Kviečiame į VU Filosofijos instituto seminarą, kuriame dr. Fritz-Anton Fritzon (Lund University) skaitys pranešimą „Good/Good For Dualism: A Defence“.2019 m. gegužės 15 d., 17 val., VU Filosofijos fakulteto 201 aud.
Pranešimas bus skaitomas anglų kalba. Įėjimas laisvas.
Pranešimas bus skaitomas anglų kalba. Įėjimas laisvas.
Pranešimo santrauka anglų kalba:
Both the notion of ‘good for (someone or something)’ and the contrasting notion of ‘good period’ have been criticised by rival camps of philosophers. Some hold that it is the relational notion of ‘good for’ that is the problematic one and that only the non-relational ‘good’ makes sense. Others hold that it is instead ‘good’ that is problematic and that only ‘good for’ makes sense. I will call the latter camp relational monists and the former non-relational monists. Opposed to both kind of monist are dualists who recognize both ‘good’ and ‘good for’ as coherent and intelligible parts of our evaluative thought and discourse, none of which can be eliminated or reduced to the other. In this talk I will defend the dualist position against challenges from both kinds of monist. The structure of my argument is to treat dualism as the default position and then to argue that none of the challenges coming from the different monists are strong enough to warrant abandoning dualism.
Both the notion of ‘good for (someone or something)’ and the contrasting notion of ‘good period’ have been criticised by rival camps of philosophers. Some hold that it is the relational notion of ‘good for’ that is the problematic one and that only the non-relational ‘good’ makes sense. Others hold that it is instead ‘good’ that is problematic and that only ‘good for’ makes sense. I will call the latter camp relational monists and the former non-relational monists. Opposed to both kind of monist are dualists who recognize both ‘good’ and ‘good for’ as coherent and intelligible parts of our evaluative thought and discourse, none of which can be eliminated or reduced to the other. In this talk I will defend the dualist position against challenges from both kinds of monist. The structure of my argument is to treat dualism as the default position and then to argue that none of the challenges coming from the different monists are strong enough to warrant abandoning dualism.
Dr. Fritz-Anton Fritzson dirba Lundo universitete (Švedija), taip pat yra vizituojantis podoktorantūros stažuotojas Vilniaus universitete. Daktaro disertacijoje (Value Grounded on Attitudes. Subjectivism in Value Theory, 2014) jis tyrė subjektyvizmą vertybių teorijoje, o dabartinis tyrimas „Santykinės vertybės prigimtis“ telkiasi ties filosofine sąvokos „geras (kam nors)“ ir paties ja nurodomo ryšio prigimties analize. Pagrindiniai dr. Fritzsono darbai paskelbti moksliniuose žurnaluose Philosophy bei Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.