritas Augustini concordat, qui in II super Gen. ad Litt. dicit sic: illud quod veritas patefaciet, libris sanctis sive testamenti veteris sive novi nullo modo potest esse adversum.*

*Ex quo evidenter colligitur, quaecumque argumenta contra fidei documenta ponantur, haec ex principiis primis naturae inditis per se notis non recte procedere. Unde nec demonstrationis vim habent, sed vel sunt rationes probabiles vel*

For that with which the human reason is naturally endowed is clearly most true; so much so, that it is impossible for us to think of such truths as false. Nor is it permissible to believe as false that which we hold by faith, since this is confirmed in a way that is so clearly divine. Since, therefore, only the false is opposed to the true, as is clearly evident from an examination of their definitions, it is impossible that the truth of faith should be opposed to those principles that the human reason knows naturally.

[2] Furthermore, that which is introduced into the soul of the student by the teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher—unless his teaching is fictitious, which it is improper to say of God. Now, the knowledge of the principles that are known to us naturally has been implanted in us by God; for God is the Author of our nature. These principles, therefore, are also contained by the divine Wisdom. Hence, whatever is opposed to them is opposed to the divine Wisdom, and, therefore, cannot come from God. That which we hold by faith as divinely revealed, therefore, cannot be contrary to our natural knowledge.

[3] Again. In the presence of contrary arguments our intellect is chained, so that it cannot proceed to the knowledge of the truth. If, therefore, contrary knowledges were implanted in us by God, our intellect would be hindered from knowing truth by this very fact. Now, such an effect cannot come from God.

[4] And again. What is natural cannot change as long as nature does not. Now, it is impossible that contrary opinions should exist in the same knowing subject at the same time. No opinion or belief, therefore, is implanted in man by God which is contrary to man's natural knowledge.

[5] Therefore, the Apostle says: "The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart. This is the word of faith, which we preach" (Rom. 10:8). But because it overcomes reason, there are some who think that it is opposed to it: which is impossible.

[6] The authority of St. Augustine also agrees with this. He writes as follows: "That which truth will reveal cannot in any way be opposed to the sacred books of the Old and the New Testament" [ *De genesi ad litteram* II, 18].

[7] From this we evidently gather the following conclusion: whatever arguments are brought forward against the doctrines of faith are conclusions incorrectly derived from the first and self-evident principles imbedded in nature. Such conclusions do not have the force of demonstration; they are arguments that are

sophisticae. Et sic ad ea solvenda locus relinquitur.

either probable or sophistical. And so, there exists the possibility to answer them.

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### Caput 8

### Chapter 8

#### *Qualiter se habeat humana ratio ad veritatem fidei*

#### HOW THE HUMAN REASON IS RELATED TO THE TRUTH OF FAITH

*Considerandum etiam videtur quod res quidem sensibiles, ex quibus humana ratio cognitionis principium sumit, aliquale vestigium in se divinae imitationis retinent, ita tamen imperfectum quod ad declarandam ipsius Dei substantiam omnino insufficiens invenitur. Habent enim effectus suarum causarum suo modo similitudinem, cum agens agat sibi simile: non tamen effectus ad perfectam agentis similitudinem semper pertingit. Humana igitur ratio ad cognoscendum fidei veritatem, quae solum videntibus divinam substantiam potest esse notissima, ita se habet quod ad eam potest aliquas verisimilitudines colligere, quae tamen non sufficiunt ad hoc quod praedicta veritas quasi demonstrative vel per se intellecta comprehendatur. Utile tamen est ut in huiusmodi rationibus, quantumcumque debilibus, se mens humana exerceat, dummodo desit comprehendendi vel demonstrandi praesumptio: quia de rebus altissimis etiam parva et debili consideratione aliquid posse inspicere iucundissimum est, ut ex dictis apparet.*

[1] There is also a further consideration. Sensible things, from which the human reason takes the origin of its knowledge, retain within themselves some sort of trace of a likeness to God. This is so imperfect, however, that it is absolutely inadequate to manifest the substance of God. For effects bear within themselves, in their own way, the likeness of their causes, since an agent produces its like; yet an effect does not always reach to the full likeness of its cause. Now, the human reason is related to the knowledge of the truth of faith (a truth which can be most evident only to those who see the divine substance) in such a way that it can gather certain likenesses of it, which are yet not sufficient so that the truth of faith may be comprehended as being understood demonstratively or through itself. Yet it is useful for the human reason to exercise itself in such arguments, however weak they may be, provided only that there be present no presumption to comprehend or to demonstrate. For to be able to see something of the loftiest realities, however thin and weak the sight may be, is, as our previous remarks indicate, a cause of the greatest joy.

*Cui quidem sententiae auctoritas Hilarii concordat, qui sic dicit in libro de Trin., loquens de huiusmodi veritate: haec credendo incipe, procurre, persiste: etsi non perventurum sciam, gratulabor tamen profecturum. Qui enim pie infinita prosequitur, etsi non contingat aliquando, semper tamen proficiet prodeundo. Sed ne te inferas in illud secretum, et arcano interminabilis nativitatis non te immergas, summam intelligentiae comprehendere praesumens: sed intellige incomprehensibilia esse.*

[2] The testimony of Hilary agrees with this. Speaking of this same truth, he writes as follows in his *De Trinitate* [II, 10, ii]: “Enter these truths by believing, press forward, persevere. And though I may know that you will not arrive at an end, yet I will congratulate you in your progress. For, though he who pursues the infinite with reverence will never finally reach the end, yet he will always progress by pressing onward. But do not intrude yourself into the divine secret, do not, presuming to comprehend the sum total of intelligence, plunge yourself into the mystery of the unending nativity; rather, understand that these things are incomprehensible.”

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### Caput 9

### Chapter 9

#### *De ordine et modo procedendi in hoc opere*

#### THE ORDER AND MANNER OF PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT WORK

*Ex praemissis igitur evidenter apparet sapientis intentionem circa duplicem veritatem divinarum*

[1] It is clearly apparent, from what has been said, that the intention of the wise man ought to be directed toward the

*debere versari, et circa errores contrarios destruendos: ad quarum unam investigatio rationis pertinere potest, alia vero omnem rationis excedit industriam. Dico autem duplicem veritatem divinorum, non ex parte ipsius Dei, qui est una et simplex veritas; sed ex parte cognitionis nostrae, quae ad divina cognoscenda diversimode se habet.*

*Ad primae igitur veritatis manifestationem per rationes demonstrativas, quibus adversarius convinci possit, procedendum est. Sed quia tales rationes ad secundam veritatem haberi non possunt, non debet esse ad hoc intentio ut adversarius rationibus vincatur: sed ut eius rationes, quas contra veritatem habet, solvantur; cum veritati fidei ratio naturalis contraria esse non possit, ut ostensum est. Singularis vero modus convincendi adversarium contra huiusmodi veritatem est ex auctoritate Scripturae divinitus confirmata miraculis: quae enim supra rationem humanam sunt, non credimus nisi Deo revelante. Sunt tamen ad huiusmodi veritatem manifestandam rationes aliquae verisimiles inducendae, ad fidelium quidem exercitium et solatium, non autem ad adversarios convincendos: quia ipsa rationum insufficientia eos magis in suo errore confirmaret, dum aestimarent nos propter tam debiles rationes veritati fidei consentire.*

*Modo ergo proposito procedere intendentes, primum nitentur ad manifestationem illius veritatis quam fides profitetur et ratio investigat, inducentes rationes demonstrativas et probabiles, quarum quasdam ex libris philosophorum et sanctorum collegimus per quas veritas confirmetur et adversarius vincatur. Deinde, ut a manifestioribus ad minus manifesta fiat processus, ad illius veritatis manifestationem procedemus quae rationem excedit, solventes rationes adversariorum et rationibus probabilibus et auctoritatibus, quantum Deus dederit, veritatem fidei declarantes.*

*Intendentibus igitur nobis per viam rationis prosequi ea quae de Deo ratio humana investigare potest, primo, occurrit consideratio de his quae Deo secundum seipsum conveniunt; secundo, vero, de processu creaturarum ab ipso; tertio, autem, de ordine creaturarum in ipsum sicut in finem.*

twofold truth of divine things, and toward the destruction of the errors that are contrary to this truth. One kind of divine truth the investigation of the reason is competent to reach, whereas the other surpasses every effort of the reason. I am speaking of a “twofold truth of divine things,” not on the part of God Himself, Who is truth one and simple, but from the point of view of our knowledge, which is variously related to the knowledge of divine things.

[2] Now, to make the first kind of divine truth known, we must proceed through demonstrative arguments, by which our adversary may become convinced. However, since such arguments are not available for the second kind of divine truth, our intention should not be to convince our adversary by arguments: it should be to answer his arguments against the truth; for, as we have shown, the natural reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith. The sole way to overcome an adversary of divine truth is from the authority of Scripture—an authority divinely confirmed by miracles. For that which is above the human reason we believe only because God has revealed it. Nevertheless, there are certain likely arguments that should be brought forth in order to make divine truth known. This should be done for the training and consolation of the faithful, and not with any idea of refuting those who are adversaries. For the very inadequacy of the arguments would rather strengthen them in their error, since they would imagine that our acceptance of the truth of faith was based on such weak arguments.

[3] This, then, is the manner of procedure we intend to follow. We shall first seek to make known that truth which faith professes and reason investigates. This we shall do by bringing forward both demonstrative and probable arguments, some of which were drawn from the books of the philosophers and of the saints, through which truth is strengthened and its adversary overcome [Books I-III]. Then, in order to follow a development from the more manifest to the less manifest, we shall proceed to make known that truth which surpasses reason, answering the objections of its adversaries and setting forth the truth of faith by probable arguments and by authorities, to the best of our ability [Book IV].

[4] We are aiming, then, to set out following the way of the reason and to inquire into what the human reason can investigate about God. In this aim the first consideration that confronts us is of that which belongs to God in Himself [Book I]. The second consideration concerns the coming forth of creatures from God [Book II]. The third concerns the ordering of creatures to God as to their end [Book III].

*Inter ea vero quae de Deo secundum seipsum consideranda sunt, praemittendum est, quasi totius operis necessarium fundamentum, consideratio qua demonstratur Deum esse. Quo non habito, omnis consideratio de rebus divinis tollitur.*

[5] Now, among the inquiries that we must undertake concerning God in Himself, we must set down in the beginning that whereby His Existence is demonstrated, as the necessary foundation of the whole work. For, if we do not demonstrate that God exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily suppressed.

## **Super Boetium de Trinitate. Quaestio II. De manifestatione divinae cognitionis**

Articulus 3. Whether in the Science of Faith, Which Is Concerning God, it Is Permissible to Use the Rational Arguments of the Natural Philosophers.

### **Whether in the Science of Faith, Which Is Concerning God, it Is Permissible to Use the Rational Arguments of the Natural Philosophers**

#### **Objections**

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in his quae sunt fidei non liceat philosophicis rationibus uti. 1 Cor. 1: non misit me Christus baptizare, sed evangelizare, non in sapientia verbi, Glossa: in doctrina philosophorum. Et super illud: ubi inquisitor huius saeculi? Dicit Glossa: inquisitor est qui naturae secreta rimatur, tales non recipit Deus inter praedicatores. Et super illud 2 c.: sermo meus et praedicatio mea fuit non in persuasibilibus humanae sapientiae verbis, dicit Glossa: etsi persuasibilia fuerunt verba mea, non tamen per humanam sapientiam, ut verba pseudoapostolorum.*

1. It seems that in regard to those truths that are of faith it is not right to employ the rational arguments of the natural philosophers, for, according to 1 Cor. 1:17, "Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel: not wisdom of speech"; that is, "in the doctrine of the philosophers," as the gloss says. And concerning the line (1 Cor. 1:20), "Where is the disputer of this world?" the gloss says: "The disputer is he who searches into the secrets of nature; such men God does not accept as preachers." And on the line (1 Cor. 2:4), "And my speech and my preaching was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom," the gloss says: "Although the words were persuasive, they were not so because of human wisdom, as is the word of pseudo-apostles."

*Ex quibus omnibus videtur quod in his quae sunt fidei non liceat rationibus philosophicis uti.*

From all these lines it is evident that in matters of faith it is not lawful to employ philosophical reasoning.

*Praeterea, Is. 15 super illud: nocte vastata est Ar, dicit Glossa: Ar, id est adversarius, scilicet scientia saecularis, quae adversaria est Deo. Ergo scientia saeculari in his quae Dei sunt uti non debemus.*

2. On that line (Is. 15:1), "Because in the night Ar of Moab is laid waste," the gloss says: "Ar, that is, the adversary, namely, secular science, which is the adversary of God"; therefore, etc.

*Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit: sacramentum fidei a philosophicis argumentis est liberum. Ergo ubi de fide agitur, philosophorum rationibus et dictis uti non licet.*

3. Ambrose says: "The deepest mysteries of faith are free from the reasonings of the philosophers"; therefore, when a matter of faith is dealt with, the reasonings and words of the philosophers ought not to be used.

*Praeterea, Hieronymus refert in epistula ad Eustochium virginem se in visione verberatum divini iudicio fuisse pro eo quod in libris legerat Ciceronis,*

4. Jerome relates in a letter to Eustochium that in vision he was beaten, according to divine justice, because he had read the books of Cicero, and that those standing by besought that



*et qui astabant precabantur ut veniam tribueret adolescentiae, exacturus deinde cruciatum, si gentiliū libros aliquando legisset; unde obtestans nomen Dei clamavit: domine, si umquam habuero saeculares codices, si legero, te negavi. Si ergo non licet in eis studere et legere, multo minus licet eis in divinis tractatibus uti.*

*Praeterea, saecularis sapientia frequenter in Scriptura per aquam significatur, sapientia vero divina per vinum. Sed Is. 1 vituperabuntur caupones aquam vino miscentes. Ergo vituperandi sunt doctores qui sacrae doctrinae philosophica documenta admiscent.*

*Praeterea, sicut dicit Hieronymus in Glossa Osee 2, cum haereticis nec nomina debemus habere communia. Sed haeretici utuntur ad fidei corruptionem philosophicis documentis, ut habetur in Glossa Prov. 7 et Is. 15. Ergo Catholici eis in suis tractatibus uti non debent.*

*Praeterea, sicut quaelibet scientia habet principia propria, ita et sacra doctrina, scilicet articulos fidei. Sed in aliis scientiis non recte proceditur, si assumantur alterius scientiae principia, sed oportet in unaquaque ex propriis principiis procedere, secundum doctrinam philosophi in I posteriorum. Ergo nec in sacra doctrina recte proceditur, si quis ex documentis philosophorum procedit.*

*Praeterea, si alicuius doctrina in aliquo repudiatur, eius auctoritas invalida est ad aliquid confirmandum; unde dicit Augustinus quod si in sacra Scriptura concesserimus aliquid esse falsitatis, peribit eius auctoritas ad fidei confirmationem. Sed sacra doctrina in multis doctrinam philosophorum repudiat, quia in multis errasse inveniuntur. Ergo eorum auctoritas non est efficax ad aliquid confirmandum.*

*Sed contra est quod apostolus Tit. 1 Epimenidis poetae versiculo usus est dicens: Cretenses semper mendaces, malae bestiae, ventres pigri, et 1 Cor. 15 verbis Menandri: corrumpunt bonos mores colloquia prava, et Athenis usus est verbis Arati: ipsius, scilicet Dei, et genus sumus, ut habetur Act. 17. Ergo et aliis divinae Scripturae doctoribus licet philosophicis argumentis uti.*

leniency might be granted on account of his youth, and that afterward the extreme penalty should be exacted if he read again the books of the Gentiles; wherefore, calling upon the name of God, he exclaimed: "If ever I shall possess secular books, if ever I read them, I shall have denied You"; therefore it is not lawful to use them in treating of divine things.

5. In Scripture, secular wisdom is often represented by water, but divine wisdom by wine. Now, according to Is., chap. 1, the innkeepers are upbraided for mixing water with wine; therefore the doctors are blameworthy for their mingling of philosophical doctrine with sacred Scripture.

6. Jerome says, in his gloss on Hosea, chap. 2, "With heretics we ought not to have even names in common." But heretics use the arguments of philosophers to destroy faith, as is maintained in the gloss on Prov., chap. 7 and Is., chap. 15; therefore Catholics ought not to use such in their discussions.

7. Every science has its proper principles, and thus also sacred doctrine has those that belong to it, namely, the articles of faith; but in other sciences the process is not valid if principles are taken from a different science, but each ought to proceed from its own principles, according to the teaching of the Philosopher (*I Poster.*); therefore the method is not permissible in sacred doctrine.

8. If the doctrine of anyone is repudiated in any respect, the authority of his teaching will not be valid in proving anything; wherefore Augustine says that, if in sacred doctrine we discover some falsity, the authority of that teaching is destroyed for confirming anything in regard to faith; but sacred doctrine repudiates the doctrine of the philosophers in many ways, because many errors are found among them; therefore their authority has no efficacy in proving anything (regarding sacred doctrine).

### **Sed contra**

But on the contrary, the Apostle (Titus 1: 12) makes use of a verse from the poet Epimenides, saying, "The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts," etc.; and (1 Cor. 15:33) he employs the words of Menander: "Evil communications corrupt good manners"; and in Acts 17:28 are the words of Aratus, "For we are also his (i.e., God's) offspring." Therefore it is licit for other doctors of divine Scripture also to make use of the arguments of the philosophers.

*Praeterea, Hieronymus in epistula ad magnum urbis Romae oratorem enumeratis pluribus sacrae Scripturae doctoribus ut Basilio, Gregorio et quibusdam aliis subiungit: qui omnes in tantum philosophorum doctrinis atque sententiis suos refererunt libros, ut nescias, quid in eis primum mirari debeas, utrum eruditionem saeculi vel scientiam Scripturarum. Quod non fecissent, si non licuisset vel inutile fuisset.*

*Praeterea, Hieronymus in epistula ad Pammachium de dormitione Paulinae: si adamaveris mulierem captivam, id est sapientiam saecularem, et eius pulchritudine captus fueris, decalva eam, et illecebras crinium atque ornamenta verborum cum tenacibus unguibus seca, lava eam prophetali nitro, et requiescens cum illa dicito: sinistra eius sub capite meo, et dextera illius amplexabitur me, et multos tibi captiva fetus dabit, ac de Moabitide efficietur tibi Israelites. Ergo fructuosum est ut aliquis sapientia saeculari utatur.*

*Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in II de Trinitate: non ero segnus ad inquirendam substantiam Dei sive per Scripturam sive per creaturam. Sed cognitio de creaturis in philosophia proponitur. Ergo non est inconveniens quod aliquis in sacra doctrina rationibus philosophicis utatur.*

*Praeterea, Augustinus in II de doctrina Christiana: philosophi autem qui dicuntur si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae accomoda dixerunt, non solum formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis tamquam iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda. Et sic idem quod prius.*

*Praeterea, Daniel I super illud: proposuit autem Daniel etc., dicit Glossa: si quis imperitus mathematicae artis contra mathematicos scribat aut expers philosophiae contra philosophos agat, quis etiam ridendus vel ridendo non rideat? Sed oportet quandoque doctorem sacrae Scripturae contra philosophos agere. Ergo oportet eum philosophia uti.*

*Responsio. Dicendum quod dona gratiarum hoc modo naturae adduntur quod eam non tollunt, sed magis perficiunt; unde et lumen fidei, quod nobis gratis infunditur, non destruit lumen naturalis rationis divinitus nobis inditum. Et quamvis lumen naturale mentis humanae sit insufficiens ad manifestationem eorum quae manifestantur per fidem, tamen impossibile est quod ea, quae per fidem traduntur nobis divinitus, sint contraria his quae sunt per*

Again, Jerome, in a letter to Magnus, a famous orator of Rome, having enumerated many doctors of Scripture, such as Basil and Gregory, adds: "All these have so intermingled in their books the teachings and the sayings of the philosophers that one knows not which to admire first in them, their secular erudition or their knowledge of the Scriptures." But this they would not have done had such been illicit or useless.

Also Jerome in a letter to Pammachius about the death of Paula says: you have become enamored of the captive woman, secular wisdom, and captivated by her beauty, cut her hair and her finger nails, cut away the enticement of her tresses and the adornments of her words, bathe her with prophetic niter, and, lying with her, say: 'His left hand under my head, and his right hand shall embrace me' (Cant. 8:3), and many children will the captive woman give to you, and from the Moabite, Israelites will be born to you." Therefore with fruitful results some make use of secular wisdom.

Again Augustine (II *De Trinitate*) says: "I shall not be without zeal in seeking out knowledge of God, whether through Scripture or creatures"; but knowledge of God through creatures is given in philosophy; therefore it is not unfitting that in sacred doctrine one should make use of philosophical reasoning.

Again Augustine (Book II, *De doctrina Christiana*) says: "If the philosophers have by chance uttered truths helpful to our faith, they are not only not to be feared, but rather those truths ought to be taken from them as from unjust possessors and used to our advantage." Thus the conclusion is as before.

Also on the saying in Dan. 1:8, "But Daniel purposed in his heart," the gloss says: "If anyone ignorant of mathematics should write in opposition to the mathematicians, or knowing nothing of philosophy should argue against the philosophers, would he not be derided?" But doctors of sacred Scripture must at times argue with philosophers; therefore it is needful that they make use of philosophy.

**Response.** I answer that it must be said that gifts of grace are added to those of nature in such a way that they do not destroy the latter, but rather perfect them; wherefore also the light of faith, which is gratuitously infused into our minds, does not destroy the natural light of cognition, which is in us by nature. For although the natural light of the human mind is insufficient to reveal those truths revealed by faith, yet it is impossible that those things which God has manifested to us by faith should be contrary to those which are evident to

*naturam nobis indita. Oporteret enim alterum esse falsum; et cum utrumque sit nobis a Deo, Deus nobis esset auctor falsitatis, quod est impossibile. Sed magis cum in imperfectis inveniatur aliqua imitatio perfectorum, in ipsis, quae per naturalem rationem cognoscuntur, sunt quaedam similitudines eorum quae per fidem sunt tradita.*

*Sicut autem sacra doctrina fundatur supra lumen fidei, ita philosophia fundatur supra lumen naturale rationis; unde impossibile est quod ea, quae sunt philosophiae, sint contraria his quae sunt fidei, sed deficiunt ab eis. Continent tamen aliquas eorum similitudines et quaedam ad ea praeambula, sicut natura praeambula est ad gratiam.*

*Si quid autem in dictis philosophorum invenitur contrarium fidei, hoc non est philosophia, sed magis philosophiae abusus ex defectu rationis. Et ideo possibile est ex principiis philosophiae huiusmodi errorem refellere vel ostendendo omnino esse impossibile vel ostendendo non esse necessarium. Sicut enim ea quae sunt fidei non possunt demonstrative probari, ita quaedam contraria eis non possunt demonstrative ostendi esse falsa, sed potest ostendi ea non esse necessaria.*

*Sic ergo in sacra doctrina philosophia possumus tripliciter uti.*

*Primo ad demonstrandum ea quae sunt praeambula fidei, quae necesse est in fide scire, ut ea quae naturalibus rationibus de Deo probantur, ut Deum esse, Deum esse unum et alia huiusmodi vel de Deo vel de creaturis in philosophia probata, quae fides supponit.*

*Secundo ad notificandum per aliquas similitudines ea quae sunt fidei, sicut Augustinus in libro de Trinitate utitur multis similitudinibus ex doctrinis philosophicis sumptis ad manifestandum Trinitatem.*

*Tertio ad resistendum his quae contra fidem dicuntur sive ostendendo ea esse falsa sive ostendendo ea non esse necessaria.*

*Tamen utentes philosophia in sacra doctrina possumus dupliciter errare.*

*Uno modo in hoc quod utantur his quae sunt contra fidem, quae non sunt philosophiae, sed corruptio vel abusus eius, sicut Origenes fecit.*

us by natural knowledge. In this case one would necessarily be false: and since both kinds of truth are from God, God would be the author of error, a thing which is impossible. Rather, since in imperfect things there is found some imitation of the perfect, though the image is deficient, in those things known by natural reason there are certain similitudes of the truths revealed by faith.

Now, as sacred doctrine is founded upon the light of faith, so philosophy depends upon the light of natural reason; wherefore it is impossible that philosophical truths are contrary to those that are of faith; but they are deficient as compared to them. Nevertheless they incorporate some similitudes of those higher truths, and some things that are preparatory for them, just as nature is the preamble to grace.

If, however, anything is found in the teachings of the philosophers contrary to faith, this error does not properly belong to philosophy, but is due to an abuse of philosophy owing to the insufficiency of reason. Therefore also it is possible from the principles of philosophy to refute an error of this kind, either by showing it to be altogether impossible, or not to be necessary. For just as those things which are of faith cannot be demonstratively proved, so certain things contrary to them cannot be demonstratively shown to be false, but they can be shown not to be necessary.

Thus, in sacred doctrine we are able to make a threefold use of philosophy:

1. First, to demonstrate those truths that are preambles of faith and that have a necessary place in the science of faith. Such are the truths about God that can be proved by natural reason—that God exists, that God is one; such truths about God or about His creatures, subject to philosophical proof, faith presupposes.

2. Secondly, to give a clearer notion, by certain similitudes, of the truths of faith, as Augustine in his book, *De Trinitate*, employed any comparisons taken from the teachings of the philosophers to aid understanding of the Trinity.

3. In the third place, to resist those who speak against the faith, either by showing that their statements are false, or by showing that they are not necessarily true.

Nevertheless, in the use of philosophy in sacred Scripture, there can be a twofold error:

In one way, by using doctrines contrary to faith, which are not truths of philosophy, but rather error, or abuse of philosophy, as Origen did.

*Alio modo, ut ea quae sunt fidei includantur sub metis philosophiae, ut scilicet si aliquis credere nolit nisi quod per philosophiam haberi potest, cum e converso philosophia sit ad metas fidei redigenda, secundum illud apostoli 2 Cor. 10: in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex omnibus verbis illis ostenditur quod doctrina philosophorum non sit utendum quasi principali, ut scilicet propter eam veritas fidei credatur; non tamen removetur, quin ea possint uti sacri doctores quasi secundaria. Unde ibidem super illud: perdam sapientiam sapientum, dicit Glossa: non ideo hoc dicit ut veritatis intelligentia possit a Deo reprobari, sed quia eorum prudentia reprobat, qui in sua eruditione confidunt.*

*Ut tamen totum quod est fidei non humanae potentiae aut sapientiae tribueretur, sed Deo, voluit Deus ut primitiva apostolorum praedicatio esset in infirmitate et simplicitate, cui tamen postea potentia et saecularis sapientia superveniens ostendit per victoriam fidei mundum esse Deo subiectum et quantum ad potentiam et quantum ad sapientiam.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod sapientia saecularis dicitur esse contraria Deo quantum ad eius abusum, sicut ea haeretici abutuntur, non quantum ad eius veritatem.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod sacramentum fidei pro tanto dicitur liberum a philosophicis argumentis, quia sub metis philosophiae non coartatur, ut dictum est.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod Hieronymus adeo afficiebatur ad gentilium libros quod sacram Scripturam quodammodo contemnebat; unde ipsemet ibidem dicit: si quando in memet reversus prophetas legere coepissem, sermo horrebat incultus. Et hoc esse reprehensibile nullus ambigit.*

*Ad quintum dicendum quod ex tropicis locutionibus non est sumenda argumentatio, ut dicit Magister II distinctione III sententiarum, et Dionysius dicit in epistula ad Titum quod symbolica theologia non est argumentativa, et praecipue cum illa expositio non sit alicuius auctoris. Et tamen potest dici quod quando*

In another way, by using them in such manner as to include under the measure of philosophy truths of faith, as if one should be willing to believe nothing except what could be held by philosophic reasoning; when, on the contrary, philosophy should be subject to the measure of faith, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:5), "Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ."

### Answers to objections

1. It may be said: From all these words it is shown that philosophical doctrine ought not to be used as if it had first place, as if on account of it one believed by faith; nevertheless the fact is not disproved that doctors of sacred learning may employ philosophy, as it were, secondarily. Wherefore, on the saying (1 Cor. 1:19), "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise," the gloss adds: "This he does not say because the understanding of truth can be worthy of God's anger, but because the false prudence of those who trusted in their erudition is worthy of reproof."

Nevertheless, in order that all that is of faith might be attributed not to human power or wisdom but to God, God willed that the primitive preaching of the apostles should be in infirmity and simplicity; though, on the other hand, with the later advent of power and secular wisdom, He manifested by the victory of the faith that the world is subject to God as much by wisdom as by power.

2. It may be said: Secular wisdom is said to be contrary to God in so far as it is an abuse of wisdom (i.e., erroneous) as when heretics abuse it, but not in so far as it is true.

3. It may be answered: The sacred deposit of the truth of faith is said to be free from philosophical doctrine inasmuch as it is not confined by the limits of philosophy.

4. It may be said: Jerome was so influenced by certain books of the Gentiles that he contemned, in a way, sacred Scripture: wherefore he himself says: "If I began to read it while turning over the words of the Prophets in my own mind, their crude expression filled me with distaste." And no one will deny that such was reprehensible.

5. It may be said: No conclusive argument can be drawn from figurative speech, as the Master (Peter Lombard) says. Dionysius also says in his letter to Titus that symbolic theology has no weight of proof, especially when such interprets no authority. Nevertheless it can be said that When one of two things passes into the nature of another, the

*alterum duorum transit in dominium alterius, non reputatur mixtio, sed quando utrumque a sua natura alteratur. Unde illi, qui utuntur philosophicis documentis in sacra doctrina redigendo in obsequium fidei, non miscent aquam vino, sed aquam convertunt in vinum.*

*Ad sextum dicendum quod Hieronymus loquitur de illis nominibus quae ab haereticis sunt inventa accomoda suis erroribus. Philosophicae autem disciplinae non sunt tales, immo earum abusus solum in errorem ducit, et ideo non sunt propter hoc vitandae.*

*Ad septimum dicendum quod scientiae quae habent ordinem ad invicem hoc modo se habent quod una potest uti principiis alterius, sicut scientiae posteriores utuntur principiis scientiarum priorum, sive sint superiores sive inferiores; unde metaphysica, quae est omnibus superior, utitur his quae in aliis scientiis sunt probata. Et similiter theologia, cum omnes aliae scientiae sint huic quasi famulantes et praeambulae in via generationis, quamvis sint dignitate posteriores, potest uti principiis omnium aliarum scientiarum.*

*Ad octavum dicendum quod in quantum sacra doctrina utitur philosophicis documentis propter se, non recipit ea propter auctoritatem dicentium, sed propter rationem dictorum, unde quaedam bene dicta accipit et alia respuit. Sed quando utitur eis propter alios refellendos, utitur eis, in quantum sunt in auctoritatem illis qui refelluntur, quia testimonium ab adversariis est efficacius.*

product is not considered a mixture except when the nature of both is altered. Wherefore those who use philosophical doctrines in sacred Scripture in such a way as to subject them to the service of faith, do not mix water with wine, but change water into wine.

6. It may be said: Jerome is speaking of those arguments that were invented by heretics to give support to their errors; but such doctrines do not belong to philosophy; rather they lead only to error; and consequently on their account the truths of philosophy ought not be shunned.

7. Answer may be made: Sciences which are ordered to one another are so related that one can use the principles of another, just as posterior sciences can use the principles of prior sciences, whether they are superior or inferior: wherefore metaphysics, which is superior in dignity to all, uses truths that have been proved in other sciences. And in like manner theology—Although all other sciences are related to it in the order of generation, as serving it and as preambles to it—can make use of the principles of all the others, even if they are posterior to it in dignity.

8. It may be said: Inasmuch as sacred doctrine makes use of the teachings of philosophy for their own sake, it does not accept them on account of the authority of those who taught them, but on account of the reasonableness of the doctrine; wherefore it accepts truth well said and rejects other things: but when it uses these doctrines to refute certain errors, it uses them inasmuch as their authority is esteemed by those whose refutation is desired, because the testimony of an adversary has in that case greater weight.

## **Summa Theologiae Secunda Secundae. Quaestio 6. De causa fidei.**

Articulus 1. Whether faith is infused into man by God?

### **Whether faith is infused into man by God?**

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides non sit homini infusa a Deo. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIV de Trin., quod per scientiam gignitur in nobis fides, nutritur, defenditur et roboratur. Sed ea quae per scientiam in nobis gignuntur magis videntur acquisita esse quam infusa. Ergo fides non videtur in nobis esse ex infusione divina.*

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us, and nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.

*Praeterea, illud ad quod homo pertingit audiendo et videndo videtur esse ab homine acquisitum. Sed homo pertingit ad credendum et videndo miracula et audiendo fidei doctrinam, dicitur enim Ioan. IV, cognovit pater quia illa hora erat in qua dixit ei Iesus, filius tuus vivit, et credidit ipse et domus eius tota; et Rom. X dicitur quod fides est ex auditu. Ergo fides habetur ab homine tanquam acquisita.*

*Praeterea, illud quod consistit in hominis voluntate ab homine potest acquiri. Sed fides consistit in credentium voluntate, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praed. Sanct. Ergo fides potest esse ab homine acquisita.*

*Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Ephes. II, gratia estis salvati per fidem, et non ex vobis, ne quis gloriatur, Dei enim donum est.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod ad fidem duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est ut homini credibilia proponantur, quod requiritur ad hoc quod homo aliquid explicitate credat. Aliud autem quod ad fidem requiritur est assensus credentis ad ea quae proponuntur. Quantum igitur ad primum horum, necesse est quod fides sit a Deo. Ea enim quae sunt fidei excedunt rationem humanam, unde non cadunt in contemplatione hominis nisi Deo revelante. Sed quibusdam quidem revelantur immediate a Deo, sicut sunt revelata apostolis et prophetis, quibusdam autem proponuntur a Deo mittente fidei praedicatores, secundum illud Rom. X, quomodo praedicabunt nisi mittantur?*

*Quantum vero ad secundum, scilicet ad assensum hominis in ea quae sunt fidei, potest considerari duplex causa. Una quidem exterius inducens, sicut miraculum visum, vel persuasio hominis inducentis ad fidem. Quorum neutrum est sufficiens causa, videntium enim unum et idem miraculum, et audientium eandem praedicationem, quidam credunt et quidam non credunt. Et ideo oportet ponere aliam causam interiorem, quae movet hominem interius ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei.*

*Hanc autem causam Pelagiani ponebant solum liberum arbitrium hominis, et propter hoc dicebant quod initium fidei est ex nobis, inquantum scilicet ex nobis est quod parati sumus ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei; sed consummatio fidei est a Deo, per quem nobis proponuntur ea quae credere debemus. Sed hoc est falsum. Quia cum homo, assentiendo his quae sunt fidei, elevetur supra naturam suam, oportet quod hoc insit ei ex supernaturali principio interius movente, quod est Deus. Et ideo fides quantum ad assensum, qui*

Objection 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing, seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (Jn. 4:53): "The father... knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole house"; and (Rm. 10:17) it is said that "faith is through hearing." Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.

Objection 3: Further, that which depends on a man's will can be acquired by him. But "faith depends on the believer's will," according to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man.

**On the contrary,** It is written (Eph. 2:8,9): "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves... that no man may glory... for it is the gift of God."

**I answer** that, Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man's knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith, according to Rm. 10:15: "How shall they preach, unless they be sent?"

As regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to matters of faith.

The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the

*est principalis actus fidei, est a Deo interius movente per gratiam.*

chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per scientiam gignitur fides et nutritur per modum exterioris persuasionis, quae fit ab aliqua scientia. Sed principalis et propria causa fidei est id quod interius movet ad assentiendum.*

Reply to Objection 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.

*Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam ratio illa procedit de causa proponente exterius ea quae sunt fidei, vel persuadente ad credendum vel verbo vel facto.*

Reply to Objection 2: This argument again refers to the cause that proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to believe by words or deeds.

*Ad tertium dicendum quod credere quidem in voluntate credentium consistit, sed oportet quod voluntas hominis praeparetur a Deo per gratiam ad hoc quod elevetur in ea quae sunt supra naturam, ut supra dictum est.*

Reply to Objection 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as stated above (Question [2], Article [3]).

**Pažinimo objekto problema: daikto *quidditas*. Abstrahavimo teorija. *Lumen naturale* samprata**

**Summa Theologiae Prima Pars.** Quaestio 85. *De modo et ordine intelligendi.*

Articulus 1. Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms?

Articulus 5. Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and division?

**Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms?**

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster non intelligat res corporeas et materiales per abstractionem a phantasmatis. Quicumque enim intellectus intelligit rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Formae autem rerum materialium non sunt abstractae a particularibus, quorum similitudines sunt phantasmata. Si ergo intelligamus res materiales per abstractionem specierum a phantasmatis, erit falsitas in intellectu nostro.*

*Praeterea, res materiales sunt res naturales, in quarum definitione cadit materia. Sed nihil potest intelligi sine eo quod cadit in definitione eius. Ergo res materiales non possunt intelligi sine materia. Sed materia est individuationis principium. Ergo res materiales non possunt intelligi per abstractionem universalis a particulari, quod est abstrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatis.*

*Praeterea, in III de anima dicitur quod phantasmata se habent ad animam intellectivam sicut colores ad visum. Sed visio non fit per abstractionem aliquarum specierum a coloribus, sed per hoc quod colores imprimunt in visum. Ergo nec intelligere contingit per hoc quod aliquid abstrahatur a phantasmatis, sed per hoc quod phantasmata imprimunt in intellectum.*

*Praeterea, ut dicitur in III de anima, in intellectiva anima sunt duo, scilicet intellectus possibilis, et agens. Sed abstrahere a phantasmatis species intelligibiles non pertinet ad intellectum possibilem, sed recipere species iam abstractas. Sed nec etiam videtur pertinere ad intellectum agentem, qui se habet ad phantasmata sicut lumen ad colores, quod non abstrahit aliquid a coloribus, sed magis eis influit. Ergo nullo modo intelligimus abstrahendo a phantasmatis.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, if we understand material things by abstraction of the species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intellect.

**Objection 2:** Further, material things are those natural things which include matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter is the principle of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be understood by abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm.

**Objection 3:** Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul what color is to the sight. But seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from color, but by color impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect.

**Objection 4:** Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are two things in the intellectual soul—the passive intellect and the active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, but to receive them when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the active intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light is to color; since light does not abstract anything from color, but rather streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction from phantasms.



*Praeterea, philosophus, in III de anima, dicit quod intellectus intelligit species in phantasmatibus. Non ergo eas abstrahendo.*

*Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod sicut res sunt separabiles a materia, sic circa intellectum sunt. Ergo oportet quod materialia intelligantur in quantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a similitudinibus materialibus, quae sunt phantasmata.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum cognoscibile proportionatur virtuti cognoscitivae. Est autem triplex gradus cognoscitivae virtutis. Quaedam enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi corporalis, scilicet sensus. Et ideo obiectum cuiuslibet sensitivae potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit. Et quia huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis potentia sensitivae partis est cognoscitiva particularium tantum. Quaedam autem virtus cognoscitiva est quae neque est actus organi corporalis, neque est aliquo modo corporali materiae coniuncta, sicut intellectus angelicus. Et ideo huius virtutis cognoscitivae obiectum est forma sine materia subsistens, etsi enim materialia cognoscant, non tamen nisi in immaterialibus ea intuentur, scilicet vel in seipsis vel in Deo. Intellectus autem humanus medio modo se habet, non enim est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam virtus animae, quae est forma corporis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem devenimus, sicut e contra Angeli per immaterialia materialia cognoscunt.*

*Plato vero, attendens solum ad immaterialitatem intellectus humani, non autem ad hoc quod est corpori quodammodo unitus, posuit obiectum intellectus ideas separatas; et quod intelligimus, non quidem abstrahendo, sed magis abstracta participando, ut supra dictum est.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod abstrahere contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum compositionis et divisionis; sicut cum intelligimus aliquid non esse in alio,*

**Objection 5:** Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 7) says that "the intellect understands the species in the phantasm"; and not, therefore, by abstraction.

**On the contrary,** The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "things are intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter." Therefore material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms.

**I answer that,** As stated above ([Question \[84\], Article \[7\]](#)), the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form the body, as is clear from what we have said above ([Question \[76\], Article \[1\]](#)). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.

But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect, and not its being in a way united to the body, held that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas; and that we understand not by abstraction, but by participating things abstract, as stated above ([Question \[84\], Article \[1\]](#)).

**Reply to Objection 1:** Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does not exist in some

*vel esse separatum ab eo. Alio modo, per modum simplicis et absolutae considerationis; sicut cum intelligimus unum, nihil considerando de alio. Abstrahere igitur per intellectum ea quae secundum rem non sunt abstracta, secundum primum modum abstrahendi, non est absque falsitate. Sed secundo modo abstrahere per intellectum quae non sunt abstracta secundum rem, non habet falsitatem; ut in sensibilibus manifeste apparet. Si enim intelligamus vel dicamus colorem non inesse corpori colorato, vel esse separatum ab eo, erit falsitas in opinione vel in oratione. Si vero consideremus colorem et proprietates eius, nihil considerantes de pomo colorato; vel quod sic intelligimus, etiam voce exprimamus; erit absque falsitate opinionis et orationis. Pomum enim non est de ratione coloris; et ideo nihil prohibet colorem intelligi, nihil intelligendo de pomo. Similiter dico quod ea quae pertinent ad rationem speciei cuiuslibet rei materialis, puta lapidis aut hominis aut equi, possunt considerari sine principiis individualibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei. Et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari, vel speciem intelligibilem a phantasmatis, considerare scilicet naturam speciei absque consideratione individualium principiorum, quae per phantasmata repraesentantur. Cum ergo dicitur quod intellectus est falsus qui intelligit rem aliter quam sit, verum est si ly aliter referatur ad rem intellectam. Tunc enim intellectus est falsus, quando intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit. Unde falsus esset intellectus, si sic abstraheret speciem lapidis a materia, ut intelligeret eam non esse in materia, ut Plato posuit. Non est autem verum quod proponitur, si ly aliter accipiatur ex parte intelligentis. Est enim absque falsitate ut alius sit modus intelligentis in intelligendo, quam modus rei in existendo, quia intellectum est in intelligente immaterialiter, per modum intellectus; non autem materialiter, per modum rei materialis.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam putaverunt quod species rei naturalis sit forma solum, et quod materia non sit pars speciei. Sed secundum hoc, in definitionibus rerum naturalium non poneretur materia. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod materia est duplex, scilicet communis, et signata vel individualis, communis quidem, ut caro et os; individualis autem, ut haec carnes et haec ossa. Intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi. Sicut speciem hominis abstrahit ab his carnibus et his ossibus, quae non sunt de ratione*

other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way of simple and absolute consideration; thus we understand one thing without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to abstract one from another things which are not really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood. But, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which are not really abstract from one another, does not involve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For if we understood or said that color is not in a colored body, or that it is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or assertion. But if we consider color and its properties, without reference to the apple which is colored; or if we express in word what we thus understand, there is no error in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple is not essential to color, and therefore color can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the things which belong to the species of a material thing, such as a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is, that is so, if the word "otherwise" refers to the thing understood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is; and so the intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word "otherwise" be taken as referring to the one who understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing in existing; since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold, common, and "signate" or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; and individual, as this flesh and these bones. The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species of man from "this flesh and these bones," which do not

*speciei, sed sunt partes individui, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys.; et ideo sine eis considerari potest. Sed species hominis non potest abstrahi per intellectum a carnibus et ossibus.*

*Species autem mathematicae possunt abstrahi per intellectum a materia sensibili non solum individuali, sed etiam communi; non tamen a materia intelligibili communi, sed solum individuali. Materia enim sensibilis dicitur materia corporalis secundum quod subiacet qualitatibus sensibilibus, scilicet calido et frigido, duro et molli, et huiusmodi. Materia vero intelligibilis dicitur substantia secundum quod subiacet quantitati. Manifestum est autem quod quantitas prius inest substantiae quam qualitates sensibiles. Unde quantitates, ut numeri et dimensiones et figurae, quae sunt terminationes quantitatum, possunt considerari absque qualitatibus sensibilibus, quod est eas abstrahi a materia sensibili, non tamen possunt considerari sine intellectu substantiae quantitati subiectae, quod esset eas abstrahi a materia intelligibili communi. Possunt tamen considerari sine hac vel illa substantia; quod est eas abstrahi a materia intelligibili individuali. Quaedam vero sunt quae possunt abstrahi etiam a materia intelligibili communi, sicut ens, unum, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi, quae etiam esse possunt absque omni materia, ut patet in substantiis immaterialibus. Et quia Plato non consideravit quod dictum est de duplici modo abstractionis, omnia quae diximus abstrahi per intellectum, posuit abstracta esse secundum rem.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod colores habent eundem modum existendi prout sunt in materia corporali individuali, sicut et potentia visiva, et ideo possunt imprimere suam similitudinem in visum. Sed phantasmata, cum sint similitudines individuorum, et existant in organis corporeis, non habent eundem modum existendi quem habet intellectus humanus, ut ex dictis patet; et ideo non possunt sua virtute imprimere in intellectum possibilem. Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat quaedam similitudo in intellectu possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est repraesentativa eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad naturam speciei. Et per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus, non quod aliqua eadem numero forma, quae prius fuit in phantasmatibus, postmodum fiat in intellectu possibili, ad modum quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco et transfertur ad alterum.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente; et iterum ab eis, per virtutem*

belong to the species as such, but to the individual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be considered in the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect from "flesh and bones."

Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like: while intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without understanding the substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet they can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible matter. But some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as "being," "unity," "power," "act," and the like; all these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression on the passive intellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to its specific conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body transferred from one place to another.

**Reply to Objection 4:** Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm: it does more; by its own

*intellectus agentis, species intelligibiles abstrahuntur. Illuminantur quidem, quia, sicut pars sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectivam efficitur virtuosior, ita phantasmata ex virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habilia ut ab eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahantur. Abstrahit autem intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum per virtutem intellectus agentis accipere possumus in nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine individualibus conditionibus, secundum quarum similitudines intellectus possibilis informatur.*

*Ad quintum dicendum quod intellectus noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum considerat naturas rerum in universali; et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere etiam ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est.*

### **Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?**

*Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster non intelligat componendo et dividendo. Compositio enim et divisio non est nisi multorum. Sed intellectus non potest simul multa intelligere. Ergo non potest intelligere componendo et dividendo.*

*Praeterea, omni compositioni et divisioni adiungitur tempus praesens, praeteritum vel futurum. Sed intellectus abstrahit a tempore, sicut etiam ab aliis particularibus conditionibus. Ergo intellectus non intelligit componendo et dividendo.*

*Praeterea, intellectus intelligit per assimilationem ad res. Sed compositio et divisio nihil est in rebus, nihil enim invenitur in rebus nisi res quae significatur per praedicatum et subiectum, quae est una et eadem si compositio est vera; homo enim est vere id quod est animal. Ergo intellectus non componit et dividit.*

*Sed contra, voces significant conceptiones intellectus, ut dicit philosophus in I Periherm. Sed in vocibus est compositio et divisio; ut patet in propositionibus affirmativis et negativis. Ergo intellectus componit et dividit.*

power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs the passive intellect.

**Reply to Objection 5:** Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have said above ([Question \[84\]](#), [Article \[7\]](#)).

**Objection 1:** It would seem that our intellect does not understand by composition and division. For composition and division are only of many; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition and division.

**Objection 2:** Further, every composition and division implies past, present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as also from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does not understand by composition and division.

**Objection 3:** Further, the intellect understands things by a process of assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things, for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the subject, and which is one and the same, provided that the composition be true, for "man" is truly what "animal" is. Therefore the intellect does not act by composition and division.

**On the contrary,** Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition and division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division.

*Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus humanus necesse habet intelligere componendo et dividendo. Cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia in actum, similitudinem quandam habet cum rebus generabilibus, quae non statim perfectionem suam habent, sed eam successive acquirunt. Et similiter intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium obiectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. Et secundum hoc, necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere vel dividere; et ex una compositione vel divisione ad aliam procedere, quod est ratiocinari. Intellectus autem angelicus et divinus se habet sicut res incorruptibiles, quae statim a principio habent suam totam perfectionem.*

*Unde intellectus angelicus et divinus statim perfecte totam rei cognitionem habet. Unde in cognoscendo quidditatem rei, cognoscit de re simul quiddid nos cognoscere possumus componendo et dividendo et ratiocinando. Et ideo intellectus humanus cognoscit componendo et dividendo, sicut et ratiocinando. Intellectus autem divinus et angelicus cognoscunt quidem compositionem et divisionem et ratiocinationem, non componendo et dividendo et ratiocinando, sed per intellectum simplicis quidditatis.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod compositio et divisio intellectus secundum quandam differentiam vel comparisonem fit. Unde sic intellectus cognoscit multa componendo et dividendo, sicut cognoscendo differentiam vel comparisonem rerum.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus et abstrahit a phantasmatis; et tamen non intelligit actu nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, sicut supra dictum est. Et ex ea parte qua se ad phantasmata convertit, compositioni et divisioni intellectus adiungitur tempus.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod similitudo rei recipitur in intellectu secundum modum intellectus, et non secundum modum rei. Unde compositioni et divisioni intellectus respondet quidem aliquid ex parte rei; tamen non eodem modo se habet in re, sicut in intellectu. Intellectus enim humani proprium obiectum est quidditas rei materialis, quae sub sensu et imaginatione cadit. Invenitur autem duplex*

***I answer that,*** The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division. For since the intellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees: so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and proper object; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, which is the process of reasoning.

But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division, and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition, division and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic intellect know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence.

***Reply to Objection 1:*** Composition and division of the intellect are made by differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and comparison of things.

***Reply to Objection 2:*** Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as we have said ([Article \[1\]](#); [Question \[84\]](#), [Article \[7\]](#)). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involve time.

***Reply to Objection 3:*** The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode of the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect; but it does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the imagination.

*compositio in re materiali. Prima quidem, formae ad materiam, et huic respondet compositio intellectus qua totum universale de sua parte praedicatur; nam genus sumitur a materia communi, differentia vero completiva speciei a forma, particulare vero a materia individuali. Secunda vero compositio est accidentis ad subiectum, et huic reali compositioni respondet compositio intellectus secundum quam praedicatur accidens de subiecto, ut cum dicitur, homo est albus. Tamen differt compositio intellectus a compositione rei, nam ea quae componuntur in re, sunt diversa; compositio autem intellectus est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur. Non enim intellectus sic componit, ut dicat quod homo est albedo; sed dicit quod homo est albus, idest habens albedinem, idem autem est subiecto quod est homo, et quod est habens albedinem. Et simile est de compositione formae et materiae, nam animal significat id quod habet naturam sensitivam, rationale vero quod habet naturam intellectivam, homo vero quod habet utrumque, Socrates vero quod habet omnia haec cum materia individuali; et secundum hanc identitatis rationem, intellectus noster unum componit alteri praedicando.*

Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition. First, there is the composition of form with matter; and to this corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated of its part: for the genus is derived from common matter, while the difference that completes the species is derived from the form, and the particular from individual matter. The second comparison is of accident with subject: and to this real composition corresponds that composition of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of subject, as when we say "the man is white." Nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the above composition of the intellect does not imply that "man" and "whiteness" are identical, but the assertion, "the man is white," means that "the man is something having whiteness": and the subject, which is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is the same with the composition of form and matter: for animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has an intellectual nature; man, that which has both; and Socrates that which has all these things together with individual matter; and according to this kind of identity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing with another.

### **Super Boetium de Trinitate. Quaestio I.**

Articulus 1. *Whether the Human Mind in Order to Attain to a Knowledge of Truth Requires a New Illumination of Divine Light.*

Articulus 3. *Whether God Is the First Object Known by the Mind.*

### **Whether the Human Mind in Order to Attain to a Knowledge of Truth Requires a New Illumination of Divine Light**

#### **Objections**

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mens humana in cognitione cuiuslibet veritatis indigeat nova illustratione divinae lucis. 2 Cor. 3: non sumus sufficientes cogitare et cetera. Sed perceptio veritatis non potest esse sine cogitatione. Ergo humana mens non potest veritatem aliquam cognoscere, nisi de novo illustretur a Deo.*

*Praeterea, facilius est ab alio veritatem addiscere quam per se ipsum eam inspicere. Unde qui per se ipsos sciunt praeferuntur illis, qui ab aliis addiscere possunt, in I Ethicorum. Sed homo non potest ab aliis addiscere, nisi mens eius interius doceatur a Deo, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de magistro et Gregorius in homilia*

1. It seems that the human mind in attaining to any knowledge whatever requires a new illumination of divine light. "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God" (2 Cor 3:5); but there can be no perception of truth of any kind whatever without thought; therefore the human mind cannot know any truth unless it is illuminated by a new light from God,

2. It is easier to learn any truth from another than to discover it for oneself: wherefore, those who know things by their own efforts are preferred to those who are able to learn from other men, according to I Ethic.; but man is not able to learn from another unless his mind is interiorly taught by God, as Augustine says in his book, *De magistro*,

*Pentecostes. Ergo nec per se ipsum potest aliquis veritatem inspicere, nisi de novo mens eius illustretur a Deo.*

*Praeterea, sicut se habet oculus corporalis ad corpora intuenda, ita se habet intellectus ad intelligibilem veritatem conspiciendam, ut patet in III de anima. Sed oculus corporalis non potest videre corpora nisi illustratione solis materialis superveniente. Ergo nec intellectus humanus potest veritatem inspicere, nisi lumine solis invisibilis, qui est Deus, illustretur.*

*Praeterea, illi actus in nobis esse dicuntur, ad quos exercendos principia sufficientia in nobis habemus. Sed in nobis non est cognoscere veritatem, cum quandoque multi laborent ad veritatem cognoscendam, qui eam cognoscere nequeunt. Ergo non habemus sufficientia principia in nobis ad veritatem cognoscendam. Ergo oportet ad hoc, quod eam cognoscamus, ab exteriori nos iuvari, et sic idem quod prius.*

*Praeterea, magis dependet operatio mentis humanae a luce divina quam operatio creaturae sensibilis inferioris a luce corporis caelestis. Sed corpora inferiora quamvis habeant formas quae sunt principia naturalium operationum, non tamen possunt operationes suas perficere, nisi lumine solis et stellarum superveniente iuvarentur. Unde dicit Dionysius 4 c. de divinis nominibus quod lumen solis ad generationem visibilium corporum confert et ad vitam ipsa movet et nutrit et auget. Ergo nec menti humanae sufficit ad videndam veritatem naturale lumen, quod est quasi forma ipsius, nisi lumen aliud superveniat, scilicet divinum.*

*Praeterea, in omnibus causis ordinatis per se et non secundum accidens effectus non procedit a causa secunda nisi per operationem causae primae, ut patet in libro de causis. Sed mens humana ordinatur sub luce increata ordine essentiali et non accidentali. Ergo operatio mentis quae est eius effectus proprius, scilicet cognitio veritatis, non potest provenire ex ea nisi operante prima luce increata. Eius autem operatio non videtur alia esse nisi illustratio. Et sic idem quod prius.*

*Praeterea, sicut se habet voluntas ad bene volendum, ita se habet intellectus ad recte intelligendum. Sed voluntas non potest bene velle, nisi divina gratia*

and Gregory in *Hom. Pentec.*; therefore neither can anyone discover truth of himself unless his mind is illuminated by God with a new light.

3. As the eyes of the body are related to corporeal things which they behold, so is the intellect related to the intelligible truth which it perceives, as is evident in III *De anima*; but the bodily eye cannot see corporeal things unless it is illuminated by the material sun; therefore neither can the intellect behold the truth unless it is illuminated by the light of the invisible sun, which is God.

4. Those acts are said to be in us (as our own) for the exercise of which we possess within ourselves principles that are sufficient; but in us there is not the power to know truth altogether [or absolutely] for there are many who labor to learn the truth and who, nevertheless, are unable to do so; therefore we have not in us sufficient principles for knowing truth and so it must be that to arrive at knowledge of it we require aid from outside ourselves, and so the conclusion is like the foregoing.

5. The operation of the human mind depends more upon the divine light than does the operation of sensible or inferior beings upon the light of the material heaven; but inferior bodies, although they have forms which are principles of their natural operations, are, nevertheless, incapable of perfecting these operations unless they are aided by the influence of the light of the stars; wherefore Dionysius (*De div. nom.*, chap. 4) says that the light of the sun contributes to the generation of visible bodies and that it moves them to life and nourishes them and causes them to grow; therefore its natural light, which is, as it were, its form, would not, suffice to make truth visible to the human mind unless another light, namely, the divine, supervened to assist it.

6. In all causes that are ordered to one another essentially, and not accidentally, no effect proceeds from a second cause unless through the operation of a first cause, as is established in the first proposition of *De causis*; but the human mind is ordained beneath the uncreated light according to an order that is essential and not accidental; therefore the operation of the human mind which is its proper effect, namely, the cognition of truth, cannot proceed from it unless by reason of the operation of the first uncreated light: its operation, however, seems to indicate nothing other than illumination; therefore, etc.

7. As the will is related to willing well, so the intellect is related to right understanding; but the will cannot will well unless it is aided by divine grace, as Augustine says;

*adiuvetur, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo nec intellectus potest veritatem intelligere, nisi divina luce illustretur.*

*Praeterea, illud, ad quod vires nostrae sufficiunt, irreprehensibiliter nostris viribus ascribimus, sicut currere vel aedificare. Sed reprehensibile est quod aliquis scientiam veritatis suo ascribit ingenio, quin immo iubemur illam Deo ascribere, secundum illud Eccli. ult.: danti mihi sapientiam dabo gloriam. Ergo ad cognoscendam veritatem vires nostrae non sufficiunt. Et sic idem quod prius.*

*Sed contra, mens humana illustrata est divinitus lumine naturali, secundum illud Psalmi: signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine. Si ergo hoc lumen, quia creatum est, non sufficit ad veritatem conspiciendam, sed requirit novam illustrationem, pari ratione lumen superadditum non sufficiet, sed indigebit alio lumine, et sic in infinitum, quod numquam compleri potest, et sic impossibile erit cognoscere aliquam veritatem. Ergo oportet stare in primo lumine, ut scilicet mens lumine naturali sine aliquo superaddito possit veritatem videre.*

*Praeterea, sicut visibile in actu sufficiens est ad hoc quod moveat visum, ita intelligibile actu sufficit ad movendum intellectum, si sit proportionatum. Sed mens nostra habet in se unde possit facere intelligibile actu, scilicet intellectum agentem, et tale intelligibile est ei proportionatum. Ergo non indiget aliqua nova illustratione ad hoc quod mens veritatem cognoscat.*

*Praeterea, sicut se habet lux corporalis ad visionem corporalem, ita se habet lux intellectualis ad visionem intellectus. Sed quaelibet lux corporalis quantumcumque sit parva facit aliquid videri corporaliter, ad minus se ipsam. Ergo et lux intelligibilis, quae est menti connaturalis, sufficit ad aliquam veritatem cognoscendam.*

*Praeterea, omnia opera artificialia ex cognitione alicuius veritatis dependent, cum eorum principium sit scientia. Sed quaedam opera artificialia sunt, in quae potest liberum arbitrium per se ipsum secundum Augustinum, ut aedificare domos et huiusmodi. Ergo et in aliquam veritatem cognoscendam sufficit mens sine nova illustratione divina.*

*Responsio. Dicendum quod haec est differentia inter virtutes activas et passivas quod passivae non possunt*

therefore neither can the intellect know the truth unless illuminated by divine light.

8. That for which our powers do not suffice is wrongly ascribed to our strength: but it is reprehensible that anyone should ascribe knowledge of the truth to his own ability, since indeed we are even commanded to ascribe it to God, according to this saying of Sirach 51:23: "To Him that gives me wisdom, will I give glory"; therefore our powers do not suffice for knowledge of truth, and so the conclusion is as before.

**Sed contra.** The human mind is divinely illuminated by its natural light, according to the saying of Psalm 4:7: "The light of Your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." Thus, therefore, if this created light is not sufficient for the knowing of truth, but there is required a new illumination, according to the same reasoning this superadded light would not suffice either, but would require still another light, and so on to infinity, which cannot be encompassed; and so it would be impossible to know any truth. Therefore one must stand firm in reliance upon the first light, namely, that the mind by its natural light, without the superaddition of any other, can see the truth.

Again, as it suffices for what is actually visible that it should be proportionate to the sight in order to move it, so it suffices for what is intelligible that it should be proportionate to the intellect in order to move it: but our mind possesses within itself the power of making things intelligible in act, namely, the active intellect, and what is intelligible is proportionate to it; therefore it does not require another new illumination in order to know truth.

Moreover, as corporeal light is related to bodily vision, so is the intellect related to intelligible vision. But any corporeal light at all, even though it is weak, renders something corporeally visible, at least itself; therefore, the light of the intellect also, which is connatural to the mind, suffices for the understanding of some truth.

Furthermore, all things that are artificially made depend upon the cognition of some truth since the principle of them is knowledge; but it is certain that products of art do exist in which, according to Augustine, the free will is able [to act] by itself, as in building houses and the like; therefore man is sufficiently capable of knowing some truth without a new divine illumination.

**Response.** It must be said that between potencies that are active and those that are passive there is this difference:



*exire in actum propriae operationis, nisi moveantur a suis activis, sicut sensus non sentit, nisi moveatur a sensibili, sed virtutes activae possunt operari sine hoc quod ab alio moveantur, sicut patet in viribus animae vegetabilis. Sed in genere intellectus invenitur duplex potentia: activa, scilicet intellectus agens, et passiva, scilicet intellectus possibilis.*

*Quidam vero posuerunt quod solus intellectus possibilis erat potentia animae, intellectus vero agens erat quaedam substantia separata. Et haec est opinio Avicennae, secundum quam opinionem sequitur quod anima humana non possit in actum propriae operationis, quae est cognitio veritatis, exire, nisi exteriori lumine illustretur, illius scilicet substantiae separatae, quam dicit intellectum agentem.*

*Sed quia verba philosophi in III de anima magis videntur sonare quod intellectus agens sit potentia animae et huic etiam auctoritas sacrae Scripturae consonat, quae lumine intelligibili nos insignitos esse profitetur, cui philosophus comparat intellectum agentem, ideo in anima ponitur respectu intelligibilis operationis, quae est cognitio veritatis, et potentia passiva et potentia activa. Unde sicut aliae potentiae activae naturales suis passivis coniunctae sufficiunt ad naturales operationes, ita etiam anima habens in se potentiam activam et passivam sufficit ad perceptionem veritatis.*

*Cum autem quaelibet virtus activa creata finita sit, est eius sufficientia ad determinatos effectus limitata. Unde in alios effectus non potest, nisi nova virtus addatur. Sic ergo sunt quaedam intelligibiles veritates, ad quas se extendit efficacia intellectus agentis, sicut principia quae naturaliter homo cognoscit et ea quae ab his deducuntur; et ad haec cognoscenda non requiritur nova lux intelligibilis, sed sufficit lumen naturaliter inditum.*

*Quaedam vero sunt ad quae praedicta principia non se extendunt, sicut sunt ea quae sunt fidei, facultatem rationis excedentia, et futura contingentia et alia huiusmodi; et haec cognoscere mens humana non potest, nisi divinitus novo lumine illustretur superaddito lumini naturali.*

passive potencies cannot enter on the act of their proper operation unless they are moved to do so by their own active agents, just as the senses experience no sensation unless moved by some sensible object; but active potencies are capable of operation without being moved by another, as is evident in the case of the potencies of the vegetative soul: but as regards the intellect, a twofold potency is found, an active potency, that is, the active intellect, and a passive potency, that is, the possible intellect.

Now, there are certain philosophers who maintained that the possible intellect alone is a faculty of the soul, while the active intellect is a separate substance; and this is the opinion of Avicenna. According to this opinion, it follows that the human soul would not be capable of entering upon its proper operation, which is knowledge, unless illuminated by an exterior light, namely, by the light of that separate substance which they call the active intellect.

But because the words of the Philosopher (III *De anima*) seem to proclaim more convincingly that the active intellect is a potency belonging to the soul—and with this the authority of Scripture agrees, which declares that we are distinguished by that intellectual light to which the Philosopher compares the active intellect—therefore it is held that there is in the soul, fitting it for intelligible operation, that is, for undertaking the cognition of truth, a potency which is active and another which is passive. Wherefore, as some powers which are naturally active, when conjoined with those which are their passive complements, suffice for the carrying on of their natural operations, so also the soul of man, having in itself an active and a passive potency, is sufficient for perception of the truth.

Since, however, the power of any created thing is but finite, its efficacy will be limited to certain determined effects. Consequently it cannot attain to certain other effects unless new power is added to it; but there are some intelligible truths to which the efficacy of the active intellect does extend, as, for example, those first principles which man naturally knows, and those truths which are deduced from them; and for such knowledge no new light of intelligence is required, but the light with which the mind is naturally endowed suffices.

But there are other truths to which the aforesaid first principles do not extend; e.g., the truths of faith and things that exceed the faculty of reason, such as knowledge of future contingent events, and the like; and such things the human mind cannot know unless it is divinely illuminated

*Quamvis autem non requiratur novi luminis additio ad cognitionem eorum ad quae ratio naturalis se extendit, requiritur tamen divina operatio. Praeter operationem enim qua Deus rerum instituit naturas, singulis formas et virtutes proprias tribuens, quibus possent suas operationes exercere, operatur etiam in rebus opera providentiae omnium rerum virtutes ad actus proprios dirigendo et movendo. Ita enim universa creatura divinae gubernationi subicitur, sicut instrumenta subduntur gubernationi artificis et qualitates naturales virtutibus animae nutritivae, ut dicitur in II de anima. Unde sicut ex calore naturali sequitur opus digestionis secundum regulam, quam imponit calori vis digestiva, et omnes virtutes inferiorum corporum operantur, secundum quod moventur et diriguntur ex virtutibus corporum caelestium, ita omnes virtutes activae creatae operantur, secundum quod moventur et diriguntur a creatore.*

*Sic ergo in omni cognitione veritatis indiget mens humana divina operatione, sed in naturalibus cognoscendis non indiget nova luce, sed solo motu et directione eius, in aliis autem etiam nova illustratione. Et quia de talibus Boethius hic loquitur, ideo dicit: quantum divina lux et cetera.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis nihil simus sufficientes cogitare ex nobis sine Dei operatione, non tamen oportet quod in qualibet nostra cognitione novum lumen nobis infundatur.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum hoc Deus nos interiorius docet in naturalibus cognitio, quod lumen naturale in nobis causat et ipsum dirigit in veritatem, in aliis vero etiam novum lumen infundendo.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod oculus corporalis ex illustratione solis materialis non consequitur lumen aliquod sibi connaturale, per quod possit facere visibilia in actu, sicut consequitur mens nostra ex illustratione solis increati. Et ideo oculus semper indiget exteriori lumine, non autem mens.*

by a new light, superadded to that which it naturally possesses.

For, although it does not require the addition of new light for knowledge of those things to which reason naturally extends, it does require divine operation: for over and above that operation by which God created the natures of things, giving to each its proper form and ability, by which they are able to exercise their proper operation. He also operates in things the works of Providence, directing and moving the capabilities of all things to their proper acts. For in this way the whole universe of creatures is subject to the divine governance, as instruments are subject to the direction of the workman and as natural qualities are subject to the power of the nutritive soul, as is said in II *De anima*. Therefore, as the work of digestion is accompanied by a natural heat, according to the measure which the digestive function imposes upon heat, and as all the inferior powers of the body operate according as they are directed and moved by virtue of the heavenly bodies, so all the active created powers are governed and moved by the Creator.

Thus, therefore, in all cognition of truth, the human mind requires the divine operation. In the realm of naturally known truths, however, it requires no new light, but only the divine motion and direction; for the knowledge of other (supernatural) truths it needs also a new illumination. And because it is of such things that Boethius speaks, he says: "To the extent that the divine light has deigned to enkindle the feeble spark of my mind."

### **Answers to objections.**

1. Although we are in no way sufficient of ourselves, as from ourselves, to know anything without the operation of God, yet it is not necessary that for every operation of ours a new light should be given to us.
2. In matters of natural cognition God teaches us interiorly in this way: that He is the cause of the natural light which is in us, and He directs it to the truth; but in other (supernatural) matters He further teaches us by the infusion of a new light.
3. The eye of the body, when illuminated by the light of the material sun, does not respond to a light which is in any way natural (i.e., intrinsic) to itself, by means of which it makes things to be actually visible; even as is the case with the mind when it is illuminated by the uncreated Light; and therefore the eye always requires an exterior light, but not the mind.

*Ad quartum dicendum quod lumen intelligibile, ubi est purum sicut in Angelis, sine difficultate omnia cognita naturaliter demonstrat, ita quod in eis est omnia naturalia cognoscere. In nobis autem lumen intelligibile est obumbratum per coniunctionem ad corpus et ad vires corporeas, et ex hoc impeditur, ut non libere possit veritatem etiam naturaliter cognoscibilem inspicere, secundum illud Sap. 10: corpus quod corrumpitur et cetera. Et exinde est quod non est omnino in nobis veritatem cognoscere, scilicet propter impedimenta. Sed unusquisque magis vel minus habet hoc in potestate, secundum quod lumen intelligibile est in ipso purius.*

*Ad quintum dicendum quod corpora inferiora, quamvis indigeant ad hoc quod operentur ut moveantur a corporibus caelestibus, non tamen indigent ad proprias operationes efficiendas quod novas formas ab eis recipiant. Et similiter non oportet quod mens humana, quae movetur a Deo ad cognoscendum naturaliter cognita, nova luce perfundatur.*

*Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus VIII super Genesim, sicut aer illuminatur a lumine praesente, quod si fuerit absens continuo tenebratur, ita et mens illuminatur a Deo. Et ideo etiam lumen naturale in anima semper Deus causat, non aliud et aliud, sed idem; non enim est causa fieri eius solum, sed etiam esse illius. In hoc ergo continue Deus operatur in mente, quod in ipsa lumen naturale causat et ipsum dirigit, et sic mens non sine operatione causae primae in operationem suam procedit.*

*Ad septimum dicendum quod voluntas numquam potest bene velle sine divino instinctu, potest autem bene velle sine gratiae infusione, sed non meritorie. Et similiter intellectus non potest sine divino motu veritatem quamcumque cognoscere, potest autem sine novi luminis infusione, quamvis non ea quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt.*

*Ad octavum dicendum quod eo ipso quod Deus in nobis lumen naturale conservando causat et ipsum dirigit ad videndum, manifestum est quod perceptio veritatis*

4. Where there is pure light of intellect, as in the angels, it makes evident without difficulty all things known in the natural order, so that in them there is cognition of all objects naturally intelligible to them: in us, however, this light is obscure, being overshadowed as it were by reason of conjunction with the body and with corporeal powers, and on this account it is hindered so that it cannot freely and naturally behold that truth which is itself knowable, as is said in the Book of Wisdom (9:15): "For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul; and the earthly habitation presses down the mind that muses upon many things." From this it follows that on account of the impediment (of the body) it is not in our power to know truth altogether in its fullness. But each one possesses more or less the power to know in proportion to the purity of the intellectual light which is in him.

5. Although inferior bodies have need of superior bodies for their operation, to the extent that they must be moved by them; nevertheless, for the perfect accomplishment of their proper functions, they do not need to receive from these superior bodies any new forms, And in like manner it is not necessary that the human mind, which is moved by God, should be endowed with any new light in order to understand those things which are within its natural field of knowledge.

6. As Augustine says (VIII *Super Gen. ad litteram*), as the air is illuminated by the presence of light, but straightway grows dark if the light should be removed, so the mind is illuminated by God, and so also it is God who continually causes the natural light in the soul, not one kind now and another kind at another time, but the same (natural light); for He is the cause not only of its coming to be, but of its continued existence in us. In this way, therefore, God continually operates in the mind since He causes and governs the natural light in it, and thus the mind does not carry on its own function without the operation of the First Cause.

7. The will never can will the good without divine incitement: nevertheless it can will the good without infusion of grace, though not meritoriously. And likewise the intellect, without divine influence, is incapable of knowing any truth whatever; it can, however, know without infusion of new light, though not those truths which exceed natural cognition.

8. From the very fact that God causes the natural light in us by conserving it and directing it to seeing, it is manifest that perception of the truth must be ascribed principally to

*praecipue sibi debet ascribi, sicut operatio artis magis attribuitur artifici quam serrae.*

Him, just as the producing of a work of art is ascribed to the artist rather than to the thing produced.

## Whether God Is the First Object Known by the Mind

### Objections

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod primum, quod a mente cognoscitur, sit Deus. Illud enim, in quo omnia alia cognoscuntur et per quod de omnibus quae cognoscimus iudicamus, est primo cognitum a nobis, sicut lux est primo nota oculo quam ea, quae per lucem videntur, et principia intellectui prius quam conclusiones. Sed omnia in prima veritate cognoscuntur et per ipsam de omnibus iudicamus, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Trinitate et de vera religione. Ergo prima veritas, scilicet Deus, est id quod primo a nobis cognoscitur.*

*Praeterea, quando sunt plures causae ordinatae, prima causa prius influit in causatum quam causa secunda et ultimo dimittit ipsum, ut habetur in libro de causis. Sed cum scientia humana sit causata a rebus, scibile vel intelligibile est menti humanae causa intelligendi. Ergo primum intelligibile primo influet in ipsam. Sed influxus intelligibilis in intellectum, in quantum huiusmodi, est ut intelligatur. Ergo Deus, qui est primum intelligibile, ab intellectu nostro primo intelligitur.*

*Praeterea, in omni cognitione, in qua ea quae sunt priora et simpliciora primo cognoscuntur, id, quod est primum et simplicissimum, primo cognoscitur. Sed in cognitione humana ea, quae prius occurrunt, sunt priora et simpliciora, ut videtur, quia ens est illud quod primo cadit in cognitione humana, ut Avicenna dicit; esse autem est primum inter creata. Ergo cognitioni humanae primo occurrit Deus, qui est simpliciter primum et simplicissimum.*

*Praeterea, finis, qui est ultimus consecutione, est primus in intentione. Sed Deus est ultimus finis humanae voluntatis, ad quem omnes alii fines ordinantur. Ergo est primus in intentione. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi sit cognitum. Ergo illud quod primo occurrit cognoscendum est Deus.*

*Praeterea, illud, quod non indiget aliqua praecedenti operatione ad hoc quod circa ipsum sit operatio alicuius*

1. It seems that the first object known or perceived by the mind must be God Himself. For, that in which all other things are known and through which we form judgments of what we know from all other things, is the first thing known by us, just as light is known by the eye prior to what is seen by the light; and as principles are understood before conclusions: but all things are known in the First Truth, and through that Truth we judge of all things, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* and in *De vera religione*; therefore the First Truth is first known by us.

2. When there are many ordered causes, the influx of the first cause into the thing caused is prior to that of the second cause, and it is the last to leave the effect, as is said in *Liber de causis*: but since human knowledge is caused by things, the knowable or the intelligible is the cause of the mind's intellection; therefore the first intelligible is the first to influence it: but the influence of the intelligible on the mind, as such ' is that it be understood; therefore God is the first object known by our intellect, since He is the first intelligible.

3. In all cognition, in which those things that are prior and simpler are first known, what is first and simplest is known first: but in human cognition. those things that are first experienced are things prior to others and simpler, as is evident, since being is that of which first the human mind forms a concept, as Avicenna says; being, moreover, is first among created things; therefore also, God first comes to the knowledge of the human mind, since He is absolutely first and most simple being.

4. That end which is the last in attainment is the first in intention: but God is the last end of the human will, to whom all other ends are ordained; and He is, therefore, the first in intention. But this could not be unless He were known; therefore God must be the first object of knowledge.

5. That which requires no preliminary preparation in order to be fitted to the need of the workman is the first

*operantis, prius cadit sub operatione illius operantis quam hoc quod indiget aliqua operatione alia, sicut lignum iam dolatum prius cadit sub operatione facientis scamnum quam lignum adhuc dolandum. Sed res sensibiles indigent quod abstrahantur a materia per intellectum agentem, antequam intelligantur ab intellectu possibili. Deus autem per se ipsum est maxime a materia separatus. Ergo ipse prius intelligitur ab intellectu possibili quam res sensibiles.*

*Praeterea, naturaliter cognita et quae non possunt intelligi non esse sunt illa quae primo nostrae cognitioni occurrunt. Sed cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter est omnibus inserta, ut dicit Damascenus. Nec potest Deus cogitari non esse, ut dicit Anselmus. Ergo Deus est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur.*

*Sed contra, secundum philosophum omnis nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet. Sed Deus est maxime remotus a sensu. Ergo ipse non est a nobis primo, sed ultimo cognitus.*

*Praeterea, secundum philosophum ea, quae sunt posteriora secundum naturam, sunt priora quoad nos, et minus nota secundum naturam sunt magis nota quoad nos. Sed creaturae sunt posteriores et minus notae secundum naturam quam ipse Deus. Ergo Deus est posterius notus quoad nos.*

*Praeterea, illud quod promittitur ut ultimum praemium non est primum quod praecedit omnia merita. Sed cognitio Dei promittitur nobis ut ultimum praemium omnis cognitionis et actionis. Ergo Deus non est primo a nobis cognitus.*

*Responsio. Dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod primum, quod a mente humana cognoscitur etiam in hac vita, est ipse Deus qui est veritas prima, et per hoc omnia alia cognoscuntur. Sed hoc apparet esse falsum, quia cognoscere Deum per essentiam est hominis beatitudo, unde sequeretur omnem hominem beatum esse.*

*Et praeterea, cum in divina essentia omnia quae dicuntur de ipsa sint unum, nullus erraret circa ea, quae de Deo dicuntur, quod experimento patet esse falsum. Et iterum ea, quae sunt primo in cognitione intellectus, oportet esse certissima, unde intellectus certus est se ea intelligere, quod patet in proposito non esse.*

chosen for his task, rather than that which needs some labor in order to be made ready, just as one making a bench selects wood already cut rather than uncut wood: but sensible things need to be abstracted from matter by the active intellect before they can be understood by the possible intellect. God, on the other hand, is by His very nature altogether separate from matter: therefore He is understood by the possible intellect prior to sensible things.

6. Those things that are naturally known, and that cannot be thought of as non-existing, are what first occur to our cognition: but an idea of the existence of God is naturally implanted in all minds, as Damascene says. Neither is it possible to think of God as non-existent, as Anselm states; therefore God is the first being known by us.

### **Sed contra**

On the contrary, according to the Philosopher, everything known by us takes its origin from sense knowledge: but God is absolutely remote from sense experience; therefore He is not first known by us, but is known last.

Again, according to the Philosopher, those things that are posterior, according to nature, are first known as far as we are concerned; and those things which are less knowable in themselves are better known as far as we are concerned. But created things are posterior and less knowable by nature than is God Himself; therefore, by us, He is known after creatures.

Again, what is promised as an ultimate reward does not come first, preceding everything done to deserve it: but knowledge of God is promised to us as the ultimate reward of all cognition and action; therefore God is not the first object known by us.

**Response.** I answer that it must be said: There are those who declare that the first object known by the human mind even in this life is God Himself, who is first truth and the one through whom all other things are known. But this is evidently false, since to know God through His essence constitutes the beatitude of man; wherefore it would follow that every man would be blessed.

Moreover, since in the divine essence all things said of it are one, no one would err in regard to anything he said concerning God—a thing which from experience is evidently false; furthermore, since things first in the comprehension of the intellect ought to be most certainly known, the intellect would be certain that it knew them;

but it is clear that this is not the case in the proposition (as to knowing God).

*Repugnat etiam haec positio auctoritati Scripturae quae dicit Exodi 3: non videbit me homo et vivet.*

This position is also repugnant to the authority of Scripture (Exod. 33:20): “Man shall not see Me and live.”

*Unde alii dixerunt quod essentia divina non est primo cognitum a nobis in via, sed influentia lucis ipsius, et secundum hoc Deus est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur.*

Hence there are others who say that the divine essence is not the first thing known by us in this life, but the influx of its light is, and in this way God is the first object known by us.

*Sed hoc etiam stare non potest, quia prima lux divinitus influxa in mente est lux naturalis per quam constituitur vis intellectiva. Haec autem lux non est primo cognita a mente neque cognitione qua sciatur de ea quid est, cum multa inquisitione indigeat ad cognoscendum quid est intellectus; neque cognitione qua cognoscitur an est, quia intellectum nos habere non percipimus, nisi in quantum percipimus nos intelligere, ut patet per philosophum in IX Ethicorum. Nullus autem intelligit se intelligere, nisi in quantum intelligit aliquod intelligibile. Ex quo patet quod cognitio alicuius intelligibilis praecedit cognitionem qua aliquis cognoscit se intelligere et per consequens cognitionem qua aliquis cognoscit se habere intellectum, et sic influentia lucis intelligibilis naturalis non potest esse primum cognitum a nobis, et multo minus quaelibet alia influentia lucis.*

But this claim cannot be held; for the first influx of divine light in the mind is the natural light by which the power of intellectual life is constituted. This light, however, is not at first known by the mind; neither by cognition by which is known what this light is, since much investigation is required to know the essence of the intellect; nor by cognition by which is known whether such a light exists; for we do not perceive that we possess intellect, except inasmuch as we perceive that we understand, as is clear from the Philosopher’s words in IX *Ethic*. For no one knows that he understands anything, save inasmuch as he understands something intelligible. From this it is evident that cognition of an intelligible object-precedes cognition by which one knows that he himself understands, and consequently precedes the cognition by which he knows that he possesses an intellect; and so the influx of the natural light of intelligence cannot be the first thing known by us; and much less can any other kind of influx of light be the first thing known.

*Et ideo dicendum est quod primo cognitum homini potest accipi dupliciter: aut secundum ordinem diversarum potentiarum aut secundum ordinem obiectorum in una potentia.*

Therefore it must be said that “the first thing known to man” is a phrase which can be understood in two ways: either according to the order of diverse potencies, or according to the order of objects in some one potency.

*Primo quidem modo, cum cognitio intellectus nostri tota derivetur a sensu, illud, quod est cognoscibile a sensu, est prius notum nobis quam illud, quod est cognoscibile ab intellectu, scilicet singulare vel sensibile intelligibili.*

According to the first way, since all the knowledge of our intellect is derived from sense experience, what is made known to us by our senses is known prior to what is known by the intellect; and this is the singular, or the sensible-intelligible.

*Alio modo, scilicet secundum alium modum cuiuslibet potentiae est cognoscibile primo suum proprium obiectum. Cum autem in intellectu humano sit potentia activa et passiva, obiectum potentiae passivae, scilicet intellectus possibilis, erit illud, quod est actum per potentiam activam, scilicet intellectum agentem, quia potentiae passivae debet respondere proprium activum.*

According to the other meaning, that is, according to the order of objects in any one potency, the proper object of each potency is what is first knowable by it. Since, however, in the human intellect there is an active potency and a passive one, the object of the passive potency, namely, the possible intellect, will be that which is in act through the active potency, that is, through the active intellect, since to the passive potency there must correspond that which activates it.

*Intellectus autem agens non facit intelligibilia formas separatas quae sunt ex se ipsis intelligibiles, sed formas quas abstrahit a phantasmatis, et ideo huiusmodi sunt, quae primo intellectus noster intelligit. Et inter haec illa sunt priora, quae primo intellectui abstrahenti occurrunt. Haec autem sunt quae plura comprehendunt vel per modum totius universalis vel per modum totius integralis, et ideo magis universalia sunt primo nota intellectui et composita componentibus, ut diffinitum partibus diffinitionis.*

*Et secundum quod quaedam imitatio intellectus est in sensu, qui etiam quodammodo abstracta a materia recipit, etiam apud sensum singularia magis communia sunt primo nota, ut hoc corpus quam hoc animal.*

*Unde patet quod Deus et aliae substantiae separatae nullo modo possunt esse prima intellecta, sed intelliguntur ex aliis, ut dicitur Rom. 1: invisibilia et cetera.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex verbis illis Augustini et similibus non est intelligendum quod ipsa veritas increata sit proximum principium, quo cognoscimus et iudicamus, sed quia per lumen, quod est eius similitudo, nobis inditum cognoscimus et iudicamus. Nec hoc lumen habet aliquam efficaciam nisi ex prima luce; sicut in demonstrationibus secunda principia non certificant nisi ex virtute primorum. Nec tamen oportet quod etiam ipsum lumen inditum sit primo a nobis cognitum. Non enim eo alia cognoscimus sicut cognoscibili quod sit medium cognitionis, sed sicut eo quod facit alia esse cognoscibilia. Unde non oportet quod cognoscatur nisi in ipsis cognoscibilibus, sicut lux non oportet quod primo videatur ab oculo nisi in ipso colore illustrato.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnium causarum ordinarum est influentia unius rationis in ultimum effectum. Unde non oportet quod primum intelligibile hoc modo influat in intellectum nostrum quod intelligatur, sed quod praestet intelligendi virtutem. Vel*

The active intellect, however, does not render intelligible separate forms, which are of themselves intelligible, but those forms which it abstracts from phantasms; and hence forms of this latter kind are those which our intellect knows. And among these forms, the ones that first come to be abstracted by the intellect hold the place of priority. These, furthermore, are the forms that comprehend more notes—either after the manner of a total universal or after the manner of an integral whole—therefore the more universal things are first known to the intellect; a composite is known before its component parts, and a definition before the parts of the definition.

In this respect there is a certain imitation of the intellect found in the sense powers, which also receive as their objects things which in a certain way are abstracted from matter. For even in the case of the senses, singular things of a more general nature are the first known, as “this body” is known sooner than “this animal.”

Thus it is evident that God and other separate substances cannot in any way be the first objects of our intellection, but are understood from other things, as is said in Rom. 1:20: “For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”

### **Answers to objections**

1. It may be said: From the words of Augustine and from other similar sayings, it is not to be understood that the uncreated truth itself is the proximate principle by which we know and judge of things, but that through the light conferred upon us, which is a similitude of that truth, we have cognition and judgment. Nor would this light have any efficacy except from the First Light: just as in methods of demonstration second principles would have no certitude unless founded upon the truth of first principles. Nevertheless it should not be thought that even this (natural) light is the first thing known by us. For we do not know other things by means of it, as if it were a medium for cognition of the knowable, but because (as agent) it makes other things knowable. Wherefore it could not itself be known unless it were contained among knowable things; even as light could not be seen by the eye unless manifested in color itself.

2. It may be answered: In the case of a plurality of ordered causes, the influx into the ultimate effect is not always of the same nature. Therefore it need not be that the first intelligible so influence our intellect as to be Himself an object of our knowledge; but it is only necessary that as

*dicendum quod quamvis Deus sit in ordine intelligibilium primum simpliciter, non tamen est primum in ordine intelligibilium nobis.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod quamvis illa, quae sunt prima in genere eorum quae intellectus abstrahit a phantasmatis, sint primo cognita a nobis, ut ens et unum, non tamen oportet quod illa quae sunt prima simpliciter, quae non continentur in ratione proprii obiecti, sicut et ista.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod quamvis Deus sit ultimus finis in consecutione et primus in intentione appetitus naturalis, non tamen oportet quod sit primus in cognitione mentis humanae quae ordinatur in finem, sed in cognitione ordinantis, sicut et in aliis quae naturali appetitu tendunt in finem suum. Cognoscitur tamen a principio et intenditur in quadam generalitate, prout mens appetit se bene esse et bene vivere, quod tunc solum est ei, cum Deum habet.*

*Ad quintum dicendum quod substantiae separatae quamvis abstractione non indigeant ad hoc quod intelligantur, tamen non sunt intelligibiles per lumen intellectus agentis, unde non primo ab intellectu nostro cognoscuntur. Intelligibile enim per huiusmodi lumen est obiectum intellectus, sicut visibile per lumen corporale est obiectum visus.*

*Ad sextum dicendum quod Deum esse, quantum est in se, est per se notum, quia sua essentia est suum esse - et hoc modo loquitur Anselmus - non autem nobis qui eius essentiam non videmus.*

*Sed tamen eius cognitio nobis innata esse dicitur, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse.*

cause He bestow the power of intellection. Or it may be said that although in the order of intelligible things God is first absolutely, yet He is not first in the order of things that are intelligible to us.

3. It may be said: Although those things which are first in the genus of things abstracted by the intellect from phantasms are first known by us, as ens and unum, nevertheless it does not follow that those which are first absolutely (simpliciter), which are not contained in the genus of any proper object, should be classed with the former [i.e., things abstracted from phantasms].

4. Answer is made: Although God is the last end in attainment and first in the intention of the natural appetancy, it is not necessary that He be first in the cognition of the human mind, which is ordained to its end, but first in the mind of the One ordaining it, as is the case in other things which by natural appetancy tend toward their own end. Nevertheless, the end is known from the beginning and intended in a certain general way, inasmuch as the mind desires its own well-being and welfare, which is possible to it only on condition that it (ultimately) possess God.

5. It may be answered: Although a process of abstraction is not required for the understanding of separate substances, they are not intelligible through the light of the active intellect; wherefore they are not the first objects of knowledge as far as our intellect is concerned.

6. It may be said: The existence of God, considered in itself, is a thing knowable in itself, since His essence is His existence; and in this way Anselm stated the matter.

Nevertheless, to us, who do not behold His essence, it is not self-evident that He exists; though cognition of it may be said to be innate inasmuch as it is through principles which are innate in us that we are easily able to perceive that God exists.



**Whether without grace man can know any truth?**

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo sine gratia nullum verum cognoscere possit. Quia super illud I Cor. XII, nemo potest dicere, dominus Iesus, nisi in spiritu sancto, dicit Glossa Ambrosii, omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a spiritu sancto est. Sed spiritus sanctus habitat in nobis per gratiam. Ergo veritatem cognoscere non possumus sine gratia.*

*Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., quod disciplinarum certissima talia sunt qualia illa quae a sole illustrantur ut videri possint; Deus autem ipse est qui illustrat; ratio autem ita est in mentibus ut in oculis est aspectus; mentis autem oculi sunt sensus animae. Sed sensus corporis, quantumcumque sit purus, non potest aliquod visibile videre sine solis illustratione. Ergo humana mens, quantumcumque sit perfecta, non potest ratiocinando veritatem cognoscere absque illustratione divina. Quae ad auxilium gratiae pertinet.*

*Praeterea, humana mens non potest veritatem intelligere nisi cogitando; ut patet per Augustinum XIV de Trin. Sed apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, non sufficientes sumus aliquid cogitare a nobis, quasi ex nobis. Ergo homo non potest cognoscere veritatem per seipsum sine auxilio gratiae.*

*Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Retract., non approbo quod in oratione dixi, Deus, qui non nisi mundos verum scire voluisti. Responderi enim potest multos etiam non mundos multa scire vera. Sed per gratiam homo mundus efficitur; secundum illud Psalmi I, cor mundum crea in me, Deus; et spiritum rectum innova in visceribus meis. Ergo sine gratia potest homo per seipsum veritatem cognoscere.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod cognoscere veritatem est usus quidam, vel actus, intellectualis luminis, quia secundum apostolum, ad Ephes. V, omne quod manifestatur, lumen est. Usus autem quilibet quendam motum importat, large accipiendo motum secundum quod intelligere et velle motus quidam esse dicuntur, ut patet per philosophum in III de anima. Videmus autem in corporalibus quod ad motum non solum requiritur ipsa forma quae est principium motus vel actionis; sed etiam requiritur motio primi moventis. Primum autem movens in ordine*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that without grace man can know no truth. For, on 1 Cor. 12:3: "No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost," a gloss says: "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost." Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we cannot know truth without grace.

**Objection 2:** Further, Augustine says (Solil. i, 6) that "the most certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to be seen. Now God Himself is He Whom sheds the light. And reason is in the mind as sight is in the eye. And the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul." Now the bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any visible object, without the sun's light. Therefore the human mind, however perfect, cannot, by reasoning, know any truth without Divine light: and this pertains to the aid of grace.

**Objection 3:** Further, the human mind can only understand truth by thinking, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). But the Apostle says ([2 Cor. 3:5](#)): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God." Therefore man cannot, of himself, know truth without the help of grace.

**On the contrary,** Augustine says (Retract. i, 4): "I do not approve having said in the prayer, O God, Who dost wish the sinless alone to know the truth; for it may be answered that many who are not sinless know many truths." Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, according to Ps. 50:12: "Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels." Therefore without grace man of himself can know truth.

**I answer that,** To know truth is a use or act of intellectual light, since, according to the Apostle ([Eph. 5:13](#)): "All that is made manifest is light." Now every use implies movement, taking movement broadly, so as to call thinking and willing movements, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 4). Now in corporeal things we see that for movement there is required not merely the form which is the principle of the movement or action, but there is also required the motion of the first mover. Now the first mover in the order of corporeal

*corporalium est corpus caeleste. Unde quantumcumque ignis habeat perfectum calorem, non alteraret nisi per motionem caelestis corporis. Manifestum est autem quod, sicut omnes motus corporales reducuntur in motum caelestis corporis sicut in primum movens corporale; ita omnes motus tam corporales quam spirituales reducuntur in primum movens simpliciter, quod est Deus. Et ideo quantumcumque natura aliqua corporalis vel spiritualis ponatur perfecta, non potest in suum actum procedere nisi moveatur a Deo. Quae quidem motio est secundum suae providentiae rationem; non secundum necessitatem naturae, sicut motio corporis caelestis. Non solum autem a Deo est omnis motio sicut a primo movente; sed etiam ab ipso est omnis formalis perfectio sicut a primo actu. Sic igitur actio intellectus, et cuiuscumque entis creati, dependet a Deo quantum ad duo, uno modo, in quantum ab ipso habet formam per quam agit; alio modo, in quantum ab ipso movetur ad agendum.*

*Unaquaeque autem forma indita rebus creatis a Deo, habet efficaciam respectu alicuius actus determinati, in quem potest secundum suam proprietatem, ultra autem non potest nisi per aliquam formam superadditam, sicut aqua non potest calefacere nisi calefacta ab igne. Sic igitur intellectus humanus habet aliquam formam, scilicet ipsum intelligibile lumen, quod est de se sufficiens ad quaedam intelligibilia cognoscenda, ad ea scilicet in quorum notitiam per sensibilia possumus devenire. Altiora vero intelligibilia intellectus humanus cognoscere non potest nisi fortiori lumine perficiatur, sicut lumine fidei vel prophetiae; quod dicitur lumen gratiae, in quantum est naturae superadditum.*

*Sic igitur dicendum est quod ad cognitionem cuiuscumque veri, homo indiget auxilio divino ut intellectus a Deo moveatur ad suum actum. Non autem indiget ad cognoscendam veritatem in omnibus, nova illustratione superaddita naturali illustrationi; sed in quibusdam, quae excedunt naturalem cognitionem. Et tamen quandoque Deus miraculose per suam gratiam aliquos instruit de his quae per naturalem rationem cognosci possunt, sicut et quandoque miraculose facit quaedam quae natura facere potest.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, est a spiritu sancto sicut ab infundente naturale lumen, et movente ad intelligendum et loquendum veritatem. Non autem sicut ab inhabitante per gratiam gratum facientem, vel sicut a largiente aliquod habituale donum naturae superadditum, sed hoc solum est in quibusdam veris cognoscendis et loquendis;*

things is the heavenly body. Hence no matter how perfectly fire has heat, it would not bring about alteration, except by the motion of the heavenly body. But it is clear that as all corporeal movements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body as to the first corporeal mover, so all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God; but this motion is according to the plan of His providence, and not by necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly body. Now not only is every motion from God as from the First Mover, but all formal perfection is from Him as from the First Act. And thus the act of the intellect or of any created being whatsoever depends upon God in two ways: first, inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the form whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved by Him to act.

Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a determined act, which it can bring about in proportion to its own proper endowment; and beyond which it is powerless, except by a superadded form, as water can only heat when heated by the fire. And thus the human understanding has a form, viz. intelligible light, which of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible things, viz. those we can come to know through the senses. Higher intelligible things of the human intellect cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, viz. the light of faith or prophecy which is called the "light of grace," inasmuch as it is added to nature.

Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs Divine help, that the intellect may be moved by God to its act. But he does not need a new light added to his natural light, in order to know the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his natural knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some by His grace in things that can be known by natural reason, even as He sometimes brings about miraculously what nature can do.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural light, and moving us to understand and speak the truth, but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as bestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this only takes place with regard to certain truths that are

*et maxime in illis quae pertinent ad fidem, de quibus apostolus loquebatur.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod sol corporalis illustrat exterius; sed sol intelligibilis, qui est Deus, illustrat interius. Unde ipsum lumen naturale animae inditum est illustratio Dei, qua illustramur ab ipso ad cognoscendum ea quae pertinent ad naturalem cognitionem. Et ad hoc non requiritur alia illustratio, sed solum ad illa quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod semper indigemus divino auxilio ad cogitandum quodcumque, inquantum ipse movet intellectum ad agendum, actu enim intelligere aliquid est cogitare, ut patet per Augustinum, XIV de Trin.*

known and spoken, and especially in regard to such as pertain to faith, of which the Apostle speaks.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The material sun sheds its light outside us; but the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul is God's enlightenment, whereby we are enlightened to see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this there is required no further knowledge, but only for such things as surpass natural knowledge.

**Reply to Objection 3:** We always need God's help for every thought, inasmuch as He moves the understanding to act; for actually to understand anything is to think, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7).

**Pamatinis pažinimo principas: *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus***

**Quaestiones disputatae de veritate.** Quaestio 1. *De veritate.*

Articulus 1. What is truth?

Articulus 2. Is truth found principally in the intellect or in things?

**ARTICLE I**

**The problem under discussion is truth,  
and in the first article we ask:  
What is truth?**

[Cf. *S.T.*, I, 16, aa. 1, 3; *I Sent.*, 19, 5, 1; *C.G.*, I, 60; *I Perih.*, lect. 3, nn. 3-10; *VI Metaph.*, lect. 4, nn. 1230-44.]

*Quaestio est de veritate. Et primo quaeritur quid est veritas?*      **Difficulties**

*Videtur autem quod verum sit omnino idem quod ens.*      It seems that the true is exactly the same as being, for

*Augustinus in Lib. Solil. dicit, quod verum est id quod est. Sed id quod est, nihil est nisi ens. Ergo verum significat omnino idem quod ens.*      1. Augustine says: "The true is that which is." But that which is, is simply being. The true, therefore, means exactly the same as being.

*Respondens dicebat quod sunt idem secundum supposita, sed ratione differunt. Contra, ratio cuiuslibet rei est id quod significatur per suam definitionem. Sed id quod est, assignatur ab Augustino, ut definitio veri, quibusdam aliis definitionibus reprobatis. Cum ergo secundum id quod est, convenient verum et ens, videtur quod sint idem ratione.*      2. It was said in reply that the true and being are the same materially but differ formally.—On the contrary the nature of a thing is signified by its definition; and the definition of the true, according to Augustine, is "that which is." He rejects all other definitions. Now, since the true and being are materially the same, it seems that they are also formally the same.

*Praeterea, quaecumque differunt ratione, ita se habent quod unum illorum potest intelligi sine altero: unde Boethius in libro de hebdomadibus dicit, quod potest intelligi Deus esse, si separetur per intellectum paulisper bonitas eius. Ens autem nullo modo potest intelligi si separetur verum: quia per hoc intelligitur quod verum est. Ergo verum et ens non differunt ratione.*      3. Things which differ conceptually are so related to each other that one of them can be understood without the other. For this reason, Boethius says that the existence of God can be understood if for a moment we mentally separate His goodness from His existence. Being, however can in no way be understood apart from the true, for being is known only in so far as it is true. Therefore, the true and being do not differ conceptually.

*Praeterea, si verum non est idem quod ens, oportet quod sit entis dispositio. Sed non potest esse entis dispositio. Non enim est dispositio totaliter corrumpens, alias sequeretur: est verum, ergo est non ens; sicut sequitur: est homo mortuus, ergo non est homo.*      4. If the true is not the same as being, it must be a state of being. But it cannot be a state of being. It is not a state that entirely corrupts—otherwise, this would follow: "It is true. Therefore, it is non-being"—as it follows when we say: "This man is dead. Therefore, this is not a man." Similarly, the true is not a state that limits. If it were, one

*Similiter non est dispositio diminuens, alias non sequeretur: est verum, ergo est; sicut non sequitur: est albus dentes, ergo est albus. Similiter non est dispositio contrahens, vel specificans: quia sic non converteretur cum ente. Ergo verum et ens omnino sunt idem.*

*Praeterea, illa quorum est una dispositio, sunt eadem. Sed veri et entis est eadem dispositio. Ergo sunt eadem. Dicitur enim in II Metaphysic.: dispositio rei in esse est sicut sua dispositio in veritate. Ergo verum et ens sunt omnino idem.*

*Praeterea, quaecumque non sunt idem, aliquo modo differunt. Sed verum et ens nullo modo differunt: quia non differunt per essentiam, cum omne ens per essentiam suam sit verum; nec differunt per aliquas differentias, quia oporteret quod in aliquo communi genere convenirent. Ergo sunt omnino idem.*

*Item, si non sunt omnino idem, oportet quod verum aliquid super ens addat. Sed nihil addit verum super ens, cum sit etiam in plus quam ens: quod patet per philosophum, IV Metaphys., ubi dicit quod: verum definientes dicimus quod dicimus esse quod est; aut non esse quod non est; et sic verum includit ens et non ens. Ergo verum non addit aliquid super ens; et sic videtur omnino idem esse verum quod ens.*

*Sed contra.*

*Nugatio est eiusdem inutilis repetitio. Si ergo verum esset idem quod ens, esset nugatio, dum dicitur ens verum; quod falsum est. Ergo non sunt idem.*

*Item, ens et bonum convertuntur. Sed verum non convertitur cum bono; aliquod est enim verum quod non est bonum, sicut aliquem fornicari. Ergo nec verum cum ente convertitur, et ita non sunt idem.*

*Praeterea, secundum Boetium in libro de hebdomadibus: in omnibus creaturis diversum est esse et quod est. Sed verum significat esse rei. Ergo verum est diversum a quod est in creatis. Sed quod est, est idem quod ens. Ergo verum in creaturis est diversum ab ente.*

*Praeterea, quaecumque se habent ut prius et posterius, oportet esse diversa. Sed verum et ens modo praedicto se habent, quia, ut in libro de causis dicitur, prima rerum creaturarum est esse; et*

could not say: "It is true. Therefore it is." For one cannot say that a thing is white simply because it has white teeth. Finally, the true is not a state which contracts or specifies being, for it is convertible with being. It follows, therefore, that the true and being are entirely the same.

5. Things in the same state are the same. But the true and being are in the same state. Therefore, they are the same. For Aristotle writes: "The state of a thing in its act of existence is the same as its state in truth." Therefore, the true and being are entirely the same.

6. Things not the same differ in some respect. But the true and being differ in no respect. They do not differ essentially, for every being is true by its very essence. And they do not differ in any other ways, for they must belong to some common genus. Therefore, they are entirely the same.

7. If they were not entirely the same, the true would add something to being. But the true adds nothing to being, even though it has greater extension than being. This is borne out by the statement of the Philosopher that we define the true as: "That which affirms the existence of what is, and denies the existence of what is not." Consequently, the true includes both being and non-being; since it does not add anything to being, it seems to be entirely the same as being.

### **To the Contrary**

1. Useless repetition of the same thing is meaningless; so, if the true were the same as being, it would be meaningless to say: "Being is true." This, however, is hardly correct. Therefore, they are not the same.

2. Being and the good are convertible. The true and the good, however, are not interchangeable, for some things, such as fornication, are true but not good. The true, therefore, and being are not interchangeable. And so they are not the same.

3. In all creatures, as Boethius has pointed out, "to be is other than that which is." Now, the true signifies the existence of things. Consequently, in creatures it is different from that which is. But that which is, is the same as being. Therefore, in creatures the true is different from being.

4. Things related as before and after must differ. But the true and being are related in the aforesaid manner; for, as is said in *The Causes*: "The first of all created things is the act of existence." In a study of this work, a commentator writes as

*Commentator in eodem libro dicit quod omnia alia dicuntur per informationem de ente, et sic ente posteriora sunt. Ergo verum et ens sunt diversa.*

*Praeterea, quae communiter dicuntur de causa et causatis, magis sunt unum in causa quam in causatis, et praecipue in Deo quam in creaturis. Sed in Deo ista quatuor, ens, unum, verum et bonum, hoc modo appropriantur: ut ens ad essentiam pertineat, unum ad personam patris, verum ad personam filii, bonum ad personam spiritus sancti. Personae autem divinae non solum ratione, sed etiam re distinguuntur; unde de invicem non praedicantur. Ergo multo fortius in creaturis praedicta quatuor debent amplius quam ratione differre.*

*Respondeo.*

*Dicendum, quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquodque; alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum.*

*Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae metaphysicae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens; unde probat etiam philosophus in III Metaphys., quod ens non potest esse genus, sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super ens, in quantum expriment modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur. Quod dupliciter contingit:*

*uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis. Sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera. Substantia enim non addit super ens aliquam differentiam, quae designet aliquam naturam superadditam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur specialis quidam modus essendi, scilicet per se ens; et ita est in aliis generibus.*

*Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens; et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in se; alio modo*

follows: “Everything else is predicated as a specification of being.” Consequently, everything else comes after being. Therefore, the true and being are not the same.

5. What are predicated of a cause and of the effects of the cause are more united in the cause than in its effects—and more so in God than in creatures. But in God four predicates—being, the one, the true, and the good—are appropriated as follows: being, to the essence; the one, to the Father; the true, to the Son; and the good, to the Holy Spirit. Since the divine Persons are really and not merely conceptually distinct, these notions cannot be predicated of each other; if really distinct when verified of the divine Persons, the four notions in question are much more so when verified of creatures.

## REPLY

When investigating the nature of anything, one should make the same kind of analysis as he makes when he reduces a proposition to certain self-evident principles. Otherwise, both types of knowledge will become involved in an infinite regress, and science and our knowledge of things will perish.

Now, as Avicenna says, that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most evident, and to which it reduces all its concepts, is being. Consequently, all the other conceptions of the intellect are had by additions to being. But nothing can be added to being as though it were something not included in being—in the way that a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a subject—for every reality is essentially a being. The Philosopher has shown this by proving that being cannot be a genus. Yet, in this sense, some predicates may be said to add to being inasmuch as they express a mode of being not expressed by the term *being*. This happens in two ways.

First, the mode expressed is a certain special manner of being; for there are different grades of being according to which we speak when we speak of different levels of existence, and according to these grades different things are classified. Consequently, *substance* does not add a difference to being by signifying some reality added to it, but *substance* simply expresses a special manner of existing, namely, as a being in itself. The same is true of the other classes of existents.

Second, some are said to add to being because the mode they express is one that is common, and consequent upon every being. This mode can be taken in two ways: first, in so far as it follows upon every being considered absolutely; second,

*secundum quod consequitur unum ens in ordine ad aliud. Si primo modo, hoc est dupliciter quia vel exprimitur in ente aliquid affirmative vel negative. Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente, nisi essentia eius, secundum quam esse dicitur; et sic imponitur hoc nomen res, quod in hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam in principio Metaphys., quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatem vel essentiam entis. Negatio autem consequens omne ens absolute, est indivisio; et hanc exprimit hoc nomen unum: nihil aliud enim est unum quam ens indivisum.*

*Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid: dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid; unde sicut ens dicitur unum, in quantum est indivisum in se, ita dicitur aliquid, in quantum est ab aliis divisum. Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente: hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia, ut dicitur in III de anima. In anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum, ut in principio Ethic. dicitur quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis: sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur secundum speciem coloris, cognoscit colorem.*

*Prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui concordet: quae quidem concordia adaequatio intellectus et rei dicitur; et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit verum super ens, scilicet conformitatem, sive adaequationem rei et intellectus; ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei. Sic ergo entitas rei praecedit rationem veritatis, sed cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus.*

*Secundum hoc ergo veritas sive verum tripliciter invenitur diffiniri. Uno modo secundum illud quod praecedit rationem veritatis, et in quo verum fundatur; et sic Augustinus definit in Lib. Solil.: verum est id quod est; et Avicenna in sua Metaphysic.: veritas cuiusque rei est proprietas sui*

in so far as it follows upon every being considered in relation to another. In the first, the term is used in two ways, because it expresses something in the being either affirmatively or negatively. We can, however, find nothing that can be predicated of every being affirmatively and, at the same time, absolutely, with the exception of its essence by which the being is said to be. To express this, the term *thing* is used; for, according to Avicenna, "thing differs from being because being gets its name from to-be, but thing expresses the quiddity or essence of the being." There is, however, a negation consequent upon every being considered absolutely: its undividedness, and this is expressed by *one*. For the *one* is simply undivided being.

If the mode of being is taken in the second way—according to the relation of one being to another—we find a twofold use. The first is based on the distinction of one being from another, and this distinctness is expressed by the word *something*, which implies, as it were, *some other thing*. For, just as a being is said to be *one* in so far as it is without division in itself, so it is said to be *something* in so far as it is divided from others. The second division is based on the correspondence one being has with another. This is possible only if there is something which is such that it agrees with every being. Such a being is the soul, which, as is said in *The Soul*, "in some way is all things." The soul, however, has both knowing and appetitive powers. *Good* expresses the correspondence of being to the appetitive power, for, and so we note in the *Ethics*, the good is "that which all desire." *True* expresses the correspondence of being to the knowing power, for all knowing is produced by an assimilation of the knower to the thing known, so that assimilation is said to be the cause of knowledge. Similarly, the sense of sight knows a color by being informed with a species of the color.

The first reference of being to the intellect, therefore, consists in its agreement with the intellect. This agreement is called "the conformity of thing and intellect." In this conformity is fulfilled the formal constituent of the true, and this is what *the true* adds to being, namely, the conformity or equation of thing and intellect. As we said, the knowledge of a thing is a consequence of this conformity; therefore, it is an effect of truth, even though the fact that the thing is a being is prior to its truth.

Consequently, truth or the true has been defined in three ways. First of all, it is defined according to that which precedes truth and is the basis of truth. This is why Augustine writes: "The true is that which is"; and Avicenna: "The truth of each thing is a property of the act of being which has been established for it." Still others say: "The true is the

*esse quod stabilitum est ei; et quidam sic: verum est indivisio esse, et quod est. Alio modo definitur secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri perficitur; et sic dicit Isaac quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus; et Anselmus in Lib. de veritate: veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis. Rectitudo enim ista secundum adaequationem quamdam dicitur, et philosophus dicit in IV Metaphysic., quod definiens verum dicimus cum dicitur esse quod est, aut non esse quod non est.*

*Tertio modo definitur verum, secundum effectum consequentem; et sic dicit Hilarius, quod verum est declarativum et manifestativum esse; et Augustinus in Lib. de vera Relig.: veritas est qua ostenditur id quod est; et in eodem libro: veritas est secundum quam de inferioribus iudicamus.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod definitio illa Augustini datur de veritate secundum quod habet fundamentum in re, et non secundum id quod ratio veri completur in adaequatione rei ad intellectum. Vel dicendum, quod cum dicitur, verum est id quod est, li est non accipitur ibi secundum quod significat actum essendi, sed secundum quod est nota intellectus componentis, prout scilicet affirmationem propositionis significat, ut sit sensus: verum est id quod est, id est cum dicitur esse de aliquo quod est, ut sic in idem redeat definitio Augustini cum definitione philosophi supra inducta.*

*Ad secundum patet solutio ex dictis.*

*Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquid intelligi sine altero, potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo quod intelligatur aliquid, altero non intellecto: et sic, ea quae ratione differunt, ita se habent, quod unum sine altero intelligi potest. Alio modo potest accipi aliquid intelligi sine altero, quod intelligitur eo non existente: et sic ens non potest intelligi sine vero, quia ens non potest intelligi sine hoc quod concordet vel adaequetur intellectui. Sed non tamen oportet ut quicumque intelligit rationem entis intelligat veri rationem, sicut nec quicumque intelligit ens, intelligit intellectum agentem; et tamen sine intellectu agente nihil intelligi potest.*

*Ad quartum dicendum, quod verum est dispositio entis non quasi addens aliquam naturam, nec quasi*

undividedness of the act of existence from that which is.” Truth is also defined in another way—according to that in which its intelligible determination is formally completed. Thus, Isaac writes: “Truth is the conformity of thing and intellect”; and Anselm: “Truth is a rectitude perceptible only by the mind.” This rectitude, of course, is said to be based on some conformity. The Philosopher says that in defining truth we say that truth is had when one affirms that “to be which is, and that not to be which is not.”

The third way of defining truth is according to the effect following upon it. Thus, Hilary says that the true is that which manifests and proclaims existence. And Augustine says: “Truth is that by which that which is, is shown”; and also: “Truth is that according to which we, judge about inferior things.”

### Answers to Difficulties

1. That definition of Augustine is given for the true as it has its foundation in reality and not as its formal nature is given complete expression by conformity of thing and intellect. An alternative answer would be that in the statement, “The true is that which is,” the word *is* is not here understood as referring to the act of existing, but rather as the mark of the intellectual act of judging, signifying, that is, the affirmation of a proposition. The meaning would then be this: “The true is that which is—it is had when the existence of what is, is affirmed.” If this is its meaning, then Augustine’s definition agrees with that of the Philosopher mentioned above.

2. The answer is clear from what has been said.

3. “Something can be understood without another” can be taken in two ways. It can mean that something can be known while another remains unknown. Taken in this way, it is true that things which differ conceptually are such that one can be understood without the other. But there is another way that a thing can be understood without another: when it is known even though the other does not exist. Taken in this sense, being cannot be known without the true, for it cannot be known unless it agrees with or conforms to intellect. It is not necessary, however, that everyone who understands the formal notion of being should also understand the formal notion of the true—just as not everyone who understands being understands the agent intellect, even though nothing can be known without the agent intellect.

4. The true is a state of being even though it does not add any reality to being or express any special mode of existence. It



*exprimens aliquem specialem modum entis, sed aliquid quod generaliter invenitur in omni ente, quod tamen nomine entis non exprimitur; unde non oportet quod sit dispositio vel corrumpens vel diminuens vel in partem contrahens.*

*Ad quintum dicendum, quod dispositio non accipitur ibi secundum quod est in genere qualitatis, sed secundum quod importat quemdam ordinem; cum enim illa quae sunt causa aliorum essendi sint maxime entia, et illa quae sunt causa veritatis sint maxime vera; concludit philosophus, quod idem est ordo alicui rei in esse et veritate; ita, scilicet, quod ubi invenitur quod est maxime ens, est maxime verum. Unde nec hoc ideo est quia ens et verum ratione sunt idem, sed quia secundum hoc quod aliquid habet de entitate, secundum hoc est natum adaequari intellectui; et sic ratio veri sequitur rationem entis.*

*Ad sextum dicendum, quod verum et ens differunt ratione per hoc quod aliquid est in ratione veri quod non est in ratione entis; non autem ita quod aliquid sit in ratione entis quod non sit in ratione veri; unde nec per essentiam differunt, nec differentiis oppositis ab invicem distinguuntur.*

*Ad septimum dicendum, quod verum non est in plus quam ens; ens enim aliquo modo acceptum dicitur de non ente, secundum quod non ens est apprehensum ab intellectu; unde in IV Metaphys., dicit philosophus, quod negatio vel privatio entis uno modo dicitur ens; unde Avicenna etiam dicit in principio suae metaphysicae, quod non potest formari enuntiatio nisi de ente, quia oportet illud de quo propositio formatur, esse apprehensum ab intellectu; ex quo patet quod omne verum est aliquo modo ens.*

*Ad primum vero eorum, quae contra obiiciuntur, dicendum, quod ideo non est nugatio cum dicitur ens verum, quia aliquid exprimitur nomine veri quod non exprimitur nomine entis; non propter hoc quod re differant.*

*Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis istum fornicari sit malum, tamen secundum quod aliquid habet de entitate, natum est hoc conformari*

is rather something that is generally found in every being, although it is not expressed by the word *being*. Consequently, it is not a state that corrupts, limits, or contracts.

5. In this objection, *condition* should not be understood as belonging to the genus of quality. It implies, rather, a certain order; for those which are the cause of the existence of other things are themselves beings most completely, and those which are the cause of the truth of other things are themselves true most completely. It is for this reason that the Philosopher concludes that the rank of a thing in its existence corresponds to its rank in truth, so that when one finds that which is most fully being, he finds there also that which is most fully true. But this does not mean that being and the true are the same in concept. It means simply that in the degree in which a thing has being, in that degree it is capable of being proportioned to intellect. Consequently, the true is dependent upon the formal character of being.

6. There is a conceptual difference between the true and being since there is something in the notion of the true that is not in the concept of the existing—not in such a way, however, that there is something in the concept of being which is not in the concept of the true. They do not differ essentially nor are they distinguished from one another by opposing differences.

7. The true does not have a wider extension than being. Being is, in some way, predicated of non-being in so far as non-being is apprehended by the intellect. For, as the Philosopher says, the negation or the privation of being may, in a sense, be called being. Avicenna supports this by pointing out that one can form propositions only of beings, for that about which a proposition is formed must be apprehended by the intellect. Consequently, it is clear that everything true is being in some way.

### **Answers to Contrary Difficulties**

1. The reason why it is not tautological to call a being true is that something is expressed by the word *true* that is not expressed by the word *being*, and not that the two differ in reality.

2. Although fornication is evil, it possesses some being and can conform to intellect. Accordingly, the formal character

*intellectui, et secundum hoc consequitur ibi ratio veri; et ita patet quod nec verum excedit nec exceditur ab ente.*

*Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum dicitur: diversum est esse, et quod est, distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui ille actus convenit. Nomen autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi, et ideo ratio non sequitur.*

*Ad quartum dicendum, quod secundum hoc verum est posterius ente, quod ratio veri differt ab entis ratione modo praedicto.*

*Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio illa deficit in tribus. Primo, quia quamvis personae divinae re distinguantur, appropriata tamen personis non differunt re, sed tantum ratione. Secundo, quia etsi personae realiter ad invicem distinguantur, non tamen realiter ab essentia distinguuntur; unde nec verum quod appropriatur personae filii, ab ente quod se tenet ex parte essentiae. Tertio, quia, etsi ens, unum, verum et bonum magis uniantur in Deo quam in rebus creatis, non tamen oportet, quod ex quo distinguuntur in Deo, quod in rebus creatis etiam distinguantur realiter. Hoc enim contingit de illis quae non habent ex ratione sua quod sint unum secundum rem, sicut sapientia et potentia, quae, cum in Deo sint unum secundum rem, in creaturis realiter distinguuntur: sed ens, unum, verum et bonum secundum rationem suam habent quod sint unum secundum rem; unde ubicumque inveniantur, realiter unum sunt, quamvis sit perfectior unitas illius rei secundum quam uniantur in Deo, quam illius rei secundum quam uniantur in creaturis.*

of the true is found here. So it is clear that *true* is coextensive with *being*.

3. In the statement, “To be is other than that which is,” the act of being is distinguished from that to which that act belongs. But the name of being is taken from the act of existence, not from that whose act it is. Hence, the argument does not follow.

4. The true comes after being in this respect, that the notion of the true differs from that of being in the manner we have described.

5. This argument has three flaws. First, although the Persons are really distinct, the things appropriated to each Person are only conceptually, and not really, distinct. Secondly, although the Persons are really distinct from each other, they are not really distinct from the essence; so, truth appropriated to the Person of the Son is not distinct from the act of existence He possesses through the divine essence. Thirdly, although being, the true, the one, and the good are more united in God than they are in created things, it does not follow from the fact that they are conceptually distinct in God that they are really distinct in created beings. This line of argument is valid only when it is applied to things which are not by their very nature one in reality, as wisdom and power, which, although one in God, are distinct in creatures. But being, the true, the one, and the good are such that by their very nature they are one in reality. Therefore, no matter where they are found, they are really one. Their unity in God, however, is more perfect than their unity in creatures.

## ARTICLE II

**In the second article we ask:**

**Is truth found principally in the intellect or in things?**

[Parallel readings: *C.G.*, I, 59; *III De anima*, lect. 11, nn. 746-51, 760-64; *S.T.*, I, 16, 2. See also readings given for preceding article.]

*Secundo quaeritur utrum veritas principalius inveniat in intellectu quam in rebus.*

**Difficulties**

*Et videtur quod non.*

It seems that it is found principally in things, for:

*Verum enim, ut dictum est, convertitur cum ente. Sed ens principaliter invenitur in rebus quam apud animam. Ergo et verum.*

*Praeterea, res sunt in anima non per essentiam, sed per suam speciem, ut dicit philosophus in III de anima. Si ergo veritas principaliter in anima invenitur, non erit essentia rei sed similitudo et species eius, et verum erit species entis extra animam existentis. Sed species rei existens in anima, non praedicatur de re quae est extra animam, sicut nec cum ipsa convertitur: converti enim est conversim praedicari; ergo nec verum convertetur cum ente; quod est falsum.*

*Praeterea, omne quod est in aliquo, consequitur id in quo est. Si ergo veritas principaliter est in anima, tunc iudicium de veritate erit secundum aestimationem animae; et ita redibit antiquorum philosophorum error, qui dicebant, omne quod quis opinatur in intellectu esse verum, et duo contradictoria simul esse vera; quod est absurdum.*

*Praeterea, si veritas principaliter est in intellectu, oportet quod aliquid quod ad intellectum pertinet, in definitione veritatis ponatur. Sed Augustinus huiusmodi definitionem reprobatur in Lib. Solil., sicut istam: verum est quod ita est ut videtur: quia secundum hoc, non esset verum quod non videtur; quod patet esse falsum de occultissimis lapillis, qui sunt in visceribus terrae; et similiter reprobatur et improbat istam: verum est quod ita est ut cognitori videtur, si velit et possit cognoscere, quia secundum hoc non esset aliquid verum, nisi cognitor vellet et posset cognoscere. Ergo et eadem ratio esset de quibuscumque aliis definitionibus in quibus aliquid ad intellectum pertinens poneretur. Ergo veritas non est principaliter in intellectu.*

*Contra. Philosophus dicit in VI Metaphysic.: non est falsum et verum in rebus sed in mente.*

*Praeterea, veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. Sed haec adaequatio non potest esse nisi in intellectu. Ergo nec veritas est nisi in intellectu.*

*Solutio. Dicendum, quod non oportet in illis quae dicuntur per prius et per posterius de multis, quod*

1. It was pointed out that the true is convertible with being. But being is found more principally in things than in the soul. The true, therefore, is principally outside the soul.

2. Things are not in the soul through their essences but, as pointed out by the Philosopher, through species. If, therefore, truth is found principally in the soul, truth will not be the essence of a thing but merely its likeness or species; and the true will be the species of a being existing outside the soul. But the species of a thing existing in the soul is not predicated of a thing outside the soul and is not convertible with it; for, if this were so, the true could not be converted with being—which is false.

3. That which is in something is based upon that in which it is. If truth, then, is principally in the soul, judgments about truth will have as their criterion the soul's estimation. This would revive that error of the ancient philosophers who said that any opinion a person has in his intellect is true and that two contradictories can be true at the same time. This, of course, is absurd.

4. If truth is principally in the intellect, anything which pertains to the intellect should be included in the definition of truth. Augustine, however, sharply criticizes such definitions, as, for example, "The true is that which is as it is seen." For, according to this definition, something would not be true if it were not seen. This is clearly false of rocks hidden deep in the earth. Augustine similarly criticizes the following definition: "The true is that which is as it appears to the knower, provided he is willing and able to know." For, according to this definition, something would not be true unless the knower wished and were able to know. The same criticism can be leveled against other definitions that include any reference to intellect. Truth, therefore, is not principally in the intellect.

### **To the Contrary**

1. The Philosopher says: "The true and the false are not in things but in the mind."

2. Truth is "the conformity of thing and intellect." But since this conformity can be only in the intellect, truth is only in the intellect.

### **REPLY**

When a predicate is used primarily and secondarily of many things, it is not necessary that that which is the cause of the

*illud prius recipiat praedicationem communis, quod est ut causa aliorum, sed illud in quo est primo ratio illius communis completa; sicut sanum per prius dicitur de animali, in quo primo perfecta ratio sanitatis invenitur, quamvis medicina dicatur sana ut effectiva sanitatis. Et ideo, cum verum dicatur per prius et posterius de pluribus, oportet quod de illo per prius dicatur in quo primo invenitur completa ratio veritatis.*

*Complementum autem cuiuslibet motus vel operationis est in suo termino. Motus autem cognitivae virtutis terminatur ad animam: oportet enim quod cognitum sit in cognoscente per modum cognoscentis: sed motus appetitivae terminatur ad res; inde est quod philosophus in III de anima ponit circulum quemdam in actibus animae, secundum, scilicet, quod res quae est extra animam, movet intellectum, et res intellecta movet appetitum, et appetitus tendit ad hoc ut perveniat ad rem a qua motus incepit. Et quia bonum, sicut dictum est, dicit ordinem entis ad appetitum, verum autem dicit ordinem ad intellectum; inde est quod philosophus dicit VI Metaphys., quod bonum et malum sunt in rebus, verum autem et falsum sunt in mente. Res autem non dicitur vera nisi secundum quod est intellectui adaequata; unde per posterius invenitur verum in rebus, per prius autem in intellectu.*

*Sed sciendum, quod res aliter comparatur ad intellectum practicum, aliter ad speculativum. Intellectus enim practicus causat res, unde est mensura rerum quae per ipsum fiunt: sed intellectus speculativus, quia accipit a rebus, est quodammodo motus ab ipsis rebus, et ita res mesurant ipsum. Ex quo patet quod res naturales, a quibus intellectus noster scientiam accipit, mesurant intellectum nostrum, ut dicitur X Metaph.: sed sunt mesuratae ab intellectu divino, in quo sunt omnia sicut omnia artificata in intellectu artificis. Sic ergo intellectus divinus est mesurans non mesuratus; res autem naturalis, mesurans et mesurata; sed intellectus noster mesuratus et non mesurans res quidem naturales, sed artificiales tantum.*

*Res ergo naturalis inter duos intellectus constituta, secundum adaequationem ad utrumque vera dicitur; secundum enim adaequationem ad intellectum divinum dicitur vera, in quantum implet hoc ad quod est ordinata per intellectum divinum, ut patet per Anselmum in Lib. de Verit. et per Augustinum in Lib.*

others receive the primary predication of the common term, but rather that in which the meaning of the common term is first fully verified. For example, *healthy* is primarily predicated of an animal, for it is in an animal that the nature of health is first found in its fullest sense. But inasmuch as medicine causes health, it is also said to be healthy. Therefore, since truth is predicated of many things in a primary and a secondary sense, it ought to be primarily predicated of that in which its full meaning is primarily found.

Now, the fulfillment of any motion is found in the term of the motion; and, since the term of the motion of a cognitive power is, the soul, the known must be in the knower after the manner of the knower. But the motion of an appetitive power terminates in things. For this reason the Philosopher speaks of a sort of circle formed by the acts of the soul: for a thing outside the soul moves the intellect, and the thing known moves the appetite, which tends to reach the things from which the motion originally started. Since good, as mentioned previously, expresses a relation to appetite, and true, a relation to the intellect, the Philosopher says that good and evil are in things, but true and false are in the mind. A thing is not called true, however, unless it conforms to an intellect. The true, therefore, is found secondarily in things and primarily in intellect.

Note, however, that a thing is referred differently to the practical intellect than it is to the speculative intellect. Since the practical intellect causes things, it is a measure of what it causes. But, since the speculative intellect is receptive in regard to things, it is, in a certain sense, moved by things and consequently measured by them. It is clear, therefore, that, as is said in the *Metaphysics*, natural things from which our intellect gets its scientific knowledge measure our intellect. Yet these things are themselves measured by the divine intellect, in which are all created things—just as all works of art find their origin in the intellect of an artist. The divine intellect, therefore, measures and is not measured; a natural thing both measures and is measured; but our intellect is measured, and measures only artifacts, not natural things.

A natural thing, therefore, being placed between two intellects is called *true* in so far as it conforms to either. It is said to be true with respect to its conformity with the divine intellect in so far as it fulfills the end to which it was ordained by the divine intellect. This is clear from the writings of Anselm and Augustine, as well as from the

*de vera religione, et per Avicennam in definitione inducta, scilicet: veritas cuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei;*

*secundum autem adaequationem ad intellectum humanum dicitur res vera, in quantum est nata de se facere veram aestimationem; sicut e contrario falsa dicuntur quae sunt nata videri quae non sunt, aut qualia non sunt, ut dicitur in V Metaphysic.*

*Prima autem ratio veritatis per prius inest rei quam secunda, quia prius est eius comparatio ad intellectum divinum quam humanum; unde, etiam si intellectus humanus non esset, adhuc res verae dicerentur in ordine ad intellectum divinum. Sed si uterque intellectus, rebus remanentibus per impossibile, intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret.*

*Responsio ergo ad primum quod, sicut ex iam dictis patet, verum per prius dicitur de intellectu vero, et per posterius de re sibi adaequata; et utroque modo convertitur cum ente, sed diversimode, quia secundum quod dicitur de rebus, convertitur cum ente per praedicationem: omne enim ens est adaequatum intellectui divino, et potens adaequare sibi intellectum humanum, et e converso. Si autem accipiatur prout dicitur de intellectu, sic convertitur cum ente quod est extra animam, non per praedicationem, sed per consequentiam; eo quod cuilibet intellectui vero oportet quod respondeat aliquod ens, et e converso.*

*Per hoc patet solutio ad secundum.*

*Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod est in aliquo non sequitur illud in quo est, nisi quando causatur ex principiis eius; unde lux quae causatur in aere ab extrinseco, scilicet sole, sequitur motum solis magis quam aerem. Similiter et veritas quae est in anima causata a rebus, non sequitur aestimationem animae, sed existentiam rerum: quoniam eo quod res est vel non est, dicitur oratio vera vel falsa similiter et intellectus.*

definition of Avicenna, previously cited: “The truth of anything is a property of the act of being which has been established for it.”

With respect to its conformity with a human intellect, a thing is said to be true in so far as it is such as to cause a true estimate about itself; and a thing is said to be false if, as Aristotle says, “by nature it is such that it seems to be what it is not, or seems to possess qualities which it does not possess.”

In a natural thing, truth is found especially in the first, rather than in the second, sense; for its reference to the divine intellect comes before its reference to a human intellect. Even if there were no human intellects, things could be said to be true because of their relation to the divine intellect. But if, by an impossible supposition, intellect did not exist and things did continue to exist, then the essentials of truth would in no way remain.

### Answers to Difficulties

1. As is clear from the discussion, true is predicated primarily of a true intellect and secondarily of a thing conformed with intellect. True taken in either sense, however, is interchangeable with being, but in different ways. Used of things, it can be interchanged with being through a judgment asserting merely material identity, for every being is conformed with the divine intellect and can be conformed with a human intellect. The converse of this is also true. But if true is understood as used of the intellect, then it can be converted with being outside the soul—not as denominating the same subject, but as expressing conformity. For every true act of understanding is referred to a being, and every being corresponds to a true act of understanding.

2. The solution of the second argument is clear from the solution of the first.

3. What is in another does not depend on that other unless it is caused by the principles of that other. For example, even though light is in the air, it is caused by something extrinsic, the sun; and it is based on the motion of the sun rather than on air. In the same way, truth which is in the soul but caused by things does not depend on what one thinks but on the existence of things. For from the fact that a thing is or is not, a statement or an intellect is said to be true or false.

*Ad quartum dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de visione intellectus humani, a qua rei veritas non dependet. Sunt enim multae res quae nostro intellectu non cognoscuntur; nulla tamen res est quam intellectus divinus non cognoscat actu, et intellectus humanus in potentia; cum intellectus agens dicatur quo est omnia facere, intellectus possibilis quo est omnia fieri. Unde in definitione rei verae potest poni visio in actu intellectus divini, non autem intellectus humani nisi in potentia, sicut ex superioribus patet.*

4. Augustine is speaking of a thing's being seen by the human intellect. Truth, of course, does not depend on this, for many things exist that are not known by our intellects. There is nothing, however, that the divine intellect does not actually know, and nothing that the human intellect does not know potentially, for the agent intellect is said to be that "by which we make all things knowable," and the possible intellect, as that "by which we become all things." For this reason, one can place in the definition of a true thing its actually being seen by the divine intellect, but not its being seen by a human intellect, except potentially, as is clear from our earlier discussion.

### **Summa Theologiae Prima Pars. Quaestio 16. De veritate.**

Articulus 1. Whether truth resides only in the intellect?

Articulus 2. Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?

Articulus 3. Whether the true and being are convertible terms?

Articulus 4. Whether good is logically prior to the true?

Articulus 5. Whether God is truth?

Articulus 6. Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?

Articulus 7. Whether created truth is eternal?

Articulus 8. Whether truth is immutable?

#### **Whether truth resides only in the intellect?**

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit tantum in intellectu, sed magis in rebus. Augustinus enim, in libro Soliloq., reprobatur hanc notificationem veri, verum est id quod videtur, quia secundum hoc, lapides qui sunt in abditissimo terrae sinu, non essent veri lapides, quia non videntur. Reprobat etiam istam, verum est quod ita se habet ut videtur cognitori, si velit et possit cognoscere, quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod nihil esset verum, si nullus posset cognoscere. Et definit sic verum, verum est id quod est. Et sic videtur quod veritas sit in rebus, et non in intellectu.*

**Objection 1:** It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.

*Praeterea, quidquid est verum, veritate verum est. Si igitur veritas est in intellectu solo, nihil erit verum nisi secundum quod intelligitur, quod est error antiquorum philosophorum, qui dicebant omne quod videtur, esse verum. Ad quod sequitur contradictoria simul esse vera, cum contradictoria simul a diversis vera esse videantur.*

**Objection 2:** Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.

*Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis, ut patet I Poster. Sed ex eo quod res est vel non est, est opinio vel oratio vera vel falsa, secundum philosophum*

**Objection 3:** Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the

*in praedicamentis. Ergo veritas magis est in rebus quam in intellectu.*

*Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, VI Metaphys., quod verum et falsum non sunt in rebus, sed in intellectu.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, appetitus autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam. Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili, sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu. Sicut autem bonum est in re, in quantum habet ordinem ad appetitum; et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni, ita, cum verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur, secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum. Res autem intellecta ad intellectum aliquem potest habere ordinem vel per se, vel per accidens. Per se quidem habet ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet secundum suum esse, per accidens autem ad intellectum a quo cognoscibilis est. Sicut si dicamus quod domus comparatur ad intellectum artificis per se, per accidens autem comparatur ad intellectum a quo non dependet.*

*Iudicium autem de re non sumitur secundum id quod inest ei per accidens, sed secundum id quod inest ei per se. Unde unaquaque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. Et inde est quod res artificiales dicuntur verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, dicitur enim domus vera, quae assequitur similitudinem formae quae est in mente artificis; et dicitur oratio vera, in quantum est signum intellectus veri. Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt in mente divina, dicitur enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propriam lapidis naturam, secundum praeconceptionem intellectus divini. Sic ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium. Et secundum hoc, veritas diversimode notificatur. Nam Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., dicit quod veritas est, qua ostenditur id quod est. Et Hilarius dicit quod verum est declarativum aut manifestativum*

Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.

**On the contrary,** The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), "The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect."

**I answer that,** As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite—and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.

Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes

*esse. Et hoc pertinet ad veritatem secundum quod est in intellectu. Ad veritatem autem rei secundum ordinem ad intellectum, pertinet definitio Augustini in libro de vera Relig., veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla dissimilitudine est. Et quaedam definitio Anselmi, veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis; nam rectum est, quod principio concordat. Et quaedam definitio Avicennae, veritas uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei. Quod autem dicitur quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus potest ad utrumque pertinere.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate rei; et excludit a ratione huius veritatis, comparisonem ad intellectum nostrum. Nam id quod est per accidens, ab unaquaque definitione excluditur.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod antiqui philosophi species rerum naturalium non dicebant procedere ab aliquo intellectu, sed eas provenire a casu, et quia considerabant quod verum importat comparisonem ad intellectum, cogebantur veritatem rerum constituere in ordine ad intellectum nostrum. Ex quo inconvenientia sequebantur quae philosophus prosequitur in IV Metaphys. Quae quidem inconvenientia non accidunt, si ponamus veritatem rerum consistere in comparatione ad intellectum divinum.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis, sicut neque in medicina per prius invenitur ratio sanitatis quam in animali; virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas eius, causat sanitatem, cum non sit agens univocum. Et similiter esse rei, non veritas eius, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde philosophus dicit quod opinio et oratio vera est ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res vera est.*

being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true."

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### Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?

*Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit solum in intellectu componente et dividente. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima, quod sicut sensus propriorum sensibilium semper veri sunt, ita et intellectus eius quod quid est. Sed compositio et divisio non est neque in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est. Ergo veritas non solum est in compositione et divisione intellectus.*

**Objection 1:** It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.



*Praeterea, Isaac dicit, in libro de definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. Sed sicut intellectus complexorum potest adaequari rebus, ita intellectus incomplexorum, et etiam sensus sentiens rem ut est. Ergo veritas non est solum in compositione et divisione intellectus.*

*Sed contra est quod dicit philosophus, in VI Metaphys., quod circa simplicia et quod quid est non est veritas, nec in intellectu neque in rebus.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod verum, sicut dictum est, secundum sui primam rationem est in intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, in quantum est cognoscens, sit verus in quantum habet similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma eius in quantum est cognoscens. Et propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur. Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit, licet enim visus habeat similitudinem visibilis, non tamen cognoscit comparationem quae est inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea. Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest, sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo quod quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo, nam in omni propositione aliquam formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea. Et ideo bene invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus cognoscendo quod quid est, sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum. Et similiter est de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis. Veritas quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente, quod importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est.*

*Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.*

**Objection 2:** Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.

**On the contrary,** the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the intellect nor in things."

**I answer that,** As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is."

And thus the Objections given are solved.

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### Whether the true and being are convertible terms?

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim est proprie in intellectu, ut*

**Objection 1:** It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the

*dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in rebus. Ergo non convertuntur.*

*Praeterea, id quod se extendit ad ens et non ens, non convertitur cum ente. Sed verum se extendit ad ens et non ens, nam verum est quod est esse, et quod non est non esse. Ergo verum et ens non convertuntur.*

*Praeterea, quae se habent secundum prius et posterius, non videntur converti. Sed verum videtur prius esse quam ens, nam ens non intelligitur nisi sub ratione veri. Ergo videtur quod non sint convertibilia.*

*Sed contra est quod dicit philosophus, II Metaphys., quod eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et veritate.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem in quantum habet de esse, in tantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III de anima, quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen, sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum comparisonem ad intellectum.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est. Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato. Hoc enim est de ratione veri, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod etiam ens est in rebus et in intellectu, sicut et verum; licet verum principaliter in intellectu, ens vero principaliter in rebus. Et hoc accidit propter hoc, quod verum et ens differunt ratione.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod non ens non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed cognoscitur in quantum intellectus facit illud cognoscibile. Unde verum fundatur in ente, in quantum non ens est quoddam ens rationis, apprehensum scilicet a ratione.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem entis. Et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic intelligi, quod ens*

intellect, as stated ([Article \[1\]](#)); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.

**Objection 2:** Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.

**Objection 3:** Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.

**On the contrary,** the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.

**I answer that,** As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before ([Article \[1\]](#)). But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already ([Article \[1\]](#)). It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.

**Reply to Objection 3:** When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true.

*non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur ratio veri. Et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi, nisi apprehendatur ratio entis, quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile, sed tamen potest intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas. Et similiter ens intellectum est verum, non tamen intelligendo ens, intelligitur verum.*

In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.

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### Whether good is logically prior to the true?

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam verum. Quod enim est universalius, secundum rationem prius est, ut patet ex I Physic. Sed bonum est universalius quam verum, nam verum est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est secundum rationem quam verum.*

**Objection 1:** It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true.

*Praeterea, bonum est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus, ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in intellectu. Ergo prius est secundum rationem bonum quam verum.*

**Objection 2:** Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above ([Article 2](#)). But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.

*Praeterea, veritas est quaedam species virtutis, ut patet in IV Ethic. Sed virtus continetur sub bono, est enim bona qualitas mentis, ut dicit Augustinus. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum.*

**Objection 3:** Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.

*Sed contra, quod est in pluribus, est prius secundum rationem. Sed verum est in quibusdam in quibus non est bonum, scilicet in mathematicis. Ergo verum est prius quam bonum.*

**On the contrary,** What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.

*Respondeo dicendum quod, licet bonum et verum supposito convertantur cum ente, tamen ratione differunt. Et secundum hoc verum, absolute loquendo, prius est quam bonum. Quod ex duobus apparet. Primo quidem ex hoc, quod verum propinquius se habet ad ens, quod est prius, quam bonum. Nam verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate, ratio autem boni consequitur esse, secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic enim appetibile est. Secundo apparet ex hoc, quod cognitio naturaliter praecedat appetitum. Unde, cum verum respiciat cognitionem, bonum autem appetitum, prius erit verum quam bonum secundum rationem.*

**I answer that,** Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt, nam intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere. Sic ergo inter illa quae ordinantur ad obiectum voluntatis, continentur etiam ea quae sunt intellectus; et e converso. Unde in ordine appetibilium, bonum se habet ut universale, et verum ut particulare, in ordine autem intelligibilium est e converso. Ex hoc ergo quod verum est quoddam bonum, sequitur quod bonum sit prius in ordine appetibilium, non autem quod sit prius simpliciter.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum hoc est aliquid prius ratione, quod prius cadit in intellectu. Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum ens; et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et tertio apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus quae dicitur veritas, non est veritas communis, sed quaedam veritas secundum quam homo in dictis et factis ostendit se ut est. Veritas autem vitae dicitur particulariter, secundum quod homo in vita sua implet illud ad quod ordinatur per intellectum divinum, sicut etiam dictum est veritatem esse in ceteris rebus. Veritas autem iustitiae est secundum quod homo servat id quod debet alteri secundum ordinem legum. Unde ex his particularibus veritatibus non est procedendum ad veritatem communem.*

**Reply to Objection 1:** The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.

**Reply to Objection 2:** A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things ([Article \[1\]](#)). Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.

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## Whether God is truth?

*Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit veritas. Veritas enim consistit in compositione et divisione intellectus. Sed in Deo non est compositio et divisio. Ergo non est ibi veritas.*

*Praeterea, veritas, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera Relig., est similitudo principii. Sed Dei non est similitudo ad principium. Ergo in Deo non est veritas.*

*Praeterea, quidquid dicitur de Deo, dicitur de eo ut de prima causa omnium, sicut esse Dei est causa omnis esse, et bonitas eius est causa omnis boni. Si ergo in Deo sit veritas, ergo omne verum erit ab ipso. Sed aliquem peccare est verum. Ergo hoc erit a Deo. Quod patet esse falsum.*

**Objection 1:** It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.

**Objection 2:** Further, truth, according to Augustine (*De Vera Relig.* xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.

**Objection 3:** Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.

*Sed contra est quod dicit dominus, Ioan. XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, veritas invenitur in intellectu secundum quod apprehendit rem ut est, et in re secundum quod habet esse conformabile intellectui. Hoc autem maxime invenitur in Deo. Nam esse suum non solum est conforme suo intellectui, sed etiam est ipsum suum intelligere; et suum intelligere est mensura et causa omnis alterius esse, et omnis alterius intellectus; et ipse est suum esse et intelligere. Unde sequitur quod non solum in ipso sit veritas, sed quod ipse sit ipsa summa et prima veritas.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet in intellectu divino non sit compositio et divisio, tamen secundum suam simplicem intelligentiam iudicat de omnibus, et cognoscit omnia complexa. Et sic in intellectu eius est veritas.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod verum intellectus nostri est secundum quod conformatur suo principio, scilicet rebus, a quibus cognitionem accipit. Veritas etiam rerum est secundum quod conformantur suo principio, scilicet intellectui divino. Sed hoc, proprie loquendo, non potest dici in veritate divina, nisi forte secundum quod veritas appropriatur filio, qui habet principium. Sed si de veritate essentialiter dicta loquamur, non potest intelligi, nisi resolvatur affirmativa in negativam, sicut cum dicitur, pater est a se, quia non est ab alio. Et similiter dici potest similitudo principii veritas divina, inquantum esse suum non est suo intellectui dissimile.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod non ens et privationes non habent ex seipsis veritatem, sed solum ex apprehensione intellectus. Omnis autem apprehensio intellectus a Deo est, unde quidquid est veritatis in hoc quod dico, istum fornicari est verum, totum est a Deo. Sed si arguatur, ergo istum fornicari est a Deo, est fallacia accidentis.*

**On the contrary**, Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" ([Jn. 14:6](#)).

**I answer that**, As said above ([Article \[1\]](#)), truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement—"that a person commits fornication is true"—is entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident.

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### Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?

*Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una sola sit veritas, secundum quam omnia sunt vera. Quia, secundum Augustinum, nihil est maius mente humana, nisi Deus. Sed veritas est maior mente humana, alioquin mens iudicaret de veritate; nunc autem omnia iudicat*

**Objection 1:** It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (*De Trin.* xv, 1), "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of

*secundum veritatem, et non secundum seipsam. Ergo solus Deus est veritas. Ergo non est alia veritas quam Deus.*

*Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in libro de veritate, quod sicut tempus se habet ad temporalia, ita veritas ad res veras. Sed unum est tempus omnium temporalium. Ergo una est veritas, qua omnia vera sunt.*

*Sed contra est quod in Psalmo XI dicitur, diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod quodammodo una est veritas, qua omnia sunt vera, et quodammodo non. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, in quantum est illius sanitatis effectiva, et urina, in quantum est illius sanitatis significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit, illud autem significat sanitatem. Dictum est autem quod veritas per prius est in intellectu, et per posterius in rebus, secundum quod ordinantur ad intellectum divinum. Si ergo loquamur de veritate prout existit in intellectu, secundum propriam rationem, sic in multis intellectibus creatis sunt multae veritates; etiam in uno et eodem intellectu, secundum plura cognita. Unde dicit Glossa super illud Psalmi XI, diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum etc., quod sicut ab una facie hominis resultant plures similitudines in speculo, sic ab una veritate divina resultant plures veritates. Si vero loquamur de veritate secundum quod est in rebus, sic omnes sunt verae una prima veritate, cui unumquodque assimilatur secundum suam entitatem. Et sic, licet plures sint essentiae vel formae rerum, tamen una est veritas divini intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur verae.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima non secundum quamcumque veritatem iudicat de rebus omnibus; sed secundum veritatem primam, in quantum resultat in ea sicut in speculo, secundum prima intelligibilia. Unde sequitur quod veritas prima sit maior anima. Et tamen*

truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.

**Objection 2:** Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.

**On the contrary,** it is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men."

**I answer that,** In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said (Article [1]) that truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2, "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary

*etiam veritas creata, quae est in intellectu nostro, est maior anima, non simpliciter, sed secundum quid, in quantum est perfectio eius; sicut etiam scientia posset dici maior anima. Sed verum est quod nihil subsistens est maius mente rationali, nisi Deus.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod dictum Anselmi veritatem habet, secundum quod res dicuntur verae per comparationem ad intellectum divinum.*

truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.

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### Whether created truth is eternal?

*Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas creata sit aeterna. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod nihil est magis aeternum quam ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque. Sed horum veritas est veritas creata. Ergo veritas creata est aeterna.*

*Praeterea, omne quod est semper, est aeternum. Sed universalia sunt ubique et semper. Ergo sunt aeterna. Ergo et verum, quod est maxime universale.*

*Praeterea, id quod est verum in praesenti, semper fuit verum esse futurum. Sed sicut veritas propositionis de praesenti est veritas creata, ita veritas propositionis de futuro. Ergo aliqua veritas creata est aeterna.*

*Praeterea, omne quod caret principio et fine, est aeternum. Sed veritas enunciabilium caret principio et fine. Quia, si veritas incoepit cum ante non esset, verum erat veritatem non esse, et utique aliqua veritate verum erat, et sic veritas erat antequam inciperet. Et similiter si ponatur veritatem habere finem, sequitur quod sit postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas est aeterna.*

*Sed contra est quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod veritas enunciabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus. Enunciabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. Sed secundum quod est in voce, dicitur verum enunciabile, secundum quod significat aliquam veritatem intellectus; non propter aliquam veritatem in enunciabili existentem sicut in subiecto. Sicut urina dicitur sana, non a sanitate quae in*

**Objection 1:** It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.

**Objection 2:** Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal.

**Objection 3:** Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.

**Objection 4:** Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciabiles is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.

**On the contrary,** God alone is eternal, as laid down before ([Question \[10\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)).

**I answer that,** The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciabile truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health

*ipsa sit, sed a sanitate animalis, quam significat. Similiter etiam supra dictum est quod res denominantur verae a veritate intellectus. Unde si nullus intellectus esset aeternus, nulla veritas esset aeterna. Sed quia solus intellectus divinus est aeternus, in ipso solo veritas aeternitatem habet. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit aeternum quam Deus, quia veritas intellectus divini est ipse Deus, ut supra ostensum est.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent aeternitatem in mente divina.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid esse semper et ubique, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se unde se extendat ad omne tempus et ad omnem locum, sicut Deo competit esse ubique et semper. Alio modo, quia non habet in se quo determinetur ad aliquem locum vel tempus, sicut materia prima dicitur esse una, non quia habet unam formam, sicut homo est unus ab unitate unius formae, sed per remotionem omnium formarum distinguentium. Et per hunc modum, quodlibet universale dicitur esse ubique et semper, inquantum universalia abstrahunt ab hic et nunc. Sed ex hoc non sequitur ea esse aeterna, nisi in intellectu, si quis sit aeternus.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod nunc est, ex eo futurum fuit antequam esset, quia in causa sua erat ut fieret. Unde, sublata causa, non esset futurum illud fieri. Sola autem causa prima est aeterna. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod ea quae sunt, semper fuerit verum ea esse futura, nisi quatenus in causa sempiterna fuit ut essent futura. Quae quidem causa solus Deus est.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod, quia intellectus noster non est aeternus, nec veritas enuntiabilium quae a nobis formantur, est aeterna, sed quandoque incoepit. Et antequam huiusmodi veritas esset, non erat verum dicere veritatem talem non esse, nisi ab intellectu divino, in quo solum veritas est aeterna. Sed nunc verum est dicere veritatem tunc non fuisse. Quod quidem non est verum nisi veritate quae nunc est in intellectu nostro, non autem per aliquam veritatem ex parte rei. Quia ista est veritas de non ente; non ens autem non habet ex se ut sit verum, sed solummodo ex intellectu apprehendente ipsum. Unde intantum est verum dicere veritatem non fuisse, inquantum apprehendimus non esse ipsius ut praecedens esse eius.*

within it but from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already ([Article \[5\]](#)).

**Reply to Objection 1:** The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.

**Reply to Objection 2:** That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.

**Reply to Objection 3:** That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.

**Reply to Objection 4:** Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.



## Whether truth is immutable?

*Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas sit immutabilis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro II de libero arbitrio, quod veritas non est aequalis menti, quia esset mutabilis, sicut et mens.*

*Praeterea, id quod remanet post omnem mutationem, est immutabile, sicut prima materia est ingenita et incorruptibilis, quia remanet post omnem generationem et corruptionem. Sed veritas remanet post omnem mutationem, quia post omnem mutationem verum est dicere esse vel non esse. Ergo veritas est immutabilis.*

*Praeterea, si veritas enuntiationis mutatur, maxime mutatur ad mutationem rei. Sed sic non mutatur. Veritas enim, secundum Anselmum, est rectitudo quaedam, in quantum aliquid implet id quod est de ipso in mente divina. Haec autem propositio, Socrates sedet, accipit a mente divina ut significet Socratem sedere, quod significat etiam eo non sedente. Ergo veritas propositionis nullo modo mutatur.*

*Praeterea, ubi est eadem causa, et idem effectus. Sed eadem res est causa veritatis harum trium propositionum Socrates sedet, sedebit, et sedit. Ergo eadem est harum veritas. Sed oportet quod alterum horum sit verum. Ergo veritas harum propositionum immutabiliter manet. Et eadem ratione cuiuslibet alterius propositionis.*

*Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XI, diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, veritas proprie est in solo intellectu, res autem dicuntur verae a veritate quae est in aliquo intellectu. Unde mutabilitas veritatis consideranda est circa intellectum. Cuius quidem veritas in hoc consistit, quod habeat conformitatem ad res intellectas. Quae quidem conformitas variari potest dupliciter, sicut et quaelibet alia similitudo, ex mutatione alterius extremi. Unde uno modo variatur veritas ex parte intellectus, ex eo quod de re eodem modo se habente aliquis aliam opinionem accipit, alio modo si, opinione eadem manente, res mutetur. Et utroque modo fit mutatio de vero in falsum. Si ergo sit aliquis intellectus in quo non possit esse alternatio opinionum, vel cuius acceptionem non potest subterfugere res aliqua, in eo est immutabilis veritas. Talis autem est intellectus*

**Objection 1:** It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."

**Objection 2:** Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable.

**Objection 3:** Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit. Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.

**Objection 4:** Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other.

**On the contrary,** It is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men."

**I answer that,** Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before ([Article \[1\]](#)); but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been

*divinus, ut ex superioribus patet. Unde veritas divini intellectus est immutabilis. Veritas autem intellectus nostri mutabilis est. Non quod ipsa sit subiectum mutationis, sed in quantum intellectus noster mutatur de veritate in falsitatem; sic enim formae mutabiles dici possunt. Veritas autem intellectus divini est secundum quam res naturales dicuntur verae, quae est omnino immutabilis.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate divina.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod verum et ens sunt convertibilia. Unde, sicut ens non generatur neque corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens, in quantum hoc vel illud ens corrumpitur vel generatur, ut dicitur in I Physic.; ita veritas mutatur, non quod nulla veritas remaneat, sed quia non remanet illa veritas quae prius erat.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod propositio non solum habet veritatem sicut res aliae veritatem habere dicuntur, in quantum implent id quod de eis est ordinatum ab intellectu divino; sed dicitur habere veritatem quodam speciali modo, in quantum significat veritatem intellectus. Quae quidem consistit in conformitate intellectus et rei. Qua quidem subtracta, mutatur veritas opinionis, et per consequens veritas propositionis. Sic igitur haec propositio, Socrates sedet, eo sedente vera est et veritate rei, in quantum est quaedam vox significativa; et veritate significationis, in quantum significat opinionem veram. Socrate vero surgente, remanet prima veritas, sed mutatur secunda.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod sessio Socratis, quae est causa veritatis huius propositionis, Socrates sedet, non eodem modo se habet dum Socrates sedet, et postquam sederit, et antequam sederet. Unde et veritas ab hoc causata, diversimode se habet; et diversimode significatur propositionibus de praesenti, praeterito et futuro. Unde non sequitur quod, licet altera trium propositionum sit vera, quod eadem veritas invariabilis maneat.*

said before ([Question \[14\]](#), [Article \[15\]](#)). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Augustine is speaking of divine truth.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before.

**Reply to Objection 3:** A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it is said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.

**Reply to Objection 4:** The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable.

## Kalbos problema: Dievo įvardijimo galimybės ir ribos

### Summa Theologiae Prima Pars. Quaestio 13. De nominibus Dei.

Articulus 1. Whether a name can be given to God?

Articulus 2. Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?

Articulus 3. Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?

Articulus 4. Whether names applied to God are synonymous?

Articulus 5. Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?

Articulus 6. Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?

Articulus 11. Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of God?

Articulus 12. Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?

### Whether a name can be given to God?

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen Deo conveniat. Dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod neque nomen eius est, neque opinio. Et Prov. XXX dicitur, quod nomen eius, et quod nomen filii eius, si nosti?*

*Praeterea, omne nomen aut dicitur in abstracto, aut in concreto. Sed nomina significantia in concreto, non competunt Deo, cum simplex sit, neque nomina significantia in abstracto, quia non significant aliquid perfectum subsistens. Ergo nullum nomen potest dici de Deo.*

*Praeterea, nomina significant substantiam cum qualitate; verba autem et participia significant cum tempore; pronomina autem cum demonstratione vel relatione. Quorum nihil competit Deo, quia sine qualitate est et sine omni accidente, et sine tempore; et sentiri non potest, ut demonstrari possit; nec relative significari, cum relativa sint aliquorum antedictorum recordativa, vel nominum, vel participiorum, vel pronominum demonstrativorum. Ergo Deus nullo modo potest nominari a nobis.*

*Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. XV, dominus quasi vir pugnator, omnipotens nomen eius.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces referuntur ad res significandas, mediante conceptione intellectus. Secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, sic a nobis potest nominari. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in hac vita non potest a nobis videri per suam*

**Objection 1:** It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?" ([Prov. 30:4](#)).

**Objection 2:** Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.

**Objection 3:** Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us.

**On the contrary,** It is written ([Ex. 15:3](#)): "The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name."

**I answer that,** Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above ([Question \[12\]](#), [Articles](#)

*essentiam; sed cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis, secundum habitudinem principii, et per modum excellentiae et remotiois. Sic igitur potest nominari a nobis ex creaturis, non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum, exprimat divinam essentiam secundum quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo exprimit sua significatione essentiam hominis secundum quod est, significat enim eius definitionem, declarantem eius essentiam; ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea ratione dicitur Deus non habere nomen, vel esse supra nominationem, quia essentia eius est supra id quod de Deo intelligimus et voce significamus.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem venimus, et ex ipsis eum nominamus, nomina quae Deo attribuimus, hoc modo significant, secundum quod competit creaturis materialibus, quarum cognitio est nobis connaturalis, ut supra dictum est. Et quia in huiusmodi creaturis, ea quae sunt perfecta et subsistentia sunt composita; forma autem in eis non est aliquid completum subsistens, sed magis quo aliquid est, inde est quod omnia nomina a nobis imposita ad significandum aliquid completum subsistens, significant in concretionem, prout competit compositis; quae autem imponuntur ad significandas formas simplices, significant aliquid non ut subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo significat ut quo aliquid est album. Quia igitur et Deus simplex est, et subsistens est, attribuimus ei et nomina abstracta, ad significandam simplicitatem eius; et nomina concreta, ad significandum subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, quamvis utraque nomina deficiant a modo ipsius, sicut intellectus noster non cognoscit eum ut est, secundum hanc vitam.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod significare substantiam cum qualitate, est significare suppositum cum natura vel forma determinata in qua subsistit. Unde, sicut de Deo dicuntur aliqua in concretionem, ad significandum subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, sicut iam dictum est, ita dicuntur de Deo nomina significantia substantiam cum qualitate. Verba vero et participia consignantia tempus dicuntur de ipso, ex eo quod aeternitas includit omne tempus, sicut enim simplicia subsistentia non possumus apprehendere et significare nisi per modum compositorum, ita simplicem aeternitatem non possumus intelligere vel voce exprimere, nisi per modum temporalium rerum; et hoc propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad res compositas et temporales. Pronomina vero demonstrativa dicuntur de Deo, secundum quod faciunt demonstrationem ad id quod*

[11],12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by the name is the definition.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about God, and signify in word.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as He is.

**Reply to Objection 3:** To signify substance with quality is to signify the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For

*intelligitur, non ad id quod sentitur, secundum enim quod a nobis intelligitur, secundum hoc sub demonstratione cadit. Et sic, secundum illum modum quo nomina et participia et pronomina demonstrativa de Deo dicuntur, secundum hoc et pronomibus relativis significari potest.*

we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative pronouns.

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### Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?

*Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo substantialiter. Dicit enim Damascenus, oportet singulum eorum quae de Deo dicuntur, non quid est secundum substantiam significare, sed quid non est ostendere, aut habitudinem quandam, aut aliquid eorum quae assequuntur naturam vel operationem.*

**Objection 1:** It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation."

*Praeterea, dicit Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., omnem sanctorum theologorum hymnum invenies, ad bonos thearchiae processus, manifestative et laudative Dei nominationes dividendam, et est sensus, quod nomina quae in divinam laudem sancti doctores assumunt, secundum processum ipsius Dei distinguuntur. Sed quod significat processum alicuius rei, nihil significat ad eius essentiam pertinens. Ergo nomina dicta de Deo, non dicuntur de ipso substantialiter.*

**Objection 2:** Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthy the divine processions in the denomination of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.

*Praeterea, secundum hoc nominatur aliquid a nobis, secundum quod intelligitur. Sed non intelligitur Deus a nobis in hac vita secundum suam substantiam. Ergo nec aliquod nomen impositum a nobis, dicitur de Deo secundum suam substantiam.*

**Objection 3:** Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.

*Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, VI de Trin., Deo hoc est esse, quod fortem esse vel sapientem esse, et si quid de illa simplicitate dixeris, quo eius substantia significatur. Ergo omnia nomina huiusmodi significant divinam substantiam.*

**On the contrary,** Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.

*Respondeo dicendum quod de nominibus quae de Deo dicuntur negative, vel quae relationem ipsius ad creaturam significant, manifestum est quod substantiam eius nullo modo significant; sed remotionem alicuius ab ipso, vel relationem eius ad alium, vel potius alicuius ad ipsum.*

**I answer that,** Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.

*Sed de nominibus quae absolute et affirmative de Deo dicuntur, sicut bonus, sapiens, et huiusmodi, multipliciter aliqui sunt opinati. Quidam enim dixerunt quod haec omnia nomina, licet affirmative de Deo dicantur, tamen magis inventa sunt ad aliquid removendum a Deo, quam ad aliquid ponendum in ipso. Unde dicunt quod, cum dicimus Deum esse viventem, significamus quod Deus non*

But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence

*hoc modo est, sicut res inanimatae, et similiter accipiendum est in aliis. Et hoc posuit Rabbi Moyses. Alii vero dicunt quod haec nomina imposita sunt ad significandum habitudinem eius ad creata, ut, cum dicimus Deus est bonus, sit sensus, Deus est causa bonitatis in rebus. Et eadem ratio est in aliis.*

*Sed utrumque istorum videtur esse inconueniens, propter tria. Primo quidem, quia secundum neutram harum positionum posset assignari ratio quare quaedam nomina magis de Deo dicerentur quam alia. Sic enim est causa corporum, sicut est causa bonorum, unde, si nihil aliud significatur, cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nisi Deus est causa bonorum, poterit similiter dici quod Deus est corpus, quia est causa corporum. Item, per hoc quod dicitur quod est corpus, removetur quod non sit ens in potentia tantum, sicut materia prima. Secundo, quia sequeretur quod omnia nomina dicta de Deo, per posterius dicerentur de ipso, sicut sanum per posterius dicitur de medicina, eo quod significat hoc tantum quod sit causa sanitatis in animali, quod per prius dicitur sanum. Tertio, quia hoc est contra intentionem loquentium de Deo. Aliud enim intendunt dicere, cum dicunt Deum viventem, quam quod sit causa vitae nostrae, vel quod differat a corporibus inanimatis.*

*Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod huiusmodi quidem nomina significant substantiam divinam, et praedicantur de Deo substantialiter, sed deficiunt a repraesentatione ipsius. Quod sic patet. Significant enim sic nomina Deum, secundum quod intellectus noster cognoscit ipsum. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, sic cognoscit ipsum, secundum quod creaturae ipsum repraesentant. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in se praehabet omnes perfectiones creaturarum, quasi simpliciter et universaliter perfectus. Unde quaelibet creatura intantum eum repraesentat, et est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet, non tamen ita quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis, sed sicut excellens principium, a cuius forma effectus deficiunt, cuius tamen aliqualem similitudinem effectus consequuntur; sicut formae corporum inferiorum repraesentant virtutem solarem. Et hoc supra expositum est, cum de perfectione divina agebatur. Sic igitur praedicta nomina divinam substantiam significant, imperfecte tamen, sicut et creaturae imperfecte eam repraesentant. Cum igitur dicitur Deus est bonus, non est sensus, Deus est causa bonitatis, vel Deus non est malus, sed est sensus, id quod*

they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other names.

Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.

Therefore we must hold a different doctrine—viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above ([Question \[4\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#)) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above ([Question \[4\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we

*bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, praeexistit in Deo, et hoc quidem secundum modum altiorem. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod Deo competat esse bonum in quantum causat bonitatem, sed potius e converso, quia est bonus, bonitatem rebus diffundit, secundum illud Augustini, de Doctr. Christ., in quantum bonus est, sumus.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Damascenus ideo dicit quod haec nomina non significant quid est Deus, quia a nullo istorum nominum exprimitur quid est Deus perfecte, sed unumquodque imperfecte eum significat, sicut et creaturae imperfecte eum repraesentant.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod in significatione nominum, aliud est quandoque a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur ab eo quod laedit pedem, non tamen imponitur ad hoc significandum quod significet laedens pedem, sed ad significandam quandam speciem corporum; alioquin omne laedens pedem esset lapis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi divina nomina imponuntur quidem a processibus deitatis, sicut enim secundum diversos processus perfectionum, creaturae Deum repraesentant, licet imperfecte; ita intellectus noster, secundum unumquemque processum, Deum cognoscit et nominat. Sed tamen haec nomina non imponit ad significandum ipsos processus, ut, cum dicitur Deus est vivens, sit sensus, ab eo procedit vita, sed ad significandum ipsum rerum principium, prout in eo praeexistit vita, licet eminentiori modo quam intelligatur vel significetur.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod essentiam Dei in hac vita cognoscere non possumus secundum quod in se est, sed cognoscimus eam secundum quod repraesentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum. Et sic nomina a nobis imposita eam significant.*

attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we are."

**Reply to Objection 1:** Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.

**Reply to Objection 2:** In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone [\*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis" which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.

**Reply to Objection 3:** We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.

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### Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo proprie. Omnia enim nomina quae de Deo dicimus, sunt a creaturis accepta, ut dictum est. Sed nomina creaturarum metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, sicut cum dicitur Deus est lapis, vel leo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ergo omnia nomina dicta de Deo, dicuntur metaphorice.*

**Objection 1:** It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained above ([Article 11](#)). But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

*Praeterea, nullum nomen proprie dicitur de aliquo, a quo verius removetur quam de eo praedicetur. Sed omnia huiusmodi nomina, bonus sapiens, et similia, verius remonentur a Deo quam de eo praedicentur, ut patet per Dionysium, II cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo nullum istorum nominum proprie dicitur de Deo.*

*Praeterea, nomina corporum non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice, cum sit incorporeus. Sed omnia huiusmodi nomina implicant quasdam corporales conditiones, significant enim cum tempore, et cum compositione, et cum aliis huiusmodi, quae sunt conditiones corporum. Ergo omnia huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo metaphorice.*

*Sed contra est quod dicit Ambrosius, in Lib. II de fide, sunt quaedam nomina, quae evidenter proprietatem divinitatis ostendunt; et quaedam quae perspicuam divinae maiestatis exprimunt veritatem; alia vero sunt, quae translative per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur. Non igitur omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo metaphorice, sed aliqua dicuntur proprie.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Deum cognoscimus ex perfectionibus procedentibus in creaturas ab ipso; quae quidem perfectiones in Deo sunt secundum eminentiorem modum quam in creaturis. Intellectus autem noster eo modo apprehendit eas, secundum quod sunt in creaturis, et secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per nomina. In nominibus igitur quae Deo attribuimus, est duo considerare, scilicet, perfectiones ipsas significatas, ut bonitatem, vitam, et huiusmodi; et modum significandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod significant huiusmodi nomina, proprie competunt Deo, et magis proprie quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo. Quantum vero ad modum significandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo, habent enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quaedam nomina significant huiusmodi perfectiones a Deo procedentes in res creatas, hoc modo quod ipse modus imperfectus quo a creatura participatur divina perfectio, in ipso nominis significato includitur, sicut lapis significat aliquid materialiter ens, et huiusmodi nomina non possunt attribui Deo nisi metaphorice. Quaedam vero nomina significant ipsas perfectiones absolute, absque hoc quod aliquis modus participandi claudatur in eorum significatione, ut ens, bonum vivens, et huiusmodi, et talia proprie dicuntur de Deo.*

**Objection 2:** Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.

**Objection 3:** Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

**On the contrary,** Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude." Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.

**I answer that,** According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God—viz. the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.

**Reply to Objection 1:** There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God.



*Ad secundum dicendum quod ideo huiusmodi nomina dicit Dionysius negari a Deo, quia id quod significatur per nomen, non convenit eo modo ei, quo nomen significat, sed excellentiori modo. Unde ibidem dicit Dionysius quod Deus est super omnem substantiam et vitam.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod ista nomina quae proprie dicuntur de Deo important conditiones corporales, non in ipso significato nominis, sed quantum ad modum significandi. Ea vero quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, important conditionem corporalem in ipso suo significato.*

**Reply to Objection 2:** Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and all life.

**Reply to Objection 3:** These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified.

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### Whether names applied to God are synonymous?

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ista nomina dicta de Deo, sint nomina synonyma. Synonyma enim nomina dicuntur, quae omnino idem significant. Sed ista nomina dicta de Deo, omnino idem significant in Deo, quia bonitas Dei est eius essentia, et similiter sapientia. Ergo ista nomina sunt omnino synonyma.*

*Si dicatur quod ista nomina significant idem secundum rem, sed secundum rationes diversas, contra, ratio cui non respondet aliquid in re, est vana; si ergo istae rationes sunt multae, et res est una, videtur quod rationes istae sint vanae.*

*Praeterea, magis est unum quod est unum re et ratione, quam quod est unum re et multiplex ratione. Sed Deus est maxime unus. Ergo videtur quod non sit unus re et multiplex ratione. Et sic nomina dicta de Deo non significant rationes diversas, et ita sunt synonyma.*

*Sed contra, omnia synonyma, sibi invicem adiuncta, nugationem adducunt, sicut si dicatur vestis indumentum. Si igitur omnia nomina dicta de Deo sunt synonyma, non posset convenienter dici Deus bonus, vel aliquid huiusmodi; cum tamen scriptum sit Ierem. XXXII, fortissime, magne, potens, dominus exercituum nomen tibi.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo, non sunt synonyma. Quod quidem facile esset videre, si diceremus quod huiusmodi nomina sunt inducta ad removendum, vel ad designandum habitudinem causae respectu creaturarum, sic enim essent diversae rationes horum nominum secundum*

**Objection 1:** It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.

**Objection 2:** Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain notions.

**Objection 3:** Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.

**On the contrary,** All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy name" ([Jer. 32:18](#)).

**I answer that,** These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But

*diversa negata, vel secundum diversos effectus connotatos. Sed secundum quod dictum est huiusmodi nomina substantiam divinam significare, licet imperfecte, etiam plane apparet, secundum praemissa, quod habent rationes diversas. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re significata per nomen. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, format ad intelligendum Deum conceptiones proportionatas perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Quae quidem perfectiones in Deo praexistunt unite et simpliciter, in creaturis vero recipiuntur divise et multipliciter. Sicut igitur diversis perfectionibus creaturarum respondet unum simplex principium, repraesentatum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum varie et multipliciter; ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus intellectus nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum huiusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Deo attributa, licet significant unam rem, tamen, quia significant eam sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma.*

*Et sic patet solutio ad primum, quia nomina synonyma dicuntur, quae significant unum secundum unam rationem. Quae enim significant rationes diversas unius rei, non primo et per se unum significant, quia nomen non significat rem, nisi mediante conceptione intellectus, ut dictum est.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod rationes plures horum nominum non sunt cassae et vanae, quia omnibus eis respondet unum quid simplex, per omnia huiusmodi multipliciter et imperfecte repraesentatum.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum ad perfectam Dei unitatem pertinet, quod ea quae sunt multipliciter et divisim in aliis, in ipso sunt simpliciter et unite. Et ex hoc contingit quod est unus re et plures secundum rationem, quia intellectus noster ita multipliciter apprehendit eum, sicut res multipliciter ipsum repraesentant.*

even according to what was said above ([Article \[2\]](#)), that these names signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (Articles 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied to God signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not synonymous.

Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things represent Him.

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### Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?

*Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, univoce de ipsis dicantur. Omne enim aequivocum reducitur ad univocum, sicut multa ad unum. Nam si hoc nomen canis aequivocum dicitur de latrabili et marino, oportet quod de aliquibus univoce dicatur, scilicet de omnibus latrabilibus, aliter enim esset procedere in infinitum. Inveniuntur autem quaedam agentia univoca, quae conveniunt cum suis*

**Objection 1:** It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally—viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man

*effectibus in nomine et definitione, ut homo generat hominem; quaedam vero agentia aequivoca, sicut sol causat calidum, cum tamen ipse non sit calidus nisi aequivoce. Videtur igitur quod primum agens, ad quod omnia agentia reducuntur, sit agens univocum. Et ita, quae de Deo et creaturis dicuntur, univoce praedicantur.*

*Praeterea, secundum aequivoca non attenditur aliqua similitudo. Cum igitur creaturae ad Deum sit aliqua similitudo, secundum illud Genes. I, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, videtur quod aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis dicitur.*

*Praeterea, mensura est homogenera mensurato, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed Deus est prima mensura omnium entium, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo Deus est homogenerus creaturis. Et ita aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis dici potest.*

*Sed contra, quidquid praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et non secundum eandem rationem, praedicatur de eis aequivoce. Sed nullum nomen convenit Deo secundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur de creatura, nam sapientia in creaturis est qualitas, non autem in Deo; genus autem variatum mutat rationem, cum sit pars definitionis. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Quidquid ergo de Deo et creaturis dicitur, aequivoce dicitur.*

*Praeterea, Deus plus distat a creaturis, quam quaecumque creaturae ab invicem. Sed propter distantiam quarundam creaturarum, contingit quod nihil univoce de eis praedicari potest; sicut de his quae non conveniunt in aliquo genere. Ergo multo minus de Deo et creaturis aliquid univoce praedicatur, sed omnia praedicantur aequivoce.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce. Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed deficienter, ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo; sicut sol secundum unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis, puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de*

generates man; and there are some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is predicated univocally.

**Objection 2:** Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the word of Genesis ([Gn. 1:26](#)), "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally.

**Objection 3:** Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures.

**On the contrary,** whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.

Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.

**I answer that,** Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the

*homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam, non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur.*

*Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari; sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam contra philosophos, qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam etiam contra apostolum dicentem, Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur.*

*Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus, vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportionem ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum, significat*

term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.

Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made" ([Rm. 1:20](#)). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.

Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures ([Article \[1\]](#)). Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.

*signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem sanitatis.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet in praedicationibus oporteat aequivoca ad univoca reduci, tamen in actionibus agens non univocum ex necessitate praecedit agens univocum. Agens enim non univocum est causa universalis totius speciei, ut sol est causa generationis omnium hominum. Agens vero univocum non est causa agens universalis totius speciei (alioquin esset causa sui ipsius, cum sub specie contineatur), sed est causa particularis respectu huius individui, quod in participatione speciei constituit. Causa igitur universalis totius speciei non est agens univocum. Causa autem universalis est prior particulari. Hoc autem agens universale, licet non sit univocum, non tamen est omnino aequivocum, quia sic non faceret sibi simile; sed potest dici agens analogicum, sicut in praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo creaturae ad Deum est imperfecta, quia etiam nec idem secundum genus repraesentat, ut supra dictum est.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus non est mensura proportionata mensuratis. Unde non oportet quod Deus et creaturae sub uno genere contineantur.*

*Ea vero quae sunt in contrarium, concludunt quod non univoce huiusmodi nomina de Deo et creaturis praedicentur, non autem quod aequivoce.*

**Reply to Objection 1:** Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal analogical predication, which is being.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing ([Question \[4\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)).

**Reply to Objection 3:** God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same genus.

The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.

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### Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?

*Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis quam de Deo. Secundum enim quod cognoscimus aliquid, secundum hoc illud nominamus; cum nomina, secundum philosophum, sint signa intellectuum. Sed per prius cognoscimus creaturam quam Deum. Ergo nomina a nobis imposita, per prius conveniunt creaturis quam Deo.*

*Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, in libro de Div. Nom., Deum ex creaturis nominamus. Sed nomina a creaturis translata in Deum, per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo; sicut leo, lapis, et huiusmodi. Ergo omnia*

**Objection 1:** It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.

**Objection 2:** Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all

*nomina quae de Deo et de creaturis dicuntur, per prius de creaturis quam de Deo dicuntur.*

*Praeterea, omnia nomina quae communiter de Deo et creaturis dicuntur, dicuntur de Deo sicut de causa omnium, ut dicit Dionysius. Sed quod dicitur de aliquo per causam, per posterius de illo dicitur, per prius enim dicitur animal sanum quam medicina, quae est causa sanitatis. Ergo huiusmodi nomina per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo.*

*Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. III, flecto genua mea ad patrem domini nostri Iesu, ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur. Et eadem ratio videtur de nominibus aliis quae de Deo et creaturis dicuntur. Ergo huiusmodi nomina per prius de Deo quam de creaturis dicuntur.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum, et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys., necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis, secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum vel magis vel minus, sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana in quantum causat sanitatem in animali; et in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina, quae dicitur sana in quantum est signum sanitatis animalis. Sic ergo omnia nomina quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, per prius de creaturis dicuntur quam de Deo, quia dicta de Deo, nihil aliud significant quam similitudines ad tales creaturas. Sicut enim ridere, dictum de prato, nihil aliud significat quam quod pratum similiter se habet in decore cum floret, sicut homo cum ridet, secundum similitudinem proportionis; sic nomen leonis, dictum de Deo, nihil aliud significat quam quod Deus similiter se habet ut fortiter operetur in suis operibus, sicut leo in suis. Et sic patet quod, secundum quod dicuntur de Deo, eorum significatio definiri non potest, nisi per illud quod de creaturis dicitur. De aliis autem nominibus, quae non metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, esset etiam eadem ratio, si dicerentur de Deo causaliter tantum, ut quidam posuerunt. Sic enim. Cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nihil aliud esset quam Deus est causa bonitatis creaturae, et sic hoc nomen bonum, dictum de Deo, clauderet in suo intellectu bonitatem creaturae. Unde bonum per prius diceretur de creatura quam de Deo. Sed supra ostensum est quod huiusmodi*

names applied to God and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God.

**Objection 3:** Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.

**On the contrary,** It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named" ([Eph. 3:14,15](#)); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures.

**I answer that,** In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above ([Article \[2\]](#)), these names

*nomina non solum dicuntur de Deo causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter. Cum enim dicitur Deus est bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significatur quod ipse sit causa sapientiae vel bonitatis, sed quod haec in eo eminentius praeexistunt. Unde, secundum hoc, dicendum est quod, quantum ad rem significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis, quia a Deo huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant. Sed quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus. Unde et modum significandi habent qui competit creaturis, ut supra dictum est.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quantum ad impositionem nominis.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de nominibus quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, et de aliis, ut dictum est.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procederet, si huiusmodi nomina solum de Deo causaliter dicerentur et non essentialiter, sicut sanum de medicina.*

are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above ([Article \[3\]](#)).

**Reply to Objection 1:** This objection refers to the imposition of the name.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.

**Reply to Objection 3:** This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as "healthy" is applied to medicine.

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### Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?

*Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen qui est non sit maxime proprium nomen Dei. Hoc enim nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile, ut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen qui est non est nomen incommunicabile. Ergo hoc nomen qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.*

*Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom., quod boni nominatio est manifestativa omnium Dei processio. Sed hoc maxime Deo convenit, quod sit universale rerum principium. Ergo hoc nomen bonum est maxime proprium Dei, et non hoc nomen qui est.*

*Praeterea, omne nomen divinum videtur importare relationem ad creaturas, cum Deus non cognoscatur a nobis nisi per creaturas. Sed hoc nomen qui est nullam importat habitudinem ad creaturas. Ergo hoc nomen qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.*

*Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. III, quod Moysi quaerenti, si dixerint mihi, quod est nomen eius? Quid*

**Objection 1:** It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.

**Objection 2:** Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO IS.

**Objection 3:** Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.

**On the contrary,** It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall

*dicam eis? Et respondit ei dominus, sic dices eis, qui est misit me ad vos. Ergo hoc nomen qui est est maxime proprium nomen Dei.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen Dei.*

*Primo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat Deum, unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma.*

*Secundo, propter eius universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est, sed quemcumque modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod principalius omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui est, totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum. Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae rei, sed hoc nomen qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum pelagus substantiae infinitum.*

*Tertio vero, ex eius consignificatione. Significat enim esse in praesenti, et hoc maxime proprie de Deo dicitur, cuius esse non novit praeteritum vel futurum, ut dicit Augustinus in V de Trin.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est. Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum naturam divinam. Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton, quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei substantiam incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.*

I say to them?" The Lord answered him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" ([Ex. 3:13,14](#)). Therefore this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God.

**I answer that,** This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:

First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other ([Question \[3\]](#), [Article \[4\]](#)), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominatd by its form.

Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (*De Fide Orth. i*) that, "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean of substance."

Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (*De Trin. v*).

**Reply to Objection 1:** This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular.



*Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen bonum est principale nomen Dei in quantum est causa, non tamen simpliciter, nam esse absolute praeintelligitur causae.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod non est necessarium quod omnia nomina divina importent habitudinem ad creaturas; sed sufficit quod imponantur ab aliquibus perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Inter quas prima est ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen qui est.*

**Reply to Objection 2:** This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause.

**Reply to Objection 3:** It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.

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### Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?

*Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod propositiones affirmativae non possunt formari de Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hier., quod negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes autem incompactae.*

*Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod forma simplex subiectum esse non potest. Sed Deus maxime est forma simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.*

*Praeterea, omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est. Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum compositione, videtur quod propositio affirmativa vere de Deo formari non possit.*

*Sed contra est quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones quaedam affirmativae subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est trinus et unus, et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significant idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et hoc patet tam in propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali. Manifestum est enim quod homo*

**Objection 1:** It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague."

**Objection 2:** Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown ([Question \[3\]](#)): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.

**Objection 3:** Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown above ([Question \[3\]](#), [Article \[7\]](#)). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.

**On the contrary,** What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God.

**I answer that,** True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject,

*et albus sunt idem subiecto, et differunt ratione, alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi. Et similiter cum dico homo est animal, illud enim ipsum quod est homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito, sed diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem praedicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; in quantum intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad partem suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam formae in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter. Huic vero diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas praedicati et subiecti, identitatem vero rei significat intellectus per ipsam compositionem.*

*Deus autem, in se consideratus, est omnino unus et simplex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in seipso est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et subiecti, unitatem vero repraesentat intellectus per compositionem.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius dicit affirmationes de Deo esse incompactas, vel inconuenientes secundum aliam translationem, in quantum nullum nomen Deo competit secundum modum significandi, ut supra dictum est.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus noster non potest formas simplices subsistentes secundum quod in seipsis sunt, apprehendere, sed apprehendit eas secundum modum compositorum, in quibus est aliquid quod subiicitur, et est aliquid quod inest. Et ideo apprehendit formam simplicem in ratione subiecti, et attribuit ei aliquid.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod haec propositio, intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus, est duplex, ex eo quod hoc adverbium aliter potest determinare hoc verbum intelligit ex parte intellecti, vel ex parte intelligentis. Si ex parte intellecti, sic propositio vera est, et est sensus, quicumque intellectus intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit, falsus est. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito, quia intellectus noster, formans*

and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.

God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and attributes something else to it.

**Reply to Objection 3:** This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is

*propositionem de Deo, non dicit eum esse compositum, sed simplicem. Si vero ex parte intelligentis, sic propositio falsa est. Alius est enim modus intellectus in intelligendo, quam rei in essendo. Manifestum est enim quod intellectus noster res materiales infra se existentes intelligit immaterialiter; non quod intelligat eas esse immateriales, sed habet modum immaterialem in intelligendo. Et similiter, cum intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra se, intelligit ea secundum modum suum, scilicet composita, non tamen ita quod intelligat ea esse composita. Et sic intellectus noster non est falsus, formans compositionem de Deo.*

false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.

## Dievo buvimo įrodymai. Dievo esmės klausimas

**Summa Theologiae Prima Pars. Quaestio 2. De Deo, an Deus sit.**

Articulus 1. Whether the existence of God is self-evident?

Articulus 2. Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?

Articulus 3. Whether God exists?

### THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

*Quia igitur principalis intentio huius sacrae doctrinae est Dei cognitionem tradere, et non solum secundum quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et finis earum, et specialiter rationalis creaturae, ut ex dictis est manifestum; ad huius doctrinae expositionem intendentes, primo tractabimus de Deo; secundo, de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum; tertio, de Christo, qui, secundum quod homo, via est nobis tendendi in Deum. Consideratio autem de Deo tripartita erit. Primo namque considerabimus ea quae ad essentiam divinam pertinent; secundo, ea quae pertinent ad distinctionem personarum; tertio, ea quae pertinent ad processum creaturarum ab ipso.*

*In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.*

*Circa essentiam vero divinam, primo considerandum est an Deus sit; secundo, quomodo sit, vel potius quomodo non sit; tertio considerandum erit de his quae ad operationem ipsius pertinent, scilicet de scientia et de voluntate et potentia.*

*Circa primum quaeruntur tria.*

*Primo, utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.*

*Secundo, utrum sit demonstrabile.*

*Tertio, an Deus sit.*

Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.

Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is NOT the manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations—namely, His knowledge, will, power.

Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:

[\(1\)](#) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?

[\(2\)](#) Whether it is demonstrable?

[\(3\)](#) Whether God exists?

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### Whether the existence of God is self-evident?

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse sit per se notum. Illa enim nobis dicuntur per se nota, quorum cognitio nobis naturaliter inest, sicut patet de primis principiis. Sed, sicut dicit Damascenus in*

**Objection 1:** It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says

*principio libri sui, omnibus cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter est inserta. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.*

*Praeterea, illa dicuntur esse per se nota, quae statim, cognitis terminis, cognoscuntur, quod philosophus attribuit primis demonstrationis principiis, in I Poster., scito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim scitur quod omne totum maius est sua parte. Sed intellecto quid significet hoc nomen Deus, statim habetur quod Deus est. Significatur enim hoc nomine id quo maius significari non potest, maius autem est quod est in re et intellectu, quam quod est in intellectu tantum, unde cum, intellectu hoc nomine Deus, statim sit in intellectu, sequitur etiam quod sit in re. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.*

*Praeterea, veritatem esse est per se notum, quia qui negat veritatem esse, concedit veritatem esse, si enim veritas non est, verum est veritatem non esse. Si autem est aliquid verum, oportet quod veritas sit. Deus autem est ipsa veritas, Ioann. XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.*

*Sed contra, nullus potest cogitare oppositum eius quod est per se notum ut patet per philosophum, in IV Metaphys. et I Poster., circa prima demonstrationis principia. Cogitari autem potest oppositum eius quod est Deum esse, secundum illud Psalmi LII, dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus. Ergo Deum esse non est per se notum.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos. Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio est per se nota, quod praedicatum includitur in ratione subiecti, ut homo est animal, nam animal est de ratione hominis. Si igitur notum sit omnibus de praedicato et de subiecto quid sit, propositio illa erit omnibus per se nota, sicut patet in primis demonstrationum principiis, quorum termini sunt quaedam communia quae nullus ignorat, ut ens et non ens, totum et pars, et similia. Si autem apud aliquos notum non sit de praedicato et subiecto quid sit, propositio quidem quantum in se est, erit per se nota, non tamen apud illos qui praedicatum et subiectum propositionis ignorant. Et ideo contingit, ut dicit Boetius in libro de hebdomadibus, quod quaedam sunt communes animi conceptiones et per se notae, apud*

(De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.

**Objection 2:** Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.

**Objection 3:** Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" ([Jn. 14:6](#)) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.

**On the contrary,** No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in his heart, There is no God" ([Ps. 52:1](#)). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

**I answer that,** A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boetius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are

*sapientes tantum, ut incorporalia in loco non esse. Dico ergo quod haec propositio, Deus est, quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia praedicatum est idem cum subiecto; Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet Deus est hominis beatitudo, homo enim naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem, et quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine, naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem. Sed hoc non est simpliciter cognoscere Deum esse; sicut cognoscere venientem, non est cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens, multi enim perfectum hominis bonum, quod est beatitudo, existimant divitias; quidam vero voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod forte ille qui audit hoc nomen Deus, non intelligit significari aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, cum quidam crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine Deus significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo maius cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura; sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum. Nec potest argui quod sit in re, nisi daretur quod sit in re aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest, quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod veritatem esse in communi, est per se notum, sed primam veritatem esse, hoc non est per se notum quoad nos.*

some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown ([Question \[3\]](#), [Article \[4\]](#)). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature—namely, by effects.

**Reply to Objection 1:** To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.

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### Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?

*Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse non sit demonstrabile. Deum enim esse est articulus fidei. Sed ea quae sunt fidei, non sunt demonstrabilia, quia demonstratio facit scire, fides autem de non apparentibus est, ut patet per apostolum, ad Hebr. XI. Ergo Deum esse non est demonstrabile.*

*Praeterea, medium demonstrationis est quod quid est. Sed de Deo non possumus scire quid est, sed solum quid non*

**Objection 1:** It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen ([Heb. 11:1](#)). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.

**Objection 2:** Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's

*est, ut dicit Damascenus. Ergo non possumus demonstrare Deum esse.*

*Praeterea, si demonstraretur Deum esse, hoc non esset nisi ex effectibus eius. Sed effectus eius non sunt proportionati ei, cum ipse sit infinitus, et effectus finiti; finiti autem ad infinitum non est proportio. Cum ergo causa non possit demonstrari per effectum sibi non proportionatum, videtur quod Deum esse non possit demonstrari.*

*Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur. Sed hoc non esset, nisi per ea quae facta sunt, posset demonstrari Deum esse, primum enim quod oportet intelligi de aliquo, est an sit.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur propter quid, et haec est per priora simpliciter. Alia est per effectum, et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae sunt priora quoad nos, cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causae. Ex quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari propriam causam eius esse (si tamen eius effectus sint magis noti quoad nos), quia, cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito effectu necesse est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum esse, secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deum esse, et alia huiusmodi quae per rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom. I non sunt articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos, sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam, et ut perfectio perfectibile. Nihil tamen prohibet illud quod secundum se demonstrabile est et scibile, ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui demonstrationem non capit.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti effectum loco definitionis causae, ad probandum causam esse, et hoc maxime contingit in Deo. Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse est accipere pro medio quid significet nomen non autem quod quid est, quia quaestio quid est, sequitur ad quaestionem*

essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.

**Objection 3:** Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

**On the contrary,** The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" ([Rm. 1:20](#)). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is whether it exists.

**I answer that,** Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.

**Reply to Objection 2:** When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of

*an est. Nomina autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendatur, unde, demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio quid significet hoc nomen Deus.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod per effectus non proportionatos causae, non potest perfecta cognitio de causa haberi, sed tamen ex quocumque effectu potest manifeste nobis demonstrari causam esse, ut dictum est. Et sic ex effectibus Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse, licet per eos non perfecte possimus eum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam.*

the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word "God".

**Reply to Objection 3:** From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.

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### Whether God exists?

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit. Quia si unum contrariorum fuerit infinitum, totaliter destruetur aliud. Sed hoc intelligitur in hoc nomine Deus, scilicet quod sit quoddam bonum infinitum. Si ergo Deus esset, nullum malum inveniretur. Invenitur autem malum in mundo. Ergo Deus non est.*

*Praeterea, quod potest compleri per pauciora principia, non fit per plura. Sed videtur quod omnia quae apparent in mundo, possunt compleri per alia principia, supposito quod Deus non sit, quia ea quae sunt naturalia, reducuntur in principium quod est natura; ea vero quae sunt a proposito, reducuntur in principium quod est ratio humana vel voluntas. Nulla igitur necessitas est ponere Deum esse.*

*Sed contra est quod dicitur Exodi III, ex persona Dei, ego sum qui sum.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod Deum esse quinque viis probari potest.*

*Prima autem et manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur, movet autem aliquid secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum, de potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu, sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum. Non autem est possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia*

**Objection 1:** It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.

**Objection 2:** Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.

**On the contrary,** It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." ([Ex. 3:14](#))

**I answer that,** The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is



*secundum idem, sed solum secundum diversa, quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem modo, aliquid sit movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri et illud ab alio. Hic autem non est procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens; et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu. Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur, et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.*

*Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium, nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile. Non autem est possibile quod in causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et medium est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum, remota autem causa, removetur effectus, ergo, si non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non erit ultimum nec medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus, non erit prima causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae efficientes mediae, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant.*

*Tertia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario, quae talis est. Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae sunt possible esse et non esse, cum quaedam inveniantur generari et corrumpi, et per consequens possible esse et non esse. Impossibile est autem omnia quae sunt, talia esse, quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possible non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset, quia quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est; si igitur nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse, et sic modo nihil esset, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia sunt possible, sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium in rebus. Omne autem necessarium vel*

not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd.

*habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde, vel non habet. Non est autem possibile quod procedatur in infinitum in necessariis quae habent causam suae necessitatis, sicut nec in causis efficientibus, ut probatum est. Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis, quod omnes dicunt Deum.*

*Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile, et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est, sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens, nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys. Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis, sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis, et hoc dicimus Deum.*

*Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum. Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem, quod apparet ex hoc quod semper aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut consequantur id quod est optimum; unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt ad finem. Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio, Deus, cum sit summe bonus, nullo modo sineret aliquid mali esse in operibus suis, nisi esset adeo omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de malo. Hoc ergo ad infinitam Dei bonitatem pertinet, ut esse permittat mala, et ex eis eliciat bona.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum natura propter determinatum finem operetur ex directione alicuius superioris agentis, necesse est ea quae a natura fiunt, etiam in Deum reducere, sicut in primam causam. Similiter etiam quae ex proposito fiunt, oportet*

Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

**Reply to Objection 1:** As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason

*reducere in aliquam altiorem causam, quae non sit ratio et voluntas humana, quia haec mutabilia sunt et defectibilia; oportet autem omnia mobilia et deficere possibilia reduci in aliquod primum principium immobile et per se necessarium, sicut ostensum est.*

or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.

### **Summa Theologiae Prima Pars. Quaestio 3. De Dei simplicitate**

Articulus 1. Whether God is a body?

Articulus 2. Whether He is composed of matter and form?

Articulus 3. Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject?

Articulus 4. Whether He is composed of essence and existence?

Articulus 6. Whether in God there are any accidents?

Articulus 7. Whether God is altogether simple?

## **OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD**

*Cognito de aliquo an sit, inquirendum restat quomodo sit, ut sciatur de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non sit.*

When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not.

*Primo ergo considerandum est quomodo non sit; secundo, quomodo a nobis cognoscatur; tertio, quomodo nominetur.*

Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.

*Potest autem ostendi de Deo quomodo non sit, removendo ab eo ea quae ei non conveniunt, utpote compositionem, motum, et alia huiusmodi. Primo ergo inquiretur de simplicitate ipsius, per quam removetur ab eo compositio. Et quia simplicia in rebus corporalibus sunt imperfecta et partes, secundo inquiretur de perfectione ipsius; tertio, de infinitate eius; quarto, de immutabilitate; quinto, de unitate.*

Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.

*Circa primum quaeruntur octo.*

Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:

*Primo, utrum Deus sit corpus.*

[\(1\)](#) Whether God is a body?

*Secundo, utrum sit in eo compositio formae et materiae.*

[\(2\)](#) Whether He is composed of matter and form?

*Tertio, utrum sit in eo compositio quidditatis, sive essentiae, vel naturae, et subiecti.*

[\(3\)](#) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject?

*Quarto, utrum sit in eo compositio quae est ex essentia et esse.*

[\(4\)](#) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?

*Quinto, utrum sit in eo compositio generis et differentiae.*

[\(5\)](#) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?

*Sexto, utrum sit in eo compositio subiecti et accidentis.*

[\(6\)](#) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?

*Septimo, utrum sit quocumque modo compositus, vel totaliter simplex.*

[\(7\)](#) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?

*Octavo, utrum veniat in compositionem cum aliis.*

[\(8\)](#) Whether He enters into composition with other things?

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### Whether God is a body?

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit corpus. Corpus enim est quod habet trinam dimensionem. Sed sacra Scriptura attribuit Deo trinam dimensionem, dicitur enim Iob XI, excelsior caelo est, et quid facies? Profundior Inferno, et unde cognosces? Longior terra mensura eius, et latior mari. Ergo Deus est corpus.*

**Objection 1:** It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" ([Job 11:8,9](#)). Therefore God is a body.

*Praeterea, omne figuratum est corpus, cum figura sit qualitas circa quantitatem. Sed Deus videtur esse figuratus, cum scriptum sit Gen. I, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, figura enim imago dicitur, secundum illud Hebr. I, cum sit splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae eius, idest imago. Ergo Deus est corpus.*

**Objection 2:** Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" ([Gn. 1:26](#)). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His substance" ([Heb. 1:3](#)). Therefore God is a body.

*Praeterea, omne quod habet partes corporeas, est corpus. Sed Scriptura attribuit Deo partes corporeas, dicitur enim Iob XL, si habes brachium ut Deus; et in Psalmo, oculi domini super iustos; et, dextera domini fecit virtutem. Ergo Deus est corpus.*

**Objection 3:** Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like God?" ([Job 40:4](#)); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" ([Ps. 33:16](#)); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" ([Ps. 117:16](#)). Therefore God is a body.

*Praeterea, situs non convenit nisi corpori. Sed ea quae ad situm pertinent, in Scripturis dicuntur de Deo, dicitur enim Isaiae VI, vidi dominum sedentem; et Isaiae III, stat ad iudicandum dominus. Ergo Deus est corpus.*

**Objection 4:** Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the Lord sitting" ([Is. 6:1](#)), and "He standeth up to judge" ([Is. 3:13](#)). Therefore God is a body.

*Praeterea, nihil potest esse terminus localis a quo vel ad quem, nisi sit corpus vel aliquod corporeum. Sed Deus in Scriptura dicitur esse terminus localis ut ad quem, secundum illud Psalmi, accedite ad eum, et illuminamini; et ut a quo, secundum illud Hierem. XVII, recedentes a te in terra scribentur. Ergo Deus est corpus.*

**Objection 5:** Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" ([Ps. 33:6](#)), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" ([Jer. 17:13](#)). Therefore God is a body.

*Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. IV, spiritus est Deus.*

*Respondeo dicendum absolute Deum non esse corpus. Quod tripliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia nullum corpus movet non motum, ut patet inducendo per singula. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est primum movens immobile. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est corpus. Secundo, quia necesse est id quod est primum ens, esse in actu, et nullo modo in potentia. Licet enim in uno et eodem quod exit de potentia in actum, prius sit potentia quam actus tempore, simpliciter tamen actus prior est potentia, quia quod est in potentia, non reducitur in actum nisi per ens actu. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est primum ens. Impossibile est igitur quod in Deo sit aliquid in potentia. Omne autem corpus est in potentia, quia continuum, in quantum huiusmodi, divisibile est in infinitum. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus. Tertio, quia Deus est id quod est nobilissimum in entibus, ut ex dictis patet. Impossibile est autem aliquod corpus esse nobilissimum in entibus. Quia corpus aut est vivum, aut non vivum. Corpus autem vivum, manifestum est quod est nobilius corpore non vivo. Corpus autem vivum non vivit in quantum corpus, quia sic omne corpus viveret, oportet igitur quod vivat per aliquid aliud, sicut corpus nostrum vivit per animam. Illud autem per quod vivit corpus, est nobilius quam corpus. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacra Scriptura tradit nobis spiritualia et divina sub similitudinibus corporalium. Unde, cum trinam dimensionem Deo attribuit, sub similitudine quantitatis corporeae, quantitatem virtuales ipsius designat, utpote per profunditatem, virtutem ad cognoscendum occulta; per altitudinem, excellentiam virtutis super omnia; per longitudinem, durationem sui esse; per latitudinem, affectum dilectionis ad omnia. Vel, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. IX de Div. Nom., per profunditatem Dei intelligitur incomprehensibilitas ipsius essentiae; per longitudinem, processus virtutis eius, omnia penetrantis; per latitudinem vero, superextensio eius ad omnia, in quantum scilicet sub eius protectione omnia continentur.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod homo dicitur esse ad imaginem Dei, non secundum corpus, sed secundum id quo homo excellit alia animalia, unde, Gen. I, postquam*

**On the contrary,** It is written in the Gospel of St. John ([Jn. 4:24](#)): "God is a spirit."

**I answer that,** It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved ([Question \[2\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.

**Reply to Objection 1:** As we have said above ([Question \[1\]](#), [Article \[9\]](#)), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said,

*dictum est, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, subditur, ut praesit piscibus maris, et cetera. Excellit autem homo omnia animalia quantum ad rationem et intellectum. Unde secundum intellectum et rationem, quae sunt incorporea, homo est ad imaginem Dei.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod partes corporeae attribuuntur Deo in Scripturis ratione suorum actuum, secundum quandam similitudinem. Sicut actus oculi est videre, unde oculus de Deo dictus, significat virtutem eius ad videndum modo intelligibili, non sensibili. Et simile est de aliis partibus.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod etiam ea quae ad situm pertinent, non attribuuntur Deo nisi secundum quandam similitudinem, sicut dicitur sedens, propter suam immobilitatem et auctoritatem; et stans, propter suam fortitudinem ad debellandum omne quod adversatur.*

*Ad quintum dicendum quod ad Deum non acceditur passibus corporalibus, cum ubique sit, sed affectibus mentis, et eodem modo ab eo receditur. Et sic accessus et recessus, sub similitudine localis motus, designant spiritualem affectum.*

"Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea" ([Gn. 1:26](#)). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of God.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with the other parts.

**Reply to Objection 4:** Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.

**Reply to Objection 5:** We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion.

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### Whether God is composed of matter and form?

*Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae. Omne enim quod habet animam, est compositum ex materia et forma, quia anima est forma corporis. Sed Scriptura attribuit animam Deo, introducit enim ad Hebr. X, ex persona Dei, iustus autem meus ex fide vivit; quod si subtraxerit se, non placebit animae meae. Ergo Deus est compositus ex materia et forma.*

*Praeterea, ira, gaudium, et huiusmodi, sunt passiones coniuncti, ut dicitur I de anima. Sed huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo in Scriptura dicitur enim in Psalmo, iratus est furore dominus in populum suum. Ergo Deus ex materia et forma est compositus.*

*Praeterea, materia est principium individuationis. Sed Deus videtur esse individuum, non enim de multis praedicatur. Ergo est compositus ex materia et forma.*

*Sed contra, omne compositum ex materia et forma est corpus, quantitas enim dimensiva est quae primo*

**Objection 1:** It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews ([Heb. 10:38](#)), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

**Objection 2:** Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was exceeding angry with His people" ([Ps. 105:40](#)). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

**Objection 3:** Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form.

**On the contrary,** Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property

*inhaeret materiae. Sed Deus non est corpus, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est compositus ex materia et forma.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est in Deo esse materiam. Primo quidem, quia materia est id quod est in potentia. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est purus actus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Secundo, quia omne compositum ex materia et forma est perfectum et bonum per suam formam, unde oportet quod sit bonum per participationem, secundum quod materia participat formam. Primum autem quod est bonum et optimum, quod Deus est, non est bonum per participationem, quia bonum per essentiam, prius est bono per participationem. Unde impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Tertio, quia unumquodque agens agit per suam formam, unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad suam formam, sic se habet ad hoc quod sit agens. Quod igitur primum est et per se agens, oportet quod sit primo et per se forma. Deus autem est primum agens, cum sit prima causa efficiens, ut ostensum est. Est igitur per essentiam suam forma; et non compositus ex materia et forma.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima attribuitur Deo per similitudinem actus. Quod enim volumus aliquid nobis, ex anima nostra est, unde illud dicitur esse placitum animae Dei, quod est placitum voluntati ipsius.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod ira et huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo secundum similitudinem effectus, quia enim proprium est irati punire, ira eius punitio metaphorice vocatur.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod formae quae sunt receptibiles in materia individuatur per materiam, quae non potest esse in alio, cum sit primum subiectum substans, forma vero, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud impediatur, recipi potest a pluribus. Sed illa forma quae non est receptibilis in materia, sed est per se subsistens, ex hoc ipso individuatur, quod non potest recipi in alio, et huiusmodi forma est Deus. Unde non sequitur quod habeat materiam.*

of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.

**I answer that,** It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ([Question \[2\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the best—viz. God—is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.

**Reply to Objection 1:** A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God.

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### Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit idem Deus quod sua essentia vel natura. Nihil enim est in seipso. Sed essentia vel natura Dei, quae est deitas,*

**Objection 1:** It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of God—i.e. the Godhead—is said to

*dicitur esse in Deo. Ergo videtur quod Deus non sit idem quod sua essentia vel natura.*

*Praeterea, effectus assimilatur suae causae, quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Sed in rebus creatis non est idem suppositum quod sua natura, non enim idem est homo quod sua humanitas. Ergo nec Deus est idem quod sua deitas.*

*Contra, de Deo dicitur quod est vita, et non solum quod est vivens, ut patet Ioan. XIV, ego sum via, veritas et vita. Sicut autem se habet vita ad viventem, ita deitas ad Deum. Ergo Deus est ipsa deitas.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est idem quod sua essentia vel natura. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est, quod in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et suppositum. Quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum quae cadunt in definitione speciei, sicut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis, his enim homo est homo, et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet quo homo est homo. Sed materia individualis, cum accidentibus omnibus individuantibus ipsam, non cadit in definitione speciei, non enim cadunt in definitione hominis haec carnes et haec ossa, aut albedo vel nigredo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde haec carnes et haec ossa, et accidentia designantia hanc materiam, non concluduntur in humanitate. Et tamen in eo quod est homo, includuntur, unde id quod est homo, habet in se aliquid quod non habet humanitas. Et propter hoc non est totaliter idem homo et humanitas, sed humanitas significatur ut pars formalis hominis; quia principia definientia habent se formaliter, respectu materiae individuantis. In his igitur quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma, in quibus individuatio non est per materiam individualem, idest per hanc materiam, sed ipsae formae per se individuantur, oportet quod ipsae formae sint supposita subsistentia. Unde in eis non differt suppositum et natura. Et sic, cum Deus non sit compositus ex materia et forma, ut ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit sua deitas, sua vita, et quidquid aliud sic de Deo praedicatur.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus, nisi per modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus. Et ideo, de Deo loquentes, utimur nominibus concretis, ut significemus eius subsistentiam, quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi*

be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.

**Objection 2:** Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.

**On the contrary,** It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" ([Jn. 14:6](#)). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead.

**I answer that,** God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter—that is to say, to "this" matter—the very forms being individualized of themselves—it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting "supposita." Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.

**Reply to Objection 1:** We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite;



*composita, et utimur nominibus abstractis, ut significemus eius simplicitatem. Quod ergo dicitur deitas vel vita, vel aliquid huiusmodi, esse in Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione intellectus nostri; et non ad aliquam diversitatem rei.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod effectus Dei imitantur ipsum, non perfecte, sed secundum quod possunt. Et hoc ad defectum imitationis pertinet, quod id quod est simplex et unum, non potest repraesentari nisi per multa, et sic accidit in eis compositio, ex qua provenit quod in eis non est idem suppositum quod natura.*

and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature.

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### Whether essence and existence are the same in God?

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit idem essentia et esse. Si enim hoc sit, tunc ad esse divinum nihil additur. Sed esse cui nulla fit additio, est esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur, sequitur ergo quod Deus sit ens commune praedicabile de omnibus. Hoc autem est falsum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt. Ergo esse Dei non est eius essentia.*

*Praeterea, de Deo scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum est. Non autem possumus scire quid sit. Ergo non est idem esse Dei, et quod quid est eius, sive quidditas vel natura.*

*Sed contra est quod Hilarius dicit in VII de Trin., esse non est accidens in Deo, sed subsistens veritas. Id ergo quod subsistit in Deo, est suum esse.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed etiam suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius, oportet esse causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia propria consequentia speciem, ut risibile consequitur hominem et causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliquo exteriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum esse rei sit aliud ab eius essentia, necesse est quod esse illius rei vel sit causatum ab aliquo exteriori, vel a principiis essentialibus eiusdem rei. Impossibile est autem quod esse sit causatum tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, quia nulla res sufficit quod sit sibi causa essendi, si habeat esse causatum. Oportet ergo quod illud cuius esse est aliud ab essentia sua, habeat esse causatum ab alio. Hoc autem non potest dici de Deo, quia Deum dicimus esse primam causam efficientem. Impossibile*

**Objection 1:** It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:21). Therefore God's existence is not His essence.

**Objection 2:** Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above ([Question \[2\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#)); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence—that is, as His quiddity or nature.

**On the contrary,** Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in God is His existence.

**I answer that,** God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species—as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man—and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent—as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that

*est ergo quod in Deo sit aliud esse, et aliud eius essentia. Secundo, quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae, non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam esse. Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo nihil sit potentiale, ut ostensum est supra, sequitur quod non sit aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse. Sua igitur essentia est suum esse. Tertio, quia sicut illud quod habet ignem et non est ignis, est ignitum per participationem, ita illud quod habet esse et non est esse, est ens per participationem. Deus autem est sua essentia, ut ostensum est. Si igitur non sit suum esse, erit ens per participationem, et non per essentiam. Non ergo erit primum ens, quod absurdum est dicere. Est igitur Deus suum esse, et non solum sua essentia.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid cui non fit additio potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut de ratione eius sit quod non fiat ei additio; sicut de ratione animalis irrationalis est, ut sit sine ratione. Alio modo intelligitur aliquid cui non fit additio, quia non est de ratione eius quod sibi fiat additio, sicut animal commune est sine ratione, quia non est de ratione animalis communis ut habeat rationem; sed nec de ratione eius est ut careat ratione. Primo igitur modo, esse sine additione, est esse divinum, secundo modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo accipiendo esse, non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec eius essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus Deus est, vera est. Et hoc scimus ex eius effectibus, ut supra dictum est.*

in God His existence should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above ([Article \[1\]](#)), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above ([Article \[3\]](#)) if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the first being—which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.

**Reply to Objection 1:** A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense.

**Reply to Objection 2:** "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is true; and this we know from His effects ([Question \[2\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#)).

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### Whether in God there are any accidents?

*Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sint aliqua accidentia. Substantia enim nulli est accidens, ut dicitur in I Physic. Quod ergo in uno est accidens, non potest in alio esse substantia, sicut probatur quod calor non sit forma substantialis ignis, quia in aliis est accidens. Sed sapientia, virtus, et huiusmodi, quae in nobis sunt*

**Objection 1:** It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like,

*accidentia, Deo attribuuntur. Ergo et in Deo sunt accidentia.*

*Praeterea, in quolibet genere est unum primum. Multa autem sunt genera accidentium. Si igitur prima illorum generum non sunt in Deo, erunt multa prima extra Deum, quod est inconueniens.*

*Sed contra, omne accidens in subiecto est. Deus autem non potest esse subiectum, quia forma simplex non potest esse subiectum, ut dicit Boetius in Lib. de Trin. Ergo in Deo non potest esse accidens.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum praemissa, manifeste apparet quod in Deo accidens esse non potest. Primo quidem, quia subiectum comparatur ad accidens, sicut potentia ad actum, subiectum enim secundum accidens est aliquo modo in actu. Esse autem in potentia, omnino removetur a Deo, ut ex praedictis patet. Secundo, quia Deus est suum esse, et, ut Boetius dicit in Lib. de Hebdomad., licet id quod est, aliquid aliud possit habere adiunctum, tamen ipsum esse nihil aliud adiunctum habere potest, sicut quod est calidum, potest habere aliquid extraneum quam calidum, ut albedinem; sed ipse calor nihil habet praeter calorem. Tertio, quia omne quod est per se, prius est eo quod est per accidens. Unde, cum Deus sit simpliciter primum ens, in eo non potest esse aliquid per accidens. Sed nec accidentia per se in eo esse possunt, sicut risibile est per se accidens hominis. Quia huiusmodi accidentia causantur ex principiis subiecti, in Deo autem nihil potest esse causatum, cum sit causa prima. Unde relinquitur quod in Deo nullum sit accidens.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus et sapientia non univoce dicuntur de Deo et de nobis, ut infra patebit. Unde non sequitur quod accidentia sint in Deo, sicut in nobis.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum substantia sit prior accidentibus, principia accidentium reducuntur in principia substantiae sicut in priora. Quamvis Deus non sit primum contentum in genere substantiae, sed primum extra omne genus, respectu totius esse.*

which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God there are accidents.

**Objection 2:** Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God—which is absurd.

**On the contrary,** Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.

**I answer that,** From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown ([Question \[2\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God as there are in us.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all being, outside of every genus.

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## Whether God is altogether simple?

*Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino simplex. Ea enim quae sunt a Deo, imitantur ipsum, unde a primo ente sunt omnia entia, et a primo bono sunt omnia bona. Sed in rebus quae sunt a Deo, nihil est omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non est omnino simplex.*

*Praeterea, omne quod est melius, Deo attribuendum est. Sed, apud nos, composita sunt meliora simplicibus, sicut corpora mixta elementis, et elementa suis partibus. Ergo non est dicendum quod Deus sit omnino simplex.*

*Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod Deus vere et summe simplex est.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod Deum omnino esse simplicem, multipliciter potest esse manifestum. Primo quidem per supradicta. Cum enim in Deo non sit compositio, neque quantitativarum partium, quia corpus non est; neque compositio formae et materiae, neque in eo sit aliud natura et suppositum; neque aliud essentia et esse, neque in eo sit compositio generis et differentiae; neque subiecti et accidentis, manifestum est quod Deus nullo modo compositus est, sed est omnino simplex. Secundo, quia omne compositum est posterius suis componentibus, et dependens ex eis. Deus autem est primum ens, ut supra ostensum est. Tertio, quia omne compositum causam habet, quae enim secundum se diversa sunt, non conveniunt in aliquod unum nisi per aliquam causam adunantem ipsa. Deus autem non habet causam, ut supra ostensum est, cum sit prima causa efficiens. Quarto, quia in omni composito oportet esse potentiam et actum, quod in Deo non est, quia vel una partium est actus respectu alterius; vel saltem omnes partes sunt sicut in potentia respectu totius. Quinto, quia omne compositum est aliquid quod non convenit alicui suarum partium. Et quidem in totis dissimilium partium, manifestum est, nulla enim partium hominis est homo, neque aliqua partium pedis est pes. In totis vero similium partium, licet aliquid quod dicitur de toto, dicatur de parte, sicut pars aeris est aer, et aquae aqua; aliquid tamen dicitur de toto, quod non convenit alicui partium, non enim si tota aqua est bicubita, et pars eius. Sic igitur in omni composito est aliquid quod non est ipsum. Hoc autem etsi possit dici de habente formam, quod scilicet habeat aliquid quod non est ipsum (puta in albo est aliquid quod non pertinet ad rationem albi), tamen in ipsa forma nihil est alienum. Unde, cum Deus sit ipsa forma, vel*

**Objection 1:** It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether simple.

**Objection 2:** Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple; thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God is altogether simple.

**On the contrary,** Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and absolutely simple."

**I answer that,** The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown above ([Question \[2\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above ([Question \[2\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being,

*potius ipsum esse, nullo modo compositus esse potest. Et hanc rationem tangit Hilarius, VII de Trin., dicens, Deus, qui virtus est, ex infirmis non continetur, neque qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt a Deo, imitantur Deum sicut causata primam causam. Est autem hoc de ratione causati, quod sit aliquo modo compositum, quia ad minus esse eius est aliud quam quod quid est, ut infra patebit.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod apud nos composita sunt meliora simplicibus, quia perfectio bonitatis creaturae non invenitur in uno simplici, sed in multis. Sed perfectio divinae bonitatis invenitur in uno simplici, ut infra ostendetur.*

He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim."

**Reply to Objection 1:** Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ([Question \[4\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)).

**Reply to Objection 2:** With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing ([Question \[4\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#) and [Question \[6\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#)).

### **Summa Theologiae Prima Pars. Quaestio 12. Quomodo Deus a nobis cognoscatur**

Articulus 11. Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?

Articulus 12. Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?

Articulus 13. Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?

#### **Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?**

*Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis in hac vita possit Deum per essentiam videre. Dicit enim Iacob, Gen. XXXII, vidi Deum facie ad faciem. Sed videre facie ad faciem, est videre per essentiam, ut patet per illud quod dicitur I Cor. XIII, videmus nunc per speculum et in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Ergo Deus in hac vita per essentiam videri potest.*

*Praeterea, Num. XII dicit dominus de Moyse, ore ad os loquor ei, et palam, et non per aenigmata et figuras, videt Deum. Sed hoc est videre Deum per essentiam. Ergo aliquis in statu huius vitae potest Deum per essentiam videre.*

*[28764] I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud in quo alia omnia cognoscimus, et per quod de aliis iudicamus, est nobis secundum se notum. Sed omnia etiam nunc in Deo cognoscimus. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Conf., si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi quaeso illud videmus? Nec ego in te, nec tu in me, sed ambo in ipsa quae supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili veritate. Idem etiam, in libro de vera religione, dicit quod secundum veritatem divinam de omnibus iudicamus. Et XII de Trin. dicit quod rationis est*

**Objection 1:** It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" ([Gn. 32:30](#)). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face" ([1 Cor. 13:12](#)).

**Objection 2:** Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord" ([Num. 12:8](#)); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life.

**Objection 3:** Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the duty of reason to

*iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas, quae nisi supra mentem essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent. Ergo et in hac vita ipsum Deum videmus.*

*Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., visione intellectuali videntur ea quae sunt in anima per suam essentiam. Sed visio intellectualis est de rebus intelligibilibus, non per aliquas similitudines, sed per suas essentias, ut ipse ibidem dicit. Ergo, cum Deus sit per essentiam suam in anima nostra, per essentiam suam videtur a nobis.*

*Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. XXXIII, non videbit me homo et vivet. Glossa, quandiu hic mortaliter vivitur, videri per quasdam imagines Deus potest; sed per ipsam naturae suae speciem non potest.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod ab homine puro Deus videri per essentiam non potest, nisi ab hac vita mortali separetur. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra dictum est, modus cognitionis sequitur modum naturae rei cognoscentis. Anima autem nostra, quandiu in hac vita vivimus, habet esse in materia corporali, unde naturaliter non cognoscit aliqua nisi quae habent formam in materia, vel quae per huiusmodi cognosci possunt. Manifestum est autem quod per naturas rerum materialium divina essentia cognosci non potest. Ostensum est enim supra quod cognitio Dei per quamcumque similitudinem creatam, non est visio essentiae ipsius. Unde impossibile est animae hominis secundum hanc vitam viventis, essentiam Dei videre. Et huius signum est, quod anima nostra, quanto magis a corporalibus abstrahitur, tanto intelligibilium abstractorum fit capacior. Unde in somniis et alienationibus a sensibus corporis, magis divinae revelationes percipiuntur, et praevisiones futurorum. Quod ergo anima elevetur usque ad supremum intelligibilium, quod est essentia divina, esse non potest quandiu hac mortali vita utitur.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. Cael. Hier., sic in Scripturis dicitur aliquis Deum vidisse, in quantum formatae sunt aliquae figurae, vel sensibiles vel imaginariae, secundum aliquam similitudinem aliquod divinum repraesentantes. Quod ergo dicit Iacob, vidi Deum facie ad faciem, referendum est, non ad ipsam divinam essentiam, sed ad figuram in qua repraesentabatur Deus. Et hoc ipsum ad quandam prophetiae eminentiam pertinet, ut videatur persona Dei loquentis, licet imaginaria visione, ut infra patebit, cum de gradibus prophetiae loquimur. Vel hoc dicit Iacob ad*

judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable." Therefore even in this life we see God Himself.

**Objection 4:** Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.

**On the contrary,** It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" ([Ex. 32:20](#)), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own nature."

**I answer that,** God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, as was said above ([Article 4](#)), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above ([Articles 2,9](#)) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence.

**Reply to Objection 1:** According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as will later be explained ([SS, Question 174](#)) in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke

*designandam quandam eminentiam intelligibilis contemplationis, supra communem statum.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Deus miraculose aliquid supernaturaliter in rebus corporeis operatur, ita etiam et supernaturaliter, et praeter communem ordinem, mentes aliquorum in hac carne viventium, sed non sensibus carnis utentium, usque ad visionem suae essentiae elevavit; ut dicit Augustinus, XII super Genes. ad Litt., et in libro de videndo Deum de Moyse, qui fuit magister Iudaeorum, et Paulo, qui fuit magister gentium. Et de hoc plenius tractabitur, cum de raptu agemus.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia dicimur in Deo videre, et secundum ipsum de omnibus iudicare, in quantum per participationem sui luminis omnia cognoscimus et diiudicamus, nam et ipsum lumen naturale rationis participatio quaedam est divini luminis; sicut etiam omnia sensibilia dicimus videre et iudicare in sole, id est per lumen solis. Unde dicit Augustinus, I Soliloquiorum, disciplinarum spectamina videri non possunt, nisi aliquo velut suo sole illustrentur, videlicet Deo. Sicut ergo ad videndum aliquid sensibiliter, non est necesse quod videatur substantia solis, ita ad videndum aliquid intelligibiliter, non est necessarium quod videatur essentia Dei.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod visio intellectualis est eorum quae sunt in anima per suam essentiam sicut intelligibilia in intellectu. Sic autem Deus est in anima beatorum, non autem in anima nostra; sed per praesentiam, essentiam, et potentiam.*

thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.

**Reply to Objection 2:** As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of rapture ([SS, Question \[175\]](#)).

**Reply to Objection 3:** All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.

**Reply to Objection 4:** Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power.

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### Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?

*Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per naturalem rationem Deum in hac vita cognoscere non possimus. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Consol., quod ratio non capit simplicem formam. Deus autem maxime est simplex forma, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo ad eius cognitionem ratio naturalis pervenire non potest.*

*Praeterea, ratione naturali sine phantasmate nihil intelligit anima, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed Dei, cum sit incorporeus, phantasma in nobis esse non potest. Ergo cognosci non potest a nobis cognitione naturali.*

**Objection 1:** It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above ([Question \[3\], Article \[7\]](#)). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.

**Objection 2:** Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge.

*Praeterea, cognitio quae est per rationem naturalem, communis est bonis et malis, sicut natura eis communis est. Sed cognitio Dei competit tantum bonis, dicit enim Augustinus, I de Trin., quod mentis humanae acies in tam excellenti luce non figitur, nisi per iustitiam fidei emundetur. Ergo Deus per rationem naturalem cognosci non potest.*

*Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. I, quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis, idest, quod cognoscibile est de Deo per rationem naturalem.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod naturalis nostra cognitio a sensu principium sumit, unde tantum se nostra naturalis cognitio extendere potest, inquantum manuduci potest per sensibilia. Ex sensibilibus autem non potest usque ad hoc intellectus noster pertingere, quod divinam essentiam videat, quia creaturae sensibiles sunt effectus Dei virtutem causae non adaequantur. Unde ex sensibilibus cognitione non potest tota Dei virtus cognosci, et per consequens nec eius essentia videri. Sed quia sunt eius effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perducere possumus, ut cognoscamus de Deo an est; et ut cognoscamus de ipso ea quae necesse est ei convenire secundum quod est prima omnium causa, excedens omnia sua causata.*

*Unde cognoscimus de ipso habitudinem ipsius ad creaturas, quod scilicet omnium est causa; et differentiam creaturarum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse non est aliquid eorum quae ab eo causantur; et quod haec non remouentur ab eo propter eius defectum, sed quia superexcedit.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio ad formam simplicem pertingere non potest, ut sciat de ea quid est, potest tamen de ea cognoscere, ut sciat an est.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus naturali cognitione cognoscitur per phantasmata effectus sui.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio Dei per essentiam, cum sit per gratiam, non competit nisi bonis, sed cognitio eius quae est per rationem naturalem, potest competere bonis et malis. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro Retractationum, non approbo quod in oratione dixi, Deus, qui non nisi mundos verum scire voluisti, responderi enim potest, multos etiam non mundos multa scire vera, scilicet per rationem naturalem.*

**Objection 3:** Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason.

**On the contrary,** It is written ([Rm. 1:19](#)), "That which is known of God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest in them."

**I answer that,** Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.

Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is."

**Reply to Objection 2:** God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects.

**Reply to Objection 3:** As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths," i.e. by natural reason.

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**Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?**



*Ad decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod per gratiam non habeatur altior cognitio Dei, quam ea quae habetur per naturalem rationem. Dicit enim Dionysius, in libro de mystica theologia, quod ille qui melius unitur Deo in hac vita, unitur ei sicut omnino ignoto, quod etiam de Moyse dicit, qui tamen excellentiam quandam obtinuit in gratiae cognitione. Sed coniungi Deo ignorando de eo quid est, hoc contingit etiam per rationem naturalem. Ergo per gratiam non plenius cognoscitur a nobis Deus, quam per rationem naturalem.*

*Praeterea, per rationem naturalem in cognitionem divinorum pervenire non possumus, nisi per phantasmata, sic etiam nec secundum cognitionem gratiae. Dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. de Cael. Hier., quod impossibile est nobis aliter lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum. Ergo per gratiam non plenius cognoscimus Deum, quam per rationem naturalem.*

*Praeterea, intellectus noster per gratiam fidei Deo adhaeret. Fides autem non videtur esse cognitio, dicit enim Gregorius, in Homil., quod ea quae non videntur fidem habent, et non agnitionem. Ergo per gratiam non additur nobis aliqua excellentior cognitio de Deo.*

*Sed contra est quod dicit apostolus, I Cor. II, nobis revelavit Deus per spiritum suum, illa scilicet quae nemo principum huius saeculi novit, idest philosophorum, ut exponit Glossa.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod per gratiam perfectior cognitio de Deo habetur a nobis, quam per rationem naturalem. Quod sic patet. Cognitio enim quam per naturalem rationem habemus, duo requirit, scilicet, phantasmata ex sensibilibus accepta, et lumen naturale intelligibile, cuius virtute intelligibiles conceptiones ab eis abstrahimus.*

*Et quantum ad utrumque, iuvatur humana cognitio per revelationem gratiae. Nam et lumen naturale intellectus confortatur per infusionem luminis gratuiti. Et interdum etiam phantasmata in imaginatione hominis formantur divinitus, magis exprimentia res divinas, quam ea quae naturaliter a sensibilibus accipimus; sicut apparet in visionibus prophetalibus. Et interdum etiam aliquae res sensibiles formantur divinitus, aut etiam voces, ad aliquid divinum exprimentum; sicut in Baptismo visus est spiritus sanctus in specie columbae, et vox patris audita est, hic est filius meus dilectus.*

**Objection 1:** It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is," comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to us by grace than by natural reason.

**Objection 2:** Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.

**Objection 3:** Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of God by grace.

**On the contrary,** The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" ([1 Cor. 2:10](#)), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.

**I answer that,** We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions.

Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" ([Mt. 3:17](#)).

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet per revelationem gratiae in hac vita non cognoscamus de Deo quid est, et sic ei quasi ignoto coniungamur; tamen plenius ipsum cognoscimus, in quantum plures et excellentiores effectus eius nobis demonstrantur; et in quantum ei aliqua attribuimus ex revelatione divina, ad quae ratio naturalis non pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et unum.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod ex phantasmatis, vel a sensu acceptis secundum naturalem ordinem, vel divinitus in imaginatione formatis, tanto excellentior cognitio intellectualis habetur, quanto lumen intelligibile in homine fortius fuerit. Et sic per revelationem ex phantasmatis plenior cognitio accipitur, ex infusione divini luminis.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod fides cognitio quaedam est, in quantum intellectus determinatur per fidem ad aliquod cognoscibile. Sed haec determinatio ad unum non procedit ex visione credentis, sed a visione eius cui creditur. Et sic, in quantum deest visio, deficit a ratione cognitionis quae est in scientia, nam scientia determinat intellectum ad unum per visionem et intellectum primorum principiorum.*

**Reply to Objection 1:** Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and One.

**Reply to Objection 2:** From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles.

### **Summa Theologiae Prima Secundae. Quaestio 3. Quid sit beatitudo.**

Articulus 8. Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?

#### **Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?**

*Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis non sit in visione ipsius divinae essentiae. Dicit enim Dionysius, in I cap. Myst. Theol., quod per id quod est supremum intellectus, homo Deo coniungitur sicut omnino ignoto. Sed id quod videtur per essentiam, non est omnino ignotum. Ergo ultima intellectus perfectio, seu beatitudo, non consistit in hoc quod Deus per essentiam videtur.*

*Praeterea, altioris naturae altior est perfectio. Sed haec est perfectio divini intellectus propria, ut suam essentiam videat. Ergo ultima perfectio intellectus humani ad hoc non pertingit, sed infra subsistit.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His Essence.

**Objection 2:** Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something less.

*Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti ipse est.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae. Ad cuius evidentiam, duo consideranda sunt. Primo quidem, quod homo non est perfecte beatus, quandiu restat sibi aliquid desiderandum et quaerendum. Secundum est, quod uniuscuiusque potentiae perfectio attenditur secundum rationem sui obiecti. Obiectum autem intellectus est quod quid est, idest essentia rei, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde intantum procedit perfectio intellectus, inquantum cognoscit essentiam alicuius rei. Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat essentiam alicuius effectus, per quam non possit cognosci essentia causae, ut scilicet sciatur de causa quid est; non dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam simpliciter, quamvis per effectum cognoscere possit de causa an sit. Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciatur de causa quid est. Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Puta si aliquis cognoscens eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquit. Nec ista inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam causae.*

*Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est; nondum perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de cognitione eorum qui sunt in via, tendentes ad beatitudinem.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad rem ipsam quae desideratur, et hoc modo idem est finis superioris et inferioris naturae, immo omnium rerum, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo, quantum ad consecutionem huius rei, et sic diversus est finis*

**On the contrary,** It is written ([1 Jn. 3:2](#)): "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is."

**I answer that,** Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.

If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above ([Articles \[1\],7](#); [Question \[2\]](#), [Article \[8\]](#)).

**Reply to Objection 1:** Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness.

**Reply to Objection 2:** As stated above ([Question \[1\]](#), [Article \[8\]](#)), the end has a twofold acceptance. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above ([Question \[1\]](#), [Article \[8\]](#)). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus

*superioris et inferioris naturae, secundum diversam  
habitudinem ad rem talem. Sic igitur altior est  
beatitudo Dei suam essentiam intellectu  
comprehendentis, quam hominis vel Angeli videntis, et  
non comprehendentis.*

the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, according to their respective habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.

## Tikrovės struktūra: keturios priežastys; materija, forma ir stoka; esmė ir esatis; galėjimas ir aktas; laikas ir amžinybė

### De Principiis Naturae

Capitulum 1. Act and potency

Capitulum 2. The three principles of nature

Capitulum 3. The four causes

Capitulum 4. Coincidence of causes

Capitulum 5. Causes and predication

Capitulum 6. Analogy

#### Caput 1

*Nota quod quoddam potest esse licet non sit, quoddam vero est. Illud quod potest esse dicitur esse potentia; illud quod iam est, dicitur esse actu. Sed duplex est esse: scilicet esse essenziale rei, sive substantiale ut hominem esse, et hoc est esse simpliciter. Est autem aliud esse accidentale, ut hominem esse album, et hoc est esse aliquid.*

*Ad utrumque esse est aliquid in potentia. Aliquid enim est in potentia ut sit homo, ut sperma et sanguis menstruus; aliquid est in potentia ut sit album, ut homo. Tam illud quod est in potentia ad esse substantiale, quam illud quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale, potest dici materia, sicut sperma hominis, et homo albedinis.*

*Sed in hoc differt: quia materia quae est in potentia ad esse substantiale, dicitur materia ex qua; quae autem est in potentia ad esse accidentale, dicitur materia in qua. Item, proprie loquendo, quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale dicitur subiectum, quod vero est in potentia ad esse substantiale, dicitur proprie materia. Quod autem illud quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale dicatur subiectum, signum est quia; dicuntur esse accidentia in subiecto, non autem quod forma substantialis sit in subiecto.*

*Et secundum hoc differt materia a subiecto: quia subiectum est quod non habet esse ex eo quod advenit, sed per se habet esse completum, sicut homo non habet esse ab albedine. Sed materia habet esse ex eo quod ei advenit, quia de se habet esse incompletum. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, forma dat esse materiae, sed subiectum accidenti, licet*

1. Since some things can be, although they are not, and some things now are; those which can be and are not are said to be potency, but those which already exist are said to be in act. But existence is twofold: one is essential existence or the **substantial** existence of a thing, for example man exists, and this is existence *simpliciter*. The other is **accidental** existence, for example man is white, and this is existence *secundum quid*.

2. Moreover, for each existence there is something in potency. Something is in potency to be man, as sperm or the ovum, and something is in potency to be white, as man. Both that which is in potency to substantial existence and that which is in potency to accidental existence can be called **matter**: for example sperm is the matter of man and man is the matter of whiteness.

3. But these differ, because that which is in potency to substantial existence is called the **matter from which**, but that which is in potency to accidental existence is called the **matter in which**. Again, properly speaking, that which is in potency to substantial existence is called **prime matter**, but that which is in potency to accidental existence is called the *subject*. Thus we say that accidents are in a subject; but we do not say that the substantial form is in a subject.

4. In this way matter differs from subject because the subject is that which does not have existence by reason of something which comes to it, rather it has **complete** existence of itself (*per se*); just as man does not have existence through whiteness. But matter has existence by reason of what comes to it because, of itself, it has **incomplete** existence. Hence, simply speaking, the form gives existence to matter; the

*aliquando unum sumatur pro altero scilicet materia pro subiecto, et e converso.*

*Sicut autem omne quod est in potentia potest dici materia, ita omne a quo aliquid habet esse, quodcumque esse sit sive substantiale, sive accidentale, potest dici forma; sicut homo cum sit potentia albus, fit actu albus, per albedinem et sperma, cum sit potentia homo, fit actu homo per animam. Et quia forma facit esse in actu, ideo forma dicitur esse actus. Quod autem facit actu esse substantiale, est forma substantialis, et quod facit actu esse accidentale, dicitur forma accidentalis.*

*Et quia generatio est motus ad formam, duplici formae respondet duplex generatio: formae substantiali respondet generatio simpliciter; formae vero accidentali generatio secundum quid. Quando enim introducitur forma substantialis, dicitur aliquid fieri simpliciter. Quando autem introducitur forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid fieri simpliciter, sed fieri hoc; sicut quando homo fit albus, non dicimus simpliciter hominem fieri vel generari, sed fieri vel generari album.*

*Et huic duplici generationi respondet duplex corruptio, scilicet simpliciter, et secundum quid. Generatio vero et corruptio simpliciter non sunt nisi in genere substantiae; sed generatio et corruptio secundum quid sunt in aliis generibus. Et quia generatio est quaedam mutatio de non esse vel ente ad esse vel ens, e converso autem corruptio debet esse de esse ad non esse, non ex quolibet non esse fit generatio, sed ex non ente quod est ens in potentia; sicut idolum ex cupro, ad quod idolum est (cuprum) in potentia, non in actu.*

*Ad hoc ergo quod sit generatio, tria requiruntur: scilicet ens potentia, quod est materia; et non esse actu, quod est privatio; et id per quod fit actu, scilicet forma. Sicut quando ex cupro fit idolum, cuprum quod est potentia ad formam idoli, est materia; hoc autem quod est infiguratum sive indispositum, dicitur privatio; figura autem a qua dicitur idolum, est forma, non autem substantialis quia cuprum ante adventum formae seu figurae habet esse in actu, et*

accident, however, does not give existence to the subject, rather the subject gives existence to the accident; although sometimes the one is used for the other, namely matter for subject and conversely.

5. But, just as everything which is in potency can be called matter, so also everything from which something has existence whether that existence be substantial or accidental, can be called form; for example man, since he is white in potency, becomes actually white through whiteness, and sperm, since it is man in potency, becomes actually man through the soul. Also, because form causes existence in act, we say that the form is the act. However, that which causes substantial existence in act is called **substantial form** and that which causes accidental existence in act is called **accidental form**.

6. Because generation is a motion to form, there is a twofold generation corresponding to this twofold form. Generation *simpliciter* corresponds to the substantial form and generation *secundum quid* corresponds to the accidental form. When a substantial form is introduced we say that something comes into being *simpliciter*, for example we say that man comes into being or man is generated [**something**]. But when an accidental form is introduced, we do not say that something comes into being *simpliciter*, but that it comes into being as this; for example when man comes into being as white, we do not say *simpliciter* that man comes into being or is generated, but that he comes into being or is generated as white [**somehow**].

7. There is a twofold corruption opposed to this twofold generation: *simpliciter* and *secundum quid*. Generation and corruption *simpliciter* are only in the genus of substance, but generation and corruption *secundum quid* are in all the other genera. Also, because generation is a change from non-existence to existence, contrarily, corruption should be from existence to non-existence. However, generation does not take place from just any non-being, but from the non-being which is being in potency; for example a statue comes to be from bronze which is a statue in potency and not in act.

8. In order that there be generation three things are required: **being in potency** which is matter, **non-existence in act** which is privation, and **that through which something comes to be in act** which is form. For example when a statue made from bronze the bronze which is in potency to the form of the statue is the **matter**; the shapeless or undisposed something is the **privation**; and the shape because of which is called a statue is the **form**. But it is not a substantial form because the bronze, before it receives the shape, has

*eius esse non dependet ab illa figura; sed est forma accidentalis. Omnes enim formae artificiales sunt accidentales. Ars enim non operatur nisi supra id quod iam constitutum est in esse perfecto a natura.*

## **Caput 2**

*Sunt igitur tria principia naturae, scilicet materia, forma et privatio; quorum alterum, scilicet forma, est id ad quod est generatio; alia duo sunt ex parte eius ex quo est generatio. Unde materia et privatio sunt idem subiecto, sed differunt ratione. Illud enim idem quod est aes est infiguratum ante adventum formae; sed ex alia ratione dicitur aes, et ex alia infiguratum. Unde privatio dicitur esse principium non per se, sed per accidens, quia scilicet concidit cum materia; sicut dicimus quod hoc est per accidens: medicus aedificat: non enim ex eo quod medicus, sed ex eo quod aedificator, quod concidit medico in uno subiecto.*

*Sed duplex est accidens: scilicet necessarium, quod non separatur a re, ut risibile hominis; et non necessarium, quod separatur, ut album ab homine. Unde, licet privatio sit principium per accidens, non sequitur quod non sit necessarium ad generationem, quia materia a privatione non denudatur; in quantum enim est sub una forma, habet privationem alterius, et e converso, sicut in igne est privatio aeris, et in aere privatio ignis.*

*Et sciendum, quod cum generatio sit ex non esse, non dicimus quod negatio sit principium, sed privatio, quia negatio non determinat sibi subiectum. Non videt enim potest dici etiam de non entibus, ut Chimaera non videt; et iterum de entibus quae non nata sunt habere visum, sicut de lapidibus. Sed privatio non dicitur nisi de determinato subiecto, in quo scilicet natus est fieri habitus; sicut caecitas non dicitur nisi de his quae sunt nata videre. Et quia generatio non fit ex non ente simpliciter, sed ex non ente quod est in aliquo subiecto, et non in quolibet, sed in determinato (non enim ex quolibet non igne fit ignis, sed ex tali non igne, circa quod nata sit fieri forma ignis), ideo dicitur quod privatio est principium.*

*Sed in hoc differt ab aliis, quia alia sunt principia et in esse et in fieri. Ad hoc enim quod fiat idolum, oportet quod sit aes, et quod ultima sit figura idoli; et iterum, quando iam idolum est oportet haec duo esse. Sed privatio est principium in fieri et non in esse: quia*

existence in act and its existence does not depend upon that shape; rather it is an accidental form, because all artificial forms are accidental. Art operates only on that which is already constituted in existence by nature.

9. Therefore there are three principles of nature: matter, form and privation. One of these, form, is that by reason of which generation takes place; the other two are found on the part of that from which there is generation. Hence matter and privation are the same in subject but they differ in definition, because bronze and what is shapeless are the same before the advent of the form; but for one reason it is called bronze and for another reason it is called shapeless. Wherefore, **privation** is not said to be a *per se* principle, but rather a *per accidens* principle; because it is coincident with matter. For example we say that it is *per accidens* that the doctor builds, because he does not do this in so far as he is a doctor but in so far as he is a builder, which is coincident with being a doctor in the same subject.

10. But there are two kinds of accidents: the necessary, which is not separated from the thing, for example risible in man; and the non-necessary, which can be separated, for example white from man. Thus, although privation is a *per accidens* principle, still it does not follow that it is not necessary for generation, because matter is never entirely without privation. For in so far as it is under one form it has the privation of another and conversely, just as there is the privation of fire in air and the privation of air in fire.

11. Also, we should note that, although generation is from non-existence, we do not say that negation is the principle but that privation is the principle, because negation does not determine a subject. **Non-seeing** can be said even of non-beings, for example we say that the dragon does not see and we say the same of beings which are not apt to have sight, as stones. But privation is said only of a determined subject in which the habitus is apt to come to be; for example blindness is said only of those things which are apt to see. Also, because generation does not come to be from non-being *simpliciter*, but from the non-being which is in some subject, and not in just any subject, but in a determined subject, because fire does not come to be from just any non-fire, but from such non-fire as is apt to receive the form of fire; therefore we say that privation is the principle, and not negation.

12. Privation differs from the other principles, because the others are principles both in existence and in becoming. For in order that a statue come to be, it is necessary that there be bronze and, further, that there be the shape of the statue. Again, when the statue already exists, it is necessary that

*dum fit idolum, oportet quod non sit idolum. Si enim esset, non fieret, quia quod fit non est, nisi in successivis. Sed ex quo iam idolum est, non est ibi privatio idoli, quia affirmatio et negatio non sunt simul, similiter nec privatio et habitus. Item privatio est principium per accidens, ut supra expositum est, alia duo sunt principia per se.*

*Ex dictis igitur patet quod materia differt a forma et a privatione secundum rationem. Materia enim est id in quo intelligitur forma et privatio: sicut in cupro intelligitur figura et infiguratum. Quandoque quidem materia nominatur cum privatione, quandoque sine privatione: sicut aes, cum sit materia idoli, non importat privationem, quia ex hoc quod dico aes, non intelligitur indispositum seu infiguratum, sed farina, cum sit materia respectu panis, importat in se privationem formae panis, quia ex hoc quod dico farinam, significatur indispositio sive inordinatio opposita formae panis. Et quia in generatione materia sive subiectum permanet, privatio vero non, neque compositum ex materia et privatione, ideo materia quae non importat privationem, est permanens: quae autem importat, est transiens.*

*Sed sciendum, quod quaedam materia habet compositionem formae: sicut aes, cum sit materia respectu idoli, ipsum tamen aes est compositum ex materia et forma; et ideo aes non dicitur materia prima, quia habet materiam. Ipsa autem materia quae intelligitur sine qualibet forma et privatione, sed subiecta formae et privationi, dicitur materia prima, propter hoc quod ante ipsam non est alia materia. Et hoc etiam dicitur hyle. Et quia omnis definitio et omnis cognitio est per formam, ideo materia prima per se non potest cognosci vel definiri sed per comparisonem ut dicatur quod illud est materia prima, quod hoc modo se habet ad omnes formas et privationes sicut aes ad idolum et infiguratum. Et haec dicitur simpliciter prima. Potest etiam aliquid dici materia prima respectu alicuius generis, sicut aqua est materia liquabilium. Non tamen est prima simpliciter, quia est composita ex materia et forma, unde habet materiam priorem.*

*Et sciendum quod materia prima, et etiam forma, non generatur neque corrumpitur, quia omnis generatio est ad aliquid ex aliquo. Id autem ex quo est*

these two exist. But privation is a principle in **becoming** and not in existing, because until the statue comes to be it is necessary that it not be a statue. For, if it were, it would not come to be, because whatever comes to be is not, except in successive things, for example in time and motion. But from the fact that the statue already exists, the privation of statue is not there, because affirmation and negation are not found together, and neither are privation and habitus. Likewise, privation is a *per accidens* principle, as was explained above, but the other two are *per se* principles.

13. Therefore, from what was said, it is plain that **matter** differs from form and from privation by definition. Matter is that in which the form and privation are understood, just as in bronze the form and that which is shapeless is understood. Still, "matter" sometimes designates privation and sometimes does not designate privation. For example, when bronze becomes the matter of the statue, it does not imply a privation because when I speak of bronze in this way I do not mean what is undisposed or shapeless. Flour, on the other hand, since it is the matter with respect to bread, implies in itself the privation of the form of bread, because when I say "flour" the lack of disposition or the inordination opposed to the form of bread is signified. Also, because in generation the matter or the subject remains, but the privation does not, nor does the composite of matter and privation; therefore that matter which does not imply privation is permanent, but that which implies privation is transient.

14. We should notice, too, that some matter has a composition of form, for example bronze. For, although it is the matter with respect to the statue, the bronze itself is composed of matter and form. Therefore bronze is not called prime matter, even though it has matter. However, that matter which is understood without any form and privation, but rather is subject to form and privation, is called prime matter by reason of the fact that there is no other matter before it. This is also called *hyle*, [which means chaos or confusion in Greek]. Also, because all knowledge and every definition comes by way of the form, prime matter cannot be defined or known in itself but only through the composite; consequently it might be said that that is prime matter which is related to all forms and privations as bronze is to the statue and the shapeless; and this is called first *simpliciter*. A thing can also be called prime matter with respect to some genus, as water with respect to aqueous solutions; this, however, is not first *simpliciter* because it is composed of matter and form. Hence it has a prior matter.

15. Note, also, that prime matter, and likewise form, is neither generated nor corrupted, because every generation goes from something to something. But that from which



*generatio, est materia; id ad quod est forma. Si igitur materia vel forma generaretur, materiae esset materia, et formae forma, in infinitum. Unde generatio non est nisi compositi, proprie loquendo.*

*Sciendum est etiam, quod materia prima dicitur una numero in omnibus. Sed unum numero dicitur duobus modis: scilicet quod habet unam formam determinatam in numero, sicut Socrates: et hoc modo materia prima non dicitur unum numero, cum in se non habeat aliquam formam. Dicitur etiam aliquid unum numero, quia est sine dispositionibus quae faciunt differre secundum numerum: et hoc modo dicitur materia prima unum numero, quia intelligitur sine omnibus dispositionibus a quibus est differentia in numero.*

*Et sciendum quod licet materia non habeat in sua natura aliquam formam vel privationem, sicut in ratione aeris neque est figuratum neque infiguratum; tamen nunquam denudatur a forma et privatione: quandoque enim est sub una forma, quandoque sub alia. Sed per se nunquam potest esse, quia cum in ratione sua non habeat aliquam formam, non habet esse in actu, cum esse in actu non sit nisi a forma, sed est solum in potentia. Et ideo quicquid est actu, non potest dici materia prima.*

### **Caput 3**

*Ex dictis igitur patet tria esse naturae principia scilicet materia, forma et privatio. Sed haec non sunt sufficientia ad generationem. Quod enim est in potentia, non potest se reducere ad actum: sicut cuprum quod est potentia idolum, non facit se idolum, sed indiget operante, qui formam idoli extrahat de potentia in actum. Forma etiam non extraheret se de potentia in actum (et loquor de forma generati, quam diximus esse terminum generationis); forma enim non est nisi in facto esse: quod autem operatur est in fieri, idest dum res fit. Oportet ergo praeter materiam et formam esse aliquod principium quod agat, et hoc dicitur esse efficiens, vel movens, vel agens, vel unde est principium motus. Et quia, ut dicit Aristoteles in secundo Metaph., omne quod agit, non agit nisi intendendo aliquid, oportet esse aliud quartum, id scilicet quod intenditur ab operante: et hoc dicitur finis.*

*Et sciendum, quod omne agens tam naturale quam voluntarium intendit finem, non tamen sequitur quod omne agens cognoscat finem, vel deliberet de fine.*

generation takes place is matter, and that in which generation terminates is form. Therefore, if matter and form were generated, there would be a matter of matter and a form of form, and so on *ad infinitum*. Hence, properly speaking, there is generation only of the composite.

16. Again, notice that prime matter is said to be numerically one in all things. But to be numerically one can be said in two ways: that which has a determined numerically one form, as Socrates; prime matter is not said to be numerically one in this way, since it does not have in itself a form. Also, something is said to be numerically one because it is without the dispositions which would cause it to differ numerically; prime matter is said to be numerically one in this way, because it is understood without all the dispositions which would cause it to differ numerically.

17. Notice, likewise, that, although prime matter does not have in its definition any form or privation, for example neither shaped nor shapeless is in the definition of bronze, nevertheless, matter is never completely without form and privation, because it is sometimes under one form and sometimes under another. Moreover, it can never exist by itself; because, since it does not have any form in its definition, it cannot exist in act, since existence in act is only from the form. Rather it exists only in potency. Therefore whatever exists in act cannot be called prime matter.

18. From this it is plain, therefore, that there are three principles of nature: matter, form and privation. But these are not sufficient for generation. What is in potency cannot reduce itself to act; for example, the bronze which is in potency to being a statue cannot cause itself to be a statue, rather it needs an **agent** in order that the form of the statue might pass from potency to act. Neither can the form draw itself from potency to act. I mean the form of the thing generated which we say is the term of generation, because the form exists only in that which has been made to be. However, what is made is in the state of becoming as long as the thing is coming to be. Therefore it is necessary that besides the matter and form there be some principle which acts. This is called the efficient, moving or agent cause, or that whence the principle of motion is. Also, because, as Aristotle says in the second book of the *Metaphysics*, everything which acts acts only by intending something, it is necessary that there be some fourth thing, namely, that which is intended by the agent; and this is called the end.

19. Again, we should notice that, although every agent, both natural and voluntary, intends an **end**, still it does not follow that every agent knows the end or deliberates about the end.

*Cognoscere enim finem est necessarium in his quorum actiones non sunt determinatae, sed se habent ad opposita, sicut se habent agentia voluntaria; et ideo oportet quod cognoscant finem per quem suas actiones determinent. Sed in agentibus naturalibus sunt actiones determinatae; unde non est necessarium eligere ea quae sunt ad finem. Et ponit exemplum Avicenna de citharaedo quem non oportet de qualibet percussione chordarum deliberare, cum percussiones sint determinatae apud ipsum; alioquin esset inter percussiones mora, quod esset absonum. Magis autem videtur de operante voluntarie quod deliberet, quam de agente naturali. Et ita patet per locum a maiori, quod possibile est agens naturale sine deliberatione intendere finem: et hoc intendere nihil aliud erat quam habere naturalem inclinationem ad aliquid.*

*Ex dictis ergo patet, quod sunt quatuor causae: scilicet materialis, efficiens, formalis et finalis. Licet autem principium et causa dicantur convertibiliter, ut dicitur in quinto Metaph., tamen Aristoteles in Lib. Physic., ponit quatuor causas et tria principia. Causas autem accipit tam pro extrinsecis quam pro intrinsecis. Materia et forma dicuntur intrinsecae rei, eo quod sunt partes constituentes rem; efficiens et finalis dicuntur extrinsecae, quia sunt extra rem. Sed principia accipit solum causas intrinsecas. Privatio autem non nominatur inter causas, quia est principium per accidens, ut dictum est.*

*Et cum dicimus quatuor causas, intelligimus de causis per se, ad quas tamen causae per accidens reducuntur, quia omne quod est per accidens, reducitur ad id quod est per se.*

*Sed licet principia ponat Aristoteles pro causis intrinsecis in primo Physic., tamen, ut dicitur in undecimo Metaph., principium dicitur proprie de causis extrinsecis, elementum de causis quae sunt partes rei, idest de causis intrinsecis, causa dicitur de utrisque. Tamen aliquando unum ponitur pro altero. Omnis enim causa potest dici principium, et omne principium causa.*

*Sed tamen causa videtur addere supra principium communiter dictum, quia id quod est primum, sive consequatur esse posterius sive non, potest dici principium, sicut faber dicitur principium cultelli, ut ex eius operatione est esse cultelli. Sed quando aliquid movetur de nigredine ad albedinem, dicitur*

To know the end is necessary in those whose actions are not determined, but which may act for opposed ends as, for example, **voluntary** agents. Therefore it is necessary that these know the end by which they determine their actions. But in natural agents the actions are **determined**, hence it is not necessary to choose those things which are for the end. Avicenna gives the following example. A harpist does not have to deliberate about the notes in any particular chord, since these are already determined for him; otherwise there would be a delay between the notes which would cause discord. However, it seems more reasonable to attribute deliberation to a voluntary agent than to a natural agent. Thus it is plain, by reasoning *a maiori*, that, if a voluntary agent, for whom deliberation is more proper, sometimes does not deliberate, therefore neither does the natural agent. Therefore it is possible for the natural agent to intend the end without deliberation; and to intend this is nothing else than to have a natural inclination to something.

20. From the above it is plain that there are four causes: material, efficient, formal and final. But, although **principle** and **cause** are used convertibly, as is said in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, still, in the *Physics*, Aristotle gives four causes and three principles; because he takes as causes both what is extrinsic and what is intrinsic. Matter and form are said to be intrinsic to the thing because they are parts constituting the thing; the efficient and final causes are said to be extrinsic because they are outside the thing. But he takes as principles only the intrinsic causes; privation, however, is not listed among the causes because it is a principle *per accidens*, as was said.

21. When we say that there are four causes we mean the *per se* causes, to which all the *per accidens* causes are reduced, because everything which is *per accidens* is reduced to that which is *per se*.

22. And, although Aristotle calls intrinsic causes **principles** in the first book of the *Physics*, still **principle** is applied properly to extrinsic causes, as is said in the eleventh book of the *Metaphysics*; **element** is used for those causes which are parts of the thing, namely for the intrinsic causes; **cause** is applied to both. Nevertheless, one is sometimes used for the other: Every cause can be called a **principle** and every principle a **cause**.

23. However, **cause** seems to add something to **principle** as commonly used, because that which is primary, whether the existence of a posterior follows from it or not, can be called a **principle**, for example the manufacturer is called the principle of the knife because the existence of the knife comes from his operation. But, when something is moved

*quod nigrum est principium illius motus; et universaliter omne id a quo incipit esse motus dicitur principium: tamen nigredo non est id ex quo consequatur esse albedo. Sed causa solum dicitur de illo primo ex quo consequitur esse posterioris: unde dicitur quod causa est ex cuius esse sequitur aliud. Et ideo illud primum a quo incipit esse motus, non potest dici causa per se etsi dicatur principium: et propter hoc privatio ponitur inter principia, et non inter causas, quia privatio est id a quo incipit generatio. Sed potest etiam dici causa per accidens, in quantum concidit materiae, ut supra expositum est.*

*Elementum vero non dicitur proprie nisi de causis ex quibus est compositio rei, quae proprie sunt materiales. Et iterum non de qualibet causa materiali, sed de illa ex qua est prima compositio: sicut nec membra elementa sunt hominis, quia membra etiam sunt composita ex aliis; sed dicimus quod terra et aqua sunt elementa, quia haec non componuntur ex aliis corporibus, sed ex ipsis est prima compositio corporum naturalium.*

*Unde Aristoteles in quinto Metaph. dicit quod elementum est id ex quo componitur res primo, et est in ea, et non dividitur secundum formam. Expositio primae particulae, ex quo componitur res primo, patet per ea quae diximus. Secunda particula, scilicet et est in ea, ponitur ad differentiam illius materiae quae ex toto corrumpitur per generationem: sicut panis est materia sanguinis, sed non generatur sanguis nisi corrumpatur panis; unde panis non remanet in sanguine: unde non potest dici panis elementum sanguinis. Sed elementa oportet aliquo modo manere, cum non corrumpantur, ut dicitur in libro de Gener. Tertia particula, scilicet et non dividitur secundum formam, ponitur ad differentiam eorum scilicet quae habent partes diversas in forma, id est in specie, sicut manus, cuius partes sunt caro et ossa, quae differunt secundum speciem. Sed elementum non dividitur in partes diversas secundum speciem, sicut aqua, cuius quaelibet pars est aqua. Non enim oportet ad esse elementi ut non dividatur secundum quantitatem, sed sufficit si non dividatur secundum speciem: et si etiam non dividatur, dicitur elementum, sicut litterae dicuntur elementa dictionum. Patet igitur quod principium quodam modo in plus habet se quam causa; et causa in plus*

from whiteness to blackness, whiteness is said to be the principle of that motion; and universally, everything from which motion begins is called a **principle**. However, whiteness is not that from which the existence of blackness follows. But cause is said only of that primarily from which the existence of the posterior follows. Hence we say that a cause that from whose existence another follows. Therefore that primarily from which motion begins cannot really be called a **cause**, even though it may be called a **principle**. Because of this, privation is placed among the principles and not among the causes, because privation is that from which generation begins. But it can also be called a *per accidens* cause in so far as it is coincident with matter, as was said above.

24. **Element**, on the other hand, is applied properly only to the causes of which the thing is composed, which are properly the materials. Moreover, it is not said of just any material cause, but of that one of which a thing is primarily composed; for example we do not say that the members of the body are the **elements** of man, because the members also are composed of other things; rather, we say that earth and water are the **elements**, because these are not composed of other bodies, but natural bodies are primarily composed of them.

25. Hence Aristotle says, in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, that an element is that of which a thing is primarily composed, which is in that thing, and which is not divided by a form. The explanation of the first part of the definition, "that of which a thing is primarily composed", is plain from the preceding. The second part, "which is in that thing", differentiates it from that matter which is entirely corrupted by generation; for example bread is the matter of blood, but blood is generated only by the corruption of bread. Thus bread does not remain in blood; and therefore bread cannot be called an element of blood. But the elements must remain in some way, since they are not entirely corrupted, as is said in the book *On Generation*. The third part, "and which is not divided by a form", differentiates an element from those things which have parts diverse in form, i.e., in species, as the hand whose parts are flesh and bone which differ according to species. An element is not divided into parts diverse according to species, rather it is like water whose every part is water. For an element to exist, it need not be undivided by quantity, rather it is sufficient that it be undivided by form. Even if it is in no way divided, it is called an element, just as letters are the elements of words. This it is plain from what was said that **principle**, in some way, applies to more than does **cause**, and **cause** to more than does **element**. This is what the Commentator says in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*.

*quam elementum. Et hoc est quod dicit Commentator in quinto Metaph.*

#### **Caput 4**

*Viso igitur quod quatuor sunt causarum genera, sciendum est quod non est impossibile quod idem habeat plures causas: ut idolum cuius causa est cuprum et artifex, sed artifex ut efficiens, cuprum ut materia. Non autem est impossibile ut idem sit causa contrariorum: sicut gubernator est causa salutis navis et submersionis, sed huius per absentiam, illius quidem per praesentiam.*

*Sciendum est etiam quod possibile est ut aliquid idem sit causa et causatum respectu eiusdem, sed diversimode: ut deambulatio est causa sanitatis ut efficiens, sed sanitas est causa deambulationis ut finis: deambulatio enim est aliquando propter sanitatem. Et etiam corpus est materia animae, anima vero est forma corporis.*

*Efficiens enim dicitur causa respectu finis, cum finis non sit in actu nisi per operationem agentis: sed finis dicitur causa efficientis, cum non operetur nisi per intentionem finis. Unde efficiens est causa illius quod est finis: ut sit sanitas; non tamen facit finem esse finem, et ita non est causa causalitatis finis, idest non facit finem esse finalem: sicut medicus facit sanitatem esse in actu, non tamen facit quod sanitas sit finis. Finis autem non est causa illius quod est efficiens, sed est causa ut efficiens sit efficiens: sanitas enim non facit medicum esse medicum (et dico sanitatem quae fit operante medico), sed facit ut medicus sit efficiens.*

*Unde finis est causa causalitatis efficientis, quia facit efficiens esse efficiens: similiter facit materiam esse materiam, et formam esse formam, cum materia non suscipiat formam nisi per finem, et forma non perficiat materiam nisi per finem. Unde dicitur quod finis est causa causarum, quia est causa causalitatis in omnibus causis.*

*Materia enim dicitur causa formae, in quantum forma non est nisi in materia; et similiter forma est causa materiae, in quantum materia non habet esse in actu nisi per formam. Materia enim et forma dicuntur*

26. Now that we have seen that there are four genera of causes, we must understand that it is not impossible that the same thing have many causes, for example the statue whose causes are both the bronze and the artist: the artist is the efficient cause while the bronze is the material cause. Nor is it impossible that the same thing be the cause of contraries; for example the captain is the cause of the safety of the ship and of its sinking. He is the cause of the latter by his absence and of the former by his presence.

27. Also, notice that it is possible that the same thing be a cause and the thing caused, with respect to the same thing, but in diverse ways; for example, walking is sometimes the cause of health, as the efficient cause, but health is the cause of the walking, as the end: Walking is sometimes on account of health. Also, the body is the matter of the soul, but the soul is the form of the body.

28. The efficient cause is called a cause with respect to the end, since the end is actual only by the operation of the agent. But the end is called the cause of the efficient cause, since the efficient cause does not operate except by the intention of the end. Hence the efficient cause is the cause of that which is the end, for example walking in order to be healthy. However, the efficient cause does not cause the end to be the end. Therefore it is not the cause of the causality of the end, i.e., it does not cause the end to be the final cause; for example the doctor causes health to actually exist, but he does not cause health to be the end

29. Also, the end is not the cause of that which is the efficient cause, but it is the cause of the efficient cause being an efficient cause; [for example health does not cause the doctor to be a doctor I am speaking of the health which comes about by the doctor's activity but it causes the doctor to be an efficient cause. Therefore the end is the cause of the causality of the efficient cause, because it causes the efficient cause to be an efficient cause.] Likewise, the end causes the matter to be the matter and the form to be the form, since matter receives the form only for the sake of the end and the form perfects the matter only through the end. Therefore we say that the end is the cause of causes, because it is the cause of the causality in all causes.

30. Also, we say that matter is the cause of the form, in so far as the form exists only in matter. Likewise, the form is the cause of the matter, in so far as matter has existence in act only through the form because matter and form are

*relative ad invicem, ut dicitur in secundo physicorum. Dicuntur enim ad compositum sicut partes ad totum, et simplex ad compositum.*

*Sed quia omnis causa, inquantum est causa, naturaliter prior est causato, sciendum quod prius dicitur duobus modis, ut dicit Aristoteles in decimosexto de Animal.; per quorum diversitatem potest aliquid dici prius et posterius respectu eiusdem, et causa et causatum. Dicitur enim aliquid prius altero generatione et tempore, et iterum in substantia et complemento. Cum ergo naturae operatio procedat ab imperfecto ad perfectum, et ab incompleto ad completum, imperfectum est prius perfecto, secundum generationem et tempus, sed perfectum est prius in complemento: sicut potest dici quod vir est ante puerum in substantia et complemento, sed puer est ante virum generatione et tempore. Sed licet in rebus generabilibus imperfectum sit prius perfecto, et potentia prior actu, considerando in aliquo eodem quod prius est imperfectum quam perfectum, et in potentia quam in actu, simpliciter tamen loquendo, oportet actum et perfectum prius esse: quia quod reducit potentiam ad actum, actu est, et quod perficit imperfectum, perfectum est.*

*Materia quidem est prior forma generatione et tempore: prius enim est cui advenit, quam quod advenit. Forma vero est prior materia perfectione, quia materia non habet esse completum nisi per formam. Similiter efficiens prior est fine generatione et tempore, cum ab efficiente fiat motus ad finem; sed finis est prior efficiente inquantum est efficiens, in substantia et complemento, cum actio efficientis non compleatur nisi per finem. Igitur istae duae causae, scilicet materia et efficiens, sunt prius per viam generationis; sed forma et finis sunt prius per viam perfectionis.*

*Et notandum quod duplex est necessitas: scilicet necessitas absoluta et necessitas conditionalis. Necessitas quidem absoluta est quae procedit a causis prioribus in viam generationis, quae sunt materia et efficiens: sicut necessitas mortis quae provenit ex materia et ex dispositione contrariorum componentium; et haec dicitur absoluta quia non habet impedimentum. Haec etiam dicitur necessitas materiae. Necessitas autem conditionalis procedit a*

spoken of in relation to each other, as is said in the second book of the *Physics*. They are also spoken of in relation to the composite, as the part to the whole and as the simple to the composed.

31. But, because every cause, as cause, is naturally **prior** to that which it causes, notice that we say a thing is prior in two ways, as Aristotle says in book XVI of the *History of Animals*. Because of this diversity, we can call something prior and posterior with respect to the same thing, both the cause and the thing caused. We say that one thing is prior to another from the point of view of generation and time, and likewise from the point of view of substance and completeness. Since the operation of nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect and from the incomplete to the complete, the imperfect is prior to the perfect namely, from the point of view of generation and time, but the perfect prior to the imperfect from the point of view of substance. For example we can say that the man is before the boy according to substance and completeness, but the boy is before the man according to generation and time. But, although in generable things the imperfect is prior to the perfect and potency to act when we consider that in one and the same thing the imperfect is prior to the perfect and potency to act, still, simply speaking, the act and the perfect must be prior, because it is what is in act that reduces potency to act and it is the perfect that perfects the imperfect.

32. Matter is prior to form from the point of view of generation and time because that to which something comes is prior to that which comes to it. But form is prior to matter from the point of view of substance and completeness, because matter has completed existence only through the form. Likewise, the efficient cause is prior to the end from the point of view of generation and time, since the motion to the end comes from the efficient cause. But the end is prior to the efficient cause, in so far as it is the efficient cause, from the point of view of substance and completeness, since the action of the efficient cause is completed only through the end. Therefore these two causes, the material and the efficient, are prior by way of generation, but the form and the end are prior by way of perfection.

33. It must be noted that there are two kinds of necessity: absolute and conditional. **Absolute necessity** is that which proceeds from the causes prior by way of generation: the material and the efficient causes. An example of this is the necessity of death which comes from the matter, namely the disposition of the composing contraries. This is called absolute because it does not have an impediment. It is also called the necessity of matter. **Conditional necessity**, on the other hand, proceeds from causes posterior in generation,

*causis posterioribus in generatione, scilicet a forma et fine: sicut dicimus quod necessarium est esse conceptionem, si debeat generari homo; et ista est conditionalis, quia hanc mulierem concipere non est necessarium simpliciter, sed sub conditione, si debeat generari homo. Et haec dicitur necessitas finis.*

*Et est sciendum quod tres causae possunt incidere in unum, scilicet forma, finis, et efficiens: sicut patet in generatione ignis. Ignis enim generat ignem, ergo ignis est causa efficiens in quantum generat; et iterum ignis est forma in quantum facit esse actu quod prius erat potentia; et iterum est, finis in quantum est intentum ab agente et in quantum terminantur ad ipsum operationes ipsius agentis.*

*Sed duplex est finis, scilicet finis generationis, et finis rei generatae: sicut patet in generatione cultelli. Forma enim cultelli est finis generationis; sed incidere, quod est operatio cultelli, est finis ipsius generati, scilicet cultelli. Finis autem generationis concidit ex duabus dictis causis aliquando, scilicet quando fit generatio a simili in specie, sicut homo generat hominem, et oliva olivam: quod non potest intelligi de fine rei generatae.*

*Sciendum autem quod finis incidit cum forma in idem numero, quia illud idem in numero quod est forma generati est finis generationis. Sed cum efficiente non incidit in idem numero, sed in idem specie. Impossibile est enim ut faciens et factum sint idem numero, sed possunt esse idem specie: ut quando homo generat hominem, homo generans et generatus sunt diversa in numero sed idem in specie. Materia autem non concidit cum aliis, quia materia, ex eo quod est ens in potentia, habet rationem imperfecti, sed aliae causae cum sint actu, habent rationem perfecti; perfectum autem et imperfectum non concidunt in idem.*

## **Caput 5**

*Viso igitur quod sint quatuor causae, scilicet efficiens, materialis, formalis et finalis, sciendum est quod quaelibet istarum causarum dividitur multis modis. Dicitur enim aliquid causa per prius, et aliquid per posterius, sicut dicimus quod ars et medicus sunt causa sanitatis: sed ars est causa per prius, et medicus per posterius; et similiter in causa*

namely, the form and the end. For example we say that it is necessary that there be conception if a man is to be generated. This is called conditional because it is not necessary simply that this woman conceive, but only conditionally, namely, if a man is to be generated. This is called the necessity of the end.

34. Notice, also, that three causes can coincide in one thing, namely, the form, the end and the efficient cause, as is plain in the generation of fire. Fire generates fire; therefore fire is the efficient cause in so far as it generates; also, fire is the formal cause in so far as it causes to exist actually that which before was in potency; again, it is the end in so far as the operations of the agent are terminated in it and in so far as it is intended by the agent.

35. But the end is twofold: the end of generation and the end of the thing generated, as is plain in the generation of a knife. The form of the knife is the end of generation; but cutting, which is the operation of the knife, is the end of the thing generated, namely, of the knife. Moreover the end of generation sometimes is coincident with the two aforementioned causes, namely, when generation takes place from what is similar in species, as when man generates man and the olive, an olive. But this cannot be understood of the end of the thing generated.

36. Notice, nevertheless, that the end coincides with the form in something which is numerically the same, because that which is the form of the thing generated and that which is the end of generation are the same numerically. But it does not coincide with the efficient cause in a thing numerically the same, but in a thing specifically the same, because it is impossible that the maker and the thing made be numerically the same, but they can be specifically the same. Thus, when man generates man, the man generating and the one generated are numerically diverse, but they are specifically the same. However, matter does not coincide with the others. This is because matter, by the fact that it is being in potency, has the nature of something imperfect; but the other causes, since they are in act, have the nature of something perfect. However, the perfect and the imperfect do not coincide in the same thing.

37. Therefore, now that we have seen that there are four causes, the efficient, formal, material and final, we must note that any of these causes can be spoken of in many ways. We call one thing a prior cause and another a posterior cause; for example we say that art and the doctor are the cause of health, but art is a prior cause and the doctor is a posterior cause; and it is similar in the formal cause and in the other causes. Notice, also that we must always bring the question

*formali, et in aliis causis. Et nota quod semper debemus reducere quaestionem ad primam causam, ut si quaeratur: quare est iste sanus? Dicendum est: quia medicus sanavit et iterum, quare medicus sanavit propter artem sanandi quam habet.*

*Sciendum est quod idem est dictu causa propinqua quod causa posterior, et causa remota quod causa prior. Unde istae duae divisiones causarum: alia per prius, alia per posterius; et causarum alia remota, alia propinqua, idem significant. Hoc autem observandum est, quod semper illud quod universalius est, causa remota dicitur, quod autem specialius, causa propinqua: sicut dicimus quod forma hominis propinqua est sua definitio, scilicet animal rationale mortale, sed animal est magis remota, et iterum substantia remotior est. Omnia enim superiora sunt formae inferiorum. Et similiter materia idoli propinqua est cuprum, sed remota est metallum, et iterum remotius corpus.*

*Item causarum alia est per se, alia per accidens. Causa per se dicitur causa alicuius rei in quantum huiusmodi, sicut aedificator est causa domus, et lignum materia scamni. Causa per accidens est illa quae accidit causae per se, sicut cum dicimus grammaticus aedificat. Grammaticus enim dicitur causa aedificationis per accidens, non enim in quantum grammaticus, sed in quantum accidit aedificatori. Et similiter est in aliis causis.*

*Item causarum quaedam est simplex, et quaedam composita. Simplex causa dicitur quando solum dicitur causa illud quod per se est causa, vel etiam solum illud quod est per accidens: sicut si dicamus aedificatorem esse causam domus, et similiter si dicamus medicum esse causam domus. Composita autem dicitur quando utrumque dicitur causa, ut si dicamus: aedificator medicus est causa domus.*

*Potest etiam dici causa simplex, secundum quod exponit Avicenna, illud quod sine adiunctione alterius est causa, sicut cuprum idoli, sine adiunctione enim alterius materiae ex cupro fit idolum; et sicut dicitur quod medicus facit sanitatem, vel quod ignis calefacit. Composita autem causa est, quando oportet plura advenire ad hoc quod sit causa: sicut unus homo non est causa motus navis, sed multi; et sicut unus lapis non est materia domus, sed multi.*

back to the first cause. For example, if it be asked: "Why is this man healthy?", we would answer: "Because the doctor has healed him." Likewise, if it be asked: "Why did the doctor heal him?", we would say: "Because of the art of healing which the doctor has."

38. Notice, also, that the proximate cause is the same as the posterior cause and that the remote cause is the same as the prior cause. Hence these two divisions of causes into prior and posterior, remote and proximate signify the same thing. Moreover, it must be observed that that which is more universal is always called the remote cause, but that which is more particular is called the proximate cause. For example we say that the proximate form of man is his definition, namely, rational animal; but animal is more remote and substance is still more remote. All superiors are forms of the inferiors. Again, the proximate matter of the statue is bronze, but the remote matter is metal, and the still more remote is body.

39. Further, there is one cause which is a *per se* cause, another which is *per accidens*. A *per se* cause is said of one which is the cause of something as such, for example the builder is the cause of the house and the wood is the matter of the bench. A *per accidens* cause is said of one which happens to a *per se* cause. For example we say that the grammarian builds; the grammarian is called the cause of the building *per accidens*, not in so far as he is a grammarian, but in so far as it happens to the builder that he is a grammarian; and it is similar in other causes.

40. Likewise, some causes are simple, others are composed. A cause is simple when that alone is said to be the cause which is the *per se* cause, or that alone which is the *per accidens* cause; as if we were to say that the builder is the cause of the house and likewise if we were to say that the doctor is the cause of the house. A cause is composed when both are said to be the cause, as if we were to say that the medical builder is the cause of the house.

41. According to the explanation of Ibn-Sīnā, that can be called a simple cause also which is a cause without the addition of another; for example bronze is the cause of the statue without the addition of another matter because the statue is made of bronze; and we say that the doctor causes health or that fire heats. But a cause is composed when many things must come together in order that there be a cause; for example not one man, but many are the cause of the motion of a ship; and not one stone, but many are the cause of a house.

*Item causarum quaedam est actu, quaedam potentia. Causa in actu est quae actu causat rem, sicut aedificator cum aedificat, vel cuprum cum ex eo est idolum. Causa autem in potentia est quae licet non causet rem in actu, tamen potest causare: ut aedificator, dum non aedificat.*

*Et sciendum quod loquendo de causis in actu, necessarium est causam et causatum simul esse, ita quod si unum sit, et alterum. Si enim est aedificator in actu, oportet quod aedificet; et si sit aedificatio in actu, oportet quod sit aedificator in actu. Sed hoc non est necessarium in causis quae sunt solum in potentia.*

*Sciendum est autem quod causa universalis comparatur causato universali, causa vero singularis comparatur causato singulari: sicut dicimus quod aedificator est causa domus, et hic aedificator huius domus.*

### **Caput 6**

*Sciendum est etiam quod loquendo de principiis intrinsecis, scilicet materia et forma, secundum convenientiam principiatorum et differentiam est convenientia et differentia principiorum: quaedam enim sunt idem numero, sicut Socrates et hic homo demonstrato Socrate; quaedam sunt diversa numero et sunt idem in specie, ut Socrates et Plato, qui, licet convenient in specie humana, tamen differunt numero. Quedam autem differunt specie, sed sunt idem genere, sicut homo et asinus conveniunt in genere animalis; quaedam autem sunt diversa in genere, sed sunt idem solum secundum analogiam, sicut substantia et quantitas, quae non conveniunt in aliquo genere, sed conveniunt solum secundum analogiam: conveniunt enim in eo solum quod est ens. Ens autem non est genus, quia non praedicatur univoce, sed analogice.*

*Ad huius intelligentiam sciendum est, quod tripliciter aliquid praedicatur de pluribus: univoce, aequivoce et analogice. Univoce praedicatur quod praedicatur secundum idem nomen et secundum rationem eandem, idest definitionem, sicut animal praedicatur de homine et de asino. Utrumque enim dicitur animal, et utrumque est substantia animata sensibilis, quod est definitio animalis. Aequivoce praedicatur, quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen, et secundum diversam rationem: sicut canis dicitur de latrabili et de caelesti, quae conveniunt solum in nomine, et non in definitione sive significatione: id enim quod significatur per nomen, est definitio, sicut*

42. Again, some causes are in act, others are in potency. A cause in act is one which causes a thing in act, as the builder while he is building or the bronze when a statue is made of it. A cause in potency is one which, although it does not cause a thing in act, can, nevertheless, cause it; as a builder when he is not building.

43. Note that, in speaking of causes in act it is necessary that the cause and the thing caused exist at the same time, so that if one exists the other does also. If there is a builder in act, it is necessary that he be building and, if there is building in act, it is necessary that there be a builder in act. But this is not necessary in causes which are only in potency.

44. Moreover, it should be noted that the universal cause is compared to the universal thing that is caused and the singular cause is compared to the singular thing that is caused, for example we say that a builder is the cause of a house and that this builder is the cause of this house.

45. Also, notice that, when we speak of intrinsic principles, namely, matter and form, according to the agreement and difference of things that are from principles and according to the agreement and difference of principles, we find that some are numerically the same, as are Socrates and this man in the Socrates now pointed out; others are numerically diverse and specifically the same, as Socrates and Plato who, although they differ numerically, have the same human species; others differ specifically but are generically the same, as man and ass have the same genus animal; others are generically diverse and are only analogically the same, as substance and quantity which have no common genus and are only analogically the same, because they are the same only in so far as they are beings. "Being", however, is not a genus because it is not predicated univocally, but only analogically.

46. In order to understand this last we must notice something is predicated of many things in three ways: univocally, equivocally and analogically. Something is predicated **univocally** according to the same name and the same nature, i.e., definition, as animal is predicated of man and of ass, because each is called animal and each is a sensible, animated substance, which is the definition of animal. That is predicated **equivocally** which is predicated of some things according to the same name but according to a different nature, as dog is said of the thing that barks and of the star in the heavens, which two agree in the name but not in the definition or in signification, because that which is signified by the name is the definition, as is said in the fourth book of



*dicitur in quarto Metaph. Analogice dicitur praedicari, quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes diversae sunt sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem: sicut sanum dicitur de corpore animalis et de urina et de potione, sed non ex toto idem significat in omnibus. Dicitur enim de urina ut de signo sanitatis, de corpore ut de subiecto, de potione ut de causa; sed tamen omnes istae rationes attribuuntur uni fini, scilicet sanitati.*

*Aliquando enim ea quae conveniunt secundum analogiam, id est in proportione vel comparatione vel convenientia, attribuuntur uni fini, sicut patet in praedicto exemplo; aliquando uni agenti, sicut medicus dicitur et de eo qui operatur per artem et de eo qui operatur sine arte, ut vetula, et etiam de instrumentis, sed per attributionem ad unum agens, quod est medicina; aliquando autem per attributionem ad unum subiectum, sicut ens dicitur de substantia, de qualitate et quantitate et aliis praedicamentis. Non enim ex toto est eadem ratio qua substantia est ens, et quantitas, et alia, sed omnia dicuntur ex eo quod attribuuntur substantiae, quod est subiectum aliorum.*

*Et ideo ens dicitur per prius de substantia, et per posterius de aliis. Et ideo ens non est genus substantiae et quantitatis, quia nullum genus praedicatur per prius et posterius de suis speciebus, sed praedicatur analogice. Et hoc est quod diximus quod substantia et quantitas differunt genere, sed sunt idem analogia.*

*Eorum igitur quae sunt idem numero, forma et materia sunt idem numero, ut Tullii et Ciceronis. Eorum autem quae sunt idem in specie diversa numero, etiam materia et forma non est eadem numero, sed specie, sicut Socratis et Platonis. Et similiter eorum quae sunt idem genere, et principia sunt idem genere: ut anima et corpus asini et equi differunt specie, sed sunt idem genere. Et similiter eorum quae conveniunt secundum analogiam tantum, principia sunt eadem secundum analogiam tantum, sive proportionem. Materia enim et forma et privatio, sive potentia et actus, sunt principia substantiae et aliorum generum. Tamen materia substantiae et quantitatis, et similiter forma et privatio differunt genere, sed conveniunt solum secundum proportionem in hoc quod, sicut se habet materia substantiae ad substantiam in ratione materiae, ita se habet materia quantitatis ad quantitatem. Sicut tamen*

the *Metaphysics*. That is said to be predicated **analogically** which is predicated of many whose natures are diverse but which are attributed to one same thing, as health is said of the animal body, or urine and of food, but it does not signify entirely the same thing in all three; it is said of urine as a sign of health, of body as of a subject and of food as of a cause. But all these natures are attributed to one end, namely to health.

47. Sometimes those things which agree according to analogy, i.e., in proportion, comparison or agreement, are attributed to one end, as was plain in the preceding example of health. Sometimes they are attributed to one agent, as medical is said of one who acts with art, of one who acts without art, as a midwife, and even of the instruments; but it is said of all by attribution to one agent which is medicine. Sometimes it is said by attribution to one subject, as "being" is said of substance, quantity, quality and the other predicaments, because it is not entirely for the same reason that substance is being, and quantity and the others. Rather, all are called being in so far as they are attributed to substance which is the subject of the others.

48. Therefore being is said primarily of substance and secondarily of the others. Therefore "being" is not a genus of substance and quantity because no genus is predicated of its species according to prior and posterior; rather, "being" is predicated analogically. This is what we mean when we say that substance and quantity differ generically but are the same analogically.

49. Therefore the form and matter of those things which are numerically the same are themselves likewise numerically the same, as are the form and matter of Tullius and Cicero. The matter and form of those things which are specifically the same and numerically diverse are not the same numerically, but specifically, as the matter and form of Socrates and Plato. Likewise, the matter and form of those things which are generically the same, as the soul and body of an ass and a horse differ specifically but are the same generically; likewise, the principles of those things which agree only analogically or proportionally are the same only analogically or proportionally, because matter, form and privation or potency and act are the principles of substance and of the other genera. However, the matter, form and privation of substance and of quantity differ generically, but they agree according to proportion only, in so far as the matter of substance is to substance, in the nature of matter, as the matter of quantity is to quantity; still, just as substance

*substantia est causa ceterorum, ita principia substantiae sunt principia omnium aliorum.*

is the cause of the others, so the principles of substance are the principles of all the others.

## **De Ente et Essentia**

Capitulum 1. On the meaning of the terms 'being' and 'essence'

Capitulum 2. On the essences of composite substances

*Prooemium De ente et essentia, pr. Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine, secundum philosophum in I caeli et mundi, ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in principio suae metaphysicae, ideo ne ex eorum ignorantia errare contingat, ad horum difficultatem aperiendam dicendum est quid nomine essentiae et entis significetur et quomodo in diversis inveniatur et quomodo se habeat ad intentiones logicas, scilicet genus, speciem et differentiam.*

*Quia vero ex compositis simplicium cognitionem accipere debemus et ex posterioribus in priora devenire, ut, a facilibus incipientes, convenientior fiat disciplina, ideo ex significatione entis ad significationem essentiae procedendum est.*

### *Caput 1*

*Sciendum est igitur quod, sicut in V metaphysicae philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quod dividitur per decem genera, alio modo quod significat propositionum veritatem. Horum autem differentia est quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud, de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest, etiam si illud in re nihil ponat. Per quem modum privationes et negationes entia dicuntur; dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi et quod caecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo non potest dici ens nisi quod aliquid in re ponit. Unde primo modo caecitas et huiusmodi non sunt entia.*

*Nomen igitur essentiae non sumitur ab ente secundo modo dicto, aliqua enim hoc modo dicuntur entia, quae essentiam non habent, ut patet in privationibus; sed sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Unde Commentator in eodem loco dicit quod ens primo modo dictum est quod significat essentiam rei. Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia in*

Since we ought to acquire knowledge of simple things from composite ones and come to know the prior from the posterior, in instructing beginners we should begin with what is easier, and so we shall begin with the signification of being and proceed from there to the signification of essence.

### Chapter 1

As the Philosopher says in V Metaphysicae cap. 7 (1017a22-35), being has two senses. In one sense, being signifies that which is divided into the ten categories; in another sense, that which signifies the truth of propositions. The difference between these is that, in the second sense, anything can be called a being about which an affirmative proposition can be formed, even if the thing posits nothing in reality. In this way, privations and negations are called beings, as when we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, or that blindness is in the eye. But in the first sense, nothing can be called a being unless it posits something in reality, and thus in this first sense blindness and similar things are not beings.

The term essence is not taken from being in the second sense, for in this sense some things are called beings that have no essence, as is clear with privations. Rather, the term essence is taken from being in the first sense. Thus in Metaphysicae V, com. 14, the Commentator explains the cited text from Aristotle by saying that being, in the first sense, is what signifies the essence of a thing. And since, as said above, being in this sense is divided into the ten categories, essence signifies something common to all natures through which the

*diversis generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis.*

*Et quia illud, per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel specie, est hoc quod significatur per diffinitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen essentiae a philosophis in nomen quidditatis mutatur. Et hoc est quod philosophus frequenter nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid. Dicitur etiam forma secundum quod per formam significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque rei, ut dicit Avicenna in II metaphysicae suae. Hoc etiam alio nomine natura dicitur accipiendo naturam secundum primum modum illorum quattuor, quos Boethius in libro de duabus naturis assignat, secundum scilicet quod natura dicitur omne illud quod intellectu quoquo modo capi potest. Non enim res est intelligibilis nisi per diffinitionem et essentiam suam. Et sic etiam philosophus dicit in V metaphysicae quod omnis substantia est natura. Tamen nomen naturae hoc modo sumptae videtur significare essentiam rei, secundum quod habet ordinem ad propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res propria operatione destituatur. Quidditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc, quod per diffinitionem significatur. Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse.*

*Sed quia ens absolute et per prius dicitur de substantiis et per posterius et quasi secundum quid de accidentibus, inde est quod essentia proprie et vere est in substantiis, sed in accidentibus est quodammodo et secundum quid. Substantiarum vero quaedam sunt simplices et quaedam compositae, et in utrisque est essentia, sed in simplicibus veriori et nobiliori modo, secundum quod etiam esse nobilius habent. Sunt enim causa eorum quae composita sunt, ad minus substantia prima simplex, quae Deus est. Sed quia illarum substantiarum essentiae sunt nobis magis occultae, ideo ab essentiis substantiarum compositarum incipiendum est, ut a facilioribus convenientior fiat disciplina.*

*In substantiis igitur compositis forma et materia nota est, ut in homine anima et corpus. Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tantum essentia esse dicatur. Quod enim materia sola non sit essentia rei planum est, quia res per essentiam suam et cognoscibilis est et in specie ordinatur vel genere. Sed materia neque cognitionis principium est, neque secundum eam*

various beings are placed in the various genera and species, as humanity is the essence of man, and so on.

Since that through which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species is what is signified by the definition indicating what the thing is, philosophers introduced the term quiddity to mean the same as the term essence; and this is the same thing that the Philosopher frequently terms what it is to be a thing, that is, that through which something has being as a particular kind of thing. Essence is also called form, for the certitude of every thing is signified through its form, as Avicenna says in his *Metaphysicae* I, cap. 6. The same thing is also called nature, taking nature in the first of the four senses that Boethius distinguishes in his book *De Persona et Duabus Naturis* cap. 1 (PL 64, 1341B), in the sense, in other words, that nature is what we call everything that can in any way be captured by the intellect, for a thing is not intelligible except through its definition and essence. And so the Philosopher says in *V Metaphysicae* cap. 4 (1014b36) that every substance is a nature. But the term nature used in this way seems to signify the essence of a thing as it is ordered to the proper operation of the thing, for no thing is without its proper operation. The term quiddity, surely, is taken from the fact that this is what is signified by the definition. But the same thing is called essence because the being has existence through it and in it.

But because being is absolutely and primarily said of substances, and only secondarily and in a certain sense said of accidents, essence too is properly and truly in substances and is in accidents only in a certain way and in a certain sense. Now some substances are simple and some are composite, and essence is in both, though in the simple substances in a truer and more noble way, as these have existence in a nobler way: indeed, the simple substances are the cause of the composite ones, or at least this is true with respect to the first simple substance, which is God. But because the essences of these substances are more hidden from us, we ought to begin with the essences of composite substances, as learning is easier when we begin with the easier things.

## Chapter II

In composite substances we find form and matter, as in man there are soul and body. We cannot say, however, that either of these is the essence of the thing. That matter alone is not the essence of the thing is clear, for it is through its essence that a thing is knowable and is placed in a species or genus. But matter is not a principle of cognition; nor is anything determined to a genus or species according to its matter but

*aliquid ad genus vel speciem determinatur, sed secundum id quod aliquid actu est. Neque etiam forma tantum essentia substantiae compositae dici potest, quamvis hoc quidam asserere conentur. Ex his enim quae dicta sunt patet quod essentia est illud, quod per diffinitionem rei significatur. Diffinitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formam continet, sed etiam materiam; aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et mathematicae non differrent. Nec potest dici quod materia in diffinitione substantiae naturalis ponatur sicut additum essentiae eius vel ens extra essentiam eius, quia hic modus diffinitionis proprius est accidentibus, quae perfectam essentiam non habent. Unde oportet quod in diffinitione sua subiectum recipiant, quod est extra genus eorum. Patet ergo quod essentia comprehendit materiam et formam.*

*Non autem potest dici quod essentia significet relationem, quae est inter materiam et formam vel aliquid superadditum ipsis, quia hoc de necessitate esset accidens et extraneum a re nec per eam res cognosceretur, quae omnia essentiae conveniunt. Per formam enim, quae est actus materiae, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid. Unde illud quod superadvenit non dat esse actu simpliciter materiae, sed esse actu tale, sicut etiam accidentia faciunt, ut albedo facit actu album. Unde et quando talis forma acquiritur, non dicitur generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid.*

*Relinquitur ergo quod nomen essentiae in substantiis compositis significat id quod ex materia et forma compositum est. Et huic consonat verbum Boethii in commento praedicamentorum, ubi dicit quod usia significat compositum. Usia enim apud Graecos idem est quod essentia apud nos, ut ipsemet dicit in libro de duabus naturis. Avicenna etiam dicit quod quidditas substantiarum compositarum est ipsa compositio formae et materiae. Commentator etiam dicit super VII metaphysicae: natura quam habent species in rebus generabilibus est aliquod medium, id est compositum ex materia et forma. Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse substantiae compositae non est tantum formae nec tantum materiae, sed ipsius compositi. Essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur. Unde oportet quod essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma neque tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa. Sic enim in aliis videmus, quae ex pluribus principiis constituuntur, quod res*

rather according to what something is in act. Nor is form alone the essence of a composite thing, however much certain people may try to assert this. From what has been said, it is clear that the essence is that which is signified by the definition of the thing. The definition of a natural substance, however, contains not only form but also matter; otherwise, the definitions of natural things and mathematical ones would not differ. Nor can it be said that matter is placed in the definition of a natural substance as something added to the essence or as some being beyond the essence of the thing, for that type of definition is more proper to accidents, which do not have a perfect essence and which include in their definitions a subject beyond their own genus. Therefore, the essence clearly comprises both matter and form.

Nor can it be said that essence signifies the relation between the matter and the form or something superadded to these, for then the essence would of necessity be an accident and extraneous to the thing, and the thing would not be known through its essence, contrary to what pertains to an essence. Through the form, surely, which is the act of the matter, the matter is made a being in act and a certain kind of thing. Thus, something that supervenes does not give to the matter existence in act simply, but rather existence in act in a certain way, just as accidents do, as when whiteness makes something actually white. Hence, when such a form is acquired, we do not say that the thing is generated simply but only in a certain way.

The only possibility, therefore, is that the term essence, used with respect to composite substances, signifies that which is composed of matter and form. This conclusion is consistent with what Boethius says in his commentary on the Categories, namely, that ousia signifies what is composite; ousia, of course, is for the Greeks what essence is for us, as Boethius himself says in his book *De Persona et Duabus Naturis*. Avicenna even says, *Metaphysicae* V, cap. 5, that the quiddity of a composite substance is the very composition of the form and the matter. And commenting on Book VII of Aristotle's *Metaphysicae*, the Commentator says, "The nature that species in generable things have is something in the middle; that is, it is composed of matter and form." *Metaphysicae* VII, com. 27. Moreover, reason supports this view, for the existence of a composite substance is neither form alone nor matter alone but is rather composed of these. The essence is that according to which the thing is said to exist; hence, it is right that the essence by which a thing is denominated a being is neither form alone nor matter alone but both, albeit that existence of this kind is caused by the

*non denominatur ex altero illorum principiorum tantum, sed ab eo, quod utrumque complectitur, ut patet in saporibus, quia ex actione calidi digerentis humidum causatur dulcedo, et quamvis hoc modo calor sit causa dulcedinis, non tamen denominatur corpus dulce a calore, sed a sapore qui calidum et humidum complectitur.*

*Sed quia individuationis principium materia est, ex hoc forte videtur sequi quod essentia, quae materiam in se complectitur simul et formam, sit tantum particularis et non universalis. Ex quo sequeretur quod universalia diffinitionem non haberent, si essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur. Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium, sed solum materia signata. Et dico materiam signatam, quae sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur. Haec autem materia in diffinitione hominis, in quantum est homo, non ponitur, sed poneretur in diffinitione Socratis, si Socrates diffinitionem haberet. In diffinitione autem hominis ponitur materia non signata; non enim in diffinitione hominis ponitur hoc os et haec caro, sed os et caro absolute, quae sunt materia hominis non signata.*

*Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia Socratis non differunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum. Unde Commentator dicit super VII metaphysicae: Socrates nihil aliud est quam animalitas et rationalitas, quae sunt quidditas eius. Sic etiam essentia generis et speciei secundum signatum et non signatum differunt, quamvis alius modus designationis sit utrobique, quia designatio individui respectu speciei est per materiam determinatam dimensionibus, designatio autem speciei respectu generis est per differentiam constitutivam, quae ex forma rei sumitur. Haec autem determinatio vel designatio, quae est in specie respectu generis, non est per aliquid in essentia speciei existens, quod nullo modo in essentia generis sit, immo quicquid est in specie, est etiam in genere ut non determinatum. Si enim animal non esset totum quod est homo, sed pars eius, non praedicaretur de eo, cum nulla pars integralis de suo toto praedicetur. Hoc autem quomodo contingat videri poterit, si inspiciatur qualiter differt corpus secundum quod ponitur pars animalis et secundum quod ponitur genus. Non enim potest eo modo esse genus, quo est pars integralis.*

form and not by the matter. Similarly, we see that in other things that are constituted from many principles, the thing is not denominated from just one or the other of the principles but rather from that which embraces both. Thus, with respect to flavors, sweetness is caused by the action of a warm animal body digesting what is wet, and albeit that in this way warmth is the cause of the sweetness, nevertheless a body is not called sweet by reason of the warmth, but rather by reason of the flavor, which embraces both the warmth and the wetness.

But because matter is the principle of individuation, it would perhaps seem to follow that essence, which embraces in itself simultaneously both form and matter, is merely particular and not universal. From this it would follow that universals have no definitions, assuming that essence is what is signified by the definition. Thus, we must point out that matter understood in the way we have thus far understood it is not the principle of individuation; only signate matter is the principle of individuation. I call signate matter matter considered under determinate dimensions. Signate matter is not included in the definition of man as man, but signate matter would be included in the definition of Socrates if Socrates had a definition. In the definition of man, however, is included non-signate matter: in the definition of man we do not include this bone and this flesh but only bone and flesh absolutely, which are the non-signate matter of man.

Hence, the essence of man and the essence of Socrates do not differ except as the signate differs from the non-signate, and so the Commentator says, in *Metaphysicae VII, com. 20*, "Socrates is nothing other than animality and rationality, which are his quiddity." Similarly, the essence of a genus and the essence of a species differ as signate from non-signate, although in the case of genus and species a different mode of designation is used with respect to both. For, the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter determined by dimensions, while the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through the constitutive difference, which is taken from the form of the thing. This determination or designation, however, which is made in the species with respect to the genus, is not through something that exists in the essence of the species but in no way exists in the essence of the genus. On the contrary, whatever is in the species is also in the genus as undetermined. If animal were not all that man is but rather only a part of him, then animal would not be predicated of man, for no integral part is predicated of its whole. We can see how this happens by considering how body as a part of animal differs from body as the genus of animal. In the way body is the genus of animal it cannot be an integral part of animal,

*Hoc igitur nomen quod est corpus multipliciter accipi potest. Corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere substantiae, dicitur ex eo quod habet talem naturam, ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipsae enim tres dimensiones designatae sunt corpus, quod est in genere quantitatis. Contingit autem in rebus, ut quod habet unam perfectionem ad ulteriorem etiam perfectionem pertingat, sicut patet in homine, qui et naturam sensitivam habet et ulterius intellectivam. Similiter etiam et super hanc perfectionem, quae est habere talem formam, ut in ea possint tres dimensiones designari, potest alia perfectio adiungi, ut vita vel aliquid huiusmodi. Potest ergo hoc nomen corpus significare rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua sequitur in ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum cum praecisione, ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla ulterior perfectio sequatur; sed si quid aliud superadditur, sit praeter significationem corporis sic dicti.*

*Potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo accipi, ut significet rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua tres dimensiones possunt in ea designari, quaecumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit provenire aliqua ulterior perfectio sive non. Et hoc modo corpus erit genus animalis, quia in animali nihil est accipere quod non implicite in corpore continetur. Non enim anima est alia forma ab illa, per quam in re illa poterant designari tres dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur quod corpus est quod habet talem formam, ex qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur: quaecumque forma esset, sive animalitas sive lapideitas sive quaecumque alia. Et sic forma animalis implicite in forma corporis continetur, prout corpus est genus eius.*

*Et talis est etiam habitudo animalis ad hominem. Si enim animal nominaret tantum rem quandam, quae habet talem perfectionem, ut possit sentire et moveri per principium in ipso existens cum praecisione alterius perfectionis, tunc quaecumque alia perfectio ulterior superveniret, haberet se ad animal per modum partis et non sicut implicite contenta in ratione animalis, et sic animal non esset genus; sed est genus secundum quod significat rem quandam, ex cuius forma potest provenire sensus et motus, quaecumque sit illa forma, sive sit anima sensibilis tantum sive sensibilis et rationalis simul.*

*Sic ergo genus significat indeterminate totum id quod est in specie, non enim significat tantum materiam;*

and thus the term body can be accepted in several ways. Body is said to be in the genus of substance in that it has a nature such that three dimensions can be designated in the body. These three designated dimensions are the body that is in the genus of quantity. Now, it sometimes happens that what has one perfection may attain to a further perfection as well, as is clear in man, who has a sensitive nature and, further, an intellective one. Similarly, above this perfection of having a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, there can be joined another perfection, as life or some similar thing. This term body, therefore, can signify a certain thing that has a form such that from the form there follows in the thing designability in three dimensions and nothing more, such that, in other words, from this form no further perfection follows, but if some other thing is superadded, it is beyond the signification of body thus understood. And understood in this way, body will be an integral and material part of the animal, because in this way the soul will be beyond what is signified by the term body, and it will supervene on the body such that from these two, namely the soul and the body, the animal is constituted as from parts.

This term body can also be understood as signifying a certain thing that has a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, whatever form this may be, and such that either from the form some further perfection can proceed or not. Understood in this way, body will be the genus of animal, for there will be understood in animal nothing that is not implicitly contained in body. Now, the soul is a form through which there can be designated in the thing three dimensions, and therefore, when we say that body is what has a form from which three dimensions can be designated in the body, we understand there is some kind of form of this type, whether soul, or lapideousness, or whatever other form. And thus the form of animal is implicitly contained in the form of body, just as body is its genus.

The relation of animal to man is the same. For if animal named just a certain thing that has a perfection such that it can sense and move by a principle existing in itself, without any other perfection, then whatever further perfection may supervene would be related to animal as a component part, and not as implicitly contained in the notion of animal; and in this way animal would not be a genus. But animal is a genus in that it signifies a certain thing from the form of which sensation and motion can proceed, whatever this form may be, whether a sensible soul only, or a soul both sensible and rational.

Therefore, the genus signifies indeterminately the whole that is in the species and does not signify matter alone. Similarly,

*similiter etiam differentia significat totum et non significat tantum formam; et etiam diffinitio significat totum, et etiam species. Sed tamen diversimode, quia genus significat totum ut quaedam denominatio determinans id quod est materiale in re sine determinatione propriae formae. Unde genus sumitur ex materia, quamvis non sit materia, ut patet quod corpus dicitur ex hoc quod habet talem perfectionem, ut possint in eo designari tres dimensiones; quae quidem perfectio est materialiter se habens ad ulteriorem perfectionem. Differentia vero e converso est sicut quaedam denominatio a forma determinate sumpta praeter hoc quod de primo intellectu eius sit materia determinata, ut patet, cum dicitur animatum, scilicet illud quod habet animam; non enim determinatur quid sit, utrum corpus vel aliquid aliud. Unde dicit Avicenna quod genus non intelligitur in differentia sicut pars essentiae eius, sed solum sicut ens extra essentiam, sicut etiam subiectum est de intellectu passionum. Et ideo etiam genus non praedicatur de differentia per se loquendo, ut dicit philosophus in III metaphysicae et in IV topicorum, nisi forte sicut subiectum praedicatur de passione. Sed diffinitio vel species comprehendit utrumque, scilicet determinatam materiam, quam designat nomen generis, et determinatam formam, quam designat nomen differentiae.*

*Ex hoc patet ratio quare genus, species et differentia se habent proportionaliter ad materiam et formam et compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem quod illa, quia neque genus est materia, sed a materia sumptum ut significans totum, neque differentia forma, sed a forma sumpta ut significans totum. Unde dicimus hominem esse animal rationale et non ex animali et rationali, sicut dicimus eum esse ex anima et corpore. Ex anima enim et corpore dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus quaedam res tertia constituta, quae neutra illarum est. Homo enim neque est anima neque corpus. Sed si homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali esse dicatur, non erit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus, sed sicut intellectus tertius ex duobus intellectibus. Intellectus enim animalis est sine determinatione specialis formae, exprimens naturam rei ab eo quod est materiale respectu ultimae perfectionis. Intellectus autem huius differentiae rationalis consistit in determinatione formae specialis. Ex quibus duobus intellectibus constituitur intellectus speciei vel diffinitionis. Et ideo sicut res constituta ex aliquibus non recipit praedicationem earum rerum, ex quibus constituitur, ita nec intellectus recipit praedicationem eorum*

the difference also signifies the whole and does not signify the form alone, and the definition, or even the species, signifies the whole. But these nevertheless signify the same thing in different ways. For the genus signifies the whole as a certain denomination determining that which is material in the thing without a determination of its proper form, whence the genus is taken from the matter, although it is not the matter. This is clear in the case of bodies, as we call something a body in that the thing has a perfection such that in the thing three dimensions can be designated, and this perfection is related materially to some further perfection. Conversely, the difference is like a certain denomination taken from the determined form, beyond the first conception of the form by which the matter is determined. So, when we say something is animated (that, in other words, it has a soul), this does not determine what the thing is, whether it is a body or some other thing. Hence, Avicenna says, *Metaphysicae V*, cap. 6, that the genus is not understood in the difference as a part of its essence but only as a being beyond its essence, even as a subject is with respect to the concept of a passion. And thus the genus is not predicated per se of the difference, as the Philosopher says in *III Metaphysicae* cap. 8 (998b24) and in *IV Topicorum* cap. 2 (122b22-26), unless perhaps as a subject is predicated of a passion. But the definition or the species comprehends both, namely, the determined matter that the term genus designates and the determined form that the term difference designates.

From this it is clear why the genus, the difference, and the species are related proportionally to the matter, the form, and the composite in nature, although they are not the same as these things. For, the genus is not the matter, though it is taken from the matter as signifying the whole; nor is the difference the form, though it is taken from the form as signifying the whole. Thus we say that man is a rational animal, but not composed of the animal and the rational in the sense that we say that man is composed of soul and body: man is said to be composed of soul and body as from two things from which a third thing is constituted different from each of the two. Man, surely, is neither body nor soul. But if man is said in some sense to be composed of the animal and the rational, it will not be as a third thing composed from these two things, but as a third concept composed from these two concepts. The concept of animal is without determination of a special form and expresses, with respect to the ultimate perfection, the nature of the thing from that which is material; the concept of the difference, rational, consists in the determination of the special form. From these two concepts are constituted the concept of the species or the definition. Thus, just as a thing constituted from other things does not have predicated of it these other things, so too a concept does not have predicated of it the concepts of which

*intellectuum, ex quibus constituitur. Non enim dicimus quod diffinitio sit genus aut differentia.*

*Quamvis autem genus significet totam essentiam speciei, non tamen oportet ut diversarum specierum, quarum est idem genus, sit una essentia, quia unitas generis ex ipsa indeterminatione vel indifferencia procedit, non autem ita, quod illud quod significatur per genus sit una natura numero in diversis speciebus, cui superveniat res alia, quae sit differentia determinans ipsum, sicut forma determinat materiam, quae est una numero, sed quia genus significat aliquam formam, non tamen determinate hanc vel illam, quam determinate differentia exprimit, quae non est alia quam illa, quae indeterminate significabatur per genus. Et ideo dicit Commentator in XI metaphysicae quod materia prima dicitur una per remotionem omnium formarum, sed genus dicitur unum per communitatem formae significatae. Unde patet quod per additionem differentiae remota illa indeterminatione, quae erat causa unitatis generis, remanent species per essentiam diversae.*

*Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei est indeterminata respectu individui sicut natura generis respectu speciei, inde est quod sicut id quod est genus, prout praedicabatur de specie, implicabat in sua significatione, quamvis indistincte, totum quod determinate est in specie, ita etiam et id quod est species, secundum quod praedicatur de individuo, oportet quod significet totum id quod est essentialiter in individuo, licet indistincte. Et hoc modo essentia speciei significatur nomine hominis, unde homo de Socrate praedicatur. Si autem significetur natura speciei cum praecisione materiae designatae, quae est principium individuationis, sic se habebit per modum partis. Et hoc modo significatur nomine humanitatis; humanitas enim significat id unde homo est homo. Materia autem designata non est id unde homo est homo; et ita nullo modo continetur inter illa, ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo. Cum ergo humanitas in suo intellectu includat tantum ea, ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo, patet quod a significatione eius excluditur vel praeciditur materia designata. Et quia pars non praedicatur de toto, inde est quod humanitas nec de homine nec de Socrate praedicatur. Unde dicit Avicenna quod quidditas compositi non est ipsum compositum, cuius est quidditas, quamvis etiam ipsa quidditas sit composita, sicut humanitas, licet sit composita, non est homo, immo oportet quod sit recepta in aliquo quod est materia designata.*

it is constituted: clearly, we do not say that the definition is either the genus or the difference.

Although the genus may signify the whole essence of the species, nevertheless there is not just one essence of the various species under one genus, for the unity of the genus proceeds from its very indetermination or undifferentiation. Nor is it the case that what is signified through the genus is numerically one nature in the various species such that to it there supervenes some other thing, which is the difference that determines it, as a form determines matter, which is numerically one. Rather, the genus signifies some form (though not determinately this one or that one), which the difference expresses determinately, the very one that is signified indeterminately through the genus. And thus the Commentator says in *Metaphysicae* XII, 4 com. 14, that prime matter is called one by the removal of all forms, but the genus is called one through the commonality of forms signified. Hence, the indetermination, which was the cause of the unity of the genus, having been removed through the addition of the difference, the species remain essentially diverse.

Furthermore, since, as said above, the nature of the species is indeterminate with respect to the individual just as the nature of the genus is with respect to the species, and since, further, the genus, as predicated of the species, includes in its signification (although indistinctly) everything that is in the species determinately, so too does the species, as predicated of the individual, signify everything that is in the individual essentially, although it signifies this indistinctly. In this way, the essence of the species is signified by the term man, and so man is predicated of Socrates. If, however, the nature of the species is signified in such a way as to exclude designate matter, which is the principle of individuation, then the species is related to the individual as a part; and this is how the term humanity signifies, for humanity signifies that by which a man is a man. Designate matter, however, is not that by which a man is a man, and it is in no way contained among those things that make a man a man. Since, therefore, the concept of humanity includes only those things by which a man is a man, designate matter is excluded or pretermitted, and since a part is not predicated of its whole, humanity is predicated neither of man nor of Socrates. Thus Avicenna says, *Metaphysicae* V, cap. 5, that the quiddity of a composite thing is not the composite thing of which it is the quiddity, even though the quiddity itself is composite, as humanity, while composite, is not man. On the contrary, it must be received in something that is designate matter.



*Sed quia, ut dictum est, designatio speciei respectu generis est per formam, designatio autem individui respectu speciei est per materiam, ideo oportet ut nomen significans id, unde natura generis sumitur, cum praecisione formae determinatae perficientis speciem significet partem materialem totius, sicut corpus est pars materialis hominis. Nomen autem significans id, unde sumitur natura speciei cum praecisione materiae designatae, significat partem formalem. Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma quaedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius, non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus, scilicet formae et materiae, sicut forma domus superadditur partibus integralibus eius, sed magis est forma, quae est totum scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum praecisione eorum, per quae nata est materia designari.*

*Sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis significat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed diversimode, ut dictum est, quia hoc nomen homo significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non praecidit designationem materiae, sed implicite, continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet differentiam; et ideo praedicatur hoc nomen homo de individuus. Sed hoc nomen humanitas significat eam ut partem, quia non continet in significatione sua nisi id, quod est hominis in quantum est homo, et praecidit omnem designationem. Unde de individuus hominis non praedicatur. Et propter hoc etiam nomen essentiae quandoque invenitur praedicatum in re, dicimus enim Socratem esse essentiam quandam; et quandoque negatur, sicut dicimus quod essentia Socratis non est Socrates.*

But since, as said above, the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through the form, and the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter, the term signifying that from which the nature of the genus is taken thus excludes the determinate form that completes the species and signifies the material part of the whole, as the body is the material part of the man. However, the term signifying that from which the nature of the species is taken, excluding designate matter, signifies the formal part. Thus, humanity is signified as a certain form, and it is said that it is the form of the whole, not, certainly, as a form superadded to the essential parts (the form and the matter), but rather as the form of a house is superadded to its integral parts; and that is better called the form which is the whole, in other words, that which embraces the form and the matter, albeit excluding those things through which the designability of matter arises.

Therefore, the term man and the term humanity both signify the essence of man, though in diverse ways, as said above. The term man signifies the essence as a whole, in other words, insofar as the essence does not exclude designation of matter but implicitly and indistinctly contains it, in the way in which we said that the genus contains the difference. Hence, the term man is predicated of individuals. But the term humanity signifies the essence of man as a part because it contains in its signification only what belongs to man insofar as he is man, and it excludes all designation, and so it is not predicated of individual men. And for this reason the term essence is sometimes found predicated of the thing, as when we say that Socrates is a certain essence; and sometimes the term essence is denied of the thing, as when we say that the essence of Socrates is not Socrates.

### **Summa Theologiae Prima Pars. Quaestio 10. De aeternitate.**

Articulus 1. Whether this is a good definition of eternity: "eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"?

Articulus 4. Whether eternity differs from time?

### **Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"?**

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio aeternitatis, quam Boetius ponit V de consolatione, dicens quod aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio. Interminabile enim negative dicitur. Sed negatio non est de ratione nisi eorum quae sunt deficientia, quod*

**Objection 1:** It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore

*aeternitati non competit. Ergo in definitione aeternitatis non debet poni interminabile.*

*Praeterea, aeternitas durationem quandam significat. Duratio autem magis respicit esse quam vitam. Ergo non debuit poni in definitione aeternitatis vita, sed magis esse.*

*Praeterea, totum dicitur quod habet partes. Hoc autem aeternitati non convenit, cum sit simplex. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur tota.*

*Praeterea, plures dies non possunt esse simul, nec plura tempora. Sed in aeternitate pluraliter dicuntur dies et tempora, dicitur enim Micheae V, egressus eius ab initio, a diebus aeternitatis; et ad Rom., XVI cap., secundum revelationem mysterii temporibus aeternis taciti. Ergo aeternitas non est tota simul.*

*Praeterea, possessio ad durationem non pertinet. Aeternitas autem quaedam duratio est. Ergo aeternitas non est possessio.*

*Praeterea, possessio ad durationem non pertinet. Aeternitas autem quaedam duratio est. Ergo aeternitas non est possessio.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in cognitionem simplicium oportet nos venire per composita, ita in cognitionem aeternitatis oportet nos venire per tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus motus secundum prius et posterius. Cum enim in quolibet motu sit successio, et una pars post alteram, ex hoc quod numeramus prius et posterius in motu, apprehendimus tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus prioris et posterioris in motu. In eo autem quod caret motu, et semper eodem modo se habet, non est accipere prius et posterius. Sicut igitur ratio temporis consistit in numeratione prioris et posterioris in motu, ita in apprehensione uniformitatis eius quod est omnino extra motum, consistit ratio aeternitatis.*

*Item, ea dicuntur tempore mensurari, quae principium et finem habent in tempore, ut dicitur in IV Physic., et hoc ideo, quia in omni eo quod movetur est accipere aliquod principium et aliquem finem. Quod vero est omnino immutabile, sicut nec successionem, ita nec principium aut finem habere potest.*

in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be found.

**Objection 2:** Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence."

**Objection 3:** Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be "whole."

**Objection 4:** Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" ([Micah 5:2](#)); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" ([Rm. 16:25](#)). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.

**Objection 5:** Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described as "perfect."

**Objection 6:** Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.

**I answer that,** As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.

Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.

*Sic ergo ex duobus notificatur aeternitas. Primo, ex hoc quod id quod est in aeternitate, est interminabile, idest principio et fine carens (ut terminus ad utrumque referatur). Secundo, per hoc quod ipsa aeternitas successione caret, tota simul existens.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod simplicia consueverunt per negationem defini, sicut punctus est cuius pars non est. Quod non ideo est, quod negatio sit de essentia eorum, sed quia intellectus noster, qui primo apprehendit composita, in cognitionem simplicium pervenire non potest, nisi per remotionem compositionis.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod est vere aeternum, non solum est ens, sed vivens, et ipsum vivere se extendit quodammodo ad operationem, non autem esse. Protensio autem durationis videtur attendi secundum operationem, magis quam secundum esse, unde et tempus est numerus motus.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod aeternitas dicitur tota, non quia habet partes, sed in quantum nihil ei deest.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nominibus rerum corporalium metaphorice in Scripturis nominatur, sic aeternitas, tota simul existens, nominibus temporalibus successivis.*

*Ad quintum dicendum quod in tempore est duo considerare, scilicet ipsum tempus, quod est successivum; et nunc temporis, quod est imperfectum. Dicit ergo tota simul, ad removendum tempus, et perfecta, ad excludendum nunc temporis.*

*Ad sextum dicendum quod illud quod possidetur, firmiter et quiete habetur. Ad designandam ergo immutabilitatem et indeficientiam aeternitatis, usus est nomine possessionis.*

Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable—that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.

**Reply to Objection 2:** What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.

**Reply to Objection 4:** As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession.

**Reply to Objection 5:** Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.

**Reply to Objection 6:** Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we use the word "possession."

### Whether eternity differs from time?

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aeternitas non sit aliud a tempore. Impossibile est enim duas esse mensuras durationis simul, nisi una sit pars alterius, non enim sunt simul duo dies vel duae horae; sed dies et hora sunt simul, quia hora est pars diei. Sed*

**Objection 1:** It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, considering hour as part of a

*aeternitas et tempus sunt simul, quorum utrumque mensuram quandam durationis importat. Cum igitur aeternitas non sit pars temporis, quia aeternitas excedit tempus et includit ipsum; videtur quod tempus sit pars aeternitatis, et non aliud ab aeternitate.*

*Praeterea, secundum philosophum in IV Physic., nunc temporis manet idem in toto tempore. Sed hoc videtur constituere rationem aeternitatis, quod sit idem indivisibiliter se habens in toto decursu temporis. Ergo aeternitas est nunc temporis. Sed nunc temporis non est aliud secundum substantiam a tempore. Ergo aeternitas non est aliud secundum substantiam a tempore.*

*Praeterea, sicut mensura primi motus est mensura omnium motuum, ut dicitur in IV Physic., ita videtur quod mensura primi esse sit mensura omnis esse. Sed aeternitas est mensura primi esse, quod est esse divinum. Ergo aeternitas est mensura omnis esse. Sed esse rerum corruptibilium mensuratur tempore. Ergo tempus vel est aeternitas, vel aliquid aeternitatis.*

*Sed contra est quod aeternitas est tota simul, in tempore autem est prius et posterius. Ergo tempus et aeternitas non sunt idem.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod manifestum est tempus et aeternitatem non esse idem. Sed huius diversitatis rationem quidam assignaverunt ex hoc quod aeternitas caret principio et fine, tempus autem habet principium et finem. Sed haec est differentia per accidens, et non per se. Quia dato quod tempus semper fuerit et semper futurum sit, secundum positionem eorum qui motum caeli ponunt sempiternum, adhuc remanebit differentia inter aeternitatem et tempus, ut dicit Boetius in libro de Consolat., ex hoc quod aeternitas est tota simul, quod tempori non convenit, quia aeternitas est mensura esse permanentis, tempus vero est mensura motus. Si tamen praedicta differentia attendatur quantum ad mensurata, et non quantum ad mensuras, sic habet aliquam rationem, quia solum illud mensuratur tempore, quod habet principium et finem in tempore, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Unde si motus caeli semper duraret, tempus non mensuraret ipsum secundum suam totam durationem, cum infinitum non sit mensurabile; sed mensuraret quamlibet circulationem, quae habet principium et finem in tempore.*

*Potest tamen et aliam rationem habere ex parte istarum mensurarum, si accipiatur finis et principium in*

day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.

**Objection 2:** Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different from time.

**Objection 3:** Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being—that is, of the divine being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either eternity or is a part of eternity.

**On the contrary,** Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a "before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing.

**I answer that,** It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time.

Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the

*potentia. Quia etiam dato quod tempus semper duret, tamen possibile est signare in tempore et principium et finem, accipiendo aliquas partes ipsius, sicut dicimus principium et finem diei vel anni, quod non contingit in aeternitate. Sed tamen istae differentiae consequuntur eam quae est per se et primo, differentiam, per hoc quod aeternitas est tota simul, non autem tempus.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si tempus et aeternitas essent mensurae unius generis, quod patet esse falsum, ex his quorum est tempus et aeternitas mensura.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod nunc temporis est idem subiecto in toto tempore, sed differens ratione, eo quod, sicut tempus respondet motui, ita nunc temporis respondet mobili; mobile autem est idem subiecto in toto decursu temporis, sed differens ratione, in quantum est hic et ibi. Et ista alternatio est motus. Similiter fluxus ipsius nunc, secundum quod alternatur ratione, est tempus. Aeternitas autem manet eadem et subiecto et ratione. Unde aeternitas non est idem quod nunc temporis.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut aeternitas est propria mensura ipsius esse, ita tempus est propria mensura motus. Unde secundum quod aliquod esse recedit a permanentia essendi et subditur transmutationi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate et subditur tempori. Esse ergo rerum corruptibilium, quia est transmutabile, non mensuratur aeternitate, sed tempore. Tempus enim mensurat non solum quae transmutantur in actu, sed quae sunt transmutabilia. Unde non solum mensurat motum, sed etiam quietem; quae est eius quod natum est moveri, et non movetur.*

beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.

**Reply to Objection 3:** As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.

## Blogio problema

### **Compendium Theologiae.** Liber I. *De Fide*

Capitulum 114. The Meaning of Good and Evil in Things.

Capitulum 115. Impossibility of an Evil Nature.

Capitulum 116. Good and Evil as Specific Differences and as Contraries.

Capitulum 117. Impossibility of Essential or Supreme Evil.

Capitulum 118. Foundation of Evil in Good as its Substratum.

Capitulum 119. Two Kinds of Evil.

#### *Caput 114*

##### *Quid nomine boni vel mali intelligatur in rebus*

*Est igitur considerandum, quod sicut nomine boni intelligitur esse perfectum, ita nomine mali nihil aliud intelligitur quam privatio esse perfecti. Quia vero privatio proprie accepta, est eius quod natum est, et quando natum est, et quomodo natum est haberi, manifestum est quod ex hoc aliquid dicitur malum quod caret perfectione quam debet habere. Unde homo si visu careat, malum est ei, non autem malum est lapidi, quia non est natus visum habere.*

#### **CHAPTER 114**

##### **THE MEANING OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THINGS**

A question worthy of consideration arises at this point. As the term “good” signifies perfect being, so the term “evil” signifies nothing else than privation of perfect being. In its proper acceptation, privation is predicated of that which is fitted by its nature to be possessed, and to be possessed at a certain time and in a certain manner. Evidently, therefore, a thing is called evil if it lacks a perfection it ought to have. Thus if a man lacks the sense of sight, this is an evil for him. But the same lack is not an evil for a stone, for the stone is not equipped by nature to have the faculty of sight.

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#### *Caput 115*

##### *Quod impossibile est esse aliquam naturam malum*

*Impossibile est autem malum esse aliquam naturam. Nam omnis natura vel est actus, vel potentia, aut compositum ex utroque. Quod autem est actus, perfectio est, et boni obtinet rationem, cum id quod est in potentia, appetat naturaliter esse actu: bonum vero est quod omnia appetunt. Unde et compositum ex actu et potentia, in quantum participat actum, participat bonitatem. Potentia autem in quantum ordinatur ad actum, bonitatem habet: cuius signum est quod quanto potentia est capacior actus et perfectionis, tanto magis commendatur. Relinquitur igitur quod nulla natura secundum se sit malum.*

#### **CHAPTER 115**

##### **IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN EVIL NATURE**

Evil cannot be a nature. Every nature is either act or potency or a composite of the two. Whatever is act, is a perfection and is good in its very concept. And what is in potency has a natural appetite for the reception of act; but what all beings desire is good. Therefore, too, what is composed of act and potency participates in goodness to the extent that it participates in act. And potency possesses goodness inasmuch as it is ordained to act; an indication of this is the fact that potency is esteemed in proportion to its capacity for act and perfection. Consequently no nature is of itself an evil.

*Item. Unumquodque secundum hoc completur quod fit in actu, nam actus est perfectio rei. Nullum autem oppositorum completur per admixtionem alterius, sed magis destruitur vel minuitur, et sic neque malum completur per participationem boni. Omnis autem natura completur per hoc quod habet esse in actu: et*

Likewise, every being achieves its fulfillment according as it is realized in act, for act is the perfection of a thing. However, neither of a pair of opposites achieves fulfillment by being mixed with the other, but is rather destroyed or weakened thereby. Therefore evil does not realize its full capacity by sharing in good. But every

*sic cum esse bonum sit ab omnibus appetibile, omnis natura completur per participationem boni. Nulla igitur natura est malum.*

*Adhuc. Quaelibet natura appetit conservationem sui esse, et fugit destructionem quantum potest. Cum igitur bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, malum vero e contrario quod omnia fugiunt, necesse est dicere, quod esse unamquamque naturam sit bonum secundum se, non esse vero malum. Esse autem malum non est bonum, sed magis non esse malum sub boni comprehenditur ratione. Nulla igitur natura est malum.*

nature realizes its full capacity by having existence in act; and so, since to be good is the object of every being's natural tendency, a nature achieves fulfillment by participating in good. Accordingly no nature is an evil.

Moreover, any nature whatever desires the preservation of its being, and shuns destruction to the full extent of its power. Consequently, since good is that which all desire, and evil, on the contrary, is that which all shun, we must conclude that for any nature existence is in itself good, and non-existence is evil. To be evil, however, is not good; in fact, not to be evil is included in the notion of good. Therefore no nature is an evil.

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### Caput 116

*Qualiter bonum et malum sunt differentiae entis, et contraria, et genera contrariorum*

*Considerandum igitur restat quomodo bonum et malum dicantur contraria, et contrariorum genera, et differentiae aliquas species, scilicet habitus morales, constituentes. Contrariorum enim utrumque est aliqua natura. Non ens enim non potest esse neque genus neque differentia, cum genus praedicetur de re in eo quod quid, differentia vero in eo quod quale quid.*

*Sciendum est igitur, quod sicut naturalia consequuntur speciem a forma, ita moralia a fine, qui est voluntatis obiectum, a quo omnia moralia dependent. Sicut autem in naturalibus uni formae adiungitur privatio alterius, puta formae ignis privatio formae aeris, ita in moralibus uni fini adiungitur privatio finis alterius. Cum igitur privatio perfectionis debita sit malum in naturalibus, formam accipere cui adiungitur privatio formae debita, malum est, non propter formam, sed propter privationem ei adiunctam: sicut igniri malum est ligno. Et in moralibus etiam inhaerere fini cui adiungitur privatio finis debiti, malum est, non propter finem, sed propter privationem adiunctam; et sic duae actiones morales, quae ad contrarios fines ordinantur, secundum bonum et malum differunt, et per consequens contrarii habitus differunt bono et malo quasi differentiis existentibus, et contrarietatem ad invicem habentibus, non propter privationem ex qua dicitur malum, sed propter finem cui privatio adiungitur.*

### CHAPTER 116

**GOOD AND EVIL AS SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES AND AS CONTRARIES**

We have next to inquire how good and evil may be regarded as contraries and genera of contraries and differences constituting species of a sort, namely, moral habits. Each member of a pair of contraries is some kind of nature. For non-being can be neither genus nor specific difference, since genus is predicated of a thing according to what it is (*in eo quod quid*) and difference according to what sort of thing it is (*in eo quod quale quid*).

We must note that, as physical entities receive their species from their form, so moral entities receive their species from the end which is the object of the will and on which all morality depends. In physical entities, moreover, the presence of one form entails the privation of another, as, for instance, the form of fire entails the privation of the form of air. In moral entities, similarly, one end involves the privation of another end. Since the privation of a due perfection is an evil in physical entities, the reception of a form which implies the privation of the form that ought to be possessed, is an evil; not, indeed, because of the form itself, but because of the privation its presence involves. In this sense, to be on fire is an evil for a log of wood. In the field of morality, likewise, the pursuit of an end that entails the privation of the right end is an evil, not on account of the end itself, but because of the privation necessarily implied. It is in this way that two moral actions, directed to contrary ends, differ as good and evil. Consequently the corresponding contrary habits differ in good and evil as by specific differences, and as being contrary to each other. This is so, not on account of the privation from which evil receives its designation, but on account of the end which involves the privation.

*Per hunc etiam modum quidam intelligunt ab Aristotele dictum, quod bonum et malum sunt genera contrariorum, scilicet moralium. Sed si recte attendatur, bonum et malum in genere moralium magis sunt differentiae quam species. Unde melius videtur dicendum, quod bonum et malum dicuntur genera secundum positionem Pythagorae, qui omnia reduxit ad bonum et malum sicut ad prima genera: quae quidem positio habet aliquid veritatis, inquantum omnium contrariorum unum est perfectum, et alterum diminutum, ut patet in albo et nigro, dulci et amaro, et sic de aliis. Semper autem quod perfectum est, pertinet ad rationem boni, quod autem diminutum ad rationem mali.*

This is the sense in which some philosophers understand Aristotle's assertion, that good and evil are genera of contraries [ *Categories*, XI, 14 a 25], namely, of moral contraries. But if we examine the matter closely, we shall find that in the sphere of morals, good and evil are differences rather than species. Hence it seems better to say that good and evil are called genera according to the opinion of Pythagoras, who reduced everything to good and evil as to supreme genera. This position does, indeed, contain some truth, in the sense that in all contraries one member is perfect, whereas the other is deficient. This is clear in the case of white and black, sweet and bitter, and so on. But invariably, what is perfect, pertains to good, and what is deficient, pertains to evil.

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### Caput 117

### CHAPTER 117

*Quod nihil potest esse essentialiter malum, vel summe, sed est corruptio alicuius boni*

#### IMPOSSIBILITY OF ESSENTIAL OR SUPREME EVIL

*Habito igitur quod malum est privatio perfectionis debita, iam manifestum est qualiter malum bonum corrumpit, inquantum scilicet est eius privatio, sicut et caecitas dicitur corrumpere visum, quia est ipsa visus privatio. Nec tamen totum bonum corrumpit: quia supra dictum est quod non solum forma est bonum, sed etiam potentia ad formam, quae quidem potentia est subiectum privationis, sicut et formae. Unde oportet quod subiectum mali sit bonum, non quidem quod est oppositum malo, sed quod est potentia ad ipsum. Ex quo etiam patet quod non quodlibet bonum potest esse subiectum mali, sed solum bonum quod est in potentia respectu alicuius perfectionis qua potest privari: unde in his quae solum actus sunt, vel in quibus actus a potentia separari non potest, quantum ad hoc non potest esse malum.*

Knowing that evil is the privation of a due perfection, we can easily understand how evil corrupts good; this it does to the extent that it is the privation of good. Thus blindness is said to corrupt sight because it is the privation of sight. However, evil does not completely corrupt good, because, as we remarked above, not only form, but also potency to form, is good; and potency is the subject of privation as well as of form. Therefore the subject of evil must be good, not in the sense that it is opposed to evil, but in the sense that it is a potency for the reception of evil. This brings out the fact that not every good can be the subject of evil, but only such a good as is in potency with respect to some perfection of which it can be deprived. Hence in beings which are exclusively act, or in which act cannot be separated from potency, there can, to this extent, be no evil.

*Patet etiam ex hoc, quod non potest esse aliquid quod sit essentialiter malum, cum semper oporteat malum in alio subiecto bono fundari: ac per hoc nihil potest esse summe malum, sicut est summe bonum, quod est essentialiter bonum.*

As a result, nothing can be essentially evil, since evil must always have as its foundation some subject, distinct from it, that is good. And so there cannot be a being that is supremely evil, in the way that there is a being that is supremely good because it is essentially good.

*Secundum idem etiam patet quod malum non potest esse desideratum, nec aliquid agere nisi virtute boni adiuncti. Desiderabile enim est perfectio et finis, principium autem actionis est forma. Quia vero uni perfectioni vel formae adiungitur privatio alterius perfectionis aut formae, contingit per accidens quod privatio seu malum desideratur, et est alicuius actionis principium, non inquantum est malum, sed*

Further, we see clearly that evil cannot be the object of desire, and that it cannot act except in virtue of the good connected with it. For only perfection and end are desirable; and the principle of action is form. However, since a particular perfection or form involves the privation of some other perfection or form, it can happen incidentally that privation or evil may be desired and may be the principle of some action; not precisely because of the evil, but because



*propter bonum adiunctum, sicut musicus aedificat non inquantum musicus, sed inquantum domifactor.*

*Ex quo etiam patet quod impossibile est malum esse primum principium, eo quod principium per accidens est posterius eo quod est per se.*

of the good connected with it. An example of what I here mean by “incidentally” is the musician who constructs a house, not in his capacity of musician, but in the capacity of being also a builder.

From this we may also infer that evil cannot be a first principle, for a principle *per accidens* is subsequent to a principle that is such *per se*.

### Caput 118

*Quod malum fundatur in bono sicut in subiecto*

*Si quis autem contra praedicta obiicere velit, quod bonum non potest esse subiectum mali, et quod unum oppositorum non sit subiectum alterius, nec unquam in aliis oppositis invenitur quod sint simul, considerare debet, quod alia opposita sunt alicuius generis determinati, bonum autem et malum communia. Nam omne ens, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum est; omnis autem privatio, inquantum talis, est mala. Unde sicut subiectum privationis oportet esse ens, ita et bonum; non autem subiectum privationis oportet esse album, aut dulce, aut videns, quia haec non dicuntur de ente inquantum huiusmodi; et ideo nigrum non est in albo, nec caecitas in vidente; sed malum est in bono, sicut et caecitas est in subiecto visus; sed quod subiectum visus non dicatur videns, hoc est quia videns non est commune omni enti.*

### CHAPTER 118

#### FOUNDATION OF EVIL IN GOOD AS ITS SUBSTRATUM

Some may feel impelled to lodge a difficulty against this presentation: good cannot be the substratum of evil, for one of a pair of opposites cannot be the substratum of the other, nor do extremes ever exist together in other kinds of opposition. But let such quibblers reflect that other kinds of opposition belong to some definite genus, whereas good and evil are common to all genera. Every being, as such, is good; and every privation, as such, is evil. The substratum of a privation must be a being, hence good. But the subject of a privation need not be white or sweet or endowed with sight, because none of these predicates belongs to being as such. And so black is not in white, nor blindness in the person who sees; but evil is in good, just as blindness is in the sense that is the subject of sight. The reason why the subject of sight, in the case of a blind man, is not called “seeing,” is that “seeing” is not a predicate common to every being.

### Caput 119

*De duplici genere mali*

*Quia igitur malum est privatio et defectus; defectus autem, ut ex dictis patet, potest contingere in re aliqua non solum secundum quod in natura sua consideratur, sed etiam secundum quod per actionem ordinatur ad finem, consequens est ut malum utroque modo dicatur, scilicet secundum defectum in ipsa re, prout caecitas est quoddam malum animalis, et secundum defectum in actione prout claudicatio significat actionem cum defectu. Malum igitur actionis ad aliquem finem ordinatae, ad quem non debito modo se habet, peccatum dicitur tam in voluntariis quam in naturalibus. Peccat enim medicus in actione sua, dum non operatur convenienter ad sanitatem; et natura*

### CHAPTER 119

#### TWO KINDS OF EVIL

Since evil is privation and defect, and since defect, as is clear from what we said above, can occur in a thing both as regarded in its nature and as regarded in its relation to an end by its action, we may speak of evil in both senses: that is, by reason of a defect in the thing itself (thus blindness is a certain evil in an animal), and by reason of a defect in a creature’s action (thus lameness connotes action with a defect). Evil in an action that is directed to an end in such a way that it is not rightly related to the end, is called fault (*peccatum*) both in voluntary agents and in natural agents. A physician is faulty (*peccat*) in his action, when he does not proceed in such a way as to procure health. Nature, too, is faulty in its activity when it fails to advance a generated

*etiam peccat in sua operatione, dum ad debitam dispositionem et formam rem generatam non perducit, sicut cum accidunt monstra in natura.*

being, to its proper disposition and form; this is why monsters occur in nature.

**Summa Theologiae Prima Pars. Quaestio 48. De distinctione boni et mali.**

Articulus 1. Whether evil is a nature?

Articulus 2. Whether evil is found in things?

Articulus 3. Whether evil is in good as in its subject?

Articulus 4. Whether evil corrupts the whole good?

**Whether evil is a nature?**

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod malum sit natura quaedam. Quia omne genus est natura quaedam. Sed malum est quoddam genus, dicitur enim in praedicamentis, quod bonum et malum non sunt in genere, sed sunt genera aliorum. Ergo malum est natura quaedam.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x) that "good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things." Therefore evil is a nature.

*Praeterea, omnis differentia constitutiva alicuius speciei est natura quaedam. Malum autem est differentia constitutiva in moralibus, differt enim specie malus habitus a bono, ut liberalitas ab illiberalitate. Ergo malum significat naturam quandam.*

**Objection 2:** Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality; for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.

*Praeterea, utrumque contrariorum est natura quaedam. Sed malum et bonum non opponuntur ut privatio et habitus, sed ut contraria, ut probat philosophus, in praedicamentis, per hoc quod inter bonum et malum est aliquid medium, et a malo potest fieri reditus ad bonum. Ergo malum significat naturam quandam.*

**Objection 3:** Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries, as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.

*Praeterea, quod non est, non agit. Sed malum agit, quia corrumpit bonum. Ergo malum est quoddam ens, et natura quaedam.*

**Objection 4:** Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.

*Praeterea, ad perfectionem universitatis rerum non pertinet nisi quod est ens et natura quaedam. Sed malum pertinet ad perfectionem universitatis rerum, dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., quod ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulchritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum, et suo loco positum, eminentius commendat bona. Ergo malum est natura quaedam.*

**Objection 5:** Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir. 10,11) that the "admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is the eminent commendation of what is good." Therefore evil is a nature.

*Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., malum non est existens neque bonum.*

**On the contrary,** Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither a being nor a good."

*Respondeo dicendum quod unum oppositorum cognoscitur per alterum, sicut per lucem tenebra. Unde et quid sit malum, oportet ex ratione boni accipere. Diximus autem supra quod bonum est omne id quod est appetibile, et sic, cum omnis natura appetat suum esse et suam perfectionem, necesse est dicere quod esse et perfectio cuiuscumque naturae rationem habeat bonitatis. Unde non potest esse quod malum significet quoddam esse, aut quandam formam seu naturam. Relinquitur ergo quod nomine mali significetur quaedam absentia boni. Et pro tanto dicitur quod malum neque est existens nec bonum, quia cum ens, inquantum huiusmodi, sit bonum, eadem est remotio utrorumque.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Aristoteles ibi loquitur secundum opinionem Pythagoricorum, qui malum existimabant esse naturam quandam, et ideo ponebant bonum et malum genera. Consuevit enim Aristoteles, et praecipue in libris logicalibus, ponere exempla quae probabilia erant suo tempore, secundum opinionem aliquorum philosophorum. Vel dicendum, sicut dicit philosophus in X Metaphys., quod prima contrarietas est habitus et privatio, quia scilicet in omnibus contrariis salvatur, cum semper unum contrariorum sit imperfectum respectu alterius, ut nigrum respectu albi, et amarum respectu dulcis. Et pro tanto bonum et malum dicuntur genera, non simpliciter, sed contrariorum, quia sicut omnis forma habet rationem boni, ita omnis privatio, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem mali.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum et malum non sunt differentiae constitutivae nisi in moralibus, quae recipiunt speciem ex fine, qui est obiectum voluntatis, a qua moralia dependent. Et quia bonum habet rationem finis, ideo bonum et malum sunt differentiae specificae in moralibus; bonum per se, sed malum inquantum est remotio debiti finis. Nec tamen remotio debiti finis constituit speciem in moralibus, nisi secundum quod adiungitur fini indebito, sicut neque in naturalibus invenitur privatio formae substantialis, nisi adiuncta alteri formae. Sic igitur malum quod est differentia constitutiva in moralibus, est quoddam bonum adiunctum privationi alterius boni, sicut finis intemperati est, non quidem carere bono rationis, sed delectabile sensus absque ordine rationis. Unde malum, inquantum malum, non est differentia constitutiva; sed ratione boni adiuncti.*

*Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad tertium. Nam ibi philosophus loquitur de bono et malo, secundum quod inveniuntur in moralibus. Sic enim inter bonum et malum invenitur medium, prout bonum dicitur quod est*

***Answer that,*** One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.

***Reply to Objection 1:*** Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil. For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first kind of contrariety is habit and privation," as being verified in all contraries; since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to white, and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not simply, but in regard to contraries; because, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as such, has the nature of evil.

***Reply to Objection 2:*** Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the object of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end; just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed.

***Reply to Objection 3:*** This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something

*ordinatum; malum autem, quod non solum est deordinatum, sed etiam nocivum alteri. Unde dicit philosophus in IV Ethic., quod prodigus vanus quidem est, sed non malus. Ab hoc etiam malo quod est secundum morem, contingit fieri reditum ad bonum; non autem ex quocumque malo. Non enim ex caecitate fit reditus ad visionem, cum tamen caecitas sit malum quoddam.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod aliquid agere dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, formaliter, eo modo loquendi quo dicitur albedo facere album. Et sic malum, etiam ratione ipsius privationis, dicitur corrumpere bonum, quia est ipsa corruptio vel privatio boni. Alio modo dicitur aliquid agere effective, sicut pictor dicitur facere album parietem. Tertio modo, per modum causae finalis, sicut finis dicitur efficere, movendo efficientem. His autem duobus modis malum non agit aliquid per se, idest secundum quod est privatio quaedam, sed secundum quod ei bonum adiungitur, nam omnis actio est ab aliqua forma, et omne quod desideratur ut finis, est perfectio aliqua. Et ideo, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., malum non agit neque desideratur nisi virtute boni adiuncti; per se autem est infinitum, et praeter voluntatem et intentionem.*

*Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, partes universi habent ordinem ad invicem, secundum quod una agit in alteram, et est finis alterius et exemplar. Haec autem, ut dictum est, non possunt convenire malo, nisi ratione boni adiuncti. Unde malum neque ad perfectionem universi pertinet, neque sub ordine universi concluditur, nisi per accidens, idest ratione boni adiuncti.*

rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, i) that a "prodigal man is foolish, but not evil." And from this evil in morality, there may be a return to good, but not from any sort of evil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although blindness is an evil.

**Reply to Objection 4:** A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good, forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause. But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and beside the scope of our will and intention."

**Reply to Objection 5:** As was said above, the parts of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good. Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that is, by reason of some good joined to it.

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### Whether evil is found in things?

*Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod malum non inveniatur in rebus. Quidquid enim invenitur in rebus, vel est ens aliquod, vel privatio entis alicuius, quod est non ens. Sed Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum distat ab existente, et adhuc plus distat a non existente. Ergo malum nullo modo invenitur in rebus.*

*Praeterea, ens et res convertuntur. Si ergo malum est ens in rebus, sequitur quod malum sit res quaedam. Quod est contra praedicta.*

*Praeterea, albius est quod est nigro impermixtius, ut dicitur in III libro Topic. Aristotelis. Ergo et melius est*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that evil is not found in things. For whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of something, that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from non-existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in things.

**Objection 2:** Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is contrary to what has been said ([Article \[1\]](#)).

**Objection 3:** Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4).

*quod est malo impermixtius. Sed Deus facit semper quod melius est, multo magis quam natura. Ergo in rebus a Deo conditis nihil malum invenitur.*

*Sed contra est quod secundum hoc removerentur omnes prohibitiones et poenae, quae non sunt nisi malorum.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, perfectio universi requirit inaequalitatem esse in rebus, ut omnes bonitatis gradus impleantur. Est autem unus gradus bonitatis ut aliquid ita bonum sit, quod nunquam deficere possit. Alius autem gradus bonitatis est, ut sic aliquid bonum sit, quod a bono deficere possit. Qui etiam gradus in ipso esse inveniuntur, quaedam enim sunt, quae suum esse amittere non possunt, ut incorporalia; quaedam vero sunt, quae amittere possunt, ut corporalia.*

*Sicut igitur perfectio universitatis rerum requirit ut non solum sint entia incorruptibilia, sed etiam corruptibilia; ita perfectio universi requirit ut sint quaedam quae a bonitate deficere possint; ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere. In hoc autem consistit ratio mali, ut scilicet aliquid deficiat a bono. Unde manifestum est quod in rebus malum invenitur, sicut et corruptio, nam et ipsa corruptio malum quoddam est.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod malum distat et ab ente simpliciter, et non ente simpliciter, quia neque est sicut habitus, neque sicut pura negatio, sed sicut privatio.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in V Metaphys., ens dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, secundum quod significat entitatem rei, prout dividitur per decem praedicamenta, et sic convertitur cum re. Et hoc modo, nulla privatio est ens, unde nec malum. Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis, quae in compositione consistit, cuius nota est hoc verbum est, et hoc est ens quo respondetur ad quaestionem an est. Et sic caecitatem dicimus esse in oculo, vel quamcumque aliam privationem. Et hoc modo etiam malum dicitur ens. Propter huius autem distinctionis ignorantiam, aliqui, considerantes quod aliquae res dicuntur malae, vel quod malum dicitur esse in rebus, crediderunt quod malum esset res quaedam.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus et natura, et quodcumque agens, facit quod melius est in toto; sed non*

Therefore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is no evil.

**On the contrary,** On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.

**I answer that,** As was said above ([Question \[47\]](#), [Articles \[1\],2](#)), the perfection of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness may be realized. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible.

As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an evil.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple "not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a privation.

**Reply to Objection 2:** As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that sense it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by a copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense being is what answers to the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in itself.

**Reply to Objection 3:** God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best in

*quod melius est in unaquaque parte, nisi per ordinem ad totum, ut supra dictum est. Ipsum autem totum quod est universitas creaturarum, melius et perfectius est, si in eo sint quaedam quae a bono deficere possunt, quae interdum deficiunt, Deo hoc non impediente. Tum quia providentiae non est naturam destruere, sed salvare, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ipsa autem natura rerum hoc habet, ut quae deficere possunt, quandoque deficiant. Tum quia, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchirid., Deus est adeo potens, quod etiam potest bene facere de malis. Unde multa bona tollerentur, si Deus nullum malum permetteret esse. Non enim generaretur ignis, nisi corrumperetur aer; neque conservaretur vita leonis, nisi occideretur asinus; neque etiam laudaretur iustitia vindicans, et patientia sufferens, si non esset iniquitas.*

every single part, except in order to the whole, as was said above ([Question \[47\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#)). And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), "God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil." Hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.

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### Whether evil is in good as in its subject?

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod malum non sit in bono sicut in subiecto. Omnia enim bona sunt existentia. Sed Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum non est existens, neque in existentibus. Ergo malum non est in bono sicut in subiecto.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject. For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists." Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject.

*Praeterea, malum non est ens, bonum vero est ens. Sed non ens non requirit ens, in quo sit sicut in subiecto. Ergo nec malum requirit bonum, in quo sit sicut in subiecto.*

**Objection 2:** Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But "non-being" does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither does evil require good as its subject.

*Praeterea, unum contrariorum non est subiectum alterius. Sed bonum et malum sunt contraria. Ergo malum non est in bono sicut in subiecto.*

**Objection 3:** Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as in its subject.

*Praeterea, id in quo est albedo sicut in subiecto, dicitur esse album. Ergo et id in quo est malum sicut in subiecto, est malum. Si ergo malum sit in bono sicut in subiecto, sequitur quod bonum sit malum, contra id quod dicitur Isai. V, vae, qui dicitis malum bonum, et bonum malum.*

**Objection 4:** Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore also the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in good as in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said ([Is. 5:20](#)): "Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!"

*Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod malum non est nisi in bono.*

**On the contrary,** Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that "evil exists only in good."

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, malum importat remotionem boni. Non autem quaelibet remotio boni malum dicitur. Potest enim accipi remotio boni et privative, et negative. Remotio igitur boni negative accepta, mali rationem non habet, alioquin sequeretur quod ea quae nullo modo sunt, mala essent; et iterum quod quaelibet res esset mala, ex hoc quod non habet bonum alterius rei, utpote quod homo esset malus, quia*

**I answer that,** As was said above ([Article \[1\]](#)), evil imports the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having the good belonging to something else; for instance, a man would be evil who

*non habet velocitatem capreae, vel fortitudinem leonis. Sed remotio boni privative accepta, malum dicitur, sicut privatio visus caecitas dicitur.*

*Subiectum autem privationis et formae est unum et idem, scilicet ens in potentia, sive sit ens in potentia simpliciter, sicut materia prima, quae est subiectum formae substantialis et privationis oppositae; sive sit ens in potentia secundum quid et in actu simpliciter, ut corpus diaphanum, quod est subiectum tenebrarum et lucis. Manifestum est autem quod forma per quam aliquid est actu, perfectio quaedam est, et bonum quoddam, et sic omne ens in actu, bonum quoddam est. Et similiter omne ens in potentia, in quantum huiusmodi, bonum quoddam est, secundum quod habet ordinem ad bonum, sicut enim est ens in potentia, ita et bonum in potentia. Relinquitur ergo quod subiectum mali sit bonum.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius intelligit malum non esse in existentibus sicut partem, aut sicut proprietatem naturalem alicuius existentis.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod non ens negative acceptum non requirit subiectum. Sed privatio est negatio in subiecto, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys., et tale non ens est malum.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod malum non est sicut in subiecto in bono quod ei opponitur, sed in quodam alio bono, subiectum enim caecitatis non est visus, sed animal. Videtur tamen, ut Augustinus dicit, hic fallere dialecticorum regula, quae dicit contraria simul esse non posse. Hoc tamen intelligendum est secundum communem acceptionem boni et mali, non autem secundum quod specialiter accipitur hoc bonum et hoc malum. Album autem et nigrum, dulce et amarum, et huiusmodi contraria, non accipiuntur nisi specialiter, quia sunt in quibusdam generibus determinatis. Sed bonum circuit omnia genera, unde unum bonum potest simul esse cum privatione alterius boni.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod propheta imprecatur vae illis qui dicunt id quod est bonum, secundum quod est bonum, esse malum. Hoc autem non sequitur ex praemissis, ut per praedicta patet.*

had not the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness.

Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same—viz. being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality, as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in relative potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.

**Reply to Objection 2:** "Not-being," understood negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such "not-being" is an evil.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not "sight," but "animal." Yet, it appears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is laid down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter, and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus; whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with the privation of another good.

**Reply to Objection 4:** The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as is clear from the explanation given.

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### Whether evil corrupts the whole good?

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod malum corrumpat totum bonum. Unum enim contrariorum*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by another.

*totaliter corrumpitur per alterum. Sed bonum et malum sunt contraria. Ergo malum potest corrumpere totum bonum.*

*Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod malum nocet in quantum adimit bonum. Sed bonum est sibi simile et uniforme. Ergo totaliter tollitur per malum.*

*Praeterea, malum, quandiu est, nocet et aufert bonum. Sed illud a quo semper aliquid aufertur, quandoque consumitur, nisi sit infinitum; quod non potest dici de aliquo bono creato. Ergo malum consumit totaliter bonum.*

*Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod malum non potest totaliter consumere bonum.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod malum non potest totaliter consumere bonum. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod est triplex bonum. Quoddam, quod per malum totaliter tollitur, et hoc est bonum oppositum malo; sicut lumen totaliter per tenebras tollitur, et visus per caecitatem. Quoddam vero bonum est, quod nec totaliter tollitur per malum, nec diminuitur, scilicet bonum quod est subiectum mali; non enim per tenebras aliquid de substantia aeris diminuitur. Quoddam vero bonum est, quod diminuitur quidem per malum, sed non totaliter tollitur, et hoc bonum estabilitas subiecti ad actum.*

*Diminutio autem huius boni non est accipienda per subtractionem, sicut est diminutio in quantitibus, sed per remissionem, sicut est diminutio in qualitibus et formis. Remissio autem huius habitatis est accipienda e contrario intensioni ipsius. Intenditur enim huiusmodi habitus per dispositiones quibus materia praeparatur ad actum; quae quanto magis multiplicantur in subiecto, tanto habilis est ad recipiendum perfectionem et formam. Et e contrario remittitur per dispositiones contrarias; quae quanto magis multiplicatae sunt in materia, et magis intensae, tanto magis remittitur potentia ad actum.*

*Si igitur contrariae dispositiones in infinitum multiplicari et intendi non possunt, sed usque ad certum terminum, neque habitus praedicta in infinitum diminuitur vel remittitur. Sicut patet in qualitibus activis et passivis elementorum, frigiditas enim et humiditas, per quae diminuitur sive remittitur habitus materiae ad formam ignis, non possunt multiplicari in infinitum. Si vero*

But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.

**Objection 2:** Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a piece and uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.

**Objection 3:** Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away good. But that from which something is always being removed, is at some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.

**On the contrary,** Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot wholly consume good."

**I answer that,** Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a subject to some actuality.

The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habitus is to be taken as contrary to its intensity. For this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the actuality.

Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the



*dispositiones contrariae in infinitum multiplicari possunt, et habitas praedicta in infinitum diminuitur vel remittitur. Non tamen totaliter tollitur, quia semper manet in sua radice, quae est substantia subiecti. Sicut si in infinitum interponantur corpora opaca inter solem et aerem, in infinitum diminuetur habitas aeris ad lumen, nunquam tamen totaliter tollitur, manente aere, qui secundum naturam suam est diaphanus. Similiter in infinitum potest fieri additio in peccatis, per quae semper magis ac magis minuitur habitas animae ad gratiam, quae quidem peccata sunt quasi obstacula interposita inter nos et Deum secundum illud Isaiae LIX, peccata nostra dividerunt inter nos et Deum. Neque tamen tollitur totaliter ab anima praedicta habitas, quia consequitur naturam ipsius.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum quod opponitur malo, totaliter tollitur, sed alia bona non totaliter tolluntur, ut dictum est.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod habitas praedicta est media inter subiectum et actum. Unde ex ea parte qua attingit actum, diminuitur per malum, sed ex ea parte qua tenet se cum subiecto, remanet. Ergo, licet bonum in se sit simile, tamen, propter comparisonem eius ad diversa, non totaliter tollitur, sed in parte.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam, imaginantes diminutionem boni praedicti ad similitudinem diminutionis quantitatis, dixerunt quod, sicut continuum dividitur in infinitum, facta divisione secundum eandem proportionem (ut puta quod accipiatur medium medii, vel tertium tertii), sic in proposito accidit. Sed haec ratio hic locum non habet. Quia in divisione in qua semper servatur eadem proportio, semper subtrahitur minus et minus, minus enim est medium medii quam medium totius. Sed secundum peccatum non de necessitate minus diminuit de habitate praedicta, quam praecedens, sed forte aut aequaliter, aut magis.*

*Dicendum est ergo quod, licet ista habitas sit quoddam finitum, diminuitur tamen in infinitum, non per se, sed per accidens, secundum quod contrariae dispositiones etiam in infinitum augentur, ut dictum est.*

contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude, whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and God, according to Is. 59:2: "Our sins have divided between us and God." Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it belongs to its very nature.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half of the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance either equally or more.

Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not "per se," but accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased infinitely, as explained above.

**Summa Theologiae Prima Pars. Quaestio 49. De causa mali.**

Articulus 1. Whether good can be the cause of evil?

Articulus 2. Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?

Articulus 3. Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?

**THE CAUSE OF EVIL**

*Consequenter quaeritur de causa mali. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.*

We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are three points of inquire:

*Primo, utrum bonum possit esse causa mali.*

[\(1\)](#) Whether good can be the cause of evil?

*Secundo, utrum summum bonum, quod est Deus, sit causa mali.*

[\(2\)](#) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?

*Tertio, utrum sit aliquod summum malum, quod sit prima causa omnium malorum.*

[\(3\)](#) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils?

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**Whether good can be the cause of evil?**

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum non possit esse causa mali. Dicitur enim Matth. VII, non potest arbor bona malos fructus facere.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For it is said ([Mt. 7:18](#)): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit."

*Praeterea, unum contrariorum non potest esse causa alterius. Malum autem est contrarium bono. Ergo bonum non potest esse causa mali.*

**Objection 2:** Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.

*Praeterea, effectus deficiens non procedit nisi a causa deficiente. Sed malum, si causam habeat, est effectus deficiens. Ergo habet causam deficientem. Sed omne deficiens malum est. Ergo causa mali non est nisi malum.*

**Objection 3:** Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause, if it has one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil. Therefore the cause of evil can only be evil.

*Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum non habet causam. Ergo bonum non est causa mali.*

**Objection 4:** Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.

*Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, contra Iulianum, non fuit omnino unde oriri posset malum, nisi ex bono.*

**On the contrary,** Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): "There is no possible source of evil except good."

*Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod omne malum alicqualiter causam habeat. Malum enim est defectus boni quod natum est et debet haberi. Quod autem aliquid deficiat a sua naturali et debita dispositione, non potest provenire nisi ex aliqua causa trahente rem extra suam dispositionem, non enim grave movetur sursum nisi ab aliquo impellente, nec agens deficit in sua actione nisi propter aliquod impedimentum. Esse autem causam non potest convenire nisi bono, quia nihil potest esse causa*

**I answer that,** It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment. But only good can be a

*nisi inquantum est ens; omne autem ens, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum est.*

*Et si consideremus speciales rationes causarum, agens et forma et finis perfectionem quandam important, quae pertinet ad rationem boni, sed et materia, inquantum est potentia ad bonum, habet rationem boni. Et quidem quod bonum sit causa mali per modum causae materialis, iam ex praemissis patet, ostensum est enim quod bonum est subiectum mali. Causam autem formalem malum non habet, sed est magis privatio formae. Et similiter nec causam finalem, sed magis est privatio ordinis ad finem debitum; non solum enim finis habet rationem boni, sed etiam utile, quod ordinatur ad finem. Causam autem per modum agentis habet malum, non autem per se, sed per accidens.*

*Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod aliter causatur malum in actione, et aliter in effectu. In actione quidem causatur malum propter defectum alicuius principiorum actionis, vel principalis agentis, vel instrumentalis, sicut defectus in motu animalis potest contingere vel propter debilitatem virtutis motivae, ut in pueris; vel propter solam ineptitudinem instrumenti, ut in claudis. Malum autem in re aliqua, non tamen in proprio effectu agentis, causatur quandoque ex virtute agentis; quandoque autem ex defectu ipsius, vel materiae. Ex virtute quidem vel perfectione agentis, quando ad formam intentam ab agente sequitur ex necessitate alterius formae privatio; sicut ad formam ignis sequitur privatio formae aeris vel aquae. Sicut ergo, quanto ignis fuerit perfectior in virtute, tanto perfectius imprimit formam suam, ita etiam tanto perfectius corrumpit contrarium, unde malum et corruptio aeris et aquae, est ex perfectione ignis. Sed hoc est per accidens, quia ignis non intendit privare formam aquae, sed inducere formam propriam; sed hoc faciendo, causat et illud per accidens. Sed si sit defectus in effectu proprio ignis, puta quod deficiat a calefaciendo, hoc est vel propter defectum actionis, qui redundat in defectum alicuius principii, ut dictum est; vel ex indispositione materiae, quae non recipit actionem ignis agentis. Sed et hoc ipsum quod est esse deficiens, accidit bono, cui per se competit agere. Unde verum est quod malum secundum nullum modum habet causam nisi per accidens. Sic autem bonum est causa mali.*

cause; because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is good.

And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the agent, the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection which belongs to the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to good, has the nature of good. Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the material cause was shown above ([Question \[48\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)). For it was shown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally.

In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason of the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the instrumental agent; thus the defect in the movement of an animal may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter. It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly does it impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and water comes from the perfection of the fire: but this is accidental; because fire does not aim at the privation of the form of water, but at the bringing in of its own form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other. But if there is a defect in the proper effect of the fire—as, for instance, that it fails to heat—this comes either by defect of the action, which implies the defect of some principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the matter, which does not receive the action of the fire, the agent. But this very fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause; and thus is good the cause of evil.

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, contra Iulian., arborem malam appellat dominus voluntatem malam, et arborem bonam, voluntatem bonam. Ex voluntate autem bona non producit actus moralis malus, cum ex ipsa voluntate bona iudicetur actus moralis bonus. Sed tamen ipse motus malae voluntatis causatur a creatura rationali, quae bona est. Et sic est causa mali.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum non causat illud malum quod est sibi contrarium, sed quoddam aliud, sicut bonitas ignis causat malum aquae; et homo bonus secundum suam naturam, causat malum actum secundum morem. Et hoc ipsum per accidens est, ut dictum est. Invenitur autem quod etiam unum contrariorum causat aliud per accidens, sicut frigidum exterius ambiens calefacit, inquantum calor retrahitur ad interiora.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod malum habet causam deficientem aliter in rebus voluntariis, et naturalibus. Agens enim naturale producit effectum suum talem quale ipsum est, nisi impediatur ab aliquo extrinseco, et hoc ipsum est quidam defectus eius. Unde nunquam sequitur malum in effectu, nisi praeexistat aliquod aliud malum in agente vel materia, sicut dictum est. Sed in rebus voluntariis, defectus actionis a voluntate actu deficiente procedit, inquantum non subiicit se actu suae regulae. Qui tamen defectus non est culpa, sed sequitur culpa ex hoc quod cum tali defectu operatur.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod malum non habet causam per se, sed per accidens tantum, ut dictum est.*

**Reply to Objection 1:** As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): "The Lord calls an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree." Now, a good will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature, which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes evil to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act morally evil. And, as explained above ([Question \[19\]](#), [Article \[9\]](#)), this is by accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes another by accident: for instance, the exterior surrounding cold heats (the body) through the concentration of the inward heat.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it. Hence evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will actually deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect.

**Reply to Objection 4:** Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause, as was said above.

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### Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?

*Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod summum bonum, quod est Deus, sit causa mali. Dicitur enim Isai. XLV, ego dominus, et non est alter Deus, formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum. Et Amos III, si erit malum in civitate, quod dominus non fecerit.*

*Praeterea, effectus causae secundae reducitur in causam primam. Bonum autem est causa mali, ut dictum est. Cum igitur omnis boni causa sit Deus, ut supra ostensum est, sequitur quod etiam omne malum sit a Deo.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil. For it is said ([Is. 45:5,7](#)): "I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil." And Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done?"

**Objection 2:** Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above ([Article \[1\]](#)). Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above ([Question \[2\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#); [Question \[6\]](#), [Articles \[1\]](#),4), it follows that also every evil is from God.

*Praeterea, sicut dicitur in II Physic., idem est causa salutis navis, et periculi. Sed Deus est causa salutis omnium rerum. Ergo est ipse causa omnis perditionis et mali.*

*Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod Deus non est auctor mali, quia non est causa tendendi ad non esse.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, malum quod in defectu actionis consistit, semper causatur ex defectu agentis. In Deo autem nullus defectus est, sed summa perfectio, ut supra ostensum est. Unde malum quod in defectu actionis consistit, vel quod ex defectu agentis causatur, non reducitur in Deum sicut in causam. Sed malum quod in corruptione rerum aliquarum consistit, reducitur in Deum sicut in causam.*

*Et hoc patet tam in naturalibus quam in voluntariis. Dictum est enim quod aliquod agens, in quantum sua virtute producit aliquam formam ad quam sequitur corruptio et defectus, causat sua virtute illam corruptionem et defectum. Manifestum est autem quod forma quam principaliter Deus intendit in rebus creatis, est bonum ordinis universi. Ordo autem universi requirit, ut supra dictum est, quod quaedam sint quae deficere possint, et interdum deficiant. Et sic Deus, in rebus causando bonum ordinis universi, ex consequenti, et quasi per accidens, causat corruptiones rerum; secundum illud quod dicitur I Reg. II, dominus mortificat et vivificat. Sed quod dicitur Sap. I, quod Deus mortem non fecit, intelligitur quasi per se intentam. Ad ordinem autem universi pertinet etiam ordo iustitiae, qui requirit ut peccatoribus poena inferatur. Et secundum hoc, Deus est auctor mali quod est poena, non autem mali quod est culpa, ratione supra dicta.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae loquuntur de malo poenae, non autem de malo culpa.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod effectus causae secundae deficientis reducitur in causam primam non deficientem, quantum ad id quod habet entitatis et perfectionis, non autem quantum ad id quod habet de defectu. Sicut quidquid est motus in claudicatione, causatur a virtute motiva; sed quod est obliquitatis in ea, non est ex virtute*

**Objection 3:** Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and of all evil.

**On the contrary,** Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being."

**I answer that,** As appears from what was said ([Article \[1\]](#)), the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection, as was shown above ([Question \[4\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause.

But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural things and voluntary things. For it was said ([Article \[1\]](#)) that some agent inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe requires, as was said above ([Question \[22\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#), ad 2; [Question \[48\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#)), that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to 1 Kgs. 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." But when we read that "God hath not made death" (Wis. 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.

**Reply to Objection 1:** These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the evil of fault.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does

*motiva, sed ex curvitate cruris. Et similiter quidquid est entitatis et actionis in actione mala, reducitur in Deum sicut in causam, sed quod est ibi defectus, non causatur a Deo, sed ex causa secunda deficiente.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod submersio navis attribuitur nautae ut causae, ex eo quod non agit quod requiritur ad salutem navis. Sed Deus non deficit ab agendo quod est necessarium ad salutem. Unde non est simile.*

not come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.

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### Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit unum summum malum, quod sit causa omnis mali. Contrariorum enim effectuum contrariae sunt causae. Sed in rebus invenitur contrarietas, secundum illud Eccli. XXXIII, contra malum bonum est, et contra vitam mors; sic et contra virum iustum peccator. Ergo sunt contraria principia, unum boni, et aliud mali.*

*Praeterea, si unum contrariorum est in rerum natura, et reliquum, ut dicitur in II de caelo et mundo. Sed summum bonum est in rerum natura, quod est causa omnis boni, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo est et summum malum ei oppositum, causa omnis mali.*

*Praeterea, sicut in rebus invenitur bonum et melius, ita malum et peius. Sed bonum et melius dicuntur per respectum ad optimum. Ergo malum et peius dicuntur per respectum ad aliquod summum malum.*

*Praeterea, omne quod est per participationem, reducitur ad illud quod est per essentiam. Sed res quae sunt malae apud nos, non sunt malae per essentiam, sed per participationem. Ergo est invenire aliquod summum malum per essentiam, quod est causa omnis mali.*

*Praeterea, omne quod est per accidens, reducitur ad illud quod est per se. Sed bonum est causa mali per accidens. Ergo oportet ponere aliquod summum malum, quod sit causa malorum per se. Neque potest dici quod malum non habeat causam per se, sed per accidens tantum, quia sequeretur quod malum non esset ut in pluribus, sed ut in paucioribus.*

*Praeterea, malum effectus reducitur ad malum causae, quia effectus deficiens est a causa deficiente, sicut supra*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes. But contrariety is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: "Good is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against a just man." Therefore there are many contrary principles, one of good, the other of evil.

**Objection 2:** Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as was shown above ([Question \[2\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#); [Question \[6\]](#), [Articles \[2\]](#),4). Therefore, also, there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.

**Objection 3:** Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to what is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme evil.

**Objection 4:** Further, everything participated is reduced to what is essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially, but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil.

**Objection 5:** Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is "per se." But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we must suppose some supreme evil which is the "per se" cause of evils. Nor can it be said that evil has no "per se" cause, but only an accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in the many, but only in the few.

**Objection 6:** Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause; because the deficient effect comes

*dictum est. Sed hoc non est procedere in infinitum. Ergo oportet ponere unum primum malum, quod sit causa omnis mali.*

*Sed contra est quod summum bonum est causa omnis entis, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse aliquod principium ei oppositum, quod sit causa malorum.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod ex praedictis patet non esse unum primum principium malorum, sicut est unum primum principium bonorum.*

*Primo quidem, quia primum principium bonorum est per essentiam bonum, ut supra ostensum est. Nihil autem potest esse per suam essentiam malum, ostensum est enim quod omne ens, in quantum est ens, bonum est; et quod malum non est nisi in bono ut in subiecto.*

*Secundo, quia primum bonorum principium est summum et perfectum bonum, quod praehabet in se omnem bonitatem, ut supra ostensum est. Summum autem malum esse non potest, quia, sicut ostensum est, etsi malum semper diminuat bonum, nunquam tamen illud potest totaliter consumere; et sic, semper remanente bono, non potest esse aliquid integre et perfecte malum. Propter quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod si malum integrum sit, seipsum destruet, quia destructo omni bono (quod requiritur ad integritatem mali), subtrahitur etiam ipsum malum, cuius subiectum est bonum.*

*Tertio, quia ratio mali repugnat rationi primi principii. Tum quia omne malum causatur ex bono, ut supra ostensum est. Tum quia malum non potest esse causa nisi per accidens, et sic non potest esse prima causa, quia causa per accidens est posterior ea quae est per se, ut patet in II Physic.*

*Qui autem posuerunt duo prima principia, unum bonum et alterum malum, ex eadem radice in hunc errorem inciderunt, ex qua et aliae extraneae positiones antiquorum ortum habuerunt, quia scilicet non consideraverunt causam universalem totius entis, sed particulares tantum causas particularium effectuum. Propter hoc enim, si aliquid invenerunt esse nocivum alicui rei per virtutem suae naturae, aestimaverunt naturam illius rei esse malam, puta si quis dicat naturam ignis esse malam, quia combussit domum alicuius pauperis. Iudicium autem de bonitate alicuius rei non est*

from the deficient cause, as was said above ([Articles \[1\],2](#)). But we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil.

**On the contrary,** The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was shown above ([Question \[2\], Article \[3\]; Question \[6\], Article \[4\]](#)). Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.

**I answer that,** It appears from what precedes that there is no one first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.

First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good, as was shown above ([Question \[6\], Articles \[3\],4](#)). But nothing can be essentially bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good ([Question \[5\], Article \[3\]](#)); and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject ([Question \[48\], Article \[3\]](#)).

Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above ([Question \[6\], Article \[2\]](#)). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was shown above ([Question \[48\], Article \[4\]](#)), although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away, since its subject is good.

Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown above ([Article \[1\]](#)), and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct cause.

Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also arose other strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to consider the universal cause of all being, and considered only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however,

*accipiendum secundum ordinem ad aliquid particulare; sed secundum seipsum, et secundum ordinem ad totum universum, in quo quaelibet res suum locum ordinatissime tenet, ut ex dictis patet.*

*Similiter etiam, quia invenerunt duorum particularium effectuum contrariorum duas causas particulares contrarias, nesciverunt reducere causas particulares contrarias in causam universalem communem. Et ideo usque ad prima principia contrarietatem in causis esse iudicaverunt. Sed cum omnia contraria convenient in uno communi, necesse est in eis, supra causas contrarias proprias, inveniri unam causam communem, sicut supra qualitates contrarias elementorum invenitur virtus corporis caelestis. Et similiter supra omnia quae quocumque modo sunt, invenitur unum primum principium essendi, ut supra ostensum est.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod contraria convenient in genere uno, et etiam convenient in ratione essendi. Et ideo, licet habeant causas particulares contrarias, tamen oportet devenire ad unam primam causam communem.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod privatio et habitus nata sunt fieri circa idem. Subiectum autem privationis est ens in potentia, ut dictum est. Unde, cum malum sit privatio boni, ut ex dictis patet, illi bono opponitur cui adiungitur potentia, non autem summo bono, quod est actus purus.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod unumquodque intenditur secundum propriam rationem. Sicut autem forma est perfectio quaedam, ita privatio est quaedam remotio. Unde omnis forma et perfectio et bonum per accessum ad terminum perfectum intenditur, privatio autem et malum per recessum a termino. Unde non dicitur malum et peius per accessum ad summum malum, sicut dicitur bonum et melius per accessum ad summum bonum.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod nullum ens dicitur malum per participationem, sed per privationem participationis. Unde non oportet fieri reductionem ad aliquid quod sit per essentiam malum.*

*Ad quintum dicendum quod malum non potest habere causam nisi per accidens, ut supra ostensum est. Unde impossibile est fieri reductionem ad aliquid quod sit per se*

of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above ([Question \[47\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#), ad 1).

Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the power of a heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being, as was shown above ([Question \[2\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)).

**Reply to Objection 1:** Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Privation and habit belong naturally to the same subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as was said above ([Question \[48\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)). Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears from what was said above ([Question \[48\]](#), [Articles \[1\]](#), 2,3), it is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.

**Reply to Objection 4:** No being is called evil by participation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any essential evil.

**Reply to Objection 5:** Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown above ([Article \[1\]](#)). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is impossible. And



*causa mali. Quod autem dicitur, quod malum est ut in pluribus, simpliciter falsum est. Nam generabilia et corruptibilia, in quibus solum contingit esse malum naturae, sunt modica pars totius universi. Et iterum in unaquaque specie defectus naturae accidit ut in paucioribus. In solis autem hominibus malum videtur esse ut in pluribus, quia bonum hominis secundum sensum non est hominis in quantum homo, id est secundum rationem; plures autem sequuntur sensum quam rationem.*

*Ad sextum dicendum quod in causis mali non est procedere in infinitum, sed est reducere omnia mala in aliquam causam bonam, ex qua sequitur malum per accidens.*

to say that evil is in the greater number is simply false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole universe. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as in the greater number; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man—that is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good in regard to the senses than good according to reason.

**Reply to Objection 6:** In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows accidentally.

## **On Evil**

Thomas Aquinas, 2003. *On Evil*, trans. R. Regan, ed. B. Davies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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### **Quaestiones Disputatae De malo.** Quaestio 3. *De causa peccati.*

Articulus 1. Does God Cause Sin?

#### *Articulus 1*

##### *Et primo quaeritur utrum Deus sit causa peccati*

*Et videtur quod sic.*

*Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. I, 28: tradidit eos Deus in reprobum sensum, ut faciant quae non conveniunt; ubi dicit Glossa Augustini sumpta ex Lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio: manifestum est Deum operari in cordibus hominum inclinando voluntates eorum in quodcumque voluerit, sive ad bonum, sive ad malum. Sed inclinatio voluntatis ad malum est peccatum. Ergo Deus est causa peccati.*

*Sed dicendum, quod inclinatio voluntatis ad malum dicitur esse a Deo in quantum est poena; unde ibidem de Dei iudicio loquitur.— Sed contra, non potest esse idem secundum idem poena et culpa, ut supra, dictum est; quia poena, secundum suam rationem, repugnat voluntati, culpa autem secundum suam rationem, est voluntaria. Sed inclinatio voluntatis pertinet ad rationem voluntarii. Si ergo Deus inclinat voluntatem in malum, videtur quod et ipse sit causa culpae in quantum est culpa.*

*Praeterea, sicut culpa opponitur bono gratiae, ita poena opponitur bono naturae. Sed non impeditur quin Deus sit causa poenae per hoc quod est causa naturae. Ergo neque impeditur esse causa culpae per hoc quod est causa gratiae.*

*Praeterea, quidquid est causa causae, est causa causati. Sed liberum arbitrium est causa peccati, cuius causa est Deus. Ergo Deus est causa peccati.*

*Praeterea, illud ad quod inclinat virtus data a Deo, est causatum a Deo. Sed virtutes quaedam datae a Deo inclinant ad peccatum, sicut irascibilis ad homicidium, et concupiscibilis ad adulterium. Ergo Deus est causa peccati.*

*Praeterea, quicumque inclinat voluntatem suam vel alterius ad malum, est causa peccati; puta, si homo faciendo eleemosynam inclinet voluntatem suam ut intendat inanem gloriam. Sed Deus inclinat voluntatem hominis in malum, ut iam dictum est. Ergo est causa peccati.*

*Praeterea, Dionysius dicit IV cap., de Div. Nom., quod apud Deum causae malorum sunt. Sed non sunt in Deo otiosae. Ergo Deus est causa malorum, inter quae computantur peccata.*

*Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de natura et gratia, quod gratia in anima est sicut lux per quam homo bonum operatur, et sine qua bonum operari non potest. Sic ergo gratia est causa meriti. Ergo per oppositum subtractio gratiae est causa peccati. Sed Deus est qui subtrahit gratiam. Ergo Deus est causa peccati.*

*Praeterea, Augustinus dicit II Confess.: gratiae tuae deputo, quaecumque mala non feci. Non esset autem imputandum gratiae quod homo male non faceret, si carens gratia posset non peccare. Non ergo peccatum est causa quod aliquis privetur gratia, sed magis privatio gratiae est causa peccandi; et sic sequitur, ut prius, quod Deus sit causa peccandi.*

*Praeterea, omnis laus creaturae praecipue Deo debet attribui. Sed in laudem viri iusti dicitur Eccli. XXXI, 10: qui potuit transgredi, et non est transgressus. Ergo multo magis hoc competit Deo. Potest ergo Deus peccare et per consequens esse causa peccati.*

*Praeterea, philosophus dicit in IV Topic.: potest Deus et studiosus prava facere. Hoc est autem peccare. Ergo Deus potest peccare.*

*Praeterea, bene sequitur: Socrates potest currere si vult; ergo simpliciter potest currere sed haec est vera: Deus potest peccare, si vult, quia hoc ipsum quod est velle peccare, est peccare. Ergo Deus potest peccare simpliciter; et sic idem quod prius.*

*Praeterea, qui occasionem damni dat, damnum dedisse videtur. Sed Deus dedit occasionem peccandi homini per praeceptum quod dedit, ut dicitur, Rom. VII. Ergo Deus est causa peccati.*

*Praeterea, cum malum causetur a bono, videtur quod malum maximum causetur a maximo bono. Sed maximum malum est culpa quae facit bonum hominem vel Angelum malum. Ergo causatur a maximo bono, quod est Deus.*

*Praeterea, eiusdem est dare dominium et auferre. Sed Dei est dare dominium animae super corpus. Ergo et eius est auferre. Sed solummodo per peccatum aufertur quod spiritui non subiiciatur caro. Ergo Deus est causa peccati.*

*Praeterea, quod est causa alicuius naturae est causa motus proprii et naturalis ipsius. Sed Deus est causa naturae voluntatis; proprius autem et naturalis motus voluntatis est aversio, sicut proprius motus et naturalis lapidis est descendere, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Lib. Arbitr. Ergo Deus est causa aversionis; et sic, cum in aversione ratio culpa consistat, videtur quod Deus sit causa culpa.*

*Praeterea, qui praecipit peccatum est causa peccati. Sed Deus invenitur praecepisse peccatum, ut dicitur III regum, XXII, 22, ubi cum spiritus mendacii dixisset: egrediar, et ero spiritus mendax in ore prophetarum, dominus dixit: egredere et fac; et Oseae, I, 2, dicitur, quod dominus praecepit Oseae ut sumeret mulierem fornicariam, et faceret ex ea filios fornicationum. Ergo Deus est causa peccati.*

*Praeterea, eiusdem est agere et posse; quia, ut dicit philosophus, cuius est potentia, eius est actio. Sed Deus est causa eius quod est posse peccare. Ergo est causa eius quod est peccare.*

**Sed contra.** *Est quod dicit Augustinus in libro LXXXIII quaestionum, quod Deo auctore non fit homo deterior. Sed peccato fit homo deterior. Ergo Deus non est auctor peccati.*

*Praeterea, Fulgentius, dicit, quod Deus non est auctor illius rei cuius est ultor. Sed Deus est ultor peccati. Ergo non est auctor peccati.*

*Praeterea, Deus non est causa nisi eius quod diligit, quia hoc dicitur Sap. XI, 25: diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti. Odit autem peccatum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, 9: pariter odio sunt Deo impius et impietas eius. Ergo Deus non est auctor peccati.*

**Respondeo.** *Dicendum quod causa peccati est aliquis dupliciter: uno modo quia ipse peccat; alio modo quia facit alterum peccare; quorum neutrum Deo convenire potest. Quod enim Deus peccare non possit, manifestum est et ex communi ratione peccati, et ex propria ratione moralis peccati, quod dicitur culpa. Peccatum enim communiter dictum, secundum quod in rebus naturalibus et artificialibus invenitur, ex eo provenit quod aliquis in agendo non attingit ad finem propter quem agit; quod contingit ex defectu activi principii; sicut si grammaticus non recte scribat, contingit ex defectu artis, si tamen recte scribere intendit; et quod natura peccet in formatione animalis, sicut contingit in partibus monstruosis, contingit ex defectu activae virtutis in semine. Peccatum vero, secundum quod proprie in moralibus dicitur, habet rationem culpa, et provenit ex eo quod voluntas deficit debito fine, per hoc quod in finem indebitum tendit. In Deo autem neque activum principium potest esse deficiens, eo quod eius potentia est infinita; nec eius voluntas potest deficere a debito fine, quia ipsa eius voluntas, quae est etiam eius natura, est bonitas summa, quae est ultimus finis et prima regula*

*omnium voluntatum; unde naturaliter eius voluntas inhaeret summo bono, nec potest ab eo deficere; sicut nec alicuius rei appetitus naturalis deficere potest, quin appetat suum bonum naturale. Sic ergo Deus causa peccati esse non potest eo quod ipse peccet. Similiter etiam non potest esse causa peccati eo quod alios faciat peccare. Peccatum enim, prout nunc de peccato loquimur, consistit in aversione voluntatis creatae ab ultimo fine. Impossibile est autem quod Deus faciat voluntatem alicuius ab ultimo fine averti, cum ipsemet sit ultimus finis. Quod enim communiter invenitur in omnibus agentibus creatis, oportet quod hoc habeat ex imitatione primi agentis, quod dat omnibus suam similitudinem, secundum quod capere possunt, prout Dionysius dicit in IX cap. de Divin. Nom. Unumquodque autem agens creatum invenitur per suam actionem, alia quodammodo ad se ipsum attrahere, assimilando ea; vel per similitudinem formae, sicut cum calidum calefacit; vel convertendo alia ad finem suum, sicut homo per praeceptum alios movet ad finem quem intendit. Est ergo hoc Deo conveniens quod omnia ad se ipsum convertat, et per consequens quod nihil avertat a se ipso. Ipse autem est summum bonum. Unde non potest esse causa aversionis voluntatis a summo bono, in quo ratio culpae consistit prout nunc loquimur de culpa. Impossibile est ergo quod Deus sit causa peccati.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus dicitur tradere aliquos in reprobum sensum, vel inclinare voluntates in malum, non quidem agendo vel movendo, sed potius deserendo vel non impediendo: sicut si aliquis non daret manum cadenti, diceretur esse causa casus illius. Hoc autem Deus ex iusto iudicio facit, quod aliquibus auxilium non praestat ne cadant.*

*Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum.*

*Ad tertium dicendum, quod poena opponitur cuidam particulari bono. Non est autem contra rationem summi boni auferre aliquod particulare bonum, cum particulare bonum auferatur per appositionem alterius boni, quod interdum est melius; sicut forma aquae aufertur per appositionem formae ignis, et similiter bonum naturae particularis aufertur per poenam, per appositionem melioris boni; per hoc scilicet quod Deus ordinem iustitiae in rebus statuit. Sed malum culpae est per aversionem a summo bono, a quo summum bonum avertere non potest; unde Deus potest esse causa poenae, sed non causa culpae.*

*Ad quartum dicendum, quod effectus causati in quantum est causatum, reducitur in causam. Si autem aliquid procedit a causato non secundum quod est causatum, hoc non oportet in causam reduci. Sicut motus tibiae causatur a virtute motiva animalis, quae tibiam movet, sed obliquitas ambulationis non provenit a tibia secundum quod est mota a virtute motiva, sed secundum quod deficit a suscipiendo influxu motivae virtutis per suum defectum; et ideo claudicatio non causatur a virtute motiva. Sic ergo peccatum causatur a libero arbitrio secundum quod deficit a Deo; unde non oportet quod Deus sit causa peccati, licet sit causa liberi arbitrii.*

*Ad quintum dicendum, quod peccata non proveniunt ex inclinatione irascibilis aut concupiscibilis secundum quod sunt a Deo institutae, sed secundum quod deficiunt ab ordine institutionis ipsius: sic enim sunt institutae in homine, quod rationi subiaceant; unde quando praeter ordinem rationis ad peccatum inclinant, hoc non est a Deo.*

*Ad sextum dicendum, quod ratio illa non procedit, quia Deus non inclinat voluntatem ad malum agendo vel movendo, sed gratiam non apponendo ut dictum est.*

*Ad septimum dicendum, quod causae malorum sunt particularia bona, quae deficere possunt; huiusmodi autem particularia bona sunt apud Deum, sicut effectus apud causam, in quantum sunt bona; et pro tanto dicuntur causae malorum apud Deum esse, non quia ipse sit causa malorum.*

*Ad octavum dicendum, quod Deus, quantum est in se, omnibus se communicat pro captu eorum: unde quod res aliqua a participatione bonitatis ipsius deficiat, est ex hoc quod in ipsa invenitur aliquod impedimentum participationis divinae. Sic ergo quod gratia alicui non apponatur, non est causa ex Deo, sed ex hoc quod ipse, cui gratia apponitur, impedimentum gratiae praestat, in quantum avertitur a non avertente se lumine, ut Dionysius dicit.*

*Ad nonum dicendum, quod aliter loquendum est de homine secundum statum naturae conditae, et aliter secundum statum naturae corruptae, quia, secundum statum naturae conditae, homo nihil habebat impellens ad malum, licet bonum naturae non sufficeret ad gloriae consecutionem; et ideo indigebat auxilio gratiae ad merendum; non autem indigebat ad peccata vitandum; quia per hoc quod naturaliter acceperat, poterat stare; sed in statu naturae corruptae habet impellens ad malum, et ideo indiget auxilio gratiae ne cadat; et secundum hunc statum Augustinus divinae gratiae deputat quaecumque mala non fecit; sed hic status ex praecedenti culpa provenit.*

*Ad decimum dicendum, quod aliquid potest esse laudabile in inferiori quod ad laudem superioris non pertinet, sicut esse furibundum est laudabile in cane, non autem in homine, ut Dionysius dicit; et similiter non transgredi cum possit, pertinet ad laudem hominis, sed deficit a laude divina.*

*Ad undecimum dicendum, quod verbum illud philosophi intelligitur non de eo qui est Deus per naturam, sed de his qui dicuntur dii vel secundum opinionem, ut dii gentium, vel per participationem, ut homines supra humanum modum virtuosus, quibus attribuit heroicam seu divinam virtutem, in VII Ethicor. Vel potest dici, secundum quosdam, quod Deus dicitur posse prava facere, quia potest, si vult.*

*Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod istius conditionalis, Socrates potest currere, si vult, antecedens est possibile, et ideo sequitur possibilitas consequentis; sed in hac conditionali, Deus potest peccare, si vult, antecedens est impossibile, non enim potest Deus velle malum, et ideo non est simile.*

*Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod duplex est occasio, scilicet data et accepta. Praeceptum autem est occasio peccati, non quidem data a praecipiente, sed accepta ab eo cui praeceptum datur; unde et apostolus significanter dicit: occasione accepta, peccatum per mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam. Dicitur enim occasio dari peccandi quando fit aliquid minus rectum, ex quo per exemplum alii provocantur ad peccandum. Si autem aliquis faciat rectum opus, et alius inde provocetur ad peccandum, non erit occasio data, sed accepta, sicut cum Pharisei scandalizabantur de doctrina Christi. Mandatum autem erat sanctum et iustum, ut dicitur ad Rom. cap. VII. Unde Deus praecipiendo non dedit occasionem peccandi, sed homo accepit.*

*Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod si bonum, in quantum bonum, esset causa mali, sequeretur quod maximum bonum sit causa maximi mali; sed bonum est causa mali in quantum est deficiens. Unde quanto est magis bonum, tanto minus est causa mali.*

*Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod auferre spiritui dominium super carnem, est contra naturalem iustitiae ordinem; et ideo hoc Deo convenire non potest qui est ipsa iustitia.*

*Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod motus aversionis dicitur proprius et naturalis voluntatis secundum statum naturae corruptae, non autem secundum statum naturae conditae.*

*Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod id quod dicitur, egredere et fac, non est intelligendum per modum praecepti, sed per modum permissionis sicut et quod dicitur ad Iudam: quod facis, fac citius; eo modo loquendi quo permissio Dei dicitur eius voluntas. Quod vero dicitur ad Oseam: accipe tibi mulierem fornicariam, etc., intelligitur secundum modum praecepti; sed praeceptum divinum facit ut non sit peccatum quod aliter esset peccatum. Potest enim Deus, ut Bernardus dicit, dispensare in praeceptis secundae tabulae, per quae homo immediate ordinatur ad proximum: bonum enim proximi est quoddam bonum particulare. Non autem potest dispensare in praeceptis primae tabulae, per quae homo ordinatur in Deum, qui a se ipso alios non potest avertere, non enim potest negare se ipsum, ut dicitur II ad Tim. II, 13, quamvis quidam dicant, quod ea quae dicuntur de Osea, sunt intelligenda contigisse in visione prophetiae.*

*Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod ex verbo illo philosophi intelligitur quod idem est quod potest agere et quod agit; non autem quod quidquid sit causa potentiae, sit etiam causa actus.*

## Sielos ir intelekto sampratos

**Summa Theologiae Prima Pars.** Quaestio 75. *De homine, qui ex spirituali et corporali substantia componitur*

Articulus 1. Whether the soul is a body?

Articulus 2. Whether the human soul is something subsistent?

### Whether the soul is a body?

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit corpus. Anima enim est motor corporis. Non autem est movens non motum. Tum quia videtur quod nihil possit movere nisi moveatur, quia nihil dat alteri quod non habet, sicut quod non est calidum non calefacit. Tum quia, si aliquid est movens non motum, causat motum sempiternum et eodem modo se habentem, ut probatur in VIII Physic., quod non apparet in motu animalis, qui est ab anima. Ergo anima est movens motum. Sed omne movens motum est corpus. Ergo anima est corpus.*

*Praeterea, omnis cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Non potest autem esse similitudo corporis ad rem incorpoream. Si igitur anima non esset corpus, non posset cognoscere res corporeas.*

*Praeterea, moventis ad motum oportet esse aliquem contactum. Contactus autem non est nisi corporum. Cum igitur anima moveat corpus, videtur quod anima sit corpus.*

*Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod anima simplex dicitur respectu corporis, quia mole non diffunditur per spatium loci.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod ad inquirendum de natura animae, oportet praesupponere quod anima dicitur esse primum principium vitae in his quae apud nos vivunt animata enim viventia dicimus, res vero inanimatas vita carentes. Vita autem maxime manifestatur duplici opere, scilicet cognitionis et motus. Horum autem principium antiqui philosophi, imaginationem transcendere non valentes, aliquod corpus ponebant; sola corpora res esse dicentes, et quod non est corpus, nihil esse. Et secundum hoc, animam aliquod corpus esse dicebant. Huius autem opinionis falsitas licet multipliciter ostendi possit*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging movement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover moved. But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the soul is a body.

**Objection 2:** Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things.

**Objection 3:** Further, between the mover and the moved there must be contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the soul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body.

**On the contrary,** Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space by its bulk."

**I answer that,** To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which live: for we call living things "animate," [\*i.e. having a soul], and those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make use of only one

*tamen uno utemur, quo et communius et certius patet animam corpus non esse.*

*Manifestum est enim quod non quodcumque vitalis operationis principium est anima, sic enim oculus esset anima, cum sit quoddam principium visionis; et idem esset dicendum de aliis animae instrumentis. Sed primum principium vitae dicimus esse animam. Quamvis autem aliquod corpus possit esse quoddam principium vitae, sicut cor est principium vitae in animali; tamen non potest esse primum principium vitae aliquod corpus. Manifestum est enim quod esse principium vitae, vel vivens, non convenit corpori ex hoc quod est corpus, alioquin omne corpus esset vivens, aut principium vitae. Convenit igitur alicui corpori quod sit vivens, vel etiam principium vitae, per hoc quod est tale corpus. Quod autem est actu tale, habet hoc ab aliquo principio quod dicitur actus eius. Anima igitur, quae est primum principium vitae, non est corpus, sed corporis actus, sicut calor, qui est principium calefactionis, non est corpus, sed quidam corporis actus.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum omne quod movetur ab alio moveatur, quod non potest in infinitum procedere, necesse est dicere quod non omne movens movetur. Cum enim moveri sit exire de potentia in actum, movens dat id quod habet mobili, in quantum facit ipsum esse in actu. Sed sicut ostenditur in VIII Physic., est quoddam movens penitus immobile, quod nec per se nec per accidens movetur, et tale movens potest movere motum semper uniformem. Est autem aliud movens, quod non movetur per se, sed movetur per accidens, et propter hoc non movet motum semper uniformem. Et tale movens est anima. Est autem aliud movens, quod per se movetur, scilicet corpus. Et quia antiqui naturales nihil esse credebant nisi corpora, posuerunt quod omne movens movetur, et quod anima per se movetur, et est corpus.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod non est necessarium quod similitudo rei cognitae sit actu in natura cognoscentis, sed si aliquid sit quod prius est cognoscens in potentia et postea in actu, oportet quod similitudo cogniti non sit actu in natura cognoscentis, sed in potentia tantum; sicut color non est actu in pupilla, sed in potentia tantum. Unde non oportet quod in natura animae sit similitudo rerum corporearum in actu; sed quod sit in potentia ad huiusmodi similitudines. Sed quia antiqui naturales nesciebant distinguere inter actum et potentiam,*

proof, based on universal and certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body.

It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the "first" principle of life, which we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, as "such" a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.

**Reply to Objection 1:** As everything which is in motion must be moved by something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially—namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must

*ponebant animam esse corpus, ad hoc quod cognosceret corpus; et ad hoc quod cognosceret omnia corpora, quod esset composita ex principiis omnium corporum.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod est duplex contactus, quantitatis et virtutis. Primo modo, corpus non tangitur nisi a corpore. Secundo modo, corpus potest tangi a re incorporea quae movet corpus.*

be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.

**Reply to Objection 3:** There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of "power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body.

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### Whether the human soul is something subsistent?

*Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana non sit aliquid subsistens. Quod enim est subsistens, dicitur hoc aliquid. Anima autem non est hoc aliquid, sed compositum ex anima et corpore. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens.*

*Praeterea, omne quod est subsistens, potest dici operari. Sed anima non dicitur operari, quia, ut dicitur in I de anima, dicere animam sentire aut intelligere, simile est ac si dicat eam aliquis texere vel aedificare. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens.*

*Praeterea, si anima esset aliquid subsistens, esset aliqua eius operatio sine corpore. Sed nulla est eius operatio sine corpore, nec etiam intelligere, quia non contingit intelligere sine phantasmate, phantasma autem non est sine corpore. Ergo anima humana non est aliquid subsistens.*

*Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. Quisquis videt mentis naturam et esse substantiam, et non esse corpoream, videt eos qui opinantur eam esse corpoream, ob hoc errare, quod adiungunt ei ea sine quibus nullam possunt cogitare naturam, scilicet corporum phantasias. Natura ergo mentis humanae non solum est incorporea, sed etiam substantia, scilicet aliquid subsistens.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere id quod est principium intellectualis operationis, quod dicimus animam hominis, esse quoddam principium incorporeum et subsistens. Manifestum est enim quod homo per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum. Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura, quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter impediret cognitionem aliorum; sicut videmus quod lingua infirmi quae infecta est*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular thing." Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not something subsistent.

**Objection 2:** Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "to say that the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or builds." Therefore the soul is not subsistent.

**Objection 3:** Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from the body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent.

**On the contrary,** Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those things without which they are unable to think of any nature—i.e. imaginary pictures of corporeal things." Therefore the nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something subsistent.

**I answer that,** It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter

*cholerico et amaro humore, non potest percipere aliquid dulce, sed omnia videntur ei amara. Si igitur principium intellectuale haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis, non posset omnia corpora cognoscere. Omne autem corpus habet aliquam naturam determinatam. Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus. Et similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum, quia etiam natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium corporum; sicut si aliquis determinatus color sit non solum in pupilla, sed etiam in vase vitreo, liquor infusus eiusdem coloris videtur.*

*Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu, unde eo modo aliquid operatur, quo est. Propter quod non dicimus quod calor calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens/*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo, pro quocumque subsistente, alio modo, pro subsistente completo in natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, excludit inhaerentiam accidentis et formae materialis, secundo modo, excludit etiam imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo modo, sed non secundo modo. Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit pars speciei humanae, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi subsistens, sed non secundo modo, sic enim compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod verba illa Aristoteles dicit non secundum propriam sententiam, sed secundum opinionem illorum qui dicebant quod intelligere est moveri; ut patet ex iis quae ibi praemittit. Vel dicendum quod per se agere convenit per se existenti. Sed per se existens quandoque potest dici aliquid si non sit inhaerens ut accidens vel ut forma materialis, etiam si sit pars. Sed proprie et per se subsistens dicitur quod neque est praedicto modo inhaerens, neque est pars. Secundum quem modum oculus aut manus non posset dici per se subsistens; et per consequens nec per se operans. Unde et operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes. Dicimus enim quod homo videt per oculos, et palpat per manum, aliter quam calidum calefacit per calorem, quia calor nullo modo calefacit, proprie loquendo. Potest*

humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color.

Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.

**Reply to Objection 1:** "This particular thing" can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called "this particular thing" in the first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed be called "this particular thing," in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be "this particular thing."

**Reply to Objection 2:** Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate "per se" belongs to what exists "per se." But for a thing to exist "per se," it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a material form; even though it be part of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist "per se," which is neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist "per se"; nor can it for that reason be said to operate "per se." Hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat,



*igitur dici quod anima intelligit, sicut oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod homo intelligat per animam.*

*Praeterea, similiter se habet sensitivum ad sensibilia, sicut intellectivum et intelligibilia. Sed intAd tertium dicendum quod corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione obiecti, phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum. Sic autem indigere corpore non removet intellectum esse subsistentem, alioquin animal non esset aliquid subsistens, cum indigeat exterioribus sensibilibus ad sentiendum.*

strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands through the soul.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception.

**Summa Theologiae Prima Pars. Quaestio 79. De potentiis intellectivis.**

Articulus 1. Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its very essence?

Articulus 2. Whether the intellect is a passive power?

Articulus 3. Whether there is an active intellect?

Articulus 4. Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?

**Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?**

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit aliqua potentia animae, sed sit ipsa eius essentia. Intellectus idem enim videtur esse quod mens. Sed mens non est potentia animae sed essentia, dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Trin., mens et spiritus non relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant. Ergo intellectus est ipsa essentia animae.*

*Praeterea, diversa genera potentiarum animae non uniuntur in aliqua potentia una, sed in sola essentia animae. Appetitivum autem et intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animae, ut dicitur in II de anima; conveniunt autem in mente, quia Augustinus, X de Trin., ponit intelligentiam et voluntatem in mente. Ergo mens et intellectus est ipsa essentia animae, et non aliqua eius potentia.*

*Praeterea, secundum Gregorium, in homilia ascensionis, homo intelligit cum Angelis. Sed Angeli dicuntur mentes et intellectus. Ergo mens et intellectus hominis non est aliqua potentia animae, sed ipsa anima.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul.

**Objection 2:** Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof.

**Objection 3:** Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels are called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself.

*Praeterea, ex hoc convenit alicui substantiae quod sit intellectiva, quia est immaterialis. Sed anima est immaterialis per suam essentiam. Ergo videtur quod anima per suam essentiam sit intellectiva.*

*Sed contra est quod philosophus ponit intellectivum potentiam animae, ut patet in II de anima.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere, secundum praemissa, quod intellectus sit aliqua potentia animae, et non ipsa animae essentia. Tunc enim solum immediatum principium operationis est ipsa essentia rei operantis, quando ipsa operatio est eius esse, sicut enim potentia se habet ad operationem ut ad suum actum, ita se habet essentia ad esse. In solo Deo autem idem est intelligere quod suum esse. Unde in solo Deo intellectus est eius essentia, in aliis autem creaturis intellectualibus intellectus est quaedam potentia intelligentis.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus accipitur aliquando pro potentia, aliquando vero pro ipsa anima sensitiva, denominatur enim anima sensitiva nomine principalioris suae potentiae, quae est sensus. Et similiter anima intellectiva quandoque nominatur nomine intellectus, quasi a principali sua virtute; sicut dicitur in I de anima, quod intellectus est substantia quaedam. Et etiam hoc modo Augustinus dicit quod mens est spiritus, vel essentia.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod appetitivum et intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animae, secundum diversas rationes obiectorum. Sed appetitivum partim convenit cum intellectivo, et partim cum sensitivo, quantum ad modum operandi per organum corporale, vel sine huiusmodi organo, nam appetitus sequitur apprehensionem. Et secundum hoc Augustinus ponit voluntatem in mente, et philosophus in ratione.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod in Angelis non est alia vis nisi intellectiva, et voluntas, quae ad intellectum consequitur. Et propter hoc Angelus dicitur mens vel intellectus, quia tota virtus sua in hoc consistit. Anima autem habet multas alias vires, sicut sensitivas et nutritivas, et ideo non est simile.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod ipsa immaterialitas substantiae intelligentis creatae non est eius intellectus; sed ex immaterialitate habet virtutem ad intelligendum.*

**Objection 4:** Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence.

**On the contrary,** The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).

**I answer that,** In accordance with what has been already shown ([Question \[54\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#); [Question \[77\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is power.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a substance." And in this sense also Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16).

**Reply to Objection 2:** The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9).

**Reply to Objection 3:** In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails.

**Reply to Objection 4:** The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power of intelligence.

*Unde non oportet quod intellectus sit substantia animae, sed eius virtus et potentia.*

Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.

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### Whether the intellect is a passive power?

*Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit potentia passiva. Patitur enim unumquodque secundum materiam; sed agit ratione formae. Sed virtus intellectiva consequitur immaterialitatem substantiae intelligentis. Ergo videtur quod intellectus non sit potentia passiva.*

*Praeterea, potentia intellectiva est incorruptibilis, ut supra dictum est. Sed intellectus si est passivus, est corruptibilis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo potentia intellectiva non est passiva.*

*Praeterea, agens est nobilius patiente, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad Litt., et Aristoteles in III de anima. Potentiae autem vegetativae partis omnes sunt activae, quae tamen sunt infimae inter potentias animae. Ergo multo magis potentiae intellectivae, quae sunt supremae, omnes sunt activae.*

*Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intelligere est pati quoddam.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod pati tripliciter dicitur. Uno modo, propriissime, scilicet quando aliquid removetur ab eo quod convenit sibi secundum naturam, aut secundum propriam inclinationem; sicut cum aqua frigiditatem amittit per calefactionem, et cum homo aegrotat aut tristatur. Secundo modo, minus proprie dicitur aliquis pati ex eo quod aliquid ab ipso abiicitur, sive sit ei conveniens, sive non conveniens. Et secundum hoc dicitur pati non solum qui aegrotat, sed etiam qui sanatur; non solum qui tristatur, sed etiam qui laetatur; vel quocumque modo aliquis alteretur vel moveatur. Tertio modo, dicitur aliquid pati communiter, ex hoc solo quod id quod est in potentia ad aliquid, recipit illud ad quod erat in potentia, absque hoc quod aliquid abiiciatur. Secundum quem modum, omne quod exit de potentia in actum, potest dici pati, etiam cum perficitur. Et sic intelligere nostrum est pati. Quod quidem hac ratione apparet. Intellectus enim, sicut supra dictum est, habet operationem circa ens in universali. Considerari ergo potest utrum intellectus sit in actu vel potentia, ex hoc quod consideratur quomodo intellectus se habeat ad ens universale. Invenitur enim aliquis intellectus qui ad ens universale se habet sicut actus totius entis, et talis est*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive power.

**Objection 2:** Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have said above ([Question \[79\]](#), [Article \[6\]](#)). But "if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible" (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is not passive.

**Objection 3:** Further, the "agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. But all the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active.

**On the contrary,** The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is in a way to be passive."

**I answer that,** To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen above ([Question \[78\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)), has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to

*intellectus divinus, qui est Dei essentia, in qua originaliter et virtualiter totum ens praeexistit sicut in prima causa. Et ideo intellectus divinus non est in potentia, sed est actus purus. Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest se habere ut actus respectu totius entis universalis, quia sic oporteret quod esset ens infinitum. Unde omnis intellectus creatus, per hoc ipsum quod est, non est actus omnium intelligibilium, sed comparatur ad ipsa intelligibilia sicut potentia ad actum.*

*Potentia autem dupliciter se habet ad actum. Est enim quaedam potentia quae semper est perfecta per actum; sicut diximus de materia corporum caelestium. Quaedam autem potentia est, quae non semper est in actu, sed de potentia procedit in actum; sicut invenitur in generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Intellectus igitur angelicus semper est in actu suorum intelligibilium, propter propinquitatem ad primum intellectum, qui est actus purus, ut supra dictum est. Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium, et in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima. Quod manifeste apparet ex hoc, quod in principio sumus intelligentes solum in potentia, postmodum autem efficiuntur intelligentes in actu. Sic igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati, secundum tertium modum passionis. Et per consequens intellectus est potentia passiva.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de primo et secundo modo passionis, qui sunt proprii materiae primae. Tertius autem modus passionis est cuiuscumque in potentia existentis quod in actum reducitur.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus passivus secundum quosdam dicitur appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt animae passiones; qui etiam in I Ethic. dicitur rationalis per participationem, quia obedit rationi. Secundum alios autem intellectus passivus dicitur virtus cogitativa, quae nominatur ratio particularis. Et utroque modo passivum accipi potest secundum primos duos modos passionis, in quantum talis intellectus sic dictus, est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Sed intellectus qui est in potentia ad intelligibilia, quem Aristoteles ob hoc nominat intellectum possibilem, non est passivus nisi tertio modo, quia non est actus organi corporalis. Et ideo est incorruptibilis.*

universal being is that of the act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it would need to be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act.

Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter of the heavenly bodies ([Question \[58\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)). And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii, 4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power.

**Reply to Objection 1:** This objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act.

**Reply to Objection 2:** "Passive intellect" is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite is also called "rational by participation," because it "obeys the reason" (*Ethic.* i, 13). Others give the name of passive intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the "particular reason." And in each case "passive" may be taken in the two first senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the "possible" intellect (*De Anima* iii, 4) is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible.

*Ad tertium dicendum quod agens est nobilius patiente, si ad idem actio et passio referantur, non autem semper, si ad diversa. Intellectus autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis. Vegetativum autem est activum respectu cuiusdam entis particularis, scilicet corporis coniuncti. Unde nihil prohibet huiusmodi passivum esse nobilius tali activo.*

**Reply to Objection 3:** The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being nobler than such an active one.

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### Whether there is an active intellect?

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit ponere intellectum agentem. Sicut enim se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita se habet intellectus noster ad intelligibilia. Sed quia sensus est in potentia ad sensibilia non ponitur sensus agens, sed sensus patiens tantum. Ergo, cum intellectus noster sit in potentia ad intelligibilia, videtur quod non debeat poni intellectus agens, sed possibilis tantum.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is passive.

*Praeterea, si dicatur quod in sensu etiam est aliquod agens, sicut lumen, contra, lumen requiritur ad visum in quantum facit medium lucidum in actu, nam color ipse secundum se est motivus lucidi. Sed in operatione intellectus non ponitur aliquod medium quod necesse sit fieri in actu. Ergo non est necessarium ponere intellectum agentem.*

**Objection 2:** Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect.

*Praeterea, similitudo agentis recipitur in patiente secundum modum patientis. Sed intellectus possibilis est virtus immaterialis. Ergo immaterialitas eius sufficit ad hoc quod recipiantur in eo formae immaterialiter. Sed ex hoc ipso aliqua forma est intelligibilis in actu, quod est immaterialis. Ergo nulla necessitas est ponere intellectum agentem, ad hoc quod faciat species intelligibiles in actu.*

**Objection 3:** Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the species actually intelligible.

*Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod sicut in omni natura ita et in anima est aliquid quo est omnia fieri, et aliquid quo est omnia facere. Est ergo ponere intellectum agentem.*

**On the contrary,** The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we must admit an active intellect.

*Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum opinionem Platonis, nulla necessitas erat ponere intellectum agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu; sed forte ad praebendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti, ut infra dicitur. Posuit enim Plato formas rerum naturalium sine materia subsistere, et per consequens eas intelligibiles esse, quia ex hoc est aliquid intelligibile actu, quod est*

**I answer that,** According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained farther on ([Article \[4\]](#)). For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: since a thing is

*immateriale. Et huiusmodi vocabat species, sive ideas, ex quarum participatione dicebat etiam materiam corporalem formari, ad hoc quod individua naturaliter constituerentur in propriis generibus et speciebus; et intellectus nostros, ad hoc quod de generibus et speciebus rerum scientiam haberent. Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam, et ideo non oportuit ponere sensum agentem. Et sic patet quod in parte nutritiva omnes potentiae sunt activae; in parte autem sensitiva, omnes passivae; in parte vero intellectiva est aliquid activum, et aliquid passivum.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod circa effectum luminis est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod lumen requiritur ad visum, ut faciat colores actu visibiles. Et secundum hoc, similiter requiritur, et propter idem, intellectus agens ad intelligendum, propter quod lumen ad videndum. Secundum alios vero, lumen requiritur ad videndum, non propter colores, ut fiant actu visibiles; sed ut medium fiat actu lucidum, ut Commentator dicit in II de anima. Et secundum hoc, similitudo qua Aristoteles assimilat intellectum agentem lumini, attenditur quantum ad hoc, quod sicut hoc est necessarium ad videndum, ita illud ad intelligendum; sed non propter idem.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod, supposito agente, bene contingit diversimode recipi eius similitudinem in diversis propter eorum dispositionem diversam. Sed si agens non praexistit, nihil ad hoc faciet dispositio recipientis. Intelligibile autem in actu non est aliquid existens in rerum natura, quantum ad naturam rerum sensibilium, quae non subsistunt praeter materiam. Et ideo ad intelligendum non sufficeret immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, nisi adesset intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in actu per modum abstractionis.*

actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such forms "species or ideas"; from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species: and that our intellect was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there is something active and something passive.

**Reply to Objection 2:** There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight; not for the colors to become actually visible; but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same reason.

**Reply to Objection 3:** If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its likeness is received variously into various things, on account of their dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction.

## Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus agens non sit aliquid animae nostrae. Intellectus enim agentis effectus est illuminare ad intelligendum. Sed hoc fit per aliquid quod est altius anima; secundum illud Ioan. I, erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. Ergo videtur quod intellectus agens non sit aliquid animae.*

*Praeterea, philosophus, in III de anima, attribuit intellectui agenti quod non aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit. Sed anima nostra non semper intelligit; sed aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit. Ergo intellectus agens non est aliquid animae nostrae.*

*Praeterea, agens et patiens sufficiunt ad agendum. Si igitur intellectus possibilis est aliquid animae nostrae, qui est virtus passiva, et similiter intellectus agens, qui est virtus activa; sequitur quod homo semper poterit intelligere cum voluerit, quod patet esse falsum. Non est ergo intellectus agens aliquid animae nostrae.*

*Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est substantia actu ens. Nihil autem est respectu eiusdem in actu et in potentia. Si ergo intellectus possibilis, qui est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, est aliquid animae nostrae; videtur impossibile quod intellectus agens sit aliquid animae nostrae.*

*Praeterea, si intellectus agens est aliquid animae nostrae, oportet quod sit aliqua potentia. Non est enim nec passio nec habitus, nam habitus et passiones non habent rationem agentis respectu passionum animae; sed magis passio est ipsa actio potentiae passivae, habitus autem est aliquid quod ex actibus consequitur. Omnis autem potentia fluit ab essentia animae. Sequeretur ergo quod intellectus agens ab essentia animae procederet. Et sic non inesset animae per participationem ab aliquo superiori intellectu, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo intellectus agens est aliquid animae nostrae.*

*Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, III de anima quod necesse est in anima has esse differentias, scilicet intellectum possibilem, et agentem.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the active intellect is not something in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher than the soul: according to Jn. 1:9, "He was the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world." Therefore the active intellect is not something in the soul.

**Objection 2:** Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active intellect, "that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not understand." But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.

**Objection 3:** Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something belonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an active power: it follows that a man would always be able to understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.

**Objection 4:** Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the active intellect is a "substance in actual being." But nothing can be in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality to all things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in our soul.

**Objection 5:** Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the passivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very action of the passive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But every power flows from the essence of the soul. It would therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul. And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.

**On the contrary,** The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it is necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active intellect, "to be in the soul."

*Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus agens de quo philosophus loquitur, est aliquid animae. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod supra animam intellectivam humanam necesse est ponere aliquem superiorem intellectum, a quo anima virtutem intelligendi obtineat. Semper enim quod participat aliquid, et quod est mobile, et quod est imperfectum, praeexigit ante se aliquid quod est per essentiam suam tale, et quod est immobile et perfectum. Anima autem humana intellectiva dicitur per participationem intellectualis virtutis, cuius signum est, quod non tota est intellectiva, sed secundum aliquam sui partem. Pertingit etiam ad intelligentiam veritatis cum quodam discursu et motu, arguendo. Habet etiam imperfectam intelligentiam, tum quia non omnia intelligit; tum quia in his quae intelligit, de potentia procedit ad actum. Oportet ergo esse aliquem altiore intellectum, quo anima iuvetur ad intelligendum.*

*Posuerunt ergo quidam hunc intellectum secundum substantiam separatum, esse intellectum agentem, qui quasi illustrando phantasmata, facit ea intelligibilia actu. Sed, dato quod sit aliquis talis intellectus agens separatus, nihilominus tamen oportet ponere in ipsa anima humana aliquam virtutem ab illo intellectu superiori participatam, per quam anima humana facit intelligibilia in actu. Sicut et in aliis rebus naturalibus perfectis, praeter universales causas agentes, sunt propriae virtutes inditae singulis rebus perfectis, ab universalibus agentibus derivatae, non enim solus sol generat hominem, sed est in homine virtus generativa hominis; et similiter in aliis animalibus perfectis. Nihil autem est perfectius in inferioribus rebus anima humana. Unde oportet dicere quod in ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata a superiori intellectu, per quam possit phantasmata illustrare. Et hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus nos abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu intelligibilia. Nulla autem actio convenit alicui rei, nisi per aliquod principium formaliter ei inhaerens; ut supra dictum est, cum de intellectu possibili ageretur. Ergo oportet virtutem quae est principium huius actionis, esse aliquid in anima. Et ideo Aristoteles comparavit intellectum agentem lumini, quod est aliquid receptum in aere. Plato autem intellectum separatum imprimendum in animas nostras, comparavit soli; ut Themistius dicit in commentario tertii de anima. Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrae fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae, et in quo solo beatificatur, ut infra patebit. Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale participat, secundum*

**I answer that,** The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.

Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things, besides the universal active causes, each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal causes: for the sun alone does not generate man; but in man is the power of begetting man: and in like manner with other perfect animals. Now among these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. Now no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the passive intellect ([Question \[76\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)). Therefore the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (*De Anima* iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is something received into the air: while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on *De Anima* iii. But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on ([Question \[90\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#); [FS](#), [Question \[3\]](#), [Article \[7\]](#)).



*illud Psalmi IV, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa lux vera illuminat sicut causa universalis, a qua anima humana participat quandam particularem virtutem, ut dictum est.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus illa verba non dicit de intellectu agente, sed de intellectu in actu. Unde supra de ipso praemiserat, idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei. Vel, si intelligatur de intellectu agente, hoc dicitur quia non est ex parte intellectus agentis hoc quod quandoque intelligimus et quandoque non intelligimus; sed ex parte intellectus qui est in potentia.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod, si intellectus agens compararetur ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum agens ad potentiam, sicut visibile in actu ad visum; sequeretur quod statim omnia intelligeremus, cum intellectus agens sit quo est omnia facere. Nunc autem non se habet ut obiectum, sed ut faciens obiecta in actu, ad quod requiritur, praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis, praesentia phantasmatum, et bona dispositio virium sensitivarum, et exercitium in huiusmodi opere; quia per unum intellectum fiunt etiam alia intellecta, sicut per terminos propositiones, et per prima principia conclusiones. Et quantum ad hoc, non differt utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid animae, vel aliquid separatum.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod anima intellectiva est quidem actu immaterialis, sed est in potentia ad determinatas species rerum. Phantasmata autem, e converso, sunt quidem actu similitudines specierum quarundam, sed sunt potentia immaterialia. Unde nihil prohibet unam et eandem animam, inquantum est immaterialis in actu, habere aliquam virtutem per quam faciat immaterialia in actu abstrahendo a conditionibus individualis materiae, quae quidem virtus dicitur intellectus agens; et aliam virtutem receptivam huiusmodi specierum, quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, inquantum est in potentia ad huiusmodi species.*

*Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum essentia animae sit immaterialis, a supremo intellectu creata, nihil prohibet virtutem quae a supremo intellectu participatur, per quam abstrahit a materia, ab essentia ipsius procedere, sicut et alias eius potentias.*

Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Ps. 4:7, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."

**Reply to Objection 1:** That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The Philosopher says those words not of the active intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said: "Knowledge in act is the same as the thing." Or, if we refer those words to the active intellect, then they are said because it is not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality.

**Reply to Objection 3:** If the relation of the active intellect to the passive were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act: for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation; since through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, conclusions. From this point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul.

**Reply to Objection 4:** The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter: which power is called the "active intellect"; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the "passive intellect" by reason of its being in potentiality to such species.

**Reply to Objection 5:** Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing

from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other powers.

## Summa Contra Gentiles II

Caput 77. That it is not impossible for the possible and active intellect to exist together in the one substance of the soul.

### Caput 77

*Quod non est impossibile intellectum possibilem et agentem in una substantia animae convenire*

*Videbitur autem forsitan alicui hoc esse impossibile, quod una et eadem substantia, scilicet nostrae animae, sit in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, quod pertinet ad intellectum possibilem, et faciat ea actu, quod est intellectus agentis: cum nihil agat secundum quod est in potentia, sed secundum quod est actu. Unde non videbitur quod agens et possibilis intellectus possint in una substantia animae convenire.*

*Si quis autem recte inspiciat, nihil inconueniens aut difficile sequitur. Nihil enim prohibet hoc respectu illius esse secundum quid in potentia et secundum aliud in actu, sicut in rebus naturalibus videmus: aer enim est actu humidus et potentia siccus, terra autem e converso. Haec autem comparatio invenitur esse inter animam intellectivam et phantasmata. Habet enim anima intellectiva aliquid in actu ad quod phantasma est in potentia: et ad aliquid est in potentia quod in phantasmatis actu invenitur. Habet enim substantia animae humanae immaterialitatem, et, sicut ex dictis patet, ex hoc habet naturam intellectualem: quia omnis substantia immaterialis est huiusmodi. Ex hoc autem nondum habet quod assimiletur huic vel illi rei determinate, quod requiritur ad hoc quod anima nostra hanc vel illam rem determinate cognoscat: omnis enim cognitio fit secundum similitudinem cogniti in cognoscente. Remanet igitur ipsa anima intellectiva in potentia ad determinatas similitudines rerum cognoscibilium a nobis, quae sunt naturae rerum sensibilium. Et has quidem determinatas naturas rerum sensibilium praesentant nobis phantasmata. Quae tamen nondum pervenerunt ad esse intelligibile: cum sint similitudines rerum sensibilium etiam secundum conditiones materiales, quae sunt proprietates individuales, et sunt etiam in organis materialibus. Non igitur sunt intelligibilia actu. Et tamen, quia in hoc homine cuius similitudinem repraesentant*

### Chapter 77

THAT IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE POSSIBLE AND AGENT INTELLECT TO EXIST TOGETHER IN THE ONE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL

[1] Perhaps someone will think it impossible for one and the same substance, namely, that of our soul, to be in potentiality to all intelligibles, as becomes the possible intellect, and to actualize them, as becomes the agent intellect. For nothing acts so far as it is in potentiality, but so far as it is in act. That is why it will seem impossible for the agent and possible intellect to exist concurrently in the one substance of the soul.

[2] Upon close examination, however, it is seen that this concurrence entails nothing incongruous or difficult. For nothing prevents one thing from being in one respect potential in relation to some other thing, and actual in another respect, as we observe in things of nature; air is actually damp and potentially dry, and the reverse is true of earth. Now, this same interrelationship obtains between the intellectual soul and the phantasms. For the intellectual soul has something actual to which the phantasm is potential, and is potential to something present actually in the phantasm; since the substance of the human soul is possessed of immateriality, and, as is clear from what has been said, it therefore has an intellectual nature—every immaterial substance being of this kind. But this does not mean that the soul is now likened to this or that determinate thing, as it must be in order to know this or that thing determinately; for all knowledge is brought about by the likeness of the thing known being present in the knower. Thus, the intellectual soul itself remains potential with respect to the determinate likenesses of things that can be known by us, namely, the natures of sensible things. It is the phantasms which present these determinate sensible natures to us. But these phantasms have not yet acquired intelligible actuality, since they are likenesses of sensible things even as to material conditions, which are the individual properties, and, moreover, the phantasms exist in material organs. Consequently, they are not actually intelligible. They are, however, potentially intelligible,

*phantasmata, est accipere naturam universalem denudatam ab omnibus conditionibus individuantes, sunt intelligibilia in potentia. Sic igitur habent intelligibilitatem in potentia, determinationem autem similitudinis rerum in actu. E contrario autem erat in anima intellectiva. Est igitur in anima intellectiva virtus activa in phantasmata, faciens ea intelligibilia actu: et haec potentia animae vocatur intellectus agens. Est etiam in ea virtus quae est in potentia ad determinatas similitudines rerum sensibilium: et haec est potentia intellectus possibilis.*

*Differt tamen hoc quod invenitur in anima, ab eo quod invenitur in agentibus naturalibus. Quia ibi unum est in potentia ad aliquid secundum eundem modum quo in altero actu invenitur: nam materia aeris est in potentia ad formam aquae eo modo quo est in aqua. Et ideo corpora naturalia, quae communicant in materia, eodem ordine agunt et patiuntur ad invicem. Anima autem intellectiva non est in potentia ad similitudines rerum quae sunt in phantasmatis per modum illum quo sunt ibi: sed secundum quod illae similitudines elevantur ad aliquid altius, ut scilicet sint abstractae a conditionibus individuantes materialibus, ex quo fiunt intelligibiles actu. Et ideo actio intellectus agentis in phantasmate praecedat receptionem intellectus possibilis. Et sic principalitas actionis non attribuitur phantasmatis, sed intellectui agenti. Propter quod Aristoteles dicit quod se habet ad possibilem sicut ars ad materiam.*

*Huius autem exemplum omnino simile esset si oculus, simul cum hoc quod est diaphanum et susceptivus colorum, haberet tantum de luce quod posset colores facere visibiles actu: sicut quaedam animalia dicuntur sui oculi luce sufficienter sibi illuminare obiecta; propter quod de nocte vident magis, in die vero minus; sunt enim debilius oculorum, quia parva luce moventur, ad multam autem confunduntur. Cui etiam simile est in intellectu nostro quod ad ea quae sunt manifestissima, se habet sicut oculus noctuae ad solem: unde parvum lumen intelligibile quod est nobis connaturale, sufficit ad nostrum intelligere.*

*Quod autem lumen intelligibile nostrae animae connaturale sufficiat ad faciendum actionem intellectus agentis, patet si quis consideret necessitatem ponendi intellectum agentem. Inveniebatur enim anima in potentia ad intelligibilia, sicut sensus ad sensibilia: sicut enim non semper sentimus, ita non semper intelligimus. Haec autem*

since in the individual man whose likeness the phantasms reflect it is possible to receive the universal nature stripped of all individuating conditions. And so, the phantasms have intelligibility potentially, while being actually determinate as likenesses of things. In the intellective soul the opposite was the case. Hence, there is in that soul an active power vis-à-vis the phantasms, making them actually intelligible; and this power is called the agent intellect; while there is also in the soul a power that is in potentiality to the determinate likenesses of sensible things; and this power is the possible intellect.

[3] That which exists in the soul, however, differs from what is found in natural agents. For in the latter, one thing is in potentiality to something according to the same manner of being as that of its actual presence in something else; the matter of air is in potentiality to the form of water in the same way as it is in water. That is why natural bodies, which have matter in common, are mutually active and passive in the same order. On the other hand, the intellective soul is not in potentiality to the likenesses of things in the phantasms, according to the mode of their presence therein, but according as they are raised to a higher level by abstraction from material individuating conditions, thus being made actually intelligible. The action of the agent intellect on the phantasm, therefore, precedes the reception by the possible intellect, so that operational primacy here is ascribed not to the phantasms, but to the agent intellect. And for this reason Aristotle says that the agent intellect is related to the possible intellect as art to its matter.

[4] A quite similar case would be that of the eye, if, being transparent and receptive of colors, it were endowed with sufficient light to make colors actually visible; even as certain animals are said to illuminate objects for themselves by the light of their own eyes, and so they see more at night and less by day, for their eyes are weak, being activated by a dim light and confused by a strong one. There is something comparable to this in our intellect, which, “as regards things which are most evident of all, is as the eyes of the owl to the blaze of day”; so that the little intelligible light which is connatural to us suffices for our act of understanding.

[5] It is clear that the intelligible light connatural to our soul suffices to cause the action of the agent intellect, if one considers the necessity of affirming the existence of the agent intellect. For the soul was found to be in potentiality to intelligible things, as the senses are to sensible things; since, just as we do not always sense, so neither do we always understand. Now, these intelligibles which the

*intelligibilia quae anima intellectiva humana intelligit, Plato posuit esse intelligibilia per seipsa, scilicet ideas: unde non erat ei necessarium ponere intellectum agentem ad intelligibilia. Si autem hoc esset verum, oporteret quod, quanto aliqua sunt secundum se magis intelligibilia, magis intelligerentur a nobis. Quod patet esse falsum: nam magis sunt nobis intelligibilia quae sunt sensui proximiora, quae in se sunt minus intelligibilia. Unde Aristoteles fuit motus ad ponendum quod ea quae sunt nobis intelligibilia, non sunt aliqua existentia intelligibilia per seipsa, sed quod fiunt ex sensibilibus. Unde oportuit quod poneret virtutem quae hoc faceret. Et haec est intellectus agens. Ad hoc ergo ponitur intellectus agens, ut faceret intelligibilia nobis proportionata. Hoc autem non excedit modum luminis intelligibilis nobis connaturalis. Unde nihil prohibet ipsi lumini nostrae animae attribuere actionem intellectus agentis: et praecipue cum Aristoteles intellectum agentem comparet lumini.*

human intellectualive soul understands were asserted by Plato to be intelligible of themselves, namely, Ideas, so that in his doctrine there was no necessity of an agent intellect: an intellect having an active role with respect to intelligibles. But, if this doctrine were true, it would follow necessarily that the more intelligible in their own nature things are, the greater would be our understanding of them; which is manifestly false. For the nearer things are to our senses, the more intelligible they are to us, though in themselves they are less intelligible. That is why Aristotle was impelled to maintain that those things which are intelligible to us are not existing entities intelligible in themselves, but are made intelligible from sensibles. Aristotle, therefore, saw the necessity of admitting a power capable of doing this, namely, the agent intellect. So, the function of that intellect is to make intelligibles proportionate to our minds. Now, the mode of intellectual light connatural to us is not unequal to the performance of this function. Nothing, therefore, stands in the way of our ascribing the action of the agent intellect to the light of our soul, and especially since Aristotle compares the agent intellect to a light.

**Summa Theologiae Prima Pars.** Quaestio 93. *De fine sive termino productionis hominis, prout dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei.*

Articulus 1. Whether the image of God is in man?

Articulus 6. Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?

### Whether the image of God is in man?

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine. Dicitur enim Isaiae XL, cui similem fecistis Deum; aut quam imaginem ponetis ei?*

*Praeterea, esse Dei imaginem est proprium primogeniti, de quo dicit apostolus, ad Colos. I, qui est imago Dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae. Non ergo in homine invenitur Dei imago.*

*Praeterea, Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., quod imago est eius rei ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens; et iterum dicit quod imago est rei ad rem coaequandam indiscreta et unita similitudo. Sed non est species indifferens Dei et hominis; nec potest esse aequalitas hominis ad Deum. Ergo in homine non potest esse imago Dei.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is written ([Is. 40:18](#)): "To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make for Him?"

**Objection 2:** Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. 1:15): "Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature." Therefore the image of God is not to be found in man.

**Objection 3:** Further, Hilary says (De Synod [\*Super i can. Synod. Ancyran.]) that "an image is of the same species as that which it represents"; and he also says that "an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another." But there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no image of God in man.

*Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., ubi est imago, continuo est et similitudo; sed ubi est similitudo, non continuo est imago. Ex quo patet quod similitudo est de ratione imaginis, et quod imago aliquid addit supra rationem similitudinis, scilicet quod sit ex alio expressum, imago enim dicitur ex eo quod agitur ad imitationem alterius. Unde ovum, quantumcumque sit alteri ovo simile et aequale, quia tamen non est expressum ex illo, non dicitur imago eius.*

*Aequalitas autem non est de ratione imaginis, quia, ut Augustinus ibidem dicit, ubi est imago, non continuo est aequalitas; ut patet in imagine alicuius in speculo relucente. Est tamen de ratione perfectae imaginis, nam in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid imagini, quod insit illi de quo expressa est. Manifestum est autem quod in homine invenitur aliqua Dei similitudo, quae deducitur a Deo sicut ab exemplari, non tamen est similitudo secundum aequalitatem, quia in infinitum excedit exemplar hoc tale exemplatum. Et ideo in homine dicitur esse imago Dei, non tamen perfecta, sed imperfecta. Et hoc significat Scriptura, cum dicit hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, praepositio enim ad accessum quandam significat, qui competit rei distant.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod propheta loquitur de corporalibus imaginibus ab homine fabricatis, et ideo signanter dicit, quam imaginem ponetis ei? Sed Deus ipse sibi in homine posuit spiritualem imaginem.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod primogenitus omnis creaturae est imago Dei perfecta, perfecte implens illud cuius imago est, et ideo dicitur imago, et nunquam ad imaginem. Homo vero et propter similitudinem dicitur imago; et propter imperfectionem similitudinis, dicitur ad imaginem. Et quia similitudo perfecta Dei non potest esse nisi in identitate naturae, imago Dei est in filio suo primogenito sicut imago regis in filio sibi connaturali; in homine autem sicut in aliena natura, sicut imago regis in nummo argenteo; ut patet per Augustinum in libro de decem chordis.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, eo modo dicitur species indifferens, quo una. Unum autem dicitur aliquid non solum numero aut specie aut genere, sed etiam secundum analogiam vel proportionem quandam, et sic est unitas vel*

**On the contrary,** It is written ([Gn. 1:26](#)): "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness."

**I answer that,** As Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to likeness—namely, that it is copied from something else. For an "image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it.

But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image there is not necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition "to" signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him?" But God made a spiritual image to Himself in man.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine says explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore).

**Reply to Objection 3:** As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with God, or like

*convenientia creaturae ad Deum. Quod autem dicit rei ad rem coaequandam, pertinet ad rationem perfectae imaginis.*

to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which adequately represents another," this is to be understood of a perfect image.

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### Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?

*Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine solum secundum mentem. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XI, quod vir est imago Dei. Sed vir non est solum mens. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur solum secundum mentem.*

*Praeterea, Gen. I, creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, masculum et feminam creavit eos. Sed distinctio masculi et feminae est secundum corpus. Ergo etiam secundum corpus attenditur Dei imago in homine, et non secundum mentem tantum.*

*Praeterea, imago praecipue videtur attendi secundum figuram. Sed figura ad corpus pertinet. Ergo imago Dei attenditur in homine etiam secundum corpus, et non secundum mentem tantum.*

*Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., triplex visio invenitur in nobis, scilicet corporalis, spiritualis sive imaginaria, et intellectualis. Si ergo secundum visionem intellectualem, quae ad mentem pertinet, est aliqua Trinitas in nobis, secundum quam sumus ad imaginem Dei; pari ratione et in aliis visionibus.*

*Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Eph. IV, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, et induite novum hominem, ex quo datur intelligi quod renovatio nostra, quae fit secundum novi hominis indumentum, ad mentem pertinet. Sed ad Col. III, dicit, induentes novum hominem, qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum, ubi renovationem quae est secundum novi hominis indumentum, attribuit imagini Dei. Esse ergo ad imaginem Dei pertinet solum ad mentem.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, cum in omnibus creaturis sit aliqualis Dei similitudo, in sola creatura rationali invenitur similitudo Dei per modum imaginis, ut supra dictum est, in aliis autem creaturis per modum vestigii. Id autem in quo creatura rationalis excedit alias creaturas, est intellectus sive mens. Unde relinquitur quod nec in ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem. In aliis vero partibus, si*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the image of God is not only in man's mind. For the Apostle says ([1 Cor. 11:7](#)) that "the man is the image... of God." But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only in his mind.

**Objection 2:** Further, it is written ([Gn. 1:27](#)): "God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created them." But the distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind.

**Objection 3:** Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.

**Objection 4:** Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others.

**On the contrary,** The Apostle says ([Eph. 4:23,24](#)): "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. 3:10): "Putting on the new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of God, "according to the image of Him that created him," where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only.

**I answer that,** While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" as we have explained above ([Articles \[1\],2](#)); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the

*quas habet rationalis creatura, invenitur similitudo vestigii; sicut et in ceteris rebus quibus secundum partes huiusmodi assimilatur. Cuius ratio manifeste cognosci potest, si attendatur modus quo repraesentat vestigium, et quo repraesentat imago. Imago enim repraesentat secundum similitudinem speciei, ut dictum est. Vestigium autem repraesentat per modum effectus qui sic repraesentat suam causam, quod tamen ad speciei similitudinem non pertingit, impressiones enim quae ex motu animalium relinquuntur, dicuntur vestigia; et similiter cinis dicitur vestigium ignis; et desolatio terrae, vestigium hostilis exercitus.*

*Potest ergo huiusmodi differentia attendi inter creaturas rationales et alias creaturas, et quantum ad hoc quod in creaturis repraesentatur similitudo divinae naturae, et quantum ad hoc quod in eis repraesentatur similitudo Trinitatis increatae. Nam quantum ad similitudinem divinae naturae pertinet, creaturae rationales videntur quodammodo ad repraesentationem speciei pertingere, in quantum imitantur Deum non solum in hoc quod est et vivit, sed etiam in hoc quod intelligit, ut supra dictum est. Aliae vero creaturae non intelligunt; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium intellectus producentis, si earum dispositio consideretur. Similiter, cum increata Trinitas distinguatur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut supra habitum est; in creatura rationali, in qua invenitur processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum voluntatem, potest dici imago Trinitatis increatae per quandam repraesentationem speciei. In aliis autem creaturis non invenitur principium verbi, et verbum, et amor; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium quod haec inveniantur in causa producente. Nam hoc ipsum quod creatura habet substantiam modificatam et finitam, demonstrat quod sit a quodam principio; species vero eius demonstrat verbum facientis, sicut forma domus demonstrat conceptionem artificis; ordo vero demonstrat amorem producentis, quo effectus ordinatur ad bonum, sicut usus aedificii demonstrat artificis voluntatem. Sic igitur in homine invenitur Dei similitudo per modum imaginis secundum mentem; sed secundum alias partes eius, per modum vestigii.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo dicitur imago Dei, non quia ipse essentialiter sit imago, sed quia in eo est Dei imago impressa secundum mentem; sicut denarius dicitur imago Caesaris, in quantum habet Caesaris imaginem. Unde non oportet quod secundum quamlibet partem hominis accipiatur Dei imago.*

rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace" represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army.

Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained ([Article \[2\]](#)); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen ([Question \[28\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace."

**Reply to Objection 1:** Man is called to the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as existing in every part of man.

*Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XII de Trin., quidam imaginem Trinitatis in homine posuerunt, non secundum unum individuum, sed secundum plura; dicentes quod vir patris personam intimat; filii vero personam, quod de viro ita processit ut de illo nasceretur; atque ita tertiam personam, velut spiritum sanctum, dicunt esse mulierem, quae ita de viro processit ut non ipsa esset filius aut filia. Quod prima facie absurdum videtur. Primo quidem, quia sequeretur quod spiritus sanctus esset principium filii, sicut mulier est principium prolis quae nascitur de viro. Secundo, quia unus homo non esset nisi ad imaginem unius personae. Tertio, quia secundum hoc Scriptura de imagine Dei in homine mentionem facere non debuisset, nisi producta iam prole. Et ideo dicendum est quod Scriptura, postquam dixerat, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, addidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos, non ut imago Dei secundum distinctiones sexuum attendatur; sed quia imago Dei utriusque sexui est communis, cum sit secundum mentem, in qua non est distinctio sexuum. Unde apostolus, ad Col. III, postquam dixerat, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit illum, subdit, ubi non est masculus et femina.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis imago Dei in homine non accipiatur secundum figuram corpoream, tamen corpus hominis, quia solum inter terrenorum animalium corpora non pronum in alvum prostratum est, sed tale est ut ad contemplandum caelum sit aptius, magis in hoc ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, quam cetera corpora animalium, factum iure videri potest; ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Quod tamen non est sic intelligendum, quasi in corpore hominis sit imago Dei, sed quia ipsa figura humani corporis repraesentat imaginem Dei in anima, per modum vestigii.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod tam in visione corporali quam in visione imaginaria invenitur quaedam Trinitas, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Trin. In visione enim corporali est quidem primo species exterioris corporis; secundo vero ipsa visio, quae fit per impressionem cuiusdam similitudinis praedictae speciei in visum; tertio est ibi intentio voluntatis applicans visum ad videndum, et eum in re visa detinens.*

*Similiter etiam in visione imaginaria invenitur primo quidem species in memoria reservata; secundo ipsa imaginaria visio, quae provenit ex hoc quod acies*

**Reply to Objection 2:** As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. They held that "the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter." All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, "to the image of God He created him," it added, "male and female He created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Col. 3:10), after saying, "According to the image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male nor female" [\*these words are in reality from Gal. 3:28] (Vulg. "neither Gentile nor Jew").

**Reply to Objection 3:** Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals," as Augustine remarks (Questions. 83, qu. 51). But this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace.

**Reply to Objection 4:** Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen.

Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the



*animae, idest ipsa vis imaginaria, informatur secundum praedictam speciem; tertio vero invenitur intentio voluntatis coniungens utrumque. Sed utraque Trinitas deficit a ratione divinae imaginis. Nam ipsa species exterioris corporis est extra naturam animae, species autem quae est in memoria, etsi non sit extra animam, est tamen adventitia animae, et ita utrobique deficit repraesentatio connaturalitatis et coaeternitatis divinarum personarum. Visio vero corporalis non procedit tantum a specie exterioris corporis, sed simul cum hoc a sensu videntis, et similiter visio imaginaria non solum procedit a specie quae in memoria conservatur, sed etiam a virtute imaginativa, et ita per hoc non repraesentatur convenienter processio filii a solo patre. Intentio vero voluntatis, quae coniungit duo praedicta, non ex eis procedit, neque in visione corporea neque in spirituali, unde non convenienter repraesentatur processio spiritus sancti a patre et filio.*

faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.

## Valios ir intelekto sąveika. Laisvo apsisprendimo (*liberum arbitrium*) samprata

**Summa Theologiae Prima Pars.** Quaestio 82. *De voluntate*

Articulus 3. Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect?

Articulus 4. Whether the will moves the intellect?

### Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect?

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas sit altior potentia quam intellectus. Bonum enim et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed finis est prima et altissima causarum. Ergo voluntas est prima et altissima potentiarum.*

*Praeterea, res naturales inveniuntur procedere de imperfectis ad perfecta. Et hoc etiam in potentiis animae apparet, proceditur enim de sensu ad intellectum, qui est nobilior. Sed naturalis processus est de actu intellectus in actum voluntatis. Ergo voluntas est perfectior et nobilior potentia quam intellectus.*

*Praeterea, habitus sunt proportionati potentiis, sicut perfectiones perfectibilibus. Sed habitus quo perficitur voluntas, scilicet caritas, est nobilior habitibus quibus perficitur intellectus, dicitur enim I ad Cor. XIII, si noverim mysteria omnia, et si habuero omnem fidem, caritatem autem non habeam, nihil sum. Ergo voluntas est altior potentia quam intellectus.*

*Sed contra est quod philosophus, in X Ethic., ponit altissimam potentiam animae esse intellectum.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod eminentia alicuius ad alterum potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Consideratur autem aliquid tale simpliciter, prout est secundum seipsum tale, secundum quid autem, prout dicitur tale secundum respectum ad alterum. Si ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior invenitur. Et hoc apparet ex comparatione obiectorum ad invicem. Obiectum enim intellectus est simplicius et magis absolutum quam obiectum voluntatis, nam obiectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem appetibile, cuius ratio est in intellectu, est obiectum voluntatis. Quanto autem aliquid est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power.

**Objection 2:** Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect.

**Objection 3:** Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the will—namely, charity—is more noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written ([1 Cor. 13:2](#)): "If I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect.

**On the contrary,** The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher power than the intellect.

**I answer that,** The superiority of one thing over another can be considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a thing is considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of

*est nobilius et altius. Et ideo obiectum intellectus est altius quam obiectum voluntatis. Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum ordinem ad obiectum, sequitur quod secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate. Secundum quid autem, et per comparationem ad alterum, voluntas invenitur interdum altior intellectu; ex eo scilicet quod obiectum voluntatis in altiori re invenitur quam obiectum intellectus. Sicut si dicerem auditum esse secundum quid nobiliorem visu, in quantum res aliqua cuius est sonus, nobilior est aliqua re cuius est color, quamvis color sit nobilior et simplicior sono. Ut enim supra dictum est, actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in intelligente; actus vero voluntatis perficitur in hoc quod voluntas inclinatur ad ipsam rem prout in se est. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod bonum et malum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis, sunt in rebus; verum et falsum, quae sunt obiecta intellectus, sunt in mente. Quando igitur res in qua est bonum, est nobilior ipsa anima, in qua est ratio intellecta; per comparationem ad talem rem, voluntas est altior intellectu. Quando vero res in qua est bonum, est infra animam; tunc etiam per comparationem ad talem rem, intellectus est altior voluntate. Unde melior est amor Dei quam cognitio, e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium quam amor. Simpliciter tamen intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio causae accipitur secundum comparationem unius ad alterum, et in tali comparatione ratio boni principalior invenitur, sed verum dicitur magis absolute, et ipsius boni rationem significat. Unde et bonum quoddam verum est. Sed rursus et ipsum verum est quoddam bonum; secundum quod intellectus res quaedam est, et verum finis ipsius. Et inter alios fines iste finis est excellentior; sicut intellectus inter alias potentias.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod est prius generatione et tempore, est imperfectius, quia in uno et eodem potentia tempore praecedit actum, et imperfectio perfectionem. Sed illud quod est prius simpliciter et secundum naturae ordinem, est perfectius, sic enim actus est prior potentia. Et hoc modo intellectus est prior voluntate, sicut motivum mobili, et activum passivo, bonum enim intellectum movet voluntatem.*

the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which there is color, though color is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above ([Question \[16\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#); [Question \[27\]](#), [Article \[4\]](#)), the action of the intellect consists in this—that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in this—that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher says in *Metaph. vi* (*Did. v, 2*) that "good and evil," which are objects of the will, "are in things," but "truth and error," which are objects of the intellect, "are in the mind." When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers.

**Reply to Objection 2:** What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes the passive; for good which is understood moves the will.

*Ad tertium dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de voluntate secundum comparisonem ad id quod supra animam est. Virtus enim caritatis est qua Deum amamus.*

**Reply to Objection 3:** This reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love God.

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### Whether the will moves the intellect?

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveat intellectum. Movens enim est nobilius et prius moto, quia movens est agens; agens autem est nobilius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad Litt., et philosophus in III de anima. Sed intellectus est prior et nobilior voluntate, ut supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas non movet intellectum.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the will does not move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above ([Article \[3\]](#)). Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

*Praeterea, movens non movetur a moto, nisi forte per accidens. Sed intellectus movet voluntatem, quia appetibile apprehensum per intellectum est movens non motum; appetitus autem movens motum. Ergo intellectus non movetur a voluntate.*

**Objection 2:** Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved by the will.

*Praeterea, nihil velle possumus nisi sit intellectum. Si igitur ad intelligendum movet voluntas volendo intelligere, oportebit quod etiam illud velle praecedat aliud intelligere, et illud intelligere aliud velle, et sic in infinitum, quod est impossibile. Non ergo voluntas movet intellectum.*

**Objection 3:** Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

*Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod in nobis est percipere quamcumque volumus artem, et non percipere. In nobis autem est aliquid per voluntatem; percipimus autem artes per intellectum. Voluntas ergo movet intellectum.*

**On the contrary,** Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list." But a thing is in our power by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect.

*Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur movere dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum finis; sicut dicitur quod finis movet efficientem. Et hoc modo intellectus movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum agentis; sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet impulsum. Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum, et omnes animae vires; ut Anselmus dicit in libro de similitudinibus. Cuius ratio est, quia in omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentias quae respiciunt fines particulares. Et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in politicis. Caelum*

**I answer that,** A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. For

*enim, quod agit ad universalem conservationem generabilium et corruptibilium, movet omnia inferiora corpora, quorum unumquodque agit ad conservationem propriae speciei, vel etiam individui. Rex etiam, qui intendit bonum commune totius regni, movet per suum imperium singulos praepositos civitatum, qui singulis civitatibus curam regiminis impendunt. Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis in communi. Quaelibet autem potentia comparatur ad aliquod bonum proprium sibi conveniens; sicut visus ad perceptionem coloris, intellectus ad cognitionem veri. Et ideo voluntas per modum agentis movet omnes animae potentias ad suos actus, praeter vires naturales vegetativae partis, quae nostro arbitrio non subduntur.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum quod intellectus est apprehensivus entis et veri universalis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam res, et particularis potentia habens determinatum actum. Et similiter voluntas dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum communitatem sui obiecti, prout scilicet est appetitiva boni communis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam determinata animae potentia habens determinatum actum. Si ergo comparentur intellectus et voluntas secundum rationem communitatis obiectorum utriusque, sic dictum est supra quod intellectus est simpliciter altior et nobilior voluntate. Si autem consideretur intellectus secundum communitatem sui obiecti, et voluntas secundum quod est quaedam determinata potentia, sic iterum intellectus est altior et prior voluntate, quia sub ratione entis et veri, quam apprehendit intellectus, continetur voluntas ipsa, et actus eius, et obiectum ipsius. Unde intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et actum eius, et obiectum ipsius, sicut et alia specialia intellecta, ut lapidem aut lignum, quae continentur sub communi ratione entis et veri. Si vero consideretur voluntas secundum communem rationem sui obiecti, quod est bonum, intellectus autem secundum quod est quaedam res et potentia specialis; sic sub communi ratione boni continetur, velut quoddam speciale, et intellectus ipse, et ipsum intelligere, et obiectum eius, quod est verum, quorum quodlibet est quoddam speciale bonum. Et secundum hoc voluntas est altior intellectu, et potest ipsum movere. Ex his ergo apparet ratio quare hae potentiae suis actibus invicem se includunt, quia intellectus intelligit voluntatem velle, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere. Et simili ratione bonum continetur sub vero, in quantum est quoddam verum intellectum; et verum continetur sub bono, in quantum est quoddam bonum desideratum.*

the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its object—that is to say, as appetitive of universal good—and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If, therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above ([Article 3](#)), the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good.

*Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus alio modo movet voluntatem, quam voluntas intellectum, ut iam dictum est.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statur in intellectu sicut in primo. Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est quod praecedat apprehensio, sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit motus voluntatis; sed principium consiliandi et intelligendi est aliquod intellectivum principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est Deus, ut etiam Aristoteles dicit in VII Ethicae Eudemicae, et per hunc modum ostendit quod non est procedere in infinitum.*

**Reply to Objection 2:** The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.

**Reply to Objection 3:** There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect—namely, God—as also Aristotle says (Eth. Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to proceed indefinitely.

**Summa Theologiae Prima Pars. Quaestio 83. De libero arbitrio.**  
Articulus 1. Whether man has free-will?

### Whether man has free-will?

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non sit liberi arbitrii. Quicumque enim est liberi arbitrii, facit quod vult. Sed homo non facit quod vult, dicitur enim Rom. VII, non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, illud facio. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.*

*Praeterea, quicumque est liberi arbitrii, eius est velle et non velle, operari et non operari. Sed hoc non est hominis, dicitur enim ad Rom. IX, non est volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, scilicet currere. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.*

*Praeterea, liberum est quod sui causa est, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Quod ergo movetur ab alio, non est liberum. Sed Deus movet voluntatem, dicitur enim Prov. XXI, cor regis in manu Dei, et quocumque voluerit vertet illud; et Philipp. II, Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.*

*Praeterea, quicumque est liberi arbitrii, est dominus suorum actuum. Sed homo non est dominus suorum actuum, quia, ut dicitur Ierem. X, non est in homine via eius, nec viri est ut dirigat gressus suos. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for it is written ([Rm. 7:19](#)): "For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do." Therefore man has not free-will.

**Objection 2:** Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: for it is written ([Rm. 9:16](#)): "It is not of him that willeth"—namely, to will—"nor of him that runneth"—namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will.

**Objection 3:** Further, what is "free is cause of itself," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written ([Prov. 21:1](#)): "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it" and ([Phil. 2:13](#)): "It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish." Therefore man has not free-will.

**Objection 4:** Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written ([Jer. 10:23](#)): "The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk." Therefore man has not free-will.

*Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei. Sed non est in potestate nostra aliquales esse, sed hoc nobis est a natura. Ergo naturale est nobis quod aliquem finem sequamur. Non ergo ex libero arbitrio.*

*Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. Glossa, idest in libertate arbitrii.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod homo est liberi arbitrii, alioquin frustra essent consilia, exhortationes, praecepta, prohibitiones, praemia et poenae. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quaedam agunt absque iudicio, sicut lapis movetur deorsum; et similiter omnia cognitione carentia. Quaedam autem agunt iudicio, sed non libero; sicut animalia bruta. Iudicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, naturali iudicio, et non libero, quia non ex collatione, sed ex naturali instinctu hoc iudicat. Et simile est de quolibet iudicio brutorum animalium. Sed homo agit iudicio, quia per vim cognoscitivam iudicat aliquid esse fugiendum vel prosequendum. Sed quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero iudicio, potens in diversa ferri. Ratio enim circa contingentia habet viam ad opposita; ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis, et rhetoricis persuasionibus. Particularia autem operabilia sunt quaedam contingentia, et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, appetitus sensitivus, etsi obediat rationi, tamen potest in aliquo repugnare, concupiscendo contra illud quod ratio dicit. Hoc ergo est bonum quod homo non facit cum vult, scilicet non concupiscere contra rationem, ut Glossa Augustini ibidem dicit.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud apostoli non sic est intelligendum quasi homo non velit et non currat libero arbitrio, sed quia liberum arbitrium ad hoc non est sufficiens, nisi moveatur et iuvetur a Deo.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad*

**Objection 5:** Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing.

**On the contrary,** It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the gloss adds: "That is of his free-will."

**I answer that,** Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.

**Reply to Objection 1:** As we have said above ([Question 81](#), [Article 3](#), ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes—namely, "not to desire against reason," as Augustine says.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself

*agendum. Non tamen hoc est de necessitate libertatis, quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum est, sicut nec ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa alterius, requiritur quod sit prima causa eius. Deus igitur est prima causa movens et naturales causas et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis, movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales; ita movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint voluntariae, sed potius hoc in eis facit, operatur enim in unoquoque secundum eius proprietatem.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod dicitur non esse in homine via eius, quantum ad executiones electionum, in quibus homo impediri potest, velit nolit. Electiones autem ipsae sunt in nobis, supposito tamen divino auxilio.*

*Ad quintum dicendum quod qualitas hominis est duplex, una naturalis, et alia superveniens. Naturalis autem qualitas accipi potest vel circa partem intellectivam; vel circa corpus et virtutes corpori annexas. Ex eo igitur quod homo est aliqualis qualitate naturali quae attenditur secundum intellectivam partem, naturaliter homo appetit ultimum finem, scilicet beatitudinem. Qui quidem appetitus naturalis est, et non subiacet libero arbitrio, ut ex supradictis patet. Ex parte vero corporis et virtutum corpori annexarum, potest esse homo aliqualis naturali qualitate, secundum quod est talis complexionis, vel talis dispositionis, ex quacumque impressione corporearum causarum, quae non possunt in intellectivam partem imprimere, eo quod non est alicuius corporis actus. Sic igitur qualis unusquisque est secundum corpoream qualitatem, talis finis videtur ei, quia ex huiusmodi dispositione homo inclinatur ad eligendum aliquid vel repudiandum. Sed istae inclinationes subiacent iudicio rationis, cui obedit inferior appetitus, ut dictum est. Unde per hoc libertati arbitrii non praeiudicatur.*

*Qualitates autem supervenientes sunt sicut habitus et passiones, secundum quae aliquis magis inclinatur in unum quam in alterum. Tamen istae etiam inclinationes subiacent iudicio rationis. Et huiusmodi etiam qualitates ei subiacent, inquantum in nobis est tales qualitates acquirere, vel causaliter vel dispositive, vel a nobis excludere. Et sic nihil est quod libertati arbitrii repugnet.*

to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

**Reply to Objection 4:** "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God.

**Reply to Objection 5:** Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above ([Question \[82\]](#), [Articles \[1\],2](#)). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said ([Question \[81\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.

The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will.

**Quaestiones disputatae de veritate.** Quaestio 24. *De libero arbitrio.*  
Articulus 14. Whether free choice is capable of the good without grace.



**In the fourteenth article we ask:  
Is free choice capable of good without grace?**

[ARTICLE II Sent., 28, a. 1; and as in art. 13, especially S.T., I-II, 109, 9.]

*Quartodecimo quaeritur utrum liberum arbitrium possit in bonum sine gratia*

**Difficulties**

*Et videtur quod sic.*

It seems that it is, for

*Quia praeceptum non datur de impossibili: unde Hieronymus, dicit: maledictus qui dicit, Deum homini aliquid impossibile praecepisse. Sed homini praecipitur ut bonum faciat. Ergo homo potest per liberum arbitrium bonum facere.*

1. A commandment is not given about something impossible. Jerome says in this respect: “Cursed is he who says that God has commanded man to do anything impossible.” But man is commanded to do good. Man is therefore able to do good by his free choice.

*Praeterea, nullus debet corripi si non faciat quod facere non potest. Sed homo iuste corripitur si omittat facere bonum. Ergo per liberum arbitrium homo bonum facere potest.*

2. No one should be reprimanded if he does not do what he is not able to do. But a man is justly reprimanded if he omits doing good. Hence man is able by his free choice to do good.

*Praeterea, homo per liberum arbitrium aliquo modo peccatum vitare potest, ad minus quantum ad unum singularem actum. Sed vitare peccatum est aliquod bonum. Ergo homo per liberum arbitrium potest aliquod bonum facere.*

3. Man is able by his free choice to avoid sin to some extent, at least as regards a single act. But it is good to avoid sin. Man can therefore do something good by his free choice.

*Praeterea, unaquaeque res magis potest in id quod est sibi naturale, quam in id quod est sibi contra naturam. Sed liberum arbitrium naturaliter ordinatur in bonum; peccatum autem est ei contra naturam. Ergo magis potest in bonum quam in malum. Sed potest in malum per seipsum. Ergo multo magis in bonum.*

4. Everything is more capable of what is natural to it than of what is against its nature. But free choice is naturally ordained to good, and sin is against its nature. It is therefore more capable of good than of evil. But it is capable of evil by itself. Much more, then, is it capable of good.

*Praeterea, creatura in se creatoris similitudinem retinet ratione vestigii, et multo magis ratione imaginis. Sed creator potest per seipsum bonum facere. Ergo et creatura; et praecipue liberum arbitrium, quod est ad imaginem.*

5. A creature retains a likeness to the Creator by reason of the vestige, and much more by reason of the image. But the Creator can do good by Himself. Then so too can a creature, especially free choice, which pertains to the image.

*Praeterea, secundum philosophum in II Ethic., per eadem corrumpitur virtus et generatur. Sed per liberum arbitrium potest virtus corrumpi; quia peccatum mortale, quod homo potest per liberum arbitrium facere, virtutem corrumpit. Ergo per liberum arbitrium homo potest in generationem boni, quod est virtus.*

6. According to the Philosopher, it is by the same causes that virtue is destroyed and engendered. But by free choice virtue can be destroyed, because mortal sin, which a man can commit of his free choice, destroys virtue. By his free choice, then, man is capable of engendering the good which is virtue.

*Praeterea, I Ioan. cap. V, 3, dicitur: mandata eius gravia non sunt. Sed illud quod non est grave, potest homo ex*

7. In the first Epistle of St. John (5:3) it is said: “His commandments are not heavy.” But what is not heavy

*libero arbitrio facere. Ergo homo potest ex libero arbitrio mandata implere: quod maxime bonum est.*

*Praeterea, liberum arbitrium, secundum Anselmum in libro de libero arbitrio est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis: quae non servatur nisi bene faciendo. Ergo per liberum arbitrium potest aliquis bonum facere.*

*Praeterea, gratia est fortior quam peccatum. Sed gratia non ita ligat liberum arbitrium quin homo possit facere peccatum. Ergo nec peccatum ita ligat liberum arbitrium quin homo existens in peccato absque gratia possit facere bonum.*

*Sed contra.*

*Est quod dicitur Roman. cap. VII, 18: velle, adiacet mihi; perficere autem bonum, non invenio. Ergo homo per liberum arbitrium non potest facere bonum.*

*Praeterea, homo non potest facere bonum nisi vel actu interiori vel exteriori. Sed ad neutrum sufficit liberum arbitrium; quia, ut dicitur Rom. IX, 16, non est volentis, scilicet velle (quod pertinet ad interiorem actum), nec currentis, scilicet currere (quod pertinet ad exteriorem), sed miserentis Dei. Ergo liberum arbitrium sine gratia nullo modo potest facere bonum.*

*Praeterea, Rom. VII, 15, super illud: quod odi malum, illud facio, dicit Glossa: naturaliter quidem homo vult bonum; sed voluntas hoc semper caret effectu, si sine gratia Dei suum velle addiderit. Ergo sine gratia homo non potest efficere bonum.*

*Praeterea, cogitatio boni operationem boni praecedit, ut patet ex philosopho in II Ethicorum. Sed homo non potest cogitare bonum per seipsum, quia dicitur II Corinth. cap. III, 5: non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis. Ergo non potest homo per seipsum bonum operari.*

*Respondeo.*

*Dicendum, quod nulla res agit ultra suam speciem; sed secundum exigentiam suae speciei unaquaeque res agere potest, cum nulla res propria actione destituatur.*

man can do by his free choice. Man can therefore of his free choice fulfill the commandments, and that is good above all.

8. According to Anselm free choice “is the power of preserving the rectitude of the will for its own sake. But the rectitude of the will is preserved only by doing good. A person can therefore do good by his free choice.

9. Grace is stronger than sin. But grace does not so bind free choice that man cannot commit sin. Then neither does sin so bind free choice that a man in the state of sin cannot do good without grace.

### **To the Contrary**

1. In the Epistle to the Romans (7:18) we read: “For to will, is present with me; but to accomplish that which is good, I find not.” Man therefore cannot do good by his free choice.

2. Man can do good only by an external or an internal act. But free choice does not suffice for either; for, as is said in the Epistle to the Romans (9: 16): “It is not of him that wills”; i.e., to will, which refers to the internal act, [is not in his power]; “nor of him that runs”; i.e., to run., which refers to the external act; “but of God that shows mercy.” Free choice without grace can therefore in no way do good.

3. Commenting on the words of the Epistle to the Romans (7:15): “The evil which I hate, that I do,” the Gloss says: “Man wills good naturally, to be sure; but this will always is without effect unless God’s grace has strengthened his act of willing.” Without grace, then, man cannot accomplish any good.

4. The thought of good precedes the doing of good, as the Philosopher makes clear. But man cannot think anything good by himself; for it is said in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (3:5): “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.” Hence man cannot do good by himself.

### **REPLY**

Nothing acts outside the limits of its own species. But everything can act according to the requirements of its species, since nothing is deprived of its proper activity.

*Est autem duplex bonum: quoddam quod est humanae naturae proportionatum; quoddam vero quod excedit humanae naturae facultatem. Et haec duo bona, si de actibus loquamur, non differunt secundum substantiam actus, sed secundum modum agendi: utpote iste actus qui est dare eleemosynam, est bonum proportionatum viribus humanis, secundum quod ex quadam naturali dilectione vel benignitate homo ad hoc movetur; excedit autem humanae naturae facultatem, secundum quod ad hoc homo inducitur ex caritate, quae mentem hominis Deo unit.*

*Ad hoc ergo bonum quod est supra naturam humanam, constat liberum arbitrium non posse sine gratia; quia, cum per huiusmodi bonum homo vitam aeternam meretur, constat quod sine gratia homo mereri non potest. Illud autem bonum quod est naturae humanae proportionatum, potest homo per liberum arbitrium explere; unde dicit Augustinus quod homo per liberum arbitrium potest agros colere, domos aedificare, et alia plura bona facere sine gratia operante.*

*Quamvis autem huiusmodi bona homo possit facere sine gratia gratum faciente, non tamen potest ea facere sine Deo; cum nulla res possit in naturalem operationem exire nisi virtute divina, quia causa secunda non agit nisi per virtutem causae primae, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis. Et hoc verum est tam in naturalibus agentibus quam in voluntariis. Tamen hoc alio modo habet necessitatem in utrisque.*

*Operationis enim naturalis Deus est causa, in quantum dat et conservat id quod est principium naturalis operationis in re, ex quo de necessitate determinata operatio sequitur; sicut dum conservat gravitatem in terra, quae est principium motus deorsum. Sed voluntas hominis non est determinata ad aliquam unam operationem, sed se habet indifferenter ad multas; et sic quodammodo est in potentia, nisi mota per aliquid activum: vel quod ei exterius repraesentatur, sicut est bonum apprehensum; vel quod in ea interius operatur, sicut est ipse Deus; ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de gratia et libero Arbitr., ostendens multipliciter Deum operari in cordibus hominum. Omnes autem exteriores motus a divina providentia moderantur, secundum quod ipse iudicat aliquem esse excitandum ad bonum his vel illis actionibus. Unde, si gratiam Dei velimus dicere non aliquod habituale donum, sed ipsam misericordiam Dei, per quam interius motum mentis operatur, et exteriora ordinat ad hominis salutem; sic nec ullum bonum homo potest facere sine gratia Dei. Sed communiter loquentes utuntur nomine gratiae pro aliquo dono habituali*

Now there are two kinds of good, one which is proportioned to human nature, and another which is beyond the ability of human nature. If we are speaking of acts, these two kinds of good do not differ in the substance of the act but in the manner of acting. Take, for instance, the act of giving alms. It is a good proportioned to human powers in so far as a man is moved to it by a certain natural love or kindness; but it is beyond the ability of human nature in so far as a man is led to it by charity, which unites man's heart to God.

It is apparent that without grace free choice is incapable of the kind of good which is above human nature; and—because it is by this kind of good that man merits eternal life—it is apparent that man cannot merit without grace. The kind of good which is proportioned to human nature, however, man can accomplish by his free choice. Augustine accordingly says that man can cultivate fields, build houses, and do a number of other things by his free choice without actual grace.

Although man can perform good actions of this kind without ingratulatory grace, he cannot perform them without God, since nothing can enter upon its natural operation except by the divine power, because a secondary cause acts only by the power of the first cause, as is said in *The Causes*. This is true of both natural and voluntary agents. Yet it is verified in a different way in either case.

In natural beings God is the cause of their natural operation inasmuch as He gives and conserves the intrinsic principle of their natural operation, and from that principle a determined operation flows of necessity. In the element earth, for example, He conserves its heaviness, which is the principle of its motion downward. But man's will is not determined to any particular operation but remains indifferent in regard to many. It is thus in some sense in potency unless it is moved by an activating principle, which is either something presented to it from the outside, such as an apprehended good, or something which works within it interiorly, as God Himself. Augustine explains this, showing that God works in the hearts of men in many ways. All external motions, moreover, are also governed by divine providence, according as God judges that someone is to be aroused to good by such and such particular actions. Should we wish, accordingly, to call the grace of God, not a habitual gift, but the very mercy of God by which He interiorly moves the mind and arranges external conditions for man's salvation, in this sense also man

*iustificante. Et sic patet quod utraeque rationes aliquo modo falsum concludunt; et ideo ad utrasque respondendum est.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud quod praecipit Deus, non est impossibile homini ad servandum, quia et substantiam actus potest ex libero arbitrio servare, et modum quo elevatur supra facultatem naturae, prout scilicet fit ex caritate, potest servare ex dono gratiae, quamvis non ex solo libero arbitrio.*

*Ad secundum dicendum, quod recte homo corripitur qui praecepta non implet; quia ex eius negligentia est quod gratiam non habet, per quam potest servare mandata quantum ad modum; cum possit nihilominus per liberum arbitrium ea servare quantum ad substantiam.*

*Ad tertium dicendum, quod faciendo actum de genere bonorum, homo vitat peccatum, quamvis non mereatur praemium; et ideo, licet per liberum arbitrium aliquod peccatum homo possit vitare, non tamen sequitur quod in bonum meritorium possit per liberum arbitrium solum.*

*Ad quartum dicendum, quod in bonum quod est connaturale homini, homo potest per liberum arbitrium; sed bonum meritorium est supra naturam eius, ut dictum est, in corp. art.*

*Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis in creatura sit similitudo creatoris, non tamen perfecta; hoc enim solius filii est; et ideo non oportet quod quidquid in Deo invenitur, in creatura inveniatur.*

*Ad sextum dicendum, quod philosophus loquitur de virtute politica, quae ex actibus acquiritur, non autem de virtute infusa, quae sola est principium actus meritorii.*

*Ad septimum dicendum, quod sicut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de natura et gratia, praecepta Dei intelliguntur esse levia amori, quae sunt dura timori; unde non sequitur quod ea possit implere perfecte, nisi caritatem habens; non habens autem caritatem, etsi possit aliquod unum implere quantum ad substantiam et cum difficultate; non tamen potest implere omnia, sicut nec omnia peccata vitare.*

cannot do any good without God's grace. But commonly speaking, we use the name of grace for a habitual gift which justifies. It is accordingly clear that each set of reasons comes to a conclusion in some sense false. Consequently answers must be given to both.

### Answers to Difficulties

1. What God commands is not impossible for man to observe; for the substance of the act can be observed by his free choice; and the prescribed manner—by which the act is raised above the ability of nature, that is, in so far as it is done from charity, can be observed by a gift of grace, though not by man's free choice alone.

2. A man who does not fulfill the commandments is rightly reprimanded, because it is by reason of his negligence that he does not have the grace by which he can observe the commandments even as to the manner (since he could, even without grace, observe them as to their substance).

3. By performing an act that is good generically man avoids sin, though he does not merit a reward. Consequently, even though man can avoid a particular sin by his free choice, it still does not follow that he is capable of any meritorious good by his free choice alone.

4. By his free choice man is capable of a good which is natural to him; but a meritorious good is above his nature, as has been said.

5. Although in a creature there is a likeness to the Creator, it is not perfect. Such a likeness is exclusively proper to the Son. It is therefore not necessary that whatever is found in God be found in a creature.

6. The Philosopher is speaking of political virtue, which is acquired by acts; not of infused virtue, which is the only principle of a meritorious act.

7. As Augustine says, the commandments of God are understood to be easy for love but hard for fear. It accordingly does not follow that they can be fulfilled perfectly by anyone but a person having charity. Though a person without charity could fulfill a particular one as to its substance and with difficulty, he could not fulfill all, just as he could not avoid all sins.

*Ad octavum dicendum, quod etsi liberum arbitrium potest servare rectitudinem habitam, non tamen quando eam non habet.*

8. Though free choice can keep the rectitude which it has, it cannot keep it when it does not have it.

*Ad nonum dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium non indiget ligatione ad hoc quod in bonum meritorium non possit, quia eius naturam excedit; sicut homo, etiam si non ligetur, volare non potest.*

9. Free choice does not need to be bound for it to be incapable of meritorious good, since this is beyond its nature, just as a man is incapable of flying even if he is not bound.

### **Answers to Contrary Difficulties**

*Ad ea vero quae sunt in contrarium, patet solutio; quia vel procedunt de bono meritorio, vel ostendunt quod sine operatione Dei, homo nullum bonum facere potest.*

The answers to these are clear, because they are either arguing on the basis of meritorious good, or they show that man can do no good without the operation of God.

## **On Evil**

Thomas Aquinas, 2003. *On Evil*, trans. R. Regan, ed. B. Davies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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### **Quaestiones Disputatae De malo. Quaestio 6. De electione humana.**

Articulus 1. Do Human Beings Have Free Choice in Their Acts, or Do They Choose Necessarily?

#### **Quaestio 6**

***Et unum quaeritur hic: utrum homo habeat liberam electionem suorum actuum, aut ex necessitate eligat***

*Et videtur quod non libere, sed ex necessitate eligat.*

*Dicitur enim Ierem. X, 23: non est hominis via eius, nec viri est ut ambulet et dirigat gressus suos. Sed illud respectu cuius homo habet libertatem, eius est, quasi in ipsius dominio constitutum. Ergo videtur quod homo suarum viarum et suorum actuum liberam electionem non habeat.*

*Sed dicendum, quod hoc refertur ad executionem electionum, quae interdum non sunt in hominis potestate.- Sed contra, est quod apostolus dicit Rom. IX, 10: non est volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, scilicet currere; sed miserentis Dei. Sed sicut currere pertinet ad exteriorem executionem actuum, ita velle ad interiorem electionem. Ergo etiam interiores electiones non sunt in hominis potestate, sed sunt homini ex Deo.*

*Sed dicendum, quod homo ad eligendum movetur quodam interiori instinctu, scilicet ab ipso Deo, et immobiliter; non tamen hoc repugnat libertati.- Sed contra est, quod cum omne animal moveat seipsum per appetitum, alia tamen animalia ab homine non habent liberam electionem quia eorum appetitus a quodam exteriori movente movetur, scilicet ex virtute corporis caelestis, vel ex actione alicuius alterius corporis. Si ergo voluntas hominis immobiliter movetur a Deo, sequitur quod homo non habeat liberam electionem suorum actuum.*

*Praeterea, violentum est cuius principium est extra, nil conferente vim passo. Si ergo voluntarie electionis principium sit ab extra, scilicet Deus, videtur quod voluntas per violentiam et ex necessitate moveatur. Non ergo habet liberam electionem suorum actuum.*

*Praeterea, impossibile est voluntatem hominis discordare a voluntate Dei: quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in Enchir., aut homo facit quod vult Deus, aut Deus de eo suam voluntatem implet. Sed voluntas Dei est immutabilis. Ergo et voluntas hominis. Omnes ergo humanae electiones ex immobili electione procedunt.*

*Praeterea, nullius potentiae actus potest esse nisi in suum obiectum; sicut visus actio non potest esse nisi circa visibile. Sed obiectum voluntatis est bonum. Ergo voluntas non potest velle nisi bonum. Ex necessitate ergo vult bonum, et non habet liberam electionem boni vel mali.*

*Praeterea, omnis potentia ad quam comparatur suum obiectum ut movens ad mobile, est potentia passiva; et suum operari est pati; sicut sensibile movet sensum; unde sensus est potentia passiva, et sentire est quoddam pati. Sed obiectum voluntatis comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens ad mobile: dicit enim philosophus III de anima, et XI Metaph., quod appetibile est movens non motum; appetitus autem est movens motum. Ergo voluntas est potentia passiva, et velle est pati. Sed omnis potentia passiva ex necessitate movetur a suo activo, si sit sufficiens. Ergo videtur quod voluntas de necessitate moveatur ab appetibili. Non ergo est liberum homini velle vel non velle.*

*Sed dicendum, quod voluntas habet necessitatem respectu finis ultimi, quia omnis homo ex necessitate vult esse beatus; non autem respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem.- Sed contra, sicut finis est obiectum voluntatis, ita et quod est ad finem: quia utrumque habet rationem boni. Si ergo voluntas ex necessitate movetur in finem, videtur etiam quod ex necessitate moveatur in id quod est ad finem.*

*Praeterea, ubi est idem motivum et idem mobile, est et idem modus movendi. Sed cum aliquis vult finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, idem est quod movetur scilicet voluntas, et idem est movens: quia ea quae sunt ad finem non vult aliquis, nisi in quantum vult finem. Ergo est idem modus movendi; ut scilicet sicut aliquis ex necessitate vult finem ultimum, ita ex necessitate vult ea quae sunt ad finem.*

*Praeterea, sicut intellectus est potentia separata a materia, ita et voluntas. Sed intellectus ex necessitate movetur a suo obiecto: cogitur enim homo ex necessitate assentire alicui veritati per violentiam rationis. Ergo eadem ratione et voluntas necessario movetur a suo obiecto.*

*Praeterea, dispositio primi moventis relinquitur in omnibus sequentibus: quia omnia secunda moventia movent in quantum sunt mota a primo movente. Sed in ordine motuum voluntariorum, primum movens est appetibile apprehensum. Cum ergo apprehensio appetibilis necessitatem patiat, si per demonstrationem probetur aliquid esse bonum, videtur quod necessitas derivetur ad omnes motus sequentes, et ita voluntas non libere, sed ex necessitate movetur ad volendum.*

*Praeterea, res magis est motiva quam intentio. Sed secundum philosophum in VI Metaph., bonum est in rebus, verum autem in mente; et sic bonum est res, verum autem intentio. Ergo magis habet rationem motivi bonum quam verum. Sed verum ex necessitate movet intellectum, ut dictum est. Ergo bonum ex necessitate movet voluntatem.*

*Praeterea, dilectio, quae pertinet ad voluntatem, est vehementior motus quam cognitio, quae pertinet ad intellectum: quia cognitio assimilatur, sed dilectio transformatur, ut habetur per Dionysium IV cap. de Divin. Nomin. Ergo voluntas est magis mobilis quam intellectus. Si ergo intellectus ex necessitate movetur, videtur quod multo magis voluntas.*

*Sed diceretur, quod actio intellectus est secundum motum ad animam; actus autem voluntatis est secundum motum ab anima; et sic intellectus habet magis rationem passivi, voluntas autem magis rationem activi, unde non necessitate patitur a suo obiecto.- Sed contra, assentire pertinet ad intellectum, sicut consentire ad voluntatem. Sed assentire significat motum in rem cui assentitur, sicut et consentire in rem cui consentitur. Ergo non magis est motus voluntatis ab anima quam motus intellectus.*

*Praeterea, si voluntas respectu ad aliqua volita non ex necessitate moveatur, necesse est dicere, quod se habeat ad opposita: quia quod non necesse est esse, possibile est non esse. Sed omne quod est in potentia ad opposita, non reducitur in actum alicuius eorum nisi per aliquod ens actu, quod facit illud quod erat in potentia esse in actu. Quod autem facit aliquid esse actu, dicimus esse causam eius. Oportebit ergo, si voluntas aliquid determinate vult, quod sit aliqua causa quae faciat ipsam hoc velle. Causa autem posita, necesse est effectum poni, ut Avicenna, probat, quia si causa posita,*

*adhuc est possibile effectum non esse, indigebit adhuc alio reducete de potentia in actum; et sic primum non erat sufficiens causa. Ergo voluntas ex necessitate movetur ad aliquid volendum.*

*Praeterea, nulla virtus se habens ad contraria est activa; quia omnis virtus activa potest agere id cuius est activa. Possibili autem posito non sequitur impossibile; sequeretur enim duo opposita esse simul, quod est impossibile. Sed voluntas est potentia activa. Ergo non se habet ad opposita, sed de necessitate terminatur ad unum.*

*Praeterea, voluntas aliquando incipit eligere cum prius non eligeret. Aut ergo quia mutatur a dispositione in qua prius erat, aut non. Si non, sequitur quod sicut prius non eligebat, ita nec modo: et sic non eligens eligeret, quod est impossibile. Si autem mutatur eius dispositio, necesse est quod ab aliquo sit mutata; quia omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Movens autem imponit necessitatem mobili, alias non sufficienter moveret ipsum. Ergo voluntas ex necessitate movetur.*

*Sed dicendum, quod rationes istae concludunt de potentia materiali, quae est in materia, non autem de potentia immateriali quae est voluntas. - Sed contra, principium totius humanae cognitionis est sensus. Nihil ergo potest cognosci ab homine nisi secundum quod cadit sub sensum, vel ipsum vel effectus eius. Sed ipsa virtus se habens ad opposita, non cadit sub sensum: in effectibus enim eius qui sub sensum cadunt, non inveniuntur duo actus contrarii simul existere; sed semper videmus quod determinate unum procedit in actum: ergo non possumus iudicare esse in homine aliquam activam potentiam ad opposita se habentem.*

*Praeterea, cum potentia dicatur ad actum, sicut se habet actus ad actum, ita se habet potentia ad potentiam. Sed duo actus oppositi non possunt esse simul. Ergo nec potest esse una potentia ad duo opposita.*

*Praeterea, secundum Augustinum in I de Trinit., nihil est sibi ipsi causa ut sit. Ergo pari ratione nihil est sibi ipsi causa ut moveatur. Voluntas ergo non movet seipsam; sed necesse est quod ab aliquo moveatur: quia incipit agere post, cum prius non ageret; et omne tale aliquo modo movetur; unde et de Deo dicimus quod non incipit velle postquam noluerat, propter eius immobilitatem. Ergo necesse est quod voluntas ab alio moveatur. Sed quod ab alio movetur, necessitatem ab alio patitur. Ergo voluntas necessario vult et non libere.*

*Praeterea, omne multiforme reducitur ad aliquod uniforme. Sed motus humani sunt varii et multiformes. Ergo reducuntur in motum caeli qui uniformis est, sicut in causam. Sed quod causatur ex motu caeli, ex necessitate provenit: quia causa naturalis ex necessitate producit effectum suum nisi sit aliquid impediens. Motum autem caelestis corporis non potest aliquid impedire quin consequatur suum effectum: quia oporteret quod et actus illius impediens reduceretur in aliquod principium caeleste sicut in causam. Ergo videtur quod motus humani ex necessitate proveniant, et non ex libera electione.*

*Praeterea, qui facit quod non vult, non habet liberam electionem. Sed homo facit quod non vult, Rom. VII, 15: quod odi malum illud facio. Ergo homo non habet liberam electionem suorum actuum.*

*Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Enchir., quod homo male utens libero arbitrio se perdidit, et ipsum. Sed libere eligere non est nisi habentis liberum arbitrium. Ergo homo non habet liberam electionem.*

*Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in VIII Confess., quod dum consuetudini non resistitur, fit necessitas. Ergo videtur quod saltem in his qui sunt assueti aliquid facere, voluntas ex necessitate moveatur.*

**Sed contra.** *Est quod dicit Eccli. XV, 14: Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. Hoc autem non esset, nisi haberet liberam electionem, quae est appetitus praeconsiliati, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo homo habet liberam electionem suorum actuum.*

*Praeterea, potentiae rationales sunt ad opposita, secundum philosophum, sed voluntas est potentia rationalis: est enim in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo voluntas se habet ad opposita et non ex necessitate movetur ad unum.*

*Praeterea, secundum philosophum in III Ethic., homo est dominus sui actus, et in ipso est agere et non agere. Sed hoc non esset, si non haberet liberam electionem suorum actuum.*

**Respondeo.** *Dicendum quod quidam posuerunt, quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate movetur ad aliquid eligendum; nec tamen ponebant quod voluntas cogere. Non enim omne necessarium est violentum; sed solum id cuius principium est extra; unde et motus naturales inveniuntur aliqui necessarii, non tamen violenti: violentum enim repugnat naturali sicut et voluntario, quia utriusque principium est intra, violenti autem principium est extra. Haec autem opinio est haeretica: tollit enim rationem meriti et demeriti in humanis actibus. Non enim videtur esse meritorium vel demeritorium quod aliquis sic ex necessitate agit quod vitare non possit. Est etiam annumeranda inter extraneas philosophiae opiniones: quia non solum contrariatur fidei, sed subvertit omnia principia philosophiae moralis. Si enim non sit liberum aliquid in nobis, sed ex necessitate movemur ad volendum, tollitur deliberatio, exhortatio, praeceptum et punitio, et laus et vituperium, circa quae moralis philosophia consistit. Huiusmodi autem opiniones quae destruunt principia alicuius partis philosophiae, dicuntur positiones extraneae, sicut nihil moveri, quod destruit principia scientiae naturalis. Ad huiusmodi autem positiones ponendas inducti sunt aliqui homines partim quidem propter proterviam, partim propter aliquas rationes sophisticas, quas solvere non potuerunt, ut dicitur in IV Metaph. Ad evidentiam ergo veritatis circa hanc quaestionem primo considerandum est, quod sicut in aliis rebus est aliquod principium priorum actuum, ita etiam in hominibus. Hoc autem activum sive motivum principium in hominibus proprie est intellectus et voluntas, ut dicitur in III de anima. Quod quidem principium partim convenit cum principio activo in rebus naturalibus, partim ab eo differt. Convenit quidem, quia sicut in rebus naturalibus invenitur forma, quae est principium actionis, et inclinatio consequens formam, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis, ex quibus sequitur actio; ita in homine invenitur forma intellectiva, et inclinatio voluntatis consequens formam apprehensam, ex quibus sequitur exterior actio: sed in hoc est differentia, quia forma rei naturalis est forma individuata per materiam; unde et inclinatio ipsam consequens est determinata ad unum, sed forma intellecta est universalis sub qua multa possunt comprehendi; unde cum actus sint in singularibus, in quibus nullum est quod adaequet potentiam universalis, remanet inclinatio voluntatis indeterminate se habens ad multa: sicut si artifex concipiat formam domus in universali sub qua comprehenduntur diversae figurae domus, potest voluntas eius inclinari ad hoc quod faciat domum quadratam vel rotundam, vel alterius figurae. Principium autem activum in brutis animalibus medio modo se habet inter utrumque. Nam forma apprehensa per sensum est individualis, sicut et forma rei naturalis; et ideo ex ea sequitur inclinatio ad unum actum sicut in rebus naturalibus, sed tamen non semper eadem forma recipitur in sensu sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quia ignis est semper calidus, sed nunc una, nunc alia, puta nunc forma delectabilis, nunc tristis; unde nunc fugit, nunc prosequitur; in quo convenit cum principio activo humano. Secundo considerandum est quod potentia aliqua dupliciter movetur: uno modo ex parte subiecti; alio modo ex parte obiecti. Ex parte subiecti quidem, sicut visus per immutationem dispositionis organi movetur ad clarius vel minus clare videndum; ex parte vero obiecti, sicut visus nunc videt album nunc videt nigrum; et prima quidem immutatio pertinet ad ipsum exercitium actus, ut scilicet agatur vel non agatur aut melius vel debilius agatur: secunda vero immutatio pertinet ad specificationem actus, nam actus specificatur per obiectum. Est autem considerandum, quod in rebus naturalibus specificatio quidem actus est ex forma; ipsum autem exercitium est ab agente, quod causat ipsam motionem. Movens autem agit propter finem. Unde relinquitur quod primum principium motionis quantum ad exercitium actus, sit ex fine. Si autem consideremus obiecta voluntatis et intellectus, inveniemus quod obiectum intellectus est primum principium in genere causae formalis, est enim eius obiectum ens et verum; sed obiectum voluntatis est primum principium in genere causae finalis, nam eius obiectum est bonum, sub quo comprehenduntur omnes fines, sicut sub vero comprehenduntur omnes formae apprehensae. Unde et ipsum bonum, in quantum est quaedam forma apprehensibilis, continetur sub vero quasi quoddam verum; et ipsum verum, in quantum est finis intellectualis operationis, continetur sub bono ut quoddam particulare bonum. Si ergo consideremus motum potentiarum animae ex parte obiecti specificantis actum, primum principium motionis est ex intellectu: hoc enim modo bonum intellectum movet etiam ipsam voluntatem. Si autem consideremus motus potentiarum animae ex parte exercitii actus, sic principium motionis est ex voluntate. Nam semper potentia ad quam pertinet finis principalis, movet ad actum potentiam ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem; sicut militaris movet frenorum fabricem ad operandum, et hoc modo voluntas movet se ipsam et omnes alias potentias. Intellego enim quia volo; et similiter utor omnibus potentiis et habitibus quia volo; unde et Commentator definit habitum in III de anima, quod habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit. Sic ergo ad ostendendum quod voluntas non ex necessitate movetur, oportet considerare motum voluntatis et quantum ad exercitium actus, et quantum ad determinationem actus, qui est ex obiecto. Quantum ergo ad exercitium actus, primo quidem manifestum est quod voluntas movetur a seipsa; sicut enim movet alias potentias, ita et se ipsam movet. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod voluntas secundum idem sit in potentia et in actu. Sicut enim homo secundum intellectum in via inventionis movet se ipsum ad scientiam, in quantum*



*ex uno noto in actu venit in aliquid ignotum, quod erat solum in potentia notum; ita per hoc quod homo aliquid vult in actu, movet se ad volendum aliquid aliud in actu; sicut per hoc quod vult sanitatem, movet se ad volendum sumere potionem; ex hoc quod vult sanitatem, incipit consiliari de his quae conferunt ad sanitatem; et tandem determinato consilio vult accipere potionem. Sic ergo voluntatem accipiendi potionem praecedat consilium, quod quidem procedit ex voluntate volentis consiliari. Cum ergo voluntas se consilio moveat, consilium autem est inquisitio quaedam non demonstrativa, sed ad opposita viam habens, non ex necessitate voluntas seipsam movet. Sed cum voluntas non semper voluerit consiliari, necesse est quod ab aliquo moveatur ad hoc quod velit consiliari; et si quidem a seipsa, necesse est iterum quod motum voluntatis praecedat consilium, et consilium praecedat actus voluntatis; et cum hoc in infinitum procedere non possit, necesse est ponere, quod quantum ad primum motum voluntatis moveatur voluntas cuiuscumque non semper actu volentis ab aliquo exteriori, cuius instinctu voluntas velle incipiat. Posuerunt ergo quidam, quod iste instinctus est a corpore caelesti. Sed hoc esse non potest. Cum enim voluntas sit in ratione, secundum philosophum in III de anima, ratio autem intellectus non sit virtus corporea, impossibile est quod virtus corporis caelestis moveat ipsam voluntatem directe. Ponere autem quod voluntas hominum moveatur ex impressione caelestis corporis sicut appetitus brutorum animalium moventur, est secundum opinionem ponentium non differre intellectum a sensu. Ad hos enim refert philosophus in Lib. de anima, verbum quorundam dicentium, quod talis est voluntas in hominibus qualem inducit pater virorum deorumque, id est caelum vel sol. Relinquitur ergo, sicut concludit Aristoteles in cap. de bona fortuna, quod id quod primo movet voluntatem et intellectum, sit aliquid supra voluntatem et intellectum, scilicet Deus; qui cum omnia moveat secundum rationem mobilium, ut levia sursum et gravia deorsum, etiam voluntatem movet secundum eius conditionem, non ut ex necessitate, sed ut indeterminate se habentem ad multa. Patet ergo quod si consideretur motus voluntatis ex parte exercitii actus, non movetur ex necessitate. Si autem consideretur motus voluntatis ex parte obiecti determinantis actum voluntatis ad hoc vel illud volendum, considerandum est, quod obiectum movens voluntatem est bonum conveniens apprehensum; unde si aliquod bonum proponatur quod apprehendatur in ratione boni, non autem in ratione convenientis, non movebit voluntatem. Cum autem consilia et electiones sint circa particularia, quorum est actus, requiritur ut id quod apprehenditur ut bonum et conveniens, apprehendatur ut bonum et conveniens in particulari, et non in universali tantum. Si ergo apprehendatur aliquid ut bonum conveniens secundum omnia particularia quae considerari possunt, ex necessitate movebit voluntatem; et propter hoc homo ex necessitate appetit beatitudinem, quae, secundum Boetium est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus. Dico autem ex necessitate quantum ad determinationem actus, quia non potest velle oppositum; non autem quantum ad exercitium actus, quia potest aliquis non velle tunc cogitare de beatitudine; quia etiam ipsi actus intellectus et voluntatis particulares sunt. Si autem sit tale bonum quod non inveniatur esse bonum secundum omnia particularia quae considerari possunt, non ex necessitate movebit etiam quantum ad determinationem actus; poterit enim aliquis velle eius oppositum, etiam de eo cogitans, quia forte est bonum vel conveniens secundum aliquod aliud particulare consideratum, sicut quod est bonum sanitati, non est bonum delectationi, et sic de aliis. Et quod voluntas feratur in id quod sibi offertur magis secundum hanc particularem conditionem quam secundum aliam, potest contingere tripliciter. Uno quidem modo in quantum una praeponderat, et tunc movetur voluntas secundum rationem; puta, cum homo praeeligit id quod est utile sanitati, eo quod est utile voluntati. Alio vero modo in quantum cogitat de una particulari circumstantia et non de alia; et hoc contingit plerumque per aliquam occasionem exhibitam vel ab interiori vel ab exteriori, ut ei talis cogitatio occurrat. Tertio vero modo contingit ex dispositione hominis; quia, secundum philosophum, qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei. Unde aliter movetur ad aliquid voluntas irati et voluntas quieti, quia non idem est conveniens utrique; sicut etiam aliter acceptatur cibus a sano et aegro. Si ergo dispositio, per quam alicui videtur aliquid bonum et conveniens, fuerit naturalis et non subiacens voluntati, ex necessitate naturali voluntas praeeligit illud, sicut omnes homines naturaliter desiderant esse, vivere et intelligere. Si autem sit talis dispositio quae non sit naturalis, sed subiacens voluntati, puta, cum aliquid disponitur per habitum vel passionem ad hoc quod sibi videatur aliquid vel bonum vel malum in hoc particulari, non ex necessitate movetur voluntas; quia poterit hanc dispositionem remove, ut sibi non videatur aliquid sic, ut scilicet cum aliquis quietat in se iram, ut non iudicet de aliquo tamquam iratus. Facilius tamen removetur passio quam habitus. Sic ergo quantum ad aliqua voluntas ex necessitate movetur ex parte obiecti, non autem quantum ad omnia; sed ex parte exercitii actus, non ex necessitate movetur.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod actualitas illa dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo ut loquatur propheta quantum ad executionem electionis: non enim est in potestate hominis ut expleat in effectu quod mente deliberat. Alio modo potest intelligi quantum ad hoc quod etiam interior voluntas movetur ab aliquo superiori principio, quod est Deus; et secundum hoc apostolus dicit, quod non est volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, currere, sicut primi principii, sed Dei miserentis.*

*Unde patet solutio ad secundum.*

*Ad tertium dicendum, quod animalia bruta moventur per instinctum superioris agentis ad aliquid determinatum secundum modum formae particularis, cuius conceptionem sequitur appetitus sensitivus. Sed Deus movet quidem voluntatem immutabiliter propter efficaciam virtutis moventis, quae deficere non potest; sed propter naturam voluntatis motae, quae indifferenter se habet ad diversa, non inducitur necessitas, sed manet libertas; sicut etiam in omnibus providentia divina infallibiliter operatur; et tamen a causis contingentibus proveniunt effectus contingenter, in quantum Deus omnia movet proportionabiliter, unumquodque secundum suum modum.*

*Ad quartum dicendum, quod voluntas aliquid confert cum a Deo movetur, ipsa enim est quae operatur, sed mota a Deo; et ideo motus eius quamvis sit ab extrinseco sicut a primo principio, non tamen est violentus.*

*Ad quintum dicendum, quod voluntas hominis quodammodo discordat a Dei voluntate, in quantum scilicet vult aliquid quod Deus non vult eam velle, ut cum vult peccare, licet etiam non velit Deus voluntatem hoc non velle: quia si vellet hoc Deus fieret; omnia enim quaecumque voluit dominus fecit. Et quamvis hoc modo discordet voluntas hominis, a Dei voluntate quantum ad motum voluntatis, nunquam tamen potest discordare quantum ad exitum vel eventum; quia semper voluntas hominis hunc eventum sortitur, quod Deus de homine suam voluntatem implet. Sed quantum ad modum volendi, non oportet quod voluntas hominis Dei voluntati conformetur, quia Deus aeternaliter et infinite vult unumquodque, non tamen homo; propter quod dicitur Is., LV, 9: sicut exaltantur caeli a terra, ita sunt exaltatae viae meae a viis vestris.*

*Ad sextum dicendum, quod ex hoc quod bonum est obiectum voluntatis, potest haberi quod voluntas nihil velit nisi sub ratione boni. Sed quia sub ratione boni multa et diversa continentur, non potest ex hoc haberi quod ex necessitate voluntas moveatur in hoc vel illud.*

*Ad septimum dicendum, quod activum non ex necessitate movet nisi quando superat virtutem passivi. Cum autem voluntas se habeat in potentia respectu boni universalis, nullum bonum superat virtutem voluntatis quasi ex necessitate ipsam movens, nisi id quod secundum omnem considerationem est bonum: et hoc solum est bonum perfectum, quod est beatitudo, quod voluntas non potest non velle, ita scilicet quod velit eius oppositum; potest tamen non velle actu, quia potest avertere cogitationem beatitudinis, in quantum movet intellectum ad suum actum; et quantum ad hoc nec ipsam beatitudinem ex necessitate vult; sicut etiam aliquis non ex necessitate calefieret, si posset calidum a se repellere cum vellet.*

*Ad octavum dicendum, quod finis est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Unde non similiter se habet voluntas ad utrumque.*

*Ad nonum dicendum, quod quando ad finem non posset perveniri nisi una via, tunc eadem ratio esset volendi finem et ea quae sunt ad finem; sed ita non est in proposito; nam multis viis ad beatitudinem perveniri potest; et ideo licet homo ex necessitate velit beatitudinem, nihil tamen eorum quae ad beatitudinem ducunt, ex necessitate vult.*

*Ad decimum dicendum, quod de intellectu et voluntate quodammodo est simile, et quodammodo dissimile. Dissimile quidem quantum ad exercitium actus, nam intellectus movetur a voluntate ad agendum, voluntas autem non ab alia potentia, sed a seipsa. Sed ex parte obiecti est utrobique similitudo; sicut enim voluntas movetur ex necessitate ab obiecto quod est omnifariam bonum, non autem ab obiecto quod potest accipi secundum aliquam rationem ut malum; ita etiam intellectus ex necessitate movetur a vero necessario quod non potest accipi ut falsum, non autem a vero contingenti, quod potest accipi ut falsum.*

*Ad undecimum dicendum, quod dispositio primi moventis manet in his quae ab eo moventur, in quantum moventur ab ipso; sic enim eius similitudinem recipiunt, non tamen oportet quod totaliter eius similitudinem sequantur; unde primum principium movens est immobile, non autem alia.*

*Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod verum est intentio quaedam quasi in mente existens, habet quod sit magis formale quam bonum, et magis motivum in ratione obiecti; sed bonum est magis motivum secundum rationem finis, ut dictum est.*

*Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod amor dicitur transformare amantem in amatum, in quantum per amorem movetur amans ad ipsam rem amatam; cognitio vero assimilatur, in quantum similitudo cogniti fit in cognoscente; quorum primum pertinet ad imitationem quae est ab agente, quod quaerit finem; secundum vero pertinet ad imitationem, quae est secundum formam.*

*Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod assentire non nominat motum intellectus ad rem, sed magis ad conceptionem rei, quae habetur in mente; cui intellectus assentit dum iudicat eam esse veram.*

*Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod non omnis causa ex necessitate inducit effectum, etiam si sit causa sufficiens; eo quod causa potest impediri, ut quandoque effectum suum non consequatur; sicut causae naturales, quae non ex necessitate producunt suos effectus, sed ut in pluribus, quia in paucioribus impediuntur. Sic ergo illa causa quae facit voluntatem aliquid velle, non oportet quod ex necessitate hoc faciat: quia potest per ipsam voluntatem impedimentum praestari, vel removendo talem considerationem quae inducit eum ad volendum, vel considerando oppositum, scilicet quod hoc quod proponitur ut bonum secundum aliquid non est bonum.*

*Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod philosophus in VI Metaph., ostendit per illud medium, non quod aliqua potentia non sit activa ad contraria se habens: sed quod potentia activa ad contraria se habens non ex necessitate producit suum effectum. Hoc enim posito manifeste sequeretur quod contradictoria essent simul. Si autem detur, quod aliqua potentia activa ad opposita se habeat, non sequitur opposita esse simul; quia etsi utrumque oppositorum, ad quod potentia se habet, sit possibile, unum tamen est impossibile alteri.*

*Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod voluntas quando de novo incipit eligere, transmutatur a sua priori dispositione quantum ad hoc quod prius erat eligens in potentia, et postea fit eligens actu; et haec quidem transmutatio est ab aliquo movente, in quantum ipsa voluntas movet seipsam ad agendum, et in quantum etiam movetur ab aliquo exteriori agente, scilicet Deo. Non tamen ex necessitate movetur, ut dictum est.*

*Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod principium humanae cognitionis est a sensu; non tamen oportet quod quidquid ab homine cognoscitur, sit sensui subiectum, vel per effectum sensibilem immediate cognoscatur; nam et ipse intellectus intelligit seipsum per actum suum, qui non est sensui subiectus: similiter etiam et interiorem actum voluntatis intelligit, in quantum per actum intellectus quodammodo movetur voluntas, et alio modo actus intellectus causatur a voluntate, ut dictum est, sicut effectus cognoscitur per causam, et causa per effectum. Dato tamen quod potentia voluntatis ad opposita se habens non possit cognosci nisi per effectum sensibilem, adhuc ratio non sequitur. Sicut enim universale, quod est ubique et semper, cognoscitur a nobis per singularia quae sunt hic et nunc: et materia prima, quae est in potentia ad diversas formas, cognoscitur a nobis per successionem formarum, quae tamen non sunt simul in materia: ita et potentia voluntatis ad opposita se habens cognoscitur a nobis, non quidem per hoc quod actus oppositi sint simul, sed quia successive sibi invicem succedunt ab eodem principio.*

*Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod ista propositio: sicut se habet actus ad actum, ita se habet potentia ad potentiam, quodammodo est vera, et quodammodo est falsa. Si enim accipiatur actus ex aequo correspondens potentiae ut universale obiectum ipsius, veritatem habet propositio; sic enim se habet auditus ad visum sicut sonus ad colorem. Si autem accipiatur id quod continetur sub obiecto universali sicut particularis actus, sic propositio veritatem non habet; una est enim potentia visiva, cum tamen album et nigrum non sint idem. Licet ergo simul insit homini potentia voluntatis ad opposita se habens, tamen opposita illa ad quae habet voluntas, non sunt simul.*

*Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod idem secundum idem non movet seipsum; sed secundum aliud potest seipsum movere; sic enim intellectus, in quantum intelligit actu principia, reducit seipsum de potentia in actum quantum ad conclusiones; et voluntas in quantum vult finem, reducit se in actum quantum ad ea quae sunt ad finem.*

*Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod motus voluntatis, cum sint multiformes, reducuntur ad aliquod principium uniforme; quod tamen non est corpus caeleste, sed Deus, ut dictum est, si accipiatur principium quod directe voluntatem movet. Si autem loquamur de motu voluntatis secundum quod movetur ab exteriori sensibili per occasionem, sic motus voluntatis reducitur in corpus caeleste. Nec tamen ex necessitate voluntas movetur; non enim est necessarium quod*

*praesentatis cibis delectabilibus, voluntas appetat ipsos. Nec tamen verum est quod ea quae directe causantur a corporibus caelestibus, ex necessitate ab ipsis proveniant; ut enim philosophus dicit in VI Metaph., si omnis effectus ex aliqua causa procederet, et omnis causa ex necessitate produceret suum effectum, sequeretur quod omnia essent necessaria. Sed utrumque istorum est falsum: quia aliquae causae, etiam cum sint sufficientes, non ex necessitate producant suos effectus, quia possunt impediri, sicut patet in omnibus causis naturalibus. Nec iterum verum est quod omne quod fit, habeat causam naturalem; ea enim quae fiunt per accidens, non fiunt ab aliqua causa activa naturali; quia quod est per accidens, non est ens et unum. Sic ergo occursus impediens, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in corpus caeleste sicut in causam: agit enim corpus caeleste per modum agentis naturalis.*

*Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod ille qui facit quod non vult non habet liberam actionem, sed potest habere liberam voluntatem.*

*Ad vicesimumtertium dicendum, quod homo peccans liberum arbitrium perdidit quantum ad libertatem quae est a culpa et miseria, non autem quantum ad libertatem quae est a coactione.*

*Ad vicesimumquartum dicendum quod consuetudo facit necessitatem non simpliciter, sed in repentinis praecipue; nam ex deliberatione quantumcumque consuetus potest contra consuetudinem agere.*

## Dorybės (virtus) samprata. Dorybių tarpusavio jungtys

**Summa Theologiae Prima Secundae.** Quaestio 55. *De virtutibus, quantum ad suas essentias.*  
Articulus 4. Of the definition of virtue.

### Whether virtue is suitably defined?

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio virtutis quae solet assignari, scilicet, virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Virtus enim est bonitas hominis, ipsa enim est quae bonum facit habentem. Sed bonitas non videtur esse bona, sicut nec albedo est alba. Igitur inconvenienter dicitur quod virtus est bona qualitas.*

*Praeterea, nulla differentia est communior suo genere, cum sit generis divisiva. Sed bonum est communius quam qualitas, convertitur enim cum ente. Ergo bonum non debet poni in definitione virtutis, ut differentia qualitatis.*

*Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., ubi primo occurrit aliquid quod non sit nobis pecoribusque commune, illud ad mentem pertinet. Sed quaedam virtutes sunt etiam irrationabilium partium; ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Non ergo omnis virtus est bona qualitas mentis.*

*Praeterea, rectitudo videtur ad iustitiam pertinere, unde idem dicuntur recti, et iusti. Sed iustitia est species virtutis. Inconvenienter ergo ponitur rectum in definitione virtutis, cum dicitur, qua recte vivitur.*

*Praeterea, quicumque superbit de aliquo, male utitur eo. Sed multi superbiunt de virtute, dicit enim Augustinus, in regula, quod superbia etiam bonis operibus insidiatur, ut pereant. Falsum est ergo quod nemo virtute male utatur.*

*Praeterea, homo per virtutem iustificatur. Sed Augustinus dicit, super illud Ioan., maiora horum faciet, qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod virtutem Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness, since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a "good quality."

**Objection 2:** Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference of quality.

**Objection 3:** Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field, it is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind."

**Objection 4:** Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that "by which we live righteously."

**Objection 5:** Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that "pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is untrue, therefore, "that no one can make bad use of virtue."

**Objection 6:** Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on Jn. 15:11: "He shall do greater things than these," says [\*Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. Ap. 11]: "He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee." It is

therefore unsuitable to say that "God works virtue in us, without us."

*Sed contra est auctoritas Augustini, ex cuius verbis praedicta definitio colligitur, et praecipue in II de libero arbitrio.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes causas virtutis. Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum.*

*Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur quod est bona qualitas mentis.*

*Finis autem virtutis, cum sit habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi; aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum, sicut opinio se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur.*

*Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente. Unde dicimus*

**On the contrary,** We have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19.

**I answer that,** This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.

Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exists, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."

The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live righteously": and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which no one makes bad use."

Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused.

**Reply to Objection 1:** That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently as gone, and as good, which are convertible with being.

*quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate. Non autem hoc habet locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus. Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum. Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum animae est secundum rationem esse.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae, nisi in quantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae.*

*Ad quartum dicendum quod iustitiae est propria rectitudo quae constituitur circa res exteriores quae in usum hominis veniunt, quae sunt propria materia iustitiae, ut infra patebit. Sed rectitudo quae importat ordinem ad finem debitum et ad legem divinam, quae est regula voluntatis humanae, ut supra dictum est, communis est omni virtuti.*

*Ad quintum dicendum quod virtute potest aliquis male uti tanquam obiecto, puta cum male sentit de virtute, cum odit eam, vel superbit de ea, non autem tanquam principio usus, ita scilicet quod malus sit actus virtutis.*

*Ad sextum dicendum quod virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura.*

Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason."

**Reply to Objection 3:** Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.

**Reply to Objection 4:** Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on ([Question \[60\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#); [SS](#), [Question \[58\]](#), [Article \[8\]](#)). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated above ([Question \[19\]](#), [Article \[4\]](#)), is common to all virtues.

**Reply to Objection 5:** One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil.

**Reply to Objection 6:** Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.

**Summa Theologiae Prima Secundae. Quaestio 58. De distinctione virtutum moralis a virtutibus intellectualibus.**

3. Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?

4. Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?

5. Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?

### Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus humana non sufficienter dividatur per virtutem moralem et intellectualem. Prudentia enim videtur esse aliquid medium inter virtutem moralem et intellectualem, connumeratur enim virtutibus intellectualibus in VI Ethic.; et etiam ab omnibus communiter connumeratur inter quatuor virtutes cardinales, quae sunt morales, ut infra patebit. Non ergo sufficienter dividitur virtus per intellectualem et moralem, sicut per immediata.*

*Praeterea, continentia et perseverantia, et etiam patientia, non computantur inter virtutes intellectuales. Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, quia non tenent medium in passionibus, sed abundant in eis passionibus. Non ergo sufficienter dividitur virtus per intellectuales et morales.*

*Praeterea, fides, spes et caritas quaedam virtutes sunt. Non tamen sunt virtutes intellectuales, hae enim solum sunt quinque, scilicet scientia, sapientia, intellectus, prudentia et ars, ut dictum est. Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, quia non sunt circa passiones, circa quas maxime est moralis virtus. Ergo virtus non sufficienter dividitur per intellectuales et morales.*

*Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., duplicem esse virtutem, hanc quidem intellectualem, illam autem moralem.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod virtus humana est quidam habitus perficiens hominem ad bene operandum. Principium autem humanorum actuum in homine non est nisi duplex, scilicet intellectus sive ratio, et appetitus, haec enim sunt duo moventia in homine, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde omnis virtus humana oportet quod sit perfectiva alicuius istorum principiorum. Si quidem igitur sit perfectiva intellectus speculativi vel practici ad bonum hominis actum, erit virtus intellectualis, si autem sit perfectiva appetitivae partis, erit virtus moralis. Unde relinquitur quod omnis virtus humana vel est intellectualis vel moralis.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on ([Question \[61\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them.

**Objection 2:** Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.

**Objection 3:** Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz. science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above ([Question \[57\]](#), [Articles \[2\],3,5](#)). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.

**On the contrary,** The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral."

**I answer that,** Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that every human virtue is either intellectual or moral.



*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia, secundum essentiam suam, est intellectualis virtus. Sed secundum materiam, convenit cum virtutibus moralibus, est enim recta ratio agibile, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, virtutibus moralibus connumeratur.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod continentia et perseverantia non sunt perfectiones appetitivae virtutis sensitivae. Quod ex hoc patet, quod in continente et perseverante superabundant inordinatae passiones, quod non esset, si appetitus sensitivus esset perfectus aliquo habitu conformante ipsum rationi. Est autem continentia, seu perseverantia, perfectio rationalis partis, quae se tenet contra passiones ne deducatur. Deficit tamen a ratione virtutis, quia virtus intellectiva quae facit rationem se bene habere circa moralia, praesupponit appetitum rectum finis, ut recte se habeat circa principia, idest fines, ex quibus ratiocinatur; quod continenti et perseveranti deest. Neque etiam potest esse perfecta operatio quae a duabus potentiis procedit, nisi utraque potentia perficiatur per debitum habitum, sicut non sequitur perfecta actio alicuius agentis per instrumentum, si instrumentum non sit bene dispositum, quantumcumque principale agens sit perfectum. Unde si appetitus sensitivus, quem movet rationalis pars, non sit perfectus; quantumcumque rationalis pars sit perfecta, actio consequens non erit perfecta. Unde nec principium actionis erit virtus. Et propter hoc, continentia a delectationibus, et perseverantia a tristitiis, non sunt virtutes, sed aliquid minus virtute, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod fides, spes et caritas sunt supra virtutes humanas, sunt enim virtutes hominis prout est factus particeps divinae gratiae.*

**Reply to Objection 1:** Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above ([Question \[57\]](#), [Article \[4\]](#)). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Contingency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9).

**Reply to Objection 3:** Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.

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### Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse sine intellectuali. Virtus enim moralis, ut dicit Tullius, est habitus in modum naturae, rationi consentaneus. Sed natura etsi consentiat alicui superiori rationi moventi, non tamen oportet quod illa ratio naturae coniungatur in eodem, sicut patet in rebus naturalibus cognitione carentibus. Ergo potest esse in homine virtus moralis in modum naturae, inclinans ad consentiendum*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is "a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining him to consent to

*rationi, quamvis illius hominis ratio non sit perfecta per virtutem intellectualem.*

*Praeterea, per virtutem intellectualem homo consequitur rationis usum perfectum. Sed quandoque contingit quod aliqui in quibus non multum viget usus rationis, sunt virtuosi et Deo accepti. Ergo videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse sine virtute intellectuali.*

*Praeterea, virtus moralis facit inclinationem ad bene operandum. Sed quidam habent naturalem inclinationem ad bene operandum, etiam absque rationis iudicio. Ergo virtutes morales possunt esse sine intellectuali.*

*Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in XXII Moral., quod ceterae virtutes, nisi ea quae appetunt, prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam possunt. Sed prudentia est virtus intellectualis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtutes morales non possunt esse sine intellectualibus.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod virtus moralis potest quidem esse sine quibusdam intellectualibus virtutibus, sicut sine sapientia, scientia et arte, non autem potest esse sine intellectu et prudentia. Sine prudentia quidem esse non potest moralis virtus, quia moralis virtus est habitus electivus, idest faciens bonam electionem. Ad hoc autem quod electio sit bona, duo requiruntur. Primo, ut sit debita intentio finis, et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, quae vim appetitivam inclinat ad bonum conveniens rationi, quod est finis debitus. Secundo, ut homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem, et hoc non potest esse nisi per rationem recte consiliantem, iudicantem et praecipientem; quod pertinet ad prudentiam et ad virtutes sibi annexas, ut supra dictum est. Unde virtus moralis sine prudentia esse non potest. Et per consequens nec sine intellectu. Per intellectum enim cognoscuntur principia naturaliter nota, tam in speculativis quam in operativis. Unde sicut recta ratio in speculativis, inquantum procedit ex principiis naturaliter cognitis, praesupponit intellectum principiorum; ita etiam prudentia, quae est recta ratio agibilium.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inclinatio naturae in rebus carentibus ratione, est absque electione, et ideo talis inclinatio non requirit ex necessitate rationem. Sed inclinatio virtutis moralis est cum electione, et ideo ad suam perfectionem indiget quod sit ratio perfecta per virtutem intellectualem.*

his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue.

**Objection 2:** Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.

**Objection 3:** Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues.

**On the contrary,** Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues." But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above ([Question \[57\]](#), [Article \[5\]](#)). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.

**I answer that,** Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated above ([Question \[57\]](#), [Articles \[5\],6](#)). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.

*Ad secundum dicendum quod in virtuoso non oportet quod vigeat usus rationis quantum ad omnia, sed solum quantum ad ea quae sunt agenda secundum virtutem. Et sic usus rationis vigeat in omnibus virtuosus. Unde etiam qui videntur simplices, eo quod carent mundana astutia, possunt esse prudentes; secundum illud Matth. X, estote prudentes sicut serpentes, et simplices sicut columbae.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod naturalis inclinatio ad bonum virtutis, est quaedam inchoatio virtutis, non autem est virtus perfecta. Huiusmodi enim inclinatio, quanto est fortior, tanto potest esse periculosior, nisi recta ratio adiungatur, per quam fiat recta electio eorum quae conveniunt ad debitum finem, sicut equus currens, si sit caecus, tanto fortius impingit et laeditur, quanto fortius currit. Et ideo, etsi virtus moralis non sit ratio recta, ut Socrates dicebat; non tamen solum est secundum rationem rectam, in quantum inclinatur ad id quod est secundum rationem rectam, ut Platonici posuerunt; sed etiam oportet quod sit cum ratione recta, ut Aristoteles dicit, in VI Ethic.*

**Reply to Objection 2:** A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Mt. 10:16: "Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents, and simple as doves."

**Reply to Objection 3:** The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [\*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be "joined with right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13).

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### Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?

*Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus intellectualis possit esse sine virtute morali. Perfectio enim prioris non dependet a perfectione posterioris. Sed ratio est prior appetitu sensitivo, et movens ipsum. Ergo virtus intellectualis quae est perfectio rationis, non dependet a virtute morali, quae est perfectio appetitivae partis. Potest ergo esse sine ea.*

*Praeterea, moralia sunt materia prudentiae, sicut factibilia sunt materia artis. Sed ars potest esse sine propria materia, sicut faber sine ferro. Ergo et prudentia potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, quae tamen inter omnes intellectuales virtutes, maxime moralibus coniuncta videtur.*

*Praeterea, prudentia est virtus bene consiliativa, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed multi bene consiliantur, quibus tamen virtutes morales desunt. Ergo prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali.*

*Sed contra, velle malum facere opponitur directe virtuti morali; non autem opponitur alicui quod sine virtute morali esse potest. Opponitur autem prudentiae quod*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be without it.

**Objection 2:** Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most akin to the moral virtues.

**Objection 3:** Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.

**On the contrary,** To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue. Now it is contrary to

*volens peccet, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Non ergo prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod aliae virtutes intellectuales sine virtute morali esse possunt, sed prudentia sine virtute morali esse non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium; non autem solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, in quibus sunt actiones. Recta autem ratio praeexigit principia ex quibus ratio procedit. Oportet autem rationem circa particularia procedere non solum ex principiis universalibus, sed etiam ex principiis particularibus. Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam scientiam practicam. Sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum circa particularia. Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam, corrumpitur in particulari per aliquam passionem, sicut concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis. Et ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae; ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte iudicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, virtuosus enim recte iudicat de fine virtutis, quia qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo ad rectam rationem agibilium, quae est prudentia, requiritur quod homo habeat virtutem moralem.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio, secundum quod est apprehensiva finis, praecedit appetitum finis, sed appetitus finis praecedit rationem ratiocinantem ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam. Sicut etiam in speculativis, intellectus principiorum est principium rationis syllogizantis.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod principia artificialium non diiudicantur a nobis bene vel male secundum dispositionem appetitus nostri, sicut fines, qui sunt moralium principia, sed solum per considerationem rationis. Et ideo ars non requirit virtutem perficientem appetitum, sicut requirit prudentia.*

prudence "to sin willingly" (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.

**I answer that,** Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions are. Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based.

**Reply to Objection 2:** It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.

*Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia non solum est bene consiliativa, sed etiam bene iudicativa et bene praeceptiva. Quod esse non potest, nisi removeatur impedimentum passionum corrumpentium iudicium et praeceptum prudentiae; et hoc per virtutem moralem.*

**Reply to Objection 3:** Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.

**Summa Theologiae Prima Secundae. Quaestio 61. De virtutibus cardinalibus.**  
Articulus 2. Whether there are four cardinal virtues?

### Whether there are four cardinal virtues?

*Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint quatuor virtutes cardinales. Prudentia enim est directiva aliarum virtutum moralium, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed id quod est directivum aliorum, principalius est. Ergo prudentia sola est virtus principalis.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been said above ([Question \[58\]](#), [Article \[4\]](#)). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue.

*Praeterea, virtutes principales sunt aliquo modo morales. Sed ad operationes morales ordinamur per rationem practicam, et appetitum rectum, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo solae duae virtutes cardinales sunt.*

**Objection 2:** Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues.

*Praeterea, inter alias etiam virtutes una est principalior altera. Sed ad hoc quod virtus dicatur principalis, non requiritur quod sit principalis respectu omnium, sed respectu quarundam. Ergo videtur quod sint multo plures principales virtutes.*

**Objection 3:** Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues.

*Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., in quatuor virtutibus tota boni operis structura consurgit.*

**On the contrary,** Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues."

*Respondeo dicendum quod numerus aliquorum accipi potest aut secundum principia formalia aut secundum subiecta, et utroque modo inveniuntur quatuor cardinales virtutes.*

**I answer that,** Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.

*Principium enim formale virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, est rationis bonum. Quod quidem dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod in ipsa consideratione rationis consistit. Et sic erit una virtus principalis, quae dicitur prudentia. Alio modo, secundum quod circa aliquid ponitur rationis ordo. Et hoc vel circa operationes, et sic est iustitia, vel circa passiones, et sic necesse est esse duas virtutes. Ordinem enim rationis necesse est ponere circa passiones, considerata repugnantia ipsarum ad rationem. Quae quidem potest*

For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have "Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions

*esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod passio impellit ad aliquid contrarium rationi, et sic necesse est quod passio reprimatur, et ab hoc denominatur temperantia. Alio modo, secundum quod passio retrahit ab eo quod ratio dictat, sicut timor periculorum vel laborum, et sic necesse est quod homo firmetur in eo quod est rationis, ne recedat; et ab hoc denominatur fortitudo.*

*Similiter secundum subiecta, idem numerus invenitur. Quadruplex enim invenitur subiectum huius virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, scilicet rationale per essentiam, quod prudentia perficit; et rationale per participationem, quod dividitur in tria; idest in voluntatem, quae est subiectum iustitiae; et in concupiscibilem, quae est subiectum temperantiae; et in irascibilem, quae est subiectum fortitudinis.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus. Sed aliae ponuntur principales unaquaeque in suo genere.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod rationale per participationem dividitur in tria, ut dictum est.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes aliae virtutes, quarum una est principalior alia, reducuntur ad praedictas quatuor, et quantum ad subiectum, et quantum ad rationes formales.*

inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a curb, which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is "Fortitude."

In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude."

**Reply to Objection 1:** Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.

**Reply to Objection 2:** That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above.

**Reply to Objection 3:** All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as to the formal principle.

## **Summa Theologiae Prima Secundae. Quaestio 65. De connexione virtutum.**

Articulus 1. Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?

### **Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?**

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non sint ex necessitate connexae. Virtutes enim morales quandoque causantur ex exercitio actuum, ut probatur in II Ethic. Sed homo potest exercitari in actibus alicuius virtutis sine hoc quod exercitetur in actibus alterius virtutis. Ergo una virtus moralis potest haberi sine altera.*

*Praeterea, magnificentia et magnanimitas sunt quaedam virtutes morales. Sed aliquis potest habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habeat magnificentiam et magnanimitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod inops non potest esse magnificus, qui tamen potest habere quasdam alias virtutes; et quod ille qui parvis est*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another.

**Objection 2:** Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that "a poor man cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that "he who is worthy of small

*dignus, et his se dignificat, temperatus est, magnanimus autem non est. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt connexae.*

*Praeterea, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt partem appetitivam animae, ita virtutes intellectuales perficiunt partem intellectivam. Sed virtutes intellectuales non sunt connexae, potest enim aliquis habere unam scientiam, sine hoc quod habeat aliam. Ergo etiam neque virtutes morales sunt connexae.*

*Praeterea, si virtutes morales sint connexae, hoc non est nisi quia connectuntur in prudentia. Sed hoc non sufficit ad connexionem virtutum moralium. Videtur enim quod aliquis possit esse prudens circa agibilia quae pertinent ad unam virtutem, sine hoc quod sit prudens in his quae pertinent ad aliam, sicut etiam aliquis potest habere artem circa quaedam factibilia, sine hoc quod habeat artem circa alia. Prudentia autem est recta ratio agibilium. Ergo non est necessarium virtutes morales esse connexas.*

*Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, connexae sibi sunt, concatenataeque virtutes, ut qui unam habet, plures habere videatur. Augustinus etiam dicit, in VI de Trin., quod virtutes quae sunt in animo humano, nullo modo separantur ab invicem. Et Gregorius dicit, XXII Moral., quod una virtus sine aliis aut omnino nulla est, aut imperfecta. Et Tullius dicit, in II de Tuscul. quaest., si unam virtutem confessus es te non habere, nullam necesse est te habiturum.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod virtus moralis potest accipi vel perfecta vel imperfecta. Imperfecta quidem moralis virtus, ut temperantia vel fortitudo, nihil aliud est quam aliqua inclinatio in nobis existens ad opus aliquod de genere bonorum faciendum, sive talis inclinatio sit in nobis a natura, sive ex assuetudine. Et hoc modo accipiendo virtutes morales, non sunt connexae, videmus enim aliquem ex naturali complexione, vel ex aliqua consuetudine, esse promptum ad opera liberalitatis, qui tamen non est promptus ad opera castitatis.*

*Perfecta autem virtus moralis est habitus inclinans in bonum opus bene agendum. Et sic accipiendo virtutes morales, dicendum est eas connexas esse; ut fere ab omnibus ponitur. Cuius ratio duplex assignatur, secundum quod diversimode aliqui virtutes cardinales distinguunt. Ut enim dictum est, quidam distinguunt eas secundum quasdam generales conditiones virtutum,*

things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous." Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another.

**Objection 3:** Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have one science, without having another. Neither, therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another.

**Objection 4:** Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in relation to one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the art of making certain things, without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another.

**On the contrary,** Ambrose says on Lk. 6:20: "The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several": and Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another": and Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. ii): "If you confess to not having one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all."

**I answer that,** Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing deeds of chastity.

But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above ([Question \[61\]](#), [Articles \[3\],4](#)), some distinguish

*utpote quod discretio pertineat ad prudentiam, rectitudo ad iustitiam, moderantia ad temperantiam, firmitas animi ad fortitudinem, in quacumque materia ista considerentur. Et secundum hoc, manifeste apparet ratio connexionis, non enim firmitas habet laudem virtutis, si sit sine moderatione, vel rectitudine, aut discretione; et eadem ratio est de aliis. Et hanc rationem connexionis assignat Gregorius, XXII Moral., dicens quod virtutes, si sint disiunctae, non possunt esse perfectae, secundum rationem virtutis, quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et fortis non est; et idem subdit de aliis virtutibus. Et similem rationem assignat Augustinus, in VI de Trin.*

*Alii vero distinguunt praedictas virtutes secundum materias. Et secundum hoc assignatur ratio connexionis ab Aristotele, in VI Ethic. Quia sicut supra dictum est, nulla virtus moralis potest sine prudentia haberi, eo quod proprium virtutis moralis est facere electionem rectam, cum sit habitus electivus; ad rectam autem electionem non solum sufficit inclinatio in debitum finem, quod est directe per habitum virtutis moralis; sed etiam quod aliquis directe eligat ea quae sunt ad finem, quod fit per prudentiam, quae est consiliativa et iudicativa et praeceptiva eorum quae sunt ad finem. Similiter etiam prudentia non potest haberi nisi habeantur virtutes morales, cum prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, quae, sicut ex principiis, procedit ex finibus agibilium, ad quos aliquis recte se habet per virtutes morales. Unde sicut scientia speculativa non potest haberi sine intellectu principiorum, ita nec prudentia sine virtutibus moralibus. Ex quo manifeste sequitur virtutes morales esse connexas.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam perficiunt hominem secundum communem statum, scilicet quantum ad ea quae communiter in omni vita hominum occurrunt agenda. Unde oportet quod homo simul exercitetur circa materias omnium virtutum moralium. Et si quidem circa omnes exercitetur bene operando, acquirat habitus omnium virtutum moralium. Si autem exercitetur bene operando circa unam materiam, non autem circa aliam, puta bene se habendo circa iras, non autem circa concupiscentias; acquirat quidem habitum aliquem ad refrenandum iras, qui tamen non habebit rationem virtutis, propter defectum prudentiae, quae circa concupiscentias corrumpitur. Sicut etiam*

them according to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by saying that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, in whatever matter we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect" as a virtue, "if isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues to speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. [Question \[61\]](#), [Article \[4\]](#), [Objection \[1\]](#)). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4).

Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above ([Question \[58\]](#), [Article \[4\]](#)), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since prudence is "right reason about things to be done," and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which is



*naturales inclinationes non habent perfectam rationem virtutis, si prudentia desit.*

*Quaedam vero virtutes morales sunt quae perficiunt hominem secundum aliquem eminentem statum, sicut magnificentia, et magnanimitas. Et quia exercitium circa materias harum virtutum non occurrit unicuique communiter, potest aliquis habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habitus harum virtutum habeat actu, loquendo de virtutibus acquisitis. Sed tamen, acquisitis aliis virtutibus, habet istas virtutes in potentia propinqua. Cum enim aliquis per exercitium adeptus est liberalitatem circa mediocres donationes et sumptus, si superveniat ei abundantia pecuniarum, modico exercitio acquirat magnificentiae habitum, sicut geometer modico studio acquirat scientiam alicuius conclusionis quam nunquam consideravit. Illud autem habere dicimur, quod in promptu est ut habeamus; secundum illud philosophi, in II Physic., quod parum deest, quasi nihil deesse videtur.*

*Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales sunt circa diversas materias ad invicem non ordinatas, sicut patet in diversis scientiis et artibus. Et ideo non invenitur in eis connexio quae invenitur in virtutibus moralibus existentibus circa passiones et operationes, quae manifeste habent ordinem ad invicem. Nam omnes passiones, a quibusdam primis procedentes, scilicet amore et odio, ad quasdam alias terminantur, scilicet delectationem et tristitiam. Et similiter omnes operationes quae sunt virtutis moralis materia, habent ordinem ad invicem, et etiam ad passiones. Et ideo tota materia moralium virtutum sub una ratione prudentiae cadit.*

*Habent tamen omnia intelligibilia ordinem ad prima principia. Et secundum hoc, omnes virtutes intellectuales dependent ab intellectu principiorum; sicut prudentia a virtutibus moralibus, ut dictum est. Principia autem universalis, quorum est intellectus principiorum, non dependent a conclusionibus, de quibus sunt reliquae intellectuales virtutes; sicut morales dependent a prudentia, eo quod appetitus movet quodammodo rationem, et ratio appetitum, ut supra dictum est.*

wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue, if prudence be lacking.

But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral virtues, without actually having the habits of these virtues—provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all."

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions. Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence.

Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above ([Question \[9\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#); [Question \[58\]](#), [Article \[5\]](#), ad 1).

*Ad quartum dicendum quod ea ad quae inclinant virtutes morales, se habent ad prudentiam sicut principia, non autem factibilia se habent ad artem sicut principia, sed solum sicut materia. Manifestum est autem quod, etsi ratio possit esse recta in una parte materiae, et non in alia; nullo tamen modo potest dici ratio recta, si sit defectus cuiuscumque principii. Sicut si quis erraret circa hoc principium, omne totum est maius sua parte, non posset habere scientiam geometricam, quia oporteret multum recedere a veritate in sequentibus. Et praeterea, agibilia sunt ordinata ad invicem; non autem factibilia, ut dictum est. Et ideo defectus prudentiae circa unam partem agibilium, induceret defectum etiam circa alia agibilia. Quod in factibilibus non contingit.*

**Reply to Objection 4:** Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about the principle, "A whole is greater than its part," he cannot acquire the science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, things "done" are related to one another, but not things "made," as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made.

### **Summa Theologiae Prima Secundae. Quaestio 66. De aequalitate virtutum.**

Articulus 3. Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue.

Articulus 4. Of the moral virtues as compared with one another.

Articulus 5. Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another.

Articulus 6. Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.

### **Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?**

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales praeemineant intellectualibus. Quod enim magis est necessarium, et permanentius, est melius. Sed virtutes morales sunt permanentiores etiam disciplinis, quae sunt virtutes intellectuales, et sunt etiam magis necessariae ad vitam humanam. Ergo sunt praeferendae virtutibus intellectualibus.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues.

*Praeterea, de ratione virtutis est quod bonum faciat habentem. Sed secundum virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus, non autem secundum virtutes intellectuales, nisi forte secundum solam prudentiam. Ergo virtus moralis est melior quam intellectualis.*

**Objection 2:** Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its possessor good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue.

*Praeterea, finis est nobilior his quae sunt ad finem. Sed sicut dicitur in VI Ethic., virtus moralis facit rectam intentionem finis; prudentia autem facit rectam electionem eorum quae sunt ad finem. Ergo virtus moralis est nobilior prudentia, quae est virtus intellectualis circa moralia.*

**Objection 3:** Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to Ethic. vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters.

*Sed contra, virtus moralis est in rationali per participationem; virtus autem intellectualis in rationali per essentiam, sicut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed rationale per*

**On the contrary,** Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially rational part, as stated in

*essentiam est nobilior quam rationale per participationem. Ergo virtus intellectualis est nobilior virtute morali.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici maius vel minus, dupliciter, uno modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Nihil enim prohibet aliquid esse melius simpliciter, ut philosophari quam ditari, quod tamen non est melius secundum quid, idest necessitatem patienti. Simpliciter autem consideratur unumquodque, quando consideratur secundum propriam rationem suae speciei. Habet autem virtus speciem ex obiecto, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, illa virtus nobilior est quae habet nobilior obiectum. Manifestum est autem quod obiectum rationis est nobilior quam obiectum appetitus, ratio enim apprehendit aliquid in universali; sed appetitus tendit in res, quae habent esse particulare. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, virtutes intellectuales, quae perficiunt rationem, sunt nobiliores quam morales, quae perficiunt appetitum.*

*Sed si consideretur virtus in ordine ad actum, sic virtus moralis, quae perficit appetitum, cuius est movere alias potentias ad actum, ut supra dictum est, nobilior est. Et quia virtus dicitur ex eo quod est principium alicuius actus, cum sit perfectio potentiae, sequitur etiam quod ratio virtutis magis competat virtutibus moralibus quam virtutibus intellectualibus, quamvis virtutes intellectuales sint nobiliores habitus simpliciter.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales sunt magis permanentes quam intellectuales, propter exercitium earum in his quae pertinent ad vitam communem. Sed manifestum est quod obiecta disciplinarum, quae sunt necessaria et semper eodem modo se habentia, sunt permanentiora quam obiecta virtutum moralium, quae sunt quaedam particularia agibilia. Quod autem virtutes morales sunt magis necessariae ad vitam humanam, non ostendit eas esse nobiliores simpliciter, sed quoad hoc. Quinimmo virtutes intellectuales speculativae, ex hoc ipso quod non ordinantur ad aliud sicut utile ordinatur ad finem, sunt digniores. Hoc enim contingit quia secundum eas quodammodo inchoatur in nobis beatitudo, quae consistit in cognitione veritatis, sicut supra dictum est.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus simpliciter, et non secundum intellectuales, ea ratione, quia appetitus movet alias*

Ethic. i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.

**I answer that,** A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [\*Aristotle, Topic. iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as explained above ([Question \[54\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#); [Question \[60\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)). Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal, while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking simply, the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, which perfect the appetite.

But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to move the other powers to act, as stated above ([Question \[9\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)), is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues are more excellent habits, simply speaking.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above ([Question \[3\]](#), [Article \[6\]](#)).

**Reply to Objection 2:** The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because the appetite

*potentias ad suum actum, ut supra dictum est. Unde per hoc etiam non probatur nisi quod virtus moralis sit melior secundum quid.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia non solum dirigit virtutes morales in eligendo ea quae sunt ad finem, sed etiam in praestituendo finem. Est autem finis uniuscuiusque virtutis moralis attingere medium in propria materia, quod quidem medium determinatur secundum rectam rationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in II et VI Ethic.*

moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above ([Question \[56\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13.

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### Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustitia non sit praecipua inter virtutes morales. Maius enim est dare alicui de proprio, quam reddere alicui quod ei debetur. Sed primum pertinet ad liberalitatem; secundum autem ad iustitiam. Ergo videtur quod liberalitas sit maior virtus quam iustitia.*

*Praeterea, illud videtur esse maximum in unoquoque, quod est perfectissimum in ipso. Sed sicut dicitur Iac. I, patientia opus perfectum habet. Ergo videtur quod patientia sit maior quam iustitia.*

*Praeterea, magnanimitas operatur magnum, in omnibus virtutibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnificat etiam ipsam iustitiam. Est igitur maior quam iustitia.*

*Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod iustitia est praeclarissima virtutum.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod virtus aliqua secundum suam speciem potest dici maior vel minor, vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem virtus dicitur maior, secundum quod in ea maius bonum rationis relucet, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, iustitia inter omnes virtutes morales praecellit, tanquam propinquior rationi. Quod patet et ex subiecto, et ex obiecto. Ex subiecto quidem, quia est in voluntate sicut in subiecto, voluntas autem est appetitus rationalis, ut ex dictis patet. Secundum autem obiectum sive materiam, quia est circa operationes, quibus homo ordinatur non solum in seipso, sed etiam ad alterum. Unde iustitia est praeclarissima virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Inter alias autem virtutes morales, quae sunt circa passiones, tanto in unaquaque magis relucet rationis bonum, quanto circa maiora motus appetitivus subditur rationi. Maximum autem in his quae ad hominem*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice.

**Objection 2:** Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to Jm. 1:4, "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice.

**Objection 3:** Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue," as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice. Therefore it is greater than justice.

**On the contrary,** The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is the most excellent of the virtues."

**I answer that,** A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply, whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above ([Article \[1\]](#)). In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite, as stated above ([Question \[8\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#); [Question \[26\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected to reason, so much the

*pertinent, est vita, a qua omnia alia dependent. Et ideo fortitudo, quae appetitivum motum subdit rationi in his quae ad mortem et vitam pertinent, primum locum tenet inter virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones, tamen ordinatur infra iustitiam. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod necesse est maximas esse virtutes, quae sunt aliis honoratissimae, siquidem est virtus potentia benefactiva. Propter hoc, fortes et iustos maxime honorant, haec quidem enim in bello, scilicet fortitudo; haec autem, scilicet iustitia, et in bello et in pace utilis est. Post fortitudinem autem ordinatur temperantia, quae subiicit rationi appetitum circa ea quae immediate ordinantur ad vitam, vel in eodem secundum numerum, vel in eodem secundum speciem, scilicet in cibis et venereis. Et sic istae tres virtutes, simul cum prudentia, dicuntur esse principales etiam dignitate.*

*Secundum quid autem dicitur aliqua virtus esse maior, secundum quod adminiculum vel ornamentum praebet principali virtuti. Sicut substantia est simpliciter dignior accidente; aliquod tamen accidens est secundum quid dignius substantia, inquantum perficit substantiam in aliquo esse accidentali.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus liberalitatis oportet quod fundetur super actum iustitiae, non enim esset liberalis datio, si non de proprio daret, ut in II Polit. dicitur. Unde liberalitas sine iustitia esse non posset, quae secernit suum a non suo. Iustitia autem potest esse sine liberalitate. Unde iustitia simpliciter est maior liberalitate, tanquam communior, et fundamentum ipsius, liberalitas autem est secundum quid maior, cum sit quidam ornatus iustitiae, et complementum eius.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod patientia dicitur habere opus perfectum in tolerantia malorum, in quibus non solum excludit iniustam vindictam, quam etiam excludit iustitia; neque solum odium quod facit caritas; neque solum iram, quod facit mansuetudo; sed etiam excludit tristitiam inordinatam, quae est radix omnium praedictorum. Et ideo in hoc est perfectior et maior, quod in hac materia extirpat radicem. Non autem est simpliciter perfectior omnibus aliis virtutibus. Quia fortitudo non solum sustinet molestias absque perturbatione, quod est patientiae, sed etiam ingerit se eis, cum opus fuerit. Unde quicumque est fortis, est patiens, sed non convertitur, est enim patientia quaedam fortitudinis pars.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod magnanimitas non potest esse nisi aliis virtutibus praesistentibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.*

more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former," i.e. fortitude, "is useful in war, and the latter," i.e. justice, "both in war and in peace." After fortitude comes temperance, which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species, viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in excellence also.

A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an addition to justice.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude.

**Reply to Objection 3:** There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence

*Unde comparatur ad alias sicut ornatus earum. Et sic secundum quid est maior omnibus aliis, non tamen simpliciter.*

it is compared to them as their ornament, so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply.

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### Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?

*Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sapientia non sit maxima inter virtutes intellectuales. Imperans enim maius est eo cui imperatur. Sed prudentia videtur imperare sapientiae, dicitur enim I Ethic., quod quales disciplinarum debitum est esse in civitatibus, et quales unumquemque addiscere, et usquequo, haec praeordinat, scilicet politica, quae ad prudentiam pertinet, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Cum igitur inter disciplinas etiam sapientia contineatur, videtur quod prudentia sit maior quam sapientia.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should devote himself, and to what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom.

*Praeterea, de ratione virtutis est quod ordinet hominem ad felicitatem, est enim virtus dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Sed prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, per quae homo ad felicitatem perducitur, sapientia autem non considerat humanos actus, quibus ad beatitudinem pervenitur. Ergo prudentia est maior virtus quam sapientia.*

**Objection 2:** Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is "right reason about things to be done," whereby man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.

*Praeterea, quanto cognitio est perfectior, tanto videtur esse maior. Sed perfectiorem cognitionem habere possumus de rebus humanis, de quibus est scientia, quam de rebus divinis, de quibus est sapientia, ut distinguit Augustinus in XII de Trin., quia divina incomprehensibilia sunt, secundum illud Iob XXXVI, ecce Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram. Ergo scientia est maior virtus quam sapientia.*

**Objection 3:** Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to Job 26:26: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom.

*Praeterea, cognitio principiorum est dignior quam cognitio conclusionum. Sed sapientia concludit ex principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus; sicut et aliae scientiae. Ergo intellectus est maior virtus quam sapientia.*

**Objection 4:** Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater virtue than wisdom.

*Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod sapientia est sicut caput inter virtutes intellectuales.*

**On the contrary,** The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is "the head" among "the intellectual virtues."

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum suam speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Obiectum autem sapientiae praecellit inter obiecta omnium virtutum intellectualium, considerat enim causam altissimam, quae Deus est, ut dicitur in principio*

**I answer that,** As stated above ([Article \[3\]](#)), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the

*Metaphys. Et quia per causam iudicatur de effectu, et per causam superiorem de causis inferioribus; inde est quod sapientia habet iudicium de omnibus aliis virtutibus intellectualibus; et eius est ordinare omnes; et ipsa est quasi architectonica respectu omnium.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum prudentia sit circa res humanas, sapientia vero circa causam altissimam; impossibile est quod prudentia sit maior virtus quam sapientia, nisi, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., maximum eorum quae sunt in mundo, esset homo. Unde dicendum est, sicut in eodem libro dicitur, quod prudentia non imperat ipsi sapientiae, sed potius e converso, quia spiritualis iudicat omnia, et ipse a nemine iudicatur, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Non enim prudentia habet se intromittere de altissimis, quae considerat sapientia, sed imperat de his quae ordinantur ad sapientiam, scilicet quomodo homines debeant ad sapientiam pervenire. Unde in hoc est prudentia, seu politica, ministra sapientiae, introducit enim ad eam, praeparans ei viam, sicut ostiarius ad regem.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod prudentia considerat ea quibus pervenitur ad felicitatem, sed sapientia considerat ipsum obiectum felicitatis, quod est altissimum intelligibile. Et si quidem esset perfecta consideratio sapientiae respectu sui obiecti, esset perfecta felicitas in actu sapientiae. Sed quia actus sapientiae in hac vita est imperfectus respectu principalis obiecti, quod est Deus; ideo actus sapientiae est quaedam inchoatio seu participatio futurae felicitatis. Et sic propinquius se habet ad felicitatem quam prudentia.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de anima, una notitia praefertur alteri aut ex eo quod est nobiliorum, aut propter certitudinem. Si igitur subiecta sint aequalia in bonitate et nobilitate, illa quae est certior, erit maior virtus. Sed illa quae est minus certa de altioribus et maioribus, praefertur ei quae est magis certa de inferioribus rebus. Unde philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, quod magnum est de rebus caelestibus aliquid posse cognoscere etiam debili et topica ratione. Et in I de partibus Animal., dicit quod amabile est magis parvum aliquid cognoscere de rebus nobilioribus quam multa cognoscere de rebus ignobilioribus. Sapientia igitur ad quam pertinet Dei cognitio, homini, maxime in statu huius vitae, non potest perfecte advenire, ut sit quasi eius possessio; sed hoc solius Dei est, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Sed tamen illa modica cognitio quae per sapientiam de Deo haberi potest, omni alii cognitioni praefertur.*

beginning of the Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, "man were the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say, as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the spiritual man judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" (1 Cor. 2:15). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God, it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness.

**Reply to Objection 3:** As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), "one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though it be based on weak and probable reasoning"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is better to know a little about sublime things, than much about mean things." Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this "belongs to God alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this little knowledge about

God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge.

*Ad quartum dicendum quod veritas et cognitio principiorum indemonstrabilium dependet ex ratione terminorum, cognito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. Cognoscere autem rationem entis et non entis, et totius et partis, et aliorum quae consequuntur ad ens, ex quibus sicut ex terminis constituuntur principia indemonstrabilia, pertinet ad sapientiam, quia ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet Dei. Et ideo sapientia non solum utitur principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus, concludendo ex eis, sicut aliae scientiae; sed etiam iudicando de eis, et disputando contra negantes. Unde sequitur quod sapientia sit maior virtus quam intellectus.*

**Reply to Objection 4:** The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.

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### Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?

*Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit maxima inter virtutes theologicas. Cum enim fides sit in intellectu, spes autem et caritas in vi appetitiva, ut supra dictum est; videtur quod fides comparetur ad spem et caritatem, sicut virtus intellectualis ad moralem. Sed virtus intellectualis est maior morali, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo fides est maior spe et caritate.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above ([Question \[62\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity.

*Praeterea, quod se habet ex additione ad aliud, videtur esse maius eo. Sed spes, ut videtur, se habet ex additione ad caritatem, praesupponit enim spes amorem, ut Augustinus dicit in Enchirid.; addit autem quendam motum protensionis in rem amatam. Ergo spes est maior caritate.*

**Objection 2:** Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity.

*Praeterea, causa est potior effectu. Sed fides et spes sunt causa caritatis, dicitur enim Matth. I, in Glossa, quod fides generat spem, et spes caritatem. Ergo fides et spes sunt maiores caritate.*

**Objection 3:** Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on Mt. 1:3 says that "faith begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity.

*Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas.*

**On the contrary,** The Apostle says ([1 Cor. 13:13](#)): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum suam speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Cum autem tres virtutes theologicae respiciant*

**I answer that,** As stated above ([Article \[3\]](#)), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at



*Deum sicut proprium obiectum, non potest una earum dici maior altera ex hoc quod sit circa maius obiectum; sed ex eo quod una se habet propinquius ad obiectum quam alia. Et hoc modo caritas est maior aliis. Nam aliae important in sui ratione quandam distantiam ab obiecto, est enim fides de non visis, spes autem de non habitis. Sed amor caritatis est de eo quod iam habetur, est enim amatum quodammodo in amante, et etiam amans per affectum trahitur ad unionem amati; propter quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non hoc modo se habent fides et spes ad caritatem, sicut prudentia ad virtutem moralem. Et hoc propter duo. Primo quidem, quia virtutes theologicae habent obiectum quod est supra animam humanam, sed prudentia et virtutes morales sunt circa ea quae sunt infra hominem. In his autem quae sunt supra hominem, nobilior est dilectio quam cognitio. Perficitur enim cognitio, secundum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente, dilectio vero, secundum quod diligens trahitur ad rem dilectam. Id autem quod est supra hominem, nobilius est in seipso quam sit in homine, quia unumquodque est in altero per modum eius in quo est. E converso autem est in his quae sunt infra hominem. Secundo, quia prudentia moderatur motus appetitivos ad morales virtutes pertinentes, sed fides non moderatur motum appetitivum tendentem in Deum, qui pertinet ad virtutes theologicas; sed solum ostendit obiectum. Motus autem appetitivus in obiectum, excedit cognitionem humanam; secundum illud ad Ephes. III, supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod spes praesupponit amorem eius quod quis adipisci se sperat, qui est amor concupiscentiae, quo quidem amore magis se amat qui concupiscit bonum, quam aliquid aliud. Caritas autem importat amorem amicitiae, ad quam pervenitur spe, ut supra dictum est.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod causa perficiens est potior effectu, non autem causa disponens. Sic enim calor ignis esset potior quam anima, ad quam disponit materiam, quod patet esse falsum. Sic autem fides generat spem, et spes caritatem, secundum scilicet quod una disponit ad alteram.*

God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written ([1 Jn. 4:16](#)): "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him."

**Reply to Objection 1:** Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence moderates the appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God, which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive movement towards its object surpasses human knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge."

**Reply to Objection 2:** Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope, as stated above ([Question \[62\]](#), [Article \[4\]](#)).

**Reply to Objection 3:** An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other.

## Politinės filosofijos klausimai: įstatymai, bendrasis gėris, valstybė

**Summa Theologiae Prima Secundae. Quaestio 90. De lege.**

Articulus 1. Whether law is something of reason?

Articulus 2. Whether the law is always something directed to the common good?

Articulus 3. Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?

Articulus 4. Whether promulgation is essential to a law?

### OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW

*Consequenter considerandum est de principiis exterioribus actuum. Principium autem exterius ad malum inclinans est Diabolus, de cuius tentatione in primo dictum est. Principium autem exterius movens ad bonum est Deus, qui et nos instruit per legem, et iuvat per gratiam.*

- *Unde primo, de lege;*
- *secundo, de gratia dicendum est.*

*Circa legem autem,*

- *primo oportet considerare de ipsa lege in communi;*
- *secundo, de partibus eius.*

*Circa legem autem in communi tria occurrunt considerata,*

- *primo quidem, de essentia ipsius;*
- *secundo, de differentia legum;*
- *tertio, de effectibus legis.*

*Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum lex sit aliquid rationis. Secundo, de fine legis. Tertio, de causa eius. Quarto, de promulgatione ipsius.*

We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose temptations we have spoken in the FP, Question [114]. But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace: wherefore

- in the first place we must speak of law;
- in the second place, of grace.

Concerning law, we must consider:

- (1) Law itself in general;
- (2) its parts.

Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our consideration:

- (1) Its essence;
- (2) The different kinds of law;
- (3) The effects of law.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

- (1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
- (2) Concerning the end of law;
- (3) Its cause;
- (4) The promulgation of law.

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### Whether law is something pertaining to reason?

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex non sit aliquid rationis. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. VII, video aliam legem in membris meis, et cetera. Sed nihil quod est rationis, est in membris, quia ratio*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says ([Rm. 7:23](#)): "I see another law in my members," etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not make use

*non utitur organo corporali. Ergo lex non est aliquid rationis.*

*Praeterea, in ratione non est nisi potentia, habitus et actus. Sed lex non est ipsa potentia rationis. Similiter etiam non est aliquis habitus rationis, quia habitus rationis sunt virtutes intellectuales, de quibus supra dictum est. Nec etiam est actus rationis, quia cessante rationis actu, lex cessaret, puta in dormientibus. Ergo lex non est aliquid rationis.*

*Praeterea, lex movet eos qui subiiciuntur legi, ad recte agendum. Sed movere ad agendum proprie pertinet ad voluntatem, ut patet ex praemissis. Ergo lex non pertinet ad rationem, sed magis ad voluntatem, secundum quod etiam iurisperitus dicit, quod placuit principi, legis habet vigorem.*

*Sed contra est quod ad legem pertinet praecipere et prohibere. Sed imperare est rationis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo lex est aliquid rationis.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur, dicitur enim lex a ligando, quia obligat ad agendum. Regula autem et mensura humanorum actuum est ratio, quae est primum principium actuum humanorum, ut ex praedictis patet, rationis enim est ordinare ad finem, qui est primum principium in agendis, secundum philosophum. In unoquoque autem genere id quod est principium, est mensura et regula illius generis, sicut unitas in genere numeri, et motus primus in genere motuum. Unde relinquitur quod lex sit aliquid pertinens ad rationem.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum lex sit regula quaedam et mensura, dicitur dupliciter esse in aliquo. Uno modo, sicut in mensurante et regulante. Et quia hoc est proprium rationis, ideo per hunc modum lex est in ratione sola. Alio modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato. Et sic lex est in omnibus quae inclinatur in aliquid ex aliqua lege, ita quod quaelibet inclinatio proveniens ex aliqua lege, potest dici lex, non essentialiter, sed quasi participative. Et hoc modo inclinatio ipsa membrorum ad concupiscendum lex membrorum vocatur.*

of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason.

**Objection 2:** Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above ([Question \[57\]](#)). Nor again is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.

**Objection 3:** Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is evident from what has been said above ([Question \[9\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)). Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const. Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law."

**On the contrary,** It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as stated above ([Question \[17\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)). Therefore law is something pertaining to reason.

**Answer that,** Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above ([Question \[1\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#), ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a law, may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called "the law of the members."

*Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in actibus exterioribus est considerare operationem et operatum, puta aedificationem et aedificatum; ita in operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiusmodi actum constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; secundo, enunciatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel argumentatio. Et quia ratio etiam practica utitur quodam syllogismo in operabilibus, ut supra habitum est, secundum quod philosophus docet in VII Ethic.; ideo est invenire aliquid in ratione practica quod ita se habeat ad operationes, sicut se habet propositio in ratione speculativa ad conclusiones. Et huiusmodi propositiones universales rationis practicae ordinatae ad actiones, habent rationem legis. Quae quidem propositiones aliquando actualiter considerantur, aliquando vero habitualiter a ratione tenentur.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio habet vim movendi a voluntate, ut supra dictum est, ex hoc enim quod aliquis vult finem, ratio imperat de his quae sunt ad finem. Sed voluntas de his quae imperantur, ad hoc quod legis rationem habeat, oportet quod sit aliqua ratione regulata. Et hoc modo intelligitur quod voluntas principis habet vigorem legis, alioquin voluntas principis magis esset iniquitas quam lex.*

**Reply to Objection 2:** Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above ([Question \[13\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#); [Question \[76\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above ([Question \[17\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law.

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### Whether the law is always something directed to the common good?

*Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex non ordinetur semper ad bonum commune sicut ad finem. Ad legem enim pertinet praecipere et prohibere. Sed praecepta ordinantur ad quaedam singularia bona. Non ergo semper finis legis est bonum commune.*

*Praeterea, lex dirigit hominem ad agendum. Sed actus humani sunt in particularibus. Ergo et lex ad aliquod particulare bonum ordinatur.*

*Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., si ratione lex constat, lex erit omne quod ratione constiterit. Sed ratione consistit non solum quod ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed etiam quod ordinatur ad bonum privatum. Ergo lex non ordinatur solum ad bonum commune, sed etiam ad bonum privatum unius. [37437] I-IIae q. 90*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good.

**Objection 2:** Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is directed to some particular good.

**Objection 3:** Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law." But reason is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of that which is directed private good. Therefore the law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an individual.

*Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in V Etymol., quod lex est nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi utilitate civium conscripta.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex pertinet ad id quod est principium humanorum actuum, ex eo quod est regula et mensura. Sicut autem ratio est principium humanorum actuum, ita etiam in ipsa ratione est aliquid quod est principium respectu omnium aliorum. Unde ad hoc oportet quod principaliter et maxime pertineat lex. Primum autem principium in operativis, quorum est ratio practica, est finis ultimus. Est autem ultimus finis humanae vitae felicitas vel beatitudo, ut supra habitum est. Unde oportet quod lex maxime respiciat ordinem qui est in beatitudinem. Rursus, cum omnis pars ordinetur ad totum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum; unus autem homo est pars communitatis perfectae, necesse est quod lex proprie respiciat ordinem ad felicitatem communem. Unde et philosophus, in praemissa definitione legalium, mentionem facit et de felicitate et communione politica. Dicit enim, in V Ethic., quod legalia iusta dicimus factiva et conservativa felicitatis et particularum ipsius, politica communicatione, perfecta enim communitas civitas est, ut dicitur in I Polit.*

*In quolibet autem genere id quod maxime dicitur, est principium aliorum, et alia dicuntur secundum ordinem ad ipsum, sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa caliditatis in corporibus mixtis, quae intantum dicuntur calida, inquantum participant de igne. Unde oportet quod, cum lex maxime dicatur secundum ordinem ad bonum commune, quodcumque aliud praeceptum de particulari opere non habeat rationem legis nisi secundum ordinem ad bonum commune. Et ideo omnis lex ad bonum commune ordinatur.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praeceptum importat applicationem legis ad ea quae ex lege regulantur. Ordo autem ad bonum commune, qui pertinet ad legem, est applicabilis ad singulares fines. Et secundum hoc, etiam de particularibus quibusdam praecepta dantur.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod operationes quidem sunt in particularibus, sed illa particularia referri possunt ad bonum commune, non quidem communitate generis vel speciei, sed communitate*

**On the contrary,** Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens."

**I answer that,** As stated above ([Article \[1\]](#)), the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above ([Question \[2\]](#), [Article \[7\]](#); [Question \[3\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)). Consequently the law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. i, 1.

Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong to that genus in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.

**Reply to Objection 1:** A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are given even concerning particular matters.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end.

*causae finalis, secundum quod bonum commune dicitur finis communis.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut nihil constat firmiter secundum rationem speculativam nisi per resolutionem ad prima principia indemonstrabilia, ita firmiter nihil constat per rationem practicam nisi per ordinationem ad ultimum finem, qui est bonum commune. Quod autem hoc modo ratione constat, legis rationem habet.*

**Reply to Objection 3:** Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law.

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### Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod cuiuslibet ratio sit factiva legis. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. II, quod cum gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt, ipsi sibi sunt lex. Hoc autem communiter de omnibus dicit. Ergo quilibet potest facere sibi legem.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says ([Rm. 2:14](#)) that "when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law... they are a law to themselves." Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself.

*Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit, in libro II Ethic., intentio legislatoris est ut inducat hominem ad virtutem. Sed quilibet homo potest alium inducere ad virtutem. Ergo cuiuslibet hominis ratio est factiva legis.*

**Objection 2:** Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), "the intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue." But every man can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is competent to make laws.

*Praeterea, sicut princeps civitatis est civitatis gubernator, ita quilibet paterfamilias est gubernator domus. Sed princeps civitatis potest legem in civitate facere. Ergo quilibet paterfamilias potest in sua domo facere legem*

**Objection 3:** Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make laws for his household.

*Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., et habetur in decretis, dist. II, lex est constitutio populi, secundum quam maiores natu simul cum plebibus aliquid sanxerunt. Non est ergo cuiuslibet facere legem.*

**On the contrary,** Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): "A law is an ordinance of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with the Commonalty."

*Respondeo dicendum quod lex proprie, primo et principaliter respicit ordinem ad bonum commune. Ordinare autem aliquid in bonum commune est vel totius multitudinis, vel alicuius gerentis vicem totius multitudinis. Et ideo condere legem vel pertinet ad totam multitudinem, vel pertinet ad personam publicam quae totius multitudinis curam habet. Quia et in omnibus aliis ordinare in finem est eius cuius est proprius ille finis.*

**I answer that,** A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people: since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs.

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex est in aliquo non solum sicut in regulante, sed etiam participative sicut in regulato. Et hoc*

**Reply to Objection 1:** As stated above ([Article \[1\]](#), ad 1), a law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that is ruled. In the latter way each one

*modo unusquisque sibi est lex, in quantum participat ordinem alicuius regulantis. Unde et ibidem subditur, qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod persona privata non potest inducere efficaciter ad virtutem. Potest enim solum monere, sed si sua monitio non recipiatur, non habet vim coactivam; quam debet habere lex, ad hoc quod efficaciter inducat ad virtutem, ut philosophus dicit, in X Ethic. Hanc autem virtutem coactivam habet multitudo vel persona publica, ad quam pertinet poenas infligere, ut infra dicitur. Et ideo solius eius est leges facere.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut homo est pars domus, ita domus est pars civitatis, civitas autem est communitas perfecta, ut dicitur in I Politic. Et ideo sicut bonum unius hominis non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad commune bonum; ita etiam et bonum unius domus ordinatur ad bonum unius civitatis, quae est communitas perfecta. Unde ille qui gubernat aliquam familiam, potest quidem facere aliqua praecepta vel statuta; non tamen quae proprie habeant rationem legis.*

is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who rules him. Hence the same text goes on: "Who show the work of the law written in their hearts."

**Reply to Objection 2:** A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken, it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs to inflict penalties, as we shall state further on ([Question \[92\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#), ad 3; [SS, Question \[64\]](#), [Article \[3\]](#)). Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone.

**Reply to Objection 3:** As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of the state: and the state is a perfect community, according to Polit. i, 1. And therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common good; so too the good of one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community. Consequently he that governs a family, can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have properly the force of law.

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### Whether promulgation is essential to a law?

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod promulgatio non sit de ratione legis. Lex enim naturalis maxime habet rationem legis. Sed lex naturalis non indiget promulgatione. Ergo non est de ratione legis quod promulgetur.*

*Praeterea, ad legem pertinet proprie obligare ad aliquid faciendum vel non faciendum. Sed non solum obligantur ad implendam legem illi coram quibus promulgatur lex, sed etiam alii. Ergo promulgatio non est de ratione legis.*

*Praeterea, obligatio legis extenditur etiam in futurum, quia leges futuris negotiis necessitatem imponunt, ut iura dicunt. Sed promulgatio fit ad praesentes. Ergo promulgatio non est de necessitate legis.*

*Sed contra est quod dicitur in decretis, IV dist., quod leges instituuntur cum promulgantur.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex imponitur aliis per modum regulae et mensurae.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the natural law above all has the character of law. But the natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be promulgated.

**Objection 2:** Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law.

**Objection 3:** Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future, since "laws are binding in matters of the future," as the jurists say (Cod. 1, tit. De lege et constit. leg. vii). But promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is not essential to a law.

**On the contrary,** It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. 4, that "laws are established when they are promulgated."

**I answer that,** As stated above ([Article \[1\]](#)), a law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure

*Regula autem et mensura imponitur per hoc quod applicatur his quae regulantur et mesurantur. Unde ad hoc quod lex virtutem obligandi obtineat, quod est proprium legis, oportet quod applicetur hominibus qui secundum eam regulari debent. Talis autem applicatio fit per hoc quod in notitiam eorum deducitur ex ipsa promulgatione. Unde promulgatio necessaria est ad hoc quod lex habeat suam virtutem.*

*Et sic ex quatuor praedictis potest colligi definitio legis, quae nihil est aliud quam quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod promulgatio legis naturae est ex hoc ipso quod Deus eam mentibus hominum inseruit naturaliter cognoscendam.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod illi coram quibus lex non promulgatur, obligantur ad legem servandam, in quantum in eorum notitiam devenit per alios, vel devenire potest, promulgatione facta.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod promulgatio praesens in futurum extenditur per firmitatem Scripturae, quae quodammodo semper eam promulgat. Unde Isidorus dicit, in II Etymol., quod lex a legendo vocata est, quia scripta est.*

is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force.

Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be notified to them by others, after it has been promulgated.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v, 3; ii, 10) that "lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] because it is written."

## **Summa Theologiae Prima Secundae. Quaestio 91. De diversitate legum.**

Articulus 1. Whether there is an eternal law?

Articulus 2. Whether there is in us a natural law?

Articulus 3. Whether there is a human law?

Articulus 4. Whether there was any need for a divine law?

Articulus 5. Whether there is but one divine law?

Articulus 6. Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?

### **OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW**

*Deinde considerandum est de diversitate legum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex.*

*Primo, utrum sit aliqua lex aeterna.*

*Secundo, utrum sit aliqua lex naturalis.*

*Tertio, utrum sit aliqua lex humana.*

We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there are six points of inquiry:

[\(1\)](#) Whether there is an eternal law?

[\(2\)](#) Whether there is a natural law?

[\(3\)](#) Whether there is a human law?



Quarto, *utrum sit aliqua lex divina.*

[\(4\)](#) Whether there is a Divine law?

Quinto, *utrum sit una tantum, vel plures.*

[\(5\)](#) Whether there is one Divine law, or several?

Sexto, *utrum sit aliqua lex peccati*

[\(6\)](#) Whether there is a law of sin?

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### Whether there is an eternal law?

*Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex aeterna. Omnis enim lex aliquibus imponitur. Sed non fuit ab aeterno aliquis cui lex posset imponi, solus enim Deus fuit ab aeterno. Ergo nulla lex est aeterna.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal.

*Praeterea, promulgatio est de ratione legis. Sed promulgatio non potuit esse ab aeterno, quia non erat ab aeterno cui promulgaretur. Ergo nulla lex potest esse aeterna.*

**Objection 2:** Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom it could be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal.

*Praeterea, lex importat ordinem ad finem. Sed nihil est aeternum quod ordinetur ad finem, solus enim ultimus finis est aeternus. Ergo nulla lex est aeterna.*

**Objection 3:** Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore no law is eternal.

*Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., lex quae summa ratio nominatur, non potest cuipiam intelligenti non incommutabilis aeternaque videri.*

**On the contrary,** Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal."

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, nihil est aliud lex quam quoddam dictamen practicae rationis in principe qui gubernat aliquam communitatem perfectam. Manifestum est autem, supposito quod mundus divina providentia regatur, ut in primo habitum est, quod tota communitas universi gubernatur ratione divina. Et ideo ipsa ratio gubernationis rerum in Deo sicut in principe universitatis existens, legis habet rationem. Et quia divina ratio nihil concipit ex tempore, sed habet aeternum conceptum, ut dicitur Prov. VIII; inde est quod huiusmodi legem oportet dicere aeternam.*

**I answer that,** As stated above ([Question \[90\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#), ad 2; [Articles \[3\]](#),4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the FP, Question [22], Articles [1],2, that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Prov. 8:23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae in seipsis non sunt, apud Deum existunt, in quantum sunt ab ipso praecognita et praedeterminata; secundum illud Rom. IV, qui vocat ea quae non sunt, tanquam ea quae sunt. Sic igitur aeternus divinae legis conceptus habet rationem legis aeternae, secundum quod a Deo ordinatur ad gubernationem rerum ab ipso praecognitarum.*

**Reply to Objection 1:** Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according to Rm. 4:17: "Who calls those things that are not, as those that are." Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him.

*Ad secundum dicendum quod promulgatio fit et verbo et scripto; et utroque modo lex aeterna habet*

**Reply to Objection 2:** Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the eternal law is

*promulgationem ex parte Dei promulgantis, quia et verbum divinum est aeternum, et Scriptura libri vitae est aeterna. Sed ex parte creaturae audientis aut inspicientis, non potest esse promulgatio aeterna.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod lex importat ordinem ad finem active, inquantum scilicet per eam ordinantur aliqua in finem, non autem passive, idest quod ipsa lex ordinetur ad finem, nisi per accidens in gubernante cuius finis est extra ipsum, ad quem etiam necesse est ut lex eius ordinetur. Sed finis divinae gubernationis est ipse Deus, nec eius lex est aliud ab ipso. Unde lex aeterna non ordinatur in alium finem.*

promulgated: because both the Divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively—that is to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end—except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end.

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### Whether there is in us a natural law?

*Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis. Sufficiens enim homo gubernatur per legem aeternam, dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., quod lex aeterna est qua iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima. Sed natura non abundat in superfluis, sicut nec deficit in necessariis. Ergo non est aliqua lex homini naturalis.*

*Praeterea, per legem ordinatur homo in suis actibus ad finem, ut supra habitum est. Sed ordinatio humanorum actuum ad finem non est per naturam, sicut accidit in creaturis irrationabilibus, quae solo appetitu naturali agunt propter finem, sed agit homo propter finem per rationem et voluntatem. Ergo non est aliqua lex homini naturalis.*

*Praeterea, quanto aliquis est liberior, tanto minus est sub lege. Sed homo est liberior omnibus animalibus, propter liberum arbitrium, quod prae aliis animalibus habet. Cum igitur alia animalia non subdantur legi naturali, nec homo alicui legi naturali subditur.*

*Sed contra est quod, Rom. II, super illud, cum gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt, dicit Glossa, etsi non habent legem scriptam, habent tamen legem naturalem, qua quilibet intelligit et sibi conscius est quid sit bonum et quid malum.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex, cum sit regula et mensura, dupliciter potest esse in aliquo, uno modo, sicut in regulante et mensurante; alio modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato, quia inquantum participat aliquid de regula vel mensura, sic regulatur vel mensuratur. Unde cum omnia quae*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But nature does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessities. Therefore no law is natural to man.

**Objection 2:** Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated above ([Question \[90\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#)). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural to man.

**Objection 3:** Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will, with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a natural law.

**On the contrary,** A gloss on Rm. 2:14: "When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," comments as follows: "Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what is evil."

**I answer that,** As stated above ([Question \[90\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#), ad 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject

*divinae providentiae subduntur, a lege aeterna regulentur et mensurentur, ut ex dictis patet; manifestum est quod omnia participant aequaliter legem aeternam, in quantum scilicet ex impressione eius habent inclinationes in proprios actus et fines. Inter cetera autem rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae subiacet, in quantum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur. Unde cum Psalmista dixisset, sacrificate sacrificium iustitiae, quasi quibusdam quaerentibus quae sunt iustitiae opera, subiungit, multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? Cui quaestioni respondens, dicit, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine, quasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio divini luminis in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si lex naturalis esset aliquid diversum a lege aeterna. Non autem est nisi quaedam participatio eius, ut dictum est.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis operatio, rationis et voluntatis derivatur in nobis ab eo quod est secundum naturam, ut supra habitum est, nam omnis ratiocinatio derivatur a principiis naturaliter notis, et omnis appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, derivatur a naturali appetitu ultimi finis. Et sic etiam oportet quod prima directio actuum nostrorum ad finem, fiat per legem naturalem.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam animalia irrationalia participant rationem aeternam suo modo, sicut et rationalis creatura. Sed quia rationalis creatura participat eam intellectualiter et rationaliter, ideo participatio legis aeternae in creatura rationali proprie lex vocatur, nam lex est aliquid rationis, ut supra dictum est. In creatura autem irrationali non participatur rationaliter, unde non potest dici lex nisi per similitudinem.*

to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above ([Article \[1\]](#)); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying ([Ps. 4:6](#)): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth us good things?" in answer to which question he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.

**Reply to Objection 1:** This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof, as stated above.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as stated above ([Question \[10\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)): for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above ([Question \[90\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)). Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude.

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## Whether there is a human law?

*Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex humana. Lex enim naturalis est participatio legis aeternae, ut dictum est. Sed per legem aeternam omnia sunt ordinatissima, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb. Ergo lex naturalis sufficit ad omnia humana ordinanda. Non est ergo necessarium quod sit aliqua lex humana.*

*Praeterea, lex habet rationem mensurae, ut dictum est. Sed ratio humana non est mensura rerum, sed potius e converso, ut in X Metaphys. dicitur. Ergo ex ratione humana nulla lex procedere potest.*

*Praeterea, mensura debet esse certissima, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed dictamen humanae rationis de rebus gerendis est incertum; secundum illud Sap. IX, cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae. Ergo ex ratione humana nulla lex procedere potest.*

*Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., ponit duas leges, unam aeternam et aliam temporalem, quam dicit esse humanam.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex est quoddam dictamen practicae rationis. Similis autem processus esse invenitur rationis practicae et speculativae, utraque enim ex quibusdam principiis ad quasdam conclusiones procedit, ut superius habitum est. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum est quod, sicut in ratione speculativa ex principiis indemonstrabilibus naturaliter cognitis producuntur conclusiones diversarum scientiarum, quarum cognitio non est nobis naturaliter indita, sed per industriam rationis inventa; ita etiam ex praecipis legis naturalis, quasi ex quibusdam principiis communibus et indemonstrabilibus, necesse est quod ratio humana procedat ad aliqua magis particulariter disponenda. Et istae particulares dispositiones adinventae secundum rationem humanam, dicuntur leges humanae, servatis aliis conditionibus quae pertinent ad rationem legis, ut supra dictum est. Unde et Tullius dicit, in sua Rhetor., quod initium iuris est a natura profectum; deinde quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilitate rationis venerunt; postea res et a natura profectas et a consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio humana non potest participare ad plenum dictamen rationis divinae, sed suo modo et imperfecte. Et ideo sicut ex parte rationis speculativae, per naturalem*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above ([Article \[2\]](#)). Now through the eternal law "all things are most orderly," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law.

**Objection 2:** Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above ([Question \[90\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.

**Objection 3:** Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wis. 9:14: "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.

**On the contrary,** Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.

**I answer that,** As stated above ([Question \[90\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#), ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above ([Question \[90\]](#), [Articles \[2\],3,4](#)). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."

**Reply to Objection 1:** The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural

*participationem divinae sapientiae, inest nobis cognitio quorundam communium principiorum, non autem cuiuslibet veritatis propria cognitio, sicut in divina sapientia continetur; ita etiam ex parte rationis practicae naturaliter homo participat legem aeternam secundum quaedam communia principia, non autem secundum particulares directiones singulorum, quae tamen in aeterna lege continentur. Et ideo necesse est ulterius quod ratio humana procedat ad particulares quasdam legum sanctiones.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio humana secundum se non est regula rerum, sed principia ei naturaliter indita, sunt quaedam regulae generales et mensurae omnium eorum quae sunt per hominem agenda, quorum ratio naturalis est regula et mensura, licet non sit mensura eorum quae sunt a natura.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio practica est circa operabilia, quae sunt singularia et contingentia, non autem circa necessaria, sicut ratio speculativa. Et ideo leges humanae non possunt illam infallibilitatem habere quam habent conclusiones demonstrativae scientiarum. Nec oportet quod omnis mensura sit omni modo infallibilis et certa, sed secundum quod est possibile in genere suo.*

participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them by law.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things that are from nature.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus.

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### Whether there was any need for a Divine law?

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium esse aliquam legem divinam. Quia, ut dictum est, lex naturalis est quaedam participatio legis aeternae in nobis. Sed lex aeterna est lex divina, ut dictum est. Ergo non oportet quod praeter legem naturalem, et leges humanas ab ea derivatas, sit aliqua alia lex divina.*

*Praeterea, Eccli. XV dicitur quod Deus dimisit hominem in manu consilii sui. Consilium autem est actus rationis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo homo dimissus est gubernationi suae rationis. Sed dictamen rationis humanae est lex humana, ut dictum est. Ergo non oportet quod homo alia lege divina gubernetur.*

*Praeterea, natura humana est sufficientior irrationalibus creaturis. Sed irracionales creaturae non habent aliquam legem divinam praeter inclinationem naturalem eis inditam. Ergo multo minus creatura rationalis debet habere aliquam legem divinam praeter naturalem legem.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, as stated above ([Article \[2\]](#)), the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above ([Article \[1\]](#)). Therefore there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom.

**Objection 2:** Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:14) that "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated above ([Question \[14\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#)). Therefore man was left to the direction of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above ([Article \[3\]](#)). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a Divine law.

**Objection 3:** Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a Divine law in addition to the natural law.

*Sed contra est quod David expetit legem a Deo sibi poni, dicens, legem pone mihi, domine, in via iustificationum tuarum.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod praeter legem naturalem et legem humanam, necessarium fuit ad directionem humanae vitae habere legem divinam. Et hoc propter quatuor rationes. Primo quidem, quia per legem dirigitur homo ad actus proprios in ordine ad ultimum finem. Et si quidem homo ordinaretur tantum ad finem qui non excederet proportionem naturalis facultatis hominis, non oporteret quod homo haberet aliquid directivum ex parte rationis, supra legem naturalem et legem humanitatis positam, quae ab ea derivatur. Sed quia homo ordinatur ad finem beatitudinis aeternae, quae excedit proportionem naturalis facultatis humanae, ut supra habitum est; ideo necessarium fuit ut supra legem naturalem et humanam, dirigeretur etiam ad suum finem lege divinitus data.*

*Secundo, quia propter incertitudinem humani iudicii, praecipue de rebus contingentibus et particularibus, contingit de actibus humanis diversorum esse diversa iudicia, ex quibus etiam diversae et contrariae leges procedunt. Ut ergo homo absque omni dubitatione scire possit quid ei sit agendum et quid vitandum, necessarium fuit ut in actibus propriis dirigeretur per legem divinitus datam, de qua constat quod non potest errare.*

*Tertio, quia de his potest homo legem ferre, de quibus potest iudicare. Iudicium autem hominis esse non potest de interioribus motibus, qui latent, sed solum de exterioribus actibus, qui apparent. Et tamen ad perfectionem virtutis requiritur quod in utrisque actibus homo rectus existat. Et ideo lex humana non potuit cohibere et ordinare sufficienter interiores actus, sed necessarium fuit quod ad hoc superveniret lex divina.*

*Quarto quia, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., lex humana non potest omnia quae male fiunt, punire vel prohibere, quia dum auferre vellet omnia mala, sequeretur quod etiam multa bona tollerentur, et impediretur utilitas boni communis, quod est necessarium ad conversationem humanam. Ut ergo nullum malum improhibitum et impunitum remaneat, necessarium fuit supervenire legem divinam, per quam omnia peccata prohibentur.*

*Et istae quatuor causae tanguntur in Psalmo XVIII, ubi dicitur, lex domini immaculata, idest nullam peccati*

**On the contrary,** David prayed God to set His law before him, saying ([Ps. 118:33](#)): "Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord."

**I answer that,** Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is inproportionate to man's natural faculty, as stated above ([Question \[5\]](#), [Article \[5\]](#)), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.

Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.

Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.

Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6*), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.

And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8, where it is said: "The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing

*turpitudinem permittens; convertens animas, quia non solum exteriores actus, sed etiam interiores dirigit; testimonium domini fidele, propter certitudinem veritatis et rectitudinis; sapientiam praestans parvulis, inquantum ordinat hominem ad supernaturalem finem et divinum.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per naturalem legem participatur lex aeterna secundum proportionem capacitatis humanae naturae. Sed oportet ut altiori modo dirigatur homo in ultimum finem supernaturalem. Et ideo superadditur lex divinitus data, per quam lex aeterna participatur altiori modo.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod consilium est inquisitio quaedam, unde oportet quod procedat ex aliquibus principiis. Nec sufficit quod procedat ex principiis naturaliter inditis, quae sunt praecepta legis naturae, propter praedicta, sed oportet quod superaddantur quaedam alia principia, scilicet praecepta legis divinae.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non ordinantur ad altiorem finem quam sit finis qui est proportionatus naturali virtuti ipsarum. Et ideo non est similis ratio.*

no foulness of sin; "converting souls," because it directs not only exterior, but also interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the certainty of what is true and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.

**Reply to Objection 1:** By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain additional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers: consequently the comparison fails.

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### Whether there is but one Divine law?

*Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex divina sit una tantum. Unius enim regis in uno regno est una lex. Sed totum humanum genus comparatur ad Deum sicut ad unum regem; secundum illud Psalmi XLVI, rex omnis terrae Deus. Ergo est una tantum lex divina.*

*Praeterea, omnis lex ordinatur ad finem quem legislator intendit in eis quibus legem fert. Sed unum et idem est quod Deus intendit in omnibus hominibus; secundum illud I ad Tim. II, vult omnes homines salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire. Ergo una tantum est lex divina.*

*Praeterea, lex divina propinquior esse videtur legi aeternae, quae est una, quam lex naturalis, quanto altior est revelatio gratiae quam cognitio naturae. Sed lex naturalis est una omnium hominum. Ergo multo magis lex divina.*

*Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, translato sacerdotio, necesse est ut legis translatio fiat. Sed sacerdotium est duplex, ut ibidem dicitur, scilicet*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to Ps. 46:8: "God is the King of all the earth." Therefore there is but one Divine law.

**Objection 2:** Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends one and the same thing for all men; since according to 1 Tim. 2:4: "He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Therefore there is but one Divine law.

**Objection 3:** Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the revelation of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the Divine law but one.

**On the contrary,** The Apostle says ([Heb. 7:12](#)): "The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law." But the priesthood is twofold, as

*sacerdotium leviticum, et sacerdotium Christi. Ergo etiam duplex est lex divina, scilicet lex vetus, et lex nova.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, distinctio est causa numeri. Dupliciter autem inveniuntur aliqua distingui. Uno modo, sicut ea quae sunt omnino specie diversa, ut equus et bos. Alio modo, sicut perfectum et imperfectum in eadem specie, sicut puer et vir. Et hoc modo lex divina distinguitur in legem veterem et legem novam. Unde apostolus, ad Gal. III, comparat statum veteris legis statui puerili existenti sub paedagogo, statum autem novae legis comparat statui viri perfecti, qui iam non est sub paedagogo.*

*Attenditur autem perfectio et imperfectio utriusque legis secundum tria quae ad legem pertinent, ut supra dictum est. Primo enim ad legem pertinet ut ordinetur ad bonum commune sicut ad finem, ut supra dictum est. Quod quidem potest esse duplex. Scilicet bonum sensibile et terrenum, et ad tale bonum ordinabat directe lex vetus; unde statim, Exodi III, in principio legis, invitatur populus ad regnum terrenum Chananaeorum. Et iterum bonum intelligibile et caeleste, et ad hoc ordinat lex nova. Unde statim Christus ad regnum caelorum in suae praedicationis principio invitavit, dicens, poenitentiam agite, appropinquavit enim regnum caelorum, Matth. IV. Et ideo Augustinus dicit, in IV contra Faustum, quod temporalium rerum promissiones testamento veteri continentur, et ideo vetus appellatur, sed aeternae vitae promissio ad novum pertinet testamentum.*

*Secundo ad legem pertinet dirigere humanos actus secundum ordinem iustitiae. In quo etiam superabundat lex nova legi veteri, interiores actus animi ordinando; secundum illud Matth. V, nisi abundaverit iustitia vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in regnum caelorum. Et ideo dicitur quod lex vetus cohibet manum, lex nova animum.*

*Tertio ad legem pertinet inducere homines ad observantias mandatorum. Et hoc quidem lex vetus faciebat timore poenarum, lex autem nova facit hoc per amorem, qui in cordibus nostris infunditur per gratiam Christi, quae in lege nova confertur, sed in lege veteri figurabatur. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum, quod brevis differentia est legis et Evangelii, timor et amor.*

stated in the same passage, viz. the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the Divine law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New Law.

**I answer that,** As stated in the FP, Question [30], Article [3], distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether specifically different, e.g. a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a boy and a man: and in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle ([Gal. 3:24,25](#)) compares the state of man under the Old Law to that of a child "under a pedagogue"; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is "no longer under a pedagogue."

Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to its end, as stated above ([Question 90](#), [Article 2](#)). This good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the very outset of the law, the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans ([Ex. 3:8,17](#)). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at the very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying ([Mt. 4:17](#)): "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Hence Augustine says (*Contra Faust. iv*) that "promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament."

Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the order of righteousness ([Article 4](#)): wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Mt. 5:20: "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence the saying that "the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind" (*Sentent. iii, D, xl*).

Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine says (*Contra Adimantum Manichaei discip. xvii*) that "there is little difference [\*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words



'timor' and 'amor'—'fear' and 'love.')] between the Law and the Gospel—fear and love."

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut paterfamilias in domo alia mandata proponit pueris et adultis, ita etiam unus rex Deus, in uno suo regno, aliam legem dedit hominibus adhuc imperfectis existentibus; et aliam perfectiorem iam manuductis per priorem legem ad maiorem capacitatem divinorum.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod salus hominum non poterat esse nisi per Christum; secundum illud Act. IV, non est aliud nomen datum hominibus, in quo oporteat nos salvos fieri. Et ideo lex perfecte ad salutem omnes inducens, dari non potuit nisi post Christi adventum. Antea vero dari oportuit populo ex quo Christus erat nasciturus, legem praeparatoriam ad Christi susceptionem, in qua quaedam rudimenta salutaris iustitiae containerentur.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod lex naturalis dirigit hominem secundum quaedam praecepta communia, in quibus conveniunt tam perfecti quam imperfecti, et ideo est una omnium. Sed lex divina dirigit hominem etiam in quibusdam particularibus, ad quae non similiter se habent perfecti et imperfecti. Et ideo oportuit legem divinam esse duplicem, sicut iam dictum est.*

**Reply to Objection 1:** As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been led to a greater capacity for Divine things.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according to Acts 4:12: "There is no other name... given to men, whereby we must be saved." Consequently the law that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained.

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### Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?

*Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex fomitis. Dicit enim Isidorus, in V Etymol., quod lex ratione consistit. Fomes autem non consistit ratione, sed magis a ratione deviat. Ergo fomes non habet rationem legis.*

*Praeterea, omnis lex obligatoria est, ita quod qui ipsam non servant, transgressores dicuntur. Sed fomes non constituit aliquem transgressorem ex hoc quod ipsum non sequitur, sed magis transgressor redditur si quis ipsum sequatur. Ergo fomes non habet rationem legis.*

*Praeterea, lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut supra habitum est. Sed fomes non inclinatur ad bonum commune, sed magis ad bonum privatum. Ergo fomes non habet rationem legis.*

*Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae.*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin. For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason." But the "fomes" of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.

**Objection 2:** Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor, from not following the instigations of the "fomes"; but rather from his following them. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.

**Objection 3:** Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ([Question \[90\]](#), [Article \[2\]](#)). But the "fomes" inclines us, not to the common, but to our own private good. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of sin.

**On the contrary,** The Apostle says ([Rm. 7:23](#)): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind."

*Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex essentialiter invenitur in regulante et mesurante, participative autem in eo quod mensuratur et regulatur; ita quod omnis inclinatio vel ordinatio quae invenitur in his quae subiecta sunt legi, participative dicitur lex, ut ex supradictis patet. Potest autem in his quae subduntur legi, aliqua inclinatio inveniri dupliciter a legislatore. Uno modo, in quantum directe inclinatur suos subditos ad aliquid; et diversos interdum ad diversos actus; secundum quem modum potest dici quod alia est lex militum, et alia est lex mercatorum. Alio modo, indirecte, in quantum scilicet per hoc quod legislator destituit aliquem sibi subditum aliqua dignitate, sequitur quod transeat in alium ordinem et quasi in aliam legem, puta si miles ex militia destituatur, transibit in legem rusticorum vel mercatorum.*

*Sic igitur sub Deo legislatore diversae creaturae diversas habent naturales inclinationes, ita ut quod uni est quodammodo lex, alteri sit contra legem, ut si dicam quod furibundum esse est quodammodo lex canis, est autem contra legem ovis vel alterius mansueti animalis. Est ergo hominis lex, quam sortitur ex ordinatione divina secundum propriam conditionem, ut secundum rationem operetur. Quae quidem lex fuit tam valida in primo statu, ut nihil vel praeter rationem vel contra rationem posset subreperere homini. Sed dum homo a Deo recessit, incurrit in hoc quod feratur secundum impetum sensualitatis, et unicuique etiam particulariter hoc contingit, quanto magis a ratione recesserit, ut sic quodammodo bestiis assimiletur, quae sensualitatis impetu feruntur; secundum illud Psalmi XLVIII, homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis.*

*Sic igitur ipsa sensualitatis inclinatio, quae fomes dicitur, in aliis quidem animalibus simpliciter habet rationem legis, illo tamen modo quo in talibus lex dici potest, secundum directam inclinationem. In hominibus autem secundum hoc non habet rationem legis, sed magis est deviatio a lege rationis. Sed in quantum per divinam iustitiam homo destituitur originali iustitia et vigore rationis, ipse impetus sensualitatis qui eum ducit, habet rationem legis, in quantum est poenalis et ex lege divina consequens, hominem destituente propria dignitate.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fomite secundum se considerato, prout inclinatur ad malum. Sic enim non habet rationem legis, ut dictum*

**Answer that,** As stated above ([Article \[2\]](#); [Question \[90\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#), ad 1), the law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by way of participation, in that which is ruled and measured; so that every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to the law, is called a law by participation, as stated above ([Article \[2\]](#); [Question \[90\]](#), [Article \[1\]](#), ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a twofold inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different subjects to different acts; in this way we may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly; thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into another order, so as to be under another law, as it were: thus if a soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of mercantile legislation.

Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is allotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is that he should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective in the primitive state, that nothing either beside or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each one individually, the more he deviates from the path of reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality, according to Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them."

So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the "fomes," in other animals has simply the nature of a law (yet only in so far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a direct inclination. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this way, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law.

**Reply to Objection 1:** This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as an incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as stated above, but according as it results

*est, sed secundum quod sequitur ex divinae legis iustitia, tanquam si diceretur lex esse quod aliquis nobilis, propter suam culpam, ad servilia opera induci permetteretur.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de eo quod est lex quasi regula et mensura, sic enim deviantes a lege transgressores constituuntur. Sic autem fomes non est lex, sed per quamdam participationem, ut supra dictum est.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fomite quantum ad inclinationem propriam, non autem quantum ad suam originem. Et tamen si consideretur inclinatio sensualitatis prout est in aliis animalibus, sic ordinatur ad bonum commune, idest ad conservationem naturae in specie vel in individuo. Et hoc est etiam in homine, prout sensualitas subditur rationi. Sed fomes dicitur secundum quod exit rationis ordinem.*

from the justice of the Divine law: it is as though we were to say that the law allows a nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed.

**Reply to Objection 2:** This argument considers law in the light of a rule or measure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law become transgressors. But the "fomes" is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of participation, as stated above.

**Reply to Objection 3:** This argument considers the "fomes" as to its proper inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of nature in the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called "fomes" in so far as it strays from the order of reason.

#### **Summa Theologiae Prima Secundae. Quaestio 109. De necessitate gratiae.**

Articulus 4. Whether man without grace and by his own natural powers can fulfill the commandments of the Law?

##### **Whether man without grace and by his own natural powers can fulfil the commandments of the Law?**

*Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo sine gratia per sua naturalia possit praecepta legis implere. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. II, quod gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt. Sed illud quod naturaliter homo facit, potest per seipsum facere absque gratia. Ergo homo potest legis praecepta facere absque gratia.*

*Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, in expositione Catholicae fidei, illos esse maledicendos qui Deum praecepisse homini aliquid impossibile dicunt. Sed impossibile est homini quod per seipsum implere non potest. Ergo homo potest implere omnia praecepta legis per seipsum.*

*Praeterea, inter omnia praecepta legis maximum est illud, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo; ut patet Matth. XXII. Sed hoc mandatum potest homo implere ex solis naturalibus, diligendo Deum super*

**Objection 1:** It would seem that man without grace, and by his own natural powers, can fulfil the commandments of the Law. For the Apostle says ([Rm. 2:14](#)) that "the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the Law." Now what a man does naturally he can do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfil the commandments of the Law without grace.

**Objection 2:** Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fide [\*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius]) that "they are anathema who say God has laid impossibilities upon man." Now what a man cannot fulfil by himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfil all the commandments of himself.

**Objection 3:** Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest is this, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart" ([Mt. 27:37](#)). Now man with his natural endowments can fulfil this command by loving God above

*omnia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnia mandata legis potest homo implere sine gratia.*

*Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de haeresibus, hoc pertinere ad haeresim Pelagianorum, ut credant sine gratia posse hominem facere omnia divina mandata.*

*Respondeo dicendum quod implere mandata legis contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad substantiam operum, prout scilicet homo operatur iusta et fortia, et alia virtutis opera. Et hoc modo homo in statu naturae integrae potuit omnia mandata legis implere, alioquin non potuisset in statu illo non peccare, cum nihil aliud sit peccare quam transgredi divina mandata. Sed in statu naturae corruptae non potest homo implere omnia mandata divina sine gratia sanante. Alio modo possunt impleri mandata legis non solum quantum ad substantiam operis, sed etiam quantum ad modum agendi, ut scilicet ex caritate fiant. Et sic neque in statu naturae integrae, neque in statu naturae corruptae, potest homo implere absque gratia legis mandata. Unde Augustinus, in libro de Corrept. et Grat., cum dixisset quod sine gratia nullum prorsus bonum homines faciunt, subdit, non solum ut, monstrante ipsa quid faciendum sit, sciant; verum etiam ut, praestante ipsa, faciant cum dilectione quod sciunt. Indigent insuper in utroque statu auxilio Dei moventis ad mandata implenda, ut dictum est.*

*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Spir. et Litt., non moveat quod naturaliter eos dixit quae legis sunt facere, hoc enim agit spiritus gratiae, ut imaginem Dei, in qua naturaliter facti sumus, instauret in nobis.*

*Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod possumus cum auxilio divino, non est nobis omnino impossibile; secundum illud philosophi, in III Ethic., quae per amicos possumus, aliquantulum per nos possumus. Unde et Hieronymus ibidem confitetur sic nostrum liberum esse arbitrium, ut dicamus nos semper indigere Dei auxilio.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod praeceptum de dilectione Dei non potest homo implere ex puris naturalibus secundum quod ex caritate impletur, ut ex supradictis patet.*

all things, as stated above ([Article \[3\]](#)). Therefore man can fulfil all the commandments of the Law without grace.

**On the contrary**, Augustine says (De Haeres. lxxxviii) that it is part of the Pelagian heresy that "they believe that without grace man can fulfil all the Divine commandments."

**I answer that**, There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the Law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man does works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in the state of perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments of the Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin in that state, since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the Divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfil all the Divine commandments without healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, i.e. their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil the commandments of the law without grace. Hence, Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. ii) having stated that "without grace men can do no good whatever," adds: "Not only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know." Beyond this, in both states they need the help of God's motion in order to fulfil the commandments, as stated above ([Articles \[2\],3](#)).

**Reply to Objection 1:** As Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxvii), "do not be disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that are of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore in us the image of God, after which we were naturally made."

**Reply to Objection 2:** What we can do with the Divine assistance is not altogether impossible to us; according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3): "What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by ourselves." Hence Jerome [\*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius] concedes that "our will is in such a way free that we must confess we still require God's help."

**Reply to Objection 3:** Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfil the precept of the love of God, as stated above ([Article \[3\]](#)).

## Šaltiniai

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